Genelle Mae A. Madrigal: Position Paper in Administrative Law
Genelle Mae A. Madrigal: Position Paper in Administrative Law
MADRIGAL
Bicol College School of Law
LLB II
Position Paper in Administrative Law
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own
alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The creation of the Ombudsman in 1987 Constitution which is endowed with a wide latitude of
investigating power and whose duties primarily consist in upholding public trust by cleansing the
government’s ranks of graft and corruption and maintaining checks and balances so that tyranny would
not arise from any branch of the government. The said office is virtually free from legislative, executive,
and judicial intrusion.
The President holds two powerful positions blended into one - both chief executive and head
of state. The power of the president is not limited only to the enforcement of acts of Congress according
to their express terms. Article VI, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution says that executive power
shall be vested in the president. Subsequent provisions also enumerate specific powers. The
Constitution provides that the President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. With this
provision, it implies that the power of the president is not limited only to the enforcement of acts of
Congress according to their express terms. The power is broader than that and includes the rights and
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution. The question has arisen whether the
president may exercise powers that are not specifically mentioned – disciplinary actions over the Office
of Ombudsman.
The Philippine state provides that it is one of the duty of the independent Office of Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute including the president of the state. With this power of the Ombudsman,
the President should not have the authority to take any disciplinary action with the said office. The
Supreme Court decision made on Jan. 28, 2014 stating that the Office of the President has no
disciplinary authority over a deputy ombudsman became final and executory in May that same year,
which means it can no longer be appealed or revised. In G.R. 196231, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court ruled that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes
its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks
and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
In addition, the SC ruled that what is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily
true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are
not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her
Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like
the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should be declared void.
Indeed, the Office of the Ombudsman is not exempted from the checks and balances in
government even though it is an independent office. However, there is no constitutional power on
which the executive is basing the authority to suspend Ombudsman and his/her deputies and such
provision that previously allowed it no longer stands. As long as the legal status in GR. is final, executory
and binding until it is set aside. The decisions of the Supreme Court are part of the law of the land,
which the President is sworn to protect and uphold. The President does not have basis to enforce an
order on a provision that no longer exists in the Constitution.