EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VII

A. President
1. Qualifications
Case:
>Poe Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, GR No. 221697, Mar. 8, 2016

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good.
Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and
Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the
BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as
an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove
that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC,
and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the
President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in
determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied
by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue
of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99%
chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’
nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to
examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties
and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of

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these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when
her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree
that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in
this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due
course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate
for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her
citizenship and residency. ##
Carpio Dissent (Highlights): “Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens”
Brion Dissent (Highlights): “COMELEC’s Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a Candidate’s Eligibility”

2. Election
3. Term of Office
4. Oath of Office
5. Privileges
a. Official residence
b. Salary
c. Immunity from Suit
Cases:
> Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001)
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling,
and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a
result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and
Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On
January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as
the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed
petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He
also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
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ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and
freedom of assemblyto
exercise of the people power petition the government for
of revolution which redress of grievances which
overthrew the whole only affected the office of the
government. President.
extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted President that it caused and
from it cannot be the subject the succession of the Vice
of judicial review President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political
question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the
proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art
VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material
relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without
doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of
the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and
after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
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nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of
inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite
any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of
the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since
our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent
effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with
prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case Digest

> Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84

(2011)
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of AlyansaDagitiMannalonIti Cagayan
(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with KilusangMagbubukidngPilipinas (KMP). He
claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the OplanBantayLaya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to
confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Datawith Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres.
Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she
may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is
responsible or accountable for his abduction.
Held:

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 1. No.It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability inamparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth
or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal
that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.)
Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or
accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

2. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the

"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.This
development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature.
Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings
seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez
in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing
precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to
ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to
protect the rights of the aggrieved party.Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still
subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and
accountability within these foregoing definitions.
3. Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and
the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,necessarily possesses control over
the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility
doctrine.

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 4. No.Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced
disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA.Without even attaching, or at
the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to
rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy
allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of
forcible disappearance.Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of
evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither
was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of
his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

> In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160

Immunity from Suits

Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for
the clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the
incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino
the said provision refers to.
Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?
Held:
It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief.(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is
with the RTC )
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary
that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of
election

d. Executive Privilege
Cases:
>Neri vs. Senate Committee, 549 SCRA 77 (2008)
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was
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then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular,
he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited
him for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies
to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

> Senate vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006)

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of

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Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

6. Prohibitions/Inhibitions
Case:
> Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152154, July 15,
2003
Facts: The Republic seeks to nullify and set aside resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan ordering PCGG to pay private respondent Roberto
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Benedicto or his corporations the value of 277 shares of stock of NOGCCI
registered in his name. Petitioner invokes state immunity from suit
claiming that the order to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix
monetary liability on a government agency thus necessitating the
appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has state of immunity?
Decision: Petition granted, resolution set aside. PCGG failed to take stock
of one of the exemptions to the state immunity when the government
itself is the suitor. The state itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case,
ergo immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.

> Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194

SCRA 317
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity
of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member
of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

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 > National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, GR No.
156982, Sept. 8, 2004

National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit (GR 156982, 8 September

2004)

National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit

[GR 156982, 8 September 2004]
En Banc, Corona (J): 12 concur

Facts: The National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on 25

March 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation 347. The NAC is tasked
to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of
Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. It
appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members
turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning 12
December 1994. However, on 15 October 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on
audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period
12 December 1994 to 27 June 1997, pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA) Memorandum
97-038. On 1 September 1998, the National Government Audit Office (NGAO) upheld the
auditor's order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued to (1) Cesar Averilla,
Department of National Defense [P 2,500.00]; (2) Ramon Martinez, Department of National
Defense [P73,750.00], (3) Cielito Mindaro, Department of Justice [18,750.00]; (4) Purita
Deynata, Department of Justice [P 62,000.00]; (5) Alberto Bernardo, Department of the
Interior And Local Government [P71,250.00]; (6) Stephen Villaflor, Department of the
Interior and Local Government [P26,250.00], and (7) Artemio Aspiras, Department of Justice
[P 1,250.00]. Meanwhile, on 28 April 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order 2 (the
new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by
then President Joseph Estrada on 19 October 1999. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that
the NAC shall be composed of 7 members: (a) A Chairperson who shall be appointed by the
President; (b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President; (c) Three
(3) Ex-officio Members: (1) Secretary of Justice, (2) Secretary of National Defense, (3)
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government. The Administrative Order further provided
that the ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said
Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may
be authorized by law. NAC thus invoked Administrative Order 2 in assailing before the COA
the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex
officio members' representatives, to no avail. Hence, on 14 March 2003, the NAC filed the
petition for review. Hence, the petition for review sought to annul the two decisions of the
COA dated 26 July 2001 and 30 January 2003, affirming the 21 September 1998 ruling of the
NGAO; which upheld Auditor Ernesto C. Eulalia's order disallowing the payment of
honoraria to the representatives of NAC's ex officio members, per COA Memorandum 97-
038.

Issue [1]: Whether there is legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.

Held [1]: No. In Civil Liberties Union, the Court elucidated on the two constitutional
prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government and receiving double
compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all

10
government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other
office, profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless
allowed by the Constitution. The NAC ex officio members' representatives who were all
appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two
constitutional prohibitions. First, the NAC ex officio members' representatives are not exempt
from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new
office or position and authorizing additional compensation therefor. Sections 54 and 56 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition against multiple positions
in the government and receiving additional or double compensation. RA 6758, the Salary
Standardization Law, also bars the receipt of such additional emolument. The representatives
in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
Second, the ex officio members' representatives are also covered by the strict constitutional
prohibition imposed on the President and his official family. Again, in Civil Liberties Union,
the Court held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold
positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation
because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their
principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were
not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it
was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and
Bitonio vs. COA, the Court upheld COA's disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per
diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates. The agent,
alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio member.
The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal
force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving
additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative
likewise restricted.

Issue [2]: Whether Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order 2, providing that "The ex
officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives
shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by
law." can be the basis of the representatives' claim for per diem.

Held [2]: NO. First, the administrative order itself acknowledges that payment of allowances
to the representatives must be authorized by the law, that is, the Constitution, statutes and
judicial decisions. However, the payment of such allowances is not allowed, prohibited even.
Second, the administrative order merely allows the ex officio members to designate their
representatives to NAC meetings but not to decide for them while attending such meetings.
Thus, although the administrative order does not preclude the representatives from attending
the NAC meetings, they may do so only as guests or witnesses to the proceedings. They
cannot substitute for the ex officio members for purposes of determining quorum,
participating in deliberations and making decisions. Lastly, the Court disagrees with NAC's
position that the representatives are de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances,
pursuant to the pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union. The representatives cannot be
considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to
act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are
prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of
the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt
of such allowances.

11
 7. Rules on Succession
a. Vacancy at the beginning of the term
b. Vacancy during the term
Case:
> Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 146738, March 2, 2001
Estrada V. Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case,
praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been
laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject
of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

1. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that
time.
2. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by
Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired
of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is
clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation.
3. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact.
The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after transition period.
12
 4. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final
act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states:
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT
FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove
that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that
he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine
13
qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that
the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at
bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

c. Temporary disability
d. Duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the office of the Pres. and V. Pres.

B. Vice President
1. Qualifications
2. Election
3. Term of Office
4. Removal
a. Vacancy in the office of the V.Pres.

C. Powers of the President

1. Executive Power (Sec. 1, Art. VII)
Case:
> NEA vs. CA, GR No. 143481, Feb. 15, 2002

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA for brevity) is a government-
owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree No. 269, as
amended. NEA is charged with the responsibility of organizing, financing and regulating
electric cooperatives throughout the country.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled An Act Prescribing A Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes,
took effect. RA 6758 provided, among others, a salary schedule for all government positions,
appointive or elective, including positions in government-owned or controlled corporations
and government financial institutions.
In response to pressing economic difficulties and the need to alleviate the plight of
government personnel, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed on March 3,
1994 Joint Resolution No. 01 entitled Urging the President of the Philippines to Revise the
Existing Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and to
Implement the Same Initially Effective January 1, 1994. Approved by then President Fidel V.
Ramos on March 7, 1994, Joint Resolution No. 01 adjusted the salary schedule of all officials
and employees of the government. Paragraph 10 of Joint Resolution No. 01 provides
that the new salary schedule shall be implemented within four (4) years beginning in 1994.
14
 On December 28, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 389
(EO 389) entitled Implementing the Fourth and Final Year Salary Increases Authorized by
Joint Senate and House of Representatives Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994. EO 389
directed payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under Joint Resolution
No. 01 in two tranches, as follows:
SEC. 2. Full Implementation. The Department of Budget and Management is hereby
directed to implement in full in FY 1997 the remaining balance of said Salary Schedule after
the partial implementation made of the same in 1994, 1995 and 1996 to civilian and
uniformed personnel, as follows:
1. For Civilian Personnel
a. Effective January 1, 1997 = in accordance with the Fourth Interim Salary
Schedule hereto attached and marked as Annex A of this Order. The
adjustment shall be to the designated salary step of the employee in the
salary grade allocation of his position as of December 31, 1996;
b. Effective November 1, 1997 = in accordance with the attached Salary
Schedule marked as Annex B of this Order. The adjustment shall be to the
designated salary step of the employee in the salary grade allocation of
his position as of October 31, 1997.
x x x.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM for brevity) issued Implementing
Guidelines under National Budget Circular No. 458 (NBC No. 458), series of
1997, reiterating the schedule of payments in EO 389.
In January 1997, NEA implemented the salary increases prescribed for the year 1997
pursuant to Joint Resolution No. 01. However, NEA did not implement the salary increases
in accordance with the schedule of payment specified in EO 389 and NBC No. 458. Instead,
NEA implemented in one lump sum beginning January 1, 1997 the salary increases required
to be paid in two tranches, the first tranche on January 1, 1997 and the second tranche
on November 1, 1997. Otherwise stated, NEA accelerated the implementation of the salary
increase by paying the second tranche starting January 1, 1997 instead of November 1,
1997.
On September 26, 1997, the Commissions resident auditor in NEA issued a Notice of
Suspension requiring the submission of the legal basis for the full implementation of the
new salary schedule effective January 1, 1997 instead of November 1, 1997. The NEA failed
to submit the basis for its advance implementation of the prescribed salary rates. Thus, the
Commissions resident auditor issued on May 14 and 27, 1998, Notices of Disallowance Nos.
98-010-101 and 98-011-101, respectively. The resident auditor issued another Notice of
Disallowance on September 18, 1998. On September 28, 1998 the resident auditor denied
NEAs September 23, 1998 request to reconsider the disallowance. Consequently, NEA
appealed to the Corporate Audit Office II of the Commission but the appeal was denied
on February 5, 1999. On March 12, 1999, NEA filed an appeal with the Commission en
banc but the latter denied the same on May 16, 2000 and sustained the disallowance made
by the resident auditor.

The Issues
In itsMemorandum,[3] NEA avers that the Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disallowing the increased salaries of
NEAs officials and employees for the period January 1, 1997 to October 31, 1997 for the
following reasons:

15
 1. NEAs accelerated implementation of SSL II is in accordance with law, Joint
Senate-House of Representatives Resolution No. 01 dated March 3, 1994,
particularly Section 10 thereof x x x.
2. The fund to pay such increase had the imprimatur of the DBM and was included
in the General Appropriations Act of 1997 (R.A. 8250) x x x.[4]
In the main, NEA argues that it may accelerate the implementation of the salary
increases for the year 1997 due to the availability of funds.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First, we find that NEAs accelerated implementation of the Salary Standardization Law II
is not in accordance with law.
We reject NEAs claim that Republic Act No. 8250, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1997 (1997 GAA), serves as legal basis for NEAs accelerated
implementation of the last phase of the Salary Standardization Law II. The 1997 GAA is not
self-executory so as to serve as outright legal authority for NEA to spend what had been
appropriated for NEAs Personal Services under the 1997 GAA. Budgetary appropriations
under the GAA do not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the
appropriated amounts as they may wish.
Pursuant to the provisions on National Government Budgeting[5] found in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code), appropriations for Personal Services are
not itemized. Thus, the 1997 GAA contains a lump sum appropriation of P210,766,000.00 for
NEAs Personal Services, broken down into P37,476,000.00 for General Administration and
Support, P103,855,000.00 for Support to Operations, and P69,435,000.00 for
Operations. There is no itemization of Personal Services in the 1997 GAA, and nothing is
mentioned therein about the acceleration or full payment of the Salary Standardization Law
II.
The itemization of Personal Services is prepared after the enactment of the annual GAA
and requires the approval of the President. Thus, Section 23, Chapter 4, Book IV of the
Administrative Code provides that:
SEC. 23. Content of the General Appropriations Act. The General Appropriations Act shall be
presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each agency of the
government, with the corresponding appropriations for each program and project, including
statutory provisions of specific agency or general applicability. The General Appropriations
Act shall not contain any itemization of personal services, which shall be prepared by the
Secretary after enactment of the General Appropriations Act, for consideration and
approval of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, the execution of the annual GAA is subject to a program of expenditure to be
approved by the President and this approved program of expenditure is the basis for the
fund release. Thus, Section 34, Chapter 5, Book IV of the Administrative Code states that
Sec. 34. Program of Expenditure - The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the President
the years program of expenditure for each agency of the government on the basis of
authorized appropriations.The approved expenditure program shall constitute the basis for
fund release during the fiscal period, subject to such policies, rules and regulations as may
be approved by the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 60, Chapter 7, Book VI of the Administrative Code provides that no
portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salary increase or
adjustment unless specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget circular. It reads:
SEC. 60. Restrictions on Salary Increases. No portion of the appropriations provided in the
General Appropriations Act shall be used for payment of any salary increase or adjustment
unless specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget circular nor shall any

16
appropriation for salaries authorized in the General Appropriations Act, save as otherwise
provided for under the Compensation and Position Classification Act, be paid unless the
positions have been classified by the Budget Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 33 of the 1997 GAA itself expressly provides that the salary increases
authorized by the Senate-House of Representatives Joint Resolution No. 01 or the Salary
Standardization Law II are subject to approval by the President. It reads:
Sec. 33. Compensation Adjustment and Productivity Incentive Benefits. The amount
authorized for Compensation Adjustment and Productivity Incentive Benefits shall be used
for the adjustment in basic salary and associated benefits of national government personnel
pursuant to Joint Resolution No. 01, s. 1994 of Congress, as well as Productivity Incentive
Benefits as may be approved by the President:PROVIDED, That such compensation
adjustment shall be fully implemented within FY 1997: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
transportation allowance, if any, shall be deducted from or reduced by the salary
adjustment: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That compensation adjustment for government-
owned or controlled corporations and local government units shall be charged to their
corporate and local funds, respectively: xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, NEA cannot automatically spend its authorized appropriation for Personal
Services under the 1997 GAA. The Budget Secretary must first prepare an itemization of the
Personal Services, and submit the same for approval of the President. Next, the Budget
Secretary must recommend to the President NEAs program of expenditure for the current
year based on NEAs authorized appropriation. The President may approve the expenditure
program subject to certain policies and rules. The salary adjustments as well as the
associated benefits granted by the Salary Standardization Law II are, under the 1997 GAA,
expressly subject to the Presidents approval. Appropriations for salary increases or
adjustments shall be released as specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget
circular, which in this case is National Budget Circular No. 458. Hence, compliance with said
budget circular is mandatory.
The rules on National Government Budgeting as prescribed by the Administrative Code
are not idle or empty exercises. The mere approval by Congress of the GAA does not
instantly make the funds available for spending by the Executive Department. The funds
authorized for disbursement under the GAA are usually still to be collected during the fiscal
year. The revenue collections of the government, largely from taxes, may fall short of the
approved budget, as has been the normal occurrence almost every year.
This puts the Executive Department in a dilemma: borrow money to bridge the deficit,
or cut down on spending even if the expenditure is authorized by the general appropriations
law.Borrowing money locally puts an upward pressure on interest rates, while borrowing
from abroad increases our foreign debt stock and eventually puts a downward pressure on
the peso. On the other hand, cutting down on spending impairs the delivery of basic services
and dampens the economy. The Executive Department must balance carefully these
economic and social factors, and to do this it must calibrate government disbursements to
match, as much as possible, receipt of revenues. This is the rationale behind the rules on
National Government Budgeting.
Next, NEA argues that an intention to exempt adequately funded government-owned
or controlled corporations (GOCCs for brevity) from the two-tranche payment can be
gleaned from the last paragraph of Section 10 of EO 389 which reads:
GOCCs, GFIs and LGUs which do not have adequate or sufficient funds to pay the salary
increases prescribed herein, may only partially implement the established rate; Provided,
That, any partial implementation should be fixed at a uniform percentage such that no
official or employee shall receive a percentage adjustment higher than that of any other
official/employee in the same corporate entity and local government unit.

17
 The interpretation placed by NEA on Section 10 does not find support in the text
thereof expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied.[6]Section 10 refers only to GOCCs with insufficient funds to pay the salary
increases. Section 10 expressly authorizes GOCCs with insufficient funds to partially
implement the prescribed salary increases in a uniform and non-discriminatory manner.
Nothing in Section 10 authorizes GOCCs with sufficient funds to accelerate the prescribed
schedule of salary increases.Clearly, Section 10 of EO 389 does not authorize, expressly or
impliedly, the advance implementation of the salary increases just because a GOCC has the
available funds.
NEA also contends that its accelerated implementation of the salary increases is
supported by the Memorandum of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1995, the
subject of which reads, xxx: Authorizing the Acceleration of the Implementation of the
Revised Compensation and Position Classification Plan provided in Senate-House of
Representatives Joint Resolution No. 01 Adopted and Approved on 07 March 1994 to
Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Government Financial
Institutions (GFIs). According to NEA, the Memorandum allows full implementation of salary
increases x x x not earlier than November 1, 1996. The specific provision referred to by NEA
reads as follows:
The three tranches scheme for GOCCs are as follows:
FIRST - effective not earlier than 01 November 1997 at an amount as may be determined by
the governing Board of the GOCC concerned, provided such amount shall not exceed 30% of
the unimplemented balance of said Salary Schedule;
SECOND - the 30% of the said balance or any lower amount as may be determined by the
governing Board of the concerned GOCC may be implemented not earlier than 01 April
1996; and
THIRD the remaining balance may be implemented not earlier than 01 November
1996. (Emphasis supplied)
The Memorandum, which allows full implementation of the salary increases [n]ot
earlier than November 1, 1996, does not automatically accelerate the staggered salary
increases for 1997. On the contrary, the Memorandum specifically provides that accelerated
implementation can be availed of by GOCCs and GFIs x x x only upon prior approval of the
DBM. In order to secure such prior approval from the DBM, GOCCs and GFIs must submit an
application for acceleration to the DBM which will evaluate and act on the same on the
basis of nine terms and conditions specifically enumerated in the Memorandum. The
Memorandum provides thus:
The GOCC and GFI can avail of the above accelerated implementation only upon prior
approval by the DBM. For this purpose, GOCC and GFI will submit an application for
acceleration to DBM which will evaluate and act on same on the basis of the following terms
and conditions:
1. the GOCC and GFI shall have never been seriously/critically assailed to have
caused or contributed to the economic problems of the country as evidenced by
duly verified/proven facts presented in a responsible published public criticism;
2. that it must not have received any subsidy or other forms of financial support
from the national government in financing its operation or in the
implementation of projects for the last three (3) years;
3. that its operational performance for the same period, as well as its present
financial position, is indicative that the concerned GOCC and GFI will remain
financially viable and capable of financing its operations;
4. that it has actually remitted all mandatory dividends to the national
government through the National Treasury equivalent to 50% of its net income

18
 pursuant to R.A. No. 7656, dated 09 November 1993, and has no unpaid taxes
due the national government or local government units, and their respective
agencies and instrumentalities;
5. that all advances made by the national government for debt service and other
obligations shall have been accordingly liquidated;
6. that it has not incurred any losses from operations for the last three (3) years;
7. that the financial position and earning performance of the GOCC and GFI shall in
no case be affected by SSL acceleration;
8. that the accelerated implementation herein authorized shall strictly be based on
the Position Allocation List (PAL) specifically approved by the DBM for such
GOCC and GFI pursuant to R.A. No. 6758, or Organizational Structure and
Staffing Pattern pursuant to existing budgeting laws, and shall be based on the
33-grade Salary Schedule; and
9. that no funding support shall be required from the national government nor
funds already released and earmarked for a specific purpose be used
therefore. Funds for the purpose shall solely be sourced from corporate funds:
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, in order to avail of the benefits of accelerated implementation, NEA must
secure the approval of the DBM by complying with the terms and conditions prescribed by
the Memorandum. NEA failed to do this. Absent any authority or approval from the DBM or
the President authorizing NEA to accelerate implementation of the last phase of the salary
increase, NEAs accelerated payment is without legal basis.
Neither could NEA successfully assail the authority of the President to issue EO 389. The
Administrative Code has unequivocally vested the President with rule-making powers in the
form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders and
circulars and general or special orders.[7] An executive order, like the one prescribing the
salary schedules, is defined in the Administrative Code as follows:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.[8] (Italics supplied)
Joint Resolution No. 01 expressly acknowledges the authority of the President to revise
the existing compensation and position classification under the standards and guidelines
provided by said Resolution.[9] Further, paragraph 13 of the Resolution states that:
(13) Implementing Guidelines - The Department of Budget and Management shall prepare
and issue the necessary guidelines for the implementation of the revised compensation and
position classification system consistent with the governing executive order to be issued by
the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
As the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with the power
to execute, administer and carry out laws into practical operation. Hence, the Court has held
that -
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws.It is the power of carrying (out) the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance.[10]
There could be no doubt that EO 389 has been issued on authority and within the
confines of the law. Joint Resolution No. 01 established a time frame of four years[11] for the
implementation of the Salary Standardization Law II. Consonant with this time frame, the
initial implementation was effected in 1994 through Executive Order No. 164; in 1995
through Executive Order No. 218; in 1996 through Executive Order No. 290 and clarified by
Presidential Memorandum to the Secretary of Budget and Management dated November 7,

19
1995. For the fourth and final year, Executive Order No. 389 dated December 28, 1996 was
issued by the President. Oddly, NEA does not question the authority of the President to
issue the executive orders implementing the Salary Standardization Law II previous to EO
389. Apparently, NEA complied with the
previous executive orders implementing Joint Resolution No. 01.
NEA argues that the Commission failed to take note that RA 8244, which provides for
the same schedule of payment as EO 389 and NBC No. 458, is intended only for all national
government civilian and uniformed personnel and not GOCCs and GFIs. A reading of the
decision of the Commission would show that reference to RA 8244 by the Commission was
resorted to give effect to the relevant law and rules. Since RA 8244 and EO 389 are in pari
materia, relating as they are to the fourth year implementation of the salary increases
authorized by Joint Resolution No. 01, the Commission applied said law and rules in
harmony with each other. The Commission thus stated that a perusal of RA 8244, EO 389
and NBC No. 458 would show the same effectivity dates or schedule of payments.
Similarly untenable is NEAs contention that the Commission acted beyond the scope of
its functions in determining whether or not NEA violated the law. According to NEA, the
Commission exceeded its authority in inquiring whether NEAs advance release of the salary
increases violated certain laws considering that the Commissions power is limited to a
determination of whether or not there is a law appropriating funds for that purpose. To
support this theory, NEA cites Guevara vs. Gimenez,[12] wherein the Supreme Court allegedly
outlined the scope of authority of the Commission as follows:
Under the Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General in connection with the
expenditures of the government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of fund or
property pertaining to, or held in trust by, the government or the provinces or municipalities
thereof. xxx xxx Such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law
appropriating funds for a given purpose.
The ruling in Guevara has already been overturned by the Court in Caltex Philippines,
Inc. vs. Commission on Audit,[13] as follows:
The ruling on this particular point, quoted by petitioner from the cases of Guevara vs.
Gimenez and Ramos vs. Aquino, are no longer controlling as the two (2) were decided in the
light of the 1935 Constitution.
xxx. As observed by one of the Commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas:
It should be noted, however, that whereas under Article XI, Section 2, of the 1935
Constitution the Auditor General could not correct irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures of public funds but could only bring [the matter] to the attention
of the proper administrative officer, under the 1987 Constitution, as also under the 1973
Constitution, the Commission on Audit can promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties. Hence, since the Commission on Audit must ultimately be responsible for the
enforcement of these rules and regulations, the failure to comply with these regulations can
be a ground for disapproving the payment of a proposed expenditure.
Indeed, the powers of the Commission as provided in the 1987 Constitution are broader
and more extensive. Section 2, Paragraph D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional

20
bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which
are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. x x x.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in the Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
The Constitution and existing laws[14] mandate the Commission to audit all government
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Constitution
specifically vests in the Commission the authority to determine whether government
entities comply with laws and regulations in the disbursement of government funds and to
disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds.
Second, there is no merit in NEAs contention that the DBM, upon its approval of NEAs
proposed budget, had effectively stamped its imprimatur on the accelerated
implementation of the salary increases starting January 1, 1997 because NEAs proposed
budget for 1997 included funds for such accelerated implementation. This is not the
approval contemplated by the Presidential Memorandum dated November 7, 1995, which
requires compliance with specific terms and conditions. The DBMs approval of NEAs
proposed budget cannot be deemed sufficient authority to execute the same in disregard of
the relevant orders and circulars providing for its manner of execution. The budget process
is a cycle of sequential and interrelated budget activities regularly recurring within a specific
time frame (a twelve-month period called fiscal year).[15]
The DBMs approval of NEAs proposed budget is only a part of the first phase of the
entire budget process which consists of four major phases, namely: Budget Preparation,
Budget Authorization, Budget Execution and Budget Accountability.[16] After approval of the
proposed budget by the DBM, the same is submitted to Congress for evaluation and
inclusion in the appropriations law which sets forth the authorized appropriations of the
departments and agencies. However, this authorization does not include the authority to
disburse. A program of expenditures is first prepared showing approved programs and
projects. An itemization of personal services is also prepared listing authorized itemized
positions and their corresponding classifications and authorized salaries. As clearly stated in
Section 60, Chapter 7, Book VI of the Administrative Code, no portion of the appropriations
in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salary increase or adjustment unless specifically
authorized by law or appropriate budget circular.[17] NBC No. 458 is the appropriate budget
circular referred to by the law with respect to the payment of the last phase of the Salary
Standardization Law II.
Third, under our system of government all executive departments, bureaus and offices
are under the control of the President of the Philippines. This precept is embodied in Article
VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends to
all executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.[18] The constitutional
vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. [19]

21
 Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive branch. There is only one
Chief Executive who directs and controls the entire executive branch[20], and all other
executive officials must implement in good faith his directives and orders. This is necessary
to provide order, efficiency and coherence in carrying out the plans, policies and programs
of the executive branch.
This case would not have arisen had NEA complied in good faith with the directives and
orders of the President in the implementation of the last phase of the Salary Standardization
Law II. The directives and orders are clearly and manifestly in accordance with all relevant
laws. The reasons advanced by NEA in disregarding the Presidents directives and orders are
patently flimsy, even ill-conceived. This cannot be countenanced as it will result in chaos and
disorder in the executive branch to the detriment of public service.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision of the
Commission on Audit dated May 16, 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto.

>Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, Feb. 6, 2003

The Facts
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 [3] (EO 81
for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-
Based Sports.
EO 81 provided thus:
Section 1. Transferring the Sports Program and Activities to the PSC. All the functions, programs and
activities of DECS related to sports development as provided for in Sec. 16 of EO 117 (s. 1987) are
hereby transferred to PSC.
Section 2. Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. The DECS shall have jurisdiction and
function over the enhancement of Physical Education (P.E.) curriculum and its application in
whatever form inside schools.
Section 3. The Role of PSC. As the primary agency tasked to formulate policies and oversee the
national sports development program, the management and implementation of all school-based
sports competitions among schools at the district, provincial, regional, national and international
levels, in coordination with concerned public and private entities shall be transferred to the PSC.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales for brevity)
issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily
reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of
the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the BPESS
staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15,
2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No.
01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue
legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidents issuance of EO 81 violated
the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating
their right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this Court
prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to school sports development.Petitioners further
pray that, upon filing of the petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining order against
respondents to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known
as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001.RA 9155
expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS
relating to sports competition to the PSC. The pertinent provision thereof reads:
22
SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. All functions, programs and activities of the Department of Education
related to sports competition shall be transferred to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC). The
Program for school sports and physical fitness shall remain part of the basic education curriculum.
The Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) is hereby abolished. The personnel of
the BPESS, presently detailed with the PSC, are hereby transferred to the PSC without loss of rank,
including the plantilla positions they occupy. All other BPESS personnel shall be retained by the
Department.
The Issue
The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.
The Courts Ruling
We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic.
As manifested by both petitioners[4] and respondents,[5] the subsequent enactment of RA 9155
has rendered the issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS
and transferred the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit
that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of the
BPESS.[6] Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be
retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and preserves[7] their
right to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point out that
Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Section
31 of EO 292 provides:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For
this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well
as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292,[8] EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the
President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of
the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command
post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is
immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if
the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes
the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its
charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of the President.[9] Therefore, the President has the
authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development[10] to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferringfunctions from
23
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an
office in good faith necessarily results in the employees cessation in office, but in such event there is
no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to exist.[11] On the other hand, the transfer
of functions or agencies does not result in the employees cessation in office because his office
continues to exist although in another department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS
employees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then later permanently
reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155
now mandates that these employees shall be retained by the Department.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

> Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to
issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive
power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such
as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

2. Appointing Power (Sec. 16, Art. VII)

a. Classification of Appointments
b. Officials who may be appointed by President
c. Appointing Process
d. Discretion of Appointing Authority
e. Constitutional Limitations on Appointing Power
f. Power of Removal
Case:

24
 >Binamira vs. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154
Facts:

In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism, the petitioner assumed
office on on April 7, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of
the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as
General Manager, approved by the President on the same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager
and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of
Tourism.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating him
concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint a person to
serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum,
the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original
petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the
President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.

Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority

Held:

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner
removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his
successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this
sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.

The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the
decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment
involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an
alter ego of the President.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being
that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot
delegate his duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the
exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed
25
fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another
in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. “
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was true of
the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts
shall be considered valid only if not ‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as also
happened in the case at bar.
With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His
designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid
title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was
authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally
withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In either case, the
petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the
ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened
when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the
petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager of the PTA.
However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required to be made by the
President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

>Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO,
and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the
Commission on Elections, respondents.
G.R. No. 149036
April 2, 2002
EN BANC

FACTS:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.
On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other
commisioners in an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001
addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID,
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a
Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner
Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the
reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment
to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001,
reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during
26
the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,
Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint
with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)
of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the
ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:
We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.

> Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary
of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed
by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise
the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

27
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

> Soriano vs. Lista, GR No. 153881, March 24, 2003

PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENT; CONFIRMATION BY COA

ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires
confirmation of the COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act
or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be
classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not
involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of
National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC).

> Mary Concepcion Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16

G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA
because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad
interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

28
RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with
the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by
Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without
confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That
is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the
President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
cannot be ad interim appointments.

>Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,”
subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another
employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of
the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to
the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of
the respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the
power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light
of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was
better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

29
 > Pimentel vs. Ermita, GR No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their
regular session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.

Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that “while Congress
is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an
office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while
Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials
as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may temporarily designate an
officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer
regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any
other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]

Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
while Congress is in session.

Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such
as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while
Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-
interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments
may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

30
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one
year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with
the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against
the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint
a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

>Aparri vs. CA, 127 SCRA 231

Facts:

On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing
Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations
to take effect on January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the
incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962.
In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of
office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with
preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the annulment of the
resolution of NARRA board.

Issue:

Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

Held:

It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in
each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is
not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the
recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the
philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words
and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative
must be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is
no room for construction.

The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold
office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

31
 > Aurora vs. Marco, GR No. 202331, April 22, 2015
Province of Aurora vs Marco
Case Digest: GR 202331 Apr 22 2015

Facts:

Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov. Ong 5 days
before the end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along with 25 other appointments,
was accompanied by a certification stating that funds were available for the position. When the new
Gov took over, the appointments made by Gov Ong were revoked based on the recall made by
Budget Officer regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration
from the CSC Regional Office but was denied. On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14
held the validity of the appointment on the ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the
recall of the certification did not affect its validity because evidence was not presented.

Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the CSC because it
was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement the Apr 14 Resolution,
which was granted. The Province filed an MR of the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because
it was not filed within the 15-day reglementary period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari via Rule 43 against the CSC’s second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution,
invoking the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. The CA denied the petition
and upheld the CSC decision.

Political Law

Issue: W/N the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to appointments made by local
executives

No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to
those made by local executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.

3. Control Power (Sec. 17, Art. VII)

a. Alter Ego Principle / Qualified Political Agency
b. Power of Supervision
c. Faithful Execution Clause
Case:
>Mondano vs. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against
Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of
Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative
Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the
governor from further proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING:
Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the
32
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section
79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct
control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order
the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general
supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the
Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.

> DENR vs. DENR Region XII Employees, GR No. 149724, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional
Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from
Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued
by the DENR Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to
the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of
the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

>Gascon vs. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation

Facts:
Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4, which they have
operated through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
When martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the military and its facilities
were taken over by Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station
In 1978, KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it
under Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV stations and the Office of
Media Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4
On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to order to return to them Chs. 2 and 4
On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family

33
Upon the Lopez family's request, the respondent Executive Secretary, by the authority of the
President, entered into with ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to
Arbitrate"
Arbitration Committee was created composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for RP and Atty. Pastor
del Rosario for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman
Issue:
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case because the petitioners did not
have locus standi. If the need arises, I would say the issue is "Whether or not the Agreement to
Arbitrate, as an alternative to a lawsuit against the State, is valid"; to which, the answer is yes. Either
way, I'll just enumerate below the court's statements regarding the expropriation topic.
The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was acting for and in behalf
of the President when he signed it. Hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the
Republic of the Philippines.
Where the government takes property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.
The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above comments as obiter dicta.

> Gloria vs. CA, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000

Even if the DECS Secretary is analter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the President’s
immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts
of the President but merely those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or
that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
● Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure.

Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of
Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was
reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up
the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is
violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of
the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.

2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

Held:

1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against
petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of
the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there
is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

34
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment
of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of
Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private
respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and
technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as
the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field.
Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is
specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of
Appeals (209 SCRA 644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The
mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture
and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs.
Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a
scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA
651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of
tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)

>Angangco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619

Ang-Angco v. Castillo, No.L-17169, SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, 9 SCRA

619, February 16, 1960, Argued, November 30, 1963, Decided.

Facts:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were notcovered
by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to
secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the
releasecertificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to
Ang-Angcowhich stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could
not take action onthe request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary
of Finance whoexpressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-
Angco finally releasedthe concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he
filed an administrativecomplaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco
had been discharging theduties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the
President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified civilservice.
Previous History:
Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over allexecutive
departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative casein
subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government.
Holding:
35
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civilservice.
Reasoning:
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
beendeprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his
case, itmay be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.The Power
of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or removeofficers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but notwith
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that
inherentpower cannot be exercised.This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says
that "the Congress may by lawvest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in
the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these
officers whose appointmentsare vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for
a procedure for their removalprecisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the
Civil Service Act of 1959.
Significance:
It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on theadministrative
case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of the Presidentwithout
submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service

>Dadole vs. COA, GR No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional
monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to
reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the
power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by
statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only
interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs

4. Military Powers (Sec. 18, Art. VII)

a. Commander in Chief clause
b. “Calling out”power
c. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
d. Martial Law
Cases:
36
 >Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and
the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without
her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However,
the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the
time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected
before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance
before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law
to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent
on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so,
the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the
privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to
prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on
the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of
the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did
not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the
right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or
actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with
the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

37
 >Lagman vs. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the
"range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed
physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the
determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President
wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the
President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is
actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to
avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao.
Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would
not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial
law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The
Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The Report also highlighted
the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the
Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once
Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full
support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it
found no compelling reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a
resolution expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation
No. 216. Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens
filed several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216
for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.
ISSUES:
1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution?
2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense;
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
3. Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately?
4. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
38
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration of graduated
powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region?
7. Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to
Congress sufficient bases;
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao region?
8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements
of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?
9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region?

RULING:
1. YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it
should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII.
Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a
different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the
issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
considering the limited period within which the Court has to promulgate its decision.
In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It
could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2.
a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension,
the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal
or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically
necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports
submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
b. NO. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or
other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's
power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common
sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere
alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
c. YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of
the Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the power to declare
martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on
39
facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration
or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written
Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time
the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the
present depends on the President.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in
the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may
be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of
factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
3. YES. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke
the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to, or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On
the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise
events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further;
it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation
or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only
totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of
the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
4. YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogative, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
a. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
"namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was
the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged
his burden of proof.
b. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
5. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining
to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
40
6.
a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses.
b. NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation
for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the
Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be
deemed a trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its
power to revoke.

7. YES. A review of the facts available to the President that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives
leading to President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is
being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was reached
after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

8. YES. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to
be valid, there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety
requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against
civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
issued, road blockades and checkpoints were set up, schools and churches were burned, civilian
hostages were taken and killed, non-Muslim or Christians were targeted, young male Muslims were
forced to join their group, medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered,
reinforcement of government troops and civilian movement were hindered, and the security of the
entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public
safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

9.
a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court’s declaration of a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated
September 4, 2016 where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence from spreading and
escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
The President’s calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the
power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be precluded to a
possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
b. NO. Under the “operative fact doctrine”, the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute prior to such
a determination of constitutionality is an operative fact that may have consequence which cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidy

41
may have to be considered in various aspects- with respect to particular regulations, individual and
corporate and particular conduct, private and official.
Court Ruling on Martial law on Whole of Mindanao
We revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law
lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law
should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired.
This is not only practical but also logical.
Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As
such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not
wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat.
If that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is
infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not
the scenario envisioned by the Constitution. Going back to the illustration above, although the
President is not required to impose martial law
only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired,
he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the
coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within
predetermined bounds.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the
"range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed
physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the
determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President
wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the
President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is
actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless
elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines
coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the
place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it
will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

x x x Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found
in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both
for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As
mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi
City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to establish a
wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah
Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi,
Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and
police personnel, must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the
contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
x x x Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

> IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the
validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

42
 ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject
to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to
an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),
Article XVI of the Constitution.

> David vs. Macapagal Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines

and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army,
and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to
oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at
about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the
security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP
officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

43
II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of
valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now”and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate
release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if
he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was
NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or
any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states
that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were
violated by the CIDG operatives.

>Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448

FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death
of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et
al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al
questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the
constitutional requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this
case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal
ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this
matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by
the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after
satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold
t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

44
 5. Pardoning Power (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
a. Pardono, Commutation, Reprieve, Parole, Amnesty
b. Limitations on pardoning power
c. Classifications of Pardon
Cases:
> Lim vs. COMELEC, GR No. 206666, Jan. 21, 2015
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President
of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence
and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored
to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position
of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases
prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second
highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed
a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City
of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to
Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied
on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as
the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to
adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
45
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12
of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter
alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

FALLO:

Petition is dismissed

> People vs. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44

Facts:
From the judgment of the RTC of Negros Oriental, in Criminal Case No. 397-B, finding them and co-
accused Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay, severally, Php 200,000.00 and Php 25,000/00 as actual
damages and for the funeral expenses, and costs, accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a supplemental notice of appeal on December 8, 1993. Appeal was accepted
on December 7, 1994.

On January 11, 1996, the court received an undated urgent motion to withdraw appeal from the
accused-appellants which did not state any reason therefor. On March 22, 1996, court received a 1st
indorsement informing the Court that the accused-appellants were released on conditional pardon
on January 25, 1996.

On May 20, 1996 the court directed Superintendent Venacio Tesoro to submit the certified true
copies of the Conditional Pardon and the release/discharge order. Tesoso submitted the copies both
signed by the President on January 19, 1996 and certificates of discharge from prison showing they
were released on January 25, 1996. Pardons were granted by virtue of the authority conferred upon
the President by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Presidential Committee
for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon.

Issues:
Whether or not conditional pardons can be extended to the accused-appellants during the pendency
of their instant appeal.

Ruling:
46
No. In an earlier decision, People v Hinlo, the Court declared the practice of processing applications
for pardon or parole despite pending appeals to be in clear violation of law. In People v Salle, the
court declared grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court shall be prohibited. Agencies/instrumentalities
must require proof that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn appeal.
And that the ruling fully bind pardons extended after January 31, 1995 during the pendency of the
grantee’s appeal.

Conditional pardons granted in the case are void for having been extended on January 19, 1996
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THEIR INSTANT APPEAL.

Dispositive:
The accused-appellants’ urgent motion to withdraw appeal is denied. Bureau of Corrections is
directed to effect the re-arrest of the accused-appellants Casido and Alcorin, who shall be re-
confined at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa within 60 days from notice thereof.
The court further resolves to require the officers of the Presidential committee for grant of bail,
release, and pardon to show cause within 30 days why they should not be held in contempt of court
for acting on and favorably recommending approval of the applications for the pardon of the
accused-appellants despite the pendency of their appeal.

> People vs. Nacional, GR No. 11294, Sept. 7, 1995

Facts:
On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis," Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren
Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier Mirabete alias "Commander, " and Zacarias Militante alias "Care" were
charged with murder.
The six accused were all civilian members of the barangay organization of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) — NPA at Daraga, Albay. 10 A few days before February 21, 1985, their
organization had conference at Barangay Lacag, Daraga for the purpose of identifying suspected
informers of the military whom they perceived as posing a threat to the NPA's operations within the
vicinity. They identified Quirino and Joel Lagason, both residents of Barangay Salvacion, Daraga as
military informants and conspired to kill them. Elevino Rincopan, their team leader, however,
disapproved the proposal for lack of clearance and approval from the higher NPA authorities.
On Febuary 21 1985 they found them and carried out their plan. Walter Nacional approached
Quirino and said something to him. Walter then pulled out a gun from his waist and shot Quirino in
the face, hitting him between the eyebrows. Quirino fell to the ground and died instantly. A few
seconds later, Absalon Millamina shot Joel Lagason on the head. The group then fled towards the
direction of the RCPI Relay Station. Joel's mother, who was at the scene of the crime, rushed him to
the hospital where he died a few hours later.
Five of them were caught and tried and the trial court found them guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt and were sentenced accordingly (RP+50k indemnity) The decision was made on
May 31, 1993. And then all five of the accused appealed their case.
On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to
withdraw their appeal. They claimed that the charges against them were political in nature
"committed while they were members of the New People's Army (NPA). They informed the Court
that as political prisoners, they applied for and were recommended by then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines. The Court granted their
motion on May 11, 1994.

Issue:
Does the conditional pardon and consequent dismissal of the appeals of the accused exempt them
from payment of the civil indemnity?

47
Ruling:
The court ruled that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of
Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not exempt them from
payment of the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil
liability arising from the crime.

> People vs. Patriarca, GR No. 135457, Sept. 29, 2000

The person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.

Facts:

Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before RTC
Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for the killing of one
Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665
and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.

Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels,
Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order,
Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the
National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Issue:

What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

Held:

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr.
Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while Criminal Cases Nos.
2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed.(People vs. Patriarca, Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29,
2000)

6. Borrowing Power (Sec. 20, Art. VII)

7. Diplomatic Power (Sec. 21, Art. VII)
48
 Case:
>Saguisag vs. Ochoa, GR No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016
Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into
by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall
provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed
Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the
following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that
as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US
violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military
bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in
by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA
needs congressional ratification.

Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case

Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which
justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the
very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism
required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is
of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.

Brion Dissent

Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing
in asserting that a public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse
of discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive
Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the
transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in
invoking the court’s expanded jurisdiction. Read more

Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution

No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a
mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to
enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is
not the instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing
law or treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves “adjustments in detail” in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and
the U.S. that have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.

De Castro Dissent

49
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the
stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the
Constitution does not distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement
makes it an invalid treaty.

> Bayan vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000
THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

50
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard,
has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

8. Budgetary Power (Sec. 22, Art. VII)

Case:
>Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said
funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the
DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of
the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

51
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for
by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive,
these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under
the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no
basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
52
But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to
the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so
that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

9. Informing Power (Sec. 23, Art. VII)

10. Other powers
a. Calling special session for Congress (Sec. 15, Art. VI)
b. Approval or Veto of Bills (Sec. 27, Art. VI)
c. Consent to deputation of government personnel by COMELEC (Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C)
d. Discipline deputies (Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C)
e. Emergency powers, after delegation by Congress (Sec. 23(2), Art. VI)
f. Tariff powers, (Sec. 28,(2) Art. VI)
g. General supervision over local governments an autonomous regional
governments (Art. X)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Article VIII

1. Judicial Power
a. Definition
b. Where vested
c. Jurisdiction
Case:
> Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998
FACTS:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the
FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his
preventive suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself -
and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the
order exonerated the private respondents from the administrative charges.

Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
53
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

2. Constitutional Safeguards to ensure independence of the Judiciary

3. Power of Judicial Review or Inquiry
a. Who may exercise
b. Functions of Judicial Review
c. Requisites of Judicial Review/Inquiry
d. Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality
1. Partial Unconstitutionality
Cases:
>Guingona vs. CA, GR No. 125532, July 10, 1998

>Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004

>Salong vs. Pano, 134 SCRA 438

>Montesclaros vs. COMELEC, GR No. 152295, July 9, 2002

>Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272

>IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000

>CHR vs. CHREA, GR No. 155336, Nov. 25, 2004

54
 >Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141

>Cutaran vs. DENR, GR No. 134958, Jan. 31, 2001

>Chavezvs. PEA Amari, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

>Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001

>Romualdez vs. COMELEC, GR No. 167011, April 30, 2008

>Umali vs. Guingona, GR No. 131124, March 21, 1999

>Planters Products vs. Fertiphil Corp., GR No. 166006, March 14, 2008

>Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500

>Republic vs. Herida, 119 SCRA 411

>Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB, 35 SCRA 429

>Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145

4. Appointment to Judiciary
a. Qualifications
1. Supreme Court
2. Lower Collegiate Courts
3. Lower Courts
b. Procedure for appointment
c. Judicial and Bar Council
1. Composition
2. Appointment
3. Powers/Functions
5. Supreme Court
a. Composition
55
 b. En banc vs. Division cases
c. Powers
1. Original Jurisdiction
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
3. Temporary Assignment of Judges
4. Order change of venue
5. Rule-making power
6. Power of Appointment
7. Power of Administrative Supervision
8. Annual Report
d. Consultations/Decisions of Supreme Court
Case:
>Limketkai vs. CA, 261 SCRA 464
Limketkai Sons Milling Inc v CA (Constitution)

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v CA, BPI, National Bookstore GR No. 118509 September 5, 1996

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.cralaw
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application,
or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.cralaw (3) Cases or matters
heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en bancor in division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.
F
ACTS:
(1) Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court' s resolution of
March 29, 1996, which set aside the Court' s December 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the
Court of Appeals' decision dated August 12, 1994.
(2) Petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third
Division and arrogantly ramsits idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division
should have been chaired by Chief J ustice Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the
next senior Justice, and the Third Division by Mr. J ustice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to
stress that the change in the membership of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by
reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano' s retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the
Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. (3) In this Manifestation, petitioner merely
moved for the inhibition of the Chief Justice on the ground that the Chief Justice previously acted as
counsel for one of the respondents, which allegation the Chief J ustice vehemently denied by saying
that the information upon which the petitioner relied "it utterly without foundation in fact and is
nothing but pure speculation or wistful yearning"
(4) Counsel for the petitioner additionally insinuates that the ponente employed a "double standard"
in deciding the case and professes bewilderment at the ponente ' s act of purportedly taking a
position in the ponencia contrary to ponente' s act of purportedly taking a position in the ponencia
contrary to ponente' s standing his book.

56
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be referred to Court En banc.

HELD:
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion to refer the case to the Court En
Banc are hereby DENI ED WI TH FIN ALI TY, without prejudice to any and all appropriate actions that
the Court may take not only against counsel on record for the petitioner for his irresponsible
remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the reckless publicity anent this case
calculated to maliciously erode the people's faith and confidence in the integrity of this Court.

RATIO:
This reorganization, like those before it, was made only upon prior consultation with and approval of
the Members of theCourt. The petitioner itself found such reorganization "long overdue"

> People vs. Redulosa, 255 SCRA 279

> Garcia vs. People, GR No. 106531, Nov. 18, 1999

> Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 135789, Jan. 31, 2002

> Request for Creation of Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC, Jan. 21, 2002

> In re: IBP, 49 SCRA 22

> Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005

>Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 132601, Jan. 19, 1999

> Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, GR No. 124295, Oct. 23, 2001

> Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, GR No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

> Borromeo vs. CA, 186 SCRA 1

> Solid Homes vs. Laserna, GR No. 166051, April 8, 2008

>Dizon vs. Lopez, AM No. RTJ-96-1338, Sept. 5, 1997

6. Tenure of Judges/Justices
a. Supreme Court
b. Lower Courts
57
7. Salaries
8. Period for Decision

58