Rule 80 Full Text
Rule 80 Full Text
On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to
the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special
discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.
administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special
bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as removal of regular administrators.[36] The probate court may appoint or
such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass
special administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness[37] and the
the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon. application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78,[38] as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.[28] The long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on
CA, however, denied it. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the CA errors reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts
of law and grave abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside the is unwarranted.[39] The appointment or removal of special
RTC Order dated March 13, 2008. administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Our Ruling Court.[40]
The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely
decedents estate under the Rules of Court provide abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint
special administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending Motion
Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. When there is delay in for Exemption to File Administrators Bond, ratiocinating that the posting
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including of the administrators bond is a pre-requisite to respondents entering into
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may the duties and responsibilities of their designated office. This Court
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the disagrees.
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators appointed.[29] It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion
for Appointment as Joint Special Administrators, respondents already
Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special prayed for their exemption to post bond should they be assigned as joint
administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, special administrators. However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for when it issued its June 15, 2006 Order, designating Renato and Dalisay
the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose as special administrators and enjoining them to post bond in the amount
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only of P200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, reiterated when the RTC
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special rendered its February 16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with Erlinda
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless as special administratrix.
so ordered by the court.[30]
Undeterred by the RTCs resolve to require them to post their respective
Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. administrators bonds, respondents filed anew a Motion for Exemption to
Before an executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his File Administrators Bond on May 22, 2007, positing that it would be to
trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a the best interest of the estate of their deceased parents and all the heirs
bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows: to spare the estate from incurring the unnecessary expense of paying
for their bond premiums since they could not raise the money
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and themselves. To note, this Motion was filed only after petitioners filed a
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate on April 23,
the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the 2007. Respondents then argued that they could not enter into their
possession of any other person for him; duties and responsibilities as special administrators in light of the
(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according pendency of their motion for exemption. In other words, they could not
to the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate yet submit an inventory and render an account of the income of the
which shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of estate since they had not yet posted their bonds.
any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge
all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents appointment as special
as shall be decreed by the court; administrators for failing to post their administrators bond and to submit
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court; to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.[31] respondents plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly
did so.
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before
entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of
the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to
deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the
truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court, probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months.
and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the
them.[32] decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and
return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly
as administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3)
as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive
administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so them.
considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance
of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the
of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to
Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them the perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent
obligation to post an administrators bond of P200,000.00. However, upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the
taking into account the arguments of respondents that Dalisay was decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of
incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being
and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners included among the acts constituting the care, management, and
nominated Bian Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on
settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
nature of a qualification for the office of administration.[41] death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
Hence, the RTC revoked respondents designation as joint special one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
administrators, especially considering that respondents never denied (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
that they have been in possession, charge, and actual administration of granted to such other person as the court may select.
the estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present, despite
the assumption of Melinda as regular administratrix. In fact, respondents Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of
also admitted that, allegedly out of good faith and sincerity to observe administration, the following provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent
transparency, they had submitted a Statement of Cash Distribution[42]
for the period covering April 2002 to June 2006,[43] where they indicated Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for
that Renato had received P4,241,676.00, Erlinda P4,164,526.96, and letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
petitioners P2,486,656.60, and that the estate had advanced show, so far as known to the petitioner:
P2,700,000.00 for the hospital and funeral expenses of Leonardo.[44]
The latter cash advance was questioned by petitioners in their motion (a) The jurisdictional facts;
for revocation of special administration on account of the demand (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
letter[45] dated June 20, 2007 of Asian Hospital and Medical Center residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
bills in the amount of P2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably, (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits prayed.
generated from the properties of the decedents estate, yet they still But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
failed to post their respective administrators bonds despite collection of administration.
the advances from their supposed shares. This state of affairs continued
even after a considerable lapse of time from the appointment of Renato Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for
as a special administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court
February 16, 2007 when the RTC substituted Erlinda, for Dalisay, as shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice
special administratrix. thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the
What is more, respondents insincerity in administering the estate was manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
betrayed by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 12, 2004[46]
discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed between Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. Any interested person
respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of
the representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. the incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or
Brillantes and Amelita Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as on the ground of the contestants own right to the administration, and
vendees, over a real property situated in Bian, Laguna, and covered by may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of the Registry of Deeds of persons named in the opposition.
Laguna, for a total purchase price of P2,700,000.00. The Deed
stipulated for a payment of P1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the
contract, and the balance of P1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1) petition, it must first be shown that notice has been given as herein-
month from the receipt of title of the vendees. The contract also stated above required, and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the
that the previous contract of lease between the vendors and the vendees parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the
shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no longer decedent left no will, or that there is no competent and willing executor,
obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a it shall order the issuance of letters of administration to the party best
purported Deed of Absolute Sale[47] over the same realty between entitled thereto.
respondents, and including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as
vendors, and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect
only P1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale already had the to Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was
signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed embodied in the motion for the termination of the special administration.
that respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007,
respondents said that Dalisay already got a share from this transaction the same was canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the
in the amount of P500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of absence of the parties counsels. The February 8, 2008 hearing was
the execution of this Deed of Absolute Sale, although not notarized as again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation
the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not have been distant from the of the Hall of Justice. Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a
execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar Community Tax Manifestation/Motion dated February 29, 2008,[49] reiterating their
Certificate Numbers of the parties appearing in both contracts. prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as regular
administrator and for the revocation of the special administration. It may
Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition
on the part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the
as joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the
equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the
had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas appointment as such
no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the was not properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.[48] kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC
acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned
On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as Rules.
regular administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion.
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the
In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular estate of Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the
administrator, the following provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact that Melinda,
state pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the
required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which,
Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that
No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15,
2008.[50] These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly
(a) Is a minor; as administratrix of the decedents estate, but her appointment should
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and be converted into one of special administration, pending the
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardos
integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may then
turpitude. proceed with dispatch.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies the MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the
intestate, administration shall be granted: Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, with respect to the
revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent designated instead as special administratrix of the estate under the
and willing to serve; same administrators bond she had posted. The trial court is directed to
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the regular
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs.
to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David:
HEIRS OF BELINDA CASTILLO VS. GABRIEL TAN VS. GEDORIO
[G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000] We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may
G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum.
JARING, respondents. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in
case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her
MENDOZA, J.: husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to
hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili,
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the 90 Phil. 97).[5]
conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June
court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse. 4, 1998.[6] Hence this petition based on the following assignment of
errors:
The facts are as follows:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
Respondent Romeo Jaring[1] was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE
in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL
years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY
the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND
Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY
Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two CLAIM.
installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second
installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
signed the contract. IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317,
WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance FAVOR OF RESPONDENT JARING.[7]
of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply
with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the
sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the
the defendants fail to pay the balance. settlement of estate of the decedent.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court
based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3,
provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest 21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of of the defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the
especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted,
so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the
case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against
in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it the estate of a deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether
shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry private respondent can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner.
of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses,
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of
stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership.
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses
and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
the case.[3] The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
reason, they were declared in default. purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.[8]
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent automatically dissolved[9] and debts chargeable against it are to be paid
the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2
P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. which states:
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision[4] rendered is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property
on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held: shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in
must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
regional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants
against whom the action should be maintained. This is the teaching of As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses,
Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held: no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the
conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse.
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation
cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon
was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving
sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court
does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.[11]
the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such
that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the
xxxxxxxxx partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership
property is void.[12]
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co
was also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of
order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case Ventura v. Militante.[13] In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an
against Co. (Underlining added) amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly
contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended
were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated their
cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable
against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the the case at bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to
settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease.
complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent
the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the
husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary.
upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this
against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness case reads:[22]
chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained
thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be 2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire
filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. period of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS,
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does species thereon as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and
not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the
respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this
if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for contract; and
administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.[14] B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00)
Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy[15] and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,[16] Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation
are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be
prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of
conjugal partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of P25,300.00.
defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the dismissal of the case as to
him but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of P25,300.00, the
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
severally executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of The complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the
a collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the
this reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the
the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of
for the enforcement of the entire obligation. P25,300.00.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal SO ORDERED.
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife
is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership
which is primarily bound for its repayment.[17] Thus, when the spouses
are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they
are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of
joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even
assuming the contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in
this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely
joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to
pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the
amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be
paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the
Civil Code provides:
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e.,
the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each
debt being considered distinct from one another.[20]
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides
that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the
latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the
lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the
expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor,
they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the
property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease
or sublease but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.[21] In