Crisis Economics

N. Gregory Mankiw

T o u nder sta nd t he ch a llenge government economists have

faced over the past year and a half, it is useful to imagine the case of
a physician trying to treat an ill patient. The patient presents herself in
terrible shape; the physician has never treated a condition with symptoms
quite like hers before; and the causes of the ailments are unclear. The
doctor remembers reading about a similar case in medical school — and,
trying to recall as much of his training as possible, he endeavors to come
up with a theory as to why the patient is sick and to determine what will
make her better.
In an ideal world, the doctor would run a controlled experiment: He
would assemble 100 patients with similar symptoms, give 50 of them the
medicine that seems most likely to work and the other 50 a placebo, and
then see whether the patients on the medicine in fact improved. But the
doctor does not have 100 patients — he has only one. So, based on his
assessment of what is causing the patient’s troubles, and the most likely
remedy, he takes a risk and administers the medicine.
The patient, however, returns a few weeks later; this time, her symp-
toms are worse. What, then, should the doctor conclude? He might
decide that he gave the patient the wrong medicine. Or he might de-
termine that the patient was even sicker than he originally thought,
and thus that the medicine should be administered at an even higher
dosage. Either conclusion is plausible, but there is no way the doctor
can be sure. What he does know is that he must act before the situation
gets even worse.
When the Obama administration came into office, the American
economy was one very sick patient. To complicate matters, the financial
crisis and the recession that ensued did not neatly follow the pattern of

N. Gr e g ory M a nk i w is the Robert M. Beren Professor of Economics at Harvard University.

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 Nat iona l Affa ir s · Su m m e r 2010

past downturns — instead combining a collapse of the housing market,

a credit crisis, failures of large financial firms, and an assortment of other
worrisome symptoms. Still, the new administration’s economic advi-
sors had no choice but to diagnose the problem and propose ­solutions.
There was, however, little room for trial and error: Their only laboratory
was the very economy they were seeking to heal, and time was of the
­essence, as markets continued to plunge, jobs swiftly evaporated, and
bad news mounted.
In an economic assessment they released in January 2009, President
Obama’s advisors concluded that, if they did nothing, the unem-
ployment rate would reach 9% — its highest level since 1983. So they
developed their medicine: an ambitious plan to stimulate the econ-
omy by ­spending a great deal of taxpayer money. According to their
­estimates, that stimulus would help keep the unemployment rate from
exceeding 8%. Today, however, the unemployment rate is nearly 10%.
Clearly, things have not gone as the president’s advisors expected.
For economists, this raises some obvious questions. Why were the
administration’s projections off the mark? What should their experience
teach us regarding stimulus policies in future downturns? And what can
the government do now, as unemployment remains very high, to help the
patient heal faster? Trying to resolve these questions illustrates not only
the difficulty confronting policymakers in a crisis, but also the inherent
limitations of the economics profession — limitations that both econo-
mists and politicians would be wise to keep in mind.

T e x t book E x ercise s
To the question of why their patient — the U.S. economy — did not
respond as expected, the Obama team’s answer is that the patient was
sicker at the beginning of 2009 than they had originally thought, not
that they administered the wrong medicine. The spending-heavy fiscal
stimulus, they argue, was the right approach and did some good; if the stim-
ulus bill had not been enacted, unemployment today would be even higher.
The reason the stimulus failed to cure the economy’s woes is not that it
was the wrong course of treatment: It simply wasn’t a big enough dose.
(Hence the repeated calls for a “second stimulus.”)
There is no way to decisively prove or disprove the Obama adminis-
tration’s argument. All we can do is consider its premises. On that front,
the reasoning emerging from the Obama White House has not been
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 N. Gregory Mankiw · Crisis Economics

arbitrary, or even purely political. Rather, it represents the application

of standard textbook theory — in this case, the theory that evolved from
the work of John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist of the
early 20th century.
According to Keynesian economics, the business cycle reflects not the
wonders of Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the marketplace but rather
market failure on a grand scale. Extreme and sustained unemployment
during a recession, Keynesians argue, results from a decline in overall (or
aggregate) demand in the economy. When the economy is knocked off
balance by serious economic shocks, the government can help restore nor-
malcy by increasing demand through government spending. And because
the influx of government spending drives businesses to hire and consum-
ers to spend, its impact is multiplied.
Generations of Keynesian economists have sought to model and
quantify how that “multiplier” would function in different economic
­conditions. But most Keynesian economists have agreed that the multiplier
effect of government spending is larger than that of the other approach
to injecting demand into the economy — cutting taxes — ­because money
from tax cuts might be saved rather than spent.
To Obama-administration economists, as well as to many others, the
recession that followed the financial crisis of 2008 seemed like a classic
case of decline in aggregate demand. Because of the credit crisis, people
were not able to obtain loans — for homes, cars, business equipment,
or any of the countless other transactions that rely on credit in today’s
economy. And because people were unable to obtain loans, these sales
and purchases couldn’t take place, resulting in a significant drop in de-
mand across the economy.
So, inspired by the view that fiscal policy can prop up aggregate
demand, Obama’s advisors (and their congressional allies) began to
design a stimulus plan heavy on direct government spending. A few
days before President Obama’s inauguration, his economic advisors
­released a document titled “The Job Impact of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Plan,” in which they detailed some of their eco-
nomic assumptions. They determined that the “government-purchases
­multiplier” — that is, the multiplier for direct spending — would be 1.57,
while the tax-cut multiplier would be 0.99. In other words, every dollar
spent by the government would yield $1.57 in aggregate demand, while
every dollar in reduced taxes would yield only 99 cents in increased
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 Nat iona l Affa ir s · Su m m e r 2010

demand. And because 1.57 is larger than 0.99, the Obama team con-
cluded it was better to increase spending than to cut taxes.
Obama and his advisors arrived at these numbers through a standard
macroeconometric model of the sort economists have been using for years.
Such models take various past relationships among economic variables
(inflation and unemployment, for instance) and extrapolate them into
the future. In essence, the economy is modeled as a system of equations,
each describing how one variable responds to many ­others. University of
Chicago economist (and Nobel laureate) Robert Lucas famously criticized
these models for lacking an appreciation of people’s changing ­expectations;
many economists, however, still find such ­models valuable, and have con-
tinued to employ them for forecasting and policy analysis.
The question for economists now is whether the administration’s
­assumptions, and the model based on them, were correct. After all, if we
could be sure their model was right, we would know what to conclude
when their stimulus plan was followed by 10% unemployment: The pa-
tient was sicker than they thought, and unemployment would surely
have been higher still if not for the stimulus. (Indeed, since Obama’s
advisors do believe their model was right, this is the conclusion they
have reached.)
The trouble is, we have no way of knowing for sure if the model was
in fact correct. To react to a model’s failure to predict events accurately
by insisting that the model was nonetheless right — as Obama’s eco-
nomic advisors have done — is hardly the most obvious course. Careful
economists should instead respond with humility. When their predic-
tions fail — as they often do — they should not dig in their heels, but
should instead be willing to go back to their starting assumptions and
question their validity.

Economic Humili t y
Macroeconomists especially have good reason to be humble, for there is a
great deal we do not know. Teaching the “Principles of Economics” course
at Harvard — a full-year survey — I start each year with what we econo-
mists are confident is true, and then move to material that is less and
less certain as the course progresses. We look first at supply and ­demand,
the theory of comparative advantage, profit maximization, and marginal
revenue equaling marginal cost — the premises that almost every econo-
mist shares and accepts. As the course goes on, we move from micro to
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 N. Gregory Mankiw · Crisis Economics

macroeconomics: examining classical monetary theory, growth theory,

and, at the very end of the year, the theory of business cycles. This is the
topic we economists understand least of all: We are still deeply divided
on the validity and utility of the basic Keynesian paradigm. But it is
precisely the topic that government macroeconomists work on most,
especially during times of recession.
Even as a believer in many aspects of Keynesian theory, I appreciate that
one cannot approach this subject matter without showing some humility.
Economics is a young science, and much of our knowledge is necessarily
tentative. Humility need not result in resignation or ­fatalism; nor does it
mean we can’t make economic policy. But it should mean that we con-
stantly test our assumptions and policies against real-world results. We
should seek in retrospect the data we cannot have in advance, and use
those data to improve both our understanding of the economy and the
policies we put in place.
At first glance, the Obama administration would seem to be taking
such an empirical approach. In an attempt to “know” as much as pos-
sible about the consequences of the stimulus bill, the administration has
been compiling data to measure its effects. Indeed, the vaunted stimulus
web site (recovery.gov) claims to provide state-level job-creation “data,”
reported to two decimals of accuracy.
In reality, however, this ostensible effort at transparency is actu-
ally the least credible part of the whole case for the 2009 stimulus bill.
For one thing, the reporting errors involved in the data collection are
enormous, as hardly anyone accurately fills out the government’s ques-
tionnaires about the jobs “saved or created” with stimulus money. Some
employers, for instance, have counted money used to provide pay raises
to existing employees as “creating” jobs. Thus the Wall Street Journal
reported last November that the Mid-Willamette Valley Community
Action Agency in Oregon had claimed to create 205 jobs with its $397,761
in stimulus money — spending less than $2,000 per “new” job.
The results of gathering economic data this way can be downright
comical. A shoe-store owner in Kentucky who sold boots to the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (for work on a project made possible by stimu-
lus funds) claimed to have created nine jobs with $889 — a feat that would
certainly make him the most efficient job creator in the country. The
store owner apparently reasoned that he was creating one job for every
pair of boots he sold the Army; after all, a soldier could not go to work on
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 Nat iona l Affa ir s · Su m m e r 2010

the project without a pair of boots. The episode received attention only
because a reporter discovered the ridiculous claim, and the owner then
asserted that he had been confused by the government form.
The administration has nevertheless accepted such reports, using
them as the basis of their stimulus evaluations. But even if the ­reporting
were perfectly correct, the exercise would still make little sense as a
way of assessing the broader macroeconomic effects of the stimulus
money. When we talk about the impact of government purchases on
aggregate demand, and therefore on job creation, we must take into
account an enormous number of “general equilibrium effects” — that
is, the indirect effects that occur as one economic variable influences
another, which in turn influences yet another, and so on. Such effects
can be modeled and analyzed to some extent, but they cannot possibly
be captured by crude job-creation surveys, or easily conveyed through
administration web sites and talking points.
These general equilibrium effects are tremendously important to
the economy — sometimes in positive ways, sometimes in negative.
The positive effects are those that underlie the conventional Keynesian
fiscal-policy multipliers: Higher government spending leads to higher in-
comes for some people, which causes higher consumption, and therefore
higher incomes yet again, such that the effect cascades and multiplies.
Economists can certainly track some of these effects, but the “data” on
recovery.gov cannot possibly account for them.
The negative effects are even more challenging to trace. For ­example,
if people observe the government issuing substantial debt (required
to finance a stimulus), they may anticipate higher future taxes and
­therefore cut back on their current consumption. Increased govern-
ment ­borrowing may also drive up long-term interest rates, which could
make it difficult for people to borrow money and could therefore reduce
spending today. Obviously, recovery.gov has no way to take account of
these consequences, either.
So even if recipients of stimulus funding filled out their government
reports reliably and correctly, the data they provided would not accu-
rately describe the effects of the stimulus on job creation. Nor would
data about job creation by itself actually resolve the underlying ques-
tion about the administration’s economic-recovery effort: whether it was
right to pursue a spending-heavy stimulus plan, instead of one focused
more on tax cuts.
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 N. Gregory Mankiw · Crisis Economics

Ta x i ng Le ss or Spendi ng Mor e
Addressing this question requires not only data about the past year or
two, but also analysis of some key assumptions at the core of the admin-
istration’s approach to fiscal policy. In particular, that approach seems
to take for granted that the question in choosing between spending and
tax cuts is which would have the greater multiplier effect, and that the
answer to that question is spending rather than tax cuts.
The first assumption overlooks an important difference between
spending and tax cuts in the context of economic stimulus. When the
government is seeking to revive its sick patient — the economy — time is
of the essence. And time must be considered in any analysis of multipliers
and other economic effects of stimulus policy. Chief among these consid-
erations is whether government can spend money both quickly and wisely.
Many of us can draw on our own experiences in addressing that
question. Anyone familiar with government projects even at the mu-
nicipal level knows that the process is usually prolonged and onerous.
Even if the design phase is managed well, the project is built efficiently,
and the end product proves to be of good use to the community — all
big “ifs” — the time involved in debating project proposals, securing
approval from citizens and local boards, planning the design, hiring
contractors, and completing the construction often stretches to years.
Cram the process into a dramatically shortened time frame, and the
likelihood that the project will be an example of “wise” government
spending diminishes significantly. Expand the scope of the govern-
ment spending from town planning to national fiscal policy, and the
likelihood shrinks even further.
This is not just a matter of government waste, but also a question of
whether money spent under such circumstances actually helps the econ-
omy grow in a way that best enhances citizens’ well-being. Whenever
public money is involved, it is important to ask whether the spending
will produce something society needs, or wants, to improve the general
economic climate. Money spent on a new road that allows farmers to
get their products to market faster and in better condition, for instance,
creates more value than money spent building a “bridge to nowhere,”
even if both projects create the same number of construction jobs.
To look at it another way: If a person pays his neighbor $100 to dig
a hole in his backyard and then fill it up again, and the neighbor hires
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him to do the same, government statisticians will report that the econ-
omy has created two jobs and that the gross domestic product has risen
by $200. But it is unlikely that, having wasted all that time digging and
filling, either person is better off — economically or otherwise. Each
person’s net financial gain is zero, and all anyone has to show for the ef-
fort is a patch of fresh dirt in the backyard, which is unlikely to improve
anyone’s standard of living.
Private individuals don’t usually spend their money on things they
don’t want or need. So when money is kept in the hands of citizens, and
transactions take place in the private sector, there is less cause to worry
about inefficient spending. The same cannot always be said of ­government.
This means that government spending designed to stimulate the economy
must first be subjected to serious cost-benefit analysis, which is hard to do
in a big rush. Not all government spending is created equal — and rushed
spending is, in many important ways, likely to be less efficient and less
useful than spending that is carefully planned.
The administration’s second assumption, meanwhile, is a matter of
academic theories about the sizes of the relevant economic multipliers.
Textbook Keynesian economics tells us that government-purchases multi-
pliers are larger than tax-cut multipliers. And, as we have seen, the Obama
administration’s economic team consulted these standard models in decid-
ing that spending would be significantly more effective than tax cuts.
But a great deal of recent economic evidence calls that conclusion
into question. In an ironic twist, one key piece comes from Christina
Romer, who is now chair of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers.
About six months before she took the job, Romer teamed up with her
husband and fellow Berkeley economist David Romer to write a paper
(“The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”) that sought to measure
the influence of tax policy on GDP. Crucial to the Romers’ method was
their effort to identify changes in tax policy made during times of relative
economic stability, and driven by a desire to influence economic behav-
ior or activity (to encourage growth, say, or reduce a deficit), rather than
those changes made in response to a recession or crisis. By studying such
“exogenous” tax-policy changes, the Romers could be more confident
that they were in fact measuring the effects of taxes and not those of
extraneous conditions.
The Romers’ conclusion, which is at odds with most traditional
Keynesian analysis, was that the tax multiplier was 3 — in other words,
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 N. Gregory Mankiw · Crisis Economics

that every dollar spent on tax cuts would boost GDP by $3. This would
mean that the tax multiplier is roughly three times larger than Obama’s
advisors assumed it was during their policy simulations.
Of course, it could be that all multipliers are larger than previously
assumed. Perhaps fiscal policy has such a great influence over our econ-
omy that, if the tax multiplier is 3, the government-spending multiplier
is 4 or 5. We don’t know from the Romers’ study; they did not ana-
lyze government-spending multipliers, only tax multipliers. But several
studies on government-spending multipliers have been conducted using
techniques similar to those used by the Romers. And none has found
government-spending multipliers to be so large as to justify assumptions
about the inherent superiority of government spending over tax cuts.
Some excellent work on this topic has come from Valerie Ramey of
the University of California, San Diego. Ramey finds a government-
spending multiplier of about 1.4 — a figure close to what the Obama
administration assumed, but much smaller than the tax multiplier iden-
tified by the Romers. Similarly, in recent research, Andrew Mountford
(of the University of London) and Harald Uhlig (of the University of
Chicago) have used sophisticated statistical techniques that try to cap-
ture the complicated relationships among economic variables over time;
they conclude that a “deficit-financed tax cut is the best fiscal policy to
stimulate the economy.” In particular, they report that tax cuts are about
four times as potent as increases in government spending.
Perhaps the most compelling research on this subject is a very recent
study by my colleagues Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna at Harvard.
They used data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development to identify every major fiscal stimulus adopted by the 30
OECD countries between 1970 and 2007. Alesina and Ardagna then
separated those plans that were in fact followed by robust economic
growth from those that were not, and compared their characteristics.
They found that the stimulus packages that appeared to be successful
had cut business and income taxes, while those that evidently did not
succeed had increased government spending and transfer payments.
The data in the Alesina-Ardagna study are mostly European; only a
small portion comes from the United States. But the evidence leads to
conclusions that are very similar to those from Mountford and Uhlig’s
work using American data. These conclusions are also consistent with
the work of Ramey and the Romers, which looked at the historical
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 Nat iona l Affa ir s · Su m m e r 2010

record to identify multipliers. There appears to be a growing body of

evidence, then, suggesting that taxes may be a better tool for fiscal stim-
ulus than conventional models have indicated.
Why would that be? At this point, there is no clear-cut answer,
but it is easy to come up with plausible conjectures. The most obvi-
ous ­candidate would be the supply-side effects of tax cuts. Tax rates,
for instance, clearly influence work incentives. And economists who
focus on supply-side incentives argue that Keynesians overestimate the
­importance of aggregate demand while underestimating the role that
people’s willingness to work and invest plays in the performance of
modern economies.
But even if one believes that aggregate demand drives the econ-
omy in the short run, as many Keynesians do, it would still be wise to
­acknowledge that taxes affect aggregate demand in ways that are not
included in the textbook Keynesian model. When we change tax laws,
we typically do not just write checks to taxpayers. Usually, we change
marginal tax rates — adjusting corporate or personal income taxes, or
perhaps instituting tax credits or similar policies to drive incentives
in some particular way. These measures have more complicated and
­nuanced effects on aggregate demand than the textbook Keynesian
model assumes. They involve far more than simply changes in cash flow;
most notably, they involve changes in marginal incentives, often includ-
ing direct encouragement to spend.
We have seen recent examples of how such changes in incentives
can influence behavior. One of the most noteworthy has been the
Cash for Clunkers program, which wasn’t a tax cut, but wasn’t a clas-
sic form of Keynesian stimulus spending, either: It was an incentive
program to induce personal spending by individuals. Owners of older,
less energy-efficient vehicles received a voucher for between $3,500 and
$4,500 (depending on differences in fuel economy), which they could
apply only to the purchase of new, more energy-efficient vehicles. In the
course of the program’s two-month run (in July and August of last year),
the government spent nearly $3 billion on these rebates.
Economists will no doubt long debate whether Cash for Clunkers
passed a cost-benefit test. (Some early results, from Burton Abrams and
George Parsons of the University of Delaware, suggest not.) But the fact
that people responded to the incentive as they did — nearly 680,000 cars
were purchased — suggests that a broader, more comprehensive program
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of incentives, such as an investment tax credit, might have stimulated

spending even more.
Of course, not all tax cuts or credits are created equal, just as not all
direct government spending is. One popular idea in recent years, for
­instance, has been a tax cut for businesses that make new hires. Indeed,
the jobs bill signed by President Obama in March put in place a targeted
payroll-tax exemption for some small businesses that hire people who
have been unemployed for two months or more; several members of
Congress have proposed broader tax cuts for businesses that hire new
employees. The premise behind these policies is that, because unemploy-
ment is so high even as the economy begins to recover, we should create
incentives for businesses to place unemployed workers into jobs.
There is a case to be made for a broad-based payroll-tax cut that might
have this effect, but a narrower tax cut for new hires suffers from some
major flaws. The basic problem is that we do not know how to properly
define — or enforce a definition of — a “new hire.” Presumably we do not
want a business to hire Peter by firing Paul and to then call Peter a new
hire; this would cause a great deal of inefficient churning in the labor
force (not to mention a great deal of unpleasantness for all the Pauls).
Usually when tax credits for new hires are proposed, the idea is to
establish some baseline employment — based on a firm’s labor force a
year or two earlier — and give credit to businesses that meet or exceed
their baselines. But relying on such baselines can be problematic. Consider
an industry hit particularly hard by a recession — say, construction — in
which employment is well below the baseline established for new-hire
tax breaks. Because a few new hires would still not make these firms eli-
gible for the tax credits, these firms would have no marginal incentive to
hire additional workers. Conversely, industries that have been expanding
would be rewarded for hires they might have made even without the tax
incentives. This policy, then, would likely create tremendous disparities
across industries that could be both inequitable and inefficient. It would
also create perverse incentives in favor of new firms: By definition, all
employees of a new firm are “new hires.” This could even give existing
firms an incentive to, say, lay off the janitorial staff and hire instead an
independent janitorial contractor that just started up as a new firm, since
the cost per worker to the old firm could well be lower.
Attractive as such ideas may seem at first, targeted tax cuts and
­incentives are in fact very difficult to implement properly. If tax cuts
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 Nat iona l Affa ir s · Su m m e r 2010

indeed make for better fiscal stimulus than direct government ­spending,
they should be broad-based cuts or incentives, rather than narrowly tai-
lored interventions.
Here again, the fiscal-policy decisions of the past year and a half have
not been implausible or inexplicable — but they have also not been em-
pirically shown to work. The data point to other approaches.

Economics a nd Poli t ics

It may seem unfair to criticize government economists working under
great pressure in the midst of a crisis. After all, they are not in fact doctors
treating patients. They work for politicians, who must take into account
not just economic theory and data but also voter attitudes and political
realities. Economic policy is not just applied economics.
But economists are social scientists, not politicians. And whether they
work for the government or have the luxury of merely observing the scene
from an ivory tower, the integrity of the profession and the importance
of the work involved demand that they be subjected to critical judgment;
they must be compelled always to submit their assumptions, data, models,
and conclusions to careful scrutiny. The foremost job of economists is
not to make the lives of politicians easier, but to think through problems,
to examine all the available information about the problems’ causes and
potential treatments, and to propose the solutions most likely to work.
This is a simple point, but one that is easy to forget. As Milton
Friedman once put it: “The role of the economist in discussions of public
policy seems to me to be to prescribe what should be done in light of what
can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is ‘politically feasible’
and then to recommend it.”
In a time of economic uncertainty and political turmoil, we
­economists — both in and out of government — could hardly do better
than to follow Friedman’s sage advice.

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