MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDI~ES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

147

MARJOLEIN DEGENAAR

MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM
THREECENTURIESOF DISCUSSION
ON THE PERCEPTIONOF FORMS

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MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM
Three Centuries of Discussion
on the Perception of Forms

MARJOLEIN DEGENAAR
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Translated from the Dutch by

Michael J. Collins

L~

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 To My Husband Gert-Jan
and
My Two Sons Sebastiaan and Diederik
Molyneux's letter to the authors of the Bibliothdque universelle et historique,
7 July 1688. Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Locke c. 16, fol. 92 recto.
 CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2 Molyneux's P r o b l e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1 The First Formulation of M o l y n e u x ' s P r o b l e m . . . . . . . 17
2 Background to Molyneux's Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 The Publication of Molyneux's Problem . . . . . . . . . 21
4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 25

1 M o l y n e u x ' s P r o b l e m as a H y p o t h e t i c a l Problem . . . . . . 25
2 Negative Answers to Molyneux's Question . . . . . . . . 26
3 Positive Answers to Molyneux's Question . . . . . . . . . 39
4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5o

4 The First Experimental Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

1 Cheselden's Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2 Cataract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Cataract Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4 Cheselden's Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6o
5 The Methodology of Psychological Experiments . . . . . . . 65
6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

5 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth C e n t u r y . . . . 87

1 Congenitally Blind People Cured by Surgery . . . . . . . . 87
2 Newborn Animals and Babies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3 Stereoscopic Perception of Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . lo4
4 The Empiricism-Nativism Debate . . . . . . . . . . . lo6
5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
lO Contents

6 M o d e r n Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1 Historical Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2 Surgically Treated Cataract Patients . . . . . . . . . . 114
3 Visual Deprivation in Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4 Sensory Substitution Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12o
5 Electrical Stimulation of the Visual Cortex . . . . . . . . 124
6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

7 Molyneux's Problem in Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . 127

1 Interpretations of Molyneux's Problem . . . . . . . . . . 127
2 Ways of Dealing with Molyneux's Problem . . . . . . . . 13o
3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

 PREFACE

LTHOUGH there are already a considerable number of publications about

A Molyneux's problem concerning the visual capabilities of congenitally
blind people who have just been made to see, the historical development of
the discussion of the problem has never been studied in detail. This book
aims to fill this lacuna. It contains a comprehensive survey of the discussion
of Molyneux's problem from 1688 up to the present time.
Molyneux's question has been addressed by both philosophers and exper-
imental psychologists. This study should therefore be of interest not only to
historians of philosophy, but also to those interested in the history of experi-
mental psychology, especially the history of vision research.
This book is based on the author's doctoral dissertation of 1992. She wishes
to thank M. J. Petry and R. A. Crone for their stimulating criticism. She also
wishes to thank her husband, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, for typesetting the book
with TEX, and her two sons, Sebastiaan and Diederik, for providing her with
welcome diversions from her academic work.

11
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

MAGINE that a congenitally blind person has learnt to distinguish and

I name a sphere and a cube by touch alone. Then imagine that this person
suddenly recovers the faculty of sight. Will he be able to distinguish both
objects by sight and to say which is the sphere and which the cube?
This problem, formulated in 1688 by the Irish philosopher William Moly-
neux, has intrigued a wide variety of intellectuals for three centuries. Those
who have attempted to solve it include not only such philosophers as Locke,
Berkeley, Reid, Leibniz, Voltaire, La Mettrie, Condillac and Diderot, but
also such psychologists as Johannes Miiller, Hermann Helmholtz and William
James.
Molyneux's brainchild, which has gone down in history as "the Molyneux
problem," was not something trivial, but rather a question closely linked with
a number of major philosophical and psychological problems. It played an im-
portant part, for instance, in the development and justification of theories of
perception and knowledge. It led to discussions on what can be directly per-
ceived by the various senses, on the possible mutual interaction of the senses,
on the influence of reason on perception, on the relationship between visual
and tactile sensations of forms, on the relationship between visual and tactile
concepts of forms and on the application of familiar concepts in new situa-
tions. 1 It constituted a central controversial question for eighteenth-century
empiricists and rationalists, it figured in the nineteenth-century empiricism-
nativism debate and it has also engaged the attention of researchers from a
variety of disciplines in this century.
In a somewhat wider perspective, Molyneux's problem increased interest
in the notion that our world undergoes far-reaching changes when we lack one
or more of our senses, a suggestion found widely in the scientific and popular
literature of the Enlightenment. 2 People lacking one or other of the senses
were regarded as interesting from the point of view of theories of knowledge

1 By visual a n d tactile f o r m s I m e a n f o r m s as perceived by t h e sense of sight or t h e sense

of t o u c h respectively. By visual a n d tactile concepts I m e a n concepts of f o r m s o b t a i n e d one
w a y or a n o t h e r vi& sight or t o u c h respectively.
2See, for e x a m p l e , D u f a u 1837, Von E r h a r d t - S i e b o l d 1932, M a c L e a n 1936, Nicolson 1946 ,
a n d P a u l s o n 1987. See also Lende [x94o ] 1953.

13
14 Chapter One

because it was thought that they could serve to demonstrate what types of
knowledge we possess thanks to the various distinct senses. From other angles,
the blind, the deaf and the lame were also seen as curious creatures since--
according to some--they were thought to possess not only another capacity
for acquiring knowledge but also different beliefs, morals and msthetics. In
the mid-eighteenth century theoretical interest in the deaf and the blind was
combined with a humanitarian interest which led to philanthropists such as
l'abb@ de L'l~p@e and Valentin Hafiy being able to put through social reforms,
including provision of care and education for deaf mutes and the blind.
Finally, the history of Molyneux's problem illustrates elegantly how an area
of research traditionally included under philosophy was affected by numerous
factors (including the use of new methods and techniques and the information
they provided) and has become part of other disciplines such as psychology
and neurophysiology.
The aim of this study is to investigate how Molyneux arrived at his problem,
how the problem has been interpreted in the course of history, in what types
of context it has been discussed and what sort of arguments have been evinced
to justify the various solutions. At the same time an attempt will be made
to isolate factors that have played a rSle in the changes in interpretation and
argumentation.
The idea of sketching a history of the development of Molyneux's problem is
not entirely new. Between 1772 and 1782 the Swiss philosopher Jean-Bernard
M@rian published a number of articles in which he attempted to present a
histoire raisonnde of Molyneux's problem. Of more recent date are the article
by John Davis (196o), the book by Michael Morgan (1977) and Appendix A
of John Gerald Simms's biography of Molyneux (1982). Obviously M~rian's
writings are limited to the eighteenth century. Davis and Simms gave only a
brief historical survey of the discussion about the problem. Morgan's some-
what disorganised book contains many digressions on matters which only
indirectly relate to Molyneux's problem. It would thus seem desirable and
justified to write a more adequate and more extensive history which would
also cover the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
This book is organized as follows. The second chapter gives a description
of Molyneux's problem with a sketch of the background. The third chapter
concentrates on the arguments originally used in the attempts to solve the
problem. As will be seen, it was at first regarded as a purely hypothetical
problem amenable to solution by philosophical analyses regarding the identity
(or otherwise) of visual and tactile sensations (or concepts) of forms. The
solutions proposed were usually closely connected with the positions taken up
by their proponents in the empiricism-rationalism debate.
The discussion took a new turn in 1728 when the English surgeon William
Cheselden published a report of the observations made by a patient, blind
 Introduction 15

from birth, who had undergone a successful cataract operation. Philosophers

believed that this provided them with empirical d a t a that would be of help in
answering Molyneux's question. However, all sorts of difficulties arose which
stood in the way of a definitive answer. One of the consequences was that
criteria were laid down governing satisfactory psychological experimentation.
The fourth chapter studies the influence of Cheselden's report on the discus-
sion of Molyneux's problem.
From the end of the eighteenth century a number of changes can be seen
in the interpretation and treatment of Molyneux's problem, though there is
no sense of a break with the past. Whereas in the eighteenth century the dis-
cussion centred principally on the relationship between visual and tactile sen-
sations and concepts of forms, in the nineteenth century spatial vision stood
in the centre of attention. The empirical data which were used in the discus-
sion were of three kinds. In the first place, further cataract operations led to
new results, some of which contradicted those recorded by Cheselden--which
comes as no great surprise, since pre-operative and post-operative circum-
stances varied from case to case. Because the various cases were difficult to
compare one to the other, none of the a t t e m p t s to arrive at an unambiguous
answer to Molyneux's question were successful. Secondly information con-
cerning the visual capacities of newborn animals and babies came to widen
the perspectives of the discussion. A number of researchers regarded the fact
that some animals can see objects at a certain distance immediately after
birth as proof of the notion that a person cured of congenital blindness would
be able to distinguish a cube from a sphere. The question as to whether the
same person would be able to name the objects was not, however, amenable
to an answer in this way. Finally Wheatstone's discoveries in the field of spa-
tial vision were related to Molyneux's problem, but again failed to provide
a definitive solution to the problem. All this information was used in the
nineteenth-century empiricism-nativism debate in which Molyneux's problem
was frequently discussed. These nineteenth-century developments are dealt
with in the fifth chapter.
Even though in the twentieth century Molynenx's problem has no longer
played the m a j o r r61e it had in previous centuries, it has still been capable of
arousing the interest of philosophers, psychologists, ophthalmologists, physi-
ologists and other researchers. Though such interest is first and foremost of an
historical nature new approaches can also be detected. A t t e m p t s have been
made, for instance, to solve the problem using d a t a derived from visual de-
privation experiments with animals and from the use of sensory substitution
systems. The sixth chapter discusses these modern developments.
Finally, all the interpretations, approaches and solutions put forward over
the years are assessed as to their value and suggestions are made as to what
the present-day importance of Molyneux's problem might be.
 CHAPTER TWO

MOLYNEUX'S P R O B L E M

1 THE FIRST FORMULATION OF MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM

N Saturday 7 July 16881 William Molyneux (1656-1698) wrote a letter

O to John Locke (1623-17o4) setting out for the first time his problem
concerning the person born blind:

Dublin July. 7. 88

A Problem Proposed to the Author o / t h e

Essai Philosophique concernant L'Entendement

A Man, being born blind, and having a Globe and a Cube, nigh of
the same bignes, Committed into his Hands, and being taught or
Told, which is Called the Globe, and which the Cube, so as easily
to distinguish them by his Touch or Feeling; Then both being taken
from Him, and Laid on a Table, Let us suppose his Sight Restored
to Him; Whether he Could, by his Sight, and before he touch them,
know which is the Globe and which the Cube? Or Whether he Could
know by his Sight, before he stretchd out his Hand, whether he Could
not Reach them, tho they were Removed 2o or lOOO feet from him?
If the Learned and Ingenious Author of the Forementiond Treatise
think this problem Worth his Consideration and Answer, He may at
any time Direct it to One That Much Esteems him, and is

His Humble Servant

William Molyneux
High Ormonds Gate in Dublin. Ireland 2

1According to the Julian calendar, which remained in use in England until 1752.
~Molyneux writing to the authors of the Biblioth~que universelle et historique, 7 July
1688 (original spelling). Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Locke c. 16, fol. 92 recto; reprinted
(with slight changes) in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 3 (1978), no. lO64. In 1688 Molyneux was
not a personal friend of Locke and thus he addressed his letter to "Les Auteurs de la
Biblioth~que," c/o Mr. Waesberg, bookseller in Amsterdam, who had published Locke's
work in 1688.

17
18 Chapter Two

What was it that had caused Molyneux to formulate this problem and why
did he submit it for Locke's consideration?

2 BACKGROUND TO MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM

William Molyneux (17 April 1656-11 October 1698) was an administrator

and politician who was well known in the Ireland of his time. 1 Molyneux was
an enthusiastic devotee of the new learning. He was particularly attracted
to optics: he confessed himself "much enamoured with optics, for in them
there is such a mixture of physics and mathematics that renders this study
very pleasing. ''~ Molyneux's interest can be seen in his lectures and writings.
His talks to the Dublin Philosophical Society, which he established as a sister
institution of the Royal Society of London, covered such topics as the moon
illusion and the problem of double vision. In his correspondence with the
astronomer royal John Flamsteed he tackled problems not only in astronomy,
ballistics and maritime matters but also in various branches of optics. In 1692
Molyneux published the Dioptrica Nova, the first substantial book in English
on optics.
Molyneux was not alone among seventeenth-century intellectuals in his
interest in optical problems and related questions. It was in this century that
the science of optics advanced by leaps and bounds. Around 16oo the telescope
and the microscope were invented, with all their attendant consequences. In
16o4 Johannes Kepler demonstrated that the eye's crystalline body is not
light-sensitive, but a lens. He also discovered that the images of objects
formed on the retina by way of the lens are reversed and fiat, a revelation
that confronted him (and scientists after him) with the question of why we see
objects the right way up and at a distance. 3 Further, Snellius and Descartes
formulated the law of the refraction of light; Huygens discovered the wave
form of light and Newton proved that light consists of a mixture of colours. 4

1See W. Molyneux 18o3, C. Molyneux 182o, Chillingworth 1946 , Hoppen 1963, Dahl
1968, Hoppen 197o, Kelly 1979, Simms 1982, and Breathnach 1984. The Case o/Ire-
land's Being Bound by Acts o/ Parliament in England, Stated (1698) is Molyneux's most
important political publication.
2Molyneux to Flamsteed, 11 April 1682, quoted in Simms 1982, p. 61.
3See Kepler 16o4. It had long been a well known fact that a person with two eyes
can perceive depth, but after Kepler's discovery of the two-dimensional retinal image this
fact became an object of disbelief because no-one could explain the phenomenon. In 1838
Charles Wheatstone demonstrated that it is possible to perceive depth when presented with
two fiat images.
4See Sabra 1967 for more information on these developments.
 Molyneux's Problem 19

M o l y n e u x ' s i n t e r e s t thus f i t t e d in well w i t h t h e d o m i n a n t i n t e l l e c t u a l c l i m a t e

of t h e time. It could also be t h a t t h e blindness t h a t s t r u c k his wife, L u c y
Domville, in t h e first y e a r of t h e i r m a r r i a g e c o n t r i b u t e d to his p a s s i o n for
t h e o r i e s of vision. 1 P o s s i b l y this t r a g e d y was p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e for i n s p i r i n g
M o l y n e u x to f o r m u l a t e his p r o b l e m of t h e p e r s o n b l i n d from b i r t h .
T h e direct cause of t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of M o l y n e u x ' s p r o b l e m m u s t be looked
for in t h e Essai Philosophique concernant l'Entendement, to which he referred
in his letter. T h i s Essai a p p e a r e d in F e b r u a r y 1688 in t h e Biblioth~que uni-
verselle et historique u n d e r t h e title " E x t r a i t d ' u n livre anglois qui n ' e s t p a s
encore publiC, intitul~ Essai Philosophique concernant l'Entendement, off l'on
m o n t r e quelle est l'Stendu5 de nos connoissances certaines, & la m a n i ~ r e d o n t
nous y p a r v e n o n s . " It was a F r e n c h a b s t r a c t of Locke's An Essay concerning
Humane Understanding, to be p u b l i s h e d in L o n d o n in 169o.
Following in t h e f o o t s t e p s of A r i s t o t l e , ~ Locke d r e w a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
ideas t h a t can only be o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h one of t h e senses a n d t h o s e t h a t can
be o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h several senses. 3 A c c o r d i n g to this d i s t i n c t i o n we o b t a i n
ideas of colour only t h r o u g h t h e eye a n d of s o u n d only t h r o u g h t h e ear. Locke
a d v a n c e d t h e n o t i o n t h a t a n y o n e lacking one of t h e senses will never possess
t h e i d e a s b e l o n g i n g to t h a t sense: "si quelcun a tofijours ~t~ d e s t i t u ~ de l ' u n
de ses sens, il n ' a u r a j a m a i s eu d'id~e qui a p p a r t i e n n e £ ce sens. C ' e s t ce qui
paro~t c l a i r e m e n t p a r ceux qui sont nez sourds, ou aveugles. ''4 O t h e r ideas,
however, i n c l u d i n g t h o s e of space a n d s h a p e , would be o b t a i n e d t h a n k s to
m o r e t h a n one sense: " O u t r e cela il y e n a d ' a u t r e s [id~es] qui v i e n n e n t £
l ' E s p r i t , p a r plus d ' u n sens, c o m m e le m o u v e m e n t , le repos, l'espace, les fi-
gures, qui nous v i e n n e n t p a r la Vile et p a r l ' A t t o u c h e m e n t . " 5 T h e p r o b l e m
set o u t in M o l y n e u x ' s l e t t e r d e a l t precisely w i t h one of these "ideas," n a m e l y
t h a t of t h e s h a p e of o b j e c t s .
We can well i m a g i n e t h a t M o l y n e u x was not i n t e r e s t e d in t h e q u e s t i o n
as to w h e t h e r a c o n g e n i t a l l y b l i n d p e r s o n who s u d d e n l y gains t h e f a c u l t y of
sight could n a m e t h e colour of a red or a blue o b j e c t . In fact while b l i n d he
w o u l d never have seen colours a n d would not have been a b l e to say w h e t h e r

1William Molyneux and Lucy Domville married on 19 September 1678; a little over two
months later--on 24 November--Lucy had a stroke which rapidly made her blind. See
Simms 1982, pp. 2o-22.
~See, for example, Aristotle's De anima, bk. II, ch. 6. See also Mackie 1976, pp. 28-32.
3The term "idea" was used by Locke and his contemporaries with different meanings.
This sometimes leads to problems in the interpretation of fragments of text. It is not,
for instance, always clear whether they are concerned with sensations or with concepts.
Whenever I give expression to the opinions of Locke and other philosophers I do that in
their own terms. See Chappell 1994 for a more elaborate discussion of Locke's usage of the
term "idea."
4Locke 1688, p. 51.
5Locke 1688, p. 52.
20 Chapter Two

what he was now seeing was red or blue unless someone had told him. But
while blind he would certainly have learnt (by touch) the difference between
a sphere and a cube. He would have a concept of shapes; he would know
the characteristics of a spherical object and of a cube-shaped object. Quite
possibly Molyneux thus regarded it as worthwhile to try to find out whether
a person cured of congenital blindness would be capable of distinguishing and
naming by sight two objects that he had previously learnt to distinguish and
name by touch alone. It is probable that Molyneux presented his problem to
Locke because the latter had expressed certain opinions concerning the ideas
of the congenitally blind and the ideas of shapes that can be obtained both
through touch and through sight. An additional factor was that Molyneux
greatly admired Locke's work.
In the Dioptrica Nova (which was published in 1692 , a couple of years
after Molyneux's letter to Locke) there is a passage where Molyneux explicitly
indicates the function he accorded to a person cured of congenital blindness.
In his discussion of the question why we see objects the right way up while
the retinal image is reversed, Molyneux wrote that the terms "right way up"
and "inversed" are relative to "up" and "down" or to "farther" and "nigher"
to the centre-point of the Earth. 1 Molyneux stated that we see things in their
natural position because "the Mind takes no notice of what happens to the
Rays in the Eye by Refraction or Decussation, but [...] the Mind does hunt
back by means of each Pencil of Rays [...] to the Point from whence it comes,
and is thereby directed strait thereto. ''~ The fact that this natural power
ensures that we see trees and suchlike the right way up can be confirmed by
the presumed reaction of someone standing on his head: he would regard the
trees that he sees as being the right way up and himself as being upside-
down. 3 And this would be even more apparent in the reaction shown by a
person blind from birth who suddenly recovers the faculty of sight:

This will be more evident to us, by considering the case of an adult

Person, who has been blind from his Birth, and now suddenly restored
to his Sight: He is not prejudiced by custom, and yet (doubtless)
would judge as is usual. 4

~Molyneux 1692 , p. 1o 5.
2 M o l y n e u x 1692 , pp. 2 8 9 - 2 9 0 .
3 M o l y n e u x 1692 , p. 212.
4 M o l y n e u x 1692 ~ p. 212.
 Molyneux's Problem 21

3 THE PUBLICATION OF MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM

F o r r e a s o n s u n k n o w n Locke never replied to t h e l e t t e r M o l y n e u x a d d r e s s e d to

h i m on 7 J u l y 1688. However, a couple of y e a r s l a t e r , after t h e two philoso-
p h e r s h a d s t a r t e d an a m i c a b l e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , M o l y n e u x r e t u r n e d to his p r o b -
lem, this t i m e w i t h success. T h e e x c h a n g e of l e t t e r s was a result of M o l y n e u x ' s
p r a i s e of Locke in his d e d i c a t i o n of t h e Dioptrica Nova to t h e R o y a l Society:

B u t to none do we owe for a g r e a t e r A d v a n c e m e n t in this P a r t of

P h i l o s o p h y [i.e., Logick], t h a n to t h e i n c o m p a r a b l e M r Locke, who in
his Essay concerning Humane Understanding, has rectified m o r e re-
ceived M i s t a k e s a n d delivered m o r e p r o f o u n d T r u t h s , e s t a b l i s h e d on
E x p e r i e n c e a n d O b s e r v a t i o n , for t h e D i r e c t i o n of M a n ' s m i n d in t h e
P r o s e c u t i o n of K n o w l e d g e [...] t h a n are to be m e t w i t h in all t h e Vol-
u m e s of t h e A n t i e n t s . He has clearly o v e r t h r o w n all t h o s e M e t a p h y s -
ical W h y m s i e s , which infected m e n s B r a i n s w i t h a Spice of M a d n e s s ,
w h e r b y t h e y feign'd a Knowledge where they had none, by making a
noise with Sounds, without clear and distinct Significations. 1
Locke was sent a copy of t h e Dioptrica Nova, r e a d M o l y n e u x ' s f l a t t e r i n g w o r d s
a n d t h a n k e d t h e writer: "if m y trifle could p o s s i b l y be an occasion of v a n i t y
to me; you have done m o s t to m a k e it so, since I could scarce f o r b e a r to
a p p l a u d m y self u p o n such a t e s t i m o n y from one, who so well u n d e r s t a n d s
d e m o n s t r a t i o n . ''2 He a d d e d : "Sir, you have m a d e g r e a t a d v a n c e s of f r i e n d s h i p
t o w a r d s me, a n d you see t h e y are not lost u p o n me. ''3 T h e r e followed an
e x c h a n g e of l e t t e r s m a i n l y d e a l i n g w i t h i m p r o v e m e n t s to L o c k e ' s Essay.
In one of these, d a t e d 2 M a r c h 1692/34, M o l y n e u x once a g a i n p r e s e n t e d
Locke w i t h his p r o b l e m of t h e p e r s o n b o r n blind, t h o u g h in a s o m e w h a t
a l t e r e d form, a s k i n g Locke if he could p e r h a p s find some place in his Essay
to s a y s o m e t h i n g a b o u t it. 5 T h i s t i m e Locke r e a c t e d with e n t h u s i a s m : "Your
ingenious p r o b l e m will deserve to be p u b l i s h e d to t h e world. ''6 F r o m t h e
s e c o n d e d i t i o n of his Essay ( t h a t of 1694) Locke i n c l u d e d M o l y n e u x ' s p r o b l e m
in his w o r k a n d t h e r e b y m a d e it accessible to a wide audience: 7

1Molyneux 1692 , "Dedication to the Royal Society."

2Locke to Molyneux, 16 July 1692 , in Locke 1976-199o , vol. 4 (1979), no. 1515.
3Locke to Molyneux, 16 July 1692, in Locke 1976-199o , vol. 4 (1979), no. 1515.
4In England the new year began legally on 25 March. Like many others, Molyneux wrote
double years during the period from 1 January to 25 March.
5Molyneux to Locke, 2 March 1692/3, in Locke 1976 199o , vol. 4 (1979), no. 16o9. The
letter is included in Locke 17o8.
6Locke to Molyneux, 28 March 1693 , in Locke 1976 199o , vol. 4 (1979), no. 162o.
7Because Molyneux's problem became known through Locke's Essay it is Locke's version
that is quoted here. The edition from which it is taken is Nidditch's (1975) , which is based
22 Chapter Two

Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch
to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and
highly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other,
which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and
Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see.
Qua~re, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd them, he could now
distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube. 1

T h e r e a d e r will have n o t i c e d t h a t in this second version of his p r o b l e m M o l y -

n e u x o m i t t e d t h e question a b o u t distance. P e r h a p s he believed t h a t t h e an-
swer to t h e question r e g a r d i n g t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a n d n a m i n g of a s p h e r e
a n d a c u b e i m p l i e d t h e answer to t h e d i s t a n c e question. It is also possible
t h a t he m a d e t h e omission b e c a u s e in the Dioptrica Nova he h a d - - c l e a r l y ,
he b e l i e v e d - - d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t d i s t a n c e c a n n o t be seen a n d t h a t t h e a n s w e r
was t h e r e f o r e obvious. 2
In t h e Dioptrica Nova M o l y n e u x h a d s t a t e d t h a t t h e e s t i m a t i o n of d i s t a n c e
was m o r e a function of our j u d g m e n t a l c a p a c i t y t h a n of our vision, a n d t h a t it
was not s o m e t h i n g i n b o r n b u t r a t h e r a c a p a c i t y a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e
and comparison:

In P l a i n Vision t h e E s t i m a t e we m a k e of t h e Distance of O b j e c t s
(especially when so far removed, t h a t t h e I n t e r v a l between our two
Eyes, b e a r s no sensible P r o p o r t i o n thereto; or when l o o k ' d u p o n w i t h
one E y e only) is r a t h e r t h e A c t of our Judgment, t h a n of Sense;
a n d a c q u i r e d by Exercise a n d a F a c u l t y of comparing, r a t h e r t h a n
Natural. 3

T h e r e a s o n M o l y n e u x gave for this was l a t e r to p l a y a f u n d a m e n t a l r61e,

e s p e c i a l l y in B e r k e l e y ' s t h e o r y of vision:

F o r Distance of it self, is not to be perceived; for 'tis a Line (or a

L e n g t h ) p r e s e n t e d to our E y e with its E n d t o w a r d s us, which m u s t
t h e r e f o r e be only a Point, a n d t h a t is Invisible. 4

on the fourth edition of 17oo; for reasons of chronology quotations are given as "Locke
[1694] 1975."
1Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. ix, §8. Instead of "of the same metal" Molyneux had
written "(Suppose) of Ivory." See Molyneux to Locke, 2 March 1692/3, in Locke 1976-
199o , vol. 4 (1979), no. 16o9.
Lievers has written that "the Molyneux problem is not primarily concerned with the
application of concepts nor with the correlation between sight and touch, but must be
placed within the context of a solution to the problem of depth perception" (Lievers 1992 ,
p. 415). This may be true of the first formulation but hardly seems to apply to the second.
3Molyneux 1692, p. 113.
4Molyneux 1692, p. 113.
 Molyneux's Problem 23

Molyneux stated that distance is mainly perceived by means of interjacent

bodies--such as mountains, trees and houses--and by the estimation we make
of the comparative magnitude of bodies and of the clarity of their colours.
The distance from nearby objects, however, he believed to be observed by the
turning of the eyes or vi£ the angle of the optical axes? A person born blind
and seeing for the first time would, according to Molyneux's theory, have as
yet no experience of such judgments and would thus be unable to estimate
distance.

4 CONCLUSIONS

A number of plausible reasons can be found to explain why Molyneux formu-

lated his problem and why it was Locke to whom he submitted it. In the first
place Molyneux was interested in blindness because his wife was blind. Fur-
thermore he involved himself in questions regarding optics and the psychology
of seeing. In this he was a true child of his time, for the science of optics was
flourishing in the seventeenth century, spurring on such great scientists as Ke-
pler, Huygens and Newton to study a wide variety of geometrical, physical,
physiological and psychological aspects of light and vision and subsequently
making discoveries that appealed to the general interest. The rise of empirical
philosophy also ensured that there was an increase in epistemological inter-
est in the senses and was partly the reason why Molyneux's problem fell on
fertile ground. Molyneux brought his problem to Locke's attention because
the latter had elaborated in his Essai certain notions concerning the ideas of
persons born blind and ideas of shape that could be acquired both by sight
and by touch.
Where did Locke discuss Molyneux's problem and how did he attempt
to solve it? What did Molyneux believe to be the correct solution? And
what were the arguments advanced by subsequent philosophers to justify the
positions they adopted?

1Molyneux 1692, p. 113.

 CHAPTER THREE

P H I L O S O P H I C A L DISCUSSIONS IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

1 MOLYNEUX~S PROBLEM AS A HYPOTHETICAL P R O B L E M

INCE philosophers originally believed that it was impossible to restore the

S sight of a person born blind, they regarded Molyneux's problem as a kind
of thought experiment, susceptible of solution by reasoning alone. 1 The argu-
ments they gave for their solutions usually concerned the relationship between
visual and tactile sensations or were based on the relationship between visual
and tactile concepts of objects.
Everyone agreed that there is a difference between the visual and the tactile
sensations of objects. However, there was no agreement about the relationship
between the visual and the tactile sensations of a particular object. Some
philosophers were of the opinion that the link between the two is arbitrary
and is only forged by experience. Others believed that there certainly is a
necessary relationship between the two. Some believed that this could be
perceived immediately, while others regarded experience as necessary.
As regards the relationship between visual and tactile concepts of objects,
here too there were differences of opinion. Some philosophers suggested that
the visual concept of a sphere, for instance, differs from the tactile concept
of a sphere, and that both concepts could be made to relate to one another
either by experience or by understanding. But others believed that visual and
tactile concepts of objects are essentially the same or at least have something
in common, and that this could be immediately perceived.
Below we examine the way in which the answers to Molyneux's question
related to the various opinions.

1Similar thought experiments are still being proposed today. Think, for example, of
Frank Jackson's imaginary scientist Mary, who knows all about the neurophysiology of
colour vision but has spent her life in a black-and-white environment. Would she learn
anything she did not know before if she left her rooms? (Jackson 1982. ) The analogy
between Jackson's experiment and Molyneux's problem is noted in Levin 1986.

25
26 Chapter Three

2 NEGATIVE ANSWERS TO MOLYNEUX'S QUESTION

Molyneux assumed that the person born blind had learnt both to distinguish
a sphere from a cube by touch and to give them their correct names. The
question he put to Locke was actually a double question: if the man were
to recover his power of sight would he be able to distinguish them by sight,
without the help of the sense of touch, and would he be able to name them?
Molyneux himself did not give separate answers to these two questions, for
his answer was as follows:

Not. For though he has obtain'd the experience 0/, how a Globe, how
a Cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the Experience,
that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so; Or
that a protuberant angle in the Cube, that pressed his hand unequally,
shall appear to his eye as it does in the Cube. 1

Experience will have taught the man that a cube has projecting angles which
exert uneven pressure on the hand, while a sphere feels the same over its entire
surface. But he will as yet not have had the experience of the impressions
made by these angles and by this regular object on the eye. The man would
not know that what he was seeing were a sphere and a cube because he would
not have had the experience that what he was seeing had anything to do with
what he had previously felt. In brief, Molyneux believed that the relationship
between tactile and visual sensations of the shape of objects would not be
immediately apparent but would have to be learnt. And it is possible that he
regarded such a relationship as necessary.
In his Essay Locke expressed agreement with Molyneux's statement, but he
did not seem particularly interested in the link between the sense of touch and
the faculty of sight: in the chapter dealing with perception he used Molyneux's
problem to illustrate the thesis that we often have false beliefs about the way
in which we perceive--without our taking notice of it. Locke stated that
when, for instance, we look at a uniformly coloured sphere, the idea we get
of it is that of a (flat) circle with a variety of shades and colours. But from
experience we have learnt that this sort of idea is caused by a sphere and thus
we interpret the idea of the unevenly coloured circle as the idea of a uniformly
coloured sphere. This happens so quickly that we hardly notice it.
In order to make this process clearer, Locke used a language metaphor
which was to take on a persistent life of its own in discussions on Molyneux's
problem. Whenever a person reads or listens to something with attention

~Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. ix, §8. See also Molyneux to Locke, 2 March 1692/3 , in
Locke 1976-199o, vol. 4 (1979), no. 16o9.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 27

and understanding, stated Locke, he does not take note of the letters or the
sounds but of the concepts that they call forth. 1 Just as sounds are signs of
concepts, so also is a circle a sign for a sphere. The passage in which Locke
put his opinion regarding unconscious judgments reads as follows:

We are farther to consider concerning Perception, that the Ideas we

receive by sensation, are often in grown People alter'd by the Judg-
ment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our Eyes
a round Globe, of any uniform colour, v.g. Gold, Alabaster, or Jet,
'tis certain that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat
Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and Bright-
ness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to
perceive, what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make
in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of Light, by the
difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies, the Judgment presently,
by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their Causes: So
that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour, collecting
the Figure, it makes it pass for a m a r k of Figure, and frames to it self
the perception of a convex Figure, and an uniform Colour; when the
Idea we receive from thence, is only a Plain variously eolour'd, as is
evident in PaintingP

It is at this point that Locke introduced Molyneux's problem: "To which

purpose I shall here insert a Problem of that very Ingenious and Studious
promoter of real Knowledge, the Learned and Worthy Mr. Molineux." 3 Locke
apparently expected that his statement could be tested with the help of a
person born blind who has recovered the power of sight. Such a person would
not be prejudiced by habit as are all normally sighted adults. Locke responded
to Molyneux's question saying that he believed that a person born blind would
not be able to say immediately with any certainty which was the sphere and
which the cube:

I agree with this thinking Gent. whom I am proud to call my Friend, in

his answer to this his Problem; and am of the opinion, that the Blind
Man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was
the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them: though he could
unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them
by the difference of their Figures felt. This I have set down, and leave
with my Reader, as an occasion for him to consider, how much he

1Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. ix, §9.

2Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
3Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
28 Chapter Three

m a y be b e h o l d i n g to experience, i m p r o v e m e n t , a n d a c q u i r e d notions,
w h e r e he thinks, he has not t h e least use of, or help from t h e m : A n d
t h e r a t h e r , b e c a u s e this o b s e r v i n g Gent. f a r t h e r a d d s , t h a t having
upon the occasion of my Book, proposed this to divers very ingenious
Men, he hardly ever met with one, that at first gave the answer to it,
which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced. 1
W h a t is n o t i c e a b l e here is t h a t Locke did not deal with M o l y n e u x ' s q u e s t i o n
r e g a r d i n g t h e a b i l i t y of t h e n e w l y - s i g h t e d i n d i v i d u a l to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n
t h e s p h e r e a n d t h e cube b u t only t r e a t e d t h e question of naming t h e o b j e c t s .
A f u r t h e r p o i n t w o r t h n o t i n g is t h a t Locke believed t h a t t h e m a n would be
unable to say with certainty which was the sphere a n d which t h e cube. W e
know t h a t Locke a s s u m e d t h a t we a r e able n a t u r a l l y only to see s h a p e s in
two d i m e n s i o n s 2 A m a n b o r n b l i n d who gains his sight a n d who is n o t yet
affected by h a b i t would, in Locke's view, o b t a i n from a s p h e r e t h e i d e a of a
circle a n d from a cube t h a t of a s q u a r e or some sort of h e x a g o n , d e p e n d i n g on
his angle of vision. 3 If we a s s u m e t h a t t h e m a n b o r n blind were to be given
t h e two o b j e c t s to view s e p a r a t e l y , a c c o r d i n g to Locke's opinion he should
a t least b e a b l e to perceive a difference between t h e two o b j e c t s , t h a t is he
s h o u l d be able to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m one from t h e other. 4 If he were to b e
p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e two o b j e c t s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ( a n d in all likelihood t h a t was
M o l y n e u x ' s idea), it would be s o m e w h a t m o r e difficult. P e r h a p s he m i g h t
s u s p e c t t h a t t h e s q u a r e or t h e h e x a g o n h a d s o m e t h i n g to do w i t h a c u b e a n d
t h e circle w i t h a sphere, b u t he would not know it for sure. In o r d e r to be
a b l e to n a m e t h e cube a n d t h e s p h e r e c o r r e c t l y he would first have to l e a r n
t h a t c e r t a i n t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l p r o j e c t i o n s of the o b j e c t s t h a t he is o b s e r v i n g
c o r r e s p o n d in s o m e w a y to t a n g i b l e t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l objects. 5 T h i s could
e x p l a i n w h y Locke w r o t e t h a t t h e m a n would not be able to say with certainty
which was t h e s p h e r e a n d which t h e cube.

1Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. ix, §8. Molyneux responded to Locke's writing with
the following words: "My most Honour'd Friend, For so you have publickly allowd me to
call you; and tis a Title wherein I boast more than in Maces or Parliament-Robes. [...] I
can only Pour out my thanks to you for the Favourable Character under which you have
transmitted me to posterity." Molyneux to Locke, 28 July 1694, in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 5
(1979) ' no. 1763 .
2This conflicts with Locke's statement that we can gain a notion of space through the
sense of sight. See Locke [1694] 1975, bk. II, ch. v, and bk. II, ch. ix, §8. See also Berman
1974b.
3See Park 1969 about "real" and "apparent" dimensions of objects. According to Bolton
Brandt 1994, the man cured of blindness would not at first receive visual ideas of the bodies
he looks at, but would only be aware of light and colour. See also Vienne 1992.
4According to Mackie 1976 , p. 32, "Locke could [...] hold that we get the same idea of
shape from both sight and touch, provided that this is confined to two-dimensional shape."
5See Brandt 1975.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 29

Like Molyneux, Locke probably assumed that visual and tactile ideas of
shape have an essential relationship to one another which can be learnt by
experience; nowhere did Locke defend the idea of the complete heterogeneity
of sight and touch, an idea which the Irish philosopher George Berkeley was
most certainly to support, and his notions on this point are crystal clear.
While Locke used Molyneux's problem merely as an illustration of his thesis
that we owe more to experience than we tend to admit and that unconscious
judgments can play a part in perception, George Berkeley (1685-1753) gave
it a central rSle in his philosophy. Ernst Cassirer even stated that "die Neue
Theorie des Sehens, die den Auftakt zu Berkeleys Philosophie bildet und die
alle ihre Ergebnisse implizite enth£1t, [...] nichts als der Versuch einer voll-
st£ndigen systematischen Entwicklung und Aufhellung des Molyneuxschen
Problems list]." 1 Because of the importance of Molyneux's problem for Berke-
ley's philosophy on the one hand and, on the other, the influence of Berkeley's
theory of sight on the discussion surrounding Molyneux's problem, we need
here to make a detailed examination of Berkeley's ideas.
One of his most important motivations was the fight against scepticism,
the principal cause of which Berkeley believed to be the general belief in the
existence of material entities or external objects. He made it his business,
therefore, to overthrow this belief. Berkeley was interested in theories of
vision because the existence of the visible world is usually--and, according
to him, unjustifiably--used as an argument for the existence of a material
world. He studied the works on optics written by Descartes, Barrow and
Molyneux as well as Newton's Opticks which had just been published2 These
thinkers studied mainly geometrical optics, whereas Berkeley was interested
in the psychology of seeing, as witness his An Essay towards a New Theory
of Vision (17o9).
The aim of the Essay was "to shew the manner wherein we perceive by
sight the distance, magnitude, and situation of objects. Also to consider the
difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and touch, and whether there be
any idea common to both senses. ''3 As Berkeley remarked in the Appendix
to the second edition of his Essay in 171o , his whole theory rested on the
theory that we perceive distance neither directly nor by means of anything
else that has an essential link with it, such as lines and angles. Following in
Molyneux's footsteps Berkeley stated:

1Cassirer 1932, p. 145. See also Teape 187o, p. 3: "[Berkeley's] philosophy can alone
be truly known, when seen germinating from the question of Molyneux." Quoted by Luce
[1934] 1967, P. 34, note 1.
~Descartes 1637, Barrow 1674, Molyneux 1692 , Newton 17o4.
3Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §1.
3o Chapter Three

It is, I think, agreed by all that distance, of itself and immediately,

cannot be seen. For distance being a line directed end-wise to the eye,
it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point remains
invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter. 1

Any idea not directly perceived, said Berkeley, must be perceived by means
of another ideaP Ideas which, according to Berkeley, suggest distance include
the sensation produced by the turn of the eyes (convergence), the unclarity
of the appearance and the tension of the eye (accommodation). Among other
factors contributing to the creation of the idea of distance he mentioned the
quantity, the size and the nature of the objects we perceive. He believed that
experience links such factors to the notion of distance. 3
A person born blind gaining the power of sight would in the beginning, said
Berkeley, obtain no idea of distance through the faculty of sight; the sun and
the stars, nearby and distant objects would all appear to be in his eye--or,
rather, in his mind.

The objects intromitted by his sight would seem to him (as in truth
they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each
whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure, or the
most inward passions of his soul. For our judging objects perceived
by sight to be at any distance, or without the mind, is [...] entirely
the effect of experience, which one in those circumstances could not
yet have attained to. 4

Berkeley stated that it is only after we have had long experience of certain
ideas derived from the sense of touch being linked to certain ideas derived
from sight that we can immediately conclude which tactile ideas will follow
certain visual ideas in a natural way. Visual ideas suggest tactile ideas, just
as a flushed face suggests embarrassment and a pale face suggests fear. 5
In order to prevent confusion Berkeley distinguished two kinds of objects
of sight: primary and secondary. By means of primary, direct objects of sight
(viz. light and colours) we are, he said, able to perceive secondary, indirect

1Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §2. The remark "It is [...] agreed by all" should probably be
regarded as rhetorical. In fact Berkeley believed that it was the general opinion that we
see things at a distance outside ourselves.
2Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §9: "It is evident that when the mind perceives any idea, not
immediately and of itself, it must be by means of some other idea."
3Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §§16-28.
4Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §41.
5Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §45 and §65. In the Philosophical Commentaries Berkeley speaks
of "the constant & long association of ideas." Berkeley [17o7-17o8] 1975, no. 225.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 31

and improper objects of sight. Berkeley believed these latter properly to be-
long to the sense of touch. 1 Just as Locke had understood flat surfaces as
signs of three-dimensional shapes and had compared the visual perception
of three-dimensional shapes with the understanding of linguistic tokens, so
Berkeley compared the perception of secondary objects of sight with the un-
derstanding of the meaning of words. Whenever we hear a familiar language
we receive simultaneously the sounds and the corresponding meaning of the
words. These two are, through experience, so tightly bound together that it
seems as if we are hearing not sounds but meanings.: Where Locke made
no more than a passing reference to the analogy between visual perception
and the understanding of language, this analogy plays an important part in
Berkeley's writings.
Berkeley believed that size as well as distance was perceived indirectly.
Consequently he regarded visual size not as a primary but as a secondary or
improper object of sight. The visual size of an object can change, whereas
the tactile size is always the same. The estimates we make of visual size, said
Berkeley, depend entirely on experience. An assessment of size made by a
person born blind opening his eyes for the first time would be totally different
from the assessment we would make. 3
Berkeley introduced a third variant of Molyneux's problem relative to the
perception of the position of objects. He thereby made clear the function he
accorded to such a thought experiment. Berkeley believed that it is useful to
place ourselves in the blind man's shoes in order to rid ourselves of our visual
experience and its accompanying prejudices regarding visual perception. He
was convinced that this would, to a certain extent, be possible:

In order to disentangle our minds from whatever prejudices we may

entertain with relation to the subject in hand [i.e., situation], nothing
seems more apposite than the taking into our thoughts the case of
one born blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made to see. And
though, perhaps, it may not be an easy task to divest ourselves en-
tirely of the experience received from sight, so as to be able to put
our thoughts exactly in the posture of such a one's, we must, nev-
ertheless, as far as possible, endeavour to frame true conceptions of
what might reasonably be supposed to pass in his mind. 4

The person born blind, said Berkeley, would not at first think that what he
was seeing was high or low or the right way up or upside-down. It would only

1Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §50.

2Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §51.
3Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §79.
4Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §92.
32 Chapter Three

be after some experience had been gained that he would learn that objects
pictured on the lower part of his eye are above, since he would see them clearly
by aiming his gaze upwards. Without this eye movement, terms related to the
position of tangible objects, such as "right way up" and "upside-down," would
never have been transferred to the ideas which belong to sight. 1 Berkeley
believed that what had largely contributed to writers on optics being misled
in this m a t t e r was that they had placed too much emphasis on retinal images.
Whenever they thought of these tiny images they imagined that they were
looking at the b o t t o m of the eye of another person and that they saw the
images which were pictured there2 In addition, Berkeley was of the opinion
t h a t it was erroneous to imagine that retinal images were representations of
external objects, for in fact there would be nothing in common between ideas
of sight and those of touch; moreover the direct objects of sight do not, he
stated, exist without the mind.
This brings us to the second aim of the Essay regarding the heterogeneity
of sight and touch. Berkeley ventured to make the following statement:

The extension, figures, and motions perceived by sight are specifically

distinct from the ideas of touch called by the same names, nor is there
any such thing as one idea or kind of idea common to both senses. 3

One of the arguments used by Berkeley in an a t t e m p t to support this state-

ment was related to a new variant on Molyneux's question: a person born
blind gaining his sight would not think that the objects perceived were of the
same nature as the objects of touch nor that they had anything in common. 4
Another argument concerned the statement that only quantities of the same
sort can be added together. In view of the fact that Berkeley could not imag-
ine that he could add a visible and a tangible line together, he concluded that
they were heterogeneous.
Finally Berkeley borrowed a further argument from Molyneux's problem.~
If a square surface perceived by touch were to be of the same kind as a square
surface perceived by sight, he stated, the person born blind would recognise
it immediately on seeing it. It would be no more than "introducing into his

1Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §98.

2Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §116. See also Turbayne 1955.
aBerkeley [17o9] 1975, §127.
4Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §128. Once again Berkeley pointed out the usefulness of an
experiment of this type: "And surely, the judgment of such an unprejudiced person is more
to be relied on in this case, than the sentiments of the generality of men: who in this,
as in almost everything else, suffer themselves to be guided by custom, and the erroneous
suggestions of prejudice, rather than reason and sedate reflexion."
5Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §132: "A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from
the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem."
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 33

mind by a new inlet an idea he has been already well acquainted with. ''1 We
should therefore either assume t h a t visual forms differ from tactile forms or
t h a t the solution proposed by Molyneux and Locke ("those two thoughtful and
ingenious men") is incorrect. Berkeley pointed to his earlier statement t h a t a
person born blind gaining his sight would have names for objects previously
perceived by touch, but would be unable to give these same names to objects
perceived for the first time by sight:
Cube, sphere, table are words he has known applied to things perceiv-
able by touch, but to things perfectly intangible he never knew t h e m
applied. [...] the ideas of sight are all new perceptions, to which there
be no names annexed in his mind: he cannot therefore u n d e r s t a n d
what is said to him concerning them: and to ask of the two bodies he
saw placed on the table, which was the sphere, which the cube? were
to him a question downright bantering and unintelligible. ~
Berkeley emphasised t h a t it was erroneous to think t h a t one and the same
thing affected b o t h the sense of touch and the sense of sight. If the same
angle or shape which was the object of touch was also the object of sight,
w h a t would prevent the m a n from knowing it at first sight? 3
In order to provide an answer to the question of why visual and tactile
shapes are given the same name while not being of the same kind, Berkeley
once again m a d e a comparison with language. Words are not considered as
entities in themselves, he said, but as signs of things. Since it would be
superfluous to have a name for a thing and for a sign of t h a t thing, it is
c u s t o m a r y to indicate b o t h by the same name. T h e same would apply to
forms: visual forms are signs of tactile forms and are hardly regarded as
entities in themselves. It would be superfluous to have different names for
the tactile form and the visual form which indicates it. This does not imply
t h a t tactile and visual shapes are of the same sort. A tangible square and a
visible square are just as different as a tangible square and the six-letter word
"square" which indicates it. 4
R e s p o n d i n g to the objection t h a t a tactile square is more like a visual
square t h a n a visual circle, Berkeley stated t h a t while this is true,
it is not because it is liker, or more of a species with it, but because
the visible square contains in it several distinct parts, whereby to

1Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §133.

2Berkeley [1709] z975, §135.
3Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §136: "For though the manner wherein it affects the sight be
different from that wherein it affected his touch, yet, there being beside this manner or
circumstance, which is new and unknown, the angle or figure, which is old and known, he
cannot choose but discern it."
4Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §14o.
34 Chapter Three

m a r k the several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square,

whereas the visible circle doth not. The square perceived by touch
hath four distinct, equal sides, so also hath it four distinct angles.
It is therefore necessary that the visible figure which shall be most
proper to m a r k it contain four distinct equal parts corresponding to
the four sides of a tangible square, as likewise four other distinct and
equal parts whereby to denote the four equal angles of the tangible
square. 1

Just as certain visual forms are more appropriate to represent certain tac-
tile forms, Berkeley stated, so also do certain written words better describe
sounds. The fact that letters represent sounds is in itself arbitrary. But
once it has become the object of common consent, the combination of letters
representing a certain sound is no longer arbitrary.
The question could be put as to why visual and tactile ideas can be so
easily confused, which is not the case with other symbols. Berkeley believed
that this was so because visual signs are constant and universal and because
their relationship to tactile ideas is learnt immediately after birth. ~ The signs
are not determined by man but the objects of sight constitute "the universal
language of Nature. ''3 It is a universal language which instructs us in how to
behave in order to acquire those things which are necessary for our existence
and welfare, and in order to avoid that which can cause us harm. However,
there is no necessary connection between visual and tactile figures and, said
Berkeley, this becomes evident if we consider that what seems round and
smooth to the touch may, when viewed under the microscope, appear quite
different .4
Berkeley closed his Essay with a few remarks on geometry. On the basis
of what we have already seen, he determined that the object of geometry is
constituted not by visual but by tactile extension and/orm. An intelligent
being having the sense of sight but lacking that of touch (an unbodied spirit,
a kind of inverse of Molyneux's person born blind) would, he thought, be
incapable of perceiving solid bodies or flat shapes. 5
To round off this section we are going to look at a philosopher influenced by
Berkeley (among others) but whose ideas regarding the relationship between
touch and sight were somewhat more subtle: Thomas Reid (171o 1796), the
founder of the Scottish school of common sense philosophy and later known
for his faculty psychology. In his An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764)

1Berkeley [1709] 1975, §142.

2Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §144.
3Berkeley [1709] 1975, §147.
4Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §1o5.
5Berkeley [1709] 1975, §§15o-159.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 35

Reid proposed two solutions to Molyneux's problem, one for when the man
was using only his sight and one for when he was also capable of mathematical
reasoning.
Reid had originally espoused the doctrine which stated that ideas are the
only immediate objects of awareness but, like Kant at a later date, he was
awakened from his slumbers by Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Under-
standing (1748). Reid considered Hume's philosophy to be a reductio ad
absurdum of scepticism; it was a system that pulled the carpet from under
our feet because it made it impossible to justify any of our beliefs. Reid came
to the conclusion that the origin of scepticism was to be found in the doc-
trine of ideas, this latter being based on prejudice and confusion. Reid was
thus of the opinion that the notion that the immediate data of perception are
ideas was nothing more than a hypothesis which could nowhere find support.
Moreover, the notion failed to fulfil the r51e for which it was created, since it
left unanswered all questions regarding the reliability of each perception.
Reid attacked the doctrine of ideas by appealing to common sense: the man
in the street is convinced that what he perceives is the thing itself and not
an idea nor an impression. Reid also believed that ideas in the philosophical
sense do not exist but are fictitious creations that simply do not need to be
postulated. Locke and Hume had based their notions on certain assumptions
regarding elements of knowledge (for Locke, simple ideas and for Hume, im-
pressions) and they had then gone on to regard knowledge as the result of
combining these elementary data with the perception of their similarities and
differences. However, Reid believed that the so-called elementary data were
nothing more than the result of analysis.
To bring some clarity into the discussion, Reid made a distinction between
sensation and perception. A sensation is, according to Reid, a feeling that
exists exclusively in the mind of the perceiver. 1 Sensations have nothing in
common with external objects, of which they are merely signs. By way of
example of a sentence indicating a sensation Reid gave "I feel a pain"; the
sentence "I see a tree" would, on the contrary, indicate a perception. ~ Reid
held that a perception always involves an object distinct from the action by
which it is perceived. 3 The perception of an object implies a concept of its
form and a belief in its current existence. This belief is a consequence of our
constitution and not of argumentation: "There is no reasoning in perception

1Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xx: "[a sensation] appears to be something which can have
no existence but in a sentient mind, no distinction from the act of the mind by which it is
felt."
2Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xx.
3Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xx: "Perception [...] hath always an object distinct from the
act by which it is perceived."
36 Chapter Three

[...] The belief which is implied in it, is the effect of instinct. ''1 In contrast to
Berkeley, Reid believed that an object can exist whether or not it be perceived.
Reid drew a distinction between two types of perception: some are natural
and original, others are acquired through experience. 2 It is true of all senses
to say that we have far more acquired than original perceptions, and it is
especially true of sight:

By this sense we perceive originally the visible figure and colour of

bodies only, and their visible place; but we learn to perceive by the
eye, almost every thing which we can perceive by touch. The orig-
inal perceptions of this sense, serve only as signs to introduce the
acquired. 3

Like Locke and Berkeley, Reid drew a comparison between perception and lan-
guage. Our original perceptions are, he said, analogous to natural languages,
whereas acquired perceptions could be compared to artificial languages. The
signs employed in original perceptions are observations; the signs used in
natural languages are facial expressions, physical gestures and vocal modu-
lations. These signs are universal and the capacity to interpret them is not
acquired but inborn. In acquired perceptions the signs are either sensations
or things that we perceive through means of sensations. In artificial languages
the signs are articulated sounds. In both cases we discover the relationship
through experience. 4
Reid believed that perception must not only be distinguished from sen-
sation but also from the knowledge of the objects of sense which we have
acquired by reasoning. "When I look at the moon, I perceive her to be some-
times circular, sometimes horned, and sometimes gibbous. [...] from these
various appearances of her enlightened part, I infer that she is really of a
spherical figure. This conclusion is not obtained by simple perception, but by
reasoning." 5
Reid regarded sight as the noblest of our senses, but despite this he be-
lieved that only a fraction of the knowledge acquired by sight could not be
communicated to a person blind from birth. To clarify this notion he drew a
distinction between the visual appearance of things and the things which are
suggested by that appearance:

1Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xx.

2Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xxiv: "The original perceptions which nature gave [children]
are few, and insufficient for the purpose of life; and therefore she made them capable of
acquiring many more perceptions by habit."
3Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xx.
4Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xxiv.
5Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xx.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 37

the visible appearance of objects is hardly ever regarded by us. It

[...] serves only as a sign to introduce to the mind something else,
which may be distinctly conceived by those who never saw. 1

A book has various appearances, depending on the distance and the position
from which it is observed. But habit has taught us that we should regard
it as one and the same book: "overlooking the appearance, we immediately
conceive the real figure, distance, and position of the body, of which its visible
or perspective appearance is a sign and indication. ''~ Reid thus agreed with
Berkeley's "just and important observation" that the visual appearances of
objects constitute a kind of language used by nature to inform us of distance,
size and shape. Whenever we hear a familiar language we do not, after all,
take notice of the sounds but of the meaning of the words, of the things
indicated.
Reid believed that the visual form of an object is used only as a sign of
the real figure. He put it this way: When I use my original powers of sight
to look at a globe standing before me, I perceive only something of a circular
form, variously coloured. The visible figure has no distance from the eye, no
convexity, nor is it three-dimensional. But once I have learnt to perceive the
distance of every part of this object from the eye, this perception gives it
convexity and adds a third dimension. 3
Reid attempted to reveal the characteristics of visual forms by introducing
the Idomenians, creatures who (like Berkeley's unbodied spirit) would possess
only the faculty of sight. 4

The being we have supposed having no conception of a third dimen-

sion, his visible figures have length and breadth indeed; but thickness
is neither included nor excluded, being a thing of which he has no
conception. And therefore visible figures, although they have length
and breadth, as surfaces have, yet they are neither plain surfaces nor
curve surfaces. 5

The geometry developed by the Idomenians would, stated Reid, be non-

Euclidean. 6

1Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §ii. The only profession for which it would be required to draw
the distinction alluded to is, said Reid, that of a painter. See Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §iii.
~Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §ii.
3Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xxiii.
4The Idomenians can be regarded as the predecessors of the nineteenth-century Flat-
landers invented by Edwin A. Abbott (Abbott 1884).
5Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §ix.
6See also Daniels 197o.
38 Chapter Three

Reid believed that while a blind person gaining his sight would perceive
the same visible appearances of objects as we do, he would not understand
their language; he would only take note of the signs without realising their
significance. The blind man in Molyneux's question would therefore not know
which of the two objects was the sphere and which the cube if he only used
his ]aculty o/ sight:

To a man newly made to see, the visible appearance of objects would

be the same as to us; but he would see nothing at all of their real
dimensions, as we do. He could form no conjecture, by means of
his sight only, how m a n y inches or feet they were in length, breadth
or thickness. He could perceive little or nothing of their real figure;
nor could he discern that this was a cube, that a sphere; that this
was a cone, and that a cylinder. His eye could not inform him, that
this object was near, and that more remote [...] In a word, his eyes,
though ever so perfect, would at first give him almost no information
of things without him. 1

As we will see in the next section, Reid believed that the result would be
different if the man was capable of mathematical reasoning.
Although there are other philosophers who gave a negative answer to Moly-
neux's question, the four already dealt with above will suffice here, since the
philosophical analyses proposed by the rest do not differ essentially from those
proposed by Molyneux, Locke, Berkeley and Reid. To the extent that these
other philosophers based their conclusion (partly) on empirical data, they will
be dealt with at a later stage.
Molyneux wrote to Locke that "upon Discourse with several concerning
your Book and Notions, I have proposed [my Problem] to Diverse very In-
genious Men, and could hardly ever Meet with One that at first dash would
give me the Answer to it, which I think true; till by hearing My Reasons they
were Convinced. ''~ W h a t were the grounds advanced by these learned men
for stating that a person blind from birth cured of blindness would be able to
use no more than his faculty of sight to state which was the sphere and which
the cube?

1Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §iii.

2Molyneux to Locke, 2 March 1692/3 , in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 4 (1979), no. 16o9.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 39

3 POSITIVE ANSWERS TO MOLYNEUX'S QUESTION

The first recorded example of a positive answer to Molyneux's question is

that given by Edward Synge (1659-1741), later archbishop of Tuam.1 Francis
Quayle, prebendary of Brigown (Cloyne), laid out Molyneux's problem to
Synge in the course of a visit to a friend who was a preacher. Synge became
so obsessed by it that he could hardly put it out of his thoughts. On Friday
6 September 1695, the day after the visit, he wrote a letter to Quayle detailing
his thoughts on the problem. Quayle sent the letter on to Molyneux who, in
his turn, passed on a copy to Locke as an illustration of his statement that
the problem had placed many scholars in an awkward position. ~
In his letter Synge distinguished between various kinds of concepts: "I call
every notion of any thing which a man entertains, an Idea, but that notion
only, which a man entertains of a visible thing as it is visible I call an image." 3
According to Synge a person born blind can have a (tactile) idea of a sphere
and a cube and of some difference that exists between them, but he cannot
have any (visual) image of them. The idea he will have of the sphere is that
of an object which is the same all over. The idea he forms of a cube is that of
an object not the same on every surface, for in one place he will feel a smooth
surface, in another the sharp point of an angle and in a third a long edge
reaching from one angle to another.
If the man gains his powers of sight and is shown a sphere and a cube he
will, according to Synge, immediately have different images of the sphere and
the cube. The image he gets of the sphere is that of an object the same on
all sides; the image of the cube will be that of an object not the same all
over. The man will perceive agreement between the idea and the image of
the sphere and difference between the idea of the sphere and the image of the
cube (and vice-versa). These agreements and differences will, stated Synge,
enable him to say which is the sphere and which the cube. 4

1Edward Synge, bishop of Raphoe (x714) and archbishop of Tuam (1716), was particu-
larly well known for his Gentleman's Religion (Synge 1693).
2Synge to Quayle, 6 September 1695, in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 5 (1979), no. 1984.
Molyneux enclosed a copy of Synge's letter with the letter he wrote to Locke on Tuesday
24 December 1695. Synge's letter was published in Locke 17o8.
3Synge to Quayle, 6 September 1695, in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 5 (1979), no. 1984.
4In fact this is what Synge wrote: "if immediately upon the sight of the globe and the
cube there be ground enough for such a person Clearly to perceive the Agreement and the
difference between his preconceived ideas and the newly conceived images of those figures
then he may be able to know which is the globe and which is the Cube." [My italics if and
then.]
40 Chapter Three

In his letter, Molyneux said that Locke would very easily be able to uncover
"by what false steps this Gentleman is lead into his Error. "1 Locke replied:

I see by Mr. S's answer to that which was originally your question,
how hard it is, even for ingenious men to free themselves from the
anticipations of sense. The first step towards knowledge is to have
clear and distinct ideas; which I have just reason every day more
and more, to think few men ever have, or think themselves to want;
which is one great cause of that infinite jargon and nonsense which
so pesters the world2

Locke's laudable attempts to acquire true knowledge on the basis of clear

ideas were, however, unable to turn aside accusations that he himself had used
erroneous language and incorrect reasoning. One of his critics was Henry Lee.
Twelve years after the publication of Locke's Essay Lee published his Anti-
Scepticism: or, Notes upon each Chapter of Mr. Lock's Essay concerning
Humane Understanding (17o2). The work was first and foremost designed as
an aid to Lee's two sons, who were studying philosophy. As the title would
lead one to suspect, Lee accused Locke of scepticism: "The Idea of one thing
being no more an evidence of its real Existence, than its real Existence is of a
person's having the Idea of i t . - - A n d this is one reason why I conceive those
Ideal Principles must involve us in an endless Scepticism. "3 Lee was of the
opinion that simple ideas do not exist and that Locke's principles tended to
undermine the foundations of natural and revealed religion.
Lee agreed with Locke that the senses are corrected by the judgment, but
he doubted whether Locke's example of a uniformly coloured sphere demon-
strated this. What Lee wondered was whether experience is required to recog-
nise the difference between flat and spherical objects. He was convinced that
the retinal images of a (flat) circle and a sphere are round. He also believed
firmly that the image projected onto the retina by a flat surface is identical at
all points, whereas the image of a spherical surface is not identical since shad-
ows make a weaker impression than parts clearly illuminated. Lee believed
that by nature we immediately perceive the illuminated parts of a sphere to
be closer to us and the shaded parts to be further away. 4 He did not accept
that experience was required to learn that shade signified shape, as Locke
had suggested, "for the parts, from which the shade comes, will by the nat-

1Molyneux to Locke, 24 December 1695, in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 5 (1979), no. 1984.
2Locke to Molyneux, 5 April 1695, in Locke 1976-199o, vol. 5 (1979), no. 2%9.
3 L e e 1 7 o 2 , Preface.
4This only applies to front lighting.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 41

ural Structure of the Eye appear farther off than otherwise they would, and
so the whole Superficies of the Globe appear protuberant, as it really is. "1
Regarding Molyneux's problem Lee wondered "whether there be not con-
stituted in Nature a necessary Connexion between a certain Motion upon the
organs of Touch, and a certain Perception, and a certain Figure at the bottom
of the Eye, and that same Perception. ''~ Lee thought that there must be a
relationship of this nature, otherwise we would never be able to perceive one
and the same object by both touch and sight. If the relationship did not exist,
this would mean that nature had interposed a separation between the various
senses, and Lee could not believe that this was the case. As we have seen,
Berkeley proposed such a separation. He believed that there was no question
of one single object being capable of being perceived by both touch and sight,
but rather was it a question of two different objects. But even if there was a
necessary relationship as proposed by Lee, the question would still remain as
to whether a person born blind gaining his sight would immediately perceive
the relationship.
Using a variant on Molyneux's problem Lee attempted to suggest that this
was the case and that experience had no part to play. A person born blind
who had learnt to distinguish between a saucer and a plate, which vary only
in size, would--believed L e e - - b e able to see which was the larger and which
the smaller without recourse to experience. 3 In the same way, the man would
be able to see that in the case of a cube the distance from the centre point to
points on the edge shows variations, whereas the radius of the sphere remains
constant. Lee therefore believed that "the Author of Nature has annex'd the
same Mode of Perception to a certain Motion upon the Organs of Touch as
there is a certain Figure in the Eye. TM The person born blind would only
have to learn the name of the mode. In view of the fact that he had done
that using the sense of touch, as Molyneux had assumed, Lee believed that
he would be able to identify the sphere and the cube.
Locke's Essay met with resistance not only in England but also on the Con-
tinent. It persuaded the versatile scholar Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646
1716 ) to write a critical commentary, a document on the basis of which Leib-
niz attempted some time around 1695 to arrange discussions with Locke, but
Locke did not react. In 17oo the French translation of Locke's Essay was
published, 5 which persuaded Leibniz that he should lay out his criticism for a
wider audience in an attractive literary f o r m - - a s a dialogue. The result, the

1Lee 17o2, bk. II, ch. ix, §8. This is incorrect.

2Lee 17o2, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
3This only applies when they are at the same distance from the perceiver.
4Lee 17o2, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
5Locke 17oo.
42 Chapter Three

Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, was finished in 17o4, b u t L o c k e ' s

d e a t h in t h e s a m e y e a r t o o k a w a y a n y desire on t h e p a r t of Leibniz to p u b l i s h
t h e work. 1 T h e first e d i t i o n of t h e Nouveaux essais did not a p p e a r until 1765,
a l m o s t fifty y e a r s after Leibniz himself h a d died.
It is no secret t h a t Leibniz in no way s h a r e d Locke's e m p i r i c i s t ideas. He
b e l i e v e d t h a t in a d d i t i o n to knowledge which we acquire by e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e
a r e also e t e r n a l a n d necessary t r u t h s w i t h which we are born. T h u s Leibniz
c h a n g e d L o c k e ' s s t a t e m e n t saying t h a t all our knowledge o r i g i n a t e s in experi-
ence into t h e saying: "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non ~uerit in sensu, excipe:
nisi ipse intellectus. ''2 Leibniz rejected t h e c o m p a r i s o n Locke m a d e b e t w e e n
h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a tabula rasa since this notion would lead to m a -
t e r i a l i s m . I n s t e a d , he c o m p a r e d h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to a block of m a r b l e ,
t h e veins of which r e p r e s e n t v i r t u a l , i n b o r n knowledge.
L e i b n i z a g r e e d with Locke t h a t unconscious j u d g m e n t s can occur in per-
c e p t i o n . 3 T h e s y s t e m s u g g e s t e d by Leibniz was f o u n d e d on t h e n o t i o n of
petites perceptions or perceptions insensibles, tiny p e r c e p t i o n s r e c o r d e d un-
consciously. He also d i s t i n g u i s h e d conscious p e r c e p t i o n s , k n o w n as appercep-
tions.
Like Lee's Anti-Scepticism t h e Nouveaux essais followed in t h e f o o t s t e p s
of L o c k e ' s Essay. At t h e a p p r o p r i a t e place in t h e book, P h i l a l ~ t h e (Locke's
s p o k e s m a n ) e x p l a i n e d M o l y n e u x ' s p r o b l e m to Th@ophile. Thdophile, defender
of t h e opinions of Leibniz, replied:

je crois que, suppos@ que l'aveugle sache que ces d e u x figures qu'il
voit sont celles du cube et du globe, il p o u r r a les discerner, et dire
sans toucher. Ceci est le globe, ceci le cube. 4

In r e p l y to P h i l a l ~ t h e ' s r e m a r k t h a t he h a d given t h e w r o n g solution, Th@-

ophile a n s w e r e d t h a t his view did not differ as much from t h a t of M o l y n e u x or
Locke as m i g h t seem to be t h e case. He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t w i t h i n t h e q u e s t i o n
t h e r e was a h i d d e n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e blind person should only be able to m a k e

1In 17o6 Leibniz wrote to Thomas Burnet: "La mort de M. Locke m'a 5t~ l'envie de
publier mes remarques sur ces ouvrages; j'aime mieux publier maintenant mes pens@es ind~-
pendamment de celles d'un autre." Quoted by J. Brunschwig in his introduction to Leibniz
[1765] 1966, p. 15.
2Leibniz [1765] 1966 , bk. II, ch. i, §2.
3Leibniz accused Locke of failing to adhere to his own programme: "I1 semble que notre
habile auteur pr@tend qu'il n'y a rien de virtuel en nous et m@me rien dont nous ne nous
apercevions toujours actuellement; mais il ne peut pas le prendre ~ la rigueur, autrement
son sentiment serait trop paradoxe, puisque encore les habitudes acquises et les provisions
de notre m@moire ne sont pas toujours aper§ues [...] I1 limite aussi sa th~se en d'autres
endroits, en disant qu'il n'y a rien en nous dont nous ne nous soyons au moins aper~us
autrefois." Leibniz [1765] 1966, Prdface.
4Leibniz [1765] 1966 , bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 43

a distinction between the two objects. For the man would know beforehand
that he was to be shown a sphere and a cube. According to Th@ophile it was
therefore without question that he would be able to distinguish them "[par]
les principes de la raison, joints £ ce que l'attouchement lui a fourni aupar-
avant de connaissance sensuelle. ''1 The reason for this conviction was that a
sphere has no points which are distinct from other points because its surface
is flat and without angles, while a cube has eight points which are distinct
from each other.
Leibniz thus placed arguments in Th~ophile's mouth similar to those ad-
vanced by Synge. He subsequently had Th@ophile state that if this means of
distinguishing forms were not to exist, a blind person would not be capable
of understanding the basics of geometry by means of touch, whereas we know
that persons blind from birth can certainly do this. In contrast to Berkeley
Leibniz believed that a paralytic could, indeed, do geometry. He even stated
that geometry is mostly learnt by sight alone. And if the geometry of a blind
person were to be compared with that of a paralytic, we would see that both
have arrived at the same ideas, though they would not have any common
images:
Et il faut que ces deux g@om~tries, celle de l'aveugle et celle du para-
lytique, se rencontrent et s'accordent et m@me reviennent aux m@mes
id@es, quoiqu'il n'y ait point d'images communes2

W h a t Leibniz says here is of major importance. He makes an explicit dis-

tinction between images and ideas: "Ce qui fait encore voir combien il faut
distinguer les images des idles exactes, qui consistent dans les d~finitions."3
According to Leibniz a definition can be given of ideas--such as ideas of
shape--which are acquired by means of more than one sense:

Les idles qn'on dit venir de plus d'un sens, comme celle de l'espace,
figure, mouvement, repos, sont plutSt du sens commun, c'est-£-dire
de l'esprit-m@me, car ce sont des idles de l'entendement pur, mais
qui ont du rapport £ l'ext@rieur, et que les sens font apercevoir; aussi
sont-elles capables de d~finitions et de d~monstrations. 4

When it is possible to give a definition of the form of an object, Leibniz

believed, it is then that we have an exact idea of the object. If, however, the
nature and characteristics of an object are not known, we can have only an
image or an unclear idea (idde con/use) of it. Thus a mathematician can have

1Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.

2Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
3Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
4Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. v.
44 Chapter Three

an exact idea of a nine-sided or ten-sided figure without being immediately

capable of distinguishing them one from the other by sight. A workman or
an engineer, by way of contrast, can possess a very clear image of a ten-sided
figure without having an exact idea of it. 1
A person blind from birth acquiring the faculty of sight would, said Leibniz,
be capable of distinguishing a sphere from a cube using his understanding
and the knowledge acquired through the sense of touch, or with the aid of
exact ideas of the forms of both objects. But if the man were not to be told
beforehand that he would be shown a sphere and a cube, Leibniz believed that
he would not have any idea that he was seeing three-dimensional objects:

je r~ponds qu'il les discernera, comme je viens de dire, si quelqu'un

l'avertit que l'une ou l'autre des apparences ou perceptions qu'il en
aura appartient au cube et au globe; mais sans cette instruction pr~-
alable, j'avoue qu'il ne s'avisera pas d'abord de penser que ces esp~ces
de peintures qu'il s'en fera dans le fond de ses yeux, et qui pourraient
venir d'une plate peinture sur la table, repr~sentent des corps.:

This opinion is, indeed, very close to what Locke had stated.
Leibniz emphatically added, through the mouth of Th~ophile, that he was
not speaking of what the man would immediately do when amazed and con-
fused by the novelty, or when he was scarcely used to drawing consequences:
"je ne parle pas de ce qu'il fera peut-~tre en effet et sur-le-champ, ~tant 6bloui
et confondu par la nouveaut~ ou d'ailleurs peu accoutum~ £ tirer des consS-
quences." 3 In this, Leibniz was of the same opinion as Berkeley.
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) , an Irish philosopher known particularly for
his theory of moral sense in ethics, gave an answer to Molyneux's question
which is remarkably similar to that given by Leibniz. On 6 September 172 7
Hutcheson wrote a letter to William Mace of Gresham College in which he
dealt with Berkeley's immaterialism and, partly in response to his point of
view, gave a positive answer to Molyneux's question. The letter was first
published in 1788. 4
As already mentioned, Berkeley had stated in his Essay that either visual
extension and forms differ from tactile extension and forms or that the solution
proposed by Molyneux and Locke was incorrect. 5 Berkeley was of the opinion
that the former was the case; Hutcheson held to the latter: "Messrs. Locke
and Molyneux are both wrong about the cube and sphere proposed to a blind

1Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. xxix, §13.

~Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
3Leibniz [1765] 1966, bk. II, ch. ix, §8.
4Hutcheson [1727] 1788.
5Berkeley [17o9] 1975, §133.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 45

man restored to sight. He would not at first know the sphere from a shaded
plain surface by a view from above; but a side view would discover the equal
uniform relievo in one, and the cubic one in the other. ''1
According to Hutcheson we can judge by touch, with eyes closed, what the
visual extension of a touched object will be when we open our eyes, but we
cannot determine by touch which colour we will see:

which shews visible and tangible extension to be really the same idea,
or to have one idea common, viz. the extension; though the purely
tangible and visible perceptions are quite disparate. 2

This statement clearly recalls the statement made by Leibniz that visual and
tactile images of forms differ from one another, although their exact ideas
are the same. Both philosophers meant that while visual and tactile sensa-
tions of forms are different, the accompanying concepts are the same or have
something in common. 3
Like Leibniz, Hutcheson believed that a blind person would understand
nothing of geometry if visual and tactile ideas of extension were totally differ-
ent, as Berkeley had suggested. However, blind people do in fact understand
geometry--using, for example, wooden s h a p e s - - a n d thus visual and tactile
ideas must, he believed, be the same.
Hutcheson wanted to illustrate the erroneous nature of Berkeley's thesis
using a thought experiment inspired by Molyneux's problem. Imagine a per-
son, proposed Hutcheson, both paralytic and blind, with no notion of either
type of extension, yet having a keen sense of smell. Imagine further that an
object exists which changes its smell with every change of its shape. The
blind paralytic will give the various smells various names. Another person,
this one sighted, will use the same names for the various shapes. This latter
person will reason concerning the shapes or will formulate one of Euclid's
theorems concerning the relationship between the sides. Would it be possi-
ble, asked Hutcheson, for the blind paralytic to agree with this? Would he

1 H u t c h e s o n [1727] 1788 , p. 159. See also B e r m a n 1974a. It is unclear w h y a view from

above would lead to recognition while a side view would not.
2 H u t c h e s o n [1727] 1788, p. 159.
3 H u t c h e s o n s t a t e d t h a t a s e n s a t i o n is a c c o m p a n i e d by an idea; here he was s p e a k i n g of
" c o n c o m i t a n t ideas." H u t c h e s o n [1727] 1788 , p. 158. See also H u t c h e s o n 1728 ' p. 3, note:
"Some Ideas are f o u n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e m o s t different Sensations, which are n o t yet to be
perceived s e p a r a t e l y from s o m e sensible Quality; s u c h are Extension, Figure, Motion, a n d
Rest, which a c c o m p a n y t h e Ideas of Sight, or Colours, and yet m a y be perceived w i t h o u t
t h e m , as in t h e Ideas of Touch, at least if we move our O r g a n s along t h e P a r t s of t h e B o d y
touched. Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest s e e m therefore to be m o r e properly called
Ideas accompanying t h e Sensations of Sight a n d Touch, t h a n t h e Sensations of either of
t h e s e Senses."
46 Chapter Three

recognise the meaning by means of the smells? Hutcheson did not answer
this rhetorical question. Possibly he was hoping that all right-thinking people
would answer "no," since smells and visual forms and extension have noth-
ing in common. But a blind person would certainly be able to speak about
geometry with someone possessing only the sense of sight. This, stated Hutch-
eson, demonstrates that visual and tactile extension (and forms) possess an
idea in common. And apparently he believed that a person born blind would
immediately notice this idea when he first saw a sphere and a cube.
In the second edition of his Essai philosophique sur l'dme des b~tes, pub-
lished in 1737, the Dutch preacher and philosopher David Renaud Boullier
(1694-1759) proposed a solution to Molyneux's problem which was in line
with those put forward by Leibniz and Hutcheson. 1 The aim of his Essai was
to prove that animals possess a soul and to investigate the nature of this soul.
Boullier's discussion of the perception of animals tempted him into enlarging
on the nature of our sensations, which brought him to Molyneux's problem,
which he called "Paradoxe de mr. Locke."
The answer given by Locke was, said Boullier, incorrect and "peu digne
d'un Esprit aussi solide que le sien. ''~ The reason why Locke's reasoning did
not add up was, according to Boullier, as follows:

L'id~e du Globe vu, par exemple, et l'id@e du Globe touch5 sont la

m@me idSe essentielle, quoi que diversement modifi@e par diffSrens ac-
compagnemens de perceptions accessoires. Que mes mains touchent,
ou que mes yeux voyent un Corps, l'idSe de son ~tendue s'imprime
5galement par ces deux voyes dans mon Esprit. 3

Boullier therefore concluded that a person born blind gaining his sense of
sight would discover the same difference between the sphere and the cube as
he had already learnt through his sense of touch:

je conclus que l'Aveugle gu~ri retrouvera bien-tSt, par le secours des

yeux, la m@me difference entre le Globe et le Cube, qu'il ne connois-
soit jusqu'alors que par l'attouchement. 4

Despite Boullier's criticism of Locke, various aspects of their ideas seem to

agree. Boullier, for instance, admitted that the faculty of sight is not perfect

1The first edition of this work appeared in 1728. I have not seen this edition.
2Boullier [1728] 1737, part II, ch. vi, §18.
3Boullier [1728] 1737, part II, ch. vi, §18.
4Boullier [1728] 1737, part II, ch. vi, §18. Here Boullier added that "la vue de ces deux
Solides perfectionnera, rendra plus nette et plus vive l'id@equ'il en avoit d~ja reque par un
autre sens, et lui fera faire par cons@quent un discernement plus exact et plus juste entre
Fun et l'autre."
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 47

and t h a t it has, like other senses, its illusions which other senses, experience
and understanding have to correct. Sight, for example, would show us solid
objects as flat and deformed:

Selon la distance et l'aspect, les Corps sont vus sous une figure diffS-
rente de la v6ritable. Les angles d'un Cube sont 6moussez, certains
c6tez retr6cis, un Globe nous paroit une surface platte et circulaire
etc. 1

However, Boullier believed that this does not prevent our sight from providing
knowledge of the same properties as does our sense of touch and that it assures
us of the identity of the object that we have perceived through these two
senses.
Boullier was of the opinion that the example of the sphere and the cube
was deceptive because sight does not give us immediately an idea of solidity,
nor of the hardness or resistance of a body. He was the first to suggest taking
a square and a circle. The blind person in question will acquire the idea of
these two shapes and their properties vi£ the sense of touch, said Boullier,
and since the faculty of sight will reveal the same properties the man will be
able to say which is the square and which the circle:

La vue lui offre les m~mes rapports d'6galit6 entre les rayons du Cer-
cle, la m~me uniformit6 de Courbure, les m~mes differences entre le
Cercle et le Quarry, que le tact lui avoit d~ja fait apercevoir. L£-des-
sus il dira sans hSziter, c'est un Cercle; et de l'autre figure, c'est un
Quarr6.2

Is it not asking too much to ascribe this type of reasoning to a blind person?
Would we not be raising him to the level of a deep-thinking philosopher? No,
affirmed Boullier, for I am merely proposing that he is capable of thinking,
which in no way deviates from the terms in which the problem is laid out;
moreover it is well known that blind people are good practitioners of geometry.
W h a t we should really be asking, according to Boullier, is whether the man
would be capable of distinguishing the two objects from each other without
first thinking deeply about it:

C'est ce qui doit infailliblement arriver, ce me semble. Cette action de

notre Ame qui r6unit au m6me Objet les diverses Sensations qu'elle en
re§oit se servant de leur concours pour se former une id6e plus nette
de cet objet est un raisonnement prompt, subtil, imperceptible, mais

1Boullier [1728] 1737, part II, ch. vi, §18.

2Boullier [1728] 1737, part II, ch. vi, §19.
48 Chapter Three

n a t u r e l , qui du C o r p s mSme que nous a n i m o n s s ' ~ t e n d p a r analogie

sur les a u t r e s C o r p s qui l ' e n v i r o n n e n t . 1

In this r e g a r d Boullier differed in his opinion from Leibniz.

T h e a b o v e shows t h a t M o l y n e u x ' s p r o b l e m was s u b j e c t to a v a r i e t y of in-
t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h e r e were, for instance, differences of opinion r e g a r d i n g t h e
q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e person b o r n blind would have to r e s p o n d i m m e d i -
a t e l y or w h e t h e r he would get t h e t i m e to t h i n k a b o u t t h e p r o b l e m . T h e
L o n d o n d o c t o r J a m e s J u r i n (1684 175o) e x p l i c i t l y b r o u g h t up this a n d o t h e r
questions2
J u r i n believed t h a t Locke h a d u n d e r s t o o d M o l y n e u x ' s question differently
from t h e w a y M o l y n e u x h a d m e a n t it a n d Locke's j u d g m e n t would t h e r e f o r e be
t o t a l l y different from t h a t of M o l y n e u x . M o l y n e u x had, in fact, o n l y f o r b i d d e n
t h e m a n to touch t h e objects. B u t he would have left him free to look at t h e m
t i m e a n d a g a i n , to observe t h e m from different angles a n d to use his m e m o r y
a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a Did Locke allow this? No, replied Jurin: "As soon as he
is m a d e to see, [Locke] requires him to p r o n o u n c e , with certainty at first sight,
which is t h e globe, which t h e cube; w i t h o u t giving him leave to t a k e a second
view, much less to recollect himself a n d to reason u p o n w h a t he sees. ''4
T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r Locke's at first sight should be u n d e r s t o o d as
s t r i c t l y as J u r i n believed. O t h e r a u t h o r s used t h e expression, while it is clear
t h a t t h e y o n l y m e a n t to say "when t h e m a n has gained his faculty of sight."
J u r i n ' s r e m a r k is nonetheless i n t e r e s t i n g in t h a t it could m a k e a difference
w h e t h e r t h e m a n would be required to give an i m m e d i a t e answer or w h e t h e r
he w o u l d be given the t i m e to reflect, a n d w h e t h e r he would have to s t a n d
still or would be allowed to move his head or even his whole body.
Like Leibniz, J u r i n believed t h a t it would be t o t a l l y i m p o s s i b l e for t h e m a n
of himself to d i s t i n g u i s h a sphere from a cube by sight. 5 B u t if he were to
be told t h a t he would be given these o b j e c t s to look at (and, said J u r i n , this
c o n d i t i o n was p a r t of M o l y n e u x ' s question) t h e n he would be able to do it. 6

1Boullier [1728] 1737, part II, ch. vi, §19.

2Jurin was a well-known polemicist of his time. He had been engaged in a controversy
with Berkeley: see Berkeley 1734, Jurin 1734, Berkeley 1735, Jurin 1735, and Breidert 1989.
3Jurin 1738 , p. 28, §163.
4Jurin 1738 , p. 28, §164.
5Jurin 1738 , p. 28, §166: "That he shall be told, the two bodies he sees are one a globe
and the other a cube; without which information it is no purpose to ask him which is the
globe and which the cube."
6Jurin stated that the question would also imply that "the blind man shall by sight
perceive the globe as one thing, distinct from the cube and all other bodies; and shall
likewise perceive the cube as one thing distinct from the globe and all other bodies." Jurin
1738, p. 28, §166. However, it was precisely the question as to whether this would be the
case.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 49

If t h e m a n were to look at t h e two o b j e c t s from various angles, he w o u l d n o t e

t h a t in t h e one case he was receiving different sensations. In t h e o t h e r case he
w o u l d always receive a similar s e n s a t i o n r e g a r d l e s s of t h e side from which he
looked at t h e o b j e c t . If he were t h e n to recall how a s p h e r e a n d a cube felt, he
w o u l d r e a s o n his w a y to t h e conclusion t h a t a s p h e r e is an o b j e c t which is t h e
s a m e over its entire surface w h e r e a s a cube is not. Since our senses have not
b e e n given to us in o r d e r to deceive us, said J u r i n , a n d different s e n s a t i o n s
are caused by different o b j e c t s , t h e m a n would be able to conclude which was
t h e s p h e r e a n d which t h e cube. We have seen this sort of r e a s o n i n g before, as
p r o p o s e d by Synge a n d others. 1 Finally, J u r i n w r o t e t h a t he h a d h e a r d from
S m i t h t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t blind p h i l o s o p h e r ever to exist, D o c t o r S a u n d e r s o n
w h o - - r e m a r k a b l y e n o u g h - - t a u g h t optics, a g r e e d w i t h him. ~
R e i d a g r e e d w i t h the opinion p u t f o r w a r d by Leibniz a n d J u r i n t h a t t h e
p e r s o n b o r n b l i n d would be a b l e to identify t h e sphere a n d t h e cube if he were
c a p a b l e of ( m a t h e m a t i c a l ) reasoning. R e i d h a d p r a i s e d B e r k e l e y for h a v i n g
seen t h a t visual forms are signs of t a c t i l e forms. B u t he believed t h a t B e r k e l e y
h a d p u s h e d his thesis t o o far by a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e is no r e l a t i o n s h i p at all
b e t w e e n t h e size, t h e form a n d t h e p o s i t i o n which we see a n d which we feel.
R e i d believed t h a t t h e r e t r u l y is a similarity, even a necessary, m a t h e m a t i c a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e visual form a n d size of an o b j e c t a n d its a c t u a l form
a n d size. In t h e case of a sighted person, t h e visual form leads by e x p e r i e n c e
d i r e c t l y to t h e c o n c e p t of its t r u e form of which it is a sign. T h e t r u e form a n d
p o s i t i o n can, a c c o r d i n g to Reid, be derived t h r o u g h m a t h e m a t i c a l r e a s o n i n g
from t h e visual form a n d t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e various c o m p o n e n t s . In t h e s a m e
way, namely by mathematical reasoning, the visual form of an object can be
derived from its real form, distance and position. Reid believed that this was
possible not only for a sighted person but also for one blind from birth. 3
In order to investigate whether he was right or not, Reid conducted a
thought experiment: "let us suppose such a blind man as Dr. Saunderson,
having all the knowledge and abilities which a blind man may have, suddenly
made to see perfectly. ''4 Then imagine, continued Reid, that the man is not
given the opportunity to associate the ideas of sight with those of touch until
such time as the ideas of sight begin to be somewhat familiar to him. When

1Joseph Priestley (1733-18o4) , the discoverer of oxygen, agreed with Jurin's answer to
Molyneux's question: see Priestley 1772 , pp. 72o-725 .
~Jurin 1738 , p. 29, §17o. Nicholas Saunderson (1682-1739) was one year old when he
lost his sight as result of smallpox. He was Lucasian professor of mathematics and the
subjects he taught included Newtonian philosophy, hydrostatics, astronomy, acoustics and
optics. He practised palpable arithmetic using a calculating table which he had himself
invented. Saunderson detailed his arithmetic in Saunderson 174o.
3Reid [1764] 197o , ch. VI, §vii.
4Reid [1764] 197o , ch. VI, §xi.
50 Chapter Three

the first surprise caused by new objects has subsided, the man should be
given time to study them in his mind and to compare them with the ideas
obtained by touch; and especially to compare in his mind the visual form
and extension with the form and extension in length and breadth with which
he is already familiar thanks to the sense of touch. Reid believed that the
man would be capable of perceiving that both have length and breadth: "he
will perceive, that there may be visible as well as tangible circles, triangles,
quadrilateral and multilateral figures. ''1 This would be particularly true of
small objects which can be perceived at a glance. In the case of larger objects,
Reid believed, the properties of visual forms would differ from those of the
flat surfaces they represent. Reid concluded that

if Dr. Saunderson had been made to see, and attentively had viewed
the figures of the first book of Euclid, he might, by thought and
consideration, without touching them, have found out that they were
the very figures he was before so well acquainted with by touch. 2

If flat surfaces were to be looked at from an angle, this would be more diffi-
cult since the visual form then differs more from the tactile form. And, said
Reid, the visual representation of three-dimensional forms would be less per-
fect because visual extension does not have three but only two dimensions.
Nonetheless, we can say that there is some similarity, so Reid believed. And
therefore Berkeley had committed a major error by assuming that there is
absolutely no agreement between the extension, form and position which we
see and which we perceive by touch. 3
As far as the positive replies to Molyneux's question are concerned, we will
limit our investigations to the above philosophers. Here too the same applies:
others thinkers replied in similar ways. Those who supported their point of
view with empirical data will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.

4 CONCLUSIONS

All the philosophers we have so far examined made the basic assumption that
tactile and visual sensations differ from one another, and that is an acceptable
point of view. A number of them based their solution to Molyneux's problem
on this point. Some philosophers were of the opinion that there is a necessary
relationship between visual and tactile sensations of the form of objects. Those

1Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xi.

2Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xi.
3Reid [1764] 197o, ch. VI, §xi.
 Philosophical Discussions in the Eighteenth Century 51

who, like Molyneux, believed that this relationship can only be found out
through experience expected that the person born blind would be incapable
of distinguishing a sphere from a cube by sight. However, those who, like Lee,
were convinced that this relationship could be perceived immediately, gave
positive answers to Molyneux's question. Those who adopted a third position,
including Jurin and Reid, were of the opinion that the relationship could
be deduced by (mathematical) reasoning; they too gave a positive answer.
Berkeley and his disciples, however, believed that experience merely created
an arbitrary relationship between visual and tactile perceptions. A person
born blind would, they said, be unable to identify the sphere and the cube by
sight.
Molyneux's problem was also solved on the basis of other considerations,
related to the relationship between visual and ~actile concepts of the form
of objects. Some philosophers assumed that these concepts differ from one
another and can be made to relate to one another either by experience or by
understanding. Reasoning of this kind produced a negative and a positive
response respectively.
Other scholars, however, believed that visual and tactile concepts of form
are essentially identical or, at any rate, possess a common concept. Some of
these people, including Boullier and Hutcheson, believed that this could be
immediately perceived. Others, such as Leibniz, were of the opinion that this
identity would only be brought to light by understanding. These philosophers
were of the opinion that the person born blind restored to sight would be able
to state (immediately or not) which of the objects was the sphere and which
the cube.
In brief, there was a range of opinions which served as arguments in the
solutions proposed to Molyneux's question. There was no unanimity as to
what the correct solution could be. The most that can be said is that thinkers
who were inclined towards rationalism tended to give a positive answer while
the empiricists usually answered Molyneux's question in the negative.
The varying interpretations given to Molyneux's question hampered any
attempts to reach a unanimous answer. Some philosophers assumed that the
person born blind had to answer immediately while others thought it normal
that he be allowed to use his understanding and to move around the objects.
Some thought it would even make a difference if the man were to know that
he was to be presented with a sphere and a cube. And, of course, the various
options led to different answers.
Molyneux's problem inspired philosophers to invent further thought exper-
iments designed to provide us with information about our perception. Berke-
ley, for example, introduced the notion of an unbodied spirit, while Hutcheson
imagined a world in which the re-shaping of objects would be accompanied
by different smells. Leibniz, moreover, pointed to the importance of studying
52 Chapter Three

the ideas of people lacking one or other of the senses, a theme which we will
encounter again.
Up till this stage no-one had posed the question as to whether a person born
blind could really be given the power of sight. Everyone regarded Molyneux's
problem as a hypothetical question amenable to a solution by reasoning. It
was not until it became known that certain people born blind could be given
their sight by a cataract operation that the question arose as to whether the
eyes could provide useful information immediately following the operation.
From that moment attempts were made to test the solutions grounded in
theory against experimental data.
In fact Berkeley was the first to perceive the importance of experience as
the touchstone for his solution to Molyneux's problem. In the Appendix to
the second edition of his Essay of 171o he announced that shortly after the
publication of the first edition of the Essay he had learnt that a man born
blind in the vicinity of London had recovered his sight at the age of twenty:

Such a one may be supposed a proper judge to decide how far some
tenets laid down in several places of the foregoing essay are agreeable
to truth, and if any curious person hath the opportunity of making
proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should gladly see my notions
either amended or confirmed by experience.1

The operation in question had been performed by a certain Roger Grant, an

eye doctor who was regarded as a fraud and whose story was accorded no
credibilityP Berkeley never referred to Grant's operation again; but he gave
some attention to the report of a successful cataract operation published by
William Cheselden in 1728.
As will be seen in the next chapter, after 1728 Molyneux's problem was
usually mentioned in the same breath as the Cheselden report. It constituted
a source of arguments to support various solutions proposed to Molyneux's
problem. Because it appeared difficult to interpret the report unambiguously,
it also came to represent a stimulus to formulate criteria to which an adequate
experimental test of Molyneux's problem would have to conform.

1Berkeley [171o] 1975, P. 59.

:A description of this eye operation can be found in The Tatler; see [Steele] [17o9]
1898. An anonymous pamphlet allegedly written by Roger Grant (Grant [pseud.] 17o9)
states that Grant (? 1724) was a Baptist preacher, had been a cobbler and was illiterate.
No. 444 of the Spectator (30 July 1712) satirically describes Grant as "putting out eyes
with great success." See [Steele] [17o9] 1898, pp. 42-43, note by the editor, and Pastore
1971, pp. 388-389, note 24.
 CHAPTER FOUR

T H E F I R S T E X P E R I M E N T A L DATA

1 CHESELDEN'S OPERATION

N the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 1728 an article was

I published that was to play an important part in the discussion surround-
ing Molyneux's problem. The author of the article was the famous English
surgeon and anatomist William Cheselden and was entitled "An Account of
some Observations made by a young Gentleman, who was born blind, or lost
his Sight so early, that he had no Remembrance of ever having seen, and was
couch'd between 13 and 14 Years of Age." 1
As the title indicates, Cheselden had performed a successful operation on
a young man who, from birth or at least from a very young age, had suffered
from cataract. For this Cheselden had performed two cataract operations:
first he operated on one of the boy's eyes and then, a year later, on the
other.: In his report Cheselden described the condition of the patient's eyes
before the operation and he also gave a detailed description of what the boy
could and could not see following surgery and how he reacted to his new visual
impressions.
As could have been anticipated, those interested in Molyneux's problem
were extremely eager to find out the results of Cheselden's operation, since it
promised to provide them with arguments that would settle the dispute raging
between the various parties. As far as we can ascertain, Cheselden himself
did not know of Molyneux's problem. He referred to neither Molyneux nor
Locke (nor to other parties to the discussion) and he did not show his patient
a sphere or a cube.

1William Cheselden (1688-1752) was famous not only for the cataract operation alluded
to here but also for his "lateral operation for the stone" (an operation to remove kidney
stone) (1727) which was attended by surgeons from the whole of Europe. Cheselden was
the discoverer of the artificial pupil. He wrote two seminal works: The Anatomy of the
Human Body (1713) and Osteographia, or Anatomy of the Bones (1733). The Anatomy is
full of magnificent copperplate engravings produced using the camera obscura. See Cope
1953 and Hausmann 1989.
2The following section explains what a cataract operation is.

53
54 Chapter Four

Cheselden did not write his report until after the second operation, prob-
ably basing his writing on what he could remember and not on notes made
at the time. In general he set down the observations made by his patient
without further comment. Only a few times did he report verbatim what the
boy had said. One of these passages caused great confusion for decades and
was the occasion of a great deal of criticism.
Because Cheselden's report is of major significance, I quote it in full. Then
I take the opportunity to describe cataract as it actually is and the sorts of
cataract operation usual in the eighteenth century. Following that I shall seek
out the information contained in Cheselden's report that can be related to
Molyneux's problem. But first let us hear the voice of William Cheselden,
"F. R. S. Surgeon to her Majesty, and to St. Thomas's Hospital":

Tho' we say of the Gentleman that he was blind, as we do of all

People who have Ripe Cataracts, yet they are never so blind from
that Cause, but that they can discern Day from Night; and for the
most Part in a strong Light, distinguish Black, White, and Scarlet;
but they cannot perceive the Shape of any thing; for the Light by
which these Perceptions are made, being let in obliquely thro' the
aqueous Humour, or the anterior Surface of the Chrystalline (by which
the Rays cannot be brought into a Focus upon the Retina) they can
discern in no other Manner, than a sound Eye can thro' a Glass of
broken Jelly, where a great Variety of Surfaces so differently refract
the Light, that the several distinct Pencils of Rays cannot be collected
by the Eye into their proper Foci; wherefore the Shape of an Object
in such a Case, cannot be at all discern'd, tho' the Colour may: And
thus it was with this young Gentleman, who though he knew these
Colours asunder in a good Light; yet when he saw them after he was
couch'd, the faint Ideas he had of them before, were not sufficient for
him to know them by afterwards; and therefore he did not think them
the same, which he had known before by those Names. Now Scarlet
he thought the most beautiful of all Colours, and of others the most
gay were the most pleasing, whereas the first Time he saw Black, it
gave him great Uneasiness, yet after a little Time he was reconcil'd
to it; but some Months after, seeing by Accident a Negroe Woman,
he was struck with great Horror at the Sight.
When he first saw, he was so far from making any Judgment about
Distances, that he thought all Objects whatever touch'd his Eyes,
(as he express'd it) as what he felt, did his Skin; and thought no
Objects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho'
he could form no Judgment of their Shape, or guess what it was in
any Object that was pleasing to him: He knew not the Shape of any
 The First Experimental Data 55

Thing, nor any one Thing from another, however different in Shape,
or Magnitude; but upon being told what Things were, whose Form he
before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might
know them again; but having too many Objects to learn at once, he
forgot many of them; and (as he said) at first he learn'd to know, and
again forgot a thousand Things in a Day. One Particular only (tho'
it may appear trifling) I will relate; Having often forgot which was
the Cat, and which the Dog, he was asham'd to ask; but catching
the Cat (which he knew by feeling) he was observ'd to look at her
stedfastly, and then setting her down, said, So Puss! I shall know you
another Time. He was very much surpriz'd, that those Things which
he had lik'd best, did not appear most agreeable to his Eyes, expecting
those Persons would appear most beautiful that he lov'd most, and
such Things to be most agreeable to his Sight that were so to his
Taste. We thought he soon knew what Pictures represented, which
were shew'd to him, but we found afterwards we were mistaken; for
about two Months after he was couch'd, he discovered at once, they
represented solid Bodies; when to that Time he consider'd them only
as Party-colour'd Planes, or Surfaces diversified with a Variety of
Paint; but even then he was no less surpriz'd, expecting the Pictures
would feel like the Things they represented, and was amaz'd when he
found those Parts, which by their Light and Shadow appear'd now
round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask'd which was
the lying Sense, Feeling or Seeing?
Being shewn his Father's Picture in a Locket at his Mother's watch,
and told what it was, he acknowledged a Likeness, but was vastly
surpriz'd; asking, how it could be, that a large Face could be express'd
in so little Room, saying, It should have seem'd as impossible to him,
as to put a Bushel of any thing into a Pint.
At first, he could bear but very little Sight, and the Things he saw,
he thought extreamly large; but upon seeing Things larger, those first
seen he conceiv'd less, never being able to imagine any Lines beyond
the Bounds he saw; the Room he was in he said, he knew to be but
Part of the House, yet he could not conceive that the whole House
could look bigger. Before he was couch'd, he expected little Advan-
tage from Seeing, worth undergoing an Operation for, except reading
and writing; for he said, He thought he could have no more Pleasure
in walking abroad than he had in the Garden, which he could do
safely and readily. And even Blindness he observ'd, had this Advan-
tage, that he could go any where in the Dark much better than those
who can see; and after he had seen, he did not soon lose this Quality,
nor desire a Light to go about the House in the Night. He said, every
56 Chapter Four

new Object was a new Delight, and the Pleasure was so great, t h a t he
wanted Ways to express it; but his Gratitude to his O p e r a t o r he could
not conceal, never seeing him for some Time without Tears of Joy in
his Eyes, and other Marks of Affection: And if he did not h a p p e n
to come at any Time when he was expected, he would be so griev'd,
t h a t he could not forbear crying at his Disappointment. A Year after
first Seeing, being carried u p o n Epsom Downs, and observing a large
Prospect, he was exceedingly delighted with it, and call'd it a new
Kind of Seeing. And now being lately couch'd of his other Eye, he
says, t h a t Objects at first a p p e a r ' d large to this Eye, but not so large
as t h e y did at first to the other, and looking upon the same Object
with b o t h Eyes, he t h o u g h t it look'd a b o u t twice as large as with
the first couch'd Eye only, but not Double, t h a t we can any Ways
discover. 1

Cheselden's report can be regarded as one of the first and most i m p o r t a n t

of a series of similar r e p o r t s P It became well known because it was often
referred to. Pastore called it "the most celebrated case s t u d y in the history
of science until the early case studies of Freud came along at the beginning
of the twentieth century. ''3 Its great influence was largely due to the fact
t h a t it was sufficiently detailed to stand comparison with later reports over
a period of several decades. In most of these cases the first visual tests were
not sufficiently well prepared, so t h a t even when the post-operative conditions
were favourable the first m o m e n t of seeing was able to pass unremarked.
From 1728 Molyneux's problem was usually coupled to Cheselden's report.
As we shall see, those who already believed on theoretical grounds t h a t a per-
son born blind would be unable to distinguish a sphere from a cube regarded
the report as confirmation of their ideas, while those holding the opposite
opinion usually issued commentaries on it. Before becoming embroiled in this
controversy, however, let us examine the exact nature of c a t a r a c t and see w h a t
kind of c a t a r a c t operations were being performed in the eighteenth century.

1Cheselden 1728, PP. 447-450. Cheselden included his report in later editions of The
Anatomy and added the following sentence: "I have couched several others who were born
blind, whose observations were of the same kind; but they being younger, none of them
gave so full an account as this gentleman." Quoted by Morgan 1977, p. 21.
2Von Senden [1932] 196o, pp. 326-335, supplies an extensive list of reported cataract
operations, beginning with that carried out by Ammar (c. looo, Egypt) up to this century.
3Pastore 1971, p. 99.
 The First Experimental Data 57

2 CATARACT

In order better to understand what cataract is and how it can be cured, we

must first examine a healthy eye. As is well known, the eyeball consists of an
anterior chamber, a posterior chamber, the lens and the vitreous body. The
chambers of the eye are separated by the iris. The lens is convex on both
sides and thanks to its transparency and capacity for changing shape is an
important component of the eye's optical system. The whole is encased in a
triple layer of tissue. The outer layer (tunica fibrosa) consists of the c o r n e a - -
at the f r o n t - - a n d the sclera, which covers the rest of the eyeball. The cornea
consists of clear, transparent tissue that makes the greatest contribution to the
totM refraction of light in the eye. (The refraction caused by the lens is much
less than that caused by the cornea.) The second layer (tunica vasculosa)
consists of the iris at the front and the chorioidea at the back of the eye, plus
the corpus ciliare which binds the two together. At the front of the eye the
iris constitutes the pupil. The innermost layer covering the eye is the retina.
Until some time in the seventeenth century cataract was regarded as an eye
disease caused by a membrane which grew as a result of a thickening of the
watery anterior chamber (between cornea and iris) and which was situated
between the pupil and the lens. 1 In the sixth decade of the seventeenth
century, however, the French eye specialist Lasnier discovered that cataract is
a disturbance of the lensP His discovery was confirmed in the early eighteenth
century by Maitre-Jan and Brisseau. 3 Brisseau made the following remark
about Lasnier:
Nous ne sommes pourtant pas les premiers qui en ont parl@; & l'on
a sceu depnis que M. Lasnier habile Chirurgien de Paris & Oculiste,
avoit fait la M~me d@couverte il y a plus de 40 ans [...] Mais nous
n'en sommes pas moins les inventeurs, puisqu'elle estoit absolument
tomb@e dans l'oubli; que de nostre temps on n'en fait aucune mention
dans les TraitSs, ni dans les Cours d'anatomie & d'operations; & que
l'Acad~mie m~me l'a regard~e comme une nouveaut~. 4

1Mfinchow 1984, pp. 262-283.

~It is u n c l e a r w h e n exactly Lasnier m a d e his discovery. [Tr~voux] 1714 c o n t a i n s t h e n a m e
of t h e a n a t o m i s t R e m i g i u s L ' A s n i e r , who died in 169 o. T h i s work also s t a t e s t h a t L ' A s n i e r
did n o t regard c a t a r a c t as a m e m b r a n e between t h e cornea a n d lens b u t as a d e v i a t i o n in
t h e lens itself. See Mfinchow 1984, p. 27o.
3 A n t o i n e M a i t r e - J a n a n n o u n c e d his discovery in M a i t r e - J a n 17o7. T h e Acaddmie Royale
des Sciences had, however, already given its i m p r i m a t u r on 11 April 17o 4. Michel B r i s s e a u ' s
discovery was m a d e k n o w n to t h e Acadgmie on 17 N o v e m b e r 17o 5. By way of a rare
exception in t h e h i s t o r y of medicine, t h e two doctors did not engage in conflicting claims
r e g a r d i n g t h e discovery. See Mfinchow 1984, p. 263.
4 B r i s s e a u 17o9, as quoted in Mfinchow 1984, p. 264.
58 Chapter Four

T h e fact t h a t this nouveautg was not i m m e d i a t e l y g r a n t e d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n it

d e s e r v e d can be seen in the n u m e r o u s o b j e c t i o n s to it in the Mgmoires de
l'Acadgmie Royale des Sciences.

3 CATARACT OPERATIONS

In a h e a l t h y eye (with a t r a n s p a r e n t lens) t h e i m a g e of an o b j e c t in t h e field of

vision is focused on t h e r e t i n a by m e a n s of a c c o m m o d a t i o n . B u t when t h e lens
is o p a q u e this is no longer possible. 1 C a t a r a c t can be c o n g e n i t a l or can come
i n t o b e i n g a t a l a t e r age. It can also occur in various degrees, d e p e n d i n g on
t h e e x t e n t of t h e opaqueness. Like C h e s e l d e n ' s p a t i e n t , sufferers can u s u a l l y
perceive light b u t not shape.
T h e r e are various ways of r e m o v i n g an o p a q u e lens so t h a t it no longer
blocks off t h e light. T h e oldest a n d simplest m e t h o d is reclination of t h e
c a t a r a c t , k n o w n as ' c o u c h i n g ' or ' d e p r e s s i n g ' the c a t a r a c t . It involves t h e eye
s u r g e o n using a needle to move aside t h e o p a q u e lens in t h e w a t e r y m e d i u m
so t h a t it no longer lies in t h e line of sight. T h i s m e t h o d was k n o w n in I n d i a
in t h e p r e h i s t o r i c e r a a n d is still used in some p a r t s of t h e w o r l d P C h e s e l d e n
also used this m e t h o d . T h e i m m e d i a t e effects of couching are u s u a l l y good,
b u t t h e o p e r a t i o n is often followed by infection which m a k e s t h e eye useless
once again. A n o t h e r d i s a d v a n t a g e is t h a t even after an o p e r a t i o n c a r r i e d
o u t a p p r o p r i a t e l y t h e o p a q u e lens can r e t u r n to where it was so t h a t a n y
a d v a n t a g e i n i t i a l l y g a i n e d is lost.
In o r d e r to avoid these p r o b l e m s a new m e t h o d was developed, k n o w n
as extraction of t h e c a t a r a c t . 3 In this o p e r a t i o n t h e d o c t o r first m a k e s an
o p e n i n g in t h e c o r n e a a n d t h e n pushes a tiny s p a t u l a t h r o u g h t h e a n t e r i o r
c h a m b e r a n d t h e p u p i l until he reaches t h e u p p e r p a r t of t h e c a t a r a c t ; he
t h e n o p e n s t h e lens capsule a n d removes t h e o p a q u e lens tissue piece by piece
vi£ t h e o p e n i n g in t h e cornea. J e a n M@ry (1645-1722) was t h e first to see t h e

1A healthy lens is transparent thanks to the regular placing of the lens tissue fibres. The
formation of deviant fibres results in a more or less opaque lens.
2Susruta (looo s.c.?) may have been the first surgeon who performed the couching
operation (see Bidyadhar 1939, 194o , 1941, and Dutt 1938). The first description of a
cataract operation in European literature can be found in Celsus's De re medicina (first
half of the first century) (Celsus 1935-1938, vol. 3, PP. 349 353). It has been suggested
that Jesus effected his miraculous cures of blind people (see, for instance, Mark 8:22 26)
by pushing aside the opaque lenses of cataract patients (see Forrest 1965 and Forrest 1974).
(Cheselden and the Biblical miracles were already mentioned in one breath in Charles Bew
18oo, p. 58.)
3Ammar extracted opaque lenses with hollow needles as early as looo A.D., but this had
been forgotten. See Hirschberg 19o5, pp. 1128-1129.
 The First Experimental Data 59

advantages offered by this method. 1 In the Histoire de l'Acaddmie Royale des

Sciences o f 17o7 w e r e a d t h a t

M. M~ry croit qu'on pourroit tirer les Cataractes hors de l'oeil par
une incision faite k la Corn~e, &: que cette maniere dont il ne paro~t
pas qu'il y ait rien k apprehender, pr~viendroit tousles p~rils ou les
inconveniences de l'operation ordinaire. II est bien stir que la Cata-
racte ne remonteroit point, ~: ne causeroit point les inflammations
qu'elle peut causer, lorsqu'on la loge par force dans le bas de l'oeil.~

A third advantage of the new method was that it was no longer necessary to
postpone the operation until the cataract was mature or hard. 3
The first successful cataract extraction was performed by the Parisian doc-
tor Petit on 17 April 17o8. 4 Despite the advantages of the new method,
doctors continued to use the old one until Jacques Daviel, "oculiste ordinaire
de Louis XV," improved Petit's method and instruments in 1753 .5 This was
the reason why Daviel is usually said to be the discoverer of the cataract
extraction technique. In the second half of the eighteenth century the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of reclination and extraction were the subject of
heated debate. 6
It is important to note here that eyesight can never be perfect after these
two types of operation since the lens has disappeared and, with it, part of the
eye's refractive capacity. A ~ataract operation makes the patient far-sighted
and if good eyesight is to be restored there is need of optical correction, in

1M~ry was present at the eye operation carried out by Charles de Saint-Yves on Sunday
2o February 17o7 on a patient whose lens was pressing against the iris. Saint-Yves removed
the lens from the eye, thus performing the first recorded lens extraction in modern times.
See Mfinchow 1984, p. 264.
~[Fontenelle] 17o7, p. 24. I do not know whether Mfinchow's (1984, p. 280) ascription
of this anonymous article to Fontenelle is correct.
3It has been discovered that it is important that babies suffering from double cataract
should be operated on as soon as possible (preferably before they are two months old) since
otherwise they will develop amblyopia as a result of visual deprivation.
4petit performed the operation after consultation with and in the presence of M~ry
and Saint-Yves, who had previously carried out a lens extraction. See Mfinchow 1984,
pp. 264-265.
5In 1747 Daviel (1693-1762) performed his first cataract extraction after an attempt at
couching had failed. From 175o onwards he decided to use the new method exclusively. He
published his findings in Daviel 1748 and Daviel 1753.
6Daviel's method was fiercely supported by, for example, the elder Baron Wenzel--who
did, however, admit to having destroyed "a hatful of eyes" before mastering the technique
(Lebensohn 1969, p. 176 ). Gerard ten Haaff (172o-1791), lector at the Illustere School
of Rotterdam, was the first surgeon in the United Republic of the Netherlands to apply
Daviel's method. See Ten Haaff 1761 and Henkes 1982 , p. 11.
6o Chapter Four

the form of a lens or glasses. 1 The need for optical correction was already
perceived by Benito Daza de Valdes in 1623. In his Uso de los antojos, one
of the first books about spectacles, he recommended the wearing of glasses
for patients who had had a cataract operation. Similarly, Jacques Rohault
wrote in his Trait~ de physique (1672): "ceux £ qui l'on a ost~ des Cataractes
ne s~auroient voir que confus~ment; [...] ils ont besoin de lunettes fort pour
voir distinctement. ''~ And Louis wrote in the Encyclopddie: "apr~s qu'on
a abaiss6 la cataracte, la personne ne peut plus voir qu'£ l'aide d'une verre
lenticulaire. ''3 As will be seen in the next few sections, this fact was missed
by all the eighteenth-century commentators on Cheselden's report.

4 CHESELDEN'S OBSERVATIONS

Many philosophers writing after 1728 on Molyneux's problem referred to Ches-

elden's report. Some of them agreed vociferously with Cheselden's results,
while others criticised the report on methodological grounds. Moreover ap-
preciation of the report was closely bound up with the position taken up by the
c o m m e n t a t o r with regard to Berkeley's theory of vision. Those who rejected
Berkeley's notions were usually critical of the report. But those who accepted
Berkeley's ideas usually regarded Cheselden's observations as supportive of
those ideas. This section will examine which observations were regarded as
proof of the correctness of a negative answer to Molyneux's question.
As already said, Berkeley had stated that his theory of vision (and the
solution he offered to Molyneux's problem) could be tested against the expe-
riences of persons born blind receiving their sight through surgery. As early
as 171o he had pointed to Grant's eye operation and in The Theory of Vision
Vindicated and Explained (1733) he summarised the most significant points
in Cheselden's report. The fact that at the beginning the young man could
not estimate distance and could not distinguish objects one from another,
regardless of their size or shape, was regarded by Berkeley as definitive con-
firmation of his theory: "Thus, by fact and experiment, those points of the
theory which seem the most remote from common apprehension were not a

1After a cataract operation the patient will normally need glasses of approximately +1o
dioptres with a 2-dioptre cylinder at 18o degrees (to compensate for the vertical flattening
of the cornea caused by the incision). These days it is also possible to fit a contact lens or
an intra-ocular lens. See Trevor-Roper & Curran [1974] 1984, p. 452.
2Rohault 1672, p. 488.
3Louis 1752, p. 77o,
 The First Experimental Data 61

little confirmed, many years after I had been led into the discovery of them
by reasoning." •
Robert Smith (1689-1768), mathematician and professor of astronomy and
experimental philosophy at Cambridge's Trinity College, quoted Cheselden's
report in its entirety in his influential book A Compleat System o/Opticks
(1738)P This work, which deals with popular, mathematical, mechanical and
philosophical aspects of optics, contains a chapter on the ideas that we obtain
from our sense of sight and it was here that Smith described Molyneux's
problem. As far as Smith was concerned, the answer given by Molyneux and
Locke had turned out to be correct: "this opinion has since been confirmed by
the experience of several persons, who receiving their sight from the operation
of Couching, could not know any one thing from another, however different
in shape and magnitude."3 Smith referred to The Tatler 4 and to Cheselden's
report. Smith suspected that the patient had learnt to recognise the position,
size, shape and distance of objects by sight by following the movements of his
hand with his eyes. The ideas acquired by sight would then, he believed, be
associated with those gained through touch by means of habituation.
Berkeley's theory of vision gained a great deal of support especially in Great
Britain, but there were also some followers to be found on the Continent.
Voltaire (1694-1778), for instance, who visited England in the years 1726-
1728, was impressed not only by the liberal political and cultural climate he
found there but also by the experimental science of Newton, the empiricist
philosophy of Locke and the ideas advanced by Berkeley regarding the sense
of sight. The works he wrote after returning home included the Eldmens de la
philosophie de Neuron (1738), a popularisation of Newton's philosophy. The
book contained not only an explanation of the way in which we learn to see
such things as distance but also a summary of Cheselden's report, thereby
making it accessible to the French-speaking world. ~
Voltaire believed that distance, position, size and shape are not directly
seen with the aid of optical lines and angles. Like Berkeley he considered that
this had been proved by the reactions of people born blind who had undergone
surgery:

Tout cela ne pouvait 8tre ~clairci et mis hors de toute contestation

que par quelque aveugle-n5 £ qui on aurait donn@ le sens de la vue.
Car si cet aveugle, au moment qu'il efit ouvert les yeux, efit jug5

1Berkeley [1733] 1975, §71.

2 S m i t h ' s Opticks, which earned h i m t h e n i c k n a m e "Old Focus," was t r a n s l a t e d into
D u t c h in 1753, into G e r m a n in 1755 a n d into French in 1767 .
3 S m i t h 1738 , bk. I, ch. v, art. 132.
4[Steele] [17o9] 1898.
5Voltaire incorrectly d a t e d C h e s e l d e n ' s report 1729.
62 Chapter Four

des distances, des grandeurs et des situations, il efit ~t~ vrai que les
angles optiques, form,s tout d'un coup dans sa r~tine, eussent ~t~ les
causes imm~diates de ses sentimens. [...] Mais off trouver l'aveugle
dont d~pendait la d~cision indubitable de cette question? 1
As could have been anticipated, Voltaire found this blind person in Ches-
elden's patient. Voltaire provided a s u m m a r y of the report written by this
"clever and skilful" surgeon and invented a few details himself. He wrote, for
example, that at the beginning the young man could not distinguish between
objects that he had assessed, using his hands, as rounded or angled. 2 Voltaire
was convinced that the experiences of the young man confirmed everything
that Locke and Berkeley had so accurately predicted: "I1 ne distingua de
long-temps ni grandeurs, ni situations, ni figures mSme. ''3
Voltaire considered his opinion regarding how we do not see things to have
been justified. The question now was how we do imagine shapes and suchlike.
His answer, which betrays Berkeley's influence, was as follows: in the same
way as we imagine people's passions, namely by reading their facial expres-
sions and the colour of their faces. It is a language spoken by nature to all
eyes; but we need experience to learn to understand it. Voltaire compared
the way in which we learn to see with the way in which we learn to speak or
read, with the difference that seeing is easier.
Strictly speaking, said Voltaire, distance, size and position are not visible
things; the real and direct object of seeing is nothing more than coloured light.
All the rest we observe only after a time and through experience. And since
as far as the representation is concerned all mankind has the same language
which apparently links colour to objects, we could be tempted to believe that
we see extension. We could also tend to think that there is a necessary link
between words and meanings if everyone spoke the same language, but we
know that such is not the case.
Voltaire believed that in addition to experience we need the help of other
senses in order to assess a (sudden and arbitrary) judgment about distance
and suchlike. But he tempered this opinion by stating that a being that
possessed no more than the sense of sight would still be able to form ideas of
distance and such through experience:
Sans doute ses idles d'~tendue, de distance, ne seraient pas rigoureu-
sement les m~mes que les n5tres, puisque le sens du toucher n'aurait

1Voltaire [1738] 1819, part II, ch. vii.

2This reminds us of Molyneux's question, but Voltaire did not mention that problem
explicitly.
3Voltaire [1738] 1819, part II, ch. vii. A similar opinion was expressed by (among others)
Le Cat [174o] 1744, Krfiger 1756, Morand 1757, Condorcet [1773] 1847, Von Baer 1824, and
Apelt 1857.
 The First Experimental Data 63

pas contribu@ k les former: sans doute ses jugemens sur le lieu, la
forme, la distance, seraient plus souvent erron@s que les n6tres, parce
qu'il n'aurait pu les rectifier par le toucher. Mais il est tr~s probable
que c'est k quoi se bornerait toute la diff@rence entre lui et nous. 1

How this creature would form these ideas according to Voltaire is not clear.
But the strong suspicion expressed by Voltaire in this passage would certainly
not have been confirmed by Berkeley who, in fact, believed that an unbodied
spirit would be unable to perceive extension or shapes.
Whereas Voltaire introduced Cheselden's report into the French-speaking
world, it was Willem J a c o b ' s Gravesande who was the first Dutchman to
allude to it, in his Introductio ad philosophiam, metaphysicam et logicam con-
tinens (1736). ~ The relevant passage reads as follows (in the second edition
of 1737):
Facultatem hanc de objectis visis judicandi, Usui & Experientim tan-
turn deberi, ex natura rei deducitur. Sed omnis scrupulus removetur,
si perpendatur historia Juvenis cceci nati, & qui, inter annum mtatis
decimum tertium & decimum quartum, visum recuperavit; qum inve-
nitur in Actis Philosophicis Societatis Regime Anglicanm. Num. 4o2.
Art. 7 .3

Like his colleague Petrus van Musschenbroek, 's Gravesande had been influ-
enced by the new experimental philosophy during a visit to England. 4 Both
imitated Locke in fiercely opposing the notion that we have inborn ideas of
external objects. They were convinced that people lacking one of the senses
would not be capable of forming ideas of the related characteristics of objects.
Both philosophers referred to cured cataract patients in order to support their
belief that we learn to see. 5

1Voltaire [1738 ] 1819, part II, ch. vii, note 13.

2,s G r a v e s a n d e (1688-1742), professor of m a t h e m a t i c s , a s t r o n o m y a n d philosophy, was
t h e first p e r s o n in m a i n l a n d E u r o p e to t e a c h e x p e r i m e n t a l physics in t h e spirit of Newton.
3's G r a v e s a n d e [1736] 1737, §5o9. Translation: " T h e fact t h a t we are able to m a k e
j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e d i s t a n c e s of o b j e c t s seen on t h e basis of Habit a n d Experience alone
is d e d u c e d f r o m t h e n a t u r e of t h e m a t t e r itself; b u t all objections are r e m o v e d w h e n we
consider t h e account of a Y o u n g M a n blind from b i r t h who between t h e t h i r t e e n t h a n d
f o u r t e e n t h year of his life received t h e power of Sight again; which account is to be f o u n d
in t h e P h y s i c a l A c c o u n t s of t h e Royal Society in E n g l a n d , No. 402, Art. 7."
4Van M u s s c h e n b r o e k (1692 1761 ) was n a m e d professor of m a t h e m a t i c s a n d p h i l o s o p h y
in D u i s b u r g in 1719 a n d in Leiden in 174o. See De P a t e r 1979 a n d De P a t e r 1988.
5Van M u s s e h e n b r o e k 1762 , §1889, c o m p a r e s children a n d c a t a r a c t p a t i e n t s w h o h a d been
o p e r a t e d on w i t h people w h o have never seen an object t h r o u g h a microscope or telescope:
at first t h e y will not be able to see a n y object at all, b u t t h e m o r e f r e q u e n t l y t h e y use
t h e i n s t r u m e n t t h e b e t t e r t h e y will be able to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e various o b j e c t s one f r o m t h e
other.
64 Chapter Four

'S Gravesande and Van Musschenbroek made no comment on Molyneux's

problem. However, one of their disciples, the versatile scholar Petrus Camper
(1722-1789) did. 1 From being a student Camper was interested in descriptions
and explanations of the faculty of sight and, later, eye diseases. His two
dissertations witness to this: Dissertatio optica de visu (1746) and Dissertatio
physiologica quibusdam oculi partibus (1746); ~ so also his book De oculorum
fabriea et morbis (1766). 3 Camper operated on cataract sufferers himself; he
was a supporter of David's new method, extraction of the cataract.
Camper discussed Cheselden's report and Molyneux's problem in his Dis-
sertatio optica de visu (1746). He stated that no-one doubted the fact that
we can distinguish the form of objects by sight alone. However, we would
never have acquired the idea of the shape of an object, he continued, if we
had not already explored it by touch. He reasoned as follows: the stimulation
of a nerve and the corresponding perception have nothing in common and
therefore neither do the perception and the object perceived have anything in
common. With the exception of touch, none of our senses teach us anything
per se. For when we touch an object we are immediately aware of its resistance
and shape. Later, when we have learnt these characteristics through touch,
we begin to pay attention to the circumstances. Then we see that objects are
illuminated in various ways and we relate that to what we have felt. And thus
we learn to distinguish different objects, such as a sphere and a cube. 4 Camper
was of the opinion that Cheselden's report proved that Molyneux and Locke
had provided the correct answer to Molyneux's problem: the young man was
well able to recognise the shape of objects by touch but not by sight.
Although there are more philosophers who referred to Cheselden's obser-
vations in support of their negative answer to Molyneux's question and in
support of Berkeley's theory of vision, we will limit ourselves to those already
mentioned. What was seen as by far the most important fact relative to Moly-
neux's problem was that Cheselden's patient had not been able to distinguish
objects from one another, no matter whether they differed as regards shape
and size. On this basis they concluded that a person born blind and restored
to sight was unable to distinguish a sphere and a cube from one another and
to name them.

1Camper's interests included ophthalmology, midwifery, anatomy, veterinary medicine,

mineralogy, palmontology and economics. He was a skilled draughtsman and instrument
maker. See Rochat 1939 and Ten Doesschate's "Introduction" in Camper [1746] 1962.
Goethe called Camper "ein Meteor von Geist, Wissenschaft, Talent und Th£tigkeit"; quoted
in the Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek (1911) part 1, p. 555.
2Camper defended these two dissertations on the same day.
3This book was not published until 1913.
4Camper [1746] 1962, ch. II, §i.
 The First Experimental Data 65

In the end the unconditional acceptance of Cheselden's report failed to

lead to any new insights into Molyneux's problem. The criticism aimed at
the report did, however, raise some interesting points of view.

5 T H E METHODOLOGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS

The methods employed in and the results obtained from Cheselden's studies
were challenged mainly in France, where Berkeley's teachings on the faculty
of sight turned out to be less sacrosanct than in Great Britain. 1 A number of
philosophes wondered, for instance, if the patient's eyes immediately follow-
ing the operation had been in good condition and whether the patient had
been questioned in an appropriate, non-suggestive manner. Julien Offray de
La Mettrie (17o 9 1751 ) was the first to a t t e m p t to deal with these matters.
La Mettrie, whose reputation was largely due to his L'homme machine
(1747) , had previously proclaimed his materialistic doctrine anonymously in
the Histoire naturelle de l'dme (1745).: As is well known, La Mettrie opposed
the dualism of body and soul as proclaimed by Descartes. La Mettrie assumed
t h a t the activities of the soul are dependent on the structure and functions of
the nervous system. Like the body, therefore, the soul would be amenable to
experimental research. The "natural history of the soul" should therefore not
be the territory of the theologian or metaphysician but of the natural scientist.
La Mettrie deprived mankind of the status that Descartes still accorded the
species. Where Descartes excluded mankind from his notion of all living
creatures as a u t o m a t a , La Mettrie regarded man too as a machine or self-
regulating system. Since in La Mettrie's view nature was self-explanatory,
he did not require a hypothesis of a creator God. As could be expected,
La Mettrie's materialistic-atheist philosophy met with fierce resistance, but it
also had considerable influence.
In the Histoire naturelle de l'dme La Mettrie revealed himself a defender
of the notion that all our ideas come from our senses. At the end of the book
he set out a number of true accounts designed to support this statement. 3
T h e y are stories of individuals whose fate differed from that of "normal"
people. The first concerned a deaf-and-dumb boy from Chartres who suddenly

1In Great Britain criticism of Berkeley's theory of vision and his solution to Molyneux's
problem came from such quarters as Anti-Berkeley 1752 and Porterfield 1759.
2The title page was designed to give the impression that the book had been translated
from English. The work was reprinted (with modifications) as Traitd de l'~me in La Met-
trie's (Euvres philosophiques (La Mettrie 1751).
3La Mettrie 1745, ch. XVII; this is chapter XV in La Mettrie 1751.
66 Chapter F o u r

b e g a n to speak one day. 1 From what he said it became a p p a r e n t t h a t he

had absolutely no notion of God, the soul, goodness or death. A l t h o u g h he
had always a t t e n d e d Mass, crossed himself and knelt, he had no idea w h a t
it all meant. L a Mettrie believed t h a t this indicated t h a t ideas of G o d and
suchlike are not inborn. A n o t h e r story concerned a young boy who in 1694 was
discovered in the forests on the Russian-Lithuanian border living in the midst
of a group of bears. 2 T h e boy looked appalling, walked on all fours, p r o d u c e d
r o u g h sounds and did not use his intelligence. Once he had been reintroduced
to his own kind and had learnt to speak a few words, it turned out t h a t he had
no m e m o r y of his former circumstances. B o t h stories were recounted by other
Enlightened thinkers, partly to d e m o n s t r a t e the correctness of empiricism but
also because of their curiosity value.
L a Mettrie also recounted the suspicion expressed by Arnobius t h a t a child
b r o u g h t up in a cave with little to stimulate him would remain as d u m b as
an ox. He would have no idea of plants, animals, the earth and the sea,
nor of metaphysics, morality or mathematics. 3 La Mettrie also described
A m m a n ' s m e t h o d of teaching d e a f - a n d - d u m b people to speak, underlined the
i m p o r t a n c e of good upbringing, told tales of wild men and satyrs and quoted
the story of Cheselden's blind boy. 4 All these stories, La Mettrie believed,
proved his b o o k ' s conclusion: "Point de sens, point d'id@es. Moins on a de
sens, moins on a d'id@es. Peu d'@ducation, peu d'id6es. Point de sensations
re~iies, point d'id~es."5
L a Mettrie stated (not entirely correctly) t h a t Voltaire had written t h a t
Cheselden's patient had only perceived coloured light immediately following
the operation, without being able to distinguish a sphere from a cube and
w i t h o u t any idea of extension, distance, shape, etc. 6 However, La Mettrie
believed t h a t a person born blind and recovering the faculty of sight would
be able to distinguish different objects from one another:

un globe attentivement considSr@ par le toucher, clairement imagin@

& con~u, n ' £ q u ' £ se m o n t r e r aux yeux ouverts; il sera conforme

1The original text dealing with the deaf boy of Chartres can be found in the Histoire de
l'Acaddmie des Sciences pour l'annde 17o3, second edition (Paris 172o), pp. 18-19.
2According to Verbeek 1988, vol. 1, p. 117, La Mettrie took this story from Bernard
Connor 1697.
3Arnobius, Adversus gentes (c. 3oo A.D,), bk. II. See Arnobius 1949 for a modern
translation.
4The physician J. C. Amman (1669-1724) occupied himself with the education of deaf-
and-dumb people. See Amman 1692.
5La Mettrie 1745, "Conclusion de l'ouvrage."
6La Mettrie was the first to point out that Cheselden's account was inconsistent: the
boy was said not to perceive any size, and yet he said that his thumb was as big as a house.
La Mettrie 1745, ch. XVII, Histoire iii.
 The First Experimental Data 67

l'image, ou £ l'id~e grav~e dans le cerveau; & cons~quemment il ne

sera pas possible ~ l'.~me de ne pas distinguer cette figure de toute
autre, si l'organe dioptrique a l'arrangement interne n@essaire £ la
vision. 1

La Mettrie also considered it unimaginable that a skilful anatomist would not

be able to recognise all the bones of the human body by touch and make a
skeleton of them. Because he would recognise by touch that which he had
seen: "Les id@s re~iies par les yeux se retrouvent en touchant, & celles du
tact, en voyant. ''2 This was the position usually adopted by rationalist and
not so much by empiricist thinkers.
As far as Cheselden's report was concerned, La Mettrie believed that a
prejudice had been created by Locke's answer to Molyneux's question. A
possible explanation of the results of the report was, thought La Mettrie, that
the eye had not yet recovered from the operation or that the young man had
been influenced:

Ou on n ' a pas donn~ le tems £ l'organe dioptrique ~branl~, de se re-

mettre dans son assi~te naturelle; ou ~t force de tourmenter le nouveau
voyant, on lui a fait dire ce qu'on ~toit bien aise qu'il d~t. 3

Because, stated La Mettrie, people were more interested in finding support

for errors than in discovering the truth. The skilful theologians who had
questioned the deaf boy of Chartres expected to find in the nature of man
judgments which would precede the first perception. But God, who according
to La Mettrie does nothing that is useless, has not even given us a single first
idea of his own attributes. And thus inborn ideas of shape and space would
have been useless for Cheselden's patient in enabling him to differentiate at
first sight between a cube and a sphere. He would only require time to open
his eyes and observe the richly endowed theatre of the universe.
By drawing attention to the physiological condition of the eyes immediately
following the operation and to the nature of the questioning of the patient
La Mettrie gave a new boost to the discussions surrounding Molyneux's ques-
tion.
The Frenchman l~tienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-178o) also criticised
Cheselden's report. His first riposte was contained in his Essai sur l'origine
des connoissances humaines (1746). The motivation behind Condillac's Essai
was a desire to improve on Locke's Essay. Condillac admired Locke in that
the latter had pointed to experience as the source of all knowledge and had

1La Mettrie 1745, ch. XVII, Histoire iii.

2La Mettrie 1745, ch. XVII, Histoire iii.
3La Mettrie 1745, ch. XVII, Histoire iii.
68 Chapter Four

opened up new paths by his observation and analysis of the human mind. But
Condillac accused Locke of not having succeeded in setting out a consistent
form of empiricism since he had introduced reflection as an inborn capacity.
Condillac's Essai was intended to correct Locke's failures and it also contained
the first criticism of Berkeley's theory of vision.
Condillac's entire philosophy was based on the statement that we may not
ascribe any capacities to the mind of which we are not aware or of which we
cannot make ourselves aware. He thus criticised both Locke and Berkeley who
had assumed unconscious judgments as an explanation of certain phenomena
of perception. Judgments of this type, said Condillac, would be in conflict
with our experience. Molyneux's problem, which Locke had introduced in
order to illustrate his thesis, would in no way refute this. 1
Condillac agreed with Locke that the retinal image of a sphere was an
unevenly coloured circle. But he did not accept that the sensation we have
by means of the retinal image is the sensation of a circle:
P a r m i ces suppositions, Locke avance, sans preuve, que la sensation
de l'£me ne repr~sente rien de plus que l'image que nous savons se
tracer dans l'oeil. Pour moi, quand je regarde un globe, je vois autre
chose qu'un cercle plat: experience £ laquelle il me paro~t tout naturel
de m ' e n r a p p o r t e r 2
In Condillac's opinion Locke should have been consistent and should have
argued about distance, position, size and extension in the same way that he
had concerning shape. But Locke had not done so: in Molyneux's problem
he required the globe and the cube to be of approximately the same size,
thereby implying that sight can give us various notions of size without the
help of any other judgment whatsoever. Locke thus contradicted himself,
believed Condillac, since it is impossible to understand how one can have
ideas of size without having ideas of shape.
In contrast to Locke, Berkeley had drawn the conclusion that a blind person
suddenly being given the faculty of sight would be unable to determine not
only shape, but also position, distance and size. Berkeley had invented a
thought experiment regarding an unbodied spirit in order to demonstrate that
the pure objects of sight cannot be considered geometrical forms. This kind
of ~eil animd, as Condillac called it, would in Berkeley's view be able to see
only coloured light, but no extension etc. It would become accustomed, stated
Condillac, to judging the whole of nature as a mathematical point. But what
we in fact see, according to Condillac, is light and colours which of necessity
delineate different distances, different sizes and different positions.

1Condilla~ [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §1.

2Condillac [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §3.
 The First Experimental Data 69

As far as Molyneux's problem was concerned, Condillac believed that a

person cured of congenital blindness would not immediately be able to enjoy
the spectacle offered to him by light and colour:

il ne faut pas croire qu'au moment qu'il ouvre les yeux, il jouisse
d~j£ du spectacle que produit dans toute la nature ce mSlange admi-
rable de lumi~re et de couleur. C'est un tr~sor qui est renferm~ dans
les nouvelles sensations qu'il ~prouve; la r~flexion peut seule le lui
d~couvrir et lui en donner la vraie jouissance. 1

When we ourselves turn our eyes to a richly decorated painting and see it in
its entirety we do not as yet form any particular idea of it. We must first,
said Condillac, consider all its parts separately.
Once the person born blind is capable of reflecting on what he sees, Condil-
lac believed that he would no longer see a point but extension with a certain
length, breadth and depth. When he comes to analyzing this extension, he
will form ideas for himself of surface, line, point and all kinds of shapes, and
those ideas will be identical to those which he has acquired through touch:

car, de quelque sens que l'~tendue vienne £ notre connoissance, elle

ne peut ~tre repr~sent~e de deux manihres diff~rentes. Que je voie
ou que je touche un cercle et une rhgle, l'id~e de l'un ne peut jamais
offrir qu'une ligne courbe, et celle de l'autre qu'une ligne droite. ~

The person born blind would thus be able to distinguish the sphere from the
cube by sight, because he would recognise in them the same ideas he had
formed through the sense of touch. 3
It would be possible, said Condillac, to have the man defer his judgment
by asking him what made him so sure that bodies must have the same shape
when perceived by sight as when perceived by touch. Indeed, it could well
be that an object that looks like a sphere may appear on touching it to be a
cube. Condillac was of the opinion that it was awkward to find a convincing
proof of this; only experience would provide a solution. 4
Condillac admitted that Cheselden's report seemed to create difficulties
for him: "c'est une experience qui paro~t, en tous points, contraire au senti-
ment que je viens d'Stablir. ''5 He explained the apparent contradictions, as

1Condillac [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §14.

~Condillac [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §14.
3Condillac [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §14.
4Condillac [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §14. See also Thomson 1974 and Pitcher 1974.
5Condillac [1746] 1947, part I, ch. vi, §15. Condillac quoted Voltaire's version of Ches-
elden's report.
70 Chapter Four

La Mettrie had done, by pointing out that the young man's eyes did not func-
tion well immediately after the operation because they had not been used for
years. He would require many days of exercise before being able to persuade
the different parts of the eye to work together in a coordinated fashion after
having become stiffened in the course of time. And, said Condillac, that was
the reason why Cheselden's patient had subsequently gone round feeling his
way in the dark for another two months. In contrast to Berkeley, Condillac
believed that if the young man had not used his hands he would have obtained
by the power of sight the same ideas as those which he had earlier obtained
through touch. The only difference would be that it would have taken longer.
Condillac accused of bias those who could think of no other explanation
for the young man's weak powers of sight than those advanced by Locke and
Berkeley. And, he added, they were the wrong reasons since they were not
in agreement with the principle that only that may be proposed which is
indisputable and which everyone with the least powers of reflection can note
in themselves.
Where Condillac defended in his Essai the thesis that from birth we can
perceive size, shape, distance and position immediately outside ourselves, M lie
Elisabeth Ferrand (17oo-1752), "the Egeria of the Enlightenment," was able
to convince Condillac of the incorrectness of his thesis. 1 This caused him
to change his view radically: in his later work, the Traitd des sensations
(1754) , he praised Berkeley's insights and qualified his own earlier opinions
as prejudice.
The main cause of the widespread belief in this prejudice was, believed
Condillac, that we have formed such a deeply rooted habit of judging from
sight the things with which we are surrounded that we can no longer remem-
ber what we saw when we first opened our eyes. Molyneux had proposed his
problem of the man born blind for various reasons, including a desire to inves-
tigate what we see by nature, without being prejudiced by habit. Condillac
wanted to do something similar, but for all the senses. He wanted a tool with
which we could more easily imagine what we owe to each sense. The tool was
handed to him by M ne Ferrand. She suggested that Condillac should imagine
a statue whose various senses should be opened up. In fact it was more a
question of a series of statues: a statue that was open exclusively to the sense
of smell (or taste or sight, etc.); a statue that disposed of the sense of smell
plus taste (or smell plus sight, etc.), etc.
In fact Condillac was not the only one to set up a thought experiment of
this type. Denis Diderot had already suggested, in his Lettre sur les aveu-
gles (1749), that it should be possible to imagine a block of marble able to

1See Bo ngie 1977, p. 15o 1 and Bongie 1978 , p. 92~ no t e 34.

 The First Experimental Data 71

think and feel. 1 In his Lettre sur les sourds et muets (1751) he had written
that he wanted to conduct a sort of metaphysical anatomy by dividing up
an individual, as it were, into five persons, each of which would have only
one sense2 And Buffon had wondered what the perceptions and judgments
would be of the first man at the instant of creation. 3 On these grounds
Condillac was accused of plagiarism. 4 The force of his thought experiment
was also the subject of discussion. Grimm, for instance, was of the opinion
that Condillac's assumptions were arbitrary and impossible and that it would
be better to "faire la vdritable histoire m~taphysique de l'homme."5
Condillac believed that a statue that was endowed exclusively with the
sense of sight would only have sensations of light and colour and would not
realise that such sensations were in fact caused by external objects. If the
statue were given the additional sense of touch, it would also be able to
perceive size, shape, distance and position. If it were to see only those objects
which it touched and touch only those objects which it saw, it would be unable
to distinguish the sensations of sight from those of touch. Since our power
of sight always works jointly with the sense of touch, the sensations of sight
would mingle with those of touch. 6
Condillac emphasised that there is a difference between seeing (volt) and
looking (regarder); certainly the statue would see immediately, but it would
have to learn to look and to know what it saw. In contrast to Locke, Condillac
denied the existence of unconscious judgments. We do not see objects first
as flat bodies and then as solid, stated Condillac, but it is more a case of
the experience of touch being necessary for us to realise that we are seeing
objects.
According to Condillac, Berkeley was the first to note that the eye cannot
of itself judge distance, position, shape and size. The man born blind in Moly-

1Diderot [1749] 1961 , p. 144: "Madame, combien nos sens nous sugg~rent de choses; et
que nous aurions de peine, sans nos yeux, k supposer q u ' u n bloc de m a r b r e ne pense n i n e
sent!"
2Diderot believed that these five persons would be able to communicate with one another
using geometry: "par la facult~ qu'elles auroient d'abstraire, elles pourroient toutes 8tre
g~om~tres, s ' e n t e n d r e / ~ merveille, & ne s ' e n t e n d r e qu'en g~om~trie." Diderot [1751 ] 1965,
P. 45.
3Buffon 1749 1789, vol. 3 (1749), Histoire naturelle de l'homme, chapter "Des sens en
g~n~ral."
4See, for instance, F. M. G r i m m , "Lettre i er novembre 1755," in G r i m m & Diderot
1813, vol. 1, p. 445: "M. l'abb~ Condillac avoit noy~ la statue de M. de Buffon dans un
t o n n e a u d'eau froide." Condillac defended himself against the accusations in his "R~ponse
un reproche," which was a p p e n d e d to his Traitd des sensations.
5 G r i m m , "Lettre 1er d~cembre 1754," in G r i m m & Diderot 1813, vol. 1, p. 263.
6Condillac [1754] 1947, part III, ch. iv, §2: "ses sensations se mSlent avec les idles qu'elle
lui doit."
72 Chapter Four

neux's problem would be unable to do any of this; he would be unable, using

his sight alone, to distinguish a sphere from a cube. 1 Condillac, incidentally,
believed t h a t the conditions t h a t the sphere and the cube should be made of
the same material and should be the same size were superfluous2
In the Traitd des sensations Condillac wrote t h a t he perceived a proof
of Berkeley's thesis in Cheselden's report, but he also had a critical r e m a r k
to make a b o u t it. 3 Thus he found t h a t Cheselden had not always expressed
himself sufficiently carefully. He had written, on the one hand, t h a t the y o u n g
m a n started off by being unable to distinguish objects one from the other,
no m a t t e r how different they were in shape or size; on the other h a n d he
noted t h a t the y o u n g m a n found t h a t regular objects were the most pleasant.
However, Condillac did not blame him for this: he regarded Cheselden as
a pioneer, seeing for the first time p h e n o m e n a consisting of "thousands of
details difficult to comprehend." In such cases there is always a great deal
left to be desired. But such matters should at the very least provide insight,
so t h a t observations could be made with a greater degree of success on a
subsequent occasion. In order to avoid the same mistakes at a later date
Condillac followed Diderot's example in making some r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s as to
how a blind person operated on to restore his sight could best be observed. 4
Condillac recommended first of all t h a t one must ensure t h a t the person
born blind should reflect on the ideas that he has obtained t h r o u g h the sense
o f touch so t h a t later he can of himself (without others having to ask him
questions) say what ideas he obtains t h r o u g h the faculty of sight. Once the
operation for c a t a r a c t has been performed the patient should be forbidden to
touch a n y t h i n g until he has learnt what ideas belong to the faculty of sight.
Investigations should be carried out to ascertain whether light appears to him
to be extended or whether he can determine its limits and whether it is so
vague t h a t he cannot observe variations in it.
T h e patient should then be shown two colours, first separately and then
simultaneously, asking him if there is a n y t h i n g he recognises as having seen
previously. This should be repeated with an ever-increasing n u m b e r of colours.
A n d investigations should above all be made to discover whether he can deter-

1Condillac [1754] 1947, part HI, ch. iv, §3. Bonnet 176o also uses the notion of a statue.
Bonnet was of the opinion that a blind person who had been operated on would not be
able to recognise a round object by sight since there would be absolutely no link between
tactile and visual ideas.
2Condillac [1754] 1947, part III, ch. iv, §3.
3Condillac [1754] 1947, part III, ch. v. In 1754 Condillac discussed Cheselden's report
in far greater detail than he had done in 1746. It is likely that he was taking his data no
longer exclusively from Voltaire's Elemens (1738) but also from Buffon 1749-1789, vol. 3
(1749), Histoire naturelle de l'homme, chapter "Du sens de la vue." See Pastore 1973.
4Condillac [1754] 1947, part III, ch. vi.
 The First Experimental Data 73

mine size, shape, position, distance and movement. He should be questioned

skilfully, all leading questions being avoided. After all, asking him if he can
see a triangle or a rectangle would mean that he was being told what he
should see. And thus Condillac implicitly characterised Molyneux's question
as a bad question and a leading question.
Condillac invented a somewhat remarkable means of removing all shadow
of doubt. A blind person just operated on should be closed up in a glass
room. This would lead to two possibilities: either the patient will recognise
the objects situated on the other side of the glass and will determine their
shape and size; or he will merely note the space enclosed by the walls of
the room and will interpret the objects as surfaces of different colours, which
appear to extend as far as he can move his hand towards them. The first
case, said Condillac, would prove that the eye can judge without assistance
from touch; the second that it can only judge after having consulted touch.
Condillac suspected that the latter would be the case. 1
Denis Diderot (1713-1784), who was Condillac's contemporary, distin-
guished himself from his predecessors because his interest in those born blind
was not limited to phenomena in the field of epistemology or the psychology
of perception but concerned their whole world. In his wonderful Lettre sur
les aveugles, d l'usage de ceux qui voient (1749) he described how greatly the
world of the blind differs from that of the sighted. ~ He used as a basis a dis-
cussion he had had with an educated person from Puiseaux, blind from birth,
and on statements made by the blind mathematician, Saunderson, already
referred to here. They proved that the ideas the blind have regarding beauty
differ from those held by the sighted and, in addition, that the blind have
different morals and metaphysics. They thereby confirmed a more general
suspicion on the part of Diderot:

je n'ai jamais dout~ que l'Stat de nos organes et de nos sens n'ait pas
beaucoup d'influence sur notre m6taphysique et sur notre morale, et
que nos idSes les plus purement intellectuelles, si je puis parler ainsi,
ne tiennent de fort pros ~ la conformation de notre corps. 3

One could also state that the religious opinions and attitudes of blind people
are vastly different from those entertained by the sighted. After all, the blind
are not capable of witnessing the wonders of nature with their own eyes; and

1Condillac [1754] 1947, part III, ch. vi, §2.

2Diderot's Lettre sur les aveugles was published anonymously. Together with Moly-
neux's problem and Cheselden's report the letter was extensively discussed in an article by
D'Alembert in the Encyclopddie (D'Alembert 1751). Paulson 1987 contains an interesting
chapter about Diderot's letter. See also Perkins 1978.
3Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 92.
74 Chapter Four

moreover, said Diderot, they are themselves a monstrous p r o d u c t of nature.

Diderot put the following provocative words in Saunderson's m o u t h while the
latter was on his d e a t h b e d and was talking to the Reverend Holmes: 1

ce beau spectacle qui n ' a jamais ~t~ fait pour moi! J'ai ~t~ c o n d a m n ~
/~ passer m a vie dans les t~n~bres; et vous me citez des prodiges que
je n'entends point, et qui ne prouvent que pour vous et pour ceux qui
voient c o m m e vous. Si vous voulez que je croie en Dieu, il faut que
vous me le fassiez toucher. ~

Diderot then allowed Saunderson to speculate on the origin of time and ob-
jects. Originally there would have been overall chaos, but this would have
slowly resolved itself and a large n u m b e r of misformed and a few well-formed
beings would have come into existence. By natural selection the monsters
would be destroyed in the course of time, thus producing the wondrous order
so highly appreciated by Newton, Leibniz and Clarke. But the order in the
world is not perfect, remarked Saunderson, pointing to himself: ' T o r d r e n'est
pas si parfait [...] qu'il ne paraisse encore de temps en temps des productions
monstrueuses." 3
T h e discussion with the Reverend Holmes made such a deep impression on
Saunderson t h a t he fell into a delirium, uttered the i m m o r t a l line " 0 Dieu
de Clarke et de Newton, prends pitid de moi/" and gave up the spirit. 4 T h e
atheist a t t i t u d e expressed by Diderot in the Lettre sur les aveugles was not
appreciated: the French government locked him up in the prison of Vincennes.
A large part of the Lettre sur les aveugles deals with Molyneux's problem.
Locke, Berkeley and m a n y others had used Molyneux's t h o u g h t experiment as
a means of better reflecting on our original perceptions. By p u t t i n g ourselves
in the shoes of someone born blind it should be easier for us to imagine what
we saw before we had formed j u d g m e n t s and habits. Diderot, however, did
not see the sense in such an enterprise:

On cherche £ restituer la vue ~t des aveugles-nSs; mais si l'on y re-

gardait de plus pros, on trouverait, je crois, qu'il y a bien a u t a n t /~
profiter pour la philosophie en questionnant un aveugle de bon sens.

1Holmes does indeed appear to have been a witness of Saunderson's death: "The rev-
erend Gervas Holmes informed him [i.e., Saunderson] that the mortification gained so much
ground that his best friends could entertain no hope of his recovery. He received this notice
of his approaching death with great calmness and serenity and after a short silence, resumed
life and spirits." Quoted by Verni~re in Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 118, note 2. What Diderot
wrote was, of course, apocryphal.
~Diderot [1749] 1961, pp. 118-119.
3Diderot [1749] 1961' p. 122.
4Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 124.
 The First Experimental Data 75

On en apprendrait c o m m e n t les choses se passent en lui; on les com-

parerait avec la mani~re dont elles se passent en nous, et l'on tirerait
peut-@tre de cette comparaison la solution des difficultds qui rendent
la th@orie de la vision et des sens si embarrass@e et si incertaine. [...]
J ' a u r a i s moins de confiance dans les r@ponses d ' u n e personne qui voit
p o u r la premiere fois, que dans les d~couvertes d ' u n philosophe qui
aurait bien m@dit~ son sujet dans l'obscurit@, ou, pour vous parler le
langage des pontes, qui se serait crev@ les yeux pour conna~tre plus
ais@ment c o m m e n t se fair la vision. 1

If, despite these difficulties, the decision is taken to operate on one born
blind, said Diderot, a n u m b e r of conditions need to be fulfilled in order to
obtain reliable information. ~ First of all a blind person with a g o o d dose of
c o m m o n sense is required, preferably a philosopher since such a person can
think clearly. He would need to be t h o r o u g h l y prepared and the observations
should only begin some considerable time after the operation has been per-
formed, when the eyes are completely healed. Meanwhile the patient should
be kept in darkness, where he should be given the o p p o r t u n i t y to exercise
his eyes. M o r e o v e r - - a n d this was a s o m e w h a t sticky p r o b l e m - - h e should be
questioned in a skilful m a n n e r so t h a t he tells no more t h a n t h a t which is hap-
pening within him. Finally the questioning should take place before a forum
of learned men. 3 In brief, "Preparer et interroger un aveugle-n5 n'efit point
St@ une occupation indigne des talents r~unis de Newton, Descartes, Locke et
Leibniz." 4
Like Boullier, Diderot replaced the sphere and the cube in M o l y n e u x ' s
problem with a circle and a square, since he believed t h a t we can only judge
distance from experience and t h a t someone opening his eyes for the first time
sees only (flat) surfaces and does not know t h a t objects project forwards. A n d
even if a person born blind perceived projections and solidity from the first
instant of restored sight, and even if he could distinguish not only a circle
from a square but also a sphere from a cube, he would not, asserted Diderot,
be able to do this with more complex objects (such as a glove, a housecoat or
a d o c t o r ' s headgear). 5

1Diderot [1749] 1961, pp. 126-127.

2See also Delacampagne 1987.
3At the beginning of his letter Diderot sarcastically accused doctor Rdaumur of not
allowing philosophers to be present at his eye operations.
4Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 128.
5Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 143. Diderot agreed with Condillac on the superfluous nature
of the conditions that the sphere and the cube should be of the same size and made of the
same material. Diderot provided an interesting variant of Molyneux's question: everyone
agrees, he said, that touch does not teach sight to distinguish colours. If a person born
76 Chapter Four

Diderot was of the opinion that Molyneux's question, when seen in a some-
what more general sense than Molyneux had done, actually contained two
questions: (1) will the blind person be able to see immediately after the
cataract operation? and (2) if so, will he see sufficiently well to be able to
distinguish shapes; will he be capable, without hesitation, of giving the same
names to objects by sight as he did by those of touch; and will he have a proof
of the fact that he is using the correct names?
With regard to the first question, Diderot had no hesitation in saying that
a blind person cured of cataract would, like a baby when it first opens its eyes,
be incapable of seeing anything: "on n'est affectS, dans les premiers instants
de la vision, que d'une multitude de sensations confuses. ''1 Diderot believed
that touch could help the eye to distinguish shapes one from the other. But
he was also convinced that the eye would be capable of doing this without
the aid of touch: "je pense nullement que l'ceil ne puisse s'instruire, ou, s'il
est permis de parler ainsi, s'exp@rimenter de lui-mSme. ''2 A living eye (un
oeil vivant et animd) would, said Diderot, be able to distinguish the size and
s h a p e - - o r at least the rough outlines--of objects.
It in no way surprised Diderot that Cheselden's famous discoveries had
concluded that his patient could distinguish nothing in the beginning. He
concluded that the eye needed time to exercise and gain experience, and not
that touch would be required to distinguish shapes. Moreover, added Diderot,
what can we really expect of someone who was unaccustomed to reflect on
himself and who was unaware of the advantages of sight, who was insensitive
to his own unhappiness and was totally incapable of imagining the extent of
the damage done to his own satisfaction by the loss of this sense? Saunderson
would certainly not have been as indifferent as Cheselden's patient and he
would most certainly have reacted differently.
If the person born blind is given the time, said Diderot, at some point he
will succeed not only in distinguishing colours but also the overall outline of
an object. Suppose that he masters this skill in a short time or that he should
obtain it by moving his eyes in the dark: would he then be able to recognise
and name objects by sight that he had previously touched? Diderot gave
various answers to this question, depending on the intelligence of the blind
person. 3

blind should receive his sight and a black cube and a red sphere be placed against a white
background, he would immediately distinguish the limits of these shapes. Diderot [1749]
1961, p. 137.
1Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 135.
2Diderot [1749] 1961, pp. 135-136.
3Diderot [1749] 1961, pp. 141-143.
 The First Experimental Data 77

Uncivilised people, without education, without knowledge and unprepared,

will say that the one object is a circle and the other a square, without having
any good grounds for making such a judgment. Or in their ngivet@ they
will insist that in the objects presented to their sight they recognise nothing
similar to anything they have ever touched. For in fact they are not used to
any kind of reasoning at all. They do not know what sensations or ideas are
and are incapable of comparing the representations obtained through touch
with those received vi£ the eyes. Other people will compare the shapes they see
with shapes that have left an impression on their hands. They will mentally
touch the objects that are at a distance and of the one they will say that it is
a square and of the other that it is a circle--without knowing why.
A metaphysician will compare the ideas received through the eyes with
those gained by touch. He will say that he is strongly tempted to believe that
this is the object that he has always called a circle and the other the object
that he has always called a square. But because he would not know whether
what he sees is also perceivable by touch, the objects could be transformed
under his hands and provide sensations by touch which would be opposite to
those of sight. Thus he will be brought to confess that he has no knowledge
whatsoever regarding the content of his statements. He will only say that this
appears to him to be a circle and that a square.
If we replace the metaphysician with a geometer, or Locke with Saunderson,
he will say that the one shape is a square and the other a circle. For he will
note that only in the case of the first can he place threads and pins on his
computing board to m a r k the four corners of a square, and only in the case
of the second can he place the threads required to demonstrate the properties
of a circle. 1 Unlike the metaphysician he will not say that what feels like
a sphere perhaps looks like a cube. For he knows that those to whom he
has demonstrated the properties of a circle in the past have not touched his
instrumentarium and yet have understood him. The circle felt by the geometer
agrees, therefore, with the circle seen by his audience.
Diderot's Lettre sur les aveugles represented an important contribution to
the debate on Molyneux's problem. First of all he aroused discussion as to
whether the perceptions of the blind person operated upon were appropriate
to solve a problem dealing with sight. By asking this question he cast doubt
on the basic assumptions of Molyneux, Berkeley and others. Secondly, like
La Mettrie and Condillac before him, he pointed up the critical state in which
the eye could be immediately following the operation. Diderot also drew a
distinction between what someone opening his eyes for the first time would be

1In order to gain an impression of how Saunderson worked with his computing board,
see Saunderson 174o or Diderot [1749] 1961.
78 Chapter Four

able to see and what he would see with the aid of visual experience (though
not aided by touch). Then he laid down, stage by stage, how a patient should
be prepared for a cataract operation and what kind of observations should be
carried out if the experiment was to have any explanatory force. What, in
fact, Diderot did was to formulate a number of methodological criteria which
a psychological experiment had to meet. Finally he pointed out that patients
from different backgrounds would not all react in the same manner and that
perception was perhaps not as universal as Berkeley had suggested.
Like his French colleagues La Mettrie, Condillac and Diderot, the Swiss
philosopher Jean-Bernard M@rian (1723-18o7) wrote about Molyneux's prob-
lem, criticised Cheselden's report and suggested alternatives. All of this was
contained in a series of eight Mdmoires published between 1772 and 1782 in
the Nouveaux mdmoires de l'Acaddmie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres
of Berlin. 1 In his first Mdmoire MSrian underlined the importance of Moly-
neux's problem:

Ce probl~me tient, dans la Philosophie moderne, une place distingu@e.

Les Locke, les Leibniz, les hommes les plus cSl~bres de notre si~cle en
ont fait l'objet de leurs recherches. I1 a 5t5 le germe de dScouvertes
importantes, qui ont produit des changements consid@rables dans la
science de l'Esprit humain, et surtout dans la Th@orie des Sensations.:

M@rian's aim was to provide an histoire raisonnde of Molyneux's problem

in which the various solutions, including the arguments advanced and the
consequences drawn, would be analyzed. In order to achieve this he posed
a number of questions designed to make it possible to classify the various
solutions. Are forms the direct objects of sight? Can the eye perceive shape
and extension without experience? Does the eye need aid from touch in order
to perceive shape and extension? Are the visual and the tactile form of an
object the same form? Is similarity directly perceivable or does it have to be
derived from intermediate terms with the aid of the understanding? 3
M@rian was of the opinion that on the grounds of the solutions which he
analyzed and commented upon everyone was free to choose what he regarded
as appearing to be in the best agreement with the nature of things and the
truth. He believed that people would answer in the affirmative if convinced
that sight and touch give us the same immediate perceptions of the shape of
an object or if it is possible to abstract the same ideas. However, people who
believe that visual and tactile shapes are heterogeneous will give a negative

1In x748 M@rian went to Berlin at Maupertuis's invitation to take a seat in the Acaddmie
de Berlin. In 1797 he succeeded Formey as secrdtaire perpdtuel of the Aeaddmie.
2Merian [1772] 1984, P. 5.
3M~rian [1772] 1984, §2, pp. 5-8.
 The First Experimental Data 79

answer. Or perhaps they will take no sides if neither the pros nor cons seem
to be decisive. 1
We will not go into M~rian's historical review here but simply record his
preference for Berkeley's solution. M~rian defended Berkeley's position that
the objects of sight and those of touch are different and can only be related by
experience. The fact that the words "extension" and "shape" can be applied
to both visual and tactile qualities says nothing about their real identity:
"nous concevrons que leur identit~ nominale ne prouve point leur identit~
r~elle. ''2 Like Berkeley, M~rian illustrated the nature of the link between
visual and tactile objects using a language metaphor:

Cette liaison est purement symbolique. Elle est la m~me qu'entre

les mots et les choses, ou entre les mots ~crits et les sons articul6s.
Les objets visibles et tangibles ne se ressemblent pas davantage que
les sons ne ressemblent aux pens6es, ou les mots ~crits aux sons.
Mais la liaison une fois 6tablie, la presence des uns r6veille l'id~e des
autres; comme dans nos langues les sons articul~s r~veillent l'image
des choses signifi~es, ou les caract~res ~crits l'image des sons qui leur
sont attaches, et r~ciproquement. 3

M~rian was of the opinion that the objects of sight and those of touch could
fulfil the function both of sign and of the thing referred to: "De sorte que de
leur nature, ils sont ~galement propres £ ~tre, les uns £ l'~gard des autres, ou
le signe, ou la chose signifi~e. ''4 This relationship is therefore mutual, said
M~rian, and what first touches us always seems to summon up the idea of
the other. And yet the visual object is usually given the function of sign, in
view of the fact that our sense of touch is more important for our survival:
"I1 nous importe donc bien davantage d'etre avertis par la Vue de l'effet que
feront sur nous les objets tangibles, que de l'Stre par le Tact de l'effet que
feront sur nous les objets visibles. ''5 Like Locke and Berkeley, M~rian thus
made the objects of sight subordinate to the objects of touch.
In order to clarify Molyneux's problem M~rian invented a new thought
experiment with some resemblance to that proposed by Hutcheson. Imagine
a world, said M~rian, inhabited exclusively by people born blind and in which
objects give off odours more or less complex according to the complexity of
their form. Would someone born without the sense of smell who suddenly has

1M~rian [1781 ] 1984, pp. 165 166.

2M6rian [1774] 1984, §3, P. 64.
3M6rian [1776 ] 1984, §6, pp. 93 94.
4Merian [1776] 1984, §7, P. 95.
5Merian [1776] 1984, §7, P. 96.
80 Chapter Four

this sense restored then be able to distinguish a sphere from a cube without
touching the objects? M~rian believed n o t ?
According to M~rian, Berkeley's theory had benefitted from a rare ad-
vantage that few philosophical writings can boast of, namely that of being
confirmed by experience, that is by the observations of Cheselden's patient?
Although the young man appeared to find no similarity between visual and
tactile extension and shape, M~rian wanted to cover himself against hasty
conclusions: "je me garderai bien de prononcer p~remptoirement d'apr~s une
experience aussi d~licate, et dont nous ne connaissons pas m~me les d~tails
autant qu'il serait £ souhaiter.'3
It would be desirable, stated M6rian, if philosophers were able to perform
many more authentic observations on people born blind after being operated
upon, using measures laid down prior to the observations. This would enable
them to compare experiences and find out from the one what the other had
missed. The problem was, however, according to M~rian, that such opportu-
nities are rare; you have to wait for a stroke of luck to come along. And not
all patients are equMly suitable; there is often a lack of time to prepare them
and circumstances sometimes prove adverse. In addition, true researchers are
no less unusual: "Les philosophes sont trop indolents, trop peu curieux pour
rechercher les moyens de s'instruire; ils aiment mieux argumenter que voir.
Pour le grand nombre la philosophie est un m~tier plut6t qu'une science. "4 In
view of this state of affairs it is thus no wonder, proposed M6rian, that since
Cheselden's time--forty years previous--there had been no new experiences
of such an important matter.
M~rian believed that there was one major objection in the case of Ches-
elden's patient, as there is in that of all those born blind who undergo a
cataract operation: cataract does not cause general blindness. And in this he
was right, for even those with a mature cataract have their projection of light
intact. Those blinded by cataract combine the weak light that they perceive
with tactile extension, said M6rian, and thus they can have no purely visual
perceptions once they have undergone the operation. 5
M~rian suggested a bizarre plan to counteract these objections. Instead
of waiting until there was a suitable case of cataract, he suggested that a

1Merian [1777] 1984, §5, PP. 119-121, and M~rian [1779] 1984, §2, p. 131.
2M~rian [1774] 1984, §1, p. 6o, and M~rian [1776] 1984, §4, P. 89. M~rian referred to
Condillac's versions of Cheselden's report; he also mentioned The Tatler ([Steele] [17o9]
1898), and contradictory observations of a person born blind operated on by Marchan. See
M~rian [1782] 1984, pp. 175-177. I have only been able to check on Marchan 1768, but he
says nothing about an experiment with a sphere and a cube, as stated by M~rian.
3M6rian [1773] 1984, part II, §7, P. 54.
4M~rian [1782] 1984, p. 178.
5M~rian [1782] 1984, p. 179.
 The First Experimental Data 81

Sdminaire d'Aveugles Artificiels should be established where it would be pos-

sible to experiment systematically on a large group of people artificially de-
prived of the faculty of sight. 1 "Ce projet serait de prendre des enfants au
berceau, et de les ~lever dans de profondes t@n~bres jusqu'& l'£ge de raison. ''~
Some artificially blind people would be left to the whims of nature while oth-
ers would be given a more or less good upbringing and others still would
receive the best schooling that their condition would allow. They would be
taught to read raised letters and would receive classes in the sciences, physics,
philosophy, geometry and--especially--optics. Some would be brought up in
isolation, others would be allowed to form groups. After they had attained a
certain age, the cleverest would be chosen to form a society of learned men:

En un mot, comme leur esprit serait, pour ainsi dire, entre nos mains,
que nous pourrions le p6trir comme une cire molle, et y d~velopper
les connaissances dans telle succession qu'il nous plairait, on serait 5~
port6e de prendre toutes les Pr@cautions , et de varier les experiences
de toutes les fa§ons imaginables. 3

Once they have obtained various ideas in this manner it will be easier to
interrogate them one by one once the veil is lifted from their eyes, wrote
M6rian.
M@rian foresaw two kinds of problem, the one physical and the other moral.
In the first place one could fear that these children could lose their powers
of sight completely and would really become blind. If this should turn out
to be the case, the whole enterprise would, stated M@rian, be useless and
would even be improper. But he could think of no fact that would confirm
this possibility and he left it up to those whose task it is to study the human
body. 4 Another objection could be that light is present everywhere and that
no darkness is so intense that it cannot illuminate the eye when the eye has
grown accustomed. M~rian brushed this problem aside by pointing out that
experts would doubtless be able to invent a suitable blindfold.
The gravest objection would be that nobody wishes to sacrifice their chil-
dren for metaphysical experiments, that it is unjust to require this of anyone
and that it witnesses to cruelty towards those children. M~rian replied: "Je
r@ponds que mon projet s'adresse aux philosophes embras~s de l'amour de la

1One could state with some measure of irony that in this M~rian was anticipating the
Institution Nationale des Jeunes Aveugles established in 1784 by Valentin Haiiy.
2M~rian [a782] 1984, p. 18o.
aM@rian [1782] 1984, pp. 18o-181.
4At present we know that visual stimulation is of essential importance in the first months
following birth. Neonates brought up in darkness show serious visual defects.
82 Chapter Four

Science, qui savent qu'on ne va au grand qu'en foulant aux pieds les pr6jug6s
populaires." 1
Moreover the implementation of his plan would not be M~rian's own affair
nor that of any private individual, but that of a sovereign or of a magistrate
endowed with public authority. Without even speaking of the source offered
by orphanages for subjects, we should allow our gaze to wander through the
streets of a large town, said M~rian. Observe all those objects of our disgust
and pity, these half naked children, scarcely clothed in miserable rags, the prey
of vermin, brought up in laziness and debauchery, these accursed children,
crippled, often even made incurably blind by monsters with pretensions to
being their parents. Where is the evil in tearing these tender victims from
their persecutors so that they may serve in our experiments and may be turned
into useful or even famous citizens one day?
M6rian assumed that if our senses could have been developed one by one we
would have derived a great deal more benefit from them. They damage each
other by their simultaneous activity, since the one perfects itself at the expense
of the other. M6rian would like to have control over the first impressions, since
these are the most important for the general development of the individual:

Tout d6pend de ces premieres s~ries d'impressions sensibles, et le

secret de l'~ducation ne roule que sur cela. Ce sont les 6l~ments de
notre raison et de toutes nos connaissances. A cela tiennent notre
tour d'esprit, nos mceurs, nos penchants, notre conduite, et en grand
partie notre destinde dans ce monde. 2

According to M6rian, an individual is a bad person throughout his whole life,

a suspect or a sower of unrest, only because his first impressions were bad. If
our plan could be brought to fruition, said M~rian, we would be able to raise
people as perfect as allowed by our nature.
T h e learned people who would head M~rian's Sdminaire d'Aveugles Arti-
ficiels would have to offer their pupils objects in the order most appropriate
for the end to which they were being educated. They would be able to fol-
low the development of their understanding and in hundreds of ways develop
their ideas by varying their sensations. They would be capable of making en-
gineers, sculptors, physicists and mathematicians of the best kind, and above
all philosophers unencumbered by all kinds of prejudice. In short, M6rian
believed that for children raised in this way there would be infinitely more to
gain than to lose. They would have no idea of what they were missing and
their loss would be richly compensated:

~M~rian [1782 ] a984, p. 183.

2M~rian [1782 ] 1984, p. 185.
 The First Experimental Data 83

De quel torrent de d~lices vont-ils ~tre inond@s, quels seront leurs

transports, lorsqu'on les fera passer de la nuit au jour, des t@nhbres
£ la lumi~re, lorsqu'un nouvel univers, un monde tout brillant, ~clora
pour eux comme du sein du Chaos! Y-a-t-il rien de comparable £ un
pareil instant? 1

In addition to all of this, science too would gain. W h a t new discoveries could
be made when children started to use their eyes, what discoveries through
the association with the other senses and especially that of touch! W h a t
progress could be made in geometry, optics, natural history and philosophy!
It would become possible to have them clarify the most complex questions
and unravel the most aggravating problems. They would make discoveries
for us by discovering themselves and it would be seen that in these places of
darkness an excellent philosophical academy had been createdP
Would they blame you for having deprived them of their sight, M@rian
asked rhetorically. Of course not: "ils vous en remercieront avec des larmes
de joie, [...] ils se f@liciteront, toute leur vie, de l'@ducation que vous leur avez
donn@e."3 And that was precisely the reaction shown by the young man who
was restored to sight by Cheselden: he too greeted his benefactor with tears
of joy.
MSrian's enlightened notions of the possibility of creating good, educated
people seem not to have found much echo, no matter how interesting they
may have been from a variety of angles. 4

6 CONCLUSIONS

Anyone who studied the problem proposed by Molyneux was, of course, cu-
rious to know what a person born blind really would see when restored to
sight. It is no surprise, therefore, that many threw themselves into discus-
sion of Cheselden's report with great enthusiasm. Some philosophers judged
that the report left nothing to be desired as far as clarity was concerned. It
confirmed their suspicions that someone cured of congenital blindness would
at first be unable to distinguish objects one from the other, would be unable
to determine shape, size or distance, and would have to learn to see. The
report proved, they believed, without a shadow of doubt that the man born

1M@rian [1782] 1984, p. 187.

2M@rian [1782] 1984, p. 19o.
3M@rian [1782] 1984, pp. 19o 191.
4According to Dilthey [19ol] 1927, p. 149, Mdrian's discussion of Molyneux's problem
was "vielbesprochen." I was, however, unable to find any trace of this.
84 ChapterFour

blind in Molyneux's question would be unable to distinguish a sphere from a

cube and would be incapable of naming them. These were mostly followers
of Berkeley's theory of vision, and they were largely to be found in Great
Britain.
But there were other philosophers who did not allow themselves to be
convinced by Cheselden's report without asking questions. They believed
that the report could not be interpreted unambiguously and that the data
were capable of explanation in another way. First of all they indicated the
possibility that the eye was not functioning correctly, either because it was
not working flexibly enough because it had not been used for a long time,
or because it had not yet sufficiently recovered from the operation. Secondly
they did not exclude the possibility that Cheselden had put leading questions
to the boy. They accused those who interpreted the report in favour of the
view held by Locke and Berkeley of reading in the report only that which
was favourable to their case. Diderot pointed out that the results of the
experiments were dependent on the intelligence of the patient.
Although in the seventeenth century it was known that optical correction
was needed after a cataract operation, no-one blamed the results of Chesel-
den's operation on the absence of the lens. (However, if the sphere and cube
shown to the young man were not too small and the distance not too great,
dioptric factors cannot have been of any great consequence.) It is remarkable
that nobody suggested that the young man could not perceive depth at first
because he could only see out of one eye. His second eye was, in fact, only
operated on a year later. 1
Those who criticised Cheselden's report put forward several suggestions for
getting round these objections. First of M1 the patient should be appropriately
prepared for the operation and for the subsequent questioning. Furthermore
the patient's eyes should also be given time to recover after the operation
and the patient should be given the opportunity to exercise his eye muscles in
darkness. Then precautions should be taken not to put leading questions. In
brief, the critics of Cheselden's report--mainly to be found in France, where
the influence of Berkeley's theory of vision was not so great--paid attention
to a wide variety of methodological questions.
There was also a more fundamental criticism of the type of operation per-
formed by Cheselden. Diderot believed that it made no sense at all to put
questions to congenitally blind persons regarding what they see if the ques-
tioner wishes to find out how our powers of sight work. Molyneux, Berkeley
and other philosophers had invented various thought experiments in the hope

1In all congenital cataract patients (whether operated on one eye or both) there is a lack
of stereoscopic vision.
 The First Experimental Data 85

that these would provide us with insight into the working of our senses. They
expected that we would be able to shrug off our prejudices and habits if we
could place ourselves in the shoes of a person born blind (or of a living eye, of
a statue or some such). We would then be more easily able to imagine what
we would perceive before having formed our prejudices and habits. Diderot
believed, however, that this was an illusory quest. He had no confidence in
the reactions of someone who opened his eyes for the first time. He would
have preferred to have the problems facing the theory of vision solved by a
philosopher endowed with common sense.
M~rian too doubted whether cataract patients could be useful in the search
for a description of pure visual perceptions. Cataract patients are, after all,
not completely blind; they always retain some projection of light. However,
this was not necessarily a problem within the context of Molyneux's question
since this concerned only perception of shapes. Since cataract patients are
not capable of perceiving shapes, they would in principle be of use in finding
out whether, immediately following the operation to remove the cataracts,
they could distinguish different shapes.
M~rian developed an interesting plan which would enable the (visual) de-
velopment of people to be guided along pre-determined lines. He suggested
having newly-born children grow up under a variety of conditions in total
darkness. Once they had reached the age of reason they would be exposed
to various series of visual impressions. They would then be able to provide
an answer to the urgent questions regarding our powers of sight. It would,
moreover, be possible to provide them with that visual information most ap-
propriate to the end to which they were being educated. M~rian's plan for a
Sdminaire des Aveugles Artificiels was, in fact, a precursor of the deprivation
experiments performed on chimpanzees after the Second World War. As will
be shown in the sixth chapter, the results of the experiments were less rosy
than M~rian had prophesied.
Although Cheselden's report was often referred to again in the nineteenth-
century discussions of Molyneux's problem, its influence had been on the wane
since the end of the eighteenth century. Admirers of the report had meanwhile
been able to single out the remarkable results, while its critics had indicated
the weak points.
Without there really being any question of a cmsura, around 18oo a number
of developments took place which justify the suggestion that a new period
was dawning in the history of Molyneux's problem. First of all there were
new reports of cataract operations which were associated with the problem.
Some of these provided results that agreed with Cheselden's observations while
others appeared to be in conflict with them. In addition data on the visual
powers of newly-born animals and babies began to be applied in discussions on
Molyneux's question. Furthermore Wheatstone's clarification of stereoscopic
86 ChapterFour

vision came to play its part in the matter. As will be shown in the next
chapter, the data mentioned above acted as arguments in the nineteenth-
century empiricism-nativism debate in which Molyneux's problem frequently
figured.
 CHAPTER FIVE

E M P I R I C A L A P P R O A C H E S IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1 CONGENITALLY BLIND P E O P L E CURED BY SURGERY

]~ ORthe several decades Cheselden's report had occupied an important place in

debate surrounding Molyneux's problem because it w a s - - a p a r t from
Grant's dubious s t o r y - - t h e only source of information on what a blind person
could see after a successful operation. From the second half of the eighteenth
century there was a slow change in this situation because other eye surgeons
also began to describe the results they had achieved in operating on cataract
patients. 1 Cheselden's report did not, however, fall into oblivion. Practically
every time Molyneux's problem (or, more generally, the perception of people
blind from birth cured of their affliction) was discussed reference was made
to Cheselden. Cheselden's findings were, moreover, used as an argument in
support of Berkeley's theory well into the nineteenth century.
However, in the nineteenth century Cheselden's report was also the subject
of frequent negative criticism. William Hamilton (1788-1856), for instance,
wrote that Cheselden's report "does not merit all the eulogia that have been
lavished on it. It is at once imperfect and indistinct. ''~ Samuel Bailey (1791-
187o), a fervent opponent of Berkeley's doctrine, had a similar opinion: "The
narrative of Cheselden, which has been so celebrated and thought to be so
conclusive, appears to me, I confess, exceedingly loose, meagre, and unsat-
isfactory. ''3 The criticism levelled at the report focused particularly on the
ambiguity of certain passages. Bailey assumed that Cheselden "had not in his
mind any clear idea of the import of his words, and was unaware of the am-
biguity lurking in them. ''4 Many found his expression "all Objects whatever
touch'd his Eyes" a problem, one of the few sentences that Cheselden had re-
ported v e r b a t i m . 5 Some interpreted the sentence literally and regarded it as a

1See Bourdon 19o2 , pp. 362-391 , and Von Senden [1932 ] 196o.
~Hamilton in Reid [1837] 1863, vol. 1, p. 136 , note.
3Bailey a842, pp. 169-17o.
4Bailey 1842, pp. 179-18o.
5Cheselden 1728, p. 448.

87
88 Chapter Five

proof that distance cannot be immediately seen. Others thought it extremely

unlikely that Cheselden had understood the boy's words literally and thus
sought an alternative explanation. Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), for example,
regarded the phrase as a description of the feeling of pain caused either by the
operation or by bright light. 1 Bailey supported this explanation by referring
to work of the famous physiologist Charles BellP Stratton too (who, at the
end of the nineteenth century, carried out ingenious experiments in which a
cluster of lenses projected the outside world onto the retina the right way
up rather than upside-down) was of the opinion that the patient's experience
"was largely made up of muscular and tactual and pain sensations." 3
Another explanation given of the expression in question referred to the
patient's use of language. Bailey suggested that the young man was only
able to use a "tactual phraseology" since throughout the whole of his life he
had been familiar with objects and distances only through the sense of touch:
"In seeking to express his novel feelings by the aid of an analogical language
(the only resource he would have), this might be the analogy which his new
sensations would most readily suggest. ''4 Thomas Abbott (1829-1913) too,
who also strongly opposed Berkeley's doctrine on the faculty of sight, was of
the opinion that the patient's language must have been based on the sense
of touch because "touch was the only mode of perception with which he was
acquainted, or which he could conceive. ''5 Similarly attempts were made to
clarify other ambiguous phrases in Cheselden's report.
While Cheselden had merely noted down what his patient had perceived
under more or less natural conditions, later doctors conducted experiments
to verify whether, immediately following the operation, their patients could
perceive shape, size, distance and suchlike. A number of doctors were partic-
ularly interested in Molyneux's question and carried out tests with a sphere
and a cube to investigate how the question should be answered. The results
of the cataract operations in question also drew a great deal of attention for
other reasons. They were used to test Berkeley's theory of vision and served
as arguments in the empiricism-nativism debate.

1Stewart [1815] 1854, p. 31o, note.

2Charles Bell 1833, quoted by Bailey 1842, p. 173: "The beauty and perfection of the
system [...] is, that each nerve is made susceptible to its peculiar impression only. The
nerve of the skin is alone capable of giving the sense of contact, as the nerve of vision is
confined to its own office. [...] It is most beneficently provided that this nerve (of vision)
shall not be sensible to pain, nor be capable of conveying to the mind any impressions but
those which operate according to its proper function, producing light and colour. The pain
experienced in the eye, as from irritation of dust, is owing to a distinct nerve from that
which bestows vision."
3Stratton 1899, p. 5ol, note 1.
4Bailey 1842, p. 174.
5Abbott 1864, p. 149. See also Janet 1879 and James 189o, vol. 2, p. 4o.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 89

From the numerous reports that have come down to us I will select a few
points which can be regarded as important in solving Molynenx's problem. I
will deal with only one case extensively, that of the Leipzig doctor J. C. Au-
gust Franz, dated 1841. This is the most interesting and most accurately
documented and, moreover, involved the first experiment carried out with a
sphere and cube.
When we examine the various cases we note that they differ in a number of
ways. First of all, the patients were not all equally blind before the operation.
Some could merely distinguish between light and dark, a number were also
capable of distinguishing between various colours and one or two could also
perceive size, distance and motion. In a few cases there was some doubt as
to whether the patient really had been born blind, or had perhaps lost the
power of sight after a year or two. And some doctors even failed to report on
the pre-operative state of their patients.
There was also wide divergence in the patients' age and intelligence and
their emotional response varied greatly. A twenty-two-year-old female patient
treated by the French doctor Jean Janin (1731-1799) , for instance, gazed
around her with an expression of surprise and satisfaction while saying re-
peatedly: "Ha, mon Dieu, que cela est beau! ''1 The forty-six-year-old female
patient of the London eye doctor James Wardrop (1782-1869) was in stark
contrast, appearing "bewildered from not being able to combine the knowl-
edge acquired by the senses of touch and sight, and felt disappointed in not
having the power of distinguishing at once by her eye, objects which she could
so readily distinguish from one another by feeling them. ''2
Another difference was that the various doctors failed to perform their
experiments at the same time subsequent to the operation and that the ex-
periments were of different types. Jacques David, whom we have already
encountered as the inventor of cataract extraction, was one of the first doc-
tors to perform experiments with his cataract patients. None of them turned
out to be able to distinguish by sight the round and triangular objects which
D a v i d showed them. 3 Nor was Janin's patient able to distinguish objects
shown to her one from the other, which Janin took to be a proof of the hy-
pothesis advanced by Molyneux, Locke and Berkeley. 4
Some remarkable results were obtained in tests performed by the surgeon
Everard Home (1756 1832), which he described in "An Account of two Chil-

1Janin 1772, p. 215.

2Wardrop 1826, p. 533.
3Daviel 1762, pp. 249-250.
4Janin 1772, pp. 218-219. Janin--made aware of the discussion surrounding Molyneux's
problem by the works of Voltaire, Diderot and Condillac--did not show his patient a sphere
and a cube.
9o ChapterFive

dren born with Cataracts in their Eyes" (1807). Ten minutes after Home had
removed the cataract from the left eye of his seven-year-old patient he showed
him a number of cards an inch in diameter and having various shapes and
colours. The boy was able to name the colours correctly but he described as
round not only the round cards but also the square and triangular ones. He
gave a negative answer to the question of whether the cards were touching
his eye but he was unable to say how far away they were. Two hours after
the operation he was again shown a square and was asked if he could find
corners. He had some trouble discovering a corner and then he counted the
four corners of the square. In the same way he counted the triangle's corners:
"in doing so his eye went along the edge from corner to corner, naming them
as he went along. ''1 A fortnight later the boy was still unable to distinguish
shape without counting the corners one by one, "running his eye quickly along
the outline, so that it was evident he was still learning, just as a child learns
to read.": A week later the boy was able to determine the shape of the cards
almost as quickly as their colours.
The experiences of Home's patient were generally regarded as a proof of
intuitive seeing of distance and angles and thus as unfavourable to Berkeley's
theory of vision. Bailey was of the opinion that Home's experiment had finally
solved Molyneux's problem:

It is obvious that the single circumstance of a boy, almost immediately

after receiving his sight, being able to recognise a corner without the
aid of touch, is a conclusive solution of Molyneux's problem in the
affirmative, and it is remarkable that the proposer of it himself seems
to have placed the determination of the question on this very point,
alleging as a reason for answering it in the negative, that the blind
man could have had no experience how a tangible angle would look. 3

By far the most interesting case is that of Franz. This doctor was acquainted
with Molyneux's problem and he was also familiar with a number of earlier
reports of cataract operations. He was the first (no less than a century and
a half after Molyneux had laid his problem before Locke!) actually to carry
out experiments with a sphere and a cube. Franz described the results of
his experiments in his "Memoir of the Case of a Gentleman Born Blind, and
Successfully Operated Upon in the 18th Year of his Age, with Physiological
Observations and Experiments" (1841).
Franz's patient was born squinting and with double cataracts. At the
end of his second year his right eye was operated on, leaving him with an

1Home 18o7, p. 89.

2Home 18o7, p. 9o.
3Bailey 1842, pp. 221-222.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 91

atrophied eyeball. In subsequent years his left eye was operated on twice,
both times without success. At the age of seventeen, when he met Franz, he
was unable to perceive any light with his right eye. He was able to see light
and colours with his left eye but not objects. The boy himself thought that
he could partially see brightly lit objects but Franz was convinced that this
was completely imaginary. He believed that the young m a n ' s behaviour was
in complete accord with that of other educated blind people not completely
amaurotic: they try to convince others that they see more than they really
can in order to cover up their handicap and to avoid being treated with pity.
Franz removed the cataract from the left eye. Following the operation
it became apparent that light caused too much pain for experiments to be
performed and therefore the eye was bandaged. The bandages were taken
off for the first time three days after the operation. In answer to Franz's
question as to what he could see the boy said he saw "an extensive field of
light, in which everything appeared dull, confused and in motion. ''1 He could
not distinguish objects. The pain caused by the light obliged the young man
to close his eye again. When he opened it again two days later he described
what he saw as % number of opake watery spheres, which moved with the
movements of the eye, but, when the eye was at rest, remained stationary, and
then partially covered each other. ''2 Again after an interval of two days the
same phenomena were perceived, but now the spheres were less transparent
and the movements steadier. The boy stated that he was able for the first
time "to look through the spheres, and to perceive a difference, but merely a
difference, in the surrounding objects." 3
As soon as the young man could stand the light, Franz conducted a number
of experiments. In the first series he tested whether the young man could
recognise coloured ribands fixed to a black background. This proved to be
the case. In the second series Franz showed the boy a piece of paper on which
two strong black lines had been drawn, the one horizontal and the other
vertical. After looking closely the young man was able to name the lines
correctly. When he was asked to point with his finger to the horizontal line
"he moved his hand slowly, as if feeling, and pointed to the vertical, but after
a short time, observing his error, he corrected himself. ''4 The contours of a
square, in which a circle containing a triangle was drawn, was also recognised
and accurately described by the boy. However, he had no notion at all of
wavy or zig-zag lines.

1Franz 1841, p. 63.

~Franz 1841 ,p. 63.
3Franz 1841, p. 64.
4Franz 1841, p. 64.
92 ChapterFive

In the third series of experiments, inspired by Molyneux's problem, Franz

placed a sphere and a cube, each with a diameter of ten centimetres, on a level
with the eye and one metre away from the patient. He then allowed the young
man to move his head laterally in order to compensate for the angle of vision
of the amaurotic right eye. Once he had examined the objects attentively, the
patient said that he could see a quadrangular and a circular shape, and after
some consideration he named the one a square and the other a disc. While
the young man kept his eyes closed, Franz substituted a disc of equal size for
the square and placed it next to the sphere. When the young man opened his
eyes again he noted no difference in the shapes; he saw them both as discs.
Franz then placed the cube in a somewhat oblique position in front of the eye
and, close beside it, a figure cut out of pasteboard representing a plane outline
prospect of the cube when in this position. The boy was of the opinion that
both objects were something like flat quadrates. He saw as a plain triangle a
pyramid that had one of its sides facing him. Franz then turned the pyramid
a little so that a small area of one of its sides was visible and a large area
of another. The boy looked at it for a long time and said that it was an
extraordinary shape: neither a triangle nor a square nor a circle. He had no
idea of it and could not describe it: "In fact," he said, "I must give it up. ''1
When this series of experiments came to an end Franz asked the boy to give
a description of the sensations that the objects had produced. The youngster
replied that as soon as he had opened his eyes he had discovered a difference
between the two objects (sphere and cube) and had noted that they were not
drawings. But he had not been able to form from them the idea of a square
and a disc "until he perceived a sensation of what he saw in the points of his
fingers, as if he really touched the objects.": When Franz placed the sphere,
the cube and the pyramid in the young man's hands he was very surprised
not to have recognised them as such by sight even though familiar with these
mathematical shapes through the sense of touch.
Franz concluded from his experiments that objects which in reality were a
good distance from the patient seemed in the beginning to be so close that
he was sometimes afraid of coming into contact with them. He also believed
that the young man saw everything as completely flat and far larger than he
had expected. Franz also commented that his patient required spectacles in
order to improve his vision. 3

1Franz 1841, p. 65.

~Franz 1841, p. 65.
3Together with Ware, Franz was one of the few to see that cataract operations do not
lead to perfect vision and that cataract glasses were needed to bring about the required
correction. See Ware 18ol, pp. 384-385, note.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 93

According to Franz his experiments demonstrated that the hypothesis he

had proposed elsewhere concerning Molyneux's question was correct. In his
book The Eye (1839) he had stated that the question put by Molyneux could,
strictly speaking, be answered neither positively nor negatively:

The supposed person will certainly be able to distinguish by his sight

the cube from the sphere, though he will not, it is true, recognise the
two figures as a cube and a sphere, but will pronounce the one to be a
disk and the other a square; it must be premised, however, that some
little time must be allowed for the mind to recover from the confused
sensation produced by the novelty and multitude of objects suddenly
presented to the newly acquired faculty?

This was exactly what Franz had noted in his patient. He underlined the
importance of his study: "This is the only case on record within my knowledge
wherein, with a person born blind and afterwards successfully operated upon
at a period of life as far advanced as in this instance, such experiments have
ever been made." ~
Most of the reactions to Franz's report were simply congratulatory. A. W.
Volkmann, for instance, wrote: "Den interessantesten Fall der Art hat Dr.
Franz beschrieben [...] Diese Thatsachen sind ~ufierst wichtig und diirften
manche Streitfragen entscheiden, fiber welche sich die Physiologen bis auf die
letzten Zeiten nicht vereinigen konnten, i'3 Abbott too praised Franz's re-
search: "It is remarkable as the case in which the previous blindness was the
most perfect, the patient the best instructed, and the observations the most
accurate. ''4 He added sarcastically: "yet as far as British metaphysicians are
concerned it might as well have been buried in the pages of the Illuminated
Doctor. It is ignored by one and all of them, and is only noticed (and that very
imperfectly) by German philosophers; while Cheselden's inconclusive case has
been sedulously copied by one fi'om the other for more than a hundred years." 5
But Abbott voiced criticism too. He was of the opinion that the fact that the
patient could not perceive a sphere and a cube as such was the fault of the
experimental set-up: "Even if the young man's eye had been perfect, then, the

1Franz 1839 , pp. 32-33, note.

2Franz 1841 , p. 68. He added: "In t h e well-known case of C h e s e l d e n [...] no series of
s y s t e m a t i c e x p e r i m e n t s was i n s t i t u t e d . Beer [Beer 1813] h a s also m a d e s o m e i n t e r e s t i n g
o b s e r v a t i o n s , which, however, like t h o s e m a d e in a r a t h e r superficial m a n n e r by J a n i n a n d
Daviel, t e n d principally to describe t h e i m p r e s s i o n s which t h e newly-acquired s e n s e h a d
m a d e on t h e m i n d of t h e person o p e r a t e d u p o n . In W a r e ' s case t h e p a t i e n t was not b o r n
blind, b u t h a d b e c o m e so at an early period of life."
3 V o l k m a n n 1846 , p. 268.
4 A b b o t t 1864, p. 156.
5 A b b o t t 1864, p. 156.
94 ChapterFive

bodies were too small and too distant for a fair experiment on the perception
of solidity." 1 Other criticisms related to his use of language. W. H. S. Monck
blamed Franz for not having tried to investigate what his patient had meant
by extraordinary expressions such as "watery spheres": "Dr. Franz's obser-
vations, though usually regarded as among the best which we possess on the
subject, present features which are to me utterly inexplicable. "~
After Franz's experiments, other doctors in their turn performed tests with
a sphere and a cube. In his book entitled On the Organs of Vision (1858) the
London eye doctor Thomas Nunneley (18o9-187o) described the reaction of
a nine-year-old patient. The boy was able to distinguish a difference in shape
immediately, but he could in no way say which was which:

it was only after several days that he could or would tell by the eyes
alone, which was the sphere and which the cube; when asked, he
always, before answering, wished to take both into his hands; even
when this was allowed, when immediately afterwards the objects were
placed before the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. 3

The fact that Franz's patient had been able to name the perspective projec-
tions of the sphere and cube and Nunneley's patient had not was, according
to some, because Nunneley's patient was less developed than Franz's. 4
In 1875 the eye surgeon Arthur von Hippel (1841 1916) published an article
in which he described how his patient, a four-year-old girl, reacted to a sphere
and a cube:

Sie vermochte die KSrper weder richtig zu benennen, noch irgendwie

ihre Form zu beschreiben; es blieb mir sogar sehr zweifelhaft, ob sie
dieselben iiberhaupt nut als verschieden yon einander erkannte. 5

Von Hippel stated that this confirmed the correctness of the hypothesis ad-
vanced by Molyneux and Locke. 6
Finally we should mention R a m s a y ' s "Case of a Man Blind from Congenital
Cataract who Acquired Sight after an Operation when he was 3o Years of Age"
which appeared in The Lancet in 19o 3 . On the second day after the operation
R a m s a y showed his patient a ball and a toy brick. He told him that he was
showing him these objects and asked him whether he could distinguish them
one from the other:

1Abbott 1864, p. 158.

2Monck 1882, pp. lo7-1o8.
3Nunneley 1858 , as quoted by Fraser in Berkeley 1871 , vol. 1, p. 448.
4See, for instance, Stumpf 1873, p. 291.
5Von Hippel 1875, p. 116.
6See also Hirschberg 1875, p. 42.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 95

He looked at them attentively for a considerable time, his hands mean-

while moving nervously, as if he were trying to translate what he saw
by comparing it with an imaginary tactile impression, and then he
described both correctly. 1

When asked how he had been able to distinguish the ball from the block the
patient answered that "he was so much in the habit of handling objects that
he had come to have a 'notion in his mind' regarding the form of things. ''2
Although R a m s a y did not exclude the possibility of the man having learnt on
the first day after his operation what an angle was as a result of having seen
a table or a chair, he suspected that the man had given the correct answer
because he was capable of comparing that which he saw to that which he had
felt.
Abbott regarded R a m s a y ' s case as "the first instance in which Molyneux's
question was put exactly as he suggested. ''3 Indeed, Franz had not told his
patient that he was showing him a sphere and a cube, whereas R a m s a y did.
And that (at least for Abbott) closed the case.
When we compare the various cases we see that we can find the entire range
of possible solutions to Molyneux's problem. In a number of cases the cataract
patients operated upon were incapable of seeing even the slightest difference
between a sphere and a cube (or between two other objects). However, fol-
lowing the operation most of the people born blind were able to distinguish
the objects from each other though they did not recognise them nor could
they name them. One patient took the sphere for a circle and the cube for a
square. Another was able to distinguish the objects one from the other and
could name them once the doctor had expressly told him what he was being
shown. Finally, a couple of patients were able to identify the objects correctly
without further help.
It is no surprise that the reactions shown by the various cataract patients
should show such a variety. The cases were, after all, very different in nature.
Those wishing to make use of the experiences of the patients in order to
solve Molyneux's problem therefore had at their disposal a number of cases
which were contradictory and difficult to compare. The cases they used often
depended on the point of view they were defending. Information agreeing
with the theoretical standpoint was preferred to d a t a that failed to fit the
bill. And whenever the language used by doctor or patient was ambiguous
the option was usually taken for the interpretation that fitted the point of
view being defended.

1Ramsay 19o3, p. 1365.

=Ramsay 19o3, p. 1365.
3Abbott 19o4, p. 550.
96 ChapterFive

A number of philosophers were of the opinion that particularly positive case

histories, that is cases where the patient was capable of identifying objects,
were worthy of consideration. Thus Bailey wrote: "It is obvious that the single
circumstance of a boy, almost immediately after receiving his sight, being
able to recognise a corner without the aid of touch, is a conclusive solution
of Molyneux's problem in the affirmative. ''1 Abbott was of the opinion that
"negative evidence" could have no value because it could always be blamed
on unfavourable circumstances.: Here Abbott was referring particularly to
perception of distance which, he thought, was rendered more difficult because
most of the patients could only see with one eye--and this one eye did not
even have a lens. 3 Another reason why the patients would be unable to
identify objects, thought Abbott, could be that prior to the operation they
had no clear idea of objects: "Consequently, if upon being fairly examined
they appear incapable of doing so, it will follow that the defect is not in sight,
but in touch; not in their new sense, but in their old ideas. TM
Abbott also gave another explanation for why a person born blind undergo-
ing an operation that gave him his sight would perhaps be unable to recognise
objects. It is difficult enough--if not impossible--for someone with a normally
developed sense of sight, argued Abbott, to form an idea of the visual appear-
ance of an unfamiliar and complicated object relying on the sense of touch
alone. A person born blind seeing for the first time would, he thought, most
certainly encounter the same difficulties and would fail to recognise objects. ~
Abbott, however, considered it incorrect to conclude from this that our sense
of sight can give us no idea of the actual shape and size of objects.
William James (1842-191o) also indicated problems in the assessment of
the results of cataract operations. True, he was of the opinion that the solution
to the problem proposed by Molyneux and Locke "has not lacked experimental
confirmation. From Cheselden's case downwards, patients operated for con-
genital cataract have been unable to name at first the things they saw. ''6 But
he added: "Some of this incapacity is unquestionably due to general mental
confusion at the new experience, and to the excessively unfavorable conditions

1Bailey 1842 , pp. 221-222.

~Abbott 1864, p. 145.
3Even when both eyes have been operated upon there is absolutely no chance of the
patient being able to perceive depth.
4Abbott 1864, p. 142.
5Before Abbott, August Zeune (1788-1853) had given a negative answer to Molyneux's
question for a somewhat similar reason: "wie schwer wird es uns Sehenden, die wit das Ge-
tast noch nebenbei haben, mit zugemachten Augen eine ungewohnte Sache durchs Tasten
zu erkennen, z.B. L£nder auf einem Tast-Erdball" (Zeune 1821, p. 29). See also Hamilton
[1858-186o ] 1861 1866, vol. 2, Lecture 28, p. 176 , and Mach 1886, p. 62, note 31.
6James 189 o, vol. 2, p. 21o.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 97

for perception which an eye with its lens just extirpated affords. ''1 He drew
the same conclusion as Bailey and Abbott: "Obviously, positive cases are of
more importance than negative. ''=
Another possibility which had to be taken into account in cases of persons
born blind being operated on was pointed out in the Essays on Philosophi-
cal Subjects (1795) by the philosopher and political economist Adam Smith
(1723-1790), published after his death. Smith supported Berkeley's theory
of vision and thus started from the assumption that there is no agreement
between visual and tactile objects. However, he did believe that visual ob-
jects show in some way a certain affinity with tactile objects, an affinity that
we notice naturally. In this context Smith spoke of "instinctive perception."
Animals, said Smith, possess a similar instinctive perception and possibly
children too. But blind people operated upon would have lost this faculty:

In him [i.e., Cheselden's patient] this instinctive power, not having

been exerted at the proper season, may, from disuse, have gone grad-
ually to decay, and at last have been completely obliterated. 3

If Smith should be right, blind people undergoing a cataract operation would

not be the ideal subjects for investigations into what we usually see thanks
to nature, while this will have been one of Molyneux's intentions. Smith's
finding, coupled with the problems mentioned above, constituted the reasons
for other ways being taken to obtain greater knowledge of normal original
visual perception. What was more obvious than to investigate the powers of
sight of newborn infants or (if this should still prove too difficult and if it was
regarded as justified to regard the visual perception of humans and animals
as similar) why not the powers of sight of newborn animals?

2 NEWBORN ANIMALS AND BABIES

Around the year 18oo information regarding the powers of sight of newborn
animals and babies was introduced into the discussion of Molyneux's problem.
This information took its place next to the wide variety of data concerning

1james 189o, vol. 2, p. 21o.

=James 189o, vol. 2, p. 211, note.
3Smith 1795, p. 318. He added to this: "Or perhaps, (what seems likewise very possible,)
some feeble and unobserved remains of it may have somewhat facilitated his acquisition of
what he might otherwise have found it much more difficult to acquire." See also Abbott
1864, p. 163. As will be seen in the next chapter, there is what is called a critical period
within which the visual system must be stimulated if seeing is to be possible.
98 Chapter Five

the visual perception of persons born blind whose sight had been restored
by surgical operation. The importance attached to the visual behaviour of
the three groups differed from philosopher to philosopher. For instance Ab-
bott regarded the case histories of people undergoing a cataract operation
as unsatisfactory and ascribed more value to the powers of sight of babies:
"[infants have] the advantage over the blind, since an instinct or faculty un-
employed may tend to decay, but in the infant all the natural powers are
fresh. ''1 John Stuart Mill (18o6-1873), on the contrary, characterised the in-
formation regarding children as "singularly inconclusive" and that on blind
people operated on for cataract as "the most valuable facts of all. ''2 Bailey,
finally, called blind people cured of cataract "perhaps the most interesting
source" and regarded certain forms of behaviour exhibited by young animals
as a decisive proof against Berkeley's doctrine of sight and thus as a denial of
his answer to Molyneux's question. 3
As will be seen, there was also a difference of opinion as to whether the
power of sight possessed by the cured blind, young animals and babies was
similar or not. Some believed that information relative to the one group could
be extrapolated to the other, while others pointed to fundamental differences
between the three groups.
Researchers generally agreed that certain animals can perceive objects at
various distances immediately after birth. Adam Smith illustrated this using
the behaviour of chickens, partridges, grouse and suchlike which, as soon as
they emerge from the egg, walk around the field calmly and pick up the seeds
indicated by their mothers: "they no sooner come into the light than they seem
to understand this language of Vision as well as they ever do afterwards. ''4
This also applied, said Smith, to animals which open their eyes only a few
days after birth and for certain beasts, such as calves and foals. Thomas
Brown held a similar opinion: "The calf, and the lamb, newly dropt into the
world, seem to measure forms and distances with their eyes, as distinctly, or
at least almost as distinctly, as the human reasoner measures them, after all
the acquisitions of his long and helpless infancy. ''5
According to the German physiologist and comparative anatomist Johan-
nes Miiller (18o1-1858), the fact that some newborn animals immediately see
their mother's nipples proves that the power of seeing simple shapes is not
acquired. And thus he failed to understand why Molyneux and Locke had

1 A b b o t t 1864, p. 163.
~Mill [1842 ] 1859 , p. lO6 a n d p. 11o, respectively.
3See Bailey 1842, p. 149 a n d p. 166.
4 S m i t h 1795, p. 319 •
5 B r o w n [182o] 186o, Lecture 28, p. 181.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 99

answered Molyneux's question in the negative. 1 Bailey reached a similar con-

clusion. He stated that the movements made by certain animals immediately
following birth indicate that they can see objects at various distances:
Their running about, their snatching at objects presented to them as
soon as born, their seeking the teats of the dam, their leaping from
one spot to another with the greatest precision, all show not only
that they can see objects to be at different distances, but that there
is a natural consent of action between their limbs and their eyes, that
they can proportion their muscular efforts to visible distances. 2
In order to underline his opinion Bailey quoted Humphrey Davy and Cuvier.
Davy had noted that crocodiles bite a stick held in front of them as soon
as they emerge from the egg. And Cuvier had seen that in the first few
days following the birth of monkeys they remain hanging from their mother's
breast and look intently at all kinds of objects without touching them. When
they first jumped towards or grasped something they showed that they could
estimate distance exactly.3 Bailey stated that these examples justified his
reasoning:
Here then we have positive proof that a perception of degrees of dis-
tance is immediately possessed at birth through the unassisted organs
of vision--through organs constructed in all respects essential to the
present argument like the human eye. 4
The observations of animals were regarded by many philosophers as an argu-
ment against Berkeley's theory of vision since they believed that his doctrine
was not especially based on sensual processes actually taking place in neonates
but on the assumption that it is impossible in principle to perceive distance,
whether an animal or a human eye is involved. 5 A single case of an animal
being capable of seeing distance from birth would, they thought, constitute a
good counter to this assumption.
Ironically enough it happened to be a fierce defender of Berkeley's doctrine,
Adam Smith, who had advanced this argument. 6 Hamilton was one of the
first to take up the argument. He concluded that

1Miiller 1837-184o, vol. 2, p. 362.

~Bailey 1842, pp. 149-15o; see also Bailey 1842 , pp. 29-30.
3Bailey 1842 , p. 15o. Abbott presented similar examples taken from Smith, Bell, Cuvier
and Flourens. He also believed that most animals have no special organs of touch and that
their only idea of shape and size must therefore be visual. See Abbott 1864, pp. 163-173.
4Bailey 1842 , p. 151.
5See, for example, Bailey 1842, p. 38 and p. 152, and Abbott 1864, p. 167. Bailey spoke
in this context of "a sort of mathematico-metaphysical argument."
6Smith called Berkeley's theory "one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis that
is to be found, either in our own, or in any other language." Smith 1795, p. 294.
loo Chapter Five

[Berkeley's] theory is provokingly--and that by the most manifest

experience--found totally at fault with regard to them [i.e., animals
who possess at birth the power of regulated motion]. 1

Bailey too was of the opinion that the proof obtained from animal behaviour
was "complete and conclusive.": Abbott was of a similar opinion.3
Despite all this criticism, one or two individuals took great pains to hold
up Berkeley's theory. John Stuart Mill, for example, agreed that it was true
that the data derived from young animals "have long been felt to be a real
stumbling-block in the way of the theory. ''4 But he regarded them as little
more than a difficulty rather than a complete denial of Berkeley's doctrine.5
Moreover Mill found fault with the conclusion based on some types of be-
haviour on the part of young animals that they can perceive distance imme-
diately after birth. Kittens and puppies, stated Mill, are born blind and yet
they find their mother's teats before their eyes open. 6
Though there may have been agreement regarding the nature of the faculty
of sight in newborn animals, researchers seemed to have problems agreeing
what newborn babies can see. It was not without reason that Abbott wrote
that "nothing [...] is more difficult than tracing the earliest development of
ideas in the mind of an infant. ''7 Experimental developmental psychology
had not yet got off the ground; there were scarcely any effective research
methods and too little had at the time been published on babies' powers of
sight. The few publications which did exist coupled with observations made
by the researchers themselves did persuade some to conclude that neonates
are not capable of seeing objects at various distances immediately after birth.
But others believed that, like newborn animals, they were capable of such
activity.
Thomas Brown (1778-182o) was one of those who assumed that man's
powers of sight were substantially different from those possessed by animals.

1Hamilton in Reid [1837] 1863, vol. 1, p. 182, note.

~Bailey 1842, p. 149.
3Abbott 1864, p. 167. Abbott characterised Berkeley's theory as "the shame, not the
glory, of psychology" (p. 2).
4Mill [1842] 1859, p. lo7.
5Mill [1842 ] 1859 , p. 11o. In his response to Bailey, Mill wrote that "Berkeley's Theory of
Vision, has remained, almost from its first promulgation, one of the least disputed doctrines
in the most disputed and most disputable of all sciences, the Science of Man. [...] If the
doctrine be false, there must be something radically wrong in the received modes of studying
mental phenomena" (pp. 84 85).
6Mill [1842] 1859, p. lo 9. Mill took this argument from the Spectator.
7Abbott 1864, p. 163. Johannes Miiller had written at an earlier date: "Es ist ungemein
schwer, wenn nicht v611ig unmSglich, sich mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit einzubilden, wie
das Kind die ersten Eindrficke auf die Nervenhaut des Sehorgans beurtheilt." Miiller 1826,
quoted by Hirschberg 1875 , pp. 27--28,
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 101

Brown believed that the fact that some animals can instinctively perceive
distance proves that there is no physical impossibility involved in supposing
that a similar "original suggestion" may take place in man. But he believed
that experience teaches us that a great deal of time is required before infants
are capable of distinguishing different objects by sight and to fix their gaze
on things. Hence his conclusion that "in man, there is not that necessity for
the instinct, which exists in the peculiar situation of the other animals; and
we find, accordingly, that there is no trace of the instinct in him. ''1 Brown
believed that the situation of babies could be compared to that of people born
blind whose sight is restored at a later age and cannot distinguish a sphere
from a cube: in both cases the actual size, shape and position of objects has to
be learnt in the manner of a new language. This showed, according to Brown,
"that we learn to see,--and that vision is truly, what Swift has paradoxically
defined it to be, the art o/ seeing things that are invisible.":
Other philosophers, however, believed that the human faculty of sight was
indeed similar to that of animals. Thus Adam Smith found it difficult to
imagine that man would be the only animal whose young would have no
instinctive perception. The young of humans are, however, dependent on
others for such a long period, they have to be carried in the arms of their
mothers or nurses so long, said Smith, that instinctive perception of this
kind would seem to be less necessary for them than for other species. Before
it came to have any useful purpose, observation and experience would have
sufficiently forged the connections between visual and tactile objects. But
because children appear to see the distance, shape and size of objects at a
very early stage, Smith tended to believe that even they enjoyed some kind
of instinctive perception, "though possibly in a much weaker degree than the
greater part of other animals."3 As already mentioned, Smith attributed to
decay of the powers of sight the failure of blind people operated on for cataract
to immediately see objects at a distance.
Bailey too believed that babies' powers of vision were similar to those
enjoyed by young animals. And while Bailey was convinced that babies did
not possess full perception of distance immediately after birth, he still thought
that this did not prove that of its nature the eye was unable to perceive
distance, as Berkeley had stated. Failure to perceive in a complete manner
would, he believed, be attributable to the immaturity of the organ. 4 And
even with regard to his other senses and limbs, thought Bailey, man was at

1Brown [182o] 186o, p. 181.

2Brown [182o] 186o, p. 181. See also Stewart [1815] 1854, p. 338, Preyer 1882, pp. 39-40,
Preyer 19o8, p. 37, and Raehlmann 1891 , pp. 54-56.
3Smith 1795, p. 323 .
4See also Abbott 1864, p. 163, and Mach 19oo, p. 93-
lo2 Chapter Five

a disadvantage: it takes time for all human organs to mature. But as soon
as this is achieved, the organs can perform all the functions for which they
were created. Thus Bailey was quite sure that "the power of performing all
the functions of sight is in the eye as soon as it has come to maturity." •
Physiologists and mothers, stated Bailey, had noticed that babies open
their eyes immediately following birth and that they quickly start directing
their gaze towards sources of light, at first by turning their heads and later
also their eyes towards these sources. They had then noted that babies very
quickly demonstrate interest in faces and see relative sizes and distances. The
studies performed had also shown, said Bailey, that touch remains inert for a
long time and develops later than sight: babies do not start using their hands
until they are a few months old and it takes a long time for them to point in
the right direction or to estimate distance.:
When babies use their hands for the first time, said Bailey, they a t t e m p t
instinctively to touch what they see. In the beginning they fail, for they need
to learn how to adapt their muscle power to visual distances:

Here is no process of learning to see with precision by the help of the

touch, but one of learning to touch with precision by the help of the
sight. It is, in some respects, the reverse case to that of the blind
man who receives his sight from a surgical operation. 3

A person born blind and cured surgically is required to learn to connect his
new visual sensations and his old tactile sensations, while babies need to
do the reverse: to connect their new tactile sensations and their old visual
sensations. According to Bailey the a t t e m p t made to grasp an object implies
that the object is seen at a certain distance. On the basis of the above, Bailey
drew the following conclusion:

In the progress of the human infant, then, it is clear that the priority
of definite perceptions of extension is with the sight, and that in the
connection which is soon established between his visual and tactual
sensations, the process is so far the reverse of what Berkeley's theory
requires it to be. 4

As far as he was concerned this constituted a supplementary argument in

favour of a positive answer to Molyneux's question.

1Bailey 1842 , p. 155.

2Bailey referred to the Traitd de psychologie by C. F. Burdach (translated from German),
to Progressive Education by Mme Necker de Saussure (translated from French) and to The
Hand by Charles Bell. See Bailey 1842, pp. 158 ft.
3Bailey 1842' p. 163.
4Bailey 1842, p. 165.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century lo3

Abbott used a process of analogous reasoning to reach the same conclusion:

"There is, indeed, no instance in which we are more justified in reasoning from
the lower animals than the present. Sight is the most universal special sense." 1
Abbott believed that all vertebrates can see distance immediately and that
because of the uniformity shown in the construction of the eye it was therefore
extremely unlikely that human beings were unable to do so:

The greater the resemblance between the organs of sight and the
general phenomena of the nervous system in men and beasts, the
greater this improbability. As every advance in physiology tends to
develop this resemblance and to strengthen the conception of the
unity of system in the animal kingdom, this argument has also become
strongerP

Abbott believed that careful observation had demonstrated that "there is

an independent visual perception of distance and magnitude in the earliest
infancy prior to any association with touch or locomotion. ''3 He quoted with
approval the physiologist Schroeder van der Kolk who regarded it as absurd
that children were said by certain writers to gain their first impressions of
distance and size vi& the sense of touch and learnt to see through touch. He
was himself convinced that children see objects at different distances long
before they take hold of them with their hands and begin to explore them.
The above shows that information relative to the powers of sight of new-
born animals and babies was not only advanced in support of general theories
of vision but was also used as an argument for various solutions to Molyneux's
problem. Some regarded the fact that newborn animals can immediately see
objects at a certain distance as supporting an affirmative answer to Moly-
neux's question. Others, on the contrary, believed that visual behaviour on
the part of babies pointed to the fact that seeing is an acquired skill and that
a person born blind would not be able to identify a sphere and a cube imme-
diately after having his sight restored by surgery. Information on the powers
of sight of newborn animals and babies, therefore, was just as ineffectual in
producing agreement on Molyneux's problem as had been the information on
the powers of sight of persons born blind seeing after an operation.
Up to this point philosophers and other scientists, when justifying their
various solutions regarding Molyneux's problem, had referred to the behaviour

1Abbott 1864, p. 167. Cf. Hamilton [1858-186o ] 1861 1866, vol. 2, Lecture 28, pp. 181-
182.
2Abbott 1864, p. 168. Abbott left open the possibility that human beings have to learn
from experience what animals perceive directly, but he did not believe that anyone had
demonstrated that this was the case.
3/Abbott 1864, p. 166.
lo4 Chapter Five

of c r e a t u r e s seeing for t h e first time, which is not all t h a t surprising. 1 H a l f w a y

t h r o u g h t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, however, a p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t of t h e p e r c e p t i o n
of experienced observers was a d v a n c e d as j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e various solutions
to t h e p r o b l e m , n a m e l y stereoscopic p e r c e p t i o n of d e p t h .

3 STEREOSCOPIC PERCEPTION OF DEPTH

In t h e a n c i e n t world t h e p e r c e p t i o n of d e p t h was r e g a r d e d as s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . :
A t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y a change o c c u r r e d when K e p l e r
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e o u t s i d e world was p r o j e c t e d onto the r e t i n a in reverse a n d
fiat. F r o m t h a t t i m e t h e question b e g a n to be p o s e d as to how it was p o s s i b l e
to o b t a i n depth from a fiat r e t i n a l i m a g e ? M o r e t h a n two centuries l a t e r t h e
a l l - r o u n d i n v e n t o r a n d physicist Charles W h e a t s t o n e (18o2-1875) succeeded
in p r o v i d i n g an answer.
W h e a t s t o n e d e s c r i b e d his discoveries in an a r t i c l e in t h e Philosophical
Transactions which b e c a m e v e r y famous. 3 Here he showed with t h e aid of
t h e s t e r e o s c o p e , which he h a d himself invented, t h a t p e r c e p t i o n of d e p t h is
achieved by j o i n t a c t i o n of n o n - c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e t i n a l points. 4 To d e m o n s t r a t e
this, W h e a t s t o n e h a d m a d e two line d r a w i n g s of the s a m e object: one from
t h e angle of vision of t h e left eye a n d t h e o t h e r from t h e angle of vision of t h e
right eye. W h e n these two d r a w i n g s were looked at t h r o u g h a stereoscope,
t h e r e was an u n m i s t a k e a b l e i m p r e s s i o n of a solid t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l o b j e c t .
( W h e a t s t o n e r e m a r k e d t h a t different r e t i n a l i m a g e s can be c r e a t e d only when
t h e o b j e c t looked at is close to t h e eyes. W h e n an o b j e c t is looked a t from
s o m e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e t h e o p t i c a l axes of b o t h eyes are p a r a l l e l a n d t h e
p e r s p e c t i v e p r o j e c t i o n s a r e t h e s a m e on b o t h retinas. 5)

1Abbott 1864, p. 14o , for instance, spoke of "cases in which the phenomena of sight are
given most pure and independent--viz., those of infants, of persons born blind, who have
been enabled to see, and of the lower animals." Cf. Bailey 1842, p. 148.
2See Crone 1989.
3Wheatstone 1838.
4In order to explain why an object looked at with both eyes is seen as single, Christiaan
Huygens had defined the so-called corresponding points: "chaque point du fond de l'ceil a
son point correspondant dans le fond de l'autre en sorte que lors qu'un point de l'object est
peint dans quelques deux de ces points correspondants, alors il ne parait que simple comme
il est" (Huygens [1667] 1916). Wheatstone rejected the suggestion that seeing a single image
was possible only with corresponding points, since objects depicted on non-corresponding
points of the retina do not have to be seen as double. If they are seen as single, they create
a sensation of depth.
5Wheatstone stated that this explained why an artist can never make a true-to-life
image of a nearby object. In the case of a painting, two identical images are projected onto
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century lo5

W h e a t s t o n e ' s discovery was a heavy blow to Berkeley's t h e o r y of vision.

Bailey was a m o n g those quick to realise this:

A striking a r g u m e n t to this effect [i.e., t h a t we originally see objects

at various distances] m a y be derived, if I mistake not, from the recent
discoveries of Professor W h e a t s t o n e in binocular vision. [...] Here,
then, there is a certain combination of impressions on the nerves of the
eyes, followed by a perception of geometrical solidity, even c o n t r a r y to
the testimony of the sense of touch, proving t h a t the perception of the
third dimension of space by the sight is immediate, and independent
of information acquired by any other sense. 1

Bailey also linked W h e a t s t o n e ' s discovery to M o l y n e u x ' s problem. W h e n a

blind person suddenly acquires vision and looks at a n e a r b y solid object, stated
Bailey, two different retinal images are formed of it "and the perception of an
object of three dimensions would be doubtless produced in his mind. ''~
J o h n Stuart Mill, a t t e m p t i n g to t u r n aside Bailey's a t t a c k on Berkeley, said
t h a t he t h o u g h t the former was attaching too much i m p o r t a n c e to W h e a t -
stone's findings. 3 T h e p h e n o m e n a described by W h e a t s t o n e were, he said,
consistent with b o t h the theory of Berkeley and t h a t of Bailey. "If either the-
ory could derive s u p p o r t from this experiment," Mill added, "it would surely
be t h a t which supposes our perceptions of solidity to be inferences rapidly
drawn from visual impressions confined to two dimensions. "4 Mill opted for
this opinion because, he thought, we can see nothing except in so far as it is
represented on our retina.~ W h e a t s t o n e ' s experiment had, however, demon-
strated convincingly t h a t in the spatial perception of a three-dimensional ob-
ject the condition of both retinas is important. It had also d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t
we can see objects spatially without there being any need to involve the sense
of touch, and this did not rhyme with Berkeley's opinions on the subject.
Bailey also remarked t h a t a stereoscope can even give us an impression of
relief, whereas the sense of touch merely tells us t h a t there are two flat sheets

the retina. Leonardo da Vinci had earlier discovered that a painter will never succeed in
perfectly reproducing the sensation of depth. In order to provide the best illusion of depth
he advised looking at a picture from some distance with one eye.
1Bailey 1842, pp. lOO-lOl.
~Bailey 1842, p. lol. This is a false assumption in view of the fact that binocular vision
suffers more greatly and in a more definitive fashion as a result of visual deprivation than
does monocular acuity.
3Mill [1843] 1859, p. 117: "Mr. Bailey, in his reply, insists very much on [...] the confir-
mation which he imagines his theory to derive from Mr. Wheatstone's discoveries respecting
binocular vision, exhibited in the phenomena of the stereoscope." Bailey's pamphlet was
published as Bailey 1843.
4Mill [1843] 1859, p. 118.
5Mill [1843] 1859, p. 116.
lo6 Chapter Five

of paper. Although Wheatstone's explanation rapidly gained general accep-

tance, there was disagreement as to whether stereoscopic or spatial vision is
acquired or inborn. This was the question at the heart of the nineteenth-
century empiricism-nativism debate.

4 THE EMPIRICISM-NATIVISM DEBATE

In the second half of the nineteenth century physiologists and psychologists

concentrated on the question of whether our spatial perception is acquired or
inborn. Those known as nativists assumed that by nature we see objects in a
spatial relationship because we have an inborn knowledge of the order inherent
in retinal points. Empiricists disagreed; they believed that we merely learn to
recognise the spatial characteristics of objects. Both empiricists (Lotze and
Helmholtz being the best known) and nativists (including Mfiller, P a n u m and
Hering) were inspired by K a n t ' s doctrine of the a priori nature of space.
Immanuel Kant (1724-18o4) had no hesitation in stating that all our knowl-
edge begins with experience, but he did not believe that all knowledge stems
from experience. 1 W h a t he was attempting to show in his Critik der reinen
Vernunfl was that although our knowledge cannot rise above experience, it
is nonetheless partially a priori and cannot be derived inductively from ex-
perience. Kant assumed that the Ding an sich, which is the cause of our
sensations, is unknowable. The external world provides the material for our
sensations; our capacity for knowledge arranges it in time and space and pro-
vides us with the concepts which help us to comprehend our experiences.
K a n t distinguished two sources of human knowledge: the Sinnlichkeit and
the Verstand. Objects are given to us by means of our senses; but they are
thought by our understanding. In the former case it is a question of forms
in which the entire experience can be placed, namely space and time. In the
latter it has to do with categories of our understanding, concepts which make
possible our experiential knowledge. 2
Space, said Kant, is not a perception in itself; it is a form of perception, a
way of intuition. Space is subjective; it is part of our equipment of perception.
And thus everything we perceive will bear spatial characteristics. We use our
external senses to suggest to ourselves that objects are outside us and in
their entirety in space. Space is not an empirical concept abstracted from the

1He quoted Cheselden's patient in a discussion of this point: "nun mut~ man, wie der
Blinde des Cheselden fragen: was betriigt mich, das Gesicht oder Geffihl?" Kant 1788,
"Vorrede," p. 2 7.
2See Kant [1781] 1787, bk. I, part 1, §i.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century lo7

e x t e r n a l world, since space is a l r e a d y a s s u m e d when we r e l a t e our s e n s a t i o n s

to s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l . S p a c e is a n e c e s s a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a priori, which is
at t h e basis of all e x t e r n a l intuitions. I n d e e d , we c a n n o t i m a g i n e t h a t t h e r e
s h o u l d b e no space. S p a c e is not a discursive or g e n e r a l concept of r e l a t i o n s
b e t w e e n t h e Dinge iiberhaupt, b u t a p u r e intuition; t h e r e is only one space.
S p a c e is r e p r e s e n t e d as an infinitely given m a g n i t u d e . In short, a c c o r d i n g to
K a n t s p a c e does n o t r e p r e s e n t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of one or o t h e r Ding an sich; it
is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e form of all p h e n o m e n a of t h e e x t e r n a l senses, t h a t
is to say, t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r e c o n d i t i o n of our sensory n a t u r e . 1
K a n t ' s t h e o r y o n l y referred to space as a n e c e s s a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a priori;
it h a d no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e i n t u i t i o n of empirical
s p a c e as i n b o r n or acquired. 2 T h i s was t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n in t h e contro-
v e r s y b e t w e e n e m p i r i c i s t s a n d n a t i v i s t s . In o r d e r to p r o v i d e solid f o u n d a t i o n s
for t h e i r p o i n t s of view, researchers used not only m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d m e t h o d -
ological a r g u m e n t s b u t also i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e powers of sight of n e w l y b o r n
a n i m a l s , infants a n d b l i n d p e o p l e o p e r a t e d on for c a t a r a c t , a n d w i t h i n this
c o n t e x t M o l y n e u x ' s question once m o r e c a m e up. 3 T h e e m p i r i c a l evidence
was, as previously, s u b j e c t e d to a v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . S t u m p f , for
e x a m p l e , w r o t e as follows: "Nebst den o p e r i r t e n B l i n d g e b o r e n e n h a t m a n
auch die K i n d e r u n d die j u n g e n T h i e r e zu Zeugen aufgerufen, u n d daft diese,
wenn i i b e r h a u p t ffir eine, fiir die n a t i v i s t i s c h e T h e o r i e zeugen, v e r s t e h t sich
von selbst. ''4 O t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g J o h n Dewey, p r o c l a i m e d t h e c o n t r a r y : " T h e
proofs of this t h e o r y of t h e a c q u i r e d n a t u r e of sight p e r c e p t i o n of s p a c e are
f o u n d in t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s m a d e u p o n infants, a n d u p o n t h e c o n g e n i t a l blind,
when given sight. ''5
T h e s o l u t i o n s offered for M o l y n e u x ' s p r o b l e m were to some e x t e n t r e l a t e d
to t h e p o i n t of view t h a t each p r o t a g o n i s t t o o k in t h e e m p i r i c i s m - n a t i v i s m
d e b a t e . T h i n k e r s who were inclined t o w a r d s e m p i r i c i s m u s u a l l y believed t h a t
a p e r s o n b o r n blind who s u d d e n l y recovers t h e powers of sight would b e u n a b l e
to d i s t i n g u i s h a s p h e r e from a cube, let alone being a b l e to n a m e t h e m . 6

1See Kant [1781] 1787, bk. I, part 1, §§ii-iii.

2Hamilton wrote, for instance, "The a priori Conception [of Space] does not exclude the
a posteriori Perception." Hamilton in Reid [1837] 1863, vol. 1, p. 126, note.
3Davis 196o, called Molyneux's problem "the progenitor of the nativism-empiricism
controversy."
4Stumpf 1873 ' p. 294. See also Miiller 1837-184o , vol. 2, p. 362, Panum 1858, pp. 87-88 ,
Mach 19oo , p. 93, Dunan 1888, p. 382, and Ebbinghaus 19o8 , p. 59-
5Dewey [1887] 1891, p. 145. See also Hirschberg 1875, pp. 27--28, Preyer 1882, p. 39,
Raehlmann 1891, pp. 54-6o and p. 95, and Wundt [1896] 19o7, pp. 159-16o.
6See, for example, Helmholtz 1856 1867, vol. 3 (1867), PP. 593-594, Hirschberg 1875 ,
p. 24, p. 28 and p. 42; Von Hippel 1875, p. 116, Preyer 1882, p. 39, and Dewey [1887] 1891,
p. 145. Raehlmann was one of the few empiricists to conclude, on the basis of his own
studies of a person born blind who recovered the faculty of sight thanks to an operation,
lo8 Chapter Five

T h i n k e r s inclined to t h e n a t i v i s t v i e w p o i n t c a m e to a v a r i e t y of conclusions.
S o m e of t h e m believed t h a t t h e p e r s o n b o r n blind would be able to do no
m o r e t h a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h e o b j e c t s from one a n o t h e r , while o t h e r s a s s u m e d
t h a t he would also be able to n a m e them. 1 A few n a t i v i s t s believed t h a t
t h e s o l u t i o n to M o l y n e u x ' s p r o b l e m h a d indeed been e x p e r i m e n t a l l y p r o v e d
b u t t h e y a s c r i b e d the i n c a p a c i t y shown by the p a t i e n t s involved to m e n t a l
confusion a n d u n f a v o u r a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , r a t h e r t h a n to t h e lack of an i n b o r n
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of space. 2
T h e difference b e t w e e n empiricists a n d n a t i v i s t s was, in fact, not as g r e a t
as it was m a d e to seem. A. W . V o l k m a n n n o t e d this at an e a r l y s t a g e when
he w r o t e t h e following:

Daft unsere R a u m a n s c h a u u n g e n nicht m i n d e r A n e r z o g e n e s als A n g e -

b o r e n e s e n t h a l t e n , d a r i i b e r diirfte u n t e r den P h y s i o l o g e n und P s y -
chologen l ~ u m ein Zweifel v o r k o m m e n , nur die G r e n z e n b e i d e r sind
streitig. [... Es] scheint m i r unzweifelhaft, da6 die F a s e r n d e r T a s t -
u n d Sehnerven das Verm5gen r~umlich verschiedene E i n d r i i c k e zu er-
zeugen, von G e b u r t an besitzen. Zwar ist u n v e r k e n n b a r , d a 6 wir die
R a u m v e r h £ 1 t n i s s e der o b j e c t i v e n Welt erst d u r c h E r f a h r u n g e n ken-
nen lernen, a b e t dieses E r f a h r e n setzt ein VermSgen, E r f a h r u n g e n zu
m a c h e n , schon voraus. [...] Ich h a l t e also die W a h r n e h m u n g des Ex-
tensiven e b e n s o fiir eine p r i m i t i v e T h £ t i g k e i t des Sehnerven, wie die
W a h r n e h m u n g des F a r b i g e n . 3

K a n t ' s n o t i o n of space was not only a source of i n s p i r a t i o n for e m p i r i c i s t s

a n d n a t i v i s t s b u t also led to the question of w h e t h e r those b o r n b l i n d do
a c t u a l l y have a n y n o t i o n of space. In a c e r t a i n sense this t o o b r o u g h t one of
M o l y n e u x ' s a s s u m p t i o n s into t h e discussion.
Priedrich G o t t l o b Born, an e a r l y K a n t i a n , was one of those who s t a r t e d
off w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h o s e b o r n blind a n d t h e sighted have t h e s a m e

that such a person would be able to distinguish these two objects one from the other but
would be unable to name them. See Raehlmann 1891 , p. 94.
1See, for example, Janet 1879 , p. 7, respectively Tourtual 1827, Mfiller 1837-184o, vol. 2,
p. 362, and Stumpf 1873, p. 291. Stumpf was of the opinion that the man would be able
to name the objects provided that he was educated.
~James 189o , vol. 2, p. 21o, Mach 1886, p. 62, and Schlodtmann 19o2 , p. 260, note.
3Volkmann 1863, pp. 139-14o. Hering had a similar opinion: "Zwischen 'Nativismus'
und 'Empirismus' besteht kein grunds£tzlicher, sondern nur ein gradweiser Unterschied.
Wenn uns, um dies hier abermals abzusprechen, die Organe angeboren sind, so sind es bis
zu einem gewissen Grade auch ihre Functionen, das mfissen selbst die strengsten 'Empiris-
ten' zugeben; und andererseits hat es nie einen 'Nativisten' gegeben, der den gewaltigen
Einflu6 geleugnet h~tte, welchen Gebrauch und Ubung auf die Functionen unserer Organe
und besonders der Sinnesorgane hat." Hering [1874] 1878, as quoted in Schlodtmann 19o2 ,
p. 257.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century lo9

representation of space to the extent t h a t space is a pure intuition. But he

believed t h a t the representation t h a t the blind have of partial, empirical space
is totally different from t h a t which the sighted have, since they learn to know
objects exclusively by touch. On these grounds he regarded discussion of
M o l y n e u x ' s problem as a superfluous pursuit. 1
On the other hand, in 1793 the G e r m a n philosopher and medical m a n Ernst
P l a t n e r (1744-1818) launched the suggestion t h a t the blind have absolutely
no notion of empirical space:

die B e o b a c h t u n g und U n t e r s u c h u n g eines Blindgebohrnen [hat mich]

iiberzeugt, dat3 der Gefiihlsinn fiir sich allein alles dessen, was zu
[...] R a u m gehSrt, durchaus u n k u n d i g ist, nichts von einem 5rtlichen
Aut~ereinanderseyn weis; [...] Wirklich dient dem Blindgebohrnen die
Zeit statt des Raumes. N~he und Entfernung heittt bey ihm weiter
nichts, als die kfirzere, oder l£ngere Zeit, die geringere, oder grSi3ere
Anzahl von Gefiihlen, die er nSthig hat, um yon einem Gefiihl z u m
andern zu gelangen. 2

A n y t e m p t a t i o n on our part to regard this as strange is due, said Platner, to

the fact t h a t we allow ourselves to be deceived by the visual language used by
those born blind. P l a t n e r considered his opinion to have been proved not only
by the blind people he studied but also by Cheselden's patient: if this m a n
had had a notion of space before the operation, everything t h a t was far away
would not have seemed close nor would all the separate objects have seemed
like one great whole, a To quote James: no opinion is so silly but it will find
some "learned T h e b a n " to defend it. 4 In 1844 F. W. Hagen expressed his
agreement with Platner. ~ A n d H a m i l t o n expected t h a t if a blind person had
formed the idea of a sphere and a cube by touch, he should be able to dis-
tinguish t h e m from one another on seeing for the first time. But Cheselden's
patient had not been able to do so and on t h a t basis H a m i l t o n concluded t h a t
only sight can provide us with empirical representations of space. 6 A b b o t t

1Born 1791, pp. 11o-111: "Man darf daher nicht, mit Molyneux, die Frage aufwerfen:
ob ein Blinder, der Kugel und Wfirfel durchs Gef/ihl gekannt hatte, sie auch durchs An-
sehen kennen wiirde, wenn er pl5fllich das Gesicht bek/~me? [...] Denn da das Gesicht und
das Geffihl von denselbigen Gegenst/~nden nicht auf einerley Art afficirt werden; so muB
daher die empirische Raumvorstellung von k6rperlichen R/iumen in Personen, bey welchen
sie durch das einseitige Gefiihl bestimmt wird, ganz anders ausfallen, als bey Leuten, die
Gesicht und Geffihl verbinden."
2Platner [1776] 1793, §765, p. 44o.
3platner [1776] 1793, §765, p. 441.
4James 1887, p. 211.
5Hagen 1844, p. 718: "Was uns Raum ist, ist bei [Blindgeborenen] blo• Zeit." See also
Lotze [1881] 1882.
6Hamilton [1858-186o] 1861-1866, vol. 2, Lecture 28, pp. 176 177.
11o Chapter Five

had come to a similar conclusion. 1 John Stuart Mill also subscribed to Plat-
net's suggestion that the idea of space could eventually be reduced to that of
time and, furthermore, he believed that Platner's observations had demon-
strated that the concept of extension or distance is generated by the series
of sensations of muscle movements, as Bain had proposed. ~ Platner found a
fierce defender even halfway through the twentieth century; the German psy-
chologist Max yon Senden thought Platner to be "the first to conclude that
we merely allow ourselves to be deceived by the verbal habits of the blind and
that in reality they have no awareness of space. ''3
As could be expected, there was also criticism of Platner. 4 The French
philosopher Charles Dunan (1849-1931), while regarding Platner's observa-
tions as confirmation of the thesis that the blind would lack the notion of
space possessed by the sighted, said that this did not mean that they would
have no notion of space at all, as Platner had stated. Through discussions
that he himself had had with blind people Dunan was convinced that the
blind certainly do have a good notion of space; it is simply different from
that of the sighted. On these grounds Dunan responded in the negative to
Molyneux's question. 5
James thought that Dunan, in his turn, had only been partially right. He
believed that the notion the blind have of space may well differ from that of
the sighted, but that at the same time there is a deep analogy between the
two:

"Big" and "little," "far" and "near," are similar contents of conscious-
ness in both of us. But the measure of the bigness and the farness is
very different in [the blind man] and in ourselves. He, for example,
can have no notion of what we mean by objects appearing smaller
as they move away, because he must always conceive of them as of
their constant tactile size. Nor, whatever analogy the two extensions
involve, should we expect that a blind man receiving sight for the first
time should recognise his new-given optical objects by their familiar
tactile names. 6

1Abbott 1864, p. 151 and p. 161.

2Mill 1865, p. 231. See also Bain 1855.
3Von Senden [1932] 196o, p. 28. (In view of the fact that most of the copies of the
original work were lost in the Second World War, I used the English translation of 196o.)
On page 286 Von Senden wrote: "Since nothing is given simultaneously to his [i.e., the
blind person's] senses as spatial, it must be mentally strung together in time, which does
duty for the spatiality he lacks."
4platner has, more recently, also been criticised by Evans 1985.
5Dunan 1888, p. 135.
6James 189o, vol. 2, p. 21o. See also Mach 1886, p. 62, note 31, and Mach 19oo, p. lOO,
note 2.
 Empirical Approaches in the Nineteenth Century 111

James was therefore not surprised that the answer given by Molyneux and
Locke to Molyneux's question had been experimentally confirmed. 1
W h a t James was trying to make clear was that there are different concepts
of space. One of the major differences between visual and tactile space is
that visual space is projective and non-Euclidean whereas tactile space is
Euclidean. In the case of sight it can be said, for instance, that an object
reduces in size in proportion to its distance from the observer, that angles
change according to the point of view and that circles can pass vi£ ellipses
into straight lines. This does not apply to the sense of touch: angles, lines
and surfaces are unchangeable, no matter how an object is rotated.
James was convinced that the concepts of space originally different from
each other and even incoherent are eventually through experience reduced to
a common measure, namely that of the real world. 2 At the end of the nine-
teenth century Stratton demonstrated experimentally that tactile localization,
as regards both direction and distance, can be influenced by a disturbance of
normal visual localization. This caused him to conclude that through asso-
ciation a correspondence between touch and sight is formed point-by-point
and that we learn only through experience which visual position corresponds
to which tactile position. Stratton saw confirmation of his opinion in the
reactions shown by blind people after an operation. 3

5 CONCLUSIONS

When we take an overall view of the developments described above, we can

first conclude that Molyneux's problem had a less prominent position in the
nineteenth than in the eighteenth century. While philosophers such as Berke-
ley, Condillac and Diderot had taken the problem as the starting-point for
their psychology of perception or doctrine of knowledge, nineteenth-century
researchers generally treated it as an interesting question within the context of
theories of spatial perception. The arguments advanced in favour of the vari-
ous solutions in the nineteenth century were not so much related to the link

:James 189o , vol. 2, p. 21o. As already stated, James partially ascribed the incapacity
of the patients in question to unfavourable circumstances and attached more importance
to positive than to negative cases. See also Villey 1914, pp. 168-184.
2 "The various space-senses are, in the first instance, incoherent with each other; [...] The
education of our space-perception consists largely of two processes--reducing the various
sense-feelings to a common measure, and adding them together into the single all-including
space of the real world." James 1887, pp. 536-537; also in James 189o, vol. 2, pp. 268-269.
3Stratton 1899. Stratton conducted an experiment in which mirrors were used to project
the image of the test subject diagonally before him.
112 Chapter Five

between visual and tactile sensations or between visual and tactile concepts,
as had previously been the case, but were more involved with empirical d a t a
concerning the perception of blind people restored to sight, newborn animals
and babies.
It is remarkable that there was still no agreement as to what was the most
plausible answer to Molyneux's question. New cataract operations performed
on people born blind provided results that were contradictory and difficult
to assess. If we have to indicate a general tendency, we could say that most
researchers believed that a person born blind receiving his sight would be able
to distinguish a sphere from a cube but would not be able to name the objects
correctly.
One of the principal shifts in the nineteenth century was that Berkeley's
theory of vision (and therefore his solution to Molyneux's problem) lost its
ability to convince. Information on the powers of sight of newborn animals
(and to a lesser extent that of human infants) and Wheatstone's explanation
of stereoscopic vision contributed to this. Animals were seen to be capable
of perceiving objects at different distances immediately after birth, infants
showed evidence of spatial vision before any tactile experience worthy of men-
tion and Wheatstone demonstrated that stereoscopic perception of depth was
caused by retinal disparity. In short, it became clear that spatial vision was
not derived from touch, as Berkeley had stated.
There was disagreement surrounding the question of the extent to which
spatial vision was more acquired than inborn. As we shall see in the next
chapter, discoveries were about to be made in the field of neurophysiology
which would provide more clarity in the matter, just as research into visual
deprivation was to provide greater insight into the way to assess d a t a derived
from blind persons treated surgically.
 CHAPTER SIX

MODERN APPROACHES

1 HISTORICAL ANALYSES

E have seen that Molyneux's problem occupied a central position in

W eighteenth-century epistemology and psychology and that in the nine-
teenth century its main r61e was in theories of spatial perception and of the for-
mation of spatial concepts. This chapter will investigate the importance that
twentieth-century researchers have attached to the problem and the methods
they have employed to solve it.
In the first half of this century very little was written about Molyneux's
problem. Most publications linked the problem to the empiricism-nativism
debate or to a variety of accounts of congenitally blind patients cured by
surgery, as was the case in an earlier period. 1 Interest in Molyneux's problem
can be seen to increase from the Second World War onwards. The interest
was mainly historical, in that various biographers of and commentators on
philosophers for whom the problem was of major importance (such as Locke,
Berkeley, Condillac and Diderot) gave their views on the solutions put forward
by these philosophers. To the extent that these authors advanced interesting
viewpoints, they have been mentioned in previous chapters. The problem
is also regularly discussed in textbooks or general histories of psychology,
ophthalmology, neurophysiology and the like2
A few researchers showed particular interest in the course of the discussion
on Molyneux's problem and have written a more or less s u m m a r y history of it.
John Davis, for instance, in his article "The Molyneux Problem" (196o) gave
a brief s u m m a r y of the major eighteenth-century and of some nineteenth-
century participants in the debate. He came to the conclusion that "the
problem illustrates a phenomenon which has occurred more than once in the
history of i d e a s - - t h e shift of a problem from a speculative philosophical issue
through a phase as a psychological problem to an ending as a problem for the

1See, for example, Bourdon 19o2, Schlodtmann 19o2, Villey 1914, Dennis 1934, and
Murray 1944.
2See, for example, Klein 197o, Pastore 1971, Murray 1983, Dember & Bagwell 1985,
Van Hof & Walter [1978] 1984, Crone 1992, and Zeki 1993.

113
114 Chapter Six

physiologist. ''1 In his book Molyneux's Question Michael Morgan discussed a

few (mainly eighteenth-century) answers and dealt with a number of matters
which have to do with Molyneux's question only indirectly. Morgan's view is
interesting: the problem, he stated, requires a new approach in view of the
fact that three hundred years of discussion have failed to lead to a definitive
solution. Morgan's suggestion that blind people should be offered information
vi& what is known as a sensory substitution system will be discussed below.
In addition to historical analyses it is also possible to find fresh attempts
to solve Molyneux's question. First of all, use has been made of information
on the visual capacity of blind people who have been operated on, just as
happened in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.: What is new is that
the results of animal experiments involving deprivation have been related to
Molyneux's problem. The same applies to the use of sensory substitution
systems.

2 SURGICALLY TREATED CATARACT PATIENTS

Over the centuries cataract has been diagnosed and treated at increasingly
earlier stages, leading to a decrease in the number of reports of (older) patients
operated on. The reports which are published hardly differ from the cases we
have already examined. The fact that a couple of them are discussed here is
merely for the sake of completeness.
By far the most influential was Von Senden's Raum- und Gestaltauffassung
bei operierten Blindgeborenen (1932) which contains reports on sixty cataract
operations. Von Senden stated that Molyneux was the first to draw attention
to the importance of such patients for theories regarding our conceptions of
space. Using various cases Von Senden attempted to investigate whether the
tactile impressions of blind people provide them with any spatial awareness
and he also wished to discover how spatial awareness develops in blind people
who have been surgically treated.
Like Platner, as already stated, Von Senden believed that spatial awareness
can only be obtained through sight. He came to this conclusion "because it
repeatedly emerged throughout virtually all the cases, that everything spatial
presented to the patient after the operation is entirely new to him, and that
no bridge, however narrow, can be opened up to it from his tactual mode of

1Davis 196o, p. 408.

2Information on the faculty of sight in newborn animals and babies has not played any
significant r61ein the discussions surrounding Molyneux's question in the twentieth century.
 Modern Approaches 115

existence. ''1 In fact, however, he took as proven what had to be proved: he

assumed t h a t a real awareness of space can only be visualP
According to Von Senden, immediately after the operation the patients
were able to distinguish objects one from the other and could localise t h e m at
a certain distance, but they could not identify any objects. W h e n it a p p e a r e d
t h a t some could, indeed, identify objects, he a t t r i b u t e d it to the fact t h a t
t h e y were using other senses or had prior knowledge of the situation. 3
In general Von Senden's b o o k was warmly received because of the richness
of the material it contained, but his conclusions were not always equally ap-
preciated. T h e neuropsychologist Donald Hebb regarded Von Senden's work
as proof of his empirical theory of the perception of shapes. T h e various
cases showed, he thought, t h a t while there is an inborn figure-ground mech-
anism, experience is required in order t h a t an object be seen as a coherent
whole. 4 O t h e r researchers were more critical, however: they pointed to the
fact t h a t Von Senden's material is frequently not amenable to u n a m b i g u o u s
interpretation and rejected his statement t h a t the blind have no concept of
space. 5
T h e psychologists Richard G r e g o r y and Jean Wallace criticised Von Senden
and Hebb on the grounds of their own study of a blind person who had been
o p e r a t e d on. Vi& a local paper they had learnt t h a t a fifty-two-year-old m a n
who had become blind at the age of ten m o n t h s had recovered his sight after an
operation. According to the doctor in question the patient had recognised day-
t o - d a y objects, such as tables and c h a i r s - - i m m e d i a t e l y after the operation.
G r e g o r y and Wallace tracked the patient down and began their s t u d y forty-
eight days after the operation on the left eye. (The right eye was o p e r a t e d
on three weeks after the left.) T h e y published their findings in a m o n o g r a p h
entitled Recovery from Early Blindness (1963). 6 T h e fact t h a t the m a n was
able to distinguish by sight capital letters he had learnt by touch but failed
to do so with lower case letters that he had never felt they regarded as the
main result of their s t u d y # Gregory and Wallace believed t h a t this indicated

1Von Senden [1932 ] 196o, p. 309.

2See, for example, Von Senden [1932 ] 196o, p. 66 and p. lo6.
3Von Senden [1932] 196o, p. 117. Diderot [1749] 1961 and Abbott 19o4 had already
indicated this.
4Hebb 1949, pp. 19-21 and pp. 26-31 , respectively. Hebb's theory was, as far as the
second point is concerned, the opposite of the Gestalt theory. See K5hler 1947, p. 149:
"The elementary nature of continuous wholes is demonstrated by observations on the first
reactions of congenitally blind adults who see after an operation."
5See, for example, Zuckerman & Rock 1957; Warnock in Von Senden [1932] 196o,
pp. 319-325; Jones 1975; Evans 1985.
6Reprinted in Gregory 1974a.
7Gregory & Wallace 1963, p. 4o. Valvo 1971 appears to come to similar conclusions. See
Gregory 1974a , pp. 67-68. I was unable to consult Valvo's book myself.
116 Chapter Six

a transfer of perceptual information from touch to sight. 1 They were also

of the opinion that the case histories of cataract patients can tell nothing of
the nature of perceived space, as Von Senden had hoped, and they further
doubted whether such cases could throw light on the normal development of
the faculty of sight in young children, as Hebb had believed. The difficulties
experienced by many of the patients mentioned by Von Senden in learning to
see could, they said, be ascribed to the patients' long reliance on the sense of
touch.:
The results obtained by Gregory and Wallace stand in stark contrast to
what Ackroyd, Humphrey and Warrington reported in their article "Lasting
Effects of Early Blindness: A Case Study" (1974). Ackroyd, Humphrey and
Warrington studied a woman who had lost her sight at age three and under-
went a successful operation on her left eye when she was twenty-seven. Six
months after the operation she was able to follow the movement of promi-
nent objects and could avoid certain obstacles, but she was totally unable to
recognise objects from their shape. Eighteen months after the operation she
resumed her life as a blind person. 3
A possible explanation of the results suggested by Ackroyd, Humphrey
and Warrington was that the visual cortex of the patient had not received
sufficient stimulation in the critical period and that certain cells (known as
feature analyzers) were thus absent or abnormal. The researchers compared
the remaining seeing capacity of the patient with that of apes whose primary
visual cortex has been removed. However, in view of the fact that disturbances
in identification also occur with temporal lesions, it is not all that clear where
the deviation should be looked for in the nervous system. The deviations
do not necessarily have to occur in the visual cortex. Ackroyd, Humphrey
and Warrington further suspected that the patient studied by Gregory and
Wallace had had more pre-operative experience than was admitted.
The above shows that modern reports on congenitally blind people (or
people who became blind at an early age) operated on successfully provide
a picture which is just as ambiguous as was the case in previous centuries.

1In a later article Gregory stated that he had shown a sphere and a cube to the patient
immediately after the operation and that the man had named them correctly as round
and square. However, the original report does not mention this experiment. Gregory also
suggested that Molyneux's question had distracted research from what he considered to
be fruitful territory, namely the study of the "innate" knowledge of babies. See Gregory
1974b, p. 429. See also Mackie 1974 and Berman 1974b.
2Gregory & Wallace 1963, p. 39: "It would seem that the difficulty is not so much in
learning per se as in changing perceptual habits and strategies from touching to seeing."
3Sacks 1993 describes a patient who "had at first been unable to recognize any shapes
visually [... ]. To him, a touch square in no sense corresponded to a sight square. This was
his answer to the Molyneux question."
 Modern Approaches 117

The same applies to the interpretation of the case studies. The various cases
are difficult to compare because of the differences in pre-operative and post-
operative situations. In addition it is often unclear from what age and to
what extent the person in question was blind. The only progress made is
that greater insight has been obtained into the effects of long-lasting (total or
partial) light deprivation on the development of the visual system.
Despite the difficulties, the various reports are used as evidence for so-
lutions to Molyneux's problem. A few people have regarded the results as
confirmation of Locke's position? But most researchers have concluded that
a congenitally blind person undergoing a successful operation can indeed dis-
tinguish a sphere from a cube but cannot name the objects correctly? Gregory
and Wallace were the only ones to show conviction that the patient in question
was also able to name the objects correctly.
A number of authors have expressed criticism. They regarded the contra-
dictory results unsuitable for providing an answer to Molyneux's question.
Morgan, for instance, wrote the following: "We cannot answer confidently be-
cause the evidence is contradictory." 3 John Heil expressed himself in similar
terms: "evidence bearing on Molyneux's question remains inconclusive and
unsatisfactory. ''4 Crone too believed that cataract patients can provide no
conclusive evidence because they have forgotten the skill of seeing thanks to
their long-term blindness, s
To avoid the problems surrounding the clinical cases, alternatives with
greater experimental control were sought. These included animal experiments
involving deprivation. In 197o the historian Klein thus wrote: "In recent
decades the [Molyneux] problem has been tackled by animal physiologists by
methods more amenable to experimental control than is possible in clinical
studies." 6

1See, for example, Klein 197o, p. 391, and Dember & Bagwell 1985, pp. 279-280.
2See, for example, Von Senden [1932] 196o, p. 169, Zuckerman & Rock 1957, pp. 286-
287, Mackie 1976, p. 31, Van Hof-Van Duin 1981, p. 1655, and Van Hof & Walter [1978]
1984, PP. 524-525•
3Morgan 1977, p. 18o.
4Hell 1987, p. 233.
5Crone 1992. See also Murray 1944, p. 607, Mackie 1976, p. 31, and Evans 1985, pp. 38o-
382.
6Klein 197o, p. 391.
118 Chapter Six

3 VISUAL DEPRIVATION IN ANIMALS

Since Spalding's experiments with newborn chicks deprived of light for a few
days by means of a small cap, various species of animals have been the subject
of studies into the effects of visual deprivation on the development of the
visual system. 1 These animals have included fish, rats, rabbits, cats and
chimpanzees, allowed to mature in variable periods of total darkness from
birth. Once the period of darkness had passed, the eyes of the animals were
exposed to a quantity of light, limited or not as the case may be, and the
results of the deprivation were studied systematically. The results showed
that the effects of light deprivation vary from species to species.:
Various researchers have used the results of deprivation experiments to
solve Molyneux's problem. In view of the fact that such experiments per-
formed on human beings are generally unacceptable from a moral viewpoint
(despite the plea made by the eighteenth-century philosopher M~rian) and
animal experiments seem to meet with less resistance, researchers have based
their conclusions mainly on the experiments performed on chimpanzees, Man's
close relative. 3
In the forties the psychologist Austin Riesen allowed two chimpanzees to
spend the first sixteen months of their life in darkness. After the period had
passed they exhibited reflexes which showed that their eyes were sensitive to
light. However, they were incapable of recognising by sight objects--such
as a feeding b o t t l e - - t h a t they had learnt to recognise by touch. After the
sixteen months of darkness Riesen exposed one of the chimpanzees to a limited
amount of light for five months and the other for seventeen months. Then
the animals were placed in an environment with normal daylight. After a
number of months the first chimpanzee managed to recognise objects, but the
behaviour of the second appeared to be greatly retarded. At first its faculty
of sight improved briefly but then relapsed rapidly. 4
In another experiment a chimpanzee that had spent the first seven months
of its life in a normal environment and had good eyesight was closed up in
darkness until the age of twenty-four months. Subsequently it was unable to
recognise its feeding bottle and other objects and was even unable to look at
people or objects. Its recovery was slow and partial. 5

1See Spalding 1873.

2See, for example, Beach & Jaynes 1954.
3See, for example, Riesen 195o, p. 17: "Obviously such an experiment cannot be risked in
human beings; [...] The most logical subject for the experiment is another higher primate."
4Riesen 195o, pP- 16-19.
5Riesen 195o, p. 19.
 Modern Approaches 119

In a third experiment Riesen had a chimpanzee spend the first three months
of its life in darkness. This animal took longer to react adequately to visual
stimuli than did chimpanzees that had spent the first seven months in dark-
ness. Riesen believed that this indicated that visual discrimination is a matter
of both maturity and learning. 1
Later research showed that long-term stimulus deprivation had led to de-
generation of some of the retinal ganglion cellsP During the development
of the visual system there seems to be a particular period of sensitivity to
deprivation of light. Within this sensitive or critical period changes brought
on by deprivation can be undone. But when exposure to light is postponed
for too long the development of normal visual mechanisms becomes extremely
difficult if not impossible.
On the basis of other experiments Riesen came to the conclusion that it is
not only light itself that is essential for normal visual development: stimulus
through visual patterns is also an essential requirement. 3 Other researchers
confirmed this. The famous studies carried out on cats by Hubel and Wiesel
showed that individual neurons react to simple visual forms, such as a thin
moving rod in a particular orientation against a constant background surface. 4
Neuronal detectors of this type are present at birth and their behaviour can be
modified by experience. Blakemore and Cooper, for instance, demonstrated
that cats raised in an environment lacking vertically oriented stimuli have a
reduced number of neurons that react to vertical stimuli. The animals showed
perceptual deviations: they collided with such objects as the legs of tables and
chairs.5
As already said, the results of visual deprivation experiments were again
referred to in the context of Molyneux's problem. Riesen regarded his exper-
imental results as complementary to the clinical data assembled by Von Sen-
den. a The neurophysiologist Van Hof-Van Duin described Molyneux's prob-
lem as a deprivation experiment raised in order to establish a point of view
in the empiricism-nativism debate. She was of the opinion that although
it was impossible to take up an unambiguous position, modern deprivation
experiments had clearly shown that the visual system can be permanently af-
fected under the influence of abnormal conditions during development/ The

1Riesen 195o, p. 19.

2Chow, Riesen & Newell 1957 and Riesen 196o, p. 35.
3Riesen 195o, p. 18.
4See, for example, Hubel & Wiesel 1959 and Hubel 1988.
5Blakemore & Cooper 197o. See also Hirsch & Spinelli 197o.
6Riesen 1947, p. lo7: "These results can best be interpreted in conjunction with the
data of Senden. Lacunm in each set of findings, clinical and experimental, are in many
respects filled by the other." See also Hebb 1949, p. 18 and p. 32.
7Van Hof-Van Duin 1981, p. 1657. See also Dember & Bagwell 1985, p. 285.
120 Chapter Six

physiologists M. W. van Hof and W. G. Walter regarded Molyneux's ques-

tion as essentially "the still current question of the extent to which neuronal
elements and their mutual connections are formed under the influence of af-
ferent action potentials. ''1 They too believed that deprivation experiments
had demonstrated that environmental stimuli are of major significance in the
development of the visual system. Deviations in the visual system as a re-
sult of being brought up in abnormal circumstances should, they thought,
not simply be interpreted as evidence of merely partially pre-coded interneu-
tonal connections. For it is also possible that a network may have started off
by following the normal course of development but has fallen into secondary
degeneration as a result of insufficient functioning. 2
The historian Klein believed that the position taken up by Molyneux and
Locke had been confirmed by deprivation studies: "the general drift of the
modern experimental evidence is in essential agreement with their prediction
of the need for special visual experience before cataract patients can learn to
recognise objects like spheres and cubes by sight. ''3 However, Morgan was
of the opinion that a conclusion of this sort was premature: "The evidence
at present is insufficient to justify a definite decision on Molyneux's question,
particularly because the animal experiments have not been specifically aimed
at the problem of transfer between touch and vision. ''4 By way of an alterna-
tive he suggested that the effects of the use of sensory substitution systems
should be examined.

4 SENSORY SUBSTITUTION SYSTEMS

When, after three hundred years of discussion, no definitive solution has been
found for a particular problem, said Morgan, the problem is either useless or it
has been subjected to the wrong approach. 5 The discovery of a new technique
or the invention of a new piece of equipment can sometimes breathe life into an
exhausted problem. "It promises to be thus with Molyneux's question, which,
after long and inconclusive debates about recovery from blindness, has been
recently tackled by a totally new approach," was the way Morgan expressed

1Van Hof & Walter [1978] x984, p. 522.

~Van Hof & Waiter [1978] 1984, pp. 531-533.
3Klein 197o, p. 392.
4Morgan 1977, p. 191. According to Morgan cross-modal experiments provide no answer
to Molyneux's question, nor do experiments with visual and haptic illusions. See Morgan
1977, PP. 192-197.
5Morgan 1977, p. 198.
 Modern Approaches 121

his opinion. 1 The approach he was referring to was the use of what was called
the Tactile Visual Substitution System (TVSS) developed at the end of the
sixties by the Smith-Kettlewell Institute of Visual Sciences. 2
A TVSS is a device which can be used to project images of objects onto the
skin of a person, blind or not. Its major components are a television camera
and a matrix of twenty by twenty electrically powered vibrotactors which are
fixed to the back or stomach of the observer. The television camera transmits
signals vi£ an electronic circuit to the vibrotactors, causing some of them to
vibrate, depending on the pattern registered by the camera. Each vibrotactor
covers a small area of the image captured by the camera, just as a newspaper
photograph reproduces a situation as a series of tiny dots. The pattern of
tactile stimulation corresponds roughly to an enlarged visual image.
It turned out that provided that participants in the experiment were able to
move the camera actively themselves, after practising for some time they were
able to learn to distinguish and identify objects with the aid of the TVSS. 3
Bach-y-Rita conducted experiments involving blind people, who first were
given an explanation of how the equipment worked and were then trained to
distinguish between horizontal, vertical, diagonal and curved lines. Then they
learnt to recognise combinations of lines (such as circles, squares and triangles)
and solid objects. After an hour's practice the leader of the experiment showed
the subjects a series of day-to-day objects and drew their attention to the
various components of an object, to the relationships between the components
and to the object as a whole. Once each object had been analyzed the leader
of the experiment presented the subjects with a particular object and asked
them to identify it. At first it took five to eight minutes before an object was
recognised; after ten hours' practice the reaction time was no more than a few
seconds. 4
It became clear that test subjects can learn to determine not only the
shape of objects but also their position, relative size, number, orientation
and direction, as also the speed of movement of the camera. They form
visual concepts such as perspective, shadows, shape distortion as a function of
viewpoint and apparent change in size as a function of distance. 5 Test subjects
react with a shock when an object suddenly looms up. A remarkable thing
is that sensations of stimuli to the skin disappear in the course of time and
give way to the perception of external objects: "[the] subjects spontaneously

1Morgan 1977, P. 198.

~See Bach-y-Rita, Collins, Saunders, White & Scadden 1969, White, Saunders, Scadden,
Bach-y-Rita & Collins 197o, and Bach-y-Rita 1972.
3See Bach-y-Rita 1971, pp. 281 290 , and Guarniero 1974.
4Bach-y-Rita 1971, p. 283.
5Bach-y-Rita, Collins, Saunders, White & Scadden 1969, p. 963.
122 Chapter Six

report the external localization of stimuli, in that sensory information seems

to come from in front of the camera, rather than from the vibrotactors on
their back. ''1 The vibrations are perceived as no more than itching as far as
discomfort is concerned. Guarniero, one of the blind test subjects, wrote that
"the experienced quality of the sensations was nothing like that perceived by
touch. [...] I never discovered any connection between how something 'looked'
and how it felt. ''2 Both sighted and blind people were seen to be capable of
what came to be called "tactile vision. ''a
According to Morgan, the invention of the TVSS breathed new life into the
debate on Molyneux's question. In fact he believed that it should be possible
to use a TVSS to provide visual information to blind people and that in this
manner the power of sight could be restored to the blind. Morgan meant this
literally: "We can call it visual because the nature of the information being
extracted, and the way in which it is presented, is similar to that extracted
and presented by the eye [...] In general there is little doubt that the TVSS
allows the blind to see. TM
Study of the use of sensory substitution systems had, stated Morgan,
demonstrated that "perception is not necessarily to be equated with the in-
put from particular sense organs, still less with inputs along particular nerve
fibres, as the obsolete law of specific energies proclaimed. Perception is the
recognition of certain properties in the input." 5 Locke's answer to Molyneux's
question was, believed Morgan, incorrect to the extent that it implied that
only by association was it possible to recognise that two messages received
along different paths actually referred to the same object. The emphasis which
Locke and other empiricists placed on experience was, said Morgan, closer to
the truth. 6
Like Morgan, David Warren and Edward Strelow connected sensory sub-
stitution systems to Molyneux's problem. In their article "Learning Spatial
Dimensions with a Visual Sensory Aid: Molyneux Revisited" (1984) they
suggested that Molyneux's question in its pure form probably cannot be an-
swered, but that the use of sensory substitution systems raises questions which

1Bach-y-Rita, Collins, Saunders, White & Scadden 1969, p. 964.

2Guarniero 1974, pp. lO1-1o2.
3Gregory noted similarities between the process of learning to "see" tactually and the
stages which the blind people he had operated on had passed through. See Gregory 1974a,
p. 67.
4Morgan 1977, PP. 2ol-2o3. I would regard it as more correct to agree with Bach-y-Rita,
Collins, Saunders, White & Scadden 1969, and say that the TVSS allows the blind to "see."
5Morgan 1977, P. 207.
6Morgan 1977, p. 2o7.
 Modern Approaches 12 3

r e s e m b l e M o l y n e u x ' s a n d can, indeed, be resolved. T h e y r e g a r d e d t h e use of

such s y s t e m s as an a p p r o p r i a t e a p p r o a c h to t h e use of a new sense. 1
W a r r e n a n d Strelow set up a n u m b e r of e x p e r i m e n t s to s t u d y t h e w a y in
which t e s t s u b j e c t s l e a r n to use w h a t is known as a Binaural Sensory Aid
( B S A ) . 2 A B S A is an electronic a p p a r a t u s worn on t h e h e a d like a cap. It
consists of two c o m p o n e n t s : an u l t r a s o n i c g e n e r a t o r t h a t t r a n s m i t s u l t r a s o u n d
a n d two receivers which collect t h e echoes of t h e u l t r a s o u n d a n d t r a n s l a t e
t h e m into a u d i b l e signals. (A difference b e t w e e n a T V S S a n d a B S A is t h a t
a T V S S t u r n s visual i n f o r m a t i o n into t a c t i l e i n f o r m a t i o n while a B S A r e l a t e s
exclusively to h e a r i n g a n d p r o v i d e s sonic i n f o r m a t i o n in a form p e r c e p t i b l e to
hearing.) T h e e q u i p m e n t is designed in such a w a y t h a t t h e echoes p r o v i d e
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e d i s t a n c e , t h e d i r e c t i o n a n d t h e surface s t r u c t u r e of o b j e c t s .
T h e f r e q u e n c y of t h e s o u n d reflected specifies t h e distance; t h e i n t e r a u r a l
a m p l i t u d e difference i n d i c a t e s t h e direction; a n d t h e c l a r i t y of t h e signal is
i n d i c a t i v e of the s t r u c t u r e .
E x p e r i m e n t s which W a r r e n a n d Strelow carried o u t using b l i n d f o l d e d peo-
ple showed t h a t s o m e t i m e was required for t h e t e s t s u b j e c t s to l e a r n to
d e t e r m i n e d i s t a n c e a n d direction: "Much as Locke p r e d i c t e d for t h e use of
visual i n f o r m a t i o n by t h e p e r s o n newly recovered from blindness, we found in
t h e s e e x p e r i m e n t s t h a t t h e r e was no i m m e d i a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e i n f o r m a -
tion p r o v i d e d by t h e sensors. ''3 However, t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d was not all t h a t
long, which W a r r e n a n d Strelow believed could i n d i c a t e t h a t a b l i n d p e r s o n
g a i n i n g t h e power of sight would be able to l e a r n a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t in a
s h o r t t i m e if, as in t h e case of t h e blindfolded test s u b j e c t s , t h e r e was suffi-
cient o p p o r t u n i t y for t r a i n i n g a n d t h e r e was enough feedback. 4 W a r r e n a n d
Strelow were of t h e opinion t h a t t h e r e was no b e t t e r a p p r o a c h to M o l y n e u x ' s
problem.

1Warren & Strelow 1984, pp. 331-332. Warren and Strelow were aware that a "sensory
aid is not, strictly speaking, a new modality."
2The BSA was designed by L. Kay. See Kay 1974.
3Warren & Strelow 1984, p. 348. Heil regarded information on the use of sensory sub-
stitution systems as disproving Locke's assoeiationist position. See Heil 1987, p. 239.
4Warren and Strelow also pointed out that certain results would perhaps not be obtained
if blind rather than blindfolded people were used as test subjects. Research carried out by
Aitken and Bower (1982) also showed that blind babies quickly observe objects rather than
echoes.
12 4 Chapter Six

5 ELECTRICAL STIMULATION OF THE VISUAL CORTEX

In an article entitled "Molyneux's Question" (1985) Gareth Evans proposed

a variant on Molyneux's problem which, at first sight, seemed to provide a
better approach to the problem than that outlined above. 1 He suggested
using direct electrical stimulation in the visual cortex of a congenitally blind
person to produce a pattern of phosphenes in the shape of a square. 2 Evans
expected that the blind person would be able to apply to the new situation
the concept of "square" that he had previously learnt to apply through the
sense of touch.
As far as I have been able to discover, experiments of this nature were never
performed on persons born blind. But there is no reason to expect that they
would bring us any closer to a solution of Molyneux's problem than would
tests carried out on cataract patients, since in both cases the visual system
has undergone abnormal development.

6 CONCLUSIONS

As was the case in the nineteenth century, Molyneux's problem played not
such a prominent r61e in the twentieth century as it did in the eighteenth
century. And yet it would appear that it still keeps minds occupied. Many
modern publications on the subject are of an historical nature, usually inter-
pretations of the positions taken up by famous philosophers in earlier times.
A couple of authors have written s u m m a r y histories of the problem. In ad-
dition philosophers, psychologists and other scientists have themselves made
a t t e m p t s to solve the problem, using tools both old and new. The old meth-
ods included appeals to results obtained in tests carried out on congenitally
blind people whose sight has been restored surgically. The approach provided
no new insights, particularly because of the problems of interpretation, which
refuse to become less with the passage of time.
More interesting are the results of experiments in which animals were de-
prived of visual stimuli. Among the data such experiments have provided is
the knowledge that the nature of the stimulus during what has come to be
called the critical period is of importance in the development of the visual

1In this interesting article, Evans aimed to show "how Molyneux's Question is linked to
fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind and perception" (p. 399). See also Campbell
1989.
2Evans 1985, pp. 392 ft. See also Brindley & Lewin 1968 and Dobelle 1977.
 Modern Approaches 12 5

system. Experimental animals raised in a dark environment or one providing

a limited number of visual stimuli acquired abnormal powers of sight. De-
privation experiments are, in fact, unsuitable for solving the original problem
posed by Molyneux, since he seems to have assumed that congenitally blind
people recovering the faculty of sight would immediately be endowed with
normal, properly functioning vision. To the extent that researchers have in-
sisted on using the results of deprivation experiments as direct evidence for a
solution to Molyneux's problem, they have ended up defending the position
of Molyneux or Locke.
Deprivation experiments have thrown new light on the visual behaviour
of patients operated on for cataract. Such patients do, in fact, have some
perception of light but none of shape. This leads to their visual system devel-
oping abnormally. Depending on the age at which the cataract develops and
is treated and depending on the extent of the blindness, cataract patients can
learn to use their visual system to a varying extent after a successful cataract
operation. This explains the divergent results of the various cases. For cured
cataract patients the same applies: they are not appropriately qualified to
help in solving Molyneux's problem since their powers of sight, in contrast to
that of Molyneux's congenitally blind person, is abnormal. The same would
seem to apply to experiments involving direct electrical stimulation of the
visual cortex of congenitally blind people.
The most recent approach to Molyneux's problem involves the use of sen-
sory substitution systems which were first and foremost developed to increase
blind people's mobility and to teach them to read. Learning to use sensory
substitution systems such as a TVSS or a BSA is regarded as a good approach
to Molyneux's problem since equipment of this sort creates an opportunity
for seeing how test subjects react to a new type of sensory information. Ex-
periments conducted using sensory substitution systems have led researchers
to conclude that time is needed for the subject to learn how to use "new" sen-
sory systems, and they have proposed this conclusion as evidence supporting
Locke's position. And although this is, indeed, no more than an approach to
Molyneux's problem, we should not expect a better one to be found.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

M O L Y N E U X ' S P R O B L E M IN R E T R O S P E C T

1 INTERPRETATIONS OF MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM

N the foregoing chapters we have made an extensive examination of the

I history of the discussion surrounding Molyneux's problem and thus the
aim of this book is achieved. To close the examination, we will summarise
the various interpretations and approaches proposed over the course of three
centuries with reference to this problem.
When he set out his problem Molyneux formulated a number of conditions
and assumptions which were not completely clear or acceptable to everybody.
This led inevitably to varying interpretations of the problem.
One of Molyneux's assumptions was that an adult congenitally blind per-
son had learnt by touch to distinguish a sphere from a cube and had also
learnt to name them correctly. Most people regarded this as a plausible as-
sumption, since practically everyone believed that the congenitally blind can
acquire knowledge of geometric properties o/ objects. A person born blind
could, therefore, learn that a cube has angles whereas a sphere does not. He
would also be capable of learning that it is impossible to see all sides of an
object at the same time and that the visual appearance of anything depends
on the angle of vision. According to most philosophers, such as Leibniz and
Reid, a person born blind would also be capable of learning that the geomet-
ric properties that he has learnt vi£ touch correspond in one way or another
to the geometric properties which the sighted learn to know vi£ sight. 1 The
fact that a blind man like Saunderson could practise optics and geometry
reinforced them in their belief. Only Platner and his disciples held the opin-
ion that the congenitally blind can form no concepts whatsoever of space or
geometric properties.
Diderot suggested that it was important whether the blind person in ques-
tion was intelligent or not. An uneducated person would, he thought, be inca-
pable of arriving at the knowledge detailed above. A number of eye specialists

1As we have seen, Berkeley disagreed with this; the early Condillac suggested that it
was possible that an object resembling a sphere when seen could turn out to be a cube
when felt.

127
128 Chapter Seven

and philosophers agreed with this suggestion. Diderot further remarked that
the solutions proposed for Molyneux's problem could not simply be regarded
as universally valid. For if a person cured of blindness were to be shown com-
plex objects, such as a glove or a bathrobe, he would have greater difficulty
identifying them. This is an acceptable assumption.
One of the conditions set by Molyneux was that the sphere and the cube
offered to the blind person first to be touched and then, later, to be viewed
should be made of the same material and should be of the same size. Clearly
Molyneux wished to avoid the objects being recognised on the basis of their
structure and size rather than their shape. Condillac and Diderot regarded
such conditions as superfluous.
A further requirement was that both objects should be placed on a table.
Although nobody suggested as much, it is not difficult to imagine this condi-
tion rendering recognition of the objects more difficult: the blind person now
sighted would have to distinguish not only the cube from the sphere but also
the objects themselves from the table and the table from the background. If
the cube and sphere were to be placed against a plain background this prob-
lem would be obviated. 1 Most researchers assumed implicitly that the person
in question would see the cube and sphere as separate objects.
One of the major assumptions made by Molyneux was that the blind per-
son in question would have his sight restored. When the question was first
formulated participants accepted this hypothesis for the sake of the discus-
sion without really believing that restoration of sight was possible. All this
was changed when Cheselden restored the faculty of sight to a patient with
congenital cataract. From then on, many philosophers believed that the expe-
riences of surgically treated patients with congenital cataracts were, at least in
principle, suitable for solving Molyneux's problem. Only M~rian made an ob-
jection to using cataract patients for this purpose: they are never completely
blind. He also pointed out that people coming into the world completely blind
can never acquire the faculty of sight.
There was some lack of clarity regarding the question of whether Molyneux
would tell the blind person that he was to be shown a sphere and a cube or not.
Leibniz and Jurin, for example, assumed that the blind man would be given
this information and that he would thus only be called on to make the required
distinction. They believed that if this information was not imparted, the
subject would be incapable of distinguishing the sphere from the cube. Others,
including Condillac, thought it desirable not to ask any leading questions and
therefore not to tell the man what objects he was to be shown. And indeed

1Diderot proposed a variant on Molyneux's problem in which a black cube and a red
sphere would be placed against a white background. See Diderot [1749] 1961, p. 137.
 Molyneux's Problem in Retrospect 129

we should expect the identification of the objects to be easier if the subject

had prior information about them.
A number of philosophers, the first being Boullier, believed that it would be
better to use a circle and a square rather than a sphere and a cube because--
so thought these philosophers--we can only perceive (flat) surfaces. Even
quite recently Evans proposed using this simplified version of the problem. 1
One of the phrases in Molyneux's statement of his problem which was
subject to a variety of interpretations was whether the formerly blind per-
son could distinguish and name the objects by sight before touching them.
Some philosophers were of the opinion that the subject would have to give
an immediate reaction, as soon as his faculty of sight was restored. Others
believed that he ought to take his time, that he should be allowed to walk
around the table on which the objects had been placed and should also be
allowed to use his reason and his memory, as Jurin wrote. A number of re-
searchers saw a difference in the man being allowed only to look or also to use
mathematical reasoning. Although this difference is difficult to specify, it is
possible to imagine that it could matter whether the subject had to make an
immediate judgment or not. Probably what Molyneux was thinking of was
whether the man would be able to distinguish and name the objects without
recourse to the sense of touch. Doubtless he would have been given some time
to attempt this. Many philosophers actually expected that he would be too
amazed initially to say anything at all.
As already stated, Molyneux's problem does, in fact, consist of two ques-
tions: can a person born blind who has learnt to distinguish a sphere from
a cube by touch and to name both objects distinguish them by sight alone
on restoration of that faculty and, further, can he name them correctly?
Molyneux himself--and many others--failed to treat these two questions sep-
arately: they gave only a single answer. This is not surprising when, by
answering "no" they were indicating that they did not believe the man would
be capable of distinguishing the sphere from the cube, for in that case he
would certainly not be capable of naming the objects. But if a negative an-
swer referred only to the subject's inability to name the objects, it is then
unclear whether they also refused to accept that he would be able to dis-
tinguish the sphere from the cube or whether they thought that he would
succeed. Failure to name the objects in no way implies failure to be able to
distinguish them. (A positive answer usually produced no confusion because
it generally referred to the ability to name the objects and thus also accepted
that the formerly blind person would be able to distinguish the sphere from
the cube.) It is thus important that both questions be answered separately.

1Evans 1985, p. 365•

13o Chapter Seven

2 WAYS OF DEALING WITH MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM

Partly as a result of developments within various branches of science, Moly-

neux's problem has been dealt with in various ways in the course of the cen-
turies and a variety of solutions have been proposed grounded in diverse argu-
ments. Originally the approach was speculative. Philosophers made a t t e m p t s
to get at the link between visual and tactile sensations of the shape of objects
and they wondered whether the link could be directly observed or not. They
also a t t e m p t e d to discover whether the concepts of form obtained in one way
or another vi£ the sense of touch are the same as or have something in com-
mon with the concepts of form obtained through the faculty of s i g h t - - a n d if
so, whether this could be immediately noted.
There was agreement that visual and tactile sensations differ from one
another qualitatively. However, opinion was divided over the link between
visual and tactile sensations of the form of objects. Some philosophers were
of the opinion that there was a necessary relationship between the two. Some
of them believed that the relationship could be discerned immediately, oth-
ers thought that it came through experience and still others put it down to
(mathematical) reasoning. Other philosophers believed that there was no es-
sential connection between the two and that experience created no more than
an arbitrary link.
With regard to the relationship between tactile and visual concepts a va-
riety of opinions were defended. Some philosophers were of the opinion that
the tactile and visual concepts of a sphere and a cube are essentially the same,
or at least show similarities, and they believed that this identity or similarity
could be observed either immediately or with the aid of reason. Others held
that tactile and visual concepts differ radically from one another and that
experience is required to create a link between the two types of concept.
The question of how concepts are formed was usually left unanswered. Only
very few a t t e m p t e d to clarify the links that could exist between sensations
and concepts. Hutcheson and Boullier believed, for instance that concepts
and sensations accompany one another; and M@rian believed that concepts
can be abstracted from sensations. Leibniz pointed out that a perceiver may
have a sensation of an object without having a clear concept of that object
and that the possession of an exact concept of two objects does not imply
that these objects can be immediately distinguished on sight.
After the publication of Cheselden's account, it was believed that the var-
ious positions could be assessed empirically as to their correctness. (M@rian
was one of the few who questioned this.) The fact that the cataract patient op-
erated on by Cheselden was at first unable to distinguish objects of any shape
or size from one another demonstrated, some believed, that Molyneux's ques-
 Molyneux's Problem in Retrospect 131

tion had to be answered in the negative. Many of these people were to be

found in Great Britain, especially among followers of Berkeley's theory of vi-
sion. However, those who had formed an opinion, often based on speculative
grounds, that a congenitally blind person whose sight is restored would be
capable of distinguishing a sphere from a cube and would be able to name the
objects correctly, stated that Cheselden's study had not been performed in an
adequate manner. The philosophers in question, mainly French philosophes,
provided alternative explanations for the phenomena observed and drew up
criteria governing a reliable preparation and style of questioning of cataract
patients who were to be operated upon.
Later case studies of such patients, however, turned out to involve just as
many problems, thereby providing no answer to Molyneux's question. One
of the reasons for this was that pre-operative and post-operative conditions
differed from case to case. Prior to the operation the patients suffered from dif-
ferent degrees of blindness and had widely differing intellectual backgrounds.
Furthermore the doctors failed to conduct their experiments at the same time
following the operation and the experiments were not identical. As already
noted, MSrian expressed fundamental criticism of the use of cataract patients;
and Diderot stated expressly that he attached more importance to the judg-
ment of a philosopher with common sense than to the statements of a congen-
itally blind person who had just undergone surgery. Despite the difficulties
listed, case studies of cataract patients treated surgically continued to be used
as proofs of solutions of Molyneux's problem.
The problems mentioned above are among the reasons why, in the nine-
teenth century, other types of empirical evidence were introduced into the
discussion on Molyneux's problem. This material consisted largely of data
about the visual capacities of newborn animals and babies. There was agree-
ment on the fact that certain animals are capable of distinguishing objects
one from the other and of estimating distance immediately after birth. There
was, however, no agreement on whether this also applied to babies. The so-
lutions proposed to Molyneux's problem on the basis of these findings related
to the point of view adopted with regard to the extent to which the faculty
of sight in newborn animals and human babies could be compared to that of
congenitally blind adults cured of their blindness.
Study of the visual behaviour of young animals and neonates was interest-
ing not only in reference to Molyneux's problem but, particularly, for theories
of sight in general. For instance, the fact that animals can distinguish objects
and see depth independently of the sense of touch proved--just like Wheat-
stone's explanation of stereoscopic vision--that Berkeley's theory of vision
was untenable.
In the nineteenth century Molyneux's question was also answered on the
basis of other grounds. A number of researchers pointed out that sighted
132 Chapter Seven

people have difficulty recognising complicated or unusual shapes when using

their sense of touch. By way of analogy, they believed that a congenitally
blind person recovering his sight would have similar problems in recognising
a sphere or a cube. As Diderot had already suggested, this argument may
apply to complicated objects but the question is whether it also applies to
objects as geometrically simple as spheres and cubes.
In the twentieth century Molyneux's problem was approached in two more
ways. In the first place knowledge about the effects of visual deprivation in
animals was applied to the problem. Experiments showed that the visual sys-
tem changes under the influence of abnormal conditions during development.
If, during a certain critical period, an animal is not stimulated by visual pat-
terns, it will never learn to distinguish objects one from the o t h e r - - o r will do
so only with the greatest difficulty.
Finally, the most recent approach to Molyneux's problem has been the
use of sensory substitution systems. Such systems provide information which
is coded in a special way and is normally obtained vi£ another route. It is
not the case that the sensations normally acquired are of a similar nature to
those acquired by a sensory substitution system. And it is therefore incorrect
to join Morgan in stating that blind people really can see with the aid of a
Tactile Visual Substitution System. Warren and Strelow rightly noted that
the use of sensory substitution systems merely approaches the use of a new
sense and that research into the operation of equipment of this type cannot,
therefore, provide a definitive solution to Molyneux's problem. To the extent
that the conditions under which users of sensory substitution systems operate
are analogous to those in which Molyneux's hypothetical subject finds himself,
the results of the experiments are interesting. Experiments have demonstrated
that test subjects need time to learn to distinguish objects and to name them.
It has also been noted that feedback improves this process.
In view of the fact that we can hardly expect that a more direct approach
to the problem will be found than the alternatives we have mentioned, the
history of Molyneux's problem as outlined can be regarded as a closed book.

3 CONCLUSIONS

We have not answered Molyneux's question--and, indeed, we think that it

cannot be answered because congenitally blind people cannot be made to
see once their critical period is passed. The question was, however, worth
putting: it led to discussions and experiments which have provided us with a
veritable treasure house of information. In the course of history the question
has, in fact, been replaced by numerous other questions which, while related
 Molyneux's Problem in Retrospect 133

to the original problem, have gone on to lead a life of their own. Some of
these are philosophical in nature, such as problems relating to the conceptual
clarification of perceptual terms, to the justification of claims to knowledge, to
the status of philosophical thought experiments, 1 and so on. Others are in the
field of psychology; for example, psychological questions concerning pattern
recognition, learning processes, formation of concepts, methodological issues,
and so on. Still other questions, such as those concerned with the study of
the development of the visual system, critical periods for development, and
the nature and function of the association cortex belong to the domain of
neurophysiology.
And thus the discussions surrounding Molyneux's problem provide us with
the same image as we get from a river. The problem had its source in 1688
in Molyneux's mind. It bubbled along a little until Cheselden performed his
cataract operation in 1728 and initiated a flood. The question then quit the
high country of philosophy and flowed into the wide plains of experimental
psychology and neurophysiology. The mighty stream into which it then flowed
has since spread out to form such a wide delta that it is no longer possible to
measure its extent.

1Wilkes 1988 devotes some attention to the often problematical status of philosophical
thought experiments.
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 INDEX OF NAMES

Page numbers in italics refer to the bibliography.

Abbott, E. A., 37 n, 135 Bourdon, B., 87 n, 1 i 3 n , 137

Abbott, T. K., 88, 93, 94n, 95-98, 99 n, Bower, T. G. R., i23 n, 135
iOO, loin, IO3, lo4n , io9, lion, l15n , Brandt, R., 28n, 137
135 Breathnach, C. S., 18n, 137
Ackroyd, C., ii6, 135 Breidert, W., 48 n, 137
Aitken, G. A., i48 Brindley, G. S., 124n, 137
Aitken, S., 123n , 135 Brisseau, M., 57, 137
Alembert, J. Le Rond D', 73 n, 135 , 14o, Brown, T., 98, 1OO, 101, i 3 7
144 Brunschwig, J., 42 n, 144
A m m a n , J. C., 66, 135 Buffon, G. L. Leclerc, Comte de, 7 i, 72 n,
Ammar, 56 n, 58 n 138, 146
Anti-Berkeley, 65 n, 135 Burdach, C. F., io2 n
Apelt, E. F., 62 n, 135 Burner, T., 42 n
Arago, M. F., 139
Aristotle, 19, 135 Campbell, J., 124n , 138
Arnobius of Sicca, 66, 135 Camper, P., 64, 138, 147
Ayers, M. R., 136 Cassirer, E., 29, 138
Celsus, A. C., 58n, 138
Bach-y-Rita, P., i21, i22 n, 135 , 149 Chappell, V., 19 n, 138
Baer, K. E. von, 62n, 135 Charp, 143
Bagwell, M., 113n , i l 7 n , l i 9 n , 139 Cheselden, W., 14, 15, 52-54, 56, 58,
Bailey, S., 87, 88, 9 o, 96-io2, i o 4 n , io5, 6o-67, 69, 7o, 72, 73 n, 76, 78, 8o,
135, 136, 145 83-85, 87, 88, 93, 96, 97, lO9, 128, 13o ,
Bain, A., i i 0 , 136 i31, i33, 138, 139, 141, 146
Barrow, I., 29, 136 Chillingworth, H. R., 18 n, 138
Beach, F. A., 118n, 136 Chow, K. L., 119n , 138
Beer, G. J., 93n, 136 Clarke, S., 74
Bell, C., 88, 99n, l o 2 n , 136 Collins, C. C., 121, 122n, 135 , 149
Bering, E. A., 135 Condillac, E. Bonnot de, 13, 67 73, 75 n,
Berkeley, G., i3, 22, 29-34, 36-38, 41, 77, 78 , 8on, 89n , i i i , i i 3 , i 2 7 n , i28,
43-45, 48 n, 49-52, 6o-65, 68, 7o-72, 137, 138, 146
74, 77-8o, 84, 87-90, 94 n, 97-1o2, lO5, Condorcet, M. J. A. N. Caritat, Marquis
111--113, i 2 7 n , 131, i35-137, 144-146, de, 62 n, 139
148 Condorcet O'Connor, A., 139
Berman, D., 28n, 45 n, i i 6 n , 136 Connor, B., 66n, 139
Bew, C., 58n, 137 Cooper, G. F., 119, 137
Bidyadhar, N. K., 58n, 137 Cope, Z., 53 n, 139
Blakemore, C., i i 9 , 137 Coste, P., 144
Bolton Brandt, M., 28 n, 137 Crone, R. A., 11, l o 4 n , 113n , 117, 139
Bongie, L. L., 7on, 137 Curran, P. V , 6on, 148
Bonnet, C., 7~n, 137 Cuvier, G., 99
Born, F. G., io8, i o 9 n , 137
Boullier, D. R., 46-48 , 5 i, 75, i29, i3o, Dahl, D. S., i 8 n , 139
137 Daniels, N., 37 n, 139

15i
152 Index of Names

Daviel, J., 59, 64, 89, 93 n, 139 Hamilton, W., 87, 96n, 99, l o o n , l o 3 n ,
Davis, J. W., 14, lo7 n, 113, 114n , 139 lo7n, lO9, 141, 145, 147, 148
Davy, H., 99 Hamlyn, D. W., 135
Daza de Valdes, B., 6o, 139 Hausmann, H., 53 n, 141
De Beer, E. S., 144 Hafiy, V., 14, 81 n, 141
Delacampagne, C., 75 n, 139 Heath, P., 147
Dember, W. N., 113n , 117n , 119n , 139 Hebb, D. O., 115, 116, 119n , 141
Dennis, W., 113n , 139 Heil, J., 117, 123n , 141
Descartes, R., 18, 29, 65, 75, 139 Helmholtz, H. L. F. yon, 13, lO6, lO7 n,
Dewey, J., lo7, 139 141
Diderot, D., 13, 7o, 71 n, 72-78, 84, 85, Henkes, H. E., 59 n, 141
89 n, 111, 113, l 1 5 n , 127, 128, 131 , Hering, E., lO6, lo8n, 141
132, 135, 137, 139--141, 144--146 Hippel, A. von, 94, lo7n, 141
Dilthey, W., 83n , 14o Hirsch, H. V. B., 119n , 141
Dobelle, W. H., 124n, 14o Hirschberg, J., 58 n, 94 n, lOO n, 1o 7 n,
Doesschate, G. ten, 64 n, 138 142
Domville, L., 19 Hof, M. W. van, l13n , 117n , 12o, 142
Dufau, P. A., 13n , 14o Hof-Van Duin, J. van, 117n , 119, 142
Duggan, T., 147 Holmes, G., 74
Duin, J. van. See Hof-Van Duin, J. van Home, E., 89, 9o, 142
Dunan, C., lOTn, 110, 140 Hoppen, K. T., 18 n, 142
Dutt, K. C., 58n, 14o Hubel, D. H., 119, 142
Hume, D., 35, 142
Ebbinghaus, H., l o 7 n , 14o Humphrey, N. K., 99, 116, 135
Egeria, 7° Hutcheson, F., 44-46, 51, 79, 13o, 136,
Erhardt-Siebold, E. von, 13 n, 14o 142
Euclid, 37, 45, 50, 111, 139 Huygens, Chr., 18, 23, lO4 n, 142
Evans, G., l l O n , l 1 5 n , l 1 7 n , 124, 129,
138, 14o Jackson, F., 25 n, 142
James, W., 13, 88n, 96 , 97 n, 1o8n,
Ferrand, E., 70 109--111 ~ 14~
Flamsteed, J., 18 Janet, P., 88 n, lO8 n, 142
Flourens, M. J. P., 99 n Janin, J., 89, 93 n, 143
Fontenelle, B. Le Bovier de, 59n, 14o Jaynes, J., 118n, 136
Formey, J. H. S., 78 n Jesus, 58 n
Forrest, D. W., 58n, 14o Jones, B., 115 n, 143
Franz, J. C. A., 89-95 , 14o Joyeuse, 139
Fraser, A. C., 94n, 136 Jurin, J., 48, 49, 51, 128, 129, 143
Freud, S., 56
Kant, I., 35, lO6-1o8, 143
Gassendi, P., 137 Kay, L., 123n, 143
God, 65-67, 74, 89 Kelly, P. H., 18n, 143, 148
Goethe, J. W. von, 64 n Kepler, J., 18, 23, lO4, 143
Grant, R., 52, 6o, 87, 141, 148 Kimble, G. A., 139
's Gravesande, W. J., 63-64, 141, 146 Klein, D. B., 113n , 117, 12o, 143
Gregory, R. L., 115-117, 122 n, 141 KShler, W., 115 n, 143
Grimm, F. M., 71, 141 Kolk, J. L. C. Schroeder van der, lO3
Guarniero, G., 121n, 122, 141 Kr/iger, J. G., 62 n, 143

Haaff, G. ten, 59 n, 141 La Mettrie, J. Offroy de, 13, 65-67, 70,

Hagen, F. W., lO9, 141 77, 78 , 143, 149
Haller, A. von, 139 Lafarga, F., 139
 Index o.f Names 153

Lasnier, R., 57 Morgan, M. J., 14, 56n, 114, 117, 12o,

Le Cat, C. N., 62n, 144 121n, 122, 132 , 146
Le Roy, G., 138 Miiller, J., 13, 98, 99, l o o n , lO6, lO7,
Lebensohn, J. E., 59 n, 144 lo8n, 146
Lee, H., 4o-42, 51, 144 Miinehow~ W., 57 n, 59 n, 146
Leibniz, G. W., 13, 41-46, 48, 49, 51, 74, Murray, D. J., 113n, 146
75, 78 , 127, 128, 130 , 144 Murray, M., 113n, 117 n, 146
Lende, H.~ 13n, 144 Musschenbroek, P. van, 63, 64, 146
Leonardo da Vinci, lo5 n
L'l~p4e, L'abb~ de, 14 Newell, F. W., 119 n, 138
Newton, I., 18, 23, 29, 49n, 61, 63n, 74,
Levin, J., 25n, 144
Lewin, W. S., 124n, 137 75, 136, 14~, 143, 146, 149
Nicolson, M. H., 13n, 14e
Lievers, M., 22 n, 144
Nidditch, P. H., 21 n, 14e, 144
Locke, J., 13, 17-21, 22 n, 23, 26-29, 31,
Nunneley, T., 94, 146
33, 35, 36 , 38-42, 44, 46 , 48, 53, 61-64,
67, 68, 7o, 71 , 74, 75, 77 79, 84, 89, 9 ° , Panum, P. L., lO6, l o 7 n , 146
94, 96 , 98 , 111, 113, 117, 120, 122, 123,
Park, D., 28n, 146
125, 137, 1 4 3 - 1 4 6 Pastore, N., 52n, 56, 72n, 113n, 146
Lokhorst, D. H., 11
Pater, C. de, 63n, 146
Lokhorst, G. J. C., 11
Paulson, W. R.~ 13n, 73 n, 146
Lokhorst, S. R., 11 Perkins, M. L., 73 n, 146
Lotze, H., lo6~ lO9 n, 144 Petit, J. L., 59
Louis XV, 59 Petry, M. J., 11
Louis, A., 6o, 144 Philal~the, 42
Luce, A. A., 29n, 144 Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, 136 , 143
Phillips, A., 14o
Pitcher, G., 69 n, 146
Mace, W., 44, 14e
Math, E., 96n, lOln, lO7, lo8n, 11on, Platner, E., lO9, 11o, 114, 127, 146
Pollack, S. V., 135
144, 145
Porterfield, W., 65 n, 146, 147
Mackie, J. L., 19n, 28n, 116, 117n, 145
Preyer, W., l o l n , l o 7 n , 147
MacLean, K., 13 n, 145
Priestley, J., 49 n~ 147
Maitre-Jan, A., 57, 145
Malebranche, N., 144
Quayle, F., 39
Mansel, H. L., 141
Marchan, L., 8o n, 145 Raehlmann, E., loln~ lO7, lo8n, 147
Mark, 58 n Ramsay, A. M., 94, 95, 135, 147
Markovits, F., 145 R4aumur, R. A. Ferchault de, 75 n
Maupertuis, P. L. M., 78n Reid, T., 13, 34-38, 49-51, 87 n, l o o n ,
McCracken, G. E., 135 lo7n, 127, 139, 147
M4rian, J. B., 14, 78-83, 85, 118, 128, Riesen, A. H., 118, 119, 138, 147
130, 131, 145 Rochat, G. F., 64n, 147
M4ry, J., 58, 59 Rock, I., 115n , 117n , 149
Mesmer, F. A., 14o Rogers, G. A. J., 137
Meyer, P. H., 14o Rohault, J., 6o, 147
Mill, J. S., 98, loo, lo5, 11o, 145
Molyneux, C., 18n, 145 Sabra, A. I., 18n, 147
Molyneux, Th., 145 Sacks, O.~ 116n, 147
Molyneux, W., 17-23, 26, 28 n, 38-4 o, Saint-Yves, C. de, 59 n
145, and p a s s i m Saunders, F. A., 121, 122n, 135 , 149
Monck, W. H. S., 94, 145 Saunderson, N., 49, 5°, 73, 74, 76, 77,
Morand, S. F., 62 n, 146 127, 147
154 I n d e x o.f N a m e s

Saussure, N. de, lO2 n Valvo, A., 115n , 148

Scadden, L., 121, 122 n, 135 , 149 Vaughan, H. G., 135
Schaefer, K. L., 147 Veitch, J., 141
Schlesinger, K., 139 Verbeek, T. H. M., 66n, 149
Schlodtmann, W., l o 8 n , 113n , 147 Verni~re, P., 74 n, 14o
Schopenhauer, A., 146 Vienne, J.-M., 28n, 149
Schroeder van der Kolk, J. L. C., lO3 Villey, P., 111 n, 113 n, 149
Schwenger, A. G., 137 Volkmann, A. W., 93, lO8, 149
Selby-Bigge, L. A., 142 Voltaire IF. M. Arouet], 13, 61-63, 66,
Senden, M. von, 56n, 87n, 11o, 114-116 , 69n, 72n, 89n, 137, 146, 149
117n, 119, 14o, 147 Voorhoeve, P. E., 142
's Gravesande, W. J., 63-64, 141, 146
Simms, J. G., 14, 18, 19n , 148
Smith, A., 97-99, l o l , 148 Waesberg, 17n
Smith, R., 49, 61, 143, 148 Wagner, R., 141, 149
Snellius, W., 18 Wallace, J. G., 115-117, 141
Spalding, D. A., 118, 148 Walter, W. G., 113n, 117n, 12o, 142
Spencer, W. G., 138 Wardrop, J., 89, 149
Spinelli, D. N., 119n , 141 Ware, J., 92, 93 n, 149
Steele, R., 52n, 61n, 8on, 148 Warnock, G. J., 115 n, 147
Sterling, T. D., 135 Warren, D. H., 122, 123, 132 , 149
Stewart, D., 88, lOl n, 148 Warrington, E. K., 116, 135
Stratton, G. M., 88, 111, 148 Wenzel, Baron de, 59 n
Strelow, E. R., 122, 123, 132 , 149 Wheatstone, C., 15, 18n, 85, lO4-1o6,
Stumpf, C., 94 n, lO7, l o 8 n , 148 112, 131 , 149
Susruta, 58 n, 137 White, B. W., 121, 122n, 135 , 149
Swift, J., lOl Wiesel, T. N., 119, 142
Synge, E., 39, 43, 49, 148 Wilkes, K. V., 133n, 149
Wundt, W., lO7 n, 149
Teape, C. R., 29n, 148
Th~ophile, 42-44 Young, J. Z., 147
Thomson, J. J., 69n , 146, 148
Tourtual, C. T., l o 8 n , 148
Trevor-Roper, P. D., 6o n, 148 Zeki, S., 113n, 149
Tr~voux, 57 n, 148 Zeune, A., 96n, 149
Turbayne, C. M., 32 n, 148 Zuckerman, C. B., 115n , 117 n, 149
 INDEX OF S U B J E C T S

accommodation, 3 ° , 58 eye
amaurotism, 91, 92 anatomy of, 57
amblyopia, 59 n movement, 23, 32 , 61, 76 , 91
apperception, 42
association cortex, 133 faculty psychology, 34
association of ideas, 3o n, 49, 61
associationism, 123 n
atheism, 65, 74 Gestalt psychology, 115 n

heterogeneity of sight and touch, 29,

binaural sensory aid (BSA), 122-123, 125
binocular vision, lO4-1o6 32-34, 78

"idea", 19 n
cataract, 57-58
idea vs. image, 39, 43, 46
surgical treatment of, 58-59
immaterialism, 44
Cheselden's report, 53-56
criticism of, 6o, 65-83, 87-88
regarded as supportive of Berkeley's judgment, unconscious, 27, 29, 40, 42, 68,
theory of vision, 6o-64, 84 71
common sense, 35, 43, 75
common sense philosophy, 34 language metaphor. See visual
convergence, 3 ° perception, analogy with the
couching (cataract operation), 58 understanding of language
critical period, 97 n, 116, 119, 124, 132 looking vs. seeing, 71
cross-modal transfer, 116
materialism, 42 , 65
deprivation, visual microscope, 18, 34, 63 n
animal studies, 118--120, 124-125, 132 Molyneux's problem
in humans, 59 n, 80-83, l o 5 n , Xl 7 as empirically solvable problem,
depth, perception of. See distance, 52-125, 13o-132
perception of; space, perception of as thought experiment, 25-52 , 13o
development (visual system). See background, 18-2o
deprivation, visual first formulation, 17-18
Ding-an-sich, lO6, lO 7 first publication, 21-23
distance, perception of. See also space, history of, 14, 113-114
perception of interpretations of, 127-129
Berkeley on, 29-32 , 131 Molyneux's question
in newborn animals and babies, negative answers to, 26-38. See also
98-1o4, 131 Cheselden's report: regarded as
Molyneux on, 22 23 supportive of Berkeley's theory of
Wheatstone on, lO4-1o6, 131 vision
dualism, 65 positive answers to, 39-50. See also
Cheselden's report: criticism of
empiricism, 42, 51, 66 68, lO6-111, 113
extraction (cataract operation), 58-59 nativism, lO6-111, 113

155
156 Index of Subjects

pain, 30, 35, 88, 91 living eye (Condillac), 68, 76, 85

perception Mary (Jackson), z5 n
acquired vs. natural (original), 36 metaphysical anatomy (Diderot), 71
vs. sensation, 35 paralysis and blindness without loss of
petites perceptions (perceptions smell (Hutcheson), 45, 51
insensibles), 42 restoration of sight (Molyneux). See
Molyneux's problem: as thought
rationalism, 51 , 67 experiment
reclination (cataract operation), 58 restoration of sight (Reid), 49
restoration of smell (M~rian), 79
retinal image, 18, 2o, 32, 40, 41, 44, 58,
Sdminaire d 'A veugles A rtificiels
68, lO4, lO5
(M~rian), 80-83
statue (Condillac), 7o, 71, 85
scepticism, 29, 35, 4 ° , 42 thinking block of marble (Diderot), 7o
seeing vs. looking, 71 unbodied spirit (Berkeley), 34, 37, 51,
sensitive period. See critical period 63, 68
sensory substitution system, 12o-123, time, 74, lO6, lO9~ 11o
125, 132
space, perception of, 28n~ 106--111, visual capacities
114-116 , 122. See also distance, of cured cataract patients, 59-6o,
perception of
87-97, 114-117, 125, 130--131" See
stereoscope, lO4, 105 also Cheselden's report
substitution system. See sensory of newborn animals and babies,
substitution system
97-1o4, 131
visual cortex
tabula rasa, 42 ablation of, 116
tactile visual substitution system electrical stimulation of, 124
(TVSS), 121-123, 125 visual object
telescope, 18, 63 n primary (direct), 3o-32, 62, 78
thought experiments secondary (indirect), 3o-31
first man (Buffon), 71 visual perception, analogy with the
Flatland (Abbott), 37n understanding of language, 26, 27,
Idomenians (Reid), 37 31 , 33-38, 49, 62, 79
 ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDI~ES

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85. B6rault Stuart, Seigneur d'Aubigny: Traitd sur l'art de la guerre. Introduction et
6dition par t~lie de Comminges. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1871-6
86. S.L. Kaplan: Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV. 2 vols.,
1976 Set ISBN 90-247-1873-2
87. M. Lienhard (ed.): The Origins and Characteristics of Anabaptism / Les ddbuts et les
caractdristiques de l'Anabaptisme. With an Extensive Bibliography / Avec une
bibliographie d6taill6e. 1977 ISBN 90-247-1896-1
88. R. Descartes: R~gles utiles et claires pour la direction de l' esprit en la recherche de la
v~ritd. Traduction selon le lexique cart6sien, et annotation conceptuelle par J.-L.
Marion. Avec des notes math6matiques de P. Costabel. 1977 ISBN 90-247-1907-0
89. K. Hardesty: The 'SupplEment' to the 'Encyclopddie'. [Diderot et d'Alembert]. 1977
ISBN 90-247-1965-8
90. H.B. White: Antiquity Forgot. Essays on Shakespeare, [Francis] Bacon, and Rem-
bran&. 1978 ISBN 90-247-1971-2
91. P.B.M. Blaas: Continuity and Anachronism. Parliamentary and Constitutional
Development in Whig Historiography and in the Anti-Whig Reaction between 1890
and 1930. 1978 ISBN 90-247-2063-X
92. S.L. Kaplan (ed.): La Bagarre. Ferdinando Galiani's (1728-1787) 'Lost' Parody. With
an Introduction by the Editor. 1979 ISBN 90-247-2125-3
93. E. McNiven Hine: A Critical Study of [l~tienne Bonnot de] Condillac' s [1714-1780]
'TraitFdes Syst~mes'. 1979 ISBN 90-247-2120-2
94. M.R.G. Spiller: Concerning Natural Experimental Philosphy. Merle Casaubon [1599-
1671] and the Royal Society. 1980 ISBN 90-247-2414-7
95. F. Duchesneau: La physiologie des Lumi~res. Empirisme, modules et thC,ofies. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2500-3
96. M. Heyd: Between Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment. Jean-Robert Chouet [1642-
1731] and the Introduction of Cartesian Science in the Academy of Geneva. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2508-9
97. James O'Higgins: Yves de Vallone [1666/7-1705]: The Making of an Esprit Fort.
1982 ISBN 90-247-2520-8
98. M.L. Kuntz: Guillaume Postel [1510-1581]. Prophet of the Restitution of All Things.
His Life and Thought. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2523-2
99. A. Rosenberg: Nicolas Gueudeville and His Work (1652-172?). 1982
ISBN 90-247-2533-X
100. S.L. Jaki: Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem [1861-1916]. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2897-5; Pb (1987) 90-247-3532-7
101. Anne Conway [1631-1679]: The Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy.
Edited and with an Introduction by P. Loptson. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2671-9
102. E.C. Patterson: [Mrs.] Mary [Fairfax Greig] Sommerville [1780-1872] and the
Cultivation of Science (1815-1840). 1983 ISBN 90-247-2823 - 1
103. C.J. Berry: Hume, Hegel and Human Nature. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2682-4
104. C.J. Betts: Early Deism in France. From the so-called 'd6istes' of Lyon (1564) to
Voltaire's 'Lettres philosophiques' (1734). 1984 ISBN 90-247-2923-8
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105. R. Gascoigne: Religion, Rationality and Community. Sacred and Secular in the
Thought of Hegel and His Critics. 1985 ISBN 90-247-2992-0
106. S. Tweyman: Scepticism and Belief in Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion'. 1986 ISBN 90-247-3090-2
107. G. Cemy: Theology, Politics and Letters at the Crossroads of European Civilization.
Jacques Basnage [1653-1723] and the Baylean Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch
Republic. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3150-X
108. Spinoza's Algebraic Calculation of the Rainbow & Calculation of Changes. Edited
and Translated from Dutch, with an Introduction, Explanatory Notes and an Appendix
by M.J. Petry. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3149-6
109. R.G. McRae: Philosophy and the Absolute. The Modes of Hegel's Speculation. 1985
ISBN 90-247-3151-8
110. J.D. North and J.J. Roche (eds.): The Light of Nature. Essays in the History and
Philosophy of Science presented to A.C. Crombie. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3165-8
111. C. Walton and P.J. Johnson (eds.): [Thomas] Hobbes's 'Science of Natural Justice'.
1987 ISBN 90-247-3226-3
112. B.W. Head: Ideology and Social Science. Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism.
1985 ISBN 90-247-3228-X
113. A.Th. Peperzak: Philosophy and Politics. A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's
Philosophy of Right. 1987 ISBN Hb 90-247-3337-5; Pb ISBN 90-247-3338-3
114. S. Pines and Y. Yovel (eds.): Maimonides [1135-1204] and Philosophy. Papers
Presented at the 6th Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (May 1985). 1986
ISBN 90-247-3439-8
115. T.J. Saxby: The Quest for the New Jerusalem, Jean de Labadie [1610-1674] and the
Labadists (1610-1744). 1987 ISBN 90-247-3485-1
116. C.E. Harline: Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture in the Early Dutch Republic.
1987 ISBN 90-247-3511-4
117. R.A. Watson and J.E. Force (eds.): The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy. Essays
in Honor of Richard H. Popkin. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3584-X
118. R.T. Bienvenu and M. Feingold (eds.): In the Presence of the Past. Essays in Honor of
Frank Manuel. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1008-X
119. J. van den Berg and E.G.E. van der Wall (eds.): Jewish-Christian Relations in the
17th Century. Studies and Documents. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3617-X
120. N. Waszek: The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3596-3
121. J. Walker (ed.): Thought and Faith in the Philosophy of Hegel. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1234-1
122. Henry More [1614-1687]: The Immortality of the Soul. Edited with Introduction and
Notes by A. Jacob. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3512-2
123. P.B. Scheurer and G. Debrock (eds.): Newton's Scientific and Philosophical Legacy.
1988 ISBN 90-247-3723-0
124. D.R. Kelley and R.H. Popkin (eds.): The Shapes of Knowledge from the Renaissance
to the Enlightenment. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1259-7
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125. R.M. Golden (ed.): The Huguenot Connection. The Edict of Nantes, Its Revocation,
and Early French Migration to South Carolina. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3645-5
126. S. Lindroth: Les chemins du savoir en Suede. De la fondation de l'Universit6 d'Upsal
Jacob Berzelius. l~tudes et Portraits. Traduit du su6dois, pr6sent~ et annot6 par J.-F.
Battail. Avec une introduction sur Sten Lindroth par G. Eriksson. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3579-3
127. S. Hutton (ed.): Henry More (1614-1687). Tercentenary Studies. With a Biography
and Bibliography by R. Crocker. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0095-5
128. Y. Yovel (ed.): Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered. Papers Presented at the 7th
Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (December 1986). 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0405-5
129. J.E. Force and R.H. Popkin: Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac
Newton's Theology. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0583-3
130. N. Capaidi and D.W. Livingston (eds.): Liberty in Hume's 'History of England'. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0650-3
131. W. Brand: Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment. A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of
Human Nature. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1415-8
132. C.E. Harline (ed.): The Rhyme and Reason of Politics in Early Modern Europe.
Collected Essays of Herbert H. Rowen. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1527-8
133. N. Malebranche: Treatise on Ethics (1684). Translated and edited by C. Walton. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-1763-7
134. B.C. Southgate: 'Covetous of Truth'. The Life and Work of Thomas White
(1593-1676). 1993 ISBN 0-7923 - 1926-5
135. G. Santinello, C.W.T. Blackwell and Ph. Weller (eds.): Models of the History of
Philosophy. Vol. 1: From its Origins in the Renaissance to the 'Historia Philosphica'.
1993 ISBN 0-7923-2200-2
136. M.J. Petry (ed.): Hegel and Newtonianism. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2202-9
137. OttovonGuericke: The New (so-called Magdeburg) Experiments [Experimenta Nova,
Amsterdam 1672]. Translated and edited by M.G.Foley Ames. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2399-8
138. R.H. Popkin and G.M. Weiner (eds.): Jewish Christians and Cristian Jews. From the
Renaissance to the Enlightenment. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2452-8
139. J.E. Force and R.H. Popkin (eds.): The Books of Nature and Scripture. Recent Essays
on Natural Philosophy, Theology, and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of
Spinoza's Time and the British Isles of Newton's Time. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2467-6
140. P. Rattansi and A. Clericuzio (eds.): Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th
Centuries. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2573-7
141. S. Jayne: Plato in Renaissance England. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3060-9
142. A.P. Coudert: Leibniz and the Kabbalah. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3114-1
143. M.H. Hoffheimer: Eduard Gans and the Hegelian Philosophy of Law. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3114-1
144. J.R.M. Neto: The Christianization of Pyrrhonism. Scepticism and Faith in Pascal,
Kierkegaard, and Shestov. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3381-0
145. R.H. Popkin (ed.): Scepticism in the History of Philosophy. A Pan-American
Dialogue. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3769-7
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146. M. de Baar, M. L6wensteyn, M. Monteiro and A.A. Sneller (eds.): Choosing the
Better Part. Anna Maria van Schurman (1607-1678). 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3799-9
147. M. Degenaar: Molyneux's Problem. Three Centuries of Discussion on the Perception
of Forms. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3934-7

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