\

Translated by

Thomas Dutoit

Stanford
University
Press

Stanford
California
APORIAS

DYING-
awaiting (one another at)
the "limits of truth"

MOURIR-
s'attendre aux "limites de
la verite"

Jacques Denida
 Originally published in French in 1993
as "Apories: Mourir-s'attendre aux
limites de Ia verite," in Le Passage
des frontieres: Autour du travail de
jacques Derrida © 1993 by Editions Galilee.

Printed in the United States of America

CIP data appear at the end of the book

Original printing 1993

Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
12 II 10 09 08 07 06
In memory ofKoitchi Toyosaki
 Preamble

In advance, I thank you for your patience in what you are going
to endure.
Dare I say that all this will be said (destined, addressed) to you as
a way of thanking?
I have often denigrated thankfulness and the business of thank­
ing [les commerces du merci]. I have doubted it too often-up to the
point of publishing these doubts, quite recently. I have felt the
ingratitude of expressing one's gratitude too often for me to dare
say my thankfulness, or formulate a few sentences that could
measure my gratitude here.
Twelve years ago, when I did not expect the opportunity of this
present conference,* I had already sensed this disproportion and
this impossibility. Like today, already then I did not know whom to
thank first: our hosts at Cerisy, Edith Heurgon, Jean Ricardou,
Maurice de Gandillac, Catherine de Gandillac, Philippe Kister,
who first had the generous idea of this conference and who carried
it out so well? Or the guests [les hates] of these hosts [ces hates]
whom you are, all of you? Or, between these guests and those hosts,
she to whom all of us without doubt owe our being here? Indeed, I

"The conference was emitled "Le Passage des frontieres (autour de Jacques
Derrida)." It took place at Cerisy-la-Salle, July II-21, 1992. Dcrrida delivered
his paper on July 15, 1992.-TRANS.

zx
X Preamble

can testify to what Marie-Louise Mallet has done, ever since the
first preparatory meetings where she thought out and projected this
conference, along with Catherine Paoletti, Charles Alunni, and
Rene Major. I can testify to it, as you can, too, and maybe a little
better than you-allow me to retain this privilege. Even though you
already know it, I can and I want to testify to the lucidity, gener­
osity, and infinite patience with which, day after day, for almost
two years, she has been the providence of this conference. I see no
other word: she has been its pro-vidence with regard to what she
has foreseen and projected, its providence with regard to what she
has destined, given, and accorded-thereby according us to what
she accorded to us-with the grace that is hers, her welcoming
grace [graceprevenante]. I would say, twisting a little Malebranche's
expression. And, as one always does with her/1 hear accord, a
chord, as one says in music.
Allow me also to dedicate these preliminary reflections to the
memory of Koitchi Toyosaki, an address that will not prevent me
from addressing you. The other night we were reminded that in
1980 this great friend of mine was here. On a bench in the garden
that I ca.11 almost see from here, I had a conversation with him,
which was almost the last. (With him, as with other friends, despite
or because of my admiration, I will have spoken so little, too little.)
His father had just died, and Koitchi had to leave Cerisy abruptly.
Before he did, on that very bench, he spoke of his father-his
profession {law, I believe) and his illness. He had expected the
death that caught him here by surprise.
 Contents

§I Finis I

§2 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 43

Notes
 APORIAS

DYING­
awaiting (one another at)
the "limits of truth"

MOURIR­
s' attendre aux "limites de
Ia verite"
 § 1 Finis

"Limits of truth," with the prudence of quotation marks, is of

course a citation. A concession to the times: today one would
scarcely risk putting forth such a disquieting phrase without shel­
tering oneself behind some kind of paternity. 1 In this case, Di­
derot's authority will appear all the more reassuring since he seems
to denounce a"general defect," in particular that of"letting oneself
be carried beyond the limits of truth."
How car! one cross the borders of truth? And what "defect"
would this betray, what "general defect"?
Crossing this strange border and "letting oneself be carried
beyond the limits of truth" must be possible, indeed inevitable, in
order for such a defect to exceed the singular cases, and thereby
spread its contagion to the point of becoming "general."
What does "beyond" mean in this case? By itself, the expression
"limits of truth" can certainly be understood-and this would be an
indication-as the fact that the truth is precisely limited,finite, and
confined within its borders. In sum, the truth is not everything,
one would then say, for there is more, something else or something
better: truth is finite lfinie]. Or worse: truth, it's finished [c'estfini] .
However, by itself, the same expression can signify-and this time
it would not be an indication but the law of a negative prescrip­
tion-that the limits of truth are borders that must not be exceeded.
In both these cases it remains that a certain border crossing does

I
2 Aporias

not seem impossible as soon as truth is confined. As soon as truth is

a limit or has limirs, its own, and assuming that it knows some
limits, as the expression goes, truth would be a certain relation to
what terminates or determines it.
How would Diderot account for this passage beyond truth, a
passage that is certainly illegitimate, but so often repeated or
deadly, by defect, a "general defect"? Most of all, in what name does
he sometimes ask to be pardoned? For, in a kind of challenge,
Diderot asks to be pardoned. In sum, he provokes us to think what
the pardon can be when it touches upon the limits of truth. Is it a
pardon among others? And why, in this transgression of truth,
would death be pact of the game?
Diderot asks pardon for Seneca, more precisely for the author of
De brevitate vitae (whose reading he is rigl,n to recommend, from
the first word to the last, despite the bre\/icy of life that will have
been so short, in any case). In his Essai sur la vie de Seneque le
philosophe, Diderot pretends to contend with the philosopher. In
truth, he points his accusing finger back toward himself, Dideroc,
and toward what he calls autobiographico more, "the story of my
life." While pretending to accuse Seneca, for whom he apparently
demands pardon, Diderot in truth asks pardon for himself, from
the very moment that he also accuses himself in the name of
S�neca. This is che story of my life-that is what must always be
heard when someone speaks of someone else, cites or praises him
or her:

This defect of letting oneself be carried by the interest of the cause

that one is defending beyond the limits of truth is such a general defect
that Seneca must sometimes be pardoned for it.
I did not read the third chapter [of De brevitate vitae] without
blushing: it is the story of my life. Happy is he who does not depart
convinced that he has lived only a very small part of his life!

Diderot thus implies, in a sigh, something that he does not confide

in the open, as if he had to address such a universal complaint in
secret. One could use the future anterior co translate the time of
chis murmuring: '�h! how short life will have been!" Then he
concludes:
 Finis 3

This treatise is beautiful. I recommend its reading to all men, but

above all to those who are inclined toward perfection in the fine arts.
They will learn here how little they have worked, and that the medi­
ocrity of all kinds of productions should be attributed just as often to
the loss of rime as to the lack of talent.

Now if, aroused by curiosity, we reread this chapter of De Ia

brievete de Ia vie, which made Diderot blush because he reflected in
advance upon "the story of my life," what would we find? Well, we
would discover that this discourse on death also contains, among so
many other things, a rhetoric of borders, a lesson in wisdom con­
cerning the lines that delimit the right of absolute property, the
right of property to our own life, the proper of our existence, in
sum, a treatise about the tracing of traits as the borderly edges of
what in sum belongs to us [nous revient], belonging as much to us as
we properly belong to it.
What about borders with respect to death? About borders of
truth and borders of property? We are going to wander about in the
neighborhood of this question.
Bet:Ween Diderot and Seneca, what can, first of all, be at stake is
knowing what the property of "my life" is, and who could be its
"master"; it is also knowing whether to give is something other than
to waste, that is, whether "to give one's life by sharing it" is in sum
something other than "wasting one's time." Wasting one's time
would amount to wasting the only good of which one has the right
to be avaricious and jealous, the unique and property itself, the
unique property that "one would take pride in guarding jealously."
What is therefore in question is to think the very principle of
jealousy as the primitive passion for property and as the concern for
the proper, for the proper possibility, in question for everyone, of
his existence. It is a matter of thinking the very and only thing to
which one can testify. It is as if one could first be-or not be­
jealous of oneself, jealous to the point of dying [crever] . Thus,
according to Seneca, there would be a property, a right of property
to one's own life. In sum, the border (finis) of this property would
be more essential, more originary, and more proper than those of
any other territory in the world. As Seneca says, one is never
4 Aporias

surprised enough by a certain "blindness of human intelligence"

with respect to these borders (fines) and to these ends. Of what end
(finis) does one mean to speak of here? And why does this end
always arrive early? Prematurely? Immaturely?

1. Men do not suffer anyone to seize their estates, and if there is even
the s lightest dispute about the limit of their lands [fines: si exigua
contentio de modo jinium: it is indeed a question of tracing and
negotiating (traiter) the limits, de jinibus], they rush to stones and
arms; yet, they let others trespass upon their own life [in vitam suam]­
nay, they themselves even lead in those [ipsi etiam] who will eventually
possess it . No one is to be found who is willing to share his money, yet
to how many does each one of us give one's life by sharing it! In
guarding their fortune [in continendo patrimonio] men are often close­
fisted, yet, when it comes to the matter of wasting time, they show
themselves most prodigal of the only thipg that one would take pride
in guarding jealously [as another French translation puts it, and as the
English translation by Basore also puts it, "the case of the one thing in
which it is right to be miserly": in eo cujus unius honesta avaritia est].

2. And so I should like to lay hold upon someone from the company
of older men and say: "I see that you have reached the farthest limit of
human life [ad ultimum aetatis humanae], you are pressing hard upon
your hundredth year, or are even beyond it. Come now, recall your
life ... , look back in memory and consider . . . how little of yourself
was left to you: you will perceive that you are dying before your season
[quam exiguum tibi de tuo relictum sit: intelleges te immaturum mori).2

This exhortation is addressed to a centenary, and virtually to

anyone who finds himself at a major turning point in life, a day of
some fearsome birthday. But after having wondered, in sum, why
man-and not the animal-always dies before his time, while also
understanding that he dies immaturus, immaturely and prema­
turely, Seneca describes the absolute imminence, the imminence of
death at every instant. This imminence of a disappearance that is
by essence premature seals the union of the possible and the
impossible, of fear and desire, and of mortality and immortality, in
being-to-death.
What does he conclude from this? That to put off until later, to
 Finis 5

defer (dijferre), and above all to defer wisdom, wise resolutions, is

to deny one's condition as mortal. One then gives in to forgetting
and to distraction; one dissimulates to onesdf being-to-death:

You live as if you were destined to live forever, no thought of your

frailty ever enters your head, of how much time has already gone by
you take no heed. You squander £ime as if you drew from a full and
abundant supply, so all the while that day which you bestow on some
person or thing is perhaps your last. You have all the fears of mortals
and all the desires of immortals.... What foolish forgetfulness of
mortality [Quae tam stulta mortalitatis oblivio] to defer [dijferre] wise
resolutions [sana consilia] to the fiftieth or sixtieth year, and to intend
to begin life at a point to which few have atrained. 3

What should be understood here by the end?

In his DeJinibus, Cicero is, as always, attentive to the crossing of
borders between languages, Greek and Latin.4 He is careful to
justify his translations, whose stakes he no doubt assesses. That is
not all. What does the author of Libellus de optima genera oratorum
also do, he who was one of the first to give advice to translators
(notably to avoid the literality of verbum pro verbo)? He goes so fur
as to worry about crossing the borders of language, thereby increas­
ing his own anxiety about the translation of the word for border,
precisdy. He explains what he translates by the end:
Semis enim, credo, me iam diu, quod telos Graeci dicunt, id dicere
tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro
extrema aut ultimo dicere: You see, I believe, what the Greeks call
telos; for a long time already I have called it at times the extreme, at
times the ultimate, and at other times the supreme; instead of extreme
or ultimate, one can even call it end (3:26; my emphasis).

In order to begin, again, even before an introduction, by the

end- since we are convoked to the crossing of borders by the end,
that is, by the ends or confines (finis is therefore the term, the edge,
the limit, the border, most often that of a territory and of a
country)-let us suppose that I now have a few sentences at my
disposal. They can be negative, affirmative, or interrogative. Let us
suppose that, while having these sentences at my disposal, I dispose
6 Aporias

them among us. Among us so as to share them. To share them with

you, as a common good or a number shared in confidence, in sum,
a password. Or else to share and unshare them among themselves;
or; finally, in order that they, in turn, share us and perhaps sepa­
rate us.
Let us consider, for example, this negative sentence: "death has
no border." Or else, let us consider one of these affirmations, which
all imply something completely different: "death is a border,"
"according to an almost universal figure, death is represented as the
crossing of a border, a voyage between the here and the beyond,
with or without a ferryman, with or without a barge, with or
without elevation, toward this or that place beyond the grave."
Here, now, is an interrogation: "Can death he reduced to some line
crossing, to a departure, to a separation, to a step, and therefore to a
decease?" And, finally, here is a prsiposition that could he called
interro-denegative: "Is not death, like decease, the crossing of a
border, that is, a trespassing on death [ un trepas), an overstepping
or a transgression (transire, "sic transit," etc.)?"
You have noticed that all these propositions, whatever their
modality, involve a certain pas [step, not].

II y va d'un certain p45. [It involves a certain step/not; he goes

along at a certain pace.]

Does not this very sentence itself, ify va d'un certainpas, belong
to the French language? Both effectively and legitimately? Belong­
ing to the French language, it would also testify to that language. ll
y va d'un certain pas: indeed, this speaks for itself. What can it
mean?
First, perhaps, that this incipit, if y va d'un certain pas - which
could just as well immobilize itself like a monument and fix the
"here lies" of a word, the pas of a recumbent corpse-is not only a
part of the body of the French language, a member, an object or a
subject, something or someone that would belong to the French
language as a part belongs to a whole, an element in a class or in an
ensemble. Insofar as it speaks, this sentence- if y va d'un certain
 Finis 7

pas-would also testify to its belonging. The event of this attestation

would testify not only to the enigma of what testifYing means, that
is, to the fact that the testimony of belonging does not simply
belong to the ensemble of which it testifies, but also, consequently,
that belonging to a language is undoubtedly not comparable to any
other mode of inclusion: for example, to limit ourselves to a few
elements, belonging to a language does not compare, at first sight,
with inclusion in the space of citizenship or nationality; natu­
ral, historical, or political borders; geography or geo-politics; soil,
blood, or social class. As soon as these totalities are overdetermined,
or rather contaminated, by the events of language (let us say
instead, by the events of the mark), which they all just as necessarily
imply, they, in turn, are no longer thoroughly what they are or what
one thinks they are, that is, they are no longer identical to them­
selves, hence no longer simply identifiable and to that extent no
longer determinable. Such totalities therefore no longer authorize
simple inclusions of a part in the whole. For this pas involves the
line that terminates all determination, the final or definitional
line-peras this time rather than telos. And peras is precisely what
Cicero could also have translated by finis. The Greek word peras­
term (here, a synonym of the Greek word terma), end or limit,
extremity-puts us also on the path of peran, which means "be­
yond," on the other side, and even vis-a-vis. It also puts us on the
path of peraO: I penetrate (Aeschylus, for example, says: perao a
place or a country, eis khoran), I traverse by penetrating, I cross
through, I cross over life's term, terma tou biou, for example. Recall
the very last words, indeed the ending, of Sophocles' Oedipus the
King. At that point the chorus addresses the people, the inhabitants
of the country, the enoikoi, those who live at the heart of the
fatherland ( 0patras Thebes enoikoi). Speaking of Oedipus' last day,
before his death [trepas] , the chorus tells them at the end of the
story: "Look upon that last day always [ten teleutaian emeran].
Count no mortal happy [olbizein] till he has passed the final limit
of his life [prin an terma tou biou perasei] secure from pain [ meden
algeinon pathon] ."5 I cannot consider myself happy, or even believe
myself to have been happy, before having crossed, passed, and
8 Aporias

surpassed the last instant of my own life, even if up to that point I

have been happy in a life that will have been, in any case, so short.
What, then, is it to cross the ultimate border? What is it to pass the
term of one's life (terma tou biou)? Is it possible? Who has ever done
it and who can testify to it? The "I enter," crossing the threshold,
this "I pass" (perao) puts us on the path, ifl may say, of the aporosor
of the aporia: the difficult or the impracticable, here the impossible,
passage, the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, indeed the
nonpassage, which can in fact be something else, the event of a
coming or of a future advent [evenement de tlenue ou d'at�enir],
which no longer has the form of the movement that consists in
passing, traversing, or transiting. It would be the "coming to pass"
of an event that would no longer have the form or the appearance
of a pas: in sum, a coming without pas.
II y va d'un certain pas: all these words and each of these
enunciations would therefore belong, hypothetically and on ac­
count of this clause of nonbelonging that we have just noted, to the
French language. Legitimately and effectively, such a sentence
testifies to this belonging; it says in French: that's French. Just as it
should be.
At Cerisy-la-Salle what is said just as it should be belongs to the
French language. Here it is necessary to speak French. French
makes the law. And since this law should also be a law of hospital­
ity-the first and simple, but in truth multiple, reason for this is that
our hosts at Cerisy are artists in hospitality, but it is also that the
theme of this conference is fundamentally the very secret of the
duty of hospitality or of hospitality as the essence of culture, and
finally it is also that the first duty of the host (in the double sense
that the French bOte has of guest and host [in English in the
original]) is to pay attention [payer que/que attention], as some here
would say, and to pay homage or tribute to linguistic difference-I
therefore thought I had to begin with an untranslatable sentence,
getting myself all tied up already in Greek and in Latin. Others
would say I had to begin with one of those passwords that one
should not overuse. One would gain time-for life will have been
 Finis 9

so short-if one stopped speaking enigmatically or in shibboleths.

Unless, of course, the password also allows one to gain time.
We can receive this already untranslatable sentence, il y t'a d'un
certain pas, in more than one way. From the very first moment, the
body of its statement, pollakOs legomenon, becomes plural. At least,
it trembles in an unstable multiplicity as long as there is no context
to stop us. In our starting point, however, we will dogmatically
begin with the axiom according to which no context is absolutely
saturable or saturating. No context can determine meaning to the
point of exhaustiveness. Therefore the context neither produces
nor guarantees impassable borders, thresholds that no step could
pass [tre.passer], trespass [in English in the original], as our anglo­
phone friends would say. By recalling that this sentence, ily va d'un
certain pas, is untranslatable, I am thinking not only of trans­
latability into another language or into the other's language. For
any translation into a non-French language would lose something
of its potential multiplicity. And if one measures untranslatability,
or rather the essential incompleteness of translating, against this
remainder, well, then a similar border already passes between the
several versions or interpretations of the same sentence in French.
The shibboleth effect operates within, if one may still say so, the
French language.
For example, and to limit myself to just two possibilities, first of
all one can understand it, that is, one can paraphrase it in this way:
he is going there at a certain pace [ily va d'un certain pas] that is to
,

say, someone, the other, you or me, a man or a walking animal, in

the masculine or the neuter, goes somewhere with a certain gait.
Indeed, one will say: look, he is headed there at a certain pace [ify
va d'un certain pas], he is going there (to town, to work, to combat,
to bed-that is to say, to dream, to love, to die) with a certain gait
[pas]. Here the third person pronoun "he" [if] has the grammatical
value of a masculine personal subject.
But, secondly, one can also understand and paraphrase the same
sentence, il y va d'un certain pas, in another way: what is con­
cerned-neuter and impersonal subject-what one is talking about
IO Aporias

here, is the question of the step, the gait, the pace, the rhythm, the
passage, or the traversal (which, moreover, happens to be the theme
of the conference).
Thirdly and finally, this time in inaudible quotation marks or
italics, one can also mention a mark of negation, by citing it: a
certain "not" [pas] ( 110, not, nicht, kein) .
This border of translation does not pass among various lan­
guages. It separates translation from itself, it separates translatabil­
ity within one and the same language. A certain pragmatics thus
inscribes this border in the very inside of the so-called French lan­
guage. Like any pragmatics, it rakes into consideration gestural
operations and contextual marks that are not all and thoroughly
discursive. Such is the shibboleth effect: it always exceeds meaning
and the pure discursivity of meaning.
Babelization does not therefore wait for the multiplicity of lan­
guages. The identity of a language can only affirm itself as identity
to itself by opening itself to the hospitality of a difference from
itself or of a difference with itself. Condition of the self, such a
difference from and with itself would then be its very thing, the
pragma of its pragmatics: the stranger at home, the invited or the
one who is called. The at home [chez-soi] as the host's gift recalls a
being at home [ chez-soi] (being at home, homely, heimisch, heimlich)
that is given by a hospitality more ancient than the inhabitant
himself. As though the inhabitant himself were always staying in
the inhabitant's home, the one who invites and receives truly
begins by receiving hospitality from the guest to whom he thinks
he is giving hospitality. It is as if in truth he were received by the
one he thinks he is receiving. Wouldn't the consequences of this be
infinite? What does receiving amount to? Such an infinity would
then be lost in the abyss of receiving, of reception, or of the
receptacle, the abyss of that
endekhomenon whose enigma cuts into
the entire meditation of Timaeus concerning the address of the
Khora (eis khoran). Endekhomai means to take upon oneself. in
oneself, at home, with oneself, to receive, welcome, accept, and
admit something other than oneself, the other than oneself. One
can take it as a certain experience of hospitality, as the crossing of
 Finis II

the threshold by the guest who must be at once called, desired, and
expected, but also always free to come or not to come. It is indeed a
question of admitting, accepting, and inviting. But let us not forget
that in the passive or impersonal sense (endekhetai), the same verb
names that which is acceptable, admissible, permitted, and, more
generally, possible , the contrary of the "it is not permitted," "it is
not necessary to," "it is necessary not to," or "it is not possible"
(e.g., to cross the "limits of truth"). Endekhomen os means: insofar as
it is possible. Indeed, concerning the threshold of death, we are
engaged here toward a certain possibility of the impossible.
The crossing of borders always announces itself according to the
movement of a certain step [pas] -and of the step that crosses a
line. An indivisible line. And one always assumes the institution of
such an indivisibility. Customs, police, visa or passport, passenger
identification-all of that is established upon this institution of the
indivisible, the institution therefore of the step that is related to it,
whether the step crosses it or not. Consequently, where the figure
of the step is refused to intuition, where the identity or indi­
visibility of a line (finis or peras) is compromised, the identity to
oneself and therefore the possible identification of an intangible
edge-the crossing of the line-becomes a problem. There is a
problem as soon as the edge-line is threatened. And it is threatened
from its first tracing. This tracing can only institute the line by
dividing it intrinsically into two sides. There is a problem as soon as
this intrinsic division divides the relation to itself of the border and
therefore divides the being-one-self of anything.

PROBLEM: I choose the word problem deliberately for two

reasom.
r. First, to sacrifice a little bit more to Greek and to the experi­
ence of translation: in sum, problema can signify projection or
protection, that which one poses or throws in front of oneself, either
as the projection of a project, of a task to accomplish, or as the
protection created by a substitute, a prosthesis that we put forth in
order to represent, replace, shelter, or dissimulate ourselves, or so as
to hide something unavowable-like a shield (problema also means
12 Aporias

shield, clothing as barrier or guard-barrier) behind which one

guards oneself in secret or in shelter in case of danger. Every border is
problematic in these two senses.
2. I keep the word problem for another reason: so as to put this
word in tension with another Greek word, aporia, which I chose a
long time ago as a title for this occasion, without really knowing
where I was going, except that I knew what was going to be at stake
in this word was the "not knowing where to go." It had to be a
matter of [il devait y a/fer du] the nonpassage, or rather from the
experience of the nonpassage, the experience of what happens [se
passe] and is fascinating [passionnel in this nonpassage, paralyzing
us in this separation in a way that is not necessarily negative: before
a door, a threshold, a border, a line, or simply the edge or the
approach of the other as such. It should be a matter of [devrait y
a/fer du] what, in sum, appears to block our way or to separate us in
the very place where it would no longer be possible to constitute a
problem, a project, or a projection, that is, at the point where the
very project or the problematic task becomes impossible and where
we are exposed, absolutely without protection, without problem,
and without prosthesis, without possible substitution, singularly
exposed in our absolute and absolutely naked uniqueness, that is to
say, disarmed, delivered to the other, incapable even of sheltering
ourselves behind what could still protect the interiority of a secret.
There, in sum, in this place of aporia, there is no longer any problem.
Not that, alas or fortunately, the solutions have been given, but
because one could no longer even find a problem that would
constitute itself and that one would keep in front of oneself, as a
presentable object or project, as a protective representative or a
prosthetic substitute, as some kind of border still to cross or behind
which to protect oneself.
I gave in to the word aporias, in the plural, without re"ally
knowing where I was going and if something would come to pass,
allowing me to pass with it, except that I recalled that, for many
y ears now, the old, worn-out Greek term aporia, this tired word of
philosophy and of logic, has often imposed itself upon me, and
 Finis 13

recently it has done so even more often. Thus, I speak here in

memory of this word, as of someone with whom I would have lived
a long time, even though in this case one cannot speak of a deci­
sion or a contract. It happened in a number of different contexts,
but with a formalizable regularity about which I would like to say a
few words before attempting to go-further, closer, or elsewhere. I
would certainly not want to impose upon you a laborious or self­
indulgent return to certain trajectories or impasses of the past.
Rather, I would like to situate, from very far away and very high up,
in the most abstract way, in a few sentences, and in the form of an
index or a long note at the bottom of the page, the places of aporia
in which I have found myself, let us say, regularly tied up, indeed,
paralyzed. I was then trying to move not against or out of the
impasse but, in another way, according to another thinking of the
aporia, one perhaps more enduring. It is the obscure way of this
"according to the aporia" that I will try to determine today. And I
hope that the index I just mentioned will help situate my discourse
better.
The.word "aporia" appears in person in Aristotle's famous text,
Physics IV (217b), which reconstitutes the aporia of time dia ton
exoterikon logon. Allow me to recall the short text that, twenty-five
years ago, I devoted to a note on time in Being and Time ( " Ousia
and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time," in Margins of
Philosophy): already dealing with Heidegger, as I shall also do today,
but in a different way, this short text treated the question of the
present, of presence and of the presentation of the present, of time,
of being, and above all of nonbeing, more precisely of a certain
impossibility as nonviability, as nontrack or barred path. It concerns
the impossible or the impracticable. (Diaporeo is Aristotle's term
here; it means ''I'm stuck [dans l' e mbarras], I cannot get out, I'm
helpless.") Therefore, for example-and it is more than just one
example among others-it is impossible to determine time both as
entity and as nonentity. And with the motif of the nonentity, or of
nothingness, the motif of death is never very far away. (Even
though Levinas, in a fundamental debate, reproaches Heidegger, as
well as an entire tradition, for wrongly thinking death, in its very
14 Aporias

essence and in the first place, as annihilation.) The now is and is

not what it is. More precisely, it only "scarcely" (amudros) is what it
is. Insofar as it has been, it no longer is. But insofar as it will be, as
future to come or as death-which will be my themes today-it is
not yet. By insisting upon the fact that "the aporetic is an exoteric"6
and that Aristotle, "while acknowledging that this argument clar­
ifies nothing (218a)" "repeats its aporia without deconstructing it"
(p. 50), I was then trying to demonstrate, thereby going in the
direction ofHeidegger, that the philosophical tradition, in particu­
lar from Kant to Hegel, only inherited this aporetic: "the Aristo­
telian aporia is understood, thought, and assimilated into that
which is properly dialectical It suffices-and it is necessary-to take
things in the other sense and from the other side in order to
conclude that the Hegelian dialectic is but the repetition, the
paraphrastic reedition of an exoteric aporia, the brilliant formula­
tion of a vulgar paradox" (p. 43). But instead of stopping with a
mere confirmation of the Heideggerian diagnosis, which indeed
sees in the whole tradition, from Aristotle toHegel, a hegemony of
the vulgar concept of time insofar as it privileges the now (nun,
fetzt) , I oriented this very confirmation toward another suggestion,
even while supporting it. Allow me to recall it because I may make
a similar, albeit different, gesture today on the subject of death
according to Heidegger. The simple question from which I was
trying to draw the consequences (and from which one may never
finish drawing them) would be this: What if there was no other
concept of time than the one that Heidegger calls "vulgar"? What
if, consequently, opposing another concept to the "vulgar" concept
were itself impracticable, nonviable, and impossible? What if it was
the same for death, for a vulgar concept of death? What if the
exoteric aporia therefore remained in a certain way irreducible,
calling for an endurance, or shall we rather say an experience_ other
than that consisting in opposing, from both sides of an indivisible
line, an other concept, a nonvulgar concept, to the so-called vulgar
concept?
What would such an experience be? The word also means pas­
sage, traversal, endurance, and rite of passage, but can be a traversal
 Finis I5

without line and without indivisible border. Can it ever concern,

precisely (in all the domains where the questions of decision and
of responsibility that concern the border-ethics, law, politics,
etc.-are posed), surpassing an aporia, crossing an oppositional
line or else apprehending, enduring, and putting, in a different
way, the experience of the aporia to a test? And is it an issue here of
an either/or? Can one speak-and if so, in what sense-of an
experience ofthe aporia? An experience ofthe aporia as such? Or vice
versa: Is an experience possible that would not be an experience of
the aporia?
If it was necessary to recall at some length this analysis of the
Aristotelian-Hegelian aporetic of time, carried out with Heidegger,
it is because the theme of our conference was already noted there
insistently: the border as limit (oros, Grenze: these determinations
of the present now, of the nun or of the ]etzt that Heidegger
underlines) or the border as tracing (gramme, Linie, etc.). However,
I will not elaborate the numerous instances where this theme has
recurred since then: the aporetology or aporetography in which I
have not ceased to struggle ever since; the paradoxical limitrophy of
"Tympan" and of the margins [marges] , the levels [marches] , or the
marks [marques] of undecidability-and the interminable list of all
the so-called undecidable quasi-concepts that are so many aporetic
places or dislocations; the double bind [in English in the original]
and all the double bands and columns in Glas, the work of impossi­
ble mourning, the impracticable opposition between incorpora-,
tion and introjection in "Fors," in Memoires for Paul de Man
(particularly pp. 132 and 147), and in Psyche: Inventions de /'autre
(where deconstruction is explicitly defined as a certain aporetic
experience of the impossible, p. 27); the step [pas] and paralysis in
Parages, the "nondialectizable contradiction" (p. 72), the birth date
that "only happens by effacing itself" in Schibboleth (p. 89 and
following), iterability, that is, the conditions of possibility as condi­
tions of impossibility, which recurs almost everywhere, in particu­
lar in "Signature Event Context" (Margins) and in Limited Inc., the
invention of the other as the impossible in Psyche, the seven antino­
mies of the philosophical discipline in Du droit a La philosophie (pp.
16 Aporias

55, 515, 521), the gift as the impossible (Donner le temps, p. 19 and
following); and above all, in the places where questions of juridical,
ethical, or political responsibility also concern geographical, na­
tional, ethnic, or linguistic borders, I would have been tempted to
insist upon the most recent formalization of this aporetic in The
Other Heading (written at the time of the Gulf War). There, at a
precise moment, without giving in to any dialectic, I used the term
"aporia" (p. u6) for a single duty that recurrently duplicates itself
interminably, fissures itself, and contradicts itself without remain­
ing the same, that is, concerning the only and single "double,
contradictory imperative" (p. 77). I suggested that a sort of nonpas­
sive endurance of the aporia was the condition of responsibility and
of decision. Aporia, rather than antinomy: the word antinomy
imposed itself up to a certain point since, in terms of the law
(nomos), contradictions or antagonisms among equally imperative
laws were at stake . However; the antinomy here better deserves the
name of aporia insofar as it is neither an "apparent or illusory"
antinomy, nor a dialectizable contradiction in the Hegelian or
Marxist sense, nor even a "transcendental illusion in a dialectic of
the Kantian type," but instead an interminable experience. Such an
experience must remain such if one wants to think, to make come
or to let come any event of decision or of responsibility. The most
general and therefore most indeterminate form of this double and
single duty is that a responsible decision must obey an "it is
necessary" that owes nothing, it must obey a duty that owes nothing,
that must owe nothing in order to be a duty, a duty that has no debt to
pay back , a duty without debt and therefore without duty?
In more recent texts ("Passions" and "Donner Ia mort"), I have
pursued the necessarily aporetic analysis of a duty as over-duty
whose hubris and essential excess dictate transgressing not only the
action that conforms to duty (Pjlichtmiissig) but also the _action
undertaken out ofthe sense ofduty (aus Pflicht), that is, what Kant
defines as the very condition of morality. Duty must be such an
over-duty, which demands acting without duty, without rule or
norm (therefore without law) under the risk of seeing the so-called
responsible decision become again the merely technical application
 Finis 17

of a concept and therefore of a presentable knowledge. In order to

be responsible and truly decisive, a decision should not limit itself
to putting into operation a determinable or determining knowl­
edge, the consequence of some preestablished order. But, con­
versely, who would call a decision that is without rule, without
norm, without determinable or determined law, a decision? Who
will answer for it as if for a responsible decision, and before whom?
Who will dare call duty a duty that owes nothing, or, better (or,
worse), that must owe nothing? It is necessary, therefore, that the
decision and responsibility for it be taken, interrupting the relation
to any presentable determination but still maintaining a present­
able relation to the interruption and to what it interrupts. Is that
possible? Is it possible once the interruption always resembles
the mark of a borderly edge, the mark of a threshold not to be
trespassed?
This formulation of the paradox and of the impossible therefore
p
calls upon a figure that resembles a structure of tem orality, an
instantaneous dissociation from the present, a dijfirance in being­
with-itself of the present, of which I gave then some examples.
These examples were not fortuitously political. It was not by
accident that they concerned the question of Europe, of European
borders and of the border of the political, of politeia and of the State
as European concepts. Nine or eleven times, they involved the
same aporetic duty; they involved ten-plus or minus one-com­
mandments considered as examples in an infinite series in which
the ten could only count a series of examples. In the end, the entire
analysis concerned the very logic of exemplarism in any national or
nationalist affirmation, particularly in Europe's relation to itself. In
order to gain time, and before closing this backtracking that has the
form of premises-forgive me, I needed to do so-l will rapidly
mention the first seven aporias that concern the theme of this
conference. Each of them puts to test a passage, both an impossible
and a necessary passage, and two apparently heterogeneous bor­
ders. The first type of border passes among contents (things, objects,
referents: territories, countries, states, nations, cultures, languages,
etc.), or between Europe and some non-Europe, for example. The
18 Aporias

other type of borderly limit would pass between a concept (sin­

gularly that of duty) and an other, according to the bar of an
oppositional logic. Each time the decision concerns the choice
between the relation to an other who is its other (that is to say, an
other that can be opposed in a couple) and the relation to a wholly,
non-opposable, other, that is, an other that is no longer its other.
What is at stake in the first place is therefore not the crossing of a
given border. Rather, at stake is the double concept of the border,
from which this aporia comes to be determined:

The duty to respond to the call of European memory, to recall what has
been promised under the name Europe, to re-identify Europe-this
duty is without common measure with all that is generally understood
by the name duty, though it could be shown that all other duties
presuppose it in silence. [To put it otherwise, Europe would not only
be the object or theme of a duty-to-remember and duty-to-keep­
a-promise; Europe would be the singular place of the formation of the
concept of duty and the or igih, the possibility itself of an infinite
promise.]
This duty also dictates opening Europe, from the heading that is
divided because it is also a shoreline: opening it into that which is not,
never was, and never will be Europe.
The same duty also dictates welcoming foreigners in order not only
to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity: two
concepts of hospitality that today divide our European and national
consciOusness.
The same duty dictates criticizing ("in-both-theory-and-in­
practice," and relentlessly) a totalitarian dogmatism that, under the
pretense of putting an end to capital, destroyed democracy and the
European heritage. But it also dictates criticizing a religion of capital
that institutes its dogmatism under new guises, which we must also
learn to identify-for this is the future itself, and there will be none
otherwise.
The same duty dictates cultivating the virtue of such critique, ofthe
critical idea, the critical tradition, but also submitting it, beyond
critique and questioning, to a deconstructive genealogy that thinks
and exceeds it without yet compromising it.
The same duty dictates assuming the European, and uniquely Euro-
 Finis 19

pean, heritage of an idea of democracy, while also recognizing that this

idea, like that of international law, is never simply given, that its status
is qot even that of a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, but rather
something that remains to be thought and to come [a venir]: not
something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy
(national or international, state or trans-state) of the foture, but a
democracy that must have the structure of a promise-and thus the
memory of that which carries the foture, the to come, here and now.
The same duty dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities,
singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for
translation,. agreement, and univocity, the law of the majority, opposi­
tion to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia.8

Why this language, which does not fortuitously resemble that of

negative theology? How to justify the choice of negative form
(aporia) to designate a duty that, through the impossible or the
impracticable, nonetheless announces itself in an affirmative fash­
ion? Because one must avoid good conscience at all costs. Not only
good conscience as the grimace of an indulgent vulgarity, but quite
simply the assured form of self-consciousness: good conscience as
subjective cer ta inty is incompatible with the absolute risk that
every promise, every engagement, and every r es pons ible decision­
if there are such-must run. To protect the decision or the respon­
sibility by knowledge, by some theoretical assurance, or by the
certainty of being right, of being on the side of science, of con­
sciousness or of reason, is to transform this experience into the
deployment of a program, into a technical application of a rule or a
norm, or into the subsumption of a determined "case." All these are
conditions that must never be abandoned, of course, but that, as
such, are only the guardrail of a responsibility to whose calling they
remain radically heterogeneous. T he affirmation that announced
itself through a negative form was therefore the necessity of experi­
ence itself, the experience of the aporia (and these two words that
tell of the passage and the nonpassage are thereby coupled in an
aporetic fashion) as endurance or as passion, as interminable re­
sistance or remainder. I'll give a final quote regarding this formal
negativity:
20 Aporias

One could multiply the examples of this double duty. It w ould be

necessary above all to discern the W1precedented forms that it is taking
today in Europe. And not only to accept but to claim this putting to
the rest of the antinomy (in the forms, for example, of the double
constraint, the undecidable, the performative contradiction, etc.) . It
w ould be necessary to recognize both the typical or recurring form and
the inexhaustible singularization-without w hich there w ill never be
any event, decision, responsibility, ethics, or politics. These conditions
can only rake a negative form (w ithout X there w ould not be Y ) . One
can be certain only of this negative form. As soon as it is converted into
positive certainty ("on this condition, there will surely have been
event, decision, responsibility, ethics, or politics"), one can be sure that
one is beginning to be deceived, indeed beginning to deceive the other.
We are speaking here with names (event, decision, responsibility,
ethics, politics-Europe) of "things" that can only exceed {and must
exceed) the order of theoretical determination, of knowledge, cer­
tainty, judgment, and of statements in the form of "this is that," in
other w ords, more generally an.d essentially, the order of the p resent or
of presentation. Each time th ey are reduced to what they must exceed,
error, recklessness, the Wlthought, and irresponsibility are given the so
very presentable face of good conscience. (And it is also necessary to
say that the serious, Wlsmiling mask ofa declared bad conscience often
exhibits only a supplementary ruse; for good conscience has, by
definition, inexhaustible resources.)9

A plural logic of the aporia thus takes shape. It appears to be

paradoxical enough so that the partitioning [partage] among multi­
ple figures of aporia does not oppose figures to each other, but
instead installs the haunting of the one in the other. In one case, the
nonpassage resembles an impermeability; it would stem from the
opaque existence of an uncrossable border: a door that does not
open or that only opens according to an unlocatable condition,
according to the inaccessible secret of some shibboleth. Such is the
'
case for all closed borders (exemplarily during war) . In another
case, the nonpassage, the impasse or aporia, stems from the fact
that there is no limit. There is not yet or there is no longer a border
to cross, no opposition between two sides: the limit is too porous,
permeable, and indeterminate. There is no longer a home [chez­
soi] and a not-home [chez /'autre] , whether in peacetime (ex-
 Finis 21

emplarily according to the rule o f universal peace, even beyond

the Kantian sense that presupposes a public, interstate system of
rights10) or in wartime-war and peace both appreciate, but appre­
ciate very little, the borders. By definition, one always makes very
little [peu de cas] of a border. And this "very little" would have to be
formalized. Finally, the third type of aporia, the impossible, the
antinomy, or the contradiction, is a non passage because its elemen­
tary milieu does not allow for something that could be called
passage, step, walk, gait, displacement, or replacement, a kinesis in
general. There is no more path (odos, methodos, Weg, or Holzweg).
The impasse itself would be impossible. The coming or the future
advent of the event would have no relation to the passage of what
happens or comes to pass. In this case, there would be an aporia
because there is not even any space for an aporia determined as
experience of the step or of the edge, crossing or not of some line,
relation to some spatial figure of the limit. No more movement or
trajectory, no more trans- (transport, transposition, transgression,
translation, and even transcendence) . There would not even be any
space for the aporia because of a lack of topographical conditions
or, more radically, because of a lack of the topological condi­
tion itself. A subquestion to chis limitless question would concern
what affects these topographical or topological conditions when
the speed of the panopticization of the earth-seen, inspected,
surveyed, and transported by satellite images-even affects time,
nearly annuls it, and indeed affects the space of passage between
certain borders (this is one example among others of various so­
called technical mutations that raise the same type of question) .
In another conference it would have been necessary to explore
these experiences of the edge or of the borderline under the names
of what one calls the body proper and sexual difference. Today, in
choosing the theme of death, of the syntagm "my death'' and of the
"limits of truth," to explore this subject, I will perhaps not speak of
anything else under different names, but names matter.

Is my death possible?
Can we understand this question? Can I, myself, pose it? Am I
allowed to talk about my death? What does the syntagm "my
22 Aporias

death" mean? And why this expression "the syntagm 'my death' "?
You will agree that it is better, in this case, to name words or names,
thai: is , to stick with quotation marks. On the one hand, that
neutralizes an improper pathos. "My death" in quotation marks is
not necessarily mine; it is an expression that anybody can appropri­
ate; it can circulate from one example to another. Regarding what
Seneca said about the brevity oflife, Diderot tells us: "it is the story
of my life," it is my story. But it is not only his. Of course, ifi say it
is not mine, then I seem to be assuming that I could know when to
say "my death" while speaking of mine. But this is more than
problematic, in the sense of this word that we analyzed above. If
death (we will return to this point later) names the very irre­
placeability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in
the place of the other) , then all the examples in the world can
precisely illustrate this singularity. Everyone's death, the death of all
those who can say "my death," is irreplaceable. So is "my life."
Every other is completely other. [ Tout autre est tout autre.] Whence
comes a first exemplary complication of exemplarity: nothing is
more substitutable and yet nothing is less so than the syntagm "my
death . " It is always a matter of a hapax, of a hapax legomenon, but
of what is only said one time each time, indefinitely only one time.
This is also true for everything that entails a first-person grammati­
cal form. On the other hand, the quotat:ion marks not only affect
this strange p ossessive (the uniqueness of the hapax "my"), but they
also signal the indeterminacy of the word "death." Fundamentally,
one knows perhaps neither the meaning nor the referent of this
word. It is well known that if there is one word that remains
absolutely unassignable or unassigning with respect to its concept
and to its thingness, it is the word "death." Less than for any other
noun, save "God" -and for good reason, since their association
here is probably not fortuitous-is it possible to attribute to the
noun "death," and above all to the expression "my death," a
concept or a reality that would constitute the object of an indis­
putably determining experience.
In order not to lose myself any longer in these preambulatory
detours, I will say very quickly now why "my death" will be the
 Finis 23

subject of this small aporetic oration. First, I'll address the aporia,
that is, the impossible, the impossibility, as what cannot pass
[passer] or come to pass [se passer] : it is not even the non-pas, the
not-step, but rather the deprivation of the pas (the privative form
would be a kind of a-pas). I'll explain myself with some help from
Heidegger's famous definition of death in Being and Time: "the
possibility of the pure and simple impossibility for Dasein" (Der
Tod ist die Moglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Daseinsunmoglichkeit)
(§5o, p. 25o).U Second, I want to carry out such an explanation
together with what is our common concern here, at Cerisy-la-Salle,
during the time of this conference, namely, "the crossing [passage]
of borders."
Up to this point, we have rightly privileged at least three types of
border limits: first, those that separate territories, countries, nations,
States, languages, and cultures (and the politico-anthropological
disciplines that correspond to them); second, the separations and
sharings [partages] between domains of discourse, for example,
philosophy, anthropological sciences, and even theology, domains
that have been represented, in an encyclopedia or in an ideal
university, sometimes as ontological or onto-theological regions or
territories, sometimes as knowledges or as disciplines of research;
third, to these two kinds of border limits we have just added the
lines of separation, demarcation, or opposition between conceptual
determinations, the forms of the border that separates what are
called concepts or terms-these are lines that necessarily intersect
and overdetermine the first two kinds of terminality. Later I will
suggest some terms in order to formalize somewhat these three
kinds of limit-to be crossed or nor to be transgressed.
Now where do we situate the syntagm "my death" as possibility
and/or impossibility of passage? (As we shall see, the mobile slash
between and/ or, and/ and, or I and, or/ or, is a singular border,
simultaneously conjunctive, disjunctive, and undecidable.) "My
death," this syntagm that relates the possible to the impossible, can
be figured flashing like a son of indicator-light (a light at a border)
installed at a customs booth, between all the borders that I have just
named: between cultures, : countries, languages, but also between
24 Aporias

the areas of knowledge or the disciplines, and, finally, between

conceptual de-terminations. A light flashes at every border, where
it is awake and watches [ ra veille] . One can always see there a
nightwatchman [du veilleur] or a nightlight [de Ia veilleuse] .
Let us start with a fact that is overwhelming, well-known, and
immensely documented: there are cultures of death. In crossing a
border, one changes death [on change Ia mort] . One exchanges
death [on change de mort] ; one no longer speaks the same death
where one no longer speaks the same language. The relation to
death is not the same on this side of the Pyrenees as it is on the
other side. Often, moreover, in crossing a culture's border, one
passes from a figure of death as trespass-passage of a line, trans­
gression of a border, or step beyond [pas au-de/a] life-to another
figure of the border between life and death. Every culture is charac­
terized by its way of apprehending, dealing with, and, one could
say, "living" death as trespass. Every culture has its own funerary
rites, its representations .of the dying, its ways of mourning or
burying, and its own evaluarion of the price of existence, of collec­
tive as well as individual life. Furthermore, this culture of death can
be transformed even within what we believe we can identify as a
single culture, sometimes as a single nation, a single language, or a
single religion (but I explained above how the principle of such an
identification appears to be threatened in its very principle or to be
exposed to ruin right from the outset, that is, to be exposed to
death) . One can speak of a history of death, and, as you know, it
has been done, for the West at least. The fact that, to my knowl­
edge, it has only been done in the West (even though a Westerner,
Maurice Pinguet, devoted to this question a study that was both
genealogical and sociological, in La Mort volontaire au ]apon [Paris:
Gallimard, 1984]), that is to say, the fact that it has only been done
"here at home," here where we are, does not mean that there is no
history of death elsewhere or that no one l;tas written any-unless
the idea of a history and of a history of death is itself a Western idea
in a sense that will be clarified later. For the record, I will only cite
one or two tides from the immense library of work devoted to the
history of death. They are French works, which is the first restric-
 Finis 25

tion, and they are recent, which is another unjustifiably arbitrary

choice. First, the Essais su.r l'histoire de Ia mort en Occident du. Moyen
Age a nosjou.rs and L'Homme devant Ia mort, by Philippe Aries. Like
his \\?estern Attitudes Towards Death Qohns Hopkins University
Press, 1974) , these studies, which date from 1975 and 1977 respec­
tively, clearly show the limits within which such a history is framed.
The author, who calls himself a "historian of death" (L'Homme
devant Ia mort, p. 9), focuses on what is, in sum, a very short and
dense sequence in the time span of the Christian West. With all
due respect for the richness, the necessity, and at times the beauty
of works such as these, which are also masterpieces of their genre, I
must nevertheless recall the strict limits of these anthropological
histories. This word ("limit") not only designates the external
limits that the historian gives himself for methodological purposes
(death in the West from the Middle Ages to the present, for
example), but also certain nonthematized closures, edges [bordures]
whose concept is never formulated in these works. First, there is the
semantic or onto-phenomenological type of limit: the historian
knows, thinks he knows, or grants to himself the unquestioned
knowledge of what death is, of what being-dead means; conse­
quently, he grants to himself all the criteriology that will allow him
to identify, recognize, select, or delimit the objects of his inquiry or
the thematic field of his anthropologico-historicaJ knowledge. The
question of the meaning of death and of the word "death," the
question "What is death in general?" or "What is the experience of
death?". and the question of knowing ifdeath "is"-and whatdeath
"is" -all remain radically absent as questions. From the outset these
questions are assumed to be .answered by this anthropologico­
historical knowledge as such, at the moment when it institutes
itself and gives itself its limits. This assumption takes the form of an
"it is self-explanatory": everybody knows what one is talking about
when one names death.
In these texts foaming with knowledge, one never finds any
precaution like the one Heidegger takes, for example, when, in­
tending to recall that it is impossible to diefor the other in the sense
of "to die in his place," even if one dies for the other by offering his
 Aporias

own death to the other, he leaves the small word "is" in quotation
marks in the following sentence: "By its very essence, death is in
every case mine, insofar as it 'is' at all" ("Der Tod ist, sofern es 'ist,'
wesensmaBig je der meine") (Being and Time, p. 240). Citing
Heidegger here or there is not sufficient to put such treasures of
anthropological or cultural knowledge to the test of these semantic,
phenomenological, or ontological questions, and it is especially not
enough to cite Heidegger as an illustration or as an authoritative
argument (which often amounts to the same thing) . This is what
Louis-Vincent Thomas does, in the second book that I want to
mention, his rich Anthropologie de Ia mort (Payot, 197 5). One could
multiply the examples, but there is no time for that. At the be­
ginning of a chapter entitled "The Experience of Death: Reality,
Limit" (p. 223), Thomas writes: " 'No sooner is the human be­
ing born,' writes M. Heidegger, 'than he is already old enough to
die.' Does this incontestable (metaphysical) truth, verified by all
the givens of biological sciences and attested to by demography,
mean anything at the level of lived experience?" The sentence that
Thomas quotes is incorrectly attributed to Heidegger. It recalls ·
Seneca's remark about the permanent imminence of death, right
from birth, and the essential immaturity of the human who is
dying. In the opening of his existential analysis of death, Heidegger
also distinguishes the death of Dasein from its end (Ende) and
above all from its maturation or ripeness (Reife). Dasein does not
need to mature when death occurs. That is why life will always
have been so short. Whether one understands it as achievement or
as accomplishment, the final maturity of a fruit or of a biological
organism is a limit, an end (Ende; one could also say a telos or
terma), hence a border, which Dasein is always in a position of
surpassing. Dasein is the very transgression of this borderline. It
may well have passed its maturity before the end (vor dem Ende
schon uberschritten haben kann), Heidegger says. For the most part,
Dasein ends in unfulfillment, or else by having disintegrated and
been used up ("Zumeist endet es in der Unvollendung oder aber
zerfallen und verbraucht"; Being and Time, p. 244). Thomas should
have avoided attributing to Heidegger a line that the latter quotes
 Finis 27

(p. 245), taking it from Der Ackermann aus Bohmen ("sobald ein
Mensch zum Leben kommt, sogleich ist er alt genug zu sterben'') .
Heidegger uses this quote at the very moment when he distin­
guishes the death of Dasein from any other end, from any other
limit. This crucial distinction, which Heidegger considers indis­
pensable, allows him to situate his existential analysis of death
before any "metaphysics of death" and before all biology. Thomas,
however, thinks that he is citing Heidegger and that he can speak of
an "incontestable (metaphysical) truth" that has been verified "by
all the givens of biological sciences" as well as by "demography."
Yet Heidegger recalls that the existential analysis of death can
and must precede, on the one hand, any metaphysics of death and,
on the other, all biology, psychology, theodicy, or theology of death
(p. 248). Saying exactly the opposite of what Thomas makes him
say, Heidegger puts into operation a logic ofpresupposition. All the
disciplines thus named, and thereby identified within their re­
gional borders, notably "metaphysics" and "biology," not to men­
tion "demography," necessarily presuppose a meaning of death, a
preunderstanding of what death is or of what the word "death"
means. The theme of the existential analysis is to explain and make
explicit this ontological preunderstanding. If one wants to translate
this situation in terms of disciplinary or regional borders, of do­
mains of knowledge, then one will say that the delimitation of
the fields of anthropological, historical, biological, demographic,
and even theological knowledge presupposes a nonregional onto­
phenomenology that not only does not let itself be enclosed within
the borders of these domains, but furthermore does not let itself be
enclosed within cultural, linguistic, national, or religious borders
either, and not even within sex�al borders, which crisscross all the
others.
To put it quickly-in passing, and in an anticipatory way-the
logic of this Heideggerian gesture interests me here. It does so in its
exemplarity. However, I only want to assert the force of its necessity
and go with it as far as possible, apparently against anthropological
confusions and presumptions, so as to try to bring to light several
aporias that are internal to the Heideggerian discourse. At stake for
28 Aporias

me would be approaching the place where such aporias risk para­

-lyzing the ontological, hierarchical, and territorial apparatus to
which Heidegger lends credit. These aporias risk interrupting the
very possibility of its functioning and leading it to ruin. Death
would be the name, one of the names, of this threat, which no
doubt takes over from what Heidegger himself very early on called
"ruination."
But we are not there yet; this will come only near the end. For
the moment, let us remain close to this border dispute. It arises here
between, on the one hand, a comparative anthropo-thanatology
("anthropothanatology" is the title proposed by Thomas, who
insists on its essentially "comparative" aim, pp. 530-531) and, on
the other hand, an existential analysis.
When Heidegger suggests a delimitation of the borders (Abgren­
zung) of existential analysis (Being and Time, §49), he relies on a
classical argument within the philosophical tradition. In turn di­
alectical, transcendental, fi.nd ontological, it is always the argument
of presupposition ( Voraitssetzung) . Whether it concerns plants,
animals, or humans, the ontico-biological knowledge about the
span of life and about the mechanisms of death presupposes an
ontological problematic. This ontological problematic underlies
(zugrundeliegt) all biological research. What always remains to be
asked (zufragen bleibt), says Heidegger, is how the essence of death
is defined in terms of that of life. Insofar as they are ontical
research, biology and anthropology have already and always de­
cided (immer schon entschieden). They have decided without even
asking the question, hence by precipitating the answer and by
presupposing an ontological elucidation that had not taken place.
This precipitation does not simply stem from a speculative fail­
ure or from the betrayal of a principle of philosophical legiti­
macy [droit] concerning what must come first, whether de jure or
methodologically. It also leads to apparently empirical or techno­
juridical confusions about what the state of death is, confusions
that are increasingly serious today. These questions of legitimacy
[questions de droit] are no longer only questions concerning the
philosophical order of de jure and de facto. They impinge upon
 Finis 29

legal medicine, the politics of gerontology, the norms concerning

the surgical prolongation of life and euthanasia, and upon several
other questions that will be addressed later.
Heidegger multiplies the programmatical propositions concern­
ing the order-that is, the subordination of questions-of what is
prior and superordinate ( vorgeordnet) or, on the contrary, ulterior
and subordinate (nachgeordnet). Such propositions appear to be
firm. Ontical knowledge (anthropological or biological) naively
puts into operation more or less clear conceptual presuppositions
( Vorbegrijfe) about life and death. It therefore requires a prepara­
tory sketch, a new Vorzeichnung in terms of an ontology of Dasein,
an ontology that is itself preliminary, "superordinate," prior to an
ontology of life: "Within the ontology of Dasein, which is superor­
dinate to an ontology of life [lnnerhalb der einer Ontologie des
Lebens vorgeordneten Ontologie des Daseins; Heidegger emphasizes
superordinate: the ontology of Dasein is legitimately and logically
prior to an ontology of life] , the existential analysis of death is,
in turn, subordinate to a characterization of Dasein's basic state
( Grundverfassung)" (p. 247). This characteristic, that is, the exis­
tential analysis of Dasein, is thus an absolute priority, and then an
existential analysis of death, which is itself a part of this ontology of
Dasein, comes to be subordinate to it. In turn, this ontology of
Dasein is presupposed by an ontology of life that it thus legit­
imately precedes. If Heidegger uses the expressions Dasein and
analysis of Dasein, it is because he does not yet allow himself any
philosophical knowledge concerning what man is as animal ra­
tionale, or concerning the ego, consciousness, the soul, the subject,
the person, and so forth,, which are all presuppositions of meta­
physics or of ontical knowledge, such as anthropo-thanatology or
biology. A hierarchical order thus delimits the field; it rigorously
superordinates or subordinates the questions, themes, and, in fact,
the ontological regions. According to Heidegger, these regions are
legitimately separated by pure, rigorous, and indivisible borders.
An order is thus structured by uncrossable edges . Such edges can be
crossed, and they are infoctcrossed all the time, but they should not
be. The hierarchy of this order is governed by the concern to think
30 Aporias

what the death proper to Dasein is, that is, Dasein's "properly
dying" (eigentlich sterben). This "properly dying" belongs to the
proper and authentic being-able of Dasein, that is, to that to which
one must testifY and attest (Bezeugung, §54).
At stake for me here is approaching a certain enigmatic relation
among dying, testifYing, and surviving. We can already foresee it: if
the attestation of this "properly dying" or if the property of this
death proper to Dasein was compromised in its rigorous limits,
then the entire apparams of these edges would become problem­
atic, and along with it the very project of an analysis of Dasein, as
well as everything that, with its professed methodology, the analysis
legitimately [en droit] conditions. All these conditions of legit­
imacy [conditions de droit] concern border crossings: what autho­
rizes them here, what prohibits them there, what ordinates, subor­
dinates, or superordinates the ones over the others.
Heidegger thus suggests an ontological delimitation among the
fields of inquiry conceniing death. This delimitation seems all
I
the more abyssal because ir concerns limits about questions of the
limit, more precisely, questions of the ends, of the modes of ending
(enden, verenden), and of the limit that separates the simple ending
(enden) from properly dying (eigentlich sterben) . But as we shall see,
there is more than one limit. That is why we began, from our very
first words, by speaking about the ends, de finibus. That was not a
roundabout way of recalling the ends of man, as if after a long
decade, the present conference was not able to rid itself of the same
subject, of an indestructable [increvable] subject. If one takes it
literally, the death of Dasein is not an end of man. Between the two
there is a singular, improbable, and perhaps divisible limit that
passes, and it is the limit of the ending, the place where, in a way,
the ending ends. What comes to pass, what happens and what am I
saying when I say end [finis], for example when I say, addressing
someone or sending him a note, "end it," "end this now," or "that's
the end ofyou" ?
Heidegger says that he has called the end o f the living, the end­
ing of the living(das Enden von Lebendem), "perishing," Verendffl
(Das Enden von Lebendem nannten wir Verenden, p. 247) . This
Verenden is the ending, the way of ending or of coming to the end
 Finis 31

that all living things share. They all eventually kick the bucket [ilr
crevent] . In everyday German, verenden also means to die, to
succumb, to kick the bucket, but since that is clearly not what
Heidegger means by properly dying (eigentlich sterben), by the
dying proper to Dasein, verenden must therefore not be translated
by "dying" in order to respect what Heidegger intends to convey.
That is why the translators hesitate between translating verenden by
"arret de vie" (Vezin, stoppage of life), by "perir" (Martineau, to
perish), or by "perishing" in English (Macquarrie-Robinson) Y
I prefer "perishing." Why? Just because it turns up twice instead
of once among these translations? No, rather because the verb "to
perish'' retains something of per, of the passage of the limit, of the
traversal marked in Latin by the pereo, perire (which means exactly:
to leave, disappear, pass-an the other side of life, transire). To
perish crosses the line and passes near the lines of our conference,
even if it loses a little of this sense of ending and of corruption
perhaps marked by the ver of verenden.
Before noting a further complication in the modalities of ending
(Enden), one should consider that the distinction between perishing
and dying has been established, as far as Heidegger is concerned, as
he will never call i t into question again, not even in order to
complicate it.
AJ; is self-evident, this distinction between, on the one hand,
death (der Tod) or properly dying (eigentlich sterben) and, on the
other hand, perishing (verenden) cannot be reduced to a termi­
nological decision. It involves decisive conceptual questions for
whoever wants to approach what it is, properly, to die or what
properly dying is. Above all, and precisely for that reason, it
involves the very condition of an existential analysis of Dasein, of a
Dasein that, as we shall see, reaches its most proper possibility and
becomes most properly what it is at the very point where it can
claim to testifY to it, in its anticipation of death. If, in its very
principle, the rigor of this distinction were compromised, weak­
ened, or parasited on both sides of what it is supposed to dissociate
(verenden/ eigentlich sterben), then (and you can guess that I am
heading toward such a possibility) the entire project of the analysis
of Dasein, in its essential conceptuality, would be, if not dis-
 Aporias

credited, granted another status than the one generally atuibuted

to it. I am thus increasingly inclined to read ultimately this great,
inexhaustible book in the following way: as an event that, at least in
the final analysis, would no longer simply stem from ontological
necessity or demonstration. It would never submit to logic, phe­
nomenology, or ontology, which it nonetheless invokes. Nor would
it ever submit to a "rigorous science" (in the sense that Husser!
intended it), not even to thought (Denken) as that which parallels
the path of the poem (Dichten), and finally, not even to an incred­
ible poem-which I would be nevertheless inclined to believe,
without, however, stopping on this point for obvious reasons. The
event of this interrupted book would be irreducible to these catego­
ries, indeed to the categories that Heidegger himself never stopped
articulating. In order to welcome into thought and into history
such a "work, " the event has to be thought otherwise. Being and
Time would belong neither to science, nor to philosophy, nor to
poetics. Such is perhapts the case for every work worthy of its name:
there, what puts thinking into operation exceeds its own borders or
what thinking itself intends to present of these borders. The work
exceeds itself, it surpasses the limits of the concept of itself that it
claims to have properly while presenting itself. But if the event of
this work thus exceeds its own borders, the borders that its dis­
course seems to give to itself (for example, ''those of an existential
analysis of Dasein in the transcendental horizon of time"), then it
would do so precisely at this locus where it experiences the aporia­
and perhaps its premature interruption, its very prematurity.
It is with regard to death that we shall approach this aporetic
structure in Being and Time. But the question of knowing what it
means "to experience the aporia," indeed to put into operation the
aporia, remains. It is not necessarily a failure or a simple paralysis,
the sterile negativity of the impasse. It is neither stopping at it nor
overcoming it. (When someone suggests to you a solution for
escaping an impasse, you can be almost sure that he is ceasing to
understand, assuming that he had understood anything up to that
point.)
Let us ask: what takes place, what comes to pass with the aporia? Is
 Finis 33

it possible to undergo or to experience the aporia, the aporia as

such? Is it then a question of the aporia as such? Of a scandal arising
to suspend a certain viability? Does one then pass through this
aporia? Or is one immobilized before the threshold, to the point of
having to turn around and seek out another way, the way without
method or outlet of a Holzweg or a turning (Kehre) that could turn
the aporia-all such possibilities of wandering? What takes place
with the aporia? What we are apprehending here concerning what
takes place also touches upon the event as that which arrives at the
river's shore [arrive a Ia rive] , approaches the shore [aborde Ia rive] ,
or passes the edge [passe le bord] -another way of happening and
coming to pass by surpassing [ outrepassant] . All of these are possi­
bilities of the "coming to pass" when it meets a limit. Perhaps
nothing ever comes to pass except on the line of a transgression, the
death [trepas] of some "trespassing" [in English in the original] .
What is the event that most arrives [l'evenement le plus arrivant] ?
What is the arrivant that makes the event arrive? 13 I was recently
taken by this word, arrivant, as if its uncanniness had j ust arrived to
me in a .language in which it has nonetheless sounded very familiar
to me for a long time.14 The new arrivant, this word can, indeed,
mean the neutrality of that which arrives, but also the singularity of
who arrives, he or she who comes, coming to be where s/he was not
expected, where one was awaiting him or her without waiting for
him or her, without expecting it [sy attendre] , without knowing
what or whom to expect, what or whom I am waiting for-and
such is hospitality itself, hospitality toward the event. One does not
expect the event ofwhatever, of whoever comes, arrives, and crosses
the threshold-the immigrant, the emigrant, the guest, or the
stranger. But if the new arrivant who arrives is new, one must
expect-without waiting for him or her, without expecting it-that
he does not simply cross a given threshold. Such an arrivantaffects
the very experience of the threshold, whose possibility he thus
brings to light before one even knows whether there has been an
invitation, a call, a nomination, or a promise ( Verheissung, Heissen,
etc.) . What we could here call the arrivant, the most arrivant
among all arrivants, the arrivant par excellence, is whatever, who-
34 Aporias

ever, in arriving, does not cross a threshold separating two identifi­

able places, the proper and the foreign, the proper of the one and
the proper of the other, as one would say that the citizen of a given
identifiable co tin try crosses the border of another country as a
traveler, an emigre or a political exile, a refugee or someone who
has been deported, an immigrant worker, a student or a researcher,
a diplomat or a tourist. Those are all, of course, arrivants, but in a
country that is already defined and in which the inhabitants know
or think they are at home (as we saw above, this is what, according
to Kant, should govern public rights, concerning both universal
hospitality and visiting rights) . No, I am ralking about the absolute
arrivant, who is not even a guest. He surprises the host-who is not
yet a host or an inviting power-enough to call into question, co
the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate, all the dis­
tinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very border
that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and
language, nations, families and genealogies. The absolute arrivant
does not yet have a name or an identity. It is not an invader or an
occupier, nor is it a colonizer, even if it can also become one. This is
why I call it simply the arrivant, and not someone or something
that arrives, a subject, a person, an individual, or a living thing,
even less one of the migrants I just mentioned. It is not even a
foreigner identified as a member of a foreign, determined commu­
nity. Since the arrivant does not have any identity yet, its place of
arrival is also de-identified: one does not yet know or one no longer
knows which is the country, the place, the nation, the family, the
language, and the home in general that welcomes the absolute
arrivant. This absolute arrivant as such is, however, not an in­
truder, an invader, or a colonizer, because invasion presupposes
some self-identity for the aggressor and for the victim. Nor is the
arrivant a legislator or the discoverer of a promised land. As
disarmed as a newly born child, it no more commands than is
commanded by the memory of some originary event where the
archaic is bound with the final extremity, with the finality par
telos or of the eskhaton. It even exceeds the order of
excellence of the
any determinable promise. Now the border that is ultimately most
 Finis 35

difficult to delineate, because it is always already crossed, lies in the

fact that the absolute arrivant makes possible everything to which I
have just said it cannot be reduced, starting with the humanity of
man, which some would be inclined to recognize in all that erases,
in the arrivant, the characteristic of (cultural, social, or national)
belonging and even metaphysical determination (ego, person, sub­
ject, consciousness, etc.). It is on this border that I am tempted to
read Heidegger. Yet this border will always keep one from discrimi­
nating among the figures of the arrivant, the dead, and the revenant
(the ghost, he, she, or that which returns).
If the distinction between (properly) dying and perishing cannot
be reduced to a question of terminology, if it is not a linguistic
distinction, for Heidegger (extending well beyond Being and Time)
it nevertheless marks the difference of language, the impassable
difference between the speaking being that Dasein is and any other
living thing. Dasein or the mortal is not man, the human subject,
but it is that in terms of which the humanity of man must be
rethought. And man remains the only example of Dasein, as man
was for. Kant the only example of finite reasonable being or of
intuitus derivativus. Heidegger never stopped modulating this affir­
mation according to which the mortal is whoever experiences death
as such, as death. Since he links this possibility of the "as such'' (as
well as the possibility of death as such) to the possibility of speech,
he thereby concludes that the animal, the living thing as such, is
not properly a mortal: the animal does not relate to death as such.
The animal can come to an end, that is, perish ( verenden), it always
ends up kicking the bucket [crever] . But it can never properly die.
Much later, in On the �y to Language, Heidegger wrote:

Mortals are they who can experience death as death [den Tod als Tod
eifahren konnen] . Animals cannot do this. [Dar Tier vermag dies nicht.]
But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death
and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought [ist aber
noch ungedacht] . I S

I t is this unthought that holds us i n suspense here. For if one

must assume that the difference between a mortal (whoever dies in
 Aporias

the sense of "properly dying") and an animal incapable of dying is a

certain access to death as death, to death as such, then this access
will condition every distinction between these two ends, perishing
and dying. By the same token, it will condition the very possibility
of an analysis of Dasein, that is, of a distinction between Dasein and
another mode of being, and of a distinction to which Dasein may
testify by attesting to its proper being-able. It is therefore on the
possibility of the as such of death that the interrogation would have
to bear. But it would also have to bear on what links the possibility
of this as such (assuming that it can ever be assured as such) to the
possibility or to the power of whar is so obscurely called language.
Indeed, Heidegger's formulation, although in some respects tren­
chant, ("the animal is not capable of this") nevertheless retains a
certaif1 prudence. It does not say that the experience of death as
such, the experience granted to the mortal, of which the animal is
incapable, depends upon language. Heidegger says: "Animals can­
not do this [experience death as death] . But animals cannot speak
either. [Das Tier kann aber auch nicht sprechen.] " These two re­
marks are deliberately juxtaposed, without, however, Heidegger
feeling authorized to go any further than indicating something like
a flash in the sky concerning a link between the as such of death and
language.
Therefore, several possibilities remain open:

r. There would not be any essential and irreducible link be­

tween the two, between the "as such" and language, and someone
could relate to death as such without language, precisely where the
word breaks off or defaults (wo das Wortgebricht or zerbricht, etc.) .
But Heidegger does not fail to recall then, as he always does, that
this collapse or suspense still belongs to the possibility of language.

2. The beliefin an experience of death as such, as well as the

discourse crediting this belief to an experience of death itselfand as
such, would depend, on the contrary, upon an ability to speak and
to name. But instead of giving us added assurance about the
experience of death as death, this discourse would lose the as such in
and through the language that would create an illusion, as if to say
 Finis 37

death were enough to have access to dying as such-and such would

be the illusion or the fantasy.

3· Consequently, since death refuses itself as such to testimony

and thereby marks even what refuses its as such both to language
and to what exceeds language, it is there that any border between
the animal and the Dasein of speaking man would become unas­
signable.

4· Finally, if the living thing as such (the beast, the animal beast
or human life, the human as living thing) is incapable of an
experience of death as such, if, in sum, life as such does not know
death as such, then this axiom will allow for a reconciliation of
apparently contradictory statements, best exemplified, in my view,
by the example of Heidegger, of course, but also by those of Freud
and Levinas.

Once one has distinguished between these two ways of ending,

dying and perishing, one must take into consideration what Heideg­
ger calls an intermediate phenomenon (Zwischenphenomenon): the
demise, the Ableben, which all the French translators agree to
translate as dices. Ab-leben, to leave life, to go away from life, to
walk out oflife, to take a step away from life, to pass life, to trespass
upon death [tripasser], to cross the threshold of death, thus means
de-cedere. Already in Cicero's Latin, this figure of straying while
walking signified dying. This reminds us that the moment of the
ultimate separation, the partition that separates from life, involves a
certain steplnot [ily va d'un certain pas] . The French word deces was
introduced for other reasons. Its medico-legal usage corresponds to
the dominant sense of the German term Ableben. For the same
reasons, the English translators chose to translate Ableben by "de­
mise." Their footnote explains that the legalistic connotations do
not, however, exhaust the meaning that Heidegger gave, in this
context, toAbleben. What does Ableben (to demise) mean? It is
neither dying (Sterben) nor perishing ( Verenden) . How does one
discriminate among these three figures of ending (enden)? Dasein
alone can demise (in the medico-legal sense) , when it is declared
 Aporias

dead after its so-called biological or physiological death has been

certified according to conventionally accredited criteria. One does
not speak of the demise of a hedgehog, of a squirrel, or of an
elephant (even if, and especially if, one likes them). Demise (Able­
ben) is thus proper to Dasein, in any case, to what can properly die,
but it is not dying (Sterben). Dasein presupposes dying, but it is not
death, properly speaking: "Dasein never perishes [verendet nie] .
Dasein, however, can demise [ableben] only as long as it is dying
[solange, als es stirbt] " (p. 247).
These two sentences very economically formalize the three
modes of ending (enden) : perishing, demising, and dying. But they
also bring together all of the paradoxes and chiasmi that could
relate this existential analysis to what I would be tempted to locate
as the -two major types of concurrent discourses on death in this
century, which could be identified by the names or metonymies of
Freud and Levinas. In order to set up a serious discussion among
these discourses, one would have to explain oneself constantly,
patiently, and meticulously as to the meaning that one gives to
death, and also specify which mode of ending one is referring to.
For lack of time, let us focus on just one example.
When one keeps in mind the distinction between verenden and
sterben, Heidegger's statements are not irreconcilable with the dou­
ble Freudian postulate according to which there is an irreducible
death drive, although neither biological science, nor our belief nor
our unconsci ous testifies to our mortality, an essential, necessary, or
intrinsic mortality. Indeed, Heidegger says: "Dasein nicht einfoch
verendet," "Dasein verendet nie." Similarly, it may be enough to
distinguish between demise and dying in order to avoid Levinas's
objection to Heidegger regarding the originary and underivable
mineness of dying. When Levinas accuses Heidegger of privileging,
in the existence of Dasein, its proper death, what is at stake is
Sterben. Indeed, it is in dying proper and properly speaking rhat
"mineness" is irreplaceable, that no one can die for the other, in the
experience of the hostage or of the sacrifice, in the sense of "in the
place of the other," and that no testimony can testify to the con­
trary. But, conversely, when Levinas says and thinks that, against
 Finis 39

Heidegger, he is saying "the death of the other is the first death"

and "it is for the death of the other that I am responsible, to the
point of including myself in death. This may be phrased in a more
acceptable proposition: 'I am responsible for the other insofar as he
is mortal,' " 1 6 these statements either designate the experience that
I have of the death of the other in demise or they presuppose, as
Heidegger does, the co-originarity of Mitsein and of Sein zum Tode.
This co-originarity does not contradict, but, on the contrary, pre­
supposes a mineness of dying or of being-toward-death, a mineness
not that of an ego or of an egological sameness. One can also, and
we will return to this later, take into consideration a sort of origi­
nary mourning, something that it seems to me neither Heidegger,
Freud, nor Levinas does.
Only at the end of a discussion that would have seriously taken
into account this entire system of delimitations should one raise the
question of how much one can trust the powerful apparatus of
conceptual distinctions put forth by Heidegger. For another limit
runs here. Given the theme of this conference, this limit should be
of utmost importance to us. In Heidegger's view, this supplemen­
tary limit not only allows one to distinguish between biological end
and death properly speaking, to which the being-toward-death of
Dasein is destined or referred. It also allows one to distinguish
between all the legal, cultural, and medicoanthropological phe­
nomena of demise and being-toward-death properly speaking. The
distinction between dem ising (Ableben) and dying (Sterben) is, so
to speak, interior to the being-toward-death of Dasein. Demising
is not dying but, as we have seen, only a being-toward-death
(Dasein), that is, a being-destined-to-death, a being-to-death or
tending-toward-( or up-to)-death (zum Tode), can also demise. If it
never perishes (verendet nie) as such, as Dasein (it can perish as
living thing, animal, or man as animal rationale, but not as Dasein) ,
i f i t never simply perishes (nicht einfoch verendet), Dasein can
nevertheless end, but therefore end without perishing (verenden)
and without properly dying (das Dasein aber auch enden kann, ohne
daJS es eigentlich stirbt) . But it cannot demise without dying. Thus,
there is no scandal whatsoever in saying that Dasein remains im-
 Aporias

mortal in its originary being-to-death, if by "immortal" one under­

stands "without end" in the sense of verenden. Even if it dies (stirbt)
and even if it ends (endet), it never "kicks the bucket" (verendet nie).
Dasein, Dasein as such, does not know any end in the sense of
verenden. At least from this angle and as Dasein, I am , if not
immortal, then at least imperishable: I do not end, I never end, I
know that I will not come to an end. And with a certain knowledge
I know, Dasein says, that I can never perish [je ne sauraisperir] . One
should not be able to say to the other: "Kick the bucket! [ Creve!]"
(in the sense of "End!", "Perish!") . If one says it, then it takes the
form of a curse and it assimilates the other into the category of
animals, thereby testifying that one does not consider him an
-a::ilimal at the precise moment when one claims to say it to him.
This articulated set of distinctions (between perishing and dy­
ing, but also, within the existential field of Dasein, between death
properly speaking and demise) thus presupposes Dasein. These
delimitations also institute a hierarchy of inquiry. This hierarchy is
organized around the particular kind of limit that could be called,
in order to introduce a certain formalization, the problematic clo­
sure. The problematic closure assigns a domain, a territory, or a
field to an inquiry, a research, or a knowledge. All of this is ordered
in relation to a thematic object, more precisely to an entity, to a
modaliry of the entity whose identification is presupposed by the
unity of this space, which in principle can be closed. (We have been
interchangeably calling such a space fields, territories, or domains,
without taking into consideration, for the moment, the Kantian
distinctions and the whole lexical history of the concepts of limits;
this rhetoric of the space of appropriation and this space of rhetori­
cal appropriation naturally crisscross all the themes of this con­
ference.) We must distinguish another kind of limit from this
problematic closure (and problema, recall, denotes as much the task
of projection as the edge of protection, the program and the
shield). Let us call it the border (frontiere] , in what appears to be the
strictest sense, that is, the sense that is statistically most common.
In a way that is almost strict, if not proper, this border designates
the spacing edge that, in history, and in a way that is not natural,
 Finis 41

but artificial and conventional, nomic, separates two national,

state-controlled, linguistic, and cultural spaces. If we say that this
border--'-in the strict or common sense-is an anthropological bor­
der, it is a concession to the dominant dogma according to which
only man has such borders, and animals do not. One usually thinks
thar even if animals have territories, their territorialization (in
predatory, sexual, or regular migratory drives, etc.) could not be
encompassed by what man calls borders. There is nothing for­
tuitous about this way of thinking; this gesture denies the animal
what it gives to man: death, speech, the world as such, the law, and
the border. All of that would correspond to the same indissociable
possibility. To these two forms of limit-the problematic closure and
the anthropological border-we must also add the conceptual demar­
cation or rather the logical de-finition, that is, that which, if it were
possible, would tend to oppose rigorously two concepts or the
concepts of two essences, and to purifY such a demarcating opposi­
tion of all contamination, of all participatory sharing, of all parasit­
ism, and of all infection.
In a modest and preliminary way, my purpose is to investigate
more closely what makes one single braid of these three forms of
limits, to which I have given the somewhat arbitrary names of
problematic closure, anthropological border, and conceptual demarca­
tion. The aporia of death would be one of the place-names for what
forms the braid and keeps it from coming undone. The analysis of
a passage in Heidegger will serve here as a provisionally privileged
example in order to name and draw such a braid. Let us therefore
come back to §49 of Being and Time, which does not refer for­
tuitously to de-limitation; indeed, it is entitled "The Delimitation
[die Abgrenzung] of the Existential Analysis of Death with Respect
to Possible Other Interpretations of the Phenomenon." There is
thus another edge between properly dying and the pas of demise,
which already marks a double distance (with respect to death,
which is left behind, but also with respect to the living thing in
general, because animals, according to this hypothesis, do not
demise) . If it holds, this other edge would be the only one capable
of separating, ordinating, superordinating, and subordinating the
42 Aporias

problematics-and that is what matters here. This edge would itself

be the place of a first problematic closure, of a domain of question­
ing or of absolutely preliminary research. On the one hand, there
would be anthropological problematics. They would take into
consideration ethnologico-cultural differences affecting demise,
sickness, and death; however, on the other hand, and first ofall,
there would be the ontologico-existential problematic that anthro­
pology must presuppose and that concerns the being-until-death
of Dasein, beyond any border, and indeed beyond any cultural,
religious, linguistic, ethnological, historical, and sexual determina­
tion. In other words, there can be an anthropology or a history of
death, there can be culturologies of demise, ethnologies of mortu­
ary rites, of ritual sacrifice, of the work of mourning, of burials, of
preparations for death, of the cleansing of the dead, of the lan­
guages of death in general, of medicine, and so on. But there is no
culture of death itself or ofproperly dying. Dying is neither entirely
natural (biological) nor cultural. And the question of limits articu­
lated here is also the question of the border between cultures,
languages, countries, nations, and religions, as well as that of the
limit between a universal (although non-natural) structure and a
differential (non-natural but cultural) structure.
 § 2 Awaiting (at)
the Arrival

All people do not die in the same way. Throughout time, they
have not died in the same way. Moreover, it is not enough to recall
that there are cultures of death and that from one culture to
another, at the crossing of the borders, death changes face, mean­
ing, language, or even body. "Death has changed," Philippe Aries
writes in Essais sur l'histoire de Ia mort en Occident du Moyen-Age a
nos jours (p. 236) . One must go further: culture itself, culture in
general, is essentially, before anything, even a priori, the culture of
death. Consequently, then, it is a history of death. There is no
culture without a cult of ancestors, a ritualization of mourning and
sacrifice, institutional places and modes of burial, even if they are
only for the ashes of incineration. Nor is there culture without
medicine, and there is no medicine without this horiwn that
death, so to speak, guarantees to sickness, this very singular limit
called, from the Greek, "horizon." The very concept of culture may
seem to be synonymous with the culture of death, as if the expres­
sion "culture of death" were ultimately a pleonasm or a tautology.
But only such a redundancy can make legible the cultural differ­
ence and the grid ofborders. Because every culture entails a treatise
or treatment of death, each of them treats the end according to a
different partition. The partition would remain at all times purely
human, intra-anthropological. The difference between nature and
culture, indeed between biological life and culture, and, more

43
44 Aporias

precisely, between the animal and the human is the relation to

death, as one most often thinks according to the same philosophi­
cal doxa. The relation to death as such. The true border would be
there.
Although Heidegger, deeply rooted in this tradition, repeats it,
he also suggests a remarkable rearticulation of it. Forms of anthro­
pological knowledge supposedly treat death according to culture
and history; bio-genetic disciplines presumably treat death accord­
ing to nature. No matter how necessary and enriching they may be,
these forms of knowledge must presuppose a concept of death
properly speaking-this is, in sum, what Heidegger says. Only an
exisq:ntial analysis can provide such a concept of death to these
forms of knowledge. Heidegger describes this relation of depen­
dence by using the classical idea of order, an order of priority,
precedence, and presupposition (vorliegen, voraussetzm), which is
also an order of foundation: there is the founding basis of the
foundation and the founded structure that presupposes it. The
existential interpretation of death (hence, the existential analysis of
Dasein) "precedes"(liegt vor) any biology and ontology of life. It
also founds (fondiert) any investigation of death-and Heidegger
names a series: h.istoriological, biographical, psychological, and
ethnological investigations. Any "typology" of the forms of dying
and of the modalities according to which demise (Ableben) is
experienced (erkbt) "already presupposes the concept of death"
(setzt schon den Begriff des Todes voraus). This "already" (schon)
marks the time of the problematic closure: the field of anthropol­
ogy (the history and the typology of the forms of demise) can only
establish the markers of its problematic field by already, always
already, presupposing a concept of death. The existential analysis of
Dasein alone can provide this concept-an analysis that is not only
the fundamental anthropology presupposed by it, bur also the
analysis of a Dasein that is not yet determined as human (subject,
ego, conscience, person, soul, body, etc.) . In order to identify the
different ways of living (erkben) the demise (Abkben), that is, the
ways ofliving as such the moment of"leaving life," the moment, in
the lived experience (Erkben) of the living thing, of passing as a
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 45

living thing, the passage out oflife (Ableben), and in order to speak
competently of these modes of passage, of the one who passes or of
the other who allows the one to pass or cross, one must already
know what death means, and how to recognize death properly
speaking. One m ust already have an understanding or a com­
prehension ( Verstandnis) of what death is for Dasein: an under­
standing of the word "death" as an understanding of what relates
this word to its meaning. This logic of presupposition consists in
raising the question of what, already and from the outset, makes
possible every statement, every determination, every theme, every
project, and every object. In this context, such a logic of presup­
position is also a logic of, or a request for, foundation. Indeed,
Heidegger says that the existential interpretation ofdeath precedes,
is presupposed by all other discourses on death, but also founds
(fondiert) them.
Such a request for the foundation or for the condition of pos­
sibility often speaks the language of methodology, of methodic
order ("in good methodology," Heidegger says, the existential
analysis comes, in terms of order, before biology, psychology, and
other disciplines, which will be discussed in a moment; it is super­
ordinate to them, " methodisch vorgeordnet," p. 248) . There is a
methodological order here in every sense of the term: (r) an order in
the sense of the logic of a whole, an element, or a milieu (in the
s�nse that one says: it is on the order of . . . ; in this case, on the
order of method); (2) it is also an order as order of progression,
sequence, forward motion, or irreversible procedure, a step, a way
of proceeding or of progressing; (3) it is finally a given order, the
double prescription to follow an order and to follow a given order
of sequential linkage or of consequence: begin here and end there!
This order of orders belongs to the great ontologico-juridico­
transcendental tradition, and I believe it to be undeniable, impossi­
ble to dismantle, and invulnerable (at least this is the hypothesis
that I am following here)-except perhaps in this particular case
called death, which is more than a case and whose uniqueness
excludes it from the system of possibilities, and specifically from
the order that it, in turn, may condition. What I mean here is an
 Aporias

entirely other "logic" of the order: if there are legitimate and

powerful questions about the foundation and the "already" of the
condition of possibility, then they are themselves made possible
and necessary by a relation to death, by a "life-death" that no longer
falls under the case of what it makes possible. That is what I will
call the aporia, but we shall return to this difficulty after having
followed Heidegger as far as possible.
Confident in this logic of presupposition, Heidegger would only
have found confirmation, I imagine, in some of Aries's admissions.
Because Aries did not ground his research in an ontological elu­
cidation ofwhat death is and signifies, he knows neither what he is
talking about nor how to determine the problematic closure of his
domain. In a certain way, he says so. The author of these fascinat­
ing Essais sur thistoire de Ia mort en Occident du Moyen-Age a nos
jours admits that he has not been able to delimit his field. He
confesses it with an honesty that has the accent of both an always
feigned and wily academic courtesy and the most disarming philo­
sophical ingenuousness. In sum, he has never been able to assert
any "border" (it is his word)- neither a cultural border (historical
time and. space, cultural area and periodization), nor the border
that is the line crossing of death, which separates the one who is
dying from the beyond of life. These two borders blur somewhat
and thereby blur the borders of the very concept of death. Aries
writes:

Every corpus was sending me to another one. [Should this be a

surprise?] The first goal of my research had lost its ability to motivate
me, since other, more essential problems that were taking me to the
depths of being were covering it. I could guess that there were relations
between the attitude before death [his real theme, which is not death
itself, but behavior before demise], in its most common and general
aspects, and the variations in the consciousness of the self and of the
other, the sense of the individual destiny or of the large, collective fate.
I was thus moving up the stream of history, happy to stumble, on this
side, on a border ofculture, the burial ad sanctos, the border of another
world. I had increased the time period beyond the limits allowed by
the most liberal historical usage. (p. 236, my emphasis)
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 47

There would be too much to say, in the time that we have here,
about the methodological or theoretico-metaphysical axioms that
govern Aries's work. And to point out the limits of these axioms
and the limit of his thought about limits is not to denigrate the
interest of his work. Consider, for example, his article "Collective
Unconscious and Clear Ideas" (in Essais, pp. 236-3 7) , in which, in
a way that is both interesting and disappointing, Aries again dis­
cusses the "border" and the "limit" (his terms) . This time, not only
the limit between the biological and the cultural is in question, but
also "classificatory hypotheses" and what is calmly called a "theo­
retical and speculative problem!", with an exclamation mack, and
put off for later:

I tend to underestimate the influence of religious and cultural systems:

neither the Renaissance nor the Enlightenment appears as a decisive
landmark in my periodization. The Church interests me more insofar
as it indicates and reveals unnoticed feelings than as a pressure group
that would have governed feelings at their sources. According to me,
the large drifting movements that put beliefs and attitudes into mo­
tion-attitudes before life and death-depend on more secret, more
hidden motors, at the limit of the biological and the cultural, that is, at
the limit of the "colkctive unconscious." [The term is underlined by
Aries, who thinks that here he can use all these terms and concepts­
beliefs, attitudes, life, death, limit, biological and cultural, collective
unconscious-as if their intelligibility was guaranteed and did not
: cover up abysses or, if the historian finds the following hypothesis
more reassuring, did not cover up mountains of archives that up to this
day and for some time still to come have not been classified and are
undassifiable.] It animates elementary psychological forces, such as
self-consciousness, desire to be more, or, on the contrary, sense of
collective fate, sociability, and so on.

Then, alluding to a debate that opposes him to Michel Vovelle,

the other well-known historian of death:

Vovelle also acknowledges the importance of the collective uncon­

scious, but, a� he has shown in his remarkable Mourir autrefois [Dying
in other times] , he tends to put more weight on customs than I have
 Aporias

granted to what we have called, in our all-roo-shon debate, clear ideas:

religious doctrines, political and moral philosophies, psychological
effects of scientific and technical progress, and socio-economic sys­
tems . . . . We have only been able to show that there wa.� a problem: a
problem that may appear to be theoretical or speculative!

Mter that, although he does not draw any consequence from this in
his work, Aries in sum acknowledges and confirms in his own way
what Heidegger says about what conditions and determines knowl­
edge and historical research (or anthropological research in gen­
eral) :

In fact, )t ["the theoretical or speculative problem!"] determines the

historian's practice, for how is it possible to distinguish things and then
to organize them without a classificatory hypo thesis? And how is it
possible to establish such an overall conception, whether it is acknowl­
edged or not? (All quotes are from p. 237).

This "overall conception" obscurely predetermines at least two

things. (x) On the one hand, it predetermines everything that sterns
from the delimitation of the problematic field: Is this "history"?
(history of what?) of "ideas and attitudes," as is said? (what are
those?), of the "collective unconscious"? (what is that?) , of "self­
consciousness"? (what is that?) , of the "effects" (on social practices,
of science and technology? is this psychoanalysis? psychoanalysis of
what?) (2) On the other hand, in the hypothesis where it would be
history, and since it presents itself under this name, this so-called
"overall conception" obscurely, and in a blurred or blurring way,
predetermines the intra-historical delimitations, that is, the period­
ization with which Aries admits having difficulty, even though he is
more modest than Thomas and limits himself to the Christian
West from the Middle Ages to the present. Recall that he admits
having a lot of difficulty with certain borders of periodization, but
in fact his difficulties are much greater than he admits. Sometimes
he warns against anachronism (for example, Essais, p. 17), but on
a number of occasions he must mention "anachronistic" occur­
rences, that is, significant occurrences that do not belong to the
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 49

time within which the historian both thinks he can inscribe them
and assumes that they can be inscribed. One even has the impres­
sion that a certain anachronism is the rule with respect to these
delimitations. "Life will have been so short": this means that one
always dies in an untimely way [a contretemps] . The moment of
death no longer belongs to its time [son temps] , at least by a certain
aspect that, nonetheless, does not fail to historicize itself and
perhaps provide the occasion of the history with which historians
deal. One should ask why this anachronism insists with respect to
death. In particular, I refer to what Aries judges to be "close to
modern eroticism" (p. 85), even though it happened before moder­
nity, and also to what describes "The death of the libertine," which
is the tide of a chapter in L'Homme devant la mort (II: 24-25) .
Discussing arts o f dying, which are as much, and indeed first of all,
ways of living (such as Bellarmin's de arte bene moriendi), Aries
insists upon the recurrence of ideas that announce the Enlighten­
ment before the Enlightenment and that, no matter how "anach­
ronistic" or "exceptional" they may seem, are nonetheless recur­
rent, "verified and confirmed" by testimonies. In order not to
mulriply the examples, I am thinking above all of Sade's extraordi­
nary will. It would deserve an analysis that I must unfortunately
leave aside. This will, "written with seriousness and conviction,"
Aries notes, is defined by the historian as "both utopian for the
eighteenth century and already anachronistic for the year 18o6"
(What is this category, the "already anachronistic"?) It is "utopian"
and "already anachronistic" because it "testifies to a complete
confusion of two opinions that were up to then dose to one
another, but separate: the contempt for the body and the radical
refusal of immortality. " Faced with the internal contradictions of
this will which, as Aries himself notes, requests both that one
monumentalize the traces of the effacement that it calls for and that
one carry out a ceremony of the absence of ceremony, the historian
never wonders whether the anachronism and the internal aporia of
this may not signify something other than just the untimeliness of
an eccentric who is mistaken about the time he lives inY
As Thomas will also do, just as he dismissed the "theoretical,"
 Aporias

the "speculative," or the "overall conception," Aries does not hesi­

tate to call "metaphysical" everything that the historian must re­
spectfully leave aside and assume accessible to common sense or
universal experience. Metaphysical the metaphysical nature ofdeath:
such would be the "deepest reason" for the problems of limits and
borders encountered by the historian. But instead of asking himself
what "metaphysical" means here and without stopping at these
"deep reasons," Aries courageously pursues his inquiry and de­
scribes what he dares to call the "slowness of his progression,"
namely, the fact that he devoted "fifteen years" to this task. Fifteen
years! Fifteen years seem enormous to the historian for writing a
history o(death in the West from the Middle Ages to the present;
accordin g to him, this slowness is ultimately explained by the
metaphysical obscurity of death, by the " metaphysical nature of
death":

It may be surprising that it took me so long to arrive here: fifteen years

of research and meditation on the attitudes before death in our
Western Christian cultures! The slowness of my progression must not
be attributed only to material obstacles, to a lack of time, or to a
weariness in front of the immensity of the task. There is another,
deeper reason, which has to do with the metaphysical nature of death:
the field of my research moved backward when I thought I was
reaching its limits, and I was each time pushed further, both upstream
and downstream in relation to my starting point (p. 12).

Why underline Aries's term "metaphysical"? At least he should

be credited for not citing Heidegger, whereas, we recall, Thomas
wildly attributes to Heidegger what he calls the "metaphysical
truth'' of a sentence that is not even Heidegger's. Let us return
briefly to the Heideggerian delimitation of problematic closures.
What disciplines or problematics, according to Heidegger, do not
elucidate their presupposed foundations, the very foundations of
which the existential analysis of death must remind them? They
include not only the anthropological sciences, ethnology, psychol­
ogy, history-in short all the theories dealing with a culture of
death. Metaphysics and theology are also included there. Indeed,
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 51

for methodological reasons, Heidegger distinguishes the existential

analysis of death, which legitimately comes first, from any other
discourse on death-discourses from biological or anthropological
disciplines, to be sure, but also from metaphysics or theology. With
respect to all these problematics, the existential analysis is both
anterior and free, first and neutral. Anthropological knowledge can
be psychologies or ethnologies of death. In the best hypothesis,
psychology (and Heidegger would probably include here psycho­
analysis, rightly or wrongly) can be a psychology of the dying, hence
of the living, of whoever is still on this side of death, rather than a
discourse on dying. (What Heidegger then notes could easily turn
itself against the existential analysis of death. Dasein cannot testifY
to death either; it is also as one living or dying that it attests to
being-for-death.) At that point, it remains that, in Heidegger's
view, if so-called psychology remains a psychology oflife, that is, of
the dying rather than of dying, this merely reflects, like a reflection
( Widerschein) , the fact that Dasein does not die or does not prop­
erly die (nicht eigentlich stirbt) in the course of an experience, of a
living, or of a lived experience as one sometimes says somewhat
ridiculously in order to translate Erleben,
Erlebnis. Dasein never has
the Erleben of its own demise (Ableben) , or of its own death
(Sterben) . This, however, does not mean that it cannot testifY,
according to a concept of testimony (Bezeugung) that should be
questioned here because it plays a major role in Being and Time and
because it is neither simply phenomenological nor free of all phe­
nomenology, at least if Erlebnis is the measure of the phenomeno­
logical.
According to a similar outline, what holds for psychology, psy­
choanalysis, even phenomenological psychology also holds for eth­
nology, a discipline specializing in the study of the cultural borders
separating the relation to death, to murder, to the sacrifice oflife, to
mourning, and to burial. Heidegger devotes only one sentence to
it; in a paragraph that returns to the presuppositions, and therefore
to the problematic closure, of any "typology" of "dying." After
having mentioned just as briefly the psychology of the dying, he
notes that the same holds for the study of the relation to death
 Aporias

"among primitive peoples" (bei den Primitiven), and also for the
study of their attitudes, magic, and cults. This primarily (primiir)
sheds light on the fact that the primitives in question have access to
Dasein, to death for Dasein, and to an understanding of Dasein
(Daseinsverstandnis) that also requires, therefore, an existential
analysis and a concept that corresponds to this understanding.
There is therefore no limit to the universality of this analysis. Even
if one considered it as an anthropology, which it is not, at least it
would be in this respect general or fundamental, because it is
universal.
The same prqblematic closure and therefore the same method­
p
ological presup ositions concern the "metaphysics of death'' (Met­
aphysik des Todes) . The existential analysis of death is also anterior,
neutral, and independent with regard to all the questions and all
the answers pertaining to a metaphysics of death: the questions and
answers that concern survival, immortality, the beyond (das ]en­
seits), or the other side of this side (das Diesseits), that is, what one
should do or think down here before death (ethical, juridical, and
political norms). Since this figure of the border and of the line
between the here and the beyond [l'en-dera et !'au-de/a] is of partic­
ular interest to us here, we should note that, after having excluded
from the existential analysis all considerations about the beyond
and the here (the "on this side," das Diesseits, which must not be
translated by the Platonic or Christian "down here"), arguing that
they are founded, dependent, and derivative with regard · to the
existential analysis, Heidegger nevertheless stresses that the existen­
tial analysis stands, not in "immanence," as Martineau, losing the
thread, writes in his translation, but pmely on this side: it is rein
"diesseitig. " It is on this side, on the side of Dasein and of its here,
which is our here, that the oppositions between here and over
there, this side and beyond, can be distinguished. In the same
direction, one could say that it is by always starting from the
idiomatic hereness of my language, my culture , and my belongings
that I relate myself to the difference of the over there. To wonder
what there is after death only has meaning and is legitimately possi­
ble(mit Sinn und Recht) it - is only "methodologically certain"
(methodisch sicher: Heidegger rarely claims methodological order
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 53

and derivative legitimacy as often as in these pages)-if one has

elaborated a concept of the ontological essence of death and if one
remembers that the possibility of being of every Dasein is engaged,
invested, and inscribed in the phenomenon of death (in dieses
hereinsteht) . I do not have time to discuss further this methodolog­
ism, which poses as its axiom that one can only start from here,
from this side: the best point of departure is the point from which
we can start and that is always here. Where does one start from, if
not from here? Such is the thrust of a question that may not be as
invincible as it looks. This question can be addressed to the same
axiomatic that, at the beginning of Being and Time (§§2, 3, and 4),
justifies "the ontico-ontological priority [Der ontisch-ontologische
Vorrang] " of Dasein, the "exemplary'' point of departure of the
existential analysis in Dasein, as this particular power of question­
ing that we are, we here, we who can pre-understand being, com­
prehend it pre-ontologically, wait for each other [ nous attendre] ,
expect [nous attendre-a] , listen to and understand each other [nous
entendre] . Concerning the existential analysis of death (§49), the
same decision characterizes the point of departure: the decision is
· taken here. Heidegger's determination seems to be both decisive,
that is to say, incisive, taking itself to be immediately j ustified by
the very fact that the decision is made here concerning the here, and
nonetheless rather anxious. Indeed, Heidegger allows something
undecided to remain suspended as to whether the point of depar­
ture is "on this side" and not on that side of a possible border. For,
perhaps in a form of avowal, he then declares: "Whether such a
question is a possible theoretical question [theoretische is under­
lined] at all must remain undecided here [ bleibe hier unentschie­
den] ." He does not use the indicative: this remains undecided
(bleibt unentschieden) . Instead, by another decision whose perfor­
mative incision must remain still undisputable and undisputed (let
us rather say, irrecusable or uncontested, for what is involved is a
matter of testimony and not of proof) , he uses the subjunctive:
"that it remain undecided, must remain undecided" (subjunctive,
bleibe unentschieden, and "here," bleibe hier unentschieden). The
theoretical question concerning the here, the "this side" as point of
departure must remain here, on this side, undecided, that is to say,
54 Aporias

decided without any theoretical question, before any theoretical

question: without proof. It must remain this way because one
cannot do otherwise, it is necessary; and it must remain this way
because, as soon as one cannot do otherwise, one must do it this
way, it is better to do it this way: here, in arly case. The theoretical
question can only be raised afterwards, and its nature can only be
speculative, not phenomenological. Such is the authoritative con­
clusion of the paragraph: "Die diesseitige ontologische Interpreta­
tion des Todes liegt vor jeder ontisch-jenseitigen Spekulation";
"insofar as it operates on this side [citra, intra, on this side of the
border: diesseitige] the ontological interpretation of death precedes
all ontical speculation operating beyond, on the other side [as ultra,
meta, trans] ."
It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of what is being
decided, so authoritatively and so decisively, at the very moment
when what is in question is to decide on what must remain un­
decided Its signification seems to be decisive precisely with regard
to all the borders that we are discussing. For at least three reasons.
I. On the one hand, there is no limit to the effects of a decision

that, presenting itself as "methodological," organizes and hierarch­

izes all the delimitations that have here been called problematic
closures. It extends to all problematics, all disciplines, and all forms
of knowledge about death. "Methodologically, the existential anal­
ysis is superordinate [ist methodisch vorgeordnet] to the problematic
[or the questioning: den Fragen] of a biology, psychology, theodicy,
or theology of death" (p. 248). Of course, since it thus precedes all
content of knowledge, such an analysis may seem to be formal and
empty, at least from the viewpoint of an ontical content, for any
ontology then seems formal and empty. Heidegger recognizes this,
but he sees here only an appearance, which should not blind us to
the differentiated richness of the phenomenal structures described
by such an analysis. Later, we will raise the question of whether, in
order to sustain this existential analysis, the so-called ontological
content does not surreptitiously reintroduce, in the mode of on­
tological repetition, theorems and theologemes pertaining to disci-
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 55

plines that are said to be founded and dependent-among others,

Judea-Christian theology, but also all the anthropologies that are
rooted there.

2. On the other hand, it is not enough to say that Heidegger

interprets death in terms of a decision that consists in privileging
the "this side" (das Diesseits) of the line, even if at the same time he
neutralizes the interest for the other side of a beyond that would be
opposed to this side. Rather, it seems to me that one should say the
opposite: it is the originary and underivable character of death, as
well as the finitude of the temporality in which death is rooted, that
decides and forces us to decide to start from here first, from this
side here. A mortal can only start from here, from his mortality. His
possible belief in immortality, his irresistible interest in the beyond,
in gods or spirits, what makes survival structure every instant in a
kind of irreducible torsion, the torsion of a retrospective anticipa­
tion that introduces the untimely moment and the posthumous in
the most alive of the present living thing, the rearview mirror of a
waiting-for-death [s'attendre-a-La mort] at every moment, and the
future anterior that precedes even the present, which it only seems
to modify, all this stems first from his mortality, Heidegger would
say. No matter how serious all this remains, it would thus only be
secondary. This very secondariness testifies to the primordiality of
being-toward-death, of being-until-death, or, as one could also say,
of being-to-death. Only a being-to-death can think, desire, project,
indeed, "live" immortality as such. (Here there is an affi rmation of
originary finitude that Hegel thought he had reversed in Kant, not
without good reason: one cannot think originary finitude without
removing it as infinity, nor can one think being-to-death without
starting from immortality. As is most often the case, here Heideg­
ger is on Kant's side, on this side of finitude, and not on Hegel's side.
But is not Hegel the one who wanted to think the unilaterality of
the border and thereby show that one is always already on the other
side of the here? Let us leave this enormous question in paren­
theses.) The theme of immortality, like that of any form of survival
or return [revenance] (and society, culture, memory, spirit, and
 Aporias

spirits are made only of that-only for that) is not opposed to

being-toward-death, it does not contradict it, it is not symmetrical
with it, because it is conditioned by being-toward-death and con­
firms it at every moment. The incontestability of being-toward­
death, the non-derivation of certainty concerning being-toward­
death (at least as Heidegger will assert it), would not leave any
other methodologically rigorous choice than that of starting from
"this side."

3· And finally, if it is incontestable (who could testify against it?

and from where?) , the prevalence of "this side" is also, in this
analysis, a certain prevalence of the phenomenological tradition. It
goes hand in hand - and this is an absolute indissociability-with
everything that, in existential analysis, becomes prevalence itself,
not a prevalence or hierarchizing valorization among others, but
rather the prevailing of every evaluation and every possible hier­
archy, the pre-ferring ofp re-feran ce [pre-firance, with an "a''] itself,
that is, the pre-archie originarity of the proper, the authentic, and
the eigentlich.
Before getting to it as to the ultimate aporia, let me indicate, at
least schematically and for the record, a few corollaries. The deci­
sion to decide from the hereof this side is not simply a methodolog­
ical decision, because it decides upon the very method: it decides
that a method is pre-ferable, and better, than a non-method. It
is not surprising to see this absolute decision turn into a non­
decision, since it is an unconditional decision concerning the place
and the taking-place of the decision. In fact, it is not even, not yet,
or already no longer a decision because, on the one hand, it relies
on a prevalence rooted in precisely what cannot be decided, that is,
in death, and, on the other hand and for that very reason, it leaves
undecided (unentscheidet) the theoretico-speculative questions that
could impose themselves, the questions that would make one
hesitate between decision and non-decision, as between the two
poles of one alternative. (One could perhaps conclude from this
that the essence of decision, i.e., what would make decision be the
object of thematic knowledge or of theoretical discourse, must
 Awaiting {at) the Arrival 57

remain undecidable in order for there to be decision, if there is such

a thing.)
What are these corollaries? Let us stick with those that intersect
with the themes of our conference.
r. F IRST COROLLARY: death would have no border. The only
consistent way of attempting to ground a really universal discourse
is no doubt to grant the existential analysis of death priority and
absolute independence with regard to any other problematic, disci­
pline, research, and region. Then, existential strucrures no longer
depend upon any given anthropological culture; they do not stop
at the vision of the world, the language, or the religion of any
particular society, European or not; they do not stop at any sexual
difference. The existential analysis of Dasein would ultimately be
the only discipline for which death does not know any border. No
historical limit and no periodization would affect its principle.
Heidegger's analyses would thus exceed and implicitly condition
both a history of the type that Aries suggests (a history of death in
the West, in the Christian West, from the Middle Ages to the
present) as well as an "anthropo-thanatology" such as Thomas's,
which claims to be "comparative" ("any anthropology of death can
only be comparative," p. 53 r) . Moreover, beyond their supposedly
theoretical and constative knowledge, the anthropological histo­
rian and the comparatist anthropo-thanatologian multiply cuirural
and political evaluations. They both deplore and denounce what,
according to them, they must record: a sort of disappearance of
death in the modern West and in industrialized societies. They
even declare their disapproval and denWiciation, they put it forth,
they recognize therein a determinant motivation of their research.
For us, in the West, within our borders, death would be, and
increasingly so, almost prohibited, dissimulated, disposed of, and
denied. "The prohibitions of death," Aries writes, "born in the
United States and in northwestern Europe during the twentieth
century, penetrated into France from then on" (p. r5). An affirma­
tion just as massive and careless can also be found in Thomas,
inspiring him with an admiring nostalgia for the model of an Africa
 Aporias

that he calls "traditional." According to Thomas, Mrica "offers [us]

a remarkable example of how the problems of death are resolved,
an example that probably exists in other non-industrialized popu­
lations, and which may have existed in the European past" (p. 531) .
Indeed, Thomas wants to resolve the problem of death, nothing
more and nothing less. Like Dali, up to the end he will probably
think that "it will all work out." Deploring the fact that the
industrial Wes t wants to deny or hold death at a distance, Thomas
suggests that one should know death better so as to "put it back
into its rightful place": "To know death better is to put it back into
its rightful place
[the �uthor underlines this incredible expression]
by avoiding at one/the refusal to take it into consideration (de­
nial) , the obsessional fascination that makes us lose sight of the
battle for a better life, and the evasion coward fantasies of consola­
tion (narcissism) or compensation (mortifying behavior) " (p. 534).
The existential analysis maintains itself well this side of all this
foolish comparatist predication, even if, at its root, and we will
surely return to this, a judgment on the loss of authenticity in the
relation to death also reveals, in its way-in Heidegger's way-a
certain incapacity to look death in the face, to assume in a resolute
fashion being-toward-death, a certain everyday leveling that is noc
always foreign to what is being exacerbated by a certain modernity
of the modern industrial city. In short, across all these differences,
the dominant feeling for everyone is that death, you see, is no
longer what it used to be. And who will deny it?
And who would not recognize here the crossing of borders? For,
if death figures this theme or this fundamental concept, which
guarantees the very possibility of the existential analysis, it is also
and first of all because death takes a figure. It has a privileged form,
the crossing of a line (between existence and non-existence, Dasein
and non - Dasein - 1 am not saying between living and dying) . Upon
this figure depend all the threads of the braid mentioned above:

1. The thread that passes between two cultural or historical

borders (being-to-death would here be without border, hence
universal, but universal within the borders that separate Dasein
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 59

from any other entity and from any other living thing, in
particular from the animal) ;
2. the thread between two problematic closures (the difference
between the existential analysis of death and any other regional
knowledge or general discipline of death) ;
3· finally, the thread that follows the line of logical demarca­
tion among all the concepts pertaining to these problematics.

2. SECOND COROLLARY: a politics of death. If the existential

analysis of death wants to be at the same time primary and univer­
sal (although Heidegger does not use this word, which has con­
notations that are too humanistic, too formal, and too dependent
upon a certain Aufkliirung) , and if it claims to remain neutral with
regard to culture, morality, theology, and metaphysics, it must ob­
viously also be so with regard to all politics. There is no politics of
death-of death properly speaking. The existential analysis does not
claim any competence (and indeed, it has none) for dealing with
political problems of burial, of the cult of the dead, and, above all,
of war and of medicine. True, historical anthropologies do not have
much to say either on this subject, particularly on the most original
forms that it can take today. Think for example of the hostage war,
which seems to be (but is this certain?) one of the irreducible givens
of modernity (and in particular of technical modernity and of its
treatment of speed: modes of transportation [aviation] and of
communication [telephone, mass media, television, etc.] ) . Insofar
as it depends upon this technical modernity, the hostage war also
presupposes a massive economico-cultural heterogeneity among
several experiences of the relation to death, to the individual's
mortality, and to his place in society. A given society cannot treat its
individual subjects in the same way as another society can. One can
do no more here than recall, without exaggerated pathos, the space
ofa politics of death or of mass extermination, the developments of
a modern hostage war that probably began with kidnapping (there
cannot be any kidnapping, in the strict sense, without automobiles,
without a cerrain condition of posts, telephones, and telecommuni­
cations, for example) , then developed in Europe under Nazism,
6o Aporias

and has recently expanded to worldwide dimensions. The differ­

ence in the treatment of individual or mass death has consequences
for modern war: it is not in the same way, even if it is called surgical,
that one bombards Iraq and Sarajevo in the name of international
law; and the disproportion in the evaluation of the enemies' deaths
continues to change constantly, just as "dying for one's country" has
changed. The same mutation has transformed medicine and mod­
ern bio-genetics. In every sense of the word "to treat," one does not
treat AIDS in industrial European societies as one treats it, without
treating it, in Africa; one does not even treat the statistics of AI D S
in the same way. An,d the progress of research on the so-called
human genome (dll.ia banks, predictive medicine-thus for the
moment still not covered by health insurance-which could not, at
least easily, be transferred to developing countries) will drastically
exacerbate the differences between the rich and the less rich in
our societies, and even more so between our countries and poor
countries. They will do so with respect to life and death, to sickness
and socio-medical insurance, and to all the givens of what one calls
bioethics, which by the same token is also a thanato-ethics-and
a thanato-ethics is necessarily a general euthanato-ethics, a phi­
losophy of euthanasia and of dying well', in general (ars de bene
moriendi). One must indeed die and die well [Ilfout bien mourir] .
In fact, if not by right, and like the anthropo-thanatologies
mentioned above, the existential analysis of death has nothing to
say on this matter that is not its subject. At least this is what the
existential analysis says, for it is not certain that Heidegger does not
ultimately give us a discourse on the best, indeed the mostproper and
the most authentic, relation to dying: hence, de bene moriendi.
3· The THIRD CO ROLLARY can also be political: it is what would
make us pass, in spirit, from the hostage to the host/ guest and from
the host/guest to the ghost. (This is the series constituted by
hostage, host, guest, ghost, holy ghost, and Geist.) In Being and
Time, the existential analysis does not want to know anything
about the ghost [ revenant] or about mourning. Everything that can
be said about them, as interesting as it may sometimes sound,
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 6r

would certainly stem, i n Heldegger's view, from derivative disci­

plines such as psychology or psychoanalysis, theology or meta­
physics. It would concern the figures or the experiences of demise
(Ableben) rather than death properly speaking. Such would be his
fast answer (too fast for me) to whoever would be tempted to
consider mourning and ghosting [revenance] , spectrality or living­
'o n, surviving, as non-derivable categories or as non-reducible deri­
vations (non-reducible to the fundamental debate in which I said
that Freud, Heidegger, and Levinas make up the three most deter­
minant angles) . Ifjemeinigkeit, that of Dasein or that of the ego (in
the common sense, the psychoanalytic sense, or Levinas's sense) is
constituted in its ipselty in terms of an originary mourning, then
this self-relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being­
itself as different from itself. And reciprocally: the relation to the
other (in itself outside myself, outside myself in myself) will never
be distinguishable from a bereaved apprehension. The relevance of
the question of knowing whether it is from one's own proper death
or from the other's death that the relation to death or the certitude
of death is instituted is thus limited from the start. Even where one
speaks of ]emeinigkeit, these limits would be those of the ego and
sometimes simply those of the conscious "I" and of that to which it
thinks it can testifY. Whoever tries, as I would like to do, to draw the
necessary consequences (they are incalculably numerous; they are
the incalculable itself) , would find himself accused of still presup­
posing the existential analysis of Dasein at the very moment when
he would, on the contrary, claim to extract its presuppositions or to
extract himself from its presupposed axioms. But since the recipro­
cal axiom would also be necessary, let us leave this corollary sus­
pended. Although everything is, to a certain extent, tied to this
corollary, I shall simply point out that it also includes a political
dimension. It may even engage the political in its essence. In an
economic, elliptic, hence dogmatic way, I would say that there is no
politics without an organization of the time and space of mourn­
ing, without a topolirology of the sepulcher, without an anamnesic
and thematic relation to the spirit as ghost [ revenant] , without an
open hospitality to the guest as ghost [in English in the original] ,
 Aporias

whom one holds, just as he holds us, hostage. In this regard, one
could extend beyond the limits that he ascribes to it, namely, a
discourse on "primitives," a remark of Valery that I recently came
upon in his Preface to Sir James Frazer's La Crainte des morts (Paris,
1934) . Speaking of "the ancient belief that the dead are not dead, or
are not quite dead," Valery defines Frazer's project in the following
manner: "to represent for us, with numerous examples, what one
could call the Politics of the Primitives in their relations with the
spirits of the dead." These fascinating "numerous examples" always
describe a crossing of borders: of the border that separates the
world of the living frqin that of the dead, of course, but as soon as
the crossing goes in both directions, hin and fro, the same border is
more or less than one, and more or less than one from one culture
to another.

I am, here, now, reaching the end. If possible.

The concept of possibility will allow me, legitimately or not, to

weave a certain number of motifs into the existential analysis of
death, as it is carried out in Being and Time. The only rule would be
that of a title and what accompanies it (Aporias, Dying-awaiting
(one another at) "the limits of truth" [S �ttendre aux "limites de La
verite '1) at the point where it subscribes to the contract of this
conference.
A certain thinking of the possible is at the heart of the existential
analysis of death. (For Heidegger, moreover, it is never very far
from the thinking of the heart.) This possibility of the possible
brings together on the one hand the sense of the virtuality or of the
imminence of the future, of the "that can always happen at any
instant," one must expect it, I am expecting it, we are expecting it, and
on the other hand, the sense of ability, of the possible as that of
which I am capable, that for which I have the power, the ability, or
the potentiality. These two meanings of possibility co-exist in die
Moglichkeit. At the end of this "Abgrenzung (of the Existential
Analysis of Death with Respect to Possible Other Interpretations)"
(§49) , hence with respect to what we have called the other prob-
 Awaiting (at} the Arrival

lematic closures, Heidegger suggests a sort of diagnosis. Remarking

upon the insufficiency of all these problematics, this diagnosis
therefore traces a general line of delimitation. These problematics
neglect, forget, and misrecognize the essence of Dasein. Dasein is
not an entity that is here in front of me or that I can put my hands
on, like a substantial object, als Vorhandenes. Instead, the essence of
Dasein as entity is precisely the possibility, the being-possible (das
Moglichsein). In other words, because they exclude or do not
recognize this strange dimension of the possible, all these problem­
atic closures lock Dasein into an ontological determination that is
not its own, that of the Vorhandensein. And if they lock it up, that is
already in order to give in ro a confusion between death and an end
leveled by the average, mediocre, and leveling everydayness of
Dasein. This confusion leads to speaking nonsense; it leads all these
bio- or thanato-anthropo-theological problematics toward arbi­
trariness. In order to avoid this arbitrariness, one must come back
to an ontological determination of the kind of being that Dasein is
and to an ontological determination of the limit that separates
Dasein from Vorhandensein and from Zuhandensein. In this way, to
put it in a word and all too quickly, if the limit that passes between
these three types of entity, Dasein, Zuhandensein, and Vorhanden­
sein, was not guaranteed (as I have tried elsewhere to suggest is the
case, particularly in "The Hand of Heidegger") , then this whole
discourse on death would risk losing something of its fundamen­
tality (but I leave this argument aside for the moment because it
relates to our subject in too mediated a way) .
If being-possible is the being proper to Dasein, then the existen­
tial analysis of the death of Dasein will have to make of this
possibility its theme. Like an example, the analysis of death is
submitted to the ontological law that rules the being of Dasein,
whose name is "possibility." But death is possibility par excellence.
Death exemplarily guides the existential analysis. And this is pre­
cisely what happens in the pages that immediately follow the
delimitation (die Abgrenzunt).
It is therefore necessary to isolate two typical series ofontological
 Aporias

statements concerning possibility. They are articulated with each

other; they supplement and engender each other, like the two
moments of a single aporetic sentence.
The first statements are assertions and characterize death as
Dasein's most proper possibility. Being-possible is proper to Dasein
as emity, and death is the most proper possibility of this possibility.
This typical statement distributes itself, modulates itself, and is
argued in many ways, but its recurrency gives its rhythm to the
entire ending of the chapter, that is, the four long paragraphs or
subchapters (§§50-53) . This possibility of being is not a simple
characteristic to be noted or described. In its essential and constant
imminence, it must be assumed, one can and one must testify to it;
and the testimony is not a mere constative report: the statements of
the existential analysis are originarily prescriptive or normative.
More precisely, they analyze an irreducible prescriptivity, which
itself stems from being as being-possible, but they do so in the
mode of phenomenological attestation (this is the considerable
problem of Bezeugung that I signaled too quickly above): "Death is
a possibility-of-being that Dasein itself has to take over [zu uber­
nebmen] in every case. With death, Dasein awaits itself [sat-tend
lui-meme, steht sich . . . bevor, "stands before" in Macquarrie and
Robinson] in its ownmost potentiality-for-being" (p. 250).
What am I translating here, in a slightly strange way, by "awaits
itself" [sat-tendre] ? In the French grammatical construction sat­
tendre, where the untranslatability of the idiom can produce effects
of shibboleth, several transitivities intersect and proliferate. One,
not very common, seems to be a reflexive construction with no
object properly speaking, with no other object toward which to
tend than oneself. (One simply awaits oneself [on sattend soi­
meme] : I await myself, and nothing else; I myself await mysdf in
myself; and this is the most identifiable and most identifying self­
relation, i.e., the ego's memory or promise of itself.) The other
syntax of transitivity relates to [a] something, indeed, to something
completely other: one is expecting [on s'attend a)-and my subtitle
(Mourir-sattendre aux "limites de Ia verite ") leaves this instability
in movement: to expect the limits [s'attendre aux limites], to expect
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival

meeting the limits [s'attendre a rencontrer les limites] and to await

oneself at the limits [s'attendre soi-meme aux limites] , to have a
meeting with oneself in this place, in these parts [parages] that one
calls the "limits of truth," in the vicinity of these limits. But this
instability can even lead us elsewhere, and in truth can lead us to
the limits from which the instability itself proceeds, at the very
origin of the destabilizing movement.
How? First, let us summarize. One thus can: (1) Await oneself,
await oneself in oneself. (2) As long as the waiting can only be
directed toward some other and toward some arrivant, one can and
must wait for something else, hence expect some other-as when
one is said to expect that something will happen or that some other
will arrive. In both cases the awaiting oneself [le s'attendre soi­
meme] and the expecting [le s'attendre-a] or the expecting-that [le
s'attendre-que] can have a notable relation to death, to what is
called-death (it is there, and maybe only there, that one ul­
timately awaits oneselfor expects, that one expects that; and it is only
there that the awaiting oneselfmay be no other than the expecting
the other, or that the other may arrive) . (3) But there is a third and
maybe first possibility in this grammatical structure: we can wait
for each other [s'attendre l'u n I 'autre, l'une I 'autre] , and not only is
the reflexive construction of the absolute awaiting each other [s'at­
tendre] not incompatible, but in fact, it is immediately consonant
with the most heterological reference to the completely other. This
reference is more heterological than ever-others would say as close
as ever to the limits of truth-when the waiting for each other is
related to death, to the borders of death, where we wait for each
other knowing a priori, and absolutely undeniably, that, life always
being too short, the one is waiting for the other there, for the one
and the other never arrive there together, at this rendezvous (death
is ultimately the name of impossible simultaneity and of an impos­
sibility that we know simultaneously, at which we await each other,
at the same time, ama as one says in Greek: at the same time,
simultaneously, we are expecting this anachronism and this con­
tretemps). Both the one and the other never arrive together at this
rendezvous, and the one who waits for the other there, at this
66 Aporias

border, is not he who arrives there first or she who gets there first.
In order to wait for the other at this meeting place, one must, on
the contrary, arrive there late, not early. Taking into consideration
the anachronism of the waiting for each other in this contretemps
of mourning would certainly change the commonly and hastily
assumed premises of the triangular debate that we assigned to
Freud, Heidegger, and Levinas: with respect to death, the death of
oneself, and the death of the other.
The s'attendre that I have used in order to translate Heidegger's
sentence involves imminence, indeed, the anxious anticipation of
something, but also the double or rather triple transitivity (non­
reflexive and reflexive) of the expecting, the waiting for something
that will happen as the completely other than oneself, but of
waiting (for each other) by awaiting oneself also [s'attendre en
s'attendant du meme coup soi-meme] , by preceding oneself as if one
had a meeting with a oneself that one is but does not know. The
German sentence says, "Mit dem Tod steht sich das Dasein selbst
in seinem eigensten Seinki:innen bevor." Martineau translates steht
bevor by sepre-cede [precedes itself] (''Avec la mort, le Dasein se pre­
cede lui-meme en son pouvoir-etre le plus propre"; with death
Dasein pre-cedes itself in its most proper being-able) . Vezen trans­
lates steht bevor by
a rendez-vous, has a rendezvous ("Avec Ia mort le
Dasein a rendez-vous avec lui-meme dans son pouvoir etre le plus
propre"; with death Dasein has a rendezvous with itself in its most
proper being-able) . Macquarrie and Robinson remind us of an­
other connotation of being-before-itself when they translate it
more literally by "stands before itself" ("With death, Dasein stands
before itself in its ownmost potentiality for being") . With death,
Dasein is indeed infront of itself, before itself (bevor) , both as before
a mirror and as before the future: it awaits itself [s'attend], it
precedes itself [se precede] , it has a rendezvous with itself. Dasein
stretches [se tend], bends toward [se tend vers] its most proper
being-able, offers to itself [se tend] its most proper being-able; it
offers it to itself [se le tend] as much as it bends toward it [tend vers
lui], as soon as the latter is nothing other than itself. What is most
important is this in seinem eigensten Seinkonnen-and Heidegger
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival

underlines the eigensten, the most proper. Further on, he repeats

the same expression, and he underlines it again a little later, near
the word Bevorstand, which echoes steht bevor: "So enthtillt sich der
Tod als die eigenste, unbeziigliche, uni.iberholbare Moglichkeit. Als
solche ist er eine ausgezeichneter Bevorstand"; "Thus death unveils
itself as the most proper, absolute (absolutely non-relational) , pos­
sibility, a possibility that is not to be outstripped. As such, death
is something distinctively impending [!'imminence insigne du s'at­
tendre]" (pp. 250-51) . The self-unveiling (So enthiil!t sich der Tod)
b �peaks a truth of death, indeed a truth as truth of death whose
internal limit we shall return to soon. The definition of death as the
most proper possibility comes back insistently and in the same
terms in §51 (p. 255) and in §52 (pp. 259-60) , in order to describe
both the anxiety that must be related to this most proper possibility
and the fear that keeps the everyday "one" from having the courage
or the heart (Mut) to approach or confront (aujkommen) this
anxiety before death. A frightened escape makes one misrecognize
the type of nonempirical certainty that guarantees one from death.
Dasein, then, takes refuge in gossip ( Gerede), in tranquillization, in
dissimulation, in avoiding demise, and in the race toward the
anonymity of "one dies," far from the Unheimlichkeit-indeed, all
these are structural and not accidental modalities of the Veifallen.
The values of certainty and truth are essential for this analysis.
Without being able to get into it here, let us just note that the
certainty of death is described as heterogeneous to any other cer­
tainty (apodictic, theoretical, or empirical, that is to say, derived or
induced-for example, from the spectacle of the other's demise) . As
for inauthentic existence, which evades the proper possibility of
death, Heidegger defines it as untruth ( Unwahrheit) , both in this
context and in others (§§44, 222) . When one speaks of dying,
everything thus happens at the limits of truth and untruth. In order
to approach this limit further, we must move to the second series of
statements, which we described above as the aporetic supplement
of the first series.
This second series is an aporetic supplement because it is in the
same sentence, in the interrupted unity of the same propositional
68 Aporias

syntaX in a way, that the impossibility adds an impossible comple­

ment, a complement of impossibility to possibility. Insofar as it is
its most proper possibility, and precisely as such, death is also for
Dasein, Heidegger ultimately says, the possibility of an impos­
sibility. T here are several modalized occurrences of this nuclear
proposition. It is often cited. However, its gripping paradox is
hardly noted, and the importance of all the successive explosions
that it holds in reserve, in the underground of the existential
analysis, is probably not measured. It is best to cite several of these
occurrences. They will force us to ask ourselves the following
J
questions: Is this an aporia? Where do we situate it? In the impos­
sibility or in the possibility of an impossibility (which is not
necessarily the same thing)? What can the possibility of an impos­
sibility be? How can we think that? How can we say it while
respecting logic and meaning? How can we approach that, live, or
exist it? How does one testify to it?
The first occurrence immediately follows the allusion to the
s'attendre, to the imminence of the bevorstehen, by which Dasein
stands before death [s'attend a] as its most proper possibility: "This
is a possibility in which," Heidegger abruptly adds, "the issue is
nothing less than Dasein's being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-Sein] .
Its death is the possibility of being-able-no-longer-to-be-there [die
Moglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-konnem]" (p. 250) . Heidegger
does not say "the possibility of no longer being able to be Dasein"
but "the possibility of being able no longer to be there" or "of no
longer being able to be there." T his is indeed the possibility of a
being-able-not-to or of a no-longer-being-able-to, but by no means
the impossibility of a being-able-to. The nuance is thin, but its very
fragility is what seems to me both decisive and significant, and it
probably is most essential in Heidegger's view. Death, the most
proper possibility of Dasein, is the possibility of a being-able-no­
longer-to-be-there or of a no-longer-being-able-to-be there as Da­
sein. And of that Dasein is absolutely certain; it can testify to it as to
a unique truth that is not comparable to any other. Dasein can
escape from this truth inauthentically (improperly) or approach it
authentically, properly awaiting it [sy attendant] in anxiety and in
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival

freedom. Awaiting it, that is to say, expecting and waiting for death
[satten�nt a Ia mort] and waiting for itself there [sy atten�nt lui­
meme]. As Heidegger adds: ''As potentiality-for-being, Dasein can­
not outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the
absolute impossibility of Dasein" (§50, p. 250).
Although I cannot do it here, it would be necessary to recon­
stitute a number of steps taken by Heidegger, particularly the one
that concerns the modes of waiting or of anticipating and the "not
yet" [pas encore] that are proper to Dasein. From an ontological
point of view, this "not yet" is not the anticipation of a completion
or accomplishment. It must be distinguished from what Heidegger
calls the Ausstehen of the Ausstand, a term that is very difficult to
translate: it partakes at the same time of the "delay," the remainder
(Rest), which indeed is an example of it, the "remaining in waiting"
(restant en attente, Vezin's translation), the "excess" (excedent, Mar­
tineau's translation), and the "still outstanding" (Macquarrie and
Robinson). This "remaining," this "lack as remaining" (� Fehlen
als Ausstand), remains, in sum, to be lived, like the piece of a set
with which it is homogeneous, the part that is still absent from a
whole to be completed, a "sum" in sum. By this token, and insofar
as it still belongs to Zuhandenheit, what one can wait for, count on,
expect as a remainder to be lived, is of a wholly other order than the
"not yet" of Dasein. In the "not yet" that bends us toward death, the
expecting and waiting [le sattendre] is absolutely incalculable; it is
without measure, and out of proportion with the time of what is
left for us to live. One no longer reckons with this "not yet," and
the sigh that it calls forth does not bespeak the measurable but
instead the nonmeasurable: whether it lasts a second or a century,
how short will life have been. Through an entirely interior path,
which Heidegger does not signal, one then necessarily passes from
the ontological "not yet" (Noch-nicht), insofar as it says what is, in
the indicative, to the "not yet" of prayer and of desire, the mur­
mured exclamation, the subjunctivity of the sigh: that death not
come, notyet!
Mter these steps, Heidegger repeats two more times the proposi­
tion that I just cited. He does so according to a different linkage,
70 Aporias

indeed, but without ever lending the least attention or the least
thematic interest to the logical form of the contradiction or to what
goes against meaning or common sense. In the persistence of this
apparently logical contradiction (the most proper possibility as the
possibility of an impossibility), he even seems to see a condition of
the truth, the condition oftruth, its very unveiling, where truth is no
longer measured in terms of the logical form of j udgment.
Before Heidegger repeats that death is the mostproper possibility
of Dasein (eigenste is underlined and me expression die eigenste
Moglichkeit opens, in a slightly liturgical tone, a whole series of
paragraphs in subchapter 53,)which is devoted, as its tide indicates,
to me authentic [eigentliche] being-toward-death [Sein zum Tode]),
he emphasizes: "The closest closeness [die niichste Niihe] that one
may have in being toward death as a possibility, is as far as possible
[sofern als moglich] from anything actual [einem Wirklichen] " (§53,
p. 262).
This absolute proximity is the most proper property. But since it
is also as far away as possible (so fern als moglich), and far from any
actual reality, it is the possibility of an impossible, of a nonreal as
impossible. Now, in the following semence the figure of unveiling,
that is, the truth of this syntax, makes the impossible be, in the
genitive form, the complement of the noun or the aporetic supple­
ment of the possible (possibility of the impossible), but also me
manifestation of the possible as impossible, the "as" (als) becoming
the enigmatic figure of this monstrous coupling:

The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood [je urwerhiillter

diese Moglichkeit verstanden wird] , the more purely [ um so reiner] does
the understanding penetrate into it [advances into, dringt vorl as the

porribility of the impossibility of any existence at all [underlined by

Heidegger: als die der Unmoglichkeit der Existenz iiberhaupt].

The als means that the possibility is both unveiled and pene­
trated as impossibility. It is not only the paradoxical possibility of a
possibility of impossibility: it is possibility as impossibility. What is
thus both unveiled (unverhullte) and unveiled by, for, and during a
penetraring advance ( vordringen), is this possi hili ty as impossibility,
 Awaiting (at) the An-ival ?I

this death as the most proper possibility of Dasein considered as its

proper impossibility. The singular motion thus named, the pen­
etrating advance, gives or pre-gives access to the meaning of dying.
Thanks to it, Dasein is as if in accord with ( Verstehen) its own death.
This death is both its most proper possibility and this same (most
proper) possibility as impossibility (hence, the leastproper, I would
say, but Heidegger never says it like that). The als (as, considered
as) keeps in reserve rhe most unthinkable but it is nor yet the als
solche (as such): we will have to ask ourselves how a (most proper)
possibility as impossibility can still appear as such without imme­
diately disappearing, without the "as such'' already sinking be­
forehand and without irs essential disappearance making Dasein
lose everything that distinguished it-both from other forms of
entities and even from the living animal in general, from the
animal [ bete]. And without its properly-dying being originarily
contaminated and parasited by the perishing and the demising.
For the moment, let us note that the als is translated or relayed by
· the genitive form of a complement of the noun. The text impercep­
tibly moves from the possibility as possibility ofthe impossibility to
the simple possibility of impossibility.
There are at least two examples:

r. "Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 'actualized'

[nichts zu "Verwirklichendes"] , nothing that Dasein, considered
as something actual, could be. It [Death] is the possibility of
the impossibility [die Moglichkeit der Unmoglichkeit] of every way
of . . . existing" (p. 262).

2. And further: "In the anticipation of this possibility [in the an­
ticipatory precursiveness, in the tending oneself toward (se-tendre­
vers) of theawaiting (s'attendre), in some way, im VtJrlaufin] , it
becomes 'greater and greater' [ "immer grojSer" in quotation marks;
this is a strange notation: how can the possibility of death always
grow greater, and what is here the measure? but the answer is
probably precisely the without measure, the incalculable non­
measure of truth against which this measure is measured] , that is to
say, the possibility reveals itself [sich enthii.l!t] as such, it reveals
72 Aporias

itself to be such that i t knows no measure at all, no more or less, but

signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence
[die Moglichkeit der maflosen Unmoglichkeit der Existenz] " (p. 262).
Further in the text (p. 265), reversing the order of presentation,
Heidegger wonders how the simple impossibility of existence be­
comes possible, when the moment where this impossibility be­
comes possible remains both absolutely certain and absolutely inde­
terminate.
The end is approaching. Precipitation and prematuration make
the law, even when the thing lasts too long. We must therefore
_,
interrupt, unjustly and arbitrarily, the patient and interminable
reading that would still be required of Being and Time and of so
many other texts, and we will rush without waiting toward some
questions in the form of a provisional conclusion or of suggestions
for discussion.

There are several ways of thinking the possibility of impossibility

as aporia. Heidegger would certainly not accept making of this
possibility of impossibility, that is, of dying, or of what I have called
the "awaiting death" [le s'attendre a la mort] , one example among
others, one of these cases in which a strange logical figure of
contradiction would take the form of an antinomy or of an aporia,
of a problem of language or of logic to be resolved. Death-to be
expected [a laquelle s'attendre]-is the unique occurrence of this
possibility of impossibility. For it concerns the impossibility of
existence itself, and not merely the impossibility of this or that. Any
other determined possibility or impossibility would take on mean­
ing and would be defined within its limits in terms of this particu­
lar possibility of impossibility, this particular impossibility.
While taking into consideration this absolute uniqueness, from
which every uniqueness is defined, particularly every ]emeinigkeit
of expecting death [du s'attendre a la mort] , one can nevertheless
retain the dynamic aspect of this question. Indeed, why not invoke
the same exceptionality for the aporia of which we are speaking
here (which is not just a language or logic game and which should
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 73

not be classified as such too quickly) ? Can one not also ask: What is
the place of this unique aporia in such an "expecting death" as
"expecting" the only possibility of the impossible? Is the place of
this nonpassage impossibility itself or the possibility of impos­
sibility? Or is it that the impossible be possible? Is the aporia the
impossible itself? Indeed, the aporia is said to be impossibility,
impracticability, or nonpassage: here dying would be the aporia,
the impossibility of being dead, the impossibiliry ofliving or rather
"existing" one's death, as well as the impossibility of existing once
one is dead, or, in Heidegger's terms, the impossibility for Dasein to
be what it is, there where it is, there, Dasein. Or else, on the
contrary (and is it the contrary?), is this aporia the fact that the
impossibility would be possible and would appear as such, as
impossible, as an impossibility that can nevertheless appear or
announce itself as such, an impossibility whose appearing as such
would be possible (to Dasein and not to the living animal) , an
impossibility that one can await or expect, an impossibility the
limits ofwhich one can expect or at whose limits one can wait raux
limites de laquelle on peut s'attendre], these limits of the as such
being, as we have seen, the limits of truth, but also of the possibility
of truth? Truth and non truth would be inseparable, and this couple
would only be possible for Dasein. According to Heidegger, there is
no nontruth for the animal, just as there is no death and no
language. Truth is the truth of nontruth and vice versa. Later, after
Being and Time, many of Heidegger's statements will suggest this.
Everything thus lies in this enigma of the "as such" and of the
appearing that at once marks and erases the three types of limits
that we have described: (1) the (anthropologico-cultural) borders;
(2) the delimitations of the problematic closure, and (3) the concep­
tual demarcations of this existential analysis. To mark and at the
same time to erase these lines, which only happen by erasing them­
selves, which only succeed in erasing themselves [n'am'vent qu'a
s'ejfacer] , is to trace them as still possible while also introducing the
very principle of their impossibility, the principle of ruin, which is
also their chance and which promises the line while compromising
it in parasitism [parasitage] , grafting, and divisibility. This princi-
74 Aporias

ple of ruin is nothing other than death: not the dying-properly but,
and it is quite different, the end of the properly-dying. This end
threatens and makes possible the analysis itself as a discourse of de­
limitation, of guaranteed dissociation, of the border or the deter­
mined closure (in the double sense of de-termination, that of the
logic of termination [terma, peras, finis], and that of the resolute
decision or of resolution-let us not forget that the analysis of Being
and Time is also the great discourse on Entschlossenheit).
Heidegger does not say this and he cannot say it anywhere in
Being and Time up to its interruption, even if such an (aporetic)
y
form of the nonsaid can alwa s be interpreted as denied revelation,
avowal, betrayal, or symptomatic transgression, and as a secret that
cannot be kept and presents itself cryptically. Besides, death is
always the name of a secret, since it signs the irreplaceable sin­
gularity. It puts forth the public name, the common name of a
secret, the common name of the proper name without name. It is
therefore always a shibboleth, for the manifest name of a secret is
from the beginning a private name, so that language about death
is nothing but the long history of a secret society, neither public nor
private, semi-private, semi-public, on the border between the two;
thus, also a sort of hidden religion of the awaiting (oneself as well as
each other), with its ceremonies, cults, liturgy, or its Marranolike
rituals. A universal Marrano, if one may say, beyond what may
nowadays be the finished forms of Marrano culture.
Heidegger would thus say that for Dasein impossibility as
death-the impossibility of death, the impossibility of the existence
whose name is "death" -can appear as such and announce itself; it
can make itselfawaited or let itselfbe awaited [sefaire attendre ou se
laisser attendre] as possible and as such. Only Dasein would be
capable of this aporia, only Dasein has a relation to death as such,
and this relation is not dissociable from its ability to speak, the
animal being deprived of both possibilities or abilities. And it is
only in the act of authentic (eigentlich), resolute, determinate, and
decided assumption by which Dasein would take upon itself the
possibility of this impossibility that the aporia as such would an­
nounce itself as such and purely to Dasein as its most proper
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 75

possibility, hence as the most proper essence of Dasein, its freedom,

its ability to question, and its opening to the meaning of being.
But here we have at least the scheme of a possible/ impossible
question: What difference is there between the possibility of ap­
pearing as such of the possibility of an impossibility and the
impossibility of appearing as such of the same possibility? The
impossibility of existing or of Dasein that Heidegger speaks of
under the name of "death" is the disappearance, the end, the anni­
hilation of the as such, of the possibility of the relation to the
phenomenon as such or to the phenomenon of the "as such." The
impossibility that is possible for Dasein is, indeed, that there not be
or that there no longer be Dasein: that precisely what is possible
become impossible, from then on no longer appearing as such. It is
nothing less than the end of the world, with each death, each time
that we expect no longer to be able to await ourselves and each
other [nous attendre], hence no longer to be able to understand
each other [nous entendre] . According to Heidegger, it is therefore
the impossibility of the "as such" that, as such, would be possible to
Dasein and not to any form of entity and living thing. But if the
impossibility of the "as such" is indeed the impossibility of the "as
such," it is also what cannot appear as such. Indeed, this relation to
the disappearing as such of the "as such" -the "as such" that
Heidegger makes the distinctive mark and the specific ability of
Dasein- is also the characteristic common both to the inauthentic
and to the authentic forms of the existence of Dasein, common to
all experiences of death (properly dying, perishing, and demising) ,
and also, outside of Dasein, common to all living things in general.
Common characteristic does not mean homogeneity, but rather
the impossibility of an absolutely pure and rigorously uncrossable
limit (in terms of existence or of concepts) between an existential
analysis of death and a fundamental anchropo-theology, and more­
over between anthropological cultures of death and animal cultures
of death. Against, or without, Heidegger, one could point to a
thousand signs that show that animals also die. Although the
innumerable structural differences that separate one "species" from
another should make us vigilant about any discourse on animality
 Aporias

or bestiality in general one can say that animals have a very

significant relation to death, to murder and to war (hence, to
borders), to mourning and to hospitality, and so forth, even if they
have neither a relation to death nor to the "name" of death as such,
nor, by the same token, to the other as such, to the purity as such of
the alterity of the other as such. But neither does man, that is
precisely the point! Nor does even man as Dasein, assuming that
one could ever rigorously say man and man as Dasein. Who will
guarantee that the name, the ability to name death (like that of
naming the other, and it is the same) does not participate as much
in the dissimulation of the /as such" of death as in its revelation,
and that language is not precisely the origin of the nontruth of
death, and of the other?
For, conversely, if death is indeed the possibility of the impossi­
ble and therefore the possibility of appearing as such of the impos­
sibility of appearing as such either, then man, or man as Dasein,
never has a relation to death as such, but only to perishing, to
demising, and to the death of the other, who is not the other. The
death of the other thus becomes again "first," always first. It is like
the experience of mourning that institutes my relation to myself
and constitutes the egoity of the ego as well as every femeinigkeit in
the diffiran ce
- neither internal nor external-that strucrures this
experience. The death of the other, this death of the other in "me,"
is fundamentally the only death that is named in the syntagm "my
death," with all the consequences that one can draw from this. This
is another dimension of awaiting [sattendre] as awaiting one an­
other [sattendre l'u n /autre] , awaiting oneself at death and expect­
ing death [sattendre soi-meme a Ia mort] by awaiting one another
[sattendant l'un /'autre] , up to the most advanced longevity in a life
that will have been so short, no matter what.
This nonaccess to death as such-but this access only to the
aspect of the border that can only be the threshold, the step, as one
says of the approach to the border-is also what Heidegger calls the
impossible, the access to death as nonaccess to a nonborder, as
the possibility of the impossible. But one can turn what is thus at
the very heart of the possibility of the existential analysis against the
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 77

whole apparatus of Being and Time, against the very possibility of

the existential analysis. When Blanchot constantly repeats18-and
it is a long complaint and not a triumph of life-the impossible
dying, the impossibility, alas, of dying, he says at once the same
thing and something completely different from Heidegger. It is just
a question of knowing in which sense (in the sense of direction and
trajectory) one reads the expression the possibility of impossibility.
If death, the most proper possibility of Dasein, is the possibil­
ity of its impossibility, death becomes the most improper possi­
bility and the most ex-propriadng, the most inauthenticating one.
From the most originary inside of its possibility, the proper of
Dasein becomes from then on contaminated, parasited, and di­
vided by the most improper. Heidegger indeed says that inauthen­
ticity is not an exterior accident, a sin or an evil that comes by
surprise to existence in its authentic mode. This is where Heidegger
at least claims to dissociate Verfollen from the original sin and from
any morality as well as from any theology. But he crucially needs
the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic, as well
as that among the different forms of ending: dyingproperly speaking,
perishing, and demising. These distinctions are threatened in their
very principle, and, in truth, they remain impracticable as soon as
one admits that an ultimate possibility is nothing other than the
possibility of an impossibility and that the Enteignis always inhab­
ited Eigentlichkeitbefore even being named there-indeed, this will
happen later.
To that which lives without having a name, we will give an added
name: Marrano, for example. Playing with the relative arbitrariness
of every nomination, we determine this added name [surnom] ,
which a name always is, in memory of and according to the figure
of the Marrano (of the crypto-judaic, and of the crypto-X in
general) . As we suggested just a while ago, it is said that the history
of the Marranos has just come to an end with the declaration by the
Spanish court [in r992] . You can believe that if you want to.
We will not deploy this aporetic "logic" much longer. The
principle of all the consequences that one can draw from it is
fearsome. For what guarantees its ultimate resource to the ex.isten-
 Aporias

tial analysis of Dasein (that is, the "as such'' of death) is also what
ruins the very possibility of the analysis from within. It therefore
compromises all at once: (1) the phenomenological principle of the
"as such" that regulates its method; (2) the problematic closures
that the analysis draws in its relation to other disciplines; and (3)
the conceptual limits that the analysis puts into operation: for
example, the limits between Dasein and the being of other entities
( Vorhandensein, Zuhandensein) or other living things, between the
speaking being that has a world and the animal "poor of world"
(weltarm) (this makes all the difference in the world, it concerns
all the borders of the world) ; }ut also the limits between ending
and perishing (endenl verenden), dying and perishing (sterbenl ver­
enden), dying and demising (sterbenl ableben).
In the French idiom, we could add the distinction among: (I) to
be oneself awaiting [s'attendre soi-meme] (death) in an always too
short life; (2) to be expecting death and that death come [s'attendre
a Ia mort et que Ia mort vienne] (always too soon or too late,
untimely); and (3) to be waiting for each other, waiting for/in
death as for/ at the limits of truth [s'attendre Fun I 'autre a Ia mort
comme aux limites de Ia verite1 .
What appears to be refused is the pure possibility of cutting off.
Among border, closure, and demarcation, who would be able to cut
this braid in which I have let myself be taken and that I am going
to leave here? Leaving it open or fraying it at each of its ends, let us
describe the three twisting movements that keep it open and
ultimately interminable, in other words without end.
First, it involves the aporia, since that was my theme. What we
have glimpsed, I hope, and the lesson that I draw for the usage I
was able or may be able from now on to make of the aporia, is that
if one must endure the aporia, if such is the law of all decisions, of
all responsibilities, of all duties without duty, and of all the border
problems that ever can arise, the aporia can never simply be endured
as such. The ultimate aporia is the impossibility of the aporia as
such. The reservoir of this statement seems to me incalculable. This
statemem is made with and reckons with the incalculable itself.
Death, as the possibility of the impossible as such, is a figure of the
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 79

aporia in which "death" and death can replace-and this is a

metonymy that carries the name beyond the name and beyond the
name of name-all that is only possible as impossible, if there is
such a thing: love, the gift, the other, testimony, and so forth.
Second, it involves what from the beginning foils every method­
ological strategy and every stratagem of delimitation. Circumscrip­
tion is the impossible. I hope that I have convinced you my
purpose was not to justify a passage beyond knowledge, anthropo­
thanatology, biology, or the metaphysics of death toward a more
radical, originary, or fundamental thought, as if the limit were
a known edge between, on the one hand, anthropology (be it even
a fundamental anthropology) and, on the other hand, ontology,
an existential analysis, and more generally a more questioning
thought of death in general. On the contrary, based on the example
of Heidegger or of the virtual debate among Heidegger, Levinas,
and Freud, my discourse was aimed at suggesting that this funda­
mentalist dimension is untenable and that it cannot even claim to
have any coherence or rigorous specificity. It remains untenable,
even if one thinks in an original way the limits of this coherence or
of this specificity in the form of a system, of the unity of a field,
or of an archi-region, etc. While the richest or most necessary
anthropo-thanatology cannot found itself in any other way than on
presuppositions that do not belong to its knowledge or its compe­
tence, and while these presuppositions therefore constitute a style
of questioning ofwhich Heidegger, Freud, and Levinas are remark­
able witnesses, conversely this fundamental questioning cannot
protect itself from a hidden bio-anthropo-thanato-theological con­
tamination.
Finally, since this contaminating contraband remains irreduc­
ible, it already insinuates itself through the idiom of the existential
analysis. One will always be able to consider the existential analysis
as a witness-and I keep for this term witness the ambiguity by
which, as you may remember, we characterized the clause of be­
longing without belonging that is the condition of any testimony,
and of its language first of all. What is analysis witness to? Well,
precisely to that from which it demarcates itself, here mainly from
8o Aporias

the culture characterized by the so-called religions of the Book.

Despite all the distance taken from anthropo-theology, indeed,
from Christian onto-theology, the analysis of death in Being and
Time nonetheless repeats all the essential motifs of such onto­
theology, a repetition that bores into its originarity right down to
its ontological foundation, whether it concerns the fall, the Vt>r­
follen, into the inauthentidty of relaxation or distraction, or the
sollicitudo, the cura, and the care (Sorge), or sin and originary guilt
(Schuldigsein), or anxiety, and, regarding the texts, whether it
concerns St. Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Pascal, Kierkegaard, or a
few others. Whatever the enigrha of this repetition, as well as of the
concept of repetition deployed by Heidegger, I'll just say, without
being able to go into it in any depth, that neither the language nor
the process of this analysis of death is possible without the Chris­
tian experience, indeed, the Judeo-Christiano-lslamic experience
of death to which the analysis testifies. Without this event and the
irreducible historicity to which it testifies. The same could be said
for Freud's and Levinas's thought, mutatis mutandis. Considering
what we just have seen concerning borders, demarcations, and
limits, the o nly characteristic that we can stress here is that of an
irreducibly double inclusion: the including and the included reg­
ularly exchange places in this strange topography of edges. Instead
of deploying the concept at length, I will simply point to the
example.
On the one hand, no matter how rich or new it may be, one can
read a history of death in the Christian West, like that of Aries for
example, as a small monograph that illustrates like a footnote the
extent to which it relies, in its presuppositions, upon the powerful
and universal delimitation that the existential analysis of death in
Being mld Time is. The existential analysis exceeds and therefore
includes beforehand the work of the historian, not to mention the
biologist, the psychologist, and the theologian of death. It also
conditions their work; it is constantly presupposed there.
However, on the other hand, conversely but just as legitimately,
one can also be tempted to read Being and Time as a small, late
document, among many others within the huge archive where the
 Awaiting (at) the Arrival 81

memory of death in Christian Europe is being accumulated. Each

of these two discourses on death is much more comprehensive than
the other, bigger and smaller than what it tends to include or
exclude, more and less originary, more and less ancient, young or
old.
Maybe we have the age, an age among others, of this anachro­
msm.
How can one have an age among others? How does one calculate
the age of a Marrano, for example?
Let us figuratively call Marrano anyone who remains faithful to a
secret that he has not chosen, in the very place where he lives, in the
home of the inhabitant or of the occupant, in the home of the first
or of the second arrivant, in the very place where he stays without
saying no but without identifying himself as belonging to. In the
unchallenged night where the radical absence of any historical
witness keeps him or her, in the dominant culture that by defini-
i tion has calendars, this secret keeps the Marrano even before the
' Marrano keeps it. Is it not possible to think that such a secret eludes
history, age, and aging?
Thanks to this anachronism, Marranos that we are, Marranos in
any case, whether we want to be or not, whether we know it or not,
Marranos having an incalculable number of ages, hours, and years,
of untimely histories, each both larger and smaller than the other,
each still waiting for the other, we may incessantly be younger and
older, in a last word, infinitely finished.
 Notes

1. The "paternity" here is that of Denis Diderot, and the "limits of

umh'' he bespeaks in his Essai sur Ia vie de Seneque le philosophe, mr ses
krits, et sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron, in vol. 7 of Oeuvres de Seneque
traduites en franfais par feu M Lagrange (Paris: Freres de Bure, 1778).
Diderot's essay wa.� published in 1782 in a second edition with the title
Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron et sur les moeurs et les ecrits de
Seneque, pour servir d'introduction a Ia lecture de cephilosophe, to be found
in Diderot: Oeuvres completes (Paris: Herman, 1986): 25: 363-71. Unless
otherwise identified, all translations below are my own.-Trans.
2. Seneca, "On the Shortness of Life," in vol. 2 of Moral Essays, trans.
John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932): Book 10:
3.1-4 (translation modified) .
3· Ibid. 10: 3.5-4.2.
4· Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, ed. Thomas Schiche
(Smttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1961).
5· Sophocles, Oedipus the King, trans. David Grene in Sophocles I
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973): II. 1528-30.
6. Jacques Derrida, Margins ofPhilosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 39·
7· In this and the following paragraph, the author mentions these
works of his (English rranslations have been listed where they exist) :
"Tympan," in ibid.; Glas, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., and Richard Rand
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986) ; "Fors: The Anglish Words
of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok," trans. Barbara Johnson, The
Georgia Review (Spring 1977), pp. 64-n6; Memoires for Paul de Man,
 Notes to Pages I9-2I

trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986); Psyche: Inventions de /'autre (Paris:
Editions Galilee, I987); Parages (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1986); Schib­
boleth: Pour Paul Celan (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1986); Limited Inc., re­
edited, with "Toward an Ethic of Discussion" (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1988); Du droit a Ia philosophie (Paris: Editions Galilee,
I990); Donner le temps, I: La fousse monnaie (Paris: Editions Galilee,
I991), in English as Given Time, I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Karnuf
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I992); The Other Heading, trans.
Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana Uni­
j
versity Press, I992); "Passions," "n Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. David
Wood (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, I992); "Donner Ia mort," in L'Ethique du
don, ed. Jean-Michel Rabate and Michael Wetzel (Paris: Transition,
I992).-Trans.
8. The Other Heading, pp. 76-78.
9· Ibid., pp. 8o-81.
10. Indeed, what Kant calls the peace alliance (foedus pacificum),
which is distinct from the peace contract (pactum pacis) , links the States in
order to end all wars. Always involving state control, interstate and
therefore intrastate control, this alliance aims not at political power but
at assuring the freedom of the State as such, ofone of the States and ofthe
States that are its allies. This idea of federation "should progressively
spread to all States and thus lead to perpetual peace." In Kant's view, this
is the only rational means for leaving war and the savage, lawless state
behind. Thus, it would be a matter of constituting a "State ofpeoples
(actually growing ceaselessly) , which will finally gather all the peoples of
the earth." But since the peoples do not want such a State, "only the
negative equivalent of a permanent alliance, protecting against war and
always extending itself further, can, in the place of the positive idea of a
world republic (if one does not want to lose everything), hold back the
warring inclination that fears law but that presents the constant danger of
exploding" (Zum ewigen Frieden). The themes of this conference would
demand of us that we reflect and also transpose what, according to Kant,
follows from these cosmopolitan rights with respect to hospitality and the
secret. (I) The hospitalitas should give the foreigner the right not to be
treated as an enemy when he arrives on the other's territory. But if one has
the right to send the foreigner back, it is on the condition that this
expulsion not rush him toward his ruin. And for as long as he "stays
quietly in his place," one should not treat him as an enemy. But if the
 Note to Page 2I

foreigner only has, to be sure, the right to visit and not that of residence,
this right to visit is to be extended to all mankind. Why? Because this
right is based upon the "right of the communal possession of the surface
of the earth." The earth being spherical, infinite dispersion is excluded as
a possibility. No one has originally more right to occupy territory than
anyone else, and people must indeed live alongside one another. (2)
Concerning the secret, that is, a sort of shibboleth in legal relations
[relations de droit] , doesn't it occupy here a very unique place? Certainly
public law [droit public] excludes the secret from its content, as an
objective contradiction of terms. But "subjectively" the author of an
article can want to keep the secret and judge that it is a matter of his
dignity. Concerning international relations, there is only one secret in
view of perpetual peace ( Geheimer Artikel zum ewigen Frieden): ''The
States armed for war should consult the maxims of rhe philosophers
concerning the conditions of public peace." If the legislator of a State
seems to discredit himself by seeking instruction from those citizens who
the philosophers are, when it concerns relations with other States, he is
,nonetheless "advised" to do it, Kant says. But he should do it "tacidy"
; (stillschweigend; i.e., by making a secret [ Geheimnis] of it); he is advised
to let the philosophers speak freely and publicly of universal maxims
about war and peace. Not that the State should prefer philosophical
principles to the sentences of the jurist who represents the power of the
State, but the State should listen to the philosopher. This is the logic of
the Conflict of Faculties : "The faculty of philosophy, subjected to these
united powers, finds itself at a very low level. . . . One must not expect
that kings philosophize or that philosophers become kings, but one must
also not wish for it because holding power inevitably corrupts the free
judgment of reason. But it is indispensable to the clarification of power's
affairs that kings and royalty (controlling themselves by following the
laws of egality) do not let the class of philosophers disappear or be
deprived of speech, but instead let it speak publicly, and, because the class
of philosophers, by its nature, is incapable of unifying itself into bands or
clubs, it cannot be suspected, by any scandalmongering, of propaganda
[Propagande] ." This place granted to the secret in the practice of politics,
in legislative activity, and in the conduct of international affairs escapes
from public law and public space, as well as from publicity and from the
res publica of the State, a zone of the socius that, although not public, is
not private either, and, although not belonging to law, does not stem
from reality or from natural savagery either. Before all these oppositions
86 Notes to Pages 23-49

or fundamental distinctions, before all these critical delimitations, the

secret possibility of the secret seems to situate, in truth to prescribe, the
very place of the philosophers' deliberate (premeditated) intervention in
the juridico-political space. One would have to draw all the conse­
quences. But they remain incalculable, incalculably dangerous in what
they promise or in what they threaten: concerning the secret of politics,
the politics of the secret, and first of all the concept of the secret put here
into operation.
u. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 16th ed. (Ttibingen: Max Nie­

meyer, 1986); Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962). Page numbers refer to the German
edition and are given in th� margins of the English translation. The
English translation has occasionally been modified to coincide with the
French translation used by the author.-Trans.
12. Ve2in was the first French translator of Sein undZeit(Etre et Temps,
Paris: Gallimard, 1986); Martineau's translation appeared as Etre et temps
from Authentica in 1985.-Trans.
13. Arrivant can mean "arrival," "newcomer," or "arriving."-Trans.
14. After the fact, I remembered the arrivant of La, the book by
Helene Cixous (Paris: Gallimard, 1976; Paris: Editions des Femmes,
1979), p. 132, and the play that she presented in 1977 in Avignon,
precisely under the tide of L'Arrivante.
15. Marrin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Gunther
Neske, 1959) : p. 215; On the Wtty to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New
York: Harper, 1971): p. 107.
16. Emmanuel Levinas, "La Mort et le temps," Cours de I975-76 in
L'Herne 6o (Paris: Editions de !'Herne, 1991): p. 38.
17· It is appropriate to cite Sade's will here, a will that leaves to a
certain Le Normand both Sade's body and the ceremony of its burial in a
certain chateau: "Finally, a last case-both utopic for the eighteenth
century and already anachronistic for the year 1806-is the will written
with seriousness and conviction by the Divine Marquis. It testifies to a
complete confusion of the two similar but separate opinions, the dis­
regard for the body and the radical refusal of immortality. Sade requests
that just after his death 'an express letter be sent to Sir Le Normand,
wood merchant . . . in order to request that he come himself, accom­
panied by a cart, to pick up my body so as to transport it under his escort
in the said cart to the woods of my property in Malmaison . . . near
Epernon, where I want it to be placed without any ceremony in the first
 Note to Page 77

thick copse that is to be found in the said woods off to the right when you
enter them from the side of the former castle by the large path that
separates it. The grave made in the copse will be dug by the farmer of
Malmaison under the inspection of Sir Le Normand, who shall not leave
my body until after having placed it in the said grave. He may be
accompanied in this ceremony, if he wishes so, by those of my parents or
friends who, without any sort of pomp, will be so kind as to give me this
mark of attachment. Once the grave is covered, it shall be covered by
acorns strewn over it so that, in time, the terrain of the said grave being
once again replenished and the copse being thickened as it was before,
the traces of my tomb disappear from the surface of the earth, as I flatter
myself that my memory will be effaced from the spirit of mankind [it is
pure vanity to want to impose it with a monument] , except nonetheless
the small number of those who have been so kind as to love me up to the
last moment and of whom I take a very sweet memory to the tomb,' "
Philippe Aries, L'Homme devant Ia mort, 2: 61-62. The bracketed remark,
one will have understood, is Aries's, who concludes his chapter in this
way: "The utopian will of the Marquis de Sade indicates a slant of the
epoch, a slant that was never to be descended all the way to the bottom,
but which attracted even the Christians and gave to a part of society the
vertigo of nothingness."
18. See in particular L'Attente l'oubli (1962), Le pas au-de/a (1973); The
Step Not Beyorlfi, trans. Lycette Nelson (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1990); and L'Ecriture du dlsastre (1980); The Writing of the
Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).
It would now be necessary to re-read and cite these texts from beginning
to end. Not able to do that here, I refer at least, in a much too insufficient
way, to the pages of the last book, pages that begin "Dying means: you
are dead already, in an immemorial past, of a death which was not
yours . . . . This uncertain death, always anterior-this vestige of a past
that never has been present-is never individual . . . . Impossible neces­
sary death . . . one lives and speaks only by killing the infons in oneself
(in others also) ; bur what is the infans?" ( Writing; pp. 65-67). Here as
elsewhere one can recognize the reference to Heidegger, notably to the
thinking of death as "the possibility of impossibility" ( Writing; p. 70).
The apparent neutrality of this reference (neither an approbation nor a
critique) deserves a patient and original treatment that we cannot under­
take here.