EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149743. February 18, 2005]

LEONARDO TAN, ROBERT UY and LAMBERTO TE,

petitioners, vs. SOCORRO Y. PEREA,
respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The resolution of the present petition effectively settles the

question of how many cockpits may be allowed to operate in a city
or municipality.
There are two competing values of high order that come to fore
in this casethe traditional power of the national government to
enact police power measures, on one hand, and the vague
principle of local autonomy now enshrined in the Constitution on
the other. The facts are simple, but may be best appreciated taking
into account the legal milieu which frames them.
In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known
as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted. Section 5(b) of the
Decree provided for limits on the number of cockpits that may be
established in cities and municipalities in the following manner:

Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General.

(b) Establishment of Cockpits. Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each

city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a
population of over one hundred thousand, two cockpits may be
established, maintained and operated.
[1]
With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, [a]ny law to
the contrary notwithstanding, to authorize and license the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and
[2]
regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks.
In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of
[3]
Daanbantayan, Cebu Province, enacted Municipal Ordinance No.
6 (Ordinance No. 6), Series of 1993, which served as the Revised
Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and
[4]
regulations governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan.
Section 5 thereof, relative to the number of cockpits allowed in the
municipality, stated:

Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of

Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than its equal number of
cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided
however, that this specific section can be amended for purposes of
establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants.
[5]

Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an

amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No.
7), Series of 1993, which amended the aforequoted Section 5 to
now read as follows:

Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit. There shall be allowed to operate in

the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than three
[6]
(3) cockpits.

On 8 November 1995, petitioner Leonardo Tan (Tan) applied

with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a
permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado,
Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there was
already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by
respondent Socorro Y. Perea (Perea), who was the duly franchised
and licensed cockpit operator in the municipality since the 1970s.
[7]
Pereas franchise, per records, was valid until 2002.
The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended
to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te (Te), that a
permit be issued to Tan. On 20 January 1996, Te issued a mayors
permit allowing Tan to establish/operate/conduct the business of a
cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu for the period
[8]
from 20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996.
This act of the mayor served as cause for Perea to file a
Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan, Te,
[9]
and Roberto Uy, the latter allegedly an agent of Tan. Perea
alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a
second cockpit. She claimed that Tan conducted his cockpit fights
not in Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than five kilometers
away from her own cockpit. She insisted that the unlawful
operation of Tans cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate
business, and demanded damages of at least Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) per month as actual damages, One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. Perea also
prayed that the permit issued by Te in favor of Tan be declared as
null and void, and that a permanent writ of injunction be issued
against Te and Tan preventing Tan from conducting cockfights
within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to
[10]
pursue such activity.
[11]
The case was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu, which initially granted a writ of
[12]
preliminary injunction. During trial, herein petitioners asserted
that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the sangguniang
bayan of each municipality now had the power and authority to
grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the
[13]
establishment, licensing, operation and maintenance of cockpits.
By virtue of such authority, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Daanbantayan promulgated Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7. On the other
hand, Perea claimed that the amendment authorizing the operation
of not more than three (3) cockpits in Daanbantayan violated
Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for
only one cockpit in a municipality with a population as
[14]
Daanbantayan.
In a Decision dated 10 March 1997, the RTC dismissed the
complaint. The court observed that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 6,
prior to its amendment, was by specific provision, an
[15]
implementation of the Cockfighting Law. Yet according to the
RTC, questions could be raised as to the efficacy of the
subsequent amendment under Ordinance No. 7, since under the
old Section 5, an amendment allowing additional cockpits could be
[16]
had only if the municipal population so warrants. While the RTC
seemed to doubt whether this condition had actually been fulfilled,
it nonetheless declared that since the case was only for damages,
[17]
the [RTC] cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. It ruled
that there was no evidence, testimonial or documentary, to show
that plaintiff had actually suffered damages. Neither was there
evidence that Te, by issuing the permit to Tan, had acted in bad
faith, since such issuance was pursuant to municipal ordinances
[18]
that nonetheless remained in force. Finally, the RTC noted that
the assailed permit had expired on 31 December 1996, and there
[19]
was no showing that it had been renewed.
Perea filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in
an Order dated 24 February 1998. In this Order, the RTC
categorically stated that Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7 were valid and
 [20]
legal for all intents and purpose[s]. The RTC also noted that the
Sangguniang Bayan had also promulgated Resolution No. 78-96,
conferring on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit for a period of
[21]
ten (10) years from February 1996 to 2006. This Resolution was
likewise affirmed as valid by the RTC. The RTC noted that while
the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law,
any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant
of more power to the local government unit, following the principles
[22]
of devolution under the Local Government Code.
The Decision and Order of the RTC were assailed by Perea on
an appeal with the Court of Appeals which on 21 May 2001,
[23]
rendered the Decision now assailed. The perspective from which
the Court of Appeals viewed the issue was markedly different from
that adopted by the RTC. Its analysis of the Local Government
Code, particularly Section 447(a)(3)(V), was that the provision
vesting unto the sangguniang bayan the power to authorize and
license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the
Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are not necessarily
inconsistent with each other. What the provision of the Local
Government Code did, according to the Court of Appeals, was to
transfer to the sangguniang bayan powers that were previously
[24]
conferred on the Municipal Gamefowl Commission.
Given these premises, the appellate court declared as follows:

Ordinance No. 7 should [be] held invalid for allowing, in unconditional

terms, the operation of not more than three cockpits in Daan Bantayan
(sic), clearly dispensing with the standard set forth in PD 449. However,
this issue appears to have been mooted by the expiration of the Mayors
[25]
Permit granted to the defendant which has not been renewed.

As to the question of damages, the Court of Appeals agreed

with the findings of the RTC that Perea was not entitled to
damages. Thus, it affirmed the previous ruling denying the claim for
damages. However, the Court of Appeals modified the RTCs
Decision in that it now ordered that Tan be enjoined from operating
[26]
a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan.
Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners present two legal questions for determination:
whether the Local Government Code has rendered inoperative the
Cockfighting Law; and whether the validity of a municipal ordinance
may be determined in an action for damages which does not even
[27]
contain a prayer to declare the ordinance invalid. As the denial of
the prayer for damages by the lower court is not put in issue before
this Court, it shall not be passed upon on review.
The first question raised is particularly interesting, and any
definitive resolution on that point would have obvious ramifications
not only to Daanbantayan, but all other municipalities and cities.
However, we must first determine the proper scope of judicial
inquiry that we could engage in, given the nature of the initiatory
complaint and the rulings rendered thereupon, the exact point
raised in the second question.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals, in declaring
Ordinance No. 7 as invalid, embarked on an unwarranted collateral
[28]
attack on the validity of a municipal ordinance. Pereas
complaint, which was for damages with preliminary injunction, did
not pray for the nullity of Ordinance No. 7. The Municipality of
Daanbantayan as a local government unit was not made a party to
the case, nor did any legal counsel on its behalf enter any
appearance. Neither was the Office of the Solicitor General given
[29]
any notice of the case.
[30]
These concerns are not trivial. Yet, we must point out that
the Court of Appeals did not expressly nullify Ordinance No. 7, or
any ordinance for that matter. What the appellate court did was to
say that Ordinance No. 7 should therefore be held invalid for
 [31]
being in violation of the Cockfighting Law. In the next breath
though, the Court of Appeals backtracked, saying that this issue
appears to have been mooted by the expiration of the Mayors
[32]
Permit granted to Tan.
But our curiosity is aroused by the dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision, wherein the Court of Appeals enjoined Tan from
operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within
[33]
Daanbantayan. Absent the invalidity of Ordinance No. 7, there
would be no basis for this injunction. After all, any future operation
of a cockpit by Tan in Daanbantayan, assuming all other requisites
are complied with, would be validly authorized should Ordinance
No. 7 subsist.
So it seems, for all intents and purposes, that the Court of
Appeals did deem Ordinance No. 7 a nullity. Through such resort,
did the appellate court in effect allow a collateral attack on the
validity of an ordinance through an action for damages, as the
petitioners argue?
The initiatory Complaint filed by Perea deserves close scrutiny.
Immediately, it can be seen that it is not only an action for
damages, but also one for injunction. An action for injunction will
require judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse
which is to be protected, and if there is an act constituting a
violation of such right against which injunction is sought. At the
same time, the mere fact of injury alone does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there
must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. In other
words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing
damage, there must be damnum et injuriathat act must be not only
[34]
hurtful, but wrongful.
Indubitably, the determination of whether injunction or
damages avail in this case requires the ascertainment of whether a
second cockpit may be legally allowed in Daanbantayan. If this is
permissible, Perea would not be entitled either to injunctive relief or
damages.
Moreover, an examination of the specific allegations in the
Complaint reveals that Perea therein puts into question the legal
basis for allowing Tan to operate another cockpit in Daanbantayan.
She asserted that there is no lawful basis for the establishment of a
second cockpit considering the small population of
[35]
[Daanbantayan], a claim which alludes to Section 5(b) of the
Cockfighting Law which prohibits the establishment of a second
cockpit in municipalities of less than ten thousand (10,000) in
population. Perea likewise assails the validity of the permit issued
to Tan and prays for its annulment, and also seeks that Te be
enjoined from issuing any special permit not only to Tan, but also to
any other person outside of a duly licensed cockpit in
[36]
Daanbantayan, Cebu.
It would have been preferable had Perea expressly sought the
annulment of Ordinance No. 7. Yet it is apparent from her
Complaint that she sufficiently alleges that there is no legal basis
for the establishment of a second cockpit. More importantly, the
petitioners themselves raised the valid effect of Ordinance No. 7 at
the heart of their defense against the complaint, as adverted to in
[37]
their Answer. The averment in the Answer that Ordinance No. 7
is valid can be considered as an affirmative defense, as it is the
allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the complaint, would nevertheless bar
[38]
recovery. Clearly then, the validity of Ordinance No. 7 became a
justiciable matter for the RTC, and indeed Perea squarely raised
the argument during trial that said ordinance violated the
[39]
Cockfighting Law.
Moreover, the assailed rulings of the RTC, its Decision and
subsequent Order denying Pereas Motion for Reconsideration,
both discuss the validity of Ordinance No. 7. In the Decision, the
RTC evaded making a categorical ruling on the ordinances validity
because the case was only for damages, [thus the RTC could] not
grant more relief than that prayed for. This reasoning is unjustified,
considering that Perea also prayed for an injunction, as well as for
the annulment of Tans permit. The resolution of these two
questions could very well hinge on the validity of Ordinance No. 7.
Still, in the Order denying Pereas Motion for Reconsideration,
the RTC felt less inhibited and promptly declared as valid not only
Ordinance No. 7, but also Resolution No. 78-96 of the
Sangguniang Bayan dated 23 February 1996, which conferred on
[40]
Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit from 1996 to 2006. In the
Order, the RTC ruled that while Ordinance No. 7 was in apparent
conflict with the Cockfighting Law, the ordinance was justified
under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code.
This express affirmation of the validity of Ordinance No. 7 by
the RTC was the first assigned error in Pereas appeal to the Court
[41]
of Appeals. In their Appellees Brief before the appellate court,
the petitioners likewise argued that Ordinance No. 7 was valid and
that the Cockfighting Law was repealed by the Local Government
[42]
Code. On the basis of these arguments, the Court of Appeals
rendered its assailed Decision, including its ruling that the Section
5(b) of the Cockfighting Law remains in effect notwithstanding the
enactment of the Local Government Code.
Indubitably, the question on the validity of Ordinance No. 7 in
view of the continuing efficacy of Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting
Law is one that has been fully litigated in the courts below. We are
comfortable with reviewing that question in the case at bar and
make dispositions proceeding from that key legal question. This is
militated by the realization that in order to resolve the question
whether injunction should be imposed against the petitioners, there
must be first a determination whether Tan may be allowed to
operate a second cockpit in Daanbantayan. Thus, the conflict
between Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law and Ordinance No. 7
now ripens for adjudication.
In arguing that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law has been
repealed, petitioners cite the following provisions of Section 447(a)
(3)(v) of the Local Government Code:

Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises,

enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, or enact
ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for
such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:

....

(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize

and license the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that
existing rights should not be prejudiced;

For the petitioners, Section 447(a)(3)(v) sufficiently repeals

Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs
the power and authority to issue franchises and regulate the
operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective
municipalities, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
 However, while the Local Government Code expressly
repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them.
Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code declares that all
general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
[43]
the acts that are intended to be repealed. It is a cardinal rule in
statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored and will
[44]
not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to
conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with
or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter,
unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable
but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or
unless the latter Act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.
[45]

Is the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule under the Cockfighting

Law clearly and convincingly irreconcilable with Section 447(a)(3)
(v) of the Local Government Code? The clear import of Section
447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the sangguniang bayan which is
empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation
and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks, notwithstanding any law to the
contrary. The necessity of the qualifying phrase any law to the
contrary notwithstanding can be discerned by examining the history
of laws pertaining to the authorization of cockpit operation in this
country.
Cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and
storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the
Spanish occupation. When the newly-arrived Americans proceeded
to organize a governmental structure in the Philippines, they
recognized cockfighting as an activity that needed to be regulated,
and it was deemed that it was the local municipal council that was
best suited to oversee such regulation. Hence, under Section 40 of
Act No. 82, the general act for the organization of municipal
governments promulgated in 1901, the municipal council was
empowered to license, tax or close cockpits. This power of the
municipal council to authorize or license cockpits was repeatedly
recognized even after the establishment of the present Republic in
[46]
1946. Such authority granted unto the municipal councils to
license the operation of cockpits was generally unqualified by
[47]
restrictions. The Revised Administrative Code did impose
[48]
restrictions on what days cockfights could be held.
However, in the 1970s, the desire for stricter licensing
requirements of cockpits started to see legislative fruit. The
Cockfighting Law of 1974 enacted several of these restrictions.
Apart from the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule, other restrictions
were imposed, such as the limitation of ownership of cockpits to
[49]
Filipino citizens. More importantly, under Section 6 of the
Cockfighting Law, it was the city or municipal mayor who was
authorized to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of
cockpits, subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his
[50]
authorized representatives. Thus, the sole discretion to authorize
the operation of cockpits was removed from the local government
unit since the approval of the Chief of Constabulary was now
required.
P.D. No. 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl
[51]
Commission and imposed further structure in the regulation of
cockfighting. Under Section 4 thereof, city and municipal mayors
with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod
or sangguniang bayan, were given the authority to license and
regulate cockfighting, under the supervision of the City Mayor or
the Provincial Governor. However, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802 was
subsequently amended, removing the supervision exercised by the
mayor or governor and substituting in their stead the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission. The amended provision ordained:
Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their
respective Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate
regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Commission and subject to its review and supervision.

The Court, on a few occasions prior to the enactment of the

Local Government Code in 1991, had opportunity to expound on
Section 4 as amended. A discussion of these cases will provide a
better understanding of the qualifier any law to the contrary
notwithstanding provided in Section 447(a)(3)(v).
In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate
[52]
Court, the Court, through Justice Cruz, asserted that the
conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits
in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy
[53]
embodied in the Constitution. The Court affirmed the annulment
of a resolution of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission which
ordered the revocation of a permit issued by a municipal mayor for
the operation of a cockpit and the issuance of a new permit to a
different applicant. According to the Court, the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission did not possess the power to issue cockpit licenses,
as this was vested by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802, as amended, to
the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the sanggunian. It
emphasized that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission only had
review and supervision powers, as distinguished from control, over
[54]
ordinary cockpits. The Court also noted that the regulation of
cockpits was vested in municipal officials, subject only to the
[55]
guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission.
The Court conceded that [if] at all, the power to review includes the
power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to substitute
ones own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the
exercise of its sound discretion.
The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities
who are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the powers
of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission were limited to review and
supervision were affirmed in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate
[56] [57]
Court, Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos Inc. and
[58]
Adlawan v. Intermediate Appellate Court. But notably in
[59]
Cootauco v. Court of Appeals, the Court especially noted that
Philippine Gamefowl Commission did indicate that the
[60]
Commissions power of review includes the power to disapprove.
Interestingly, Justice Cruz, the writer of Philippine Gamefowl
Commission, qualified his concurrence in Cootauco subject to the
reservations made in [Philippine Gamefowl Commission] regarding
the review powers of the PGC over cockpit licenses issued by city
[61]
and municipal mayors.
These cases reiterate what has been the traditional prerogative
of municipal officials to control the issuances of licenses for the
operation of cockpits. Nevertheless, the newly-introduced role of
the Philippine Gamefowl Commission vis--vis the operation of
cockpits had caused some degree of controversy, as shown by the
cases above cited.
Then, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted.
There is no more forceful authority on this landmark legislation than
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., its principal author. In his
annotations to the Local Government Code, he makes the following
remarks relating to Section 447(a)(3)(v):

12. Licensing power. In connection with the power to grant licenses

lodged with it, the Sangguniang Bayan may now regulate not only
businesses but also occupations, professions or callings that do not require
government examinations within its jurisdiction. It may also authorize and
license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, regulate
cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. Existing rights
however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license cockpits and
permits for cockfighting has been removed completely from the
Gamefowl Commission.
Thus, that part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of
Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc. et al., which held
that the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal councils
guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission is no
longer controlling. Under [Section 447(a)(3)(v)], the power of the
Sanggunian concerned is no longer subject to the supervision of the
[62]
Gamefowl Commission.

The above observations may be faulted somewhat in the

sense that they fail to acknowledge the Courts consistent position
that the licensing power over cockpits belongs exclusively to the
municipal authorities and not the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission. Yet these views of Senator Pimentel evince the
apparent confusion regarding the role of the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission as indicated in the cases previously cited, and
accordingly bring the phrase Section 447(a)(3)(v) used in any law
to the contrary notwithstanding into its proper light. The qualifier
serves notice, in case it was still doubtful, that it is the sanggunian
bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and
license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits,
and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks
within its territorial jurisdiction.
Given the historical perspective, it becomes evident why the
legislature found the need to use the phrase any law to the
contrary notwithstanding in Section 447(a)(3)(v). However, does
the phrase similarly allow the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize
more cockpits than allowed under Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting
Law? Certainly, applying the test of implied repeal, these two
provisions can stand together. While the sanggunian retains the
power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot
authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless
such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred
thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established.
Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the
identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over
cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous enactments
that impose restrictions on how such power may be exercised. In
short, there is no dichotomy between affirming the power and
subjecting it to limitations at the same time.
Perhaps more essential than the fact that the two controverted
provisions are not inconsistent when put together, the Court
recognizes that Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a
valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of
course, local governments are similarly empowered under Section
16 of the Local Government Code. The national government ought
to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be
sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to
regulate the general welfare of their constituents.
We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national
government to implement police power measures that affect the
subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of
regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of
territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one such condition. It is a
traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant gambling
[63]
involved or maybe even the fact that it essentially consists of two
birds killing each other for public amusement. Laws have been
[64]
enacted restricting the days when cockfights could be held, and
legislation has even been emphatic that cockfights could not be
held on holidays celebrating national honor such as Independence
[65] [66]
Day and Rizal Day.
The Whereas clauses of the Cockfighting Law emphasize that
cockfighting should neither be exploited as an object of
commercialism or business enterprise, nor made a tool of
uncontrolled gambling, but more as a vehicle for the preservation
and perpetuation of native Filipino heritage and thereby enhance
[67]
our national identity. The obvious thrust of our laws designating
when cockfights could be held is to limit cockfighting and imposing
the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule is in line with that aim.
Cockfighting is a valid matter of police power regulation, as it is a
form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing
[68]
national productivity and self-reliance. Limitation on the number
of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary
means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling
cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more cockfights.
If we construe Section 447(a)(3)(v) as vesting an unlimited
discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and
cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this could lead to the
prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in
the daily routine of life in a municipality. This certainly goes against
the grain of the legislation earlier discussed. If the arguments of the
petitioners were adopted, the national government would be
effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments
pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal
Section 447(a)(3)(v).
A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or
[69]
any statute, otherwise it is void. Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably
contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in
Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by the petitioners
arising from the Ordinance. We find the grant of injunction as
ordered by the appellate court to be well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Republic Act No. 7160.
[2]
See Section 447(3)(V), Local Government Code of 1991.
[3]
Erroneously referred to in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals as
Daan Bantayan.
[4]
Records, p. 43.
[5]
Id. at 44.
[6]
Rollo, p. 26.
[7]
Id. at 34.
[8]
Id. at 35.
[9]
Id. at 35.
[10]
Id. at 36.
[11]
Presided by Judge I. Mantilla. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-18516 BOGO-00071.
[12]
Said writ was subsequently lifted upon the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and counter bond. Rollo, p. 27.
[13]
Records, p. 40.
[14]
There seems to be no dispute that the population of Daanbantayan is less
than one hundred thousand strong. According to the National Statistics
Office, Region VII, the population of the municipality in 1995 was Sixty-
Four Thousand Five Hundred (64,500). Rollo, p. 30.
[15]
Records, p. 44.
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Id. at 47
[20]
Records, p. 51.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
The case, docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 67925, was raffled to the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals. The Decision was penned by Justice P.
Alio-Hormachuelos, and concurred in by Justice F. Martin, Jr., Chairman
of the Second Division, and Justice M. Gozo-Dadole.
[24]
Rollo, p. 29.
[25]
Id. at 30.
[26]
Id. at 31.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[28]
Id. at 18.
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
Although we do point out that under Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
the appearance of the Solicitor General in any action involving the
validity of any ordinance is only discretionary, and not mandatory on the
part of the court.
[31]
Supra note 25.
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
Rollo, p. 31.
[34]
Custodio v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 575 (1996).
[35]
Rollo, p. 35.
[36]
Id. at 37.
[37]
Id. at 42.
[38]
See Section 5(b), Rule 6, Rules of Court.
[39]
See Rollo, p. 45.
[40]
Records, p. 51.
[41]
Id. at 18.
[42]
Id. at 73.
[43]
R. AGPALO, Statutory Construction (3rd ed., 1991), at 321.
[44]
Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary, G.R. No. L-71855, 20 January
1988, 157 SCRA 147; citing PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 72
SCRA 396; Jalandoni v. Endaya, 85 SCRA 261; Villegas v. Enrile, 50
SCRA 10; and The Philippine American Management Co., Inc., v. The
Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA
149.
[45]
Maceda v. Macaraig, 274 Phil. 1060 (1991); citing U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil.
208 (1916); Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.,
66 SCRA 113 (1975).
[46]
See e.g., Section 1, Republic Act No. 1515; Section 1, Republic Act No. 938.
[47]
Interestingly, while Republic Act No. 1224 sought to impose restrictions on
the establishment of most places of amusement near public buildings,
schools, hospitals and churches, cockpits were specifically exempted
from these restrictions. See Section 1, Republic Act No. 1224.
[48]
See Section 2285, Revised Administrative Code.
[49]
See Section 5(a), P.D. No. 449.
[50]
See Section 6, P.D. No. 449.
[51]
First established through Executive Order No. 636 (1980).
[52]
No. L-72969-70, 230 Phil. 379 (1986).
[53]
Id. at 301.
[54]
The Court further added that even this power of review may have been
modified by the old Local Government Code of 1983, which granted to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to review ordinances,
resolutions and executive orders issued by the municipal government.
Ibid.
[55]
Id. at 299.
[56]
No. L-71313, 24 September 1987, 154 SCRA 250.
[57]
No. L-78592, 11 August 1988, 164 SCRA 290.
[58]
No. 73022, 9 February 1989, 170 SCRA 165.
[59]
No. L-56565, 16 June 1988, 162 SCRA 122.
[60]
Id. at 129.
[61]
J. Cruz, concurring, Cootauco, supra note 61 at 129.
[62]
A. PIMENTEL, JR., The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to
National Development (1993 ed.) at 477.
[63]
It should, furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting, although
authorized by law, is still a form of gambling. Canet v. Decena, G.R. No.
155344, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 388, 395.
[64]
See Section 2285, Revised Administrative Code.
[65]
See Republic Act No. 137 (1947).
[66]
See Republic Act No. 229 (1948).
[67]
P.D. No. 449.
[68]
Canet v. Decena, supra note 64, citing Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044,
240 SCRA 649 (1995).
[69]
See Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 107282,
December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837, Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R.
No. 40243, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 157, and Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 255.