UBILEX NON DISTINGUIT NECNOS pending appeal against the properties of Varian in

DISTINGUEREDEBEMOS (WHEN THE LAW respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment
DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD but none was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985,
respondent Court ordered the execution pending appeal as
NOT DISTINGUISH)
prayed for. 6 However, the writ of execution was returned
unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously
Republic of the Philippines
attached personal properties upon demand. In a Petition
SUPREME COURT
dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin
Manila
prayed that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay
the value of its bond. 7 In compliance with the Resolution of
FIRST DIVISION
August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner
G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987
filed its comment. 8 In the Resolution of September 12, 1985,
9 the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC.,
action.
petitioner,
vs.
It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT;
without a previous motion for reconsideration of the
SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR
questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a
CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA,
general rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered
respondents.
a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of
certiorari, this rule does not apply when special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10
GANCAYCO, J.:
It has been held further that a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution
been ordered and the need for relief was extremely urgent. 11
dated September 12, 1985 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private
The counter bond provides:
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution
WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the
on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner. The
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution
Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was
pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said
issued against abovenamed Defendant;
bond. In the Resolution of September 25, 1985 2 this Court
as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the
WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or
petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
dissolving the order of attachment issued against them in the
respondents from enforcing the order complaint of.
above-en-titled case, have offered to file a counterbond in the
sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating
THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
& Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the
Court.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of
the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of
NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL
the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the
CORPORATION, as Principal and the PHILIPPINE
posting of a supersedeas bond. 3 The latter in turn posted a
BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation
counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru petitioner
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached
of the Philippines, as Surety, in consideration of the above
properties were released.
and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of attachment,
hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the
On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision,
above Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR
the dispositive portion of which reads:
HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine
Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is
recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on
hereby GRANTED, and judgment is rendered in favor of the
demand, re-deliver the attached property so released to the
plaintiff and against the defendant Varian Industrial
Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to the
Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:
payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant
and Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the
of the property released.
principal obligation with 12% interest per annum from the
date of default until fully paid;
EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June,
1984. 12
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as
liquidated damages;
Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court
also provide:
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal
executing the order shall without delay attach, to await
obligation, as and for attorney's fees; and
judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the
party against whom the order is issued in the province, not
5. To pay the costs of suit.
exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby
makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to
the applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand
SO ORDERED. 5
besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the
property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the
the applicant of any judgement ment which he may recover
respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution
in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of
1
the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of they think it ought to be but as they find it and without
attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within the regard to consequences. 17
province.
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving not make any exception, courts may not except something
counterbond. — At any time after an order of attachment has therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the
been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person
the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld
notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this Court
order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land,
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since the law
in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to
order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which
made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be
filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory
of the court where the application is made, in an amount judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.
equal to the value of the property attached as determined by
the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law
attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing are complied with, as outlined in the case of Towers
of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, 20
on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge
of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might
section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale recover from the surety on the counterbond, it is necessary
thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or (1) that the execution be first issued against the principal
giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in
property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon
be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that
furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on the
attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment. same action as to his liability for the judgment under his
counterbond.
SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied,
recovery had upon bond. — If the execution be returned The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment
unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any that is issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5,
counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the
secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It
such counter- bond, and bound to pay to the judgement covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the
creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, execution of a judgment pending appeal.
which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties
after notice and summary hearing in the same action. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
(Emphasis supplied.) merit and the restraining order issued on September 25, 1985
is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.
Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is
provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the SO ORDERED.
payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may
recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of the
judgment shall become charged on such counterbond." Feliciano, J., is on leave.

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the

provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as
provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed
reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third
paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be
"applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules
nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application
to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that
it applies to the payment of any judgment that maybe
recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is
that an execution of any judgment including one pending
appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged against such a
counterbond.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not

distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general
words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded
their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires
that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into
parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to
justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other
words, there should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated.16 For courts are not
authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as

2
Republic of the Philippines The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of
SUPREME COURT notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
Manila writ of execution issued by the Commission against the
EN BANC properties of the offender.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or
vs. registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and
expenditures.
QUIASON, J.:
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two
Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28, 1994 Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94- (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In
040. addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
I
To implement the provisions of law relative to election
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated
certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and
Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of Elections on
candidacy. May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution
are:
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993
and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures:
upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5)
for failure to file his statement of contributions and days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the
expenditures. Commission, the regional election director of the National
Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC election registrars shall advise in writing by personal
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their
deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14). certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94- expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election
040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his
28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13). jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis
supplied).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person
We dismiss the petition. elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has filed the statement of contributions and
II expenditures herein required.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other required within the period prescribed by law.
Purposes" provides as follows:
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office,
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of failure to file statements or reports in connection with the
Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein
the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day shall constitute an administrative offense for which the
of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging
Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
contributions and expenditures in connection with the (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
election.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
duties of his office until he has filed the statement of writ of execution issued by the Commission against the
contributions and expenditures herein required. properties of the offender.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under
nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two
required herein within the period prescribed by this Act. Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000),
in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public
the statements or reports in connection with electoral office.
contributions and expenditures as required herein shall
constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to
shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he
Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of
(P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it
is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered

3
the political contest, and should have either won or lost" State courts have also ruled that such provisions are
(Rollo, p. 39). mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel.
Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269
Petitioner's argument is without merit. S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W.
2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has
the obligation to file his statement of contributions and It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his
expenditures. candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 the situation where a candidate may not have received any
SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is
SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]). No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of
the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure,
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his fact."
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section
his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did
recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in
implementation or interpretation of the provisions of WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
candidacy."
Kapunan, J., is on leave.
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As
a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies
that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may
be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this Separate Opinions
meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the
general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988];
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 MELO, J., dissenting:
[1952]).
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate,
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process including one who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy,
is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the is obliged to file his statement of contributions and
electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166
legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No.
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the
Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally
purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.
881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and
regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change
Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful of heart, so to speak, still considered a candidate to begin
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not
authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the
Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to designate
Sec. 8). a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our
election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly,
States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after
candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And
of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the
spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,
solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such
Elections § 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to
with respect to matters contained in the statements and to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in
prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys exchange for the withdrawal.
devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions
(26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 289). These statutes also enable I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of
candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of Padilla, J., concurs.
corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v.
Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W.
649 [1918]).

4
Separate Opinions

MELO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate,

including one who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy,
is obliged to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166
vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No.
2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the
main statute as well as the implementing rules generally
suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.

But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden change

of heart, so to speak, still considered a candidate to begin
with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not
bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the
simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to designate
a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our
election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing
State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly,
one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after
the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And
considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the
filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,
petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such
charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to
raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in
exchange for the withdrawal.

I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.

Padilla, J., concurs.

5
Republic of the Philippines Provincial Probation Officer on the other hand was required
SUPREME COURT to submit his report with recommendation to the court within
Manila 60 days.4
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996 On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Officer
Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, respondent's application for probation on the ground that by
vs. appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as then applied for probation, private respondent waived the
Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region, right to make his application. The Probation Officer thought
RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and the present case to be distinguishable from Santos To v. Paño
GRILDO S. TUGONON, respondents. in the sense that in this case the original sentence imposed
on private respondent by the trial court (1 year of
DECISION imprisonment) was probationable and there was no reason
for private respondent not to have filed his application for
MENDOZA, J.: probation then, whereas in Santos To v. Paño the penalty
only became probationable after it had been reduced as a
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with result of the appeal.
frustrated homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 21), the information against him alleging On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated5 his "respectful
recommendation that private respondent's application for
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more or less probation be denied and that a warrant of arrest be issued for
9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Publican+.3, him to serve his sentence in jail."
Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and granted private respondent's application for probation in
and with the use of a knife, which he was then conveniently its order of April 23, 1993,6 Hence this petition by the
provided of, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and prosecution.
feloniously assault, attack and stab Roque T. Bade thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit: The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave
abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's
Stab wound, right iliac area, application for probation despite the fact that he had
0.5 cm. penetrating non perforating lacerating posterior appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial
peritoneum, 0,5 cm. thus performing all the acts of execution court.
which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of The Court holds that it did.
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by
timely medical attendance which prevented his death. Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible
under P.D. No. 986, otherwise known as the Probation Law,
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to for the accused to take his chances on appeal by allowing
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. probation to be granted even after an accused had appealed
his sentence and failed to obtain an acquittal, just so long as
After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of he had not yet started to serve the sentence.7 Accordingly, in
prision correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay Santos To v. Paño, it was held that the fact that the accused
to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense, without had appealed did not bar him from applying for probation
subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC especially because it was as a result of the appeal that his
appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating sentence was reduced and made the probationable limit.
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took
effect on January 15, 19868 precisely to put a stop to the
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent's practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the
conviction but modified his sentence by imposing on him an sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an
indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor, as acquittal and applying for probation only if the accused fails
minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as in his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No, 1990, §4 of the
maximum.1 Probation Law now reads:

On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C. §4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions
Evangelista of the RTC set the case for repromulgation on of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
January 4, 1993. convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
probation,2 alleging that (1) he possessed all the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for probation and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
in fact reduced the penalty imposed on him by the trial court; the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
(3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a conviction.
petition for probation which he had earlier filed with it so
that the petition could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
trial court's decision, two mitigating circumstances of term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
incomplete self-defense and voluntarily surrender were probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
appreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Paño,3 the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
Supreme Court upheld the right of the accused to probation
notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed from his An order granting or denying probation shall not be
conviction by the trial court. appealable. (Emphasis added).

On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private respondent to Since private respondent filed his application for probation
report for interview to the Provincial Probation Officer. The on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect,9
6
it is covered by the prohibition that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction"
and that "the filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal," Having appealed from the
judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation
only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction,
private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation.

Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction

should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his
appeal notwithstanding the appellate court's affirmance of
his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law does
not make any distinction and so neither should the Court. In
fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set
free and not only given probation. Private respondent's
original sentence (1 year of prision correccional in its
minimum period) and the modified sentence imposed by the
Court of Appeals (2 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum)
are probationable. Thus the fact that he appealed meant that
private respondent was taking his chances which the law
precisely frowns upon. This is precisely the evil that the
amendment in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the
words of the preamble to the amendatory law, "probation was
not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to
obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should
be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are
willing to be reformed and rehabilitated."

The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal

against the Court of Appeals decision, [private respondent]
is, therefore, not covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990"
is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the
appeal referred in the law refers to the .appeal taken from a
judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the
appellate court, since under the law an application for
probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant
the same "after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the]
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal. "Accordingly, in Llamado v.
Court of Appeals, 10 it was held that the petitioner who had
appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for
probation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of

April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private
respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

7
Republic of the Philippines Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
SUPREME COURT subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated
Manila September 6, 1988, and which reads:
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991 Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988,
which was opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, merit.1âwphi1
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn
THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, against current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of
and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents. the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in
Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner. Guerrero's The Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent. Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).

A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the

PARAS, J.: aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6,
1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set wherein he contended:
aside the decision* of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio (a) That since the questioned check was drawn against
S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank,
Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein. respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with
accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not
Appeals, is as follows: contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts;

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged (b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in
before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital connection with a private transaction between petitioner and
Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in
Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows: dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the (c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the
municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable with
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such
named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the
feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. questioned check cannot be said to have violated the
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A",
Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, Decision, p. 22).
payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S.
$2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a
knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment which check when presented to the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs
drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof against petitioner.
was subsequently dishonored for the reason
"INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)
such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but
banking days after receiving said notice. the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified
on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the Hence, this petition.
Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second
offense was committed since the check involved was payable Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and
in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void required the parties to submit simultaneously their
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial
On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.
orders stating:
The petition is without merit.
Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for
lack of merit. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action,
and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or
outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159
likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in SCRA 37 [1988]).
foreign currency.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of the action
(De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
8
 It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this the law does not distinguish courts should not
review, can not be questioned. distinguish.1âwphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where
the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil.
specifically provide that: British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail
complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body
therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the to assist in determining the construction of a statute of
essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of
wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the
the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged. legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a)
Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion
any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains
this view, as follows:
In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279
[1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 xxx xxx xxx
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue
is determined by the allegations in the information." THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.

The information under consideration specifically alleged that MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and
therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one
of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information of the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be
in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about
162 SCRA 191 [1988]). checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks,
in our currency, and many others.
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the
Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative
factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker,
the check." and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This
would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs.
Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.
vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following
guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.
15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check
was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check xxx xxx xxx
was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place
where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is (p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis
the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its supplied).
consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980,
Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for
The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. lack of merit.
Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12,
October-December, 1983, p. 14). Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and
delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent at
Makati, Metro Manila.

However, petitioner argues that the check in question was

drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign
bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks
Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the
currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign

checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the
coverage of said law.

9
EJUSDEM GENERIS (WHERE GENERAL WORDS OF No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof,
A PARTICULAR, AND SPECIFIC MEANING, SUCH which reads as follows:
GENERAL WORDS ARE NOT TO BE CONSTRUED IN
THEIR WIDEST EXTENT, BUT ARE TO BE HELD AS SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on
APPLYING ONLY TO PERSONS OR THINGS OF THE foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
SAME KIND OR CLASS AS THOSE SPECIFICALLY transportation and/or other charges incident to importation
MENTIONED into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and
beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt
Republic of the Philippines syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate,
SUPREME COURT fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and
Manila supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks
EN BANC and/or established public or private educational institutions;
G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961 newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers;
petitioner, book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing
vs. of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts
ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. to be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-
biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents,
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner. biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital
supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by
the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time
laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and to promote and protect the health of the people of the
household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making
abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual
benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium importation under the rules and regulations to be
carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis
flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every supplied.)
importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to
the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer
tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials
transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and
to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the food products is based, apparently, on the principle of
Exchange Tax Law. statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted
by specific words, with the result that the general language
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by
tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our
claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general
which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under
of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term
the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles
flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making that may be classified as food or food products, but it is
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual likewise true that the other items immediately following it do
importation under the rules and regulations to be not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and
promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." After the "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food
applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the products because they are used in the farming and poultry
Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be
official advised, the petitioner that of the total sum of more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter
P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of
P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on the medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law. It
foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those
benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been listed preceding the term in question, includes not only those
approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes.
to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814
amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601,
Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for
flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax human consumption, was added among the items grouped
Law. with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the
grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-
December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to
Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This
flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish
refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not
of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers
the case to this Court thru the present petition for review. Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off.
Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of
exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or
cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction
excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule
10
of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in
connection with them, does not require the rejection of
general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken
in connection with other rules of construction. (See Handbook
of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black, p.
215.216, 2nd ed.)

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle

to pass upon the other questions raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the

respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioners
applications for refund which were approved by the Officer-
in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total
amount of P23,958.13.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., reserves his vote.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]

11
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE that having retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board opposed
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, the motion to dismiss.
COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG and PETER T.
TABANG, Petitioners, In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the
v. motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved
HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding Judge, for reconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro resolution dated March 8, 1989. Private respondent was
Manila and TROADIO TECSON, Respondents. directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidence on March 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.
The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.
On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for
Pacifico B. Advincula for Private Respondent. prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional
Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. The case was docketed
as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch 151, respondent
DECISION judge’s court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
CORTES, J.: injunction on the principal ground that the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of
This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential PCGG v. Peña, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the New 556. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board Petitioner replied to the opposition.
(hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to investigate and
cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired military officer, On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioner’s
for violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondent judge
granted the application for the issuance of a writ of
Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from
prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for the issuance of investigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep.
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the
order are the orders of respondent judge in Civil Case No. amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila: (1) dated June 23, 1989, denying petitioners’ Motion Hence, the instant petition.
to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989,
granting private respondent’s application for the issuance of On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order
a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeks the enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his orders dated
annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to June 23, 1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with
enjoin respondent judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. Civil Case No. 57092.
57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before the trial
court. Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners
filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed by private
The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Respondent. The Court gave due course to the petition and
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13, 1986, which the parties filed their memoranda. Thereafter, the case was
created the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft deemed submitted.
Board. The Board was created to "investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
both retired and in active service." The order further stated
that" [t]he Board shall be primarily charged with the task of I.
investigating cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended)
and shall make the necessary recommendations to WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities with ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING
findings." JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE
ORDERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.
the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private
respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the II.
Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his
supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex "B",
Petition]. Private respondent requested, and was granted, WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
several postponements, but was unable to produce his ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOINING
PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND
Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR
and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988, VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE
recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. ACT AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE
Act No. 1379, as amended. KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].
The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG.
Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the
following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Peña the Board, being a
his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is beyond the
1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On the second issue,
it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on petitioner strongly argues that the private respondent’s case
prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG.
12
 [W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or
The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
respondent’s position is as follows: general words are not to be construed in their widest extent,
but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith,
Executive Orders 1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58
being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would
connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him. family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and
the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his nominee in E.O. No. 2.
legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act 1379 as
already pointed out before be applied. And since, he has been Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard &
separated from the government more than four years ago, the Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987,
action against him under Republic Act 1379 has already 150 SCRA 181, 205-206.
prescribed.
The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by
2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are self-
under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained wealth evident, these being:
for the reason that he has retired more than four years ago.
1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the
3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board leaders and supporters of the previous regime" ;
(Annex "A", Petition) is null and void. Nowhere in Executive
Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is there any authority given to the a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was)
commission, its chairman and members, to create Boards or accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
bodies to be invested with powers similar to the powers immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close
invested with the commission .. [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad, xx (and)
117-118]. business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or
controlled by them, during . . . (the Marcos) administration,
1. The most important question to be resolved in this directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
case is whether or not private respondent may be their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an influence, connections or relationship;"
agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and
investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E.
because he is a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their
They cite the PCGG’s jurisdiction over — close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking
or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities undue advantage of their office, authority, influence,
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines" ;
influence, connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
was done during the administration of Pres. Marcos. buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions,
However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal
private respondent acted as a "subordinate" of Pres. Marcos properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the
within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the world;" and.
PCGG, when he allegedly unlawfully acquired the properties.
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties
A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos
will readily show what is contemplated within the term Administration or by entities or persons close to former
"subordinate." President Marcos." [Footnotes deleted].

The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or
to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President was a government official or employee during the
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a
close associates both here and abroad. prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so
Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his because otherwise the respondent’s case will fall under
wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, existing general laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes
nominees have any interest or participation." the corrupt practices of any public officer. Under Rep. Act No.
1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
ejusdem generis, that is — Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure
Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which
13
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the to the syndicate.
income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully . . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecson’s office took care
acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petition of the work.
and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after
preliminary investigation by the provincial or city prosecutor . . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount,
[Ibid]. names of persons found in the Metropolitan Manila
Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as
Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got their shares on
being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth under Rep. commission basis of the looted amount while the greater part
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, and not under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo, pp. 184-185.].
and 14-A.
Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not
Since private respondent was being investigated by the that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it would have been
presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG
in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. But the record itself Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and
belies this presumption: authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active
(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction
Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987, states: over the case of private Respondent. The PCGG cannot do
"This letter is in connection with the alleged information more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are
received by the AFP Anti-Graft Board indicating your limited. Its task is limited to the recovery of the ill-gotten
acquisition of wealth beyond legal means of income in wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant itself
Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39]. additional powers — powers not contemplated in its enabling
law.
(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board
categorically states: 3. Petitioner assails the trial court’s cognizance of the
petition filed by private Respondent. Particularly, petitioner
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: argues that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the PCGG. This matter has already been settled in Peña,
This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish to question
for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant to R.A. 3019, as or challenge the PCGG’s acts or orders must seek recourse in
amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and
Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as amended, otherwise known original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan’s decisions and
as the "Act for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari
[Rollo, p. 43]. exclusively by this Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565].

The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully The ruling in Peña was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No.
accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his office as 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuson,
Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164
is made in the Board’s resolution to link him or his SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC, NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No.
accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others, to
wife. enjoin the regional trial courts from interfering with the
actions of the PCGG.
(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of
the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear: Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 57092
Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the
the Sandiganbayan is the case folder of COLONEL PCGG.
TROADIO TECSON (Ret) who after preliminary
investigation of the case by the Board, found a prima facie 4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein
evidence against subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence, may
3019, as amended by BP 195, otherwise known as the Anti- be enjoined from doing so, but the court that issued the
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise injunction against the PCGG has not been vested by law with
known as an Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null
Property." [Rollo, p. 46]. and void.

Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge
memorandum, it would appear that private respondent issuing the writ of preliminary injunction is therefore in
accumulated his wealth for his own account. Petitioner order. Likewise, respondent judge must be enjoined from
quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC sergeant, proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
to General Fidel Ramos, the material portion of which reads:
But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to
. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent
Advice the same signed a cash advance voucher, let us say in for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must
the amount of P5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without
Tecson paid the amount. The official concerned was also prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
made to sign the receipt portion on the voucher the amount prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency
of which was left blank. Before the voucher is passed for of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted
routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecson it.
and its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the
face of the cash advance voucher is altered or superimposed. 5. The pronouncements made above should not be
The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, taken to mean that the PCGG’s creation of the AFP Anti-
P95,000.00. So it was actually the amount of P95,000.00 that Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no authority
14
to investigate and cause the prosecution of members and
former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. The PCGG may Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
members of the AFP for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379 only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., Sarmiento, J., on leave.
insofar as they involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres. Marcos and his family and "cronies." But the
PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case
falling under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, as in the case at
bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG
as the investigator and prosecutor of all unlawful
accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific
and limited purpose, as we have explained earlier, and
necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.

6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he

may no longer be prosecuted because of prescription. He
relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that"
[t]he right to file such petition [for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the
date of resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of
the term of the officer or employee concerned." He retired on
May 9, 1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must
be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 should be
deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the
1987 Constitution which provides that" [t]he right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel." Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was
deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptive period
provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is
concerned, we cannot say that he had already acquired a
vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent
enactment.

Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten

wealth would result in the validation or legitimization of the
unlawful acquisition, a consequence at variance with the
clear intent of Rep. Act No. 1379, which provides:

SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. — The laws

concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions
cannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent,
in respect to any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e.,

the city or provincial prosecutor and the Solicitor General
under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the
case and file the petition for the forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private
citizen. (On the other hand, as regards respondents for
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still in the
government service, the agency granted the power to
investigate and prosecute them is the Office of the
Ombudsman [Rep. Act No. 6770]). Under Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by
the Sandiganbayan.

7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is

without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondent
under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26,

1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case
No. 57092. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. The
PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation
and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37, without
prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecutory agency.

SO ORDERED.
15
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by
Manila using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with
SECOND DIVISION threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980 ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The
fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. the amended informations be admitted.
ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE
LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase
petitioners, "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include
vs. agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the
Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO affluent class.
DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI,
RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court
respondents. under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree
AQUINO, J.:p does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows
that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating
to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
20, 1975) provides:
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2,
possessing the property of the latter against his will for 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the
punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the
year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation
five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions
paragraph is omitted.) including buildings on and along esteros and river banks,
those along railroad tracks and those built without permits
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. on public and private property." squatting is still a major
Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against problem in urban communities all over the country;
sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized
by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been
Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
informations, reads: affluent class;

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the
present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, government's drive against this illegal and nefarious
province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of practice.
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth
and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers
grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which
applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of
No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is public health, safety and peace and order.
still against the win of the offended party; did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public
portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this
a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it
the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly
intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides:
the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the
said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person
Jr. (sic) corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo agriculture land including such public lands as are granted
Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land
were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture
Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the
and 1839, respectively). corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing
the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or
proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 force another to commit such acts.
dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it
was alleged that the accused entered the land through Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding
"stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
16
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here,
the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is

affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J.,

concur.

17
Republic of the Philippines by the above quoted provision of Law, and from taking any
SUPREME COURT action to enforce the above legal provision against the
Manila plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their rifled
FIRST DIVISION milk products, pending the final determination of the case,
G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979 Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits.

MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General
Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD, petitioner, brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to
vs. the Supreme Court. 1 In view thereof, the respondent court
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in
First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF view of the absence of any injunction or restraining order
EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them until
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK their final disposition therein.
COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES,
INC., respondents. Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action
for prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Bernardo P. injunction. Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair
Pardo for petitioners. Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No.
I . entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for private Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final
respondents. determination of Civil Case No. 52276. The facts of this
special civil action show that on December 7, 1962, Antonio
R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both in their individual
DE CASTRO, J.: capacities and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel
and President of the Philippine Association of Nutrition,
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board for
review the decision rendered by respondent judge, in Civil misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding.
Case No. 52276 and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of Among other things, the complaint filed include the charge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. omitting to state in their labels any statement sufficient to
Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents imitation of genuine cows milk. and omitting to mark the
herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution immediate containers of their filled milk products with the
of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants
products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. less than one year of age or with other equivalent words as
are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. The Board
those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), proceeded to hear the complaint until it received the writ of
Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance
respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch on March 19, 1963.
Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled
Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and
organized for the principal purpose of upholding and Special Civil Action No. 52383 were heard jointly being
maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk intimately related with each other, with common facts and
industry, of which all the other private respondents are issues being also involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the
members. respondent court issued its decision, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with
ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights
and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 In Civil Case No. 52276:
of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.
(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant,
The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his agents, or employees
Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein, from requiring plaintiffs to print on the labels of their filled
requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from milk products the words: "This milk is not suitable for
the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear nourishment for infants less than one year of age" or words
the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code with equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the without authority in law, the order of said defendant dated
explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents September 28, 1961, Annex A of the complaint, and the
to comply with said order will result in the institution of the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance, dated November 12, 1962,
necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. Annex G of the complaint; and
Section 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:
In Special Civil Action No. 52383:
Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk.
— All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever (b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade
form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or Board, its agents or employees from continuing in the
in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly investigation of the complaints against petitioners docketed
and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all as FTB I.S. No. 2, or any charges related to the manufacture
the language in which such containers are marked, with the or sale by the petitioners of their filled milk products and
words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by the
less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words. respondent Board on said complaints. (pp. 20- 21, Rollo).

The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated From the above decision of the respondent court, the
February 16, 1963 restraining the Commissioner of Internal Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board
Revenue from requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to joined together to file the present petition for certiorari with
print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words, preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:
"This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less
than one year of age or words of similar import, " as directed
18
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT much respect and weight. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs.
SEC. TION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-19337, September 30,
REPEALED BY IMPLICATION. 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan, et. al. vs. The Municipality of
Pagbilao et. al., L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara L-12347, May 30,
SECTION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX 1961, 2 SCRA 103).
PURPOSE, AND THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY
LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk
THAT THE PROPER AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE is suitable for nourishment for infants of all ages. The
HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG Petitioners themselves admitted that: "the filled milk
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants
RA 3720, NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino
REVENUE. infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any
defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).
THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE
VIOLATIONS OF FOOD LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk
FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND THAT THE FAIR filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less
TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO than one year of age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED of property without due. process of law.
MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING
ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4- Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent
5, Rollo). manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against
manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed
The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC,
Tax Code has been repealed by implication. Section 169 was in which, as admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part has
enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed a been removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The
Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which enforcement of Section 169 against the private respondents
penalized the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the only but not against other persons similarly situated as the
specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169). private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional denial of
However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of the equal pro petition of the laws, for the law, equally
Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of enforced, would similarly offend against the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of Sections 141 Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).
and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision,
without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction. As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of
Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose,
does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to
qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and enforce the same. This was so held by his predecessor
"condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in
would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the
whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to wit:
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is
restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the ... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the
familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the
terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they enforcement of the requirement in regard to the placing of
follow in the statute. the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject
which does not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the
"Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of said Code having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463. (p.
the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in 102, Rollo).
whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed.
Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce
condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code which
dessicated, to which has been added or which has been provides that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also "give
blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk effect to and administer the supervisory and police power
fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is untenable. The
of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore, Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only
between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers
the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internal
part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The
safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the
milk and filled milk. health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax
purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and Drug
The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an Administration of the Department of Health as provided for
opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of in Republic Act No. 3720. In particular, Republic Act No.
Section 169, it being a product distinct from those specified 3720 provides:
in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk
has been replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food
fortifying substances (p. 58, Rollo). This opinion bolsters the and Drug Inspection), conformably with the rules and
Court's stand as to its interpretation of the scope of Section regulations, to hold hearings and conduct investigations
169. Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called relative to matters touching the Administration of this Act,
upon to execute or implement administrative laws command to investigate processes of food, drug and cosmetic
19
manufacture and to subject reports to the Food and Drug
Administrator, recommending food and drug standards for
adoption. Said Board shall also perform such additional
functions, properly within the scope of the administration
thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the Food and Drug
Administrator. The decisions of the Board shall be advisory
to the Food and Drug Administrator.

Section 26. ...

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be

conducted by the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which
shall submit recommendation to the Food and Drug
Administrator.

(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug

Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug
Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or cosmetic
secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act is adulterated or
branded he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the
person or persons concerned and such person or persons shall
be given an opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the
correctness of the finding or charge in question.

(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes

to the knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such
character that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted
against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary
of Justice through the Secretary of Health, together with the
chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and Drug
Inspection, or other documentary evidence on which the
charge is based.

(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring

the Food and Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution
pursuant to subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this
Act whenever he believes that public interest will be
adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.

The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that

petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair
Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to
prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or
misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on
the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug
inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the
Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also
intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted.
To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would
be the result were their instant petition granted, would only
cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce
confusion and conflict of official action which is neither
practical nor desirable.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

affirmed en toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,

concur.

20
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (THE the milled products. The exportation may be effected by the
EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING OR miller himself or by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled
CONSEQUENCE IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN EXPRESS products. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled
EXLCUSION OF ALL OTHERS) products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should
be exempted from the miller’s tax.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006 The petition must fail.

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from
Petitioner, the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
vs. should be verified. A pleading required to be verified which
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,* lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
Respondent. pleading.6

DECISION Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a

sworn certification against forum shopping.7 Failure of the
CORONA, J.: petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a
petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petition.8
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) assails the
July 19, 20001 and April 3, 2001 resolutions of the Court of A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59139. upon it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied
by or are incidental to its existence through its board of
SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents.9 Hence,
milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed
allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by
Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount of corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of
P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency miller’s tax and directors.10 In the absence of authority from the board of
manufacturer’s sales tax,3 among other deficiency taxes,4 for directors, no person, not even the officers of the corporation,
taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on can bind the corporation.11
SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its SPMC’s petition in the Court of Appeals did not indicate that
sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. the person who signed the verification/certification on non-
forum shopping was authorized to do so. SPMC merely relied
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to
denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to represent SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for corporation including, among others, the filing of suits to
review docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. defend or protect it from assessments and to recover
erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no power
In its March 10, 2000 decision, the CTA cancelled SPMC’s of attorney, secretary’s certificate or board resolution to prove
liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of corn the affiant’s authority was attached to the petition. Thus, the
and edible oils but upheld the Commissioner’s assessment for petition was not properly verified. Since the petition lacked
the deficiency miller’s tax. SPMC moved for the partial proper verification, it was to be treated as an unsigned
reconsideration of the CTA affirmation of the miller’s tax pleading subject to dismissal.12
assessment but it was denied.
In PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the Court upheld
SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition on the
for review of the CTA decision insofar as it upheld the ground that the verification and certification against forum
deficiency miller’s tax assessment. In its July 19, 2000 shopping was signed by PET Plans, Inc.’s first vice-president
resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the for legal affairs/corporate secretary without any certification
principal ground5 that the verification attached to it was that he was authorized to sign in behalf of the corporation.
signed merely by SPMC’s chief financial officer ― without the
corporate secretary’s certificate, board resolution or power of In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court
attorney authorizing him to sign the verification and ruled that the petition should be dismissed outright on the
certification against forum shopping. SPMC sought a ground that the verification/certification against forum
reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied. shopping was signed by BPI Leasing Corporation’s counsel
Hence, this petition. with no specific authority to do so. Since the counsel was
purportedly acting for the corporation, he needed a resolution
Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed SPMC’s issued by the board of directors that specifically authorized
appeal? him to institute the petition and execute the certification.
Only then would his actions be legally binding on the
SPMC contends that its appeal should have been given due corporation.15
course since it substantially complied with the requirements
on verification and certification against forum shopping. It In this case, therefore, the appellate court did not commit an
insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the error when it dismissed the petition on the ground that it was
merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s signed by a person who had not been issued any authority by
tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to the board of directors to represent the corporation.
UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an
ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to Neither can the Court subscribe to SPMC’s claim of
miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. substantial compliance or to its plea for a liberal application
of the rules. Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the
two exemptions from the miller’s tax: (a) the milled products orderly administration of justice.16 Substantial compliance
in their original state were actually exported by the miller will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance such
himself or by another person, and (b) the milled products sold as the requirement on non-forum shopping,17 as well as
by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
of any manufactured article by the buyer or manufacturer of
21
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not
construction.18 to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.21
But even if the fatal procedural infirmity were to be
disregarded, the petition must still fail for lack of merit. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of
restrictive interpretation.22 Its application in this case is
As the CTA correctly ruled, SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in
to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s tax. Section 168 strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s
of the 1987 Tax Code provided: claim for tax exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope
factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories. Proprietors or
operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut Costs against petitioner.
oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut
factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of SO ORDERED.
the gross value in money of all the rope, sugar, coconut oil,
palm oil, cassava flour or starch, dessicated coconut,
manufactured, processed or milled by them, including the by-
product of the raw materials from which said articles are
produced, processed or manufactured, such tax to be based
on the actual selling price or market value of these articles at
the time they leave the factory or mill warehouse: Provided,
however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil,
palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced
or manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut
oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, shall
be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of
the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported
without returning to the Philippines, whether in their
original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured
article or products: Provided further, That where the planter
or the owner of the raw materials is the exporter of the
aforementioned milled or manufactured products, he shall be
entitled to a tax credit of the miller's taxes withheld by the
proprietor or operator of the factory or mill, corresponding to
the quantity exported, which may be used against any
internal revenue tax directly due from him: and Provided,
finally, That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid
on raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall
not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the case
of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as
provided hereunder. (emphasis supplied)

The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the

1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to
the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-
products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original
state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article
or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by
the miller himself.

The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the

interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide
that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials
enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of
products utilizing the said materials was covered by the
exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not within the ambit
of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed
under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

SPMC’s proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of

the exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption must
not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable
presumption is that the State has granted in express terms
all it intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is
limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be
intended beyond what was meant.19

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon

which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its
effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does
not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language
of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made
22
G.R. No. 148408 July 14, 2006 44 and (2) it posed a pernicious effect on the health and safety
CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner, of the people in Calasiao.
vs.
JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF After the hearing on the propriety of issuing a writ of
CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents. preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, the trial
court ruled:
DECISION
CORONA, J.: There is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Albeit, Section 44 of
1997 Rules of Court questioning the resolution of the Court the Official Zoning Code of respondent municipality does not
of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari, mention a gasoline filling station, [but] following the
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling station falls
preliminary and mandatory injunction, filed by petitioner within the ambit of Section 44.
Concepcion Parayno against respondents Jose Jovellanos
and the Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is located under
the establishment belonging to the petitioner and is very near
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in several buildings occupied by several persons. Justice
Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao dictates that the same should not be allowed to continue
petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality operating its business on that particular place. Further, the
for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. gasoline filling station endangers the lives and safety of
The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of people because once there is fire, the establishment and
Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire houses nearby will be razed to the ground.4(emphasis
Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the supplied)
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure
or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. In Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but it
Resolution No. 50, it declared: was denied by the trial court.

a) xxx the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
disregard of existing law to wit: certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,5 with a prayer for
injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of discretion,
The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44,1 the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of
nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary Judge Laron who dismissed her case.
School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters.
No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner filed a motion
measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
dated 22 June 1989. appeal.

b) The gasoline station remains in thickly populated area Before us, petitioner insists that (1) the legal maxim of
with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to ejusdem generis did not apply to her case; (2) the
each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent
people in case of fire. Moreover, additional selling and storing municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter's police
of several LPG tanks in the station (sic). powers and (3) it was the principle of res judicata that applied
in this case.6
c) The residents of our barangay always complain of the
irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during We find merit in the petition.
gas filling which tend to expose residents especially children
to frequent colds, asthma, cough and the like nowadays. The Principle of Ejusdem Generis

d) xxx the gasoline station violated Building and Fire Safety We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent
Codes because the station has 2nd floor storey building used municipality made a clear distinction between "gasoline
for business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no service station" and "gasoline filling station." The pertinent
firewalls. It also endangers the lives of people upstairs. provisions read:

e) It hampers the flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing
small and narrow, the entrance and exit are closed to the automobiles and other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil
street property lines. It couldn't cope situation (sic) on traffic only.7
because the place is a congested area.2
Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution where gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car accessories
but it was denied. Hence, she filed a special civil action for may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in
prohibition and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court addition, the following services may be rendered and sales
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44 against respondents. The and no other.
case, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 99-03010-D, was raffled
to the sala of Judge Crispin Laron. a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor
parts;
Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered
by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it was not a b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
"gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station"
governed by Section 21 thereof. She added that the decision c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),3 belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers,
in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel,
against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno), barred the bearing, mirrors and the like;
grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution
No. 50. In the HLURB case, respondent Jovellanos opposed d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
the establishment of the gas station on the grounds that: (1)
it was within the 100-meter prohibited radius under Section e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing
and polishing materials;
23
f. Grease and lubricating; Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due
process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it
g. Emergency wiring repairs; maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was
less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and
h. Minor servicing of carburators; church, the records do not show that it even attempted to
measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes; was crucial in determining whether there was an actual
violation of Section 44. The different local offices that
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation
or crankcase, or raising the motor.8 never conducted such measurement either.

xxx xxx xxx Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a

nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily
It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The
these two terms to be separate and distinct from each other. abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
Even respondent municipality's counsel admitted this possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a
dissimilarity during the hearing on the application for the nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory persons and property,17 hence, it cannot be closed down or
injunction. Counsel in fact admitted: transferred summarily to another location.

1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao, As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted
Pangasinan which [was] not yet amended; by the parties in the lower courts.18 We deem it necessary,
however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which
2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there petitioner submitted as evidence during the proceedings
[were] certain distinctions made by said municipality about before the trial court, if only to underscore petitioner's
the designation of the gasoline filling station and that of the compliance with the requirements of law before she put up
gasoline service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21 her gasoline station.
and 42, [respectively];
Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is the
3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline diligence exercised by [petitioner] in complying with the
filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the requirements of the several laws prior to the actual
zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined implementation of the project as can be attested by the fact
under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; that [petitioner] has secured the necessary building permit
and approval of [her] application for authority to relocate as
4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of per the letter of the Energy Regulatory Board xxx.19
Calasiao, the term filling station as clearly defined under
Article III, Section 21, [did] not appear in the wordings On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the
thereof;9(emphasis supplied) lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note:

The foregoing were judicial admissions which were Relative to the allegations that the project (gasoline station)
conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.10 is hazardous to life and property, the Board takes cognizance
Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the of the respondent's contention that the project "is not a fire
legal maxim of ejusdem generis11 which means "of the same hazard since petroleum products shall be safely stored in
kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general underground tanks and that the installation and
words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons construction of the underground tanks shall be in accordance
or things, the general words will apply only to persons or with the Caltex Engineering Procedures which is true to all
things of the same general nature or class as those gasoline stations in the country. xxx
enumerated.12 Instead, what applied in this case was the
legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being
means that the express mention of one thing implies the hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual.
exclusion of others.13 Hence, because of the distinct and For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander, after
definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning studying the plans and specifications of the subject proposed
ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service construction, recommended on 20 January 1989, "to build
station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP
filling station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities 1185." It is further alleged by the complainants that the
undertaken in a "gas service station" did not automatically proposed location is "in the heart of the thickly populated
embrace those in a "gas filling station." residential area of Calasiao." Again, findings of the [HLURB]
staff negate the allegations as the same is within a
The Exercise of Police Powers designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance. xxx20 (emphasis supplied)
Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in
ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner's gasoline station. The findings of fact of the HLURB are binding as they are
While it had, under RA 7160,14 the power to take actions and already final and conclusive vis-à-vis the evidence submitted
enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of by respondents.
its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law
and the rights of petitioner. The Principle of Res Judicata

A local government is considered to have properly exercised Petitioner points out that the HLURB decision in the
its police powers only when the following requisites are met: previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno)
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in
those of a particular class, require the interference of the Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res judicata. We
State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary agree.
for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive.15 The first requirement refers to Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree
the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
clause of the Constitution.16 conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
24
later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit.21 For res judicata to apply, the following elements must
be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties and (4) there must be, between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action.22

Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second

and third requisites. However, it claims that it was not a
party to the HLURB case but only its co-respondent
Jovellanos, hence, the fourth requisite was not met. The
argument is untenable.

The absolute identity of parties is not required for the

principle of res judicata to apply.23 A shared identity of
interests is sufficient to invoke the application of this
principle.24 The proscription may not be evaded by the mere
expedient of including an additional party.25 Res judicata
may lie as long as there is a community of interests between
a party in the first case and a party in the second case
although the latter may not have been impleaded in the
first.26

In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it

raised the same grounds invoked by its co-respondent in the
HLURB: (1) that the resolution aimed to close down or
transfer the gasoline station to another location due to the
alleged violation of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and (2)
that the hazards of said gasoline station threatened the
health and safety of the public. The HLURB had already
settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained
finality. It is to the interest of the public that there should be
an end to litigation by the parties over a subject matter
already fully and fairly adjudged. Furthermore, an individual
should not be vexed twice for the same cause.27

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is
hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution
No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or
transfer her gasoline station to another location.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia,

J.J., concur.

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