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Gimenez v. Nazareno

The document discusses a case where several individuals were charged with murder. One of the accused, Teodoro de la Vega Jr., escaped from detention before trial and failed to appear in court. The prosecutors filed a motion to try de la Vega in absentia as allowed by the constitution. The lower court proceeded with the trial in absentia but suspended proceedings for de la Vega, rendering a decision for the other accused only. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should have rendered a decision for de la Vega as well based on the evidence presented during the trial in absentia.

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Ernie Gultiano
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481 views

Gimenez v. Nazareno

The document discusses a case where several individuals were charged with murder. One of the accused, Teodoro de la Vega Jr., escaped from detention before trial and failed to appear in court. The prosecutors filed a motion to try de la Vega in absentia as allowed by the constitution. The lower court proceeded with the trial in absentia but suspended proceedings for de la Vega, rendering a decision for the other accused only. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should have rendered a decision for de la Vega as well based on the evidence presented during the trial in absentia.

Uploaded by

Ernie Gultiano
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners, vs.

HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and
TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts
On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio
Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. The accused
were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the
arraignment, the judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18
September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled
date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and on the said
date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (Fiscal Celso M.
Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the
hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia
invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the
above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless
gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court.
After due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the
case against the other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings
against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on the ground that
it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However,
this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and
Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of
the accused before the court.
Ruling
The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in
absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was
arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also
informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced
by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy
of the Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his
failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court
considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and
the other accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the
proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the
termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in
court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally
decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the
constitutional provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent,
a judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court, and such
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due
process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his failure to appear
during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to
present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives
his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses
who testified against him.

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