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Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Review

This review summarizes a book by Bob Hale called Abstract Objects. The review discusses Hale's Platonistic views on abstract objects and whether they exist independently of the mind and can be known. It also examines Hale's arguments regarding Carnap's views on ontology and his introduction of singular terms referring to abstract objects. The review provides analysis of several chapters and ideas presented in Hale's book.

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178 views

Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Review

This review summarizes a book by Bob Hale called Abstract Objects. The review discusses Hale's Platonistic views on abstract objects and whether they exist independently of the mind and can be known. It also examines Hale's arguments regarding Carnap's views on ontology and his introduction of singular terms referring to abstract objects. The review provides analysis of several chapters and ideas presented in Hale's book.

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Review

Reviewed Work(s): Abstract Objects by Bob Hale


Review by: Albert Sweet
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Sep., 1989), pp. 166-168
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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The Review of Metaphysics

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166 MARK M. HURLEY AND STAFF

in principle, of telling how red objects look to someone who is red


green color-blind (p. 152).
Nevertheless, Hacker's book is not without merit. It is a clear,
vigorous, well-written, and very readable exposition of a Wittgen
steinian approach to the epistemology and metaphysics of perception,
and Hacker has made a serious, albeit unsuccessful, attempt to show
that alternative approaches are untenable, and to answer crucial ob
jections to his own position.?Michael Tooley, The Australian National
University.

Hale, Bob. Abstract Objects. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. viii
+ 282 pp. $55.00?What are abstract objects? Do they exist inde
pendently of the mind? Can they be known? These questions, and
related ones, are addressed in this book, and are given Platonistic
answers of a "broadly Fregean kind." These answers emerge, for the
most part, from discussion and criticism of the writings of other phi
losophers.
The introduction contains a sympathetic but critical discussion of
Carnap's views on ontology. Carnap is praised for not questioning
the linguistic propriety of deducing statements such as "There are
natural numbers" from premises such as "There are infinitely many
natural numbers," whose truth is scarcely open to question. Con
cerning Carnap's well-known distinction between internal and external
questions about such statements, however, Hale argues: "if . . . de
ciding to adopt the (relevant linguistic) framework does not suffice to
ensure the truth of such general existential statements, then . . .
(Carnap's) argument from the (allegedly) non-cognitive character of
the decision to their triviality simply collapses" (p. 8). The triviality
here referred to is ontological triviality. At issue is Carnap's view
that the decision to use the language of number theory does not confer
significance upon such external, ontological questions as whether
numbers are abstract objects, may be known, or are mind-independent.
On the basis of his interpretation of Frege's context principle, Hale
argues that singular terms in true statements must refer to objects
about which such ontological questions may indeed be significantly
asked. Consequently, he sets forth criteria for identifying genuinely
singular terms, a task which is approached in the context of Dummett's
work on this topic. With respect to abstract objects, Hale suggests
the following way of introducing the requisite singular terms. Given
a predicate F, he "contextually introduces" the functional expression
/by the equivalence:

f(x)=f(y)iSFx~Fy
where f(x) is said to be the F-hood of x. To readers sympathetic
with Platonism it may be disappointing that this idea is not developed
in a framework in which the functor / is introduced by an explicit
definition, of which the above equivalence is a consequence. In this

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SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS 167

context, the following argument is advanced. A predicate Q is intro


duced by the equivalence:

Q(f(x))\ftFx
and it is concluded "any existential commitment present in any in
stance of its left hand side is at least implicit in the corresponding
instance of its right hand side. Thus a plain first level predication
Fa contains an implicit commitment to the object/(a)" (p. 35).
The object/(a) is asserted to be an abstract object, on the basis of
an interesting treatment of the abstract/concrete distinction. In this
context a method is suggested for characterizing directions and num
bers as abstract sortais, by reference to characteristic properties of
spatial and temporal separation of instances of those sortais.
The subsequent chapter contains a discussion of the question of
whether or not abstract objects are knowable, in the context of the
assumption that some version of the causal theory of knowledge is
correct. Hale finds unconvincing the argument of Steiner that only
a weak causal theory of knowledge is plausible. He then presents
his own argument against a strong causal theory, and concludes that
no causal theory can be strong enough to "embarrass the Platonist."
There follows a discussion of the nominalist theory of H. Field.
Hale concludes that the conservative character of mathematics, on
which Field's nominalism depends, cannot be given nominalist content,
nor can nominalist grounds be given for asserting that mathematics
is conservative.
The subsequent chapter returns to the theme of epistemology. In
the context of a criticism of Kitcher's analysis of mathematical
knowledge, Hale argues that a priori knowledge of abstract objects
is indeed possible.
There follows an extended discussion of the question whether ref
erence to abstract objects, such as directions, is possible. In the con
text of a criticism of Dummett's work on this topic, the question of
how much "semantically significant structure" is to be discerned in
the left-hand side of:

The direction of a = the direction of b iff a is parallel to b


is raised. It is argued that we will not be able to explain our readiness
to assert sentences like "They all set out in different directions," unless
we find sufficient structure in the above to assert:

x is a direction iff, for some y, x = the direction of y.

The final chapter is concerned with the problem of identifying which,


if any, of the set-theoretical representations of the system of natural
numbers is ontologically correct. The Zermelo numbers are dis
counted "since all but the first of them have just one member, so that
identity questions concerning them cannot generally be construed as
concerning 1-1 correlations among concepts" (p. 203). On the basis
of similar criteria, other representations of the natural numbers are
discounted, and the Fregean representation is favored.
In general, this book reflects the virtues and vices of the method of

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168 MARK M. HURLEY AND STAFF

exposition it employs: the critical discussions are often telling, but


the development of the author's own views would be well-served by a
more rigorous, systematic treatment.?Albert Sweet, Rutgers Uni
versity.

HiLEY, David R. Philosophy in Question: Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme.


Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. ix + 207 pp. $24.95?
Philosophy in Question is one of those rare books which manage to
cast an entirely new light on familiar themes. By recovering the
Pyrrhonian tradition, Hiley reinvigorates some key figures in philos
ophy's history while offering an insightful framework for under
standing current postmodernist talk about the "end of philosophy."
What motivated the Pyrrhonists, we find, was not "doubt for doubt's
sake," but deep concerns about the moral and social implications of
philosophy. Their critique of the Platonic equation, knowledge
= virtue = happiness, was directed against dogmatism and the pre
sumption of assuming that knowing essences would make us better
people. Hiley shows how this antiphilosophical theme reappears in
such thinkers as Montaigne, Hume, and Rousseau, and he uses it to
clarify recent questions about the Enlightenment notion of rationality
found in Foucault, Kuhn, and Rorty. In the end, we have a compelling
picture of how philosophy through the ages has been haunted by doubts
about its ability to lead us to the good life.
The first chapter focuses the issues in the Pyrrhonian stance. For
Sextus, the aim of doubt is to free the mind from dogmatism and
agitation in order to achieve the "mental health" of "living tranquilly
in accordance with instinct, custom and tradition." Montaigne's
thought reveals the "deep challenge" of Pyrrhonism: its "inherently
conservative" tendency toward acquiescence, and the problem of find
ing a basis for critique. Hume's "mitigated scepticism" suggests the
possibility of a bifocal outlook on our practices which embraces the
common life while remaining critical. The next two chapters shift
to more recent reflections on the Enlightenment. After showing how
the Enlightenment faith in achieving autonomy and solidarity through
reason depended on a teleological philosophy of history, Hiley provides
a fascinating study of Rousseau's "anti-intellectualist" project of re
conciling self and society by retrieving a more "natural" sense of life
prior to the distortions of philosophizing.
These historical reflections provide the basis for exploring current
questions about the relations of reason, power, autonomy, community,
and legitimacy. Foucault's analysis of "power/knowledge" is set
within the Pyrrhonian tradition's questioning of the value of knowl
edge for life, and the new philosophy of science is portrayed as an
attempt to defend the appearances, customs, and traditions of common
life against both an untenable dogmatism and charges of relativism.
Although these chapters are consistently illuminating and well argued,
I found their conclusions less satisfying. In order to reply to charges
that Foucault lacks a notion of emancipation, Hiley uncovers an

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