Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

LYDIA C. GELIG, G.R. No. 173150

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C. J.,
Chairperson
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF Promulgated:
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. July 28, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a
correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it
being the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed
from.[1]

Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision[2] promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The
RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Factual Antecedents

On June 6, 1982, an Information[4] was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion committed as follows:

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, at
Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and
seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon
Elementary School while in the performance of official duties and functions as
such which acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of
the said Gemma S. Micarsos.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecutions Version

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at
the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of
Gemma at the time material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after
learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in
the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias
violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her maxillary area, as shown by a medical
certificate[5] issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to
experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28,
1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to
have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate[6] was issued.

The Defenses Version

Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son
names, so that his classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by
holding her hands and kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma
against the wall.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime
of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion, and she
is hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF
ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise
ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos
as actual damages and Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA vacated the trial courts judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for
direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual
when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight
with Lydia.[8] Likewise, Lydias purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma
on the alleged name-calling of her son.[9]

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion
since there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemmas pregnancy at the time of the
incident.[10]However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial

Court-Branch 23 of Cebu City, dated October 11, 2002 is hereby VACATED
AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered CONVICTING the accused-appellant
for slight physical injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten (10)
days.
 SO ORDERED.[11]

Issues

Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the

petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of arrestomenor minimum of ten days.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the

petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information
charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.[12]
Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our
concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.[13]

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code.The provision reads as follows:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
 circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that
may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person
in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance.[14]

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault. Its elements are:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by
reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in

authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.

4. That there is no public uprising.[15]

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of
her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the
needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was
assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of
calling her son a sissy. Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead
initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principals
office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a
wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemmas fall to the floor.
 Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent
portion of the provision reads as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority Who shall be
deemed as such.

xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of
their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed
persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June
12, 1985).[16]

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled
in setting aside the trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of
direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault
because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact
remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her
official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could
talk properly,[17] but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal
invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind
as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and
violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the principals office. No
fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault
does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted
in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping
and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the
abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemmas attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr.
Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the
document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17,
1981 incident.[18] It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was
competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydias assault and Gemmas abortion. Without her
testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemmas abortion.
 It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete
abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval
of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a
direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident
were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the
abortion may have been the result of other factors.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of direct
assault, she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, when
the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority.[19] Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee since she is a teacher in a public
school. By slapping and pushing Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in
authority.

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.[20] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[21] the petitioner
should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, and the maximum of which is that properly imposable
under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the
indeterminate term of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months
of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. A fine of not more than P1,000.00 must also
be imposed on Lydia in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of direct assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1)
year and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

JR. CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
People v. Pajarillo, 183 Phil. 392, 399 (1979).
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 86-94; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in
by Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
[3]
Records, pp. 157- 161; penned by Judge Generosa G. Labra.
[4]
Id. at 40.
[5]
Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibits.
[6]
Exhibit B, id.
[7]
Records, p. 161.
[8]
CA rollo, p. 92.
[9]
Id. at 91.
[10]
Id. at 93.
[11]
Id. at 94.
[12]
Rollo, p. 8.
[13]
People v. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123, 143 (1999).
[14]
Rivera v. People, 501 Phil. 37, 44-45 (2005).
[15]
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Fifteenth Edition, Revised 2001,
p. 122.
[16]
Id. at 147.
[17]
TSN, March 20, 1991, p. 6.
[18]
Exhibit C, Folder of Exhibits.
[19]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 148.
[20]
See REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 64 (1).
[21]
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No.
4225)