SJS v.

Atienza

Facts: After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc.
(Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell)
(collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective motions for leave to intervene and for
reconsideration of the decision. The facts are as follows:

Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et.al. filed a petition against Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No.
8027, reclassifying the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas
from industrial to commercial. It also directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among
the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies.

This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7,
2007 decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city and that there
was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the Oil companies and DOE in March 12, 2017
sought to intervene and filed a motion for reconsideration in the said case. The oil companies assert
that they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will
directly affect their business and property rights. They allege that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced to relocate.

Moreover, they also called the attention of the Court that in April 25, 2003, they filed a complaint
with application of TRO in the Regional Trial Court of Manila while assailing the validity of
ordinance No. 8027, which was granted by the RTC in the same year enjoining the City of Manila
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

However, in 2006, while the case was pending in the RTC, the city council of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006, which

Aggrieved again, the oil companies file again a complaint to nullify Ordinance No. 8119 and a
TRO. The RTC granted the TRO. Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint
motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim on February 20, 2007 which was granted by the
Court.

Issue:
1. W/N the Injunctive Writs are impediments to the enforcement of ordinance No. 8027. (No)
2. W/N the Court should have taken judicial notice of Ordinance No. 8119 in the March 7,
2007 decision. (No)
 3. W/N Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly repealed Ordinance No. 8027. (No)
4. W/N Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional. (Yes)

Held:
1. No. The Injunctive Writs Are Not Impediments To The Enforcement Of Ordinance No.
8027.

Generally, an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be

restrained by injunction. Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed,
the courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement.
However, we have declared that the issuance of said writ is proper only when:

“... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge,
the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right
to the remedy sought....”

In this case, nowhere in the discussion that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right
of Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, they have convinced the judge that they had
made out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless
and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms. The mere fact that
the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its
enforcement enjoined.

2. No. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the
rule with respect to local ordinances is different.

Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial
notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Although, Section 50 of RA 40974
provides that:

SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take
judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila,
should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party
of any duty to inform the Court about it.

The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to
remove any discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of
an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence
for the record and a party must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take
notice.
3. No. Ordinance No. 8119 Did Not Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area covering the
Pandacan Terminals to "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)"87
whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area from Industrial II to Commercial
I. Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years as opposed to
Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected entities to vacate the area within six months
from the effectivity of the ordinance. Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil
depot area as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)"

However, the SC agreed to the respondent that in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the
Sanggunian did not intend to repeal Ordinance No. 8027 but meant instead to carry over
8027’s provisions to 8119 for the purpose of making Ordinance No. 8027 applicable to the
oil companies even after the passage of Ordinance No. 8119.

Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest. As statutes and ordinances are presumed to be passed only after
careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it follows that,
in passing a law, the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law
relating to the same subject matter.

Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law

does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that
the legislature has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier
special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law does not nullify a specific
or special law). This is so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently
comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act.

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area described
therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a
general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.

Lastly, the oil companies’ claim that that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law, the
existence of an all-encompassing repealing clause in Ordinance No. 8119 evinces an intent
on the part of the Sanggunian to repeal the earlier ordinance:

Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. – All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with
the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the
rights that are vested upon the effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired.

However, the SC said that the repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to
indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter,
including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since an official record of the
discussions in the Sanggunian actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
 4. Yes. Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.

a. Within the power of the LGU: Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. In this case,
ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class.
b. Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory: The oil companies are not prohibited
from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila
merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it
established.
c. Not Partial And Discriminatory: There is a reasonable classification in this case
because what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will
result from a terrorist attack.
d. Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent with RA 7638 And RA 8479(1 & 5):
The oil companies argued that the petroleum products contained in the Pandacan
Terminals are major and critical energy resources, they conclude that their
administration, storage, distribution and transport are of national interest and fall
under DOE’s primary and exclusive jurisdiction under Section 5 I of RA 7638.
Additionally, the terminals are necessary for the delivery of immediate and
adequate supply of oil to its recipients in the most economical way. s Ordinance
No. 8027 (which effectively calls for the removal of these terminals) allegedly
frustrates the state policy of ensuring a continuous, adequate, and economic supply
of energy expressed in RA 7638, a national law.

The SC does not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE
stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its
police power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. The laws cited
merely gave DOE general powers and does not preclude the LGU to exercise police
power.

Note: (RE: CPR)

The SC gave a warning to the Counsel of petitioners.

Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara, submitted a four-page

memorandum that clearly contained neither substance nor research. It is absolutely
insulting to this Court. For a member of the bar, an officer of the court, to file in this Court
a memorandum of such unacceptable quality is an entirely different matter.

As a member of the bar and as an officer of the court, a lawyer ought to be keenly
aware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law and its
magistrates.