The Antecedent Facts

FIRST DIVISION
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154953 Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the
Petitioner,
Present: subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with
CARPIO, an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San
- versus - CORONA,
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Promulgated:
a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
Respondent. June 26, 2008
published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,[4] and in the 18 October 1999 issue of
---x Peoples Journal Taliba,[5] a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a
DECISION conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
land.[6] All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
CARPIO, J.:
concerned were notified of the initial hearing.[7]

The Case On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial
hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 21 August October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court
66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December issued an Order[8] of General Default against the whole world except as
1999 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, against petitioner.
Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land
(Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang in favor of respondent.
until 29 November 1999within which to file his written
opposition.[9] Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply
appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order[10] dated 13 December for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-
1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default. interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court
ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945,
respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres which possession converted the land to private property.
(Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its authorized
representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72- The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth;
and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the
Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates
Authority (LRA), Quezon City. and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-
424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741,
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero situated in Barangay of San
Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and
Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor
continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic
1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank
Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio
Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio Once this Decision shall have become final, let the
gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio corresponding decree of registration be issued.
executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated SO ORDERED.[12]
to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).[11] On 8
August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that
the trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent
The Ruling of the Trial Court clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have
complied with the period of possession and occupation as required by the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land
law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are from Porting.
general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that
additional witnesses should have been presented to corroborate Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
Evangelistas testimony. Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in
allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals despite the following:

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in 1. Absence of showing that it or its
predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous,
toto the trial courts Decision.
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner since 12
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the June 1945 or earlier; and
possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to
that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang acquire the subject tract of land.[13]
Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelistas failure to mention
the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court
of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not The Issues
asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos The issues may be summarized as follows:
relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelistas
statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the 1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
land after Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further ruled 2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June
became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small 1945 or earlier; and
community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of
ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the land under the Public Land Act.
the sole witness testimony.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness
The Ruling of this Court
since he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of
The petition has merit. The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 20,[18] dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and
Respondent Failed to Prove authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden
Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification
of overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public
status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,[19] dated 19
domain.Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is
April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series
no longer part of the public domain.
of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands
private dominion presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to
covering over 50 hectares.[20] In this case, respondent applied for
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests
50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered
with the applicant.[15]
the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as
per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the
to certify as alienable and disposable.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3
June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under
Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,[16] certified that lot 10705,
DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under
Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto.
DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land 1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products
Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925. The (OM) permits except rattan;
second certification[17] in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, 2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five
which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that the 4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles,
subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. piles, and lumber dealers.
30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR: Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] issued the certificationswere not presented before the trial court to
(OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the
and piles and lumber dealers; contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits; the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence,
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters
they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; and and disposable.
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits
covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director,
Rules on Evidence as follows:
FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no
probative value. (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts
of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and except last wills and testaments; and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
the land is alienable and disposable. issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication[21] of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land stated therein.[26] Such government certifications may fall under the
alienable and disposable. class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23
of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of therein.[27]Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
representative, identified the certifications but the government officials
of the latter.
who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the
certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
value.[28] The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres
certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications.[29] Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an
certifications do not reflect entries in public records made in the
officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any
performance of a duty by a public officer, such as entries made by the
verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by
Civil Registrar[22] in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the
the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
ships logbook.[23] The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly
custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records
became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that
of public documents.[24] The certifications are conclusions unsupported
based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable
by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.[25] Certainly, the
and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31
stated therein.
December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable
land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue
and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December
government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
1985. Respondent alleged that the blue print plan merely serves to prove
the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described
therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the
of the land involved.[30] It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three
engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable years.Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang
and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the Puroys land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that
lands classification.[31] However, respondent should have at least Evangelistas knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land
presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of stemmed not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so
classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the that they were practically neighbors.[32] The Court of Appeals observed:
documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that
the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, people in the said community knows each and
and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful reproductions of everyone.And, because of such familiarity with each
the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the other, news or events regarding the acquisition or
disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads
discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented
like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became
to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was of public knowledge to them.[33]
different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact
relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of
unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the
Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that
relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas
Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents predecessors-
testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that
in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato
whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual
who was one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in
evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed
Evangelistas testimony.
to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly,
continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the
alienable and disposable.
testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this
case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to
We agree with petitioner.
prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more
testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or
grant.
land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge
of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
court where he obtained his information. ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and
1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, the conditions therefor.
they constitute proof of claim of ownership.[34] Respondent did not
present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from
starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v.
in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes Public Estates Authority,[35] the Court traced the law on disposition of
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no
ownership or possession of the land only in that year. prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural
Land Application by a Corporation land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the
for registration of the land of the public domain in this case. 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of
We agree with petitioner. the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: alienable land of the public domain.[36] The Court explained in Chavez:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
further classified by law according to the uses to which domain.Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public Constitution allows private corporations to hold
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private alienable lands of the public domain only through
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lease. x x x x
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
 the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The
the size of alienable lands of the public domain that available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing
corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have in the face of an ever-growing population. The most
followed the limitations on individuals, who could effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of
the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not the public domain only to individuals. This, it would
more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution. seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.[37]
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic
family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a
corporation would be more effective in preventing the In Director of Lands v. IAC,[38] the Court allowed the land registration
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five
name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139
heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of
hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat
subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in
smaller plots from one generation to the next. favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the
constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except
more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land
public domain. Without the constitutional ban, was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural
individual could own as many corporations as his means lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not
would allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as more than 144 hectares.[39]
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a
convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and
limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands
undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law
of the public domain.
created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The
area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by Court ruled:
 Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical Lands, the land x x x was already private property at the time it was
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by acquired x x x by Acme. In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-
State than the dictum of the statute itself that the interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous,
possessor(s) x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have
and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x. No short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive yet private property.
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth
be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file
required character and length of time; and registration for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to
title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open,
land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an
by operation of law from the moment the required period owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v.
of possession became complete.
Court of Appeals,[41] the Court declared:
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been
statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, converted to private ownership through acquisitive
as amended) is converted to private property by the mere prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous
land subject of this appeal was already private owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels
by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable Being already private land when TCMC bought them in
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
corporations holding or owning private land. x x corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public
x.[40] (Emphasis supplied) domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11,
1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were
no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private
property.
 acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is
for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the
acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as
having been filed in accordance with the provisions of
because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had
this Act.
already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation
cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive
prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only
prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit
to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than
12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original
successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply
registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic
for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent
Act No. 9176[42] (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land
applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of
Act[43] and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial
44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher
disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This
assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land
by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent
section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the acquired it from Porting in 1997.
benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period
shall apply only where the area applied for does not WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That
the several periods of time designated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December
President in accordance with Section Forty-five of 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not
application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from
 Republic of the Philippines court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its
SUPREME COURT judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we
Manila believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be
denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we
EN BANC choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment
cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to
G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947 render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment
simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal
vs. only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a
and appellee. question involving different considerations now to be stated.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant. According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal
respondent-appellee. after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies. withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been
prensented, but the case had already been voted and the
MORAN, C.J.: majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal
stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court,
Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing
which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of
accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was
deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular,
acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case as against his own stand in this case which had been
to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by
means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins
Krivenko appealed to this Court. his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or
circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why
whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the
residential land. Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now
immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and
unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions,
should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after
ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the
constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never development of water "power" in which cases beneficial
come up again before this court, because both vendors and use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their
transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its
to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the
this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and
with the result that our indifference of today might signify a fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization
permanent offense to the Constitution. of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means
weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three
of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this
appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the
proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question. classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in
the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows: said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that
was well-known to the members of the Constitutional
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
resources.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase
the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions
to corporations or associations at least sixty per of this Court. (See Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil.,
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159;
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director
at the time of the inaguration of the Government of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the
established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In
Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions,
this Court said: terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which
had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If
cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal
with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have
not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be been employed in that sense in a written Constitution.
included within the classification of agricultural land, not (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303;
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act Where words have been long used in a technical sense
of Congress contains only three classification, and makes and have been judicially construed to have a certain
no special provision with respect to building lots or urban meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as
lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
which they are used, the rule of construction requires that
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a the words used in such statute should be construed
parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is according to the sense in which they have been so
actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for previously used, although the sense may vary from strict
agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory
remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of Construction, p. 758.)
the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence
into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in
agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as
were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the
the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted,
meaning then prevailing. such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction
that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the
are obviously technical; and where such words have National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof
presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
have used such expressions in accordance with their associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is
technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
683.) AlsoCalder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only
648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., agricultural lands may be alienated.
1039.)
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad
"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase
"public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of
into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential,
puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their
lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-
broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it clear opinion:
embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This
broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution
Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic
agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of
puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At
lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,
favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading
under the Constitution. case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held
that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber
Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under
section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, the public domain must have to be included in one or
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber
again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be
Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or classified as agricultural.
industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after
the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in
141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the
the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62
the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to
this again is another legislative construction that the term "public cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not
(State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the
interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
 Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue
is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens'
person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home. public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely
so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated,
Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization
Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in together for they have the same purpose and the same subject
the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
(2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons
the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of
Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of
was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of
both administrations. "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under
section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a
Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in
always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute,
into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
include residential lots. Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural
land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for
shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the owned by the State or by its citizens.
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19,
favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to
included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be
considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no
except to individuals, corporations, or associations valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view,
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional
the Philippines. provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and
private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain.
Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building
to the alienable of public residential lots would become homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in
residential lands will eventually become more important, for time appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief,
will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the Constitution is beyond question.
residential lands of the public domain shall have become private
residential lands. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of
Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of
land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional
agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation.
word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the
intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2
used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate
The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech
land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural
be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of
under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to
other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the
1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
and the only lands that may become private are agricultural nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be
lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred
can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are
thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of
to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause
the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
first draft. antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am
afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for
including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our
result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?"
only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening
subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and
dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination
of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of that were actually or presumptively of the public domain
the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
members of the Constitutional Convention who are now improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations,
Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under or associations who may acquire land of the public
Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in
operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize
understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land. them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands
implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose
after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in
were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided,
reciprocity. Said section reads as follows: however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to
the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent competent courts, nor to lands and improvements
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes,
alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the event of the ownership of the lands and
the public domain under this Act; to corporations improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
their charters, and, upon express authorization by the persons,corporations or associations not legally
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of
which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or others so capacitated within the precise period of five
any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No.
while the same are in force but not thereafter. 2874.)

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these
under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural,
any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land
any other provision of law formerly in force in the which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in
Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these
two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same others so capacitated within the precise period of five
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire Government.
private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120
sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the
new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the
under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity.
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
the public domain under this Act or to corporations prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
charters.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there
under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly means provided in said provisions. We are not, however,
in force in the Philippines with regard to public diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land
lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful.
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the private agricultural land including residential land whatever its
public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies origin might have been.
organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic
shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of
by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of
and legalized by competent courts: Provided, expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This
and improvements mentioned in this section and in the prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are
last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or
to persons, corporations or associations not legally commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands
capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear
implementation and a legislative interpretation of the Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's
constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that decision might be remembered by future generations always
private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would have
necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to
deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly,
was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage
the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our
legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be
within the constitutional prohibition. the permanent abode of our race for unending generations. We
who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have long and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not
no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day
we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland,
to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from because in the crucial moment of our history , when the vision of
owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and
solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat
satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of
the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. the banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial
Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned
be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain from a looming catastrophe.
here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire. On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43
Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The case was
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17,
may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title
residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential
costs. district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The
Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur. grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not
qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the
provisions of the Constitution."

On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision

Separate Opinion granting the application. The Director of Lands appealed. In the
brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards
PERFECTO, J., concurring: Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of
Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching,
appellant made only two assignments of error, although both decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty
raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be
assignment of error as follows: alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion and
decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The
The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because
land in question in favor of the applicant who, according they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided,
to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal
Republic. question upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his
appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae.
Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos — who, while Chief Justice Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in
of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority
of the Japanese — addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture shall make known their stand on the question.
and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as
the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal The next case came when the present one submitted to us for
question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated on the
for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici constitutional question for several days.
curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote,
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final and the result was that the constitutional question was decided
decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is, six against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There
years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court.
out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court was Only three Justices dissented.
recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was
among those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the
the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10, 1947,
reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal,
filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the
prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-
final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted important constitutional question as to whether aliens may
for decision on July 3, 1946. acquire urban lots in the Philippines.

After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the
to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal question as to motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity to the
whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given
urban lands. An overwhelming majority answered no. But when without expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court
the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February
resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to 24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court should abstain
from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is
the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six hereby amended so as to read as follows:
years during which the question has been submitted for the
decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed 5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is
to form a definite opinion. mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association for a period not exceeding five years,
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice renewable for another five years, may be accepted for
Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr. registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)
Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those
who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. "(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential,
Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or
Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned
resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national,
motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed
"where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all included within the purview of the prohibition contained in
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied." And section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the
we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by
promulgated. those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the
public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284,
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the
our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of casting his practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since
vote on the question, although we insisted that it was the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.
unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of the Court
were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice "(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement
Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and
have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in
against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the
votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast Constitution, citizens of the United States and
for its denial. corporations or associations owned or controlled by such
citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned
luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by the register of or controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights
deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or
polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the
the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to
Secretary of Justice which reads as follows: the public domain."
 ROMAN OZAETA Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be
Secretary of Justice asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's
absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the
amended by the above is as follows: proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the
motion to withdraw is considered denied.
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a
right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is transferred, Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could
assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of
national, may be entered in the primary entry book; but, seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be
denied — unless and/or until otherwise specifically Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of
directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once
— and the party in interest shall be advised of such on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a
denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be
therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all
Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of the members were present, the votes on the motion
shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on
section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a
Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 tie. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the
by the Commonwealth Act No. 615. inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr.
Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be
cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and tense fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the
deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following members be taken in cases like this.
resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, of the narration of facts, that when the petition to
a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this
a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices
adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and
in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, expressed the opinion that since then, according to the
and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. rules, the petition should have been considered denied.
Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Said first vote took place many days before the one
Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla.
Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and
Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the
consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were
 granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration.
and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation
same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting of our decision.
was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were
present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity
the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. suggested by us for all the official actuations of this Supreme
Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since
their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the
one month afterwards, without any previous notice the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the
matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from
result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known
might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense on
of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus stood, February 24, 1947.
Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its
result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no one The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left
is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The uncertainty
motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay.
matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. While the doubt among the people as to what is the correct
Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be
matter was over as far as he was concerned, this uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of
Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming
not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should
counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness
motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and Keryces
have been denied on grounds of pure were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus
technicality never invoked before. I counted that the must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what
proceeding was arbitrary and illegal. destiny has in store for them.

The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by
Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings and why it our forefathers should remain as one of the most cherished
became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to
sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the question. unending generations of our race, is not a new one. The long
chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages
of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became moot in view of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the
of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and
128, thus giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the
had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of
decision of an important constitutional question, submitted to us Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese,
Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our
iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the
navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the
his daring enterprises, with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a
men in the battle of Mactan. world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that
scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away
continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to
defend the national patrimony against the aggressive ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national
onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and survival.
the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners
who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. When the ideal of one world should have been translated into
Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations reality, those guarantees might not be needed and our people
who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable
whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to
unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is
uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the called upon in a case, like the one now before us.
Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and
credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, One of the fundamental purposes of the government established
embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it "shall conserve
the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is
disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern addressed to all departments and branches of our government,
civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific
to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all
practice of confession and other means of moral intimidation, doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved
mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural
obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people
credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of until, by constitutional amendment, they should decide to
heaven, renounced all their property in favor of religious orders renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary
and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other succession — the only exception allowed by the Constitution —
apparently religious purposes, leaving in destitute their no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of
decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment
were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the
committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that
situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed
drove our people into a national revolution not only against the in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style —
Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to the drafter of the final text — has written in the Constitution, and
unlimited proportions. that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our
people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told
Japanized Davao. Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case
"as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of
The urgency of settling once and forever the getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so
constitutional question raised in this case cannot be reports in his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held
overemphasized. If we should decide this question after the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact
many urban lots have been transferred to and registered that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the
in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest
created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John
the nullification may create complications and problems Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have
highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of
objective lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been
From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, able to overcome its judicial diffidence on state
Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the occasions.
following:
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal technicalities
important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the
example. That was the first case in which the Court held case of Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands and
a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national
1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign
of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the
was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our
purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of
legislator, but not before the land companies had We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution,
completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by fundamental law became effective are null and void per
leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty
title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by
of the grant was void under the Constitution as an their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid
impairment of the obligation of a contract. down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare
no efforts so that any and all violations which may have taken
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme place should be corrected.
Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had
bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant
He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen, could not
acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of
the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being the respective department to the people. For this reason, I
null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this
rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm. direction with respect to this Court.

HILADO, J., concurring: I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated
August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was issued in good
Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b)
conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of appellee, of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended,
indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or
another department, I ultimately voted to grant the motion after other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within
the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the votes the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII,
of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under of the Constitution", made at a time when the self-same
Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the
motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the serious danger that should this Court refrain from deciding said
exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional
virtue of which it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the mandate, the people may see in such an attitude an
appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its
withdrawal, when appellee's brief has been filed. Under the own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence,
principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an in view of an opinion, given in advance of its own decision, by
opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is an officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no
the decision or determination of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the small degree from public respect and confidence towards the
resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the other
resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the governmental departments included — would desire such a
court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall situation to ensue.
be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide
the case upon the merits. I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is
confined to the constitutional question here presented, namely,
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire
separation of powers in a government like ours that I have residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or
always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon,
concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the for example, are not covered by the decision.
constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the
three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my
be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice, I
makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and uphold have signed said decision.
its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and
confidence in each department must be striven for and kept, for BRIONES, M., conforme:
any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el
puede añadir ni quitar nada, tal es su acabada y compacta por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo
elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el
mas que para unas observaciones, particularmente sobre Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.
ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y
extraordinario. Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque
pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con tanta
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como
Perfecto, despues de laboriosas deliberaciones este asunto se este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo
puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este año, presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que
confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante
algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el
— impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un
y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten
maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y
patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion
ha demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia, habiendose constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el
votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año. Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte, entablando
fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien
considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido demora en Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar
el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia, pues
alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica contra los trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la
metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte
asunto ha sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en
yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los
guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o
complicados como el que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban
planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no
juridica de las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision
tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto juntamente con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos
finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en
las vacaciones judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la
dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio siempre
Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los
— incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a paralizar la Magistrados que pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos
pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion
el 10 de Julio persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo de la sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion
permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo dominical de
todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares tenemos ante Nos — y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos
residenciales, comerciales e industriales.) Pero otros Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las
Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro
hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de
discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir,
y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta Corte siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen
estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia "residenciales, comerciales e industriales."
esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de
los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido
pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo, no
primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa
eso — la interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la
manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion; obrar circular num. 14 — prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es
de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado. precisamente el objeto del presente asunto — venia
practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida,
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de
mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que la lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el Departamento de
retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas
del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin manos de esta Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y
nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la
medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.
Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo
pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala
retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida insolitamentepor
en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en la el Procurador General. ¿ Para que esperar ladecision de la
concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? ¿ No estaba ya
excusado de transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de
reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros?
Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y Por eso no es extraño quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko,
levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la
inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la
documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como fundamento que la
residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now
urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del
transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las
enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:
medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida
en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento — la prohibicion In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice,
que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular No. 14 by
 expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el
lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y dependenciasque
General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde
appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco
parties and the question is now moot. For this reason the se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir
court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.1 circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de
caracter semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los
Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones.
Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los De hecho la circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta
tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los
tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de
administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos
que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega
sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y
Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada circular del
manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en
su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente
ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y legales, ya no esel Departamento el que tiene que determinar o
competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los
esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo — tradicioninviolada e inviolable — tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el
maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo,
General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala
ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando venian llamados a Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no
hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para
litigio, civil o criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere
tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse
tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto
escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo:
queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de
justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth
absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. — When the
todaingerencia extraña. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings- step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument
pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el presented for registration or where any party in interest
gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia does not agree with the register of deeds with reference
hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the
nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza! judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of
 the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo
register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de
doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in los poderes del Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y
interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si esa intromision se
the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede
case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive
hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada con motivo
taken or memorandum to be made. de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con
otropoder del Estado. En casos recientes en que estaban
Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa
su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de laPropiedad de suposicion constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud
Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay
prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. ¿ Que hizo que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos
Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Magistrados, entre ellos el opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un
Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos,
presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por
Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos Tribunales, le
Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su
como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala decidio el asunto excepcion sin ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y
confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.
Corte la apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es
esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la prohibicion Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de
quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion, por
He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14: dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba
conformecon dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun
shall be denied, — unless and /or until otherwise se dice, de soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se
specifically directed by a final decision or order of a pueda. Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el
competent court — and the party in interest shall be Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion
advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of sobre un asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su
the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la
section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del
Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como sigue:
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo
de intromision (interference) en sus funciones esde lo mas Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of
peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas right at any time before the filing of appelle's brief. After
disposiciones que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the
actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de
estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en
delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero
masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto
unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro
de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el Procurador solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo.
General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan
cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado
significacion — el pueblo filipino — ysiendo materia del litigio la se considero como terreno publico. ¿ Podemos hacer la misma
propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a
que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la cualquier otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun
Constitucion. Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes,
consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir publico. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados para
la retirada dela apelacion para no tener queresolver la cuestion nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo
constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe
o doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o descartarse totalmente.
cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra
mañera. ¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en
en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto que
decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no
inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contraGaw Chee
Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas
Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de
constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la
decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber
Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual
inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de
unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, prelaciony prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados
seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala
Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao
num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la
contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver
otra ley para el caso. de otra manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional
para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., modono seria un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria
No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las disidencias, es unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no
completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde
la cuestion constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de
los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de
sido un poco de parsimonia, lentitud. lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade
disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos
¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se
pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla
pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia alguna razon de especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo
interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion
Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario, nuestro deber exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones
ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente sobre registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento
ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la
debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.
de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o
quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en estas Islas. Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria
Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para resolver el
podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los
Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir efectos de la circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia,
sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no
Corte una provee la interdiccion de que se trata. Tuvimosesa en virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta
mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya
de este año (8 contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia
laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que
de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion
cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de
falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la
de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una sentencia enel
mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones
parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema naturalmente quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra
npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse
abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera
avanzado de la Constitucion. podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna
porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y coordinado del
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un gobierno.
monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor,o de suplir
una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion
insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir queel
de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado
un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las
vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima de funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio
nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor
presume que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la
dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la propiedad de bienes raices en Filipinas.
apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin
consideracion a losmotivos de nadie. II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion.
Todos los angulos y fases de la misma estanacabadamente
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a
Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion queculmino hacer unas cuantas observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica
en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea,
de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi
de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea
en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.
Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para
formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar
justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel
ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que hubiese quorum. articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto
A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. completo de la seccion:
Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la
ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no obstante la except to individuals, corporations, or associations
ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla the Philippines.
56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada.
¿Donde esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"? ¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los
terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Tal es
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen
reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba como que no.
ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente
academica (moot question) por la conformidad del Procurador Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel
Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como untodo
Departamento de Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli
Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un
denegada.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto
Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiveros no de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo,
pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? ¿Iba a detenerse un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que
larueda de la justicia por eso? Conviene, sin embargo, la misma ley asi to diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el
hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de
que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico, y la medio siglo.
segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado — y lo tiene
vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado y porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa
disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas
filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado? ¿Da
ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural"
En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural cuandose refiere a terreno privado? ¿Donde esta esa
land." definicion? ¿O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera
no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 "public" o "private", segun que se trate de terrenopublico o
perceptua que "the Congress may determine bylaw the size of privado?
private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or
associations may acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la
prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es la que palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun significado
queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho
ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private constar asi expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion
agricultural land." Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra
"agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia,
agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con
terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la
mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres. mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion de la
Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el
laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa privado. Pensarde otra manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante;
terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba
comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en compuestade miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las
ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.
porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de
sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de
firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me cupo elhonor de
"agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite encargado
Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo
publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales, que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero
comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en
excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir, que se aplica a la cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos
actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho
constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used
FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to
Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the
de su reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las particular statute in which they are used, the rule of
primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en construction requires that the words used in such statute
nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el should be construed according to the sense in which they
actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex- have been so previously used, although that sense may
Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II
Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.)
Filipina, ex-miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y
ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado
Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno particular,
Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio de dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al
Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente
Benitez. insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la
jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla
No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la
personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un articuloenque un AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria
vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel
diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely
terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con
intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a
omision de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de
evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del matices e idiotismos?
publico. Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los
Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una
logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en la definicionde lo que
diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su
hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion manera. Uno de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su
dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario
una sola comun definicin — la establecida en la Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to
jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular agricultural connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the
y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que la palabra agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien
"agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular.
solaresresidenciales, comerciales, e industriales. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate
agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same cultivation, to the raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado
meaning throughout the statute, unless a different
Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el
"agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular. Magistrado Sr. Willard en el asunto clasico de
Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado,
de una manera distinta. Segun ellos, "land spoken of as que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos son
`agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato
agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such than for presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaña mas pedregosa y
another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . . el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano
The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el
but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Sr. Willard añade las siguietes observacionessumamente
Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina la petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto
calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique que nos ocupa, a saber:
alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la industria.Los
autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el . . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden
hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad. Hay
immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente
agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es
multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la
esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno
pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero en virtud de denominado Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El
su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila,
aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, situado entre estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y
el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de
cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier
latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen. tiempo destinarse al cultivo.

Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno
terreno agricola del concepto popular y de losdiccionarios, asi agricola de un terreno industrial. En este respectoes preciso
sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados ¿que tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser
normas claras, concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a
establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas
lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria
¿Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno
Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se
es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera industrialice aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado
comoresidencial, comercial e industrial todo lo que esta Plan Beyster ¿que normas segfuras se podrian establecer para
dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero ¿resolveria esto la poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada
dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde
arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado poblacio
extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser
asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales? mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales
comerciales e industriales, limitandose el precepto a los propia
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra o estrictamenteagricolas.
Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque el articulo
XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que
indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso equivale a
que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por
establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que
Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados — es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial. En
criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una
arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra
parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo
185). terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien
residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII,
Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo determinarpor seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno
ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los publico. Ahora bien; ¿que diferencia hay, despuesde todo,
individous, corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de
poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es mas menois
de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad,
land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e al titulo dominical — en que el uno es del Estado y el otro es de
industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno un particular.
quedarian excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la
Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3. En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien
Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños de psicologica,subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando
todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no habria limite a las pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se
adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en
residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel;
peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero es
elapelante. indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del
conceptovulgar — una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes,
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la
tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu
Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de
estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados?
5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se ¿Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes,
añadio la palabra calificativa agricola—"private agricultural land" cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo
De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra un gran abogado español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el
precepto constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional
tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa
que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no ¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema
ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que de la tierra en general sobre el problema capitalismo de los
propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida. terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre
los Delegados? Y ¿como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo
tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion delprecepto se del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e
añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en interprete?
vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por
razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la
de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural Asamblea Constituyente. El tono predomionante entodos ellos
land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia. era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera
Loimportante es saber que la añadidura, tal como esta de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan
jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo
Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo. para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la
posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la un significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si es
Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la motivacion y dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas
finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede de este tono pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente
ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines
la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion
es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra
constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel
autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado particula que desempeñaban en las treas constituyentes. Por
sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo
dice a este efectolo sigiuente: representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia
horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining
the mischief designed to be remedied, or . . . Con la completa nacionnalization de
the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que
provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por
the convention which framed the instrument. Where the 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son
proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los
provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de
where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete
difficult to derive from this source much reliable instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de
Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of
 the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene
Aruego). Providence,in order to establish a government that shall
enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y themslves and their posterity the blessings of
privada. independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and
democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante
del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la Asamblea El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea
que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras: Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y recursosnaturales es de
facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir solo para el Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que
terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueños de advendria despues de10 años. Querianos, puesd asegurar
propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major
necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela
para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra
los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya
Aruego, supra, pag. 593.) perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el abreviamiento
dela vida?
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de
Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico
Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos debamos
generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien
Comite: de nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de
una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante.
Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas —
naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la nacion centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente
filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las
que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales.
para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.) China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que estaba entonces en el
apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada
verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente. Sus rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de Davao, donde,
mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la
esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la tierra, instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura, con
Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un rigido todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la
proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya
benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima
aqui el preambulo: con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que
contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba y otraspaises del Mar ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional — la llmada
Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.
terrible maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la
enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros. The mere literal construction of a section in a statute
ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno- legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are
filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente se haciancargo sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it
tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent
apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be
los filipinos. so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the
intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the
Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y words used to express it, the manifest reason and the
tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a
rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat.
y finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones
filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que
los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre
de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria
principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know- toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que
how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante
complicaciones internacionales. interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas
conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes
del precepto los terrenos residenciales comercialese industrial, problemassobre la tierra.
pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de
conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una
de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase cuestion constitucional por excelencia. Solamenteel pueblo
de terrenos como para otra. ¿Por que se iba a temer, puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni
verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno mucho menos los tribunales, pueden disponerde ese
estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer
que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica? una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas
(3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que, noobstante el
natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria
americanos., a estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en una economia mal entendida. Si no se escatiman gastos para
relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del
pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral
patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para lands of the public domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting
reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural
Congreso, por lo menos. land. The contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional
provision, far from stating that all timber and mineral lands
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely
tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma como lo interpretamos proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are
en nuestra decision. then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of
the Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be
Se confirma la sentencia. alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands
theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the
public domain. We have held, quite recently, that lands in the
possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest
since time immemorial do not belong to the Government, for
PARAS, J., dissenting: such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had
been private properties even before the Spanish conquest. (Oh
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect
cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall to the pronouncement in Cariño vs. Insular Government (212
be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is
domain in the Philippines." The important question that arises is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or
whether private residential land is included in the terms "private mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or
agricultural land." mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or
mineral lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5
Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion, lands of the public of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?
domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There
can be no doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually used SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of
for residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations,
the three classes. or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights
existing prior to the enactmentof such law.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private
ownership at the time of the approval of the Constitution, have SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of
the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
conclusion — which is at once absurd and anomalous — that subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned individuals.
to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is,
however, contended that timber and mineral lands can never be SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession,
private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
 assigned except to individuals, corporations, or expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or ownership
public domain in the Philippines. by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the
original draft in which the more general terms "private land" was
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural"
private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid
associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and
prior to the enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated
of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of
individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is
private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in
classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land"
applicable to private lands, and , as we have shown, there may in section 3 and 5. Following the line of reasoning of the
be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may
sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine be expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also
the size of private agricultural land only, and in not extending the private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as private
prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands. residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's
contention that there cannot be any private timber or mineral
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled land.
by the classification of public lands, and the term "agricultural"
appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in
namely, as denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto, Chairman of
words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within the the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in
inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same
original draft referred merely to "private land." This certainty refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and such
would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another
land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that
significant. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation to said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the
foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever agriculturists."
be enacted with a view to permitting limited areas of land for
residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said prohibition Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de
may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al parecer
progress in Philippine economy. On the other hand, should any inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido
danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay
a law may be passed to remedy the situation, thereby enabling de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que
the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del
time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran interes una
difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser
frio, señores. Parece que es meyor tratar estas incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de
cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.
atencion, como siempre suelo hacer a todos los
argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda
el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez
decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy buenos demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la
a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que
reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta
terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes produciendo daños a la comunidad, es cuando entonces
despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los
atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este
no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, es un postulado que todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir
cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen
con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas
publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues,
discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no
engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el
hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible, ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto
que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente
limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera exacto. Vamos a suponer que efectivamente un padre de
parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno,
de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los
puede tener. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la
desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan
urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por
de que con mucha especialidad en las regiones ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de
agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no podra
se extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para
intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La
de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o
nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la
que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo
para su existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un
dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es
Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius
lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido.
explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos Es por esto porque el Comite precisamente no ha
si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas
presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner
hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, el tejado?"
al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el
fijar ese numero. Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de
importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir
gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no podra porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de
revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante
Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor
Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de
de que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta
a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida no es
autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque
cuando este convencida, primero, de que la existencia de Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para
ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en
cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido
gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion. fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un
pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad.
Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo
autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi
autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi discurso
expropiacion. agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate
Sotto.)
Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha
mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana — y digo con I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by
exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha mentado limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring lands,
la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan un issuede private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust
esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President,
comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para ser extend this provision also to those who are engaged in
elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth.
ordenen la expropriacion? ¡Que argumento mas bonito si If the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to
tuviera base! Lo mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed
el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against
Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I
disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment
Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. ¿Quien because many reasons have been given already
esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)
trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a
the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does not embrace definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and
private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe after a carefully consideration of the question we are
that the sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is
were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13
5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the says that the Government shall "make rules and
Constitution. regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the
public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority minds that is the only definition that can be said to be
opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect that "the given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase
exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or
of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.,
Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and 182.)
natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate
Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the The majority, in support of their construction, invoke
terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the
as the preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land
principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this
in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner
the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order,
made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in
(3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios
Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually
specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in or presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.) They hold
section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is
to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere strongly implemented by said Act." The majority have evidently
mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said
Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections
manifestation of Delegate Sotto. referto land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal
provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 originally of the public domain. The lands that may be acquired
Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not controlling, under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural
because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, lands, since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation
secondly, in that case it was expressly held that the phrase or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they
"agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public become private, said lands retained their original agricultural
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is
lands," — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out
of Congress of July 1, 1902. and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before
us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government,
appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public
provisions contemplated therein. lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral
lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15,
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming
Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No. 2874 that "residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the
or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the
section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving
undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to
Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural
residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to lands is applicable."
aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July
not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of Deeds
while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion
article XIII of the Constitution speaks of "public agricultural No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted
lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among
after the approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section
of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of
public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or
not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or
against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of
already of private ownership prior to the approval of the the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered
Constitution. pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which
holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land, and
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly
departments of the Government — Judicial, Legislative and Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not
Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public apply.
domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and
that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather There is no conflict between the two opinions.
misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the
construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the
exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public
residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article
agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us particularize treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore,
in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within
 the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an
XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force
that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion
of the public domain are included within the phrase of his Department pending judicial determination of the question.
"public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting
(formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. in effect the opinion of his Department rendered in1941. Last but
In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous
XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to
of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition
residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. In on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary
cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII to what the majority believe, our Government has constantly
(formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under
exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the
of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, Constitution.
commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public
domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the
land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be blinded by any
Article XII) governs. sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a
degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a construction not
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to
Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in favor of convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over
alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the
under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence
Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the either by its amendment or by Congressional action.
Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that There should really have been no occasion for writing this
private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of the
section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and
occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the the same should have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs.
Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we
section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass
an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the
private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
buildings and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment,
said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision
(Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court
will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in
present case, that course of action was not only possible but a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but
absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.
been opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for
its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should
after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue any
allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the
should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof. What
constitutional question will thereby be avoided. is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of
Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If
"arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to teh the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said of
denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect
which all the eleven members were present, seven voted to prohibiting the registration of transfers of private residential lots
allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of
notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866),
was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was
was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and
result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially register it in his name," and notwithstanding the fact that in said
released and the motion denied under the technicality provided case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant
in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another
observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision holding
the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in
notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court,
motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr. Justice failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to
Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met
vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the withdrawal by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a
is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the decision on the constitutional question resolved in the case at
effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other
registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present
residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to
and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is,
functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the
petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for
a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of
Department of Justice issued while this case was pending today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution,"
before this Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court
motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or
is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy
of the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain
no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or
provision in question in the sense desired by the majority. Upon creditors of the seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to
the other hand, the majority should not worry about the aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly
remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their
upon this constitutional question, because we can take advance sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough
notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable,
Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have already presented. But perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion for
even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention
recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length shall be invited to points inadequately touched or improperly
and breadth of the country, there will be those who will dispute considered.
their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the
constitutional prohibition. It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently
being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject to the
BENGZON, J., dissenting: final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To
spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances, might
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such
extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties having transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet
agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our
hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to give advice to Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their
other person who might be interested to give advice to other validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese
persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity authorities had shown distaste for such transfers.
of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and
juriscounsults. The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-
important point, and reflect upon the conflicting politico-
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation
any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It must be against international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also
remembered that the other departments of the Government are delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:
not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising in
the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional (a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail
Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time of its
nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who
other Government departments, with the obligation to seize any should become landowners after the approval of the
opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous Constitution;7
application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the
suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has (b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have
interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before upon our position and commitments in the United Nations
the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with
will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to other nations of the worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private
citizen. Under the treaties between the United States and ownership suitable for residence are included in the term
Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to
lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa
did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban
during the existence of the Commonwealth Government? lands of the public domain are included in the term "public
agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority overlooks the
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for
of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for withholding of residence in the term "public agricultural land" was due to the
any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now classification made by the Congress of the United States in the
ready to cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In
the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into
— not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or
This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging to
Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain
particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor mineral,
interpretation of the prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public
poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the
whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the
the cumbersome and highly expensive process of a inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural
constitutional amendment. land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would
hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de
PADILLA, J., dissenting: Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and
yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public
of private ownership suitable or intended for residence may be domain suitable for residence are included in the classification
alienated or sold to an alien. of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what
the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides: "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of statutory
construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private that have a common or ordinary meaning as understood by he
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except average citizen.
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February
Philippines. 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874. Under this
Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership and corporations or associations described in section 23
suitable or intended or used for residence is included in the term thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
"private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the
public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase lands for agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That
agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). any person, corporation, association, or
This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for
the Act provides: agricultural purposes under the provisions of this
Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title
No person, corporation, association or partnership other suitable for industrial or residence purposes, but the title
than those mentioned in the last preceding section may or lease granted shall only be valid while such land
acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any issued for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
other denomination or classification, not used for
industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or Section 121 of the Act provides:
was originally, really or presumptively, of the public
domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any No land originally acquired in any manner under the
real right on such land and improvement: Provided, provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other
however, That persons, corporations, associations, or Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands
take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
other denomination not used for industrial or residence realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
purposes, that belonged originally, really or actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal
presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
lands and improvements, having acquired the same alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations,
under the laws and regulations in force at the date of or associations who may acquire land of the public
such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding domain under this Act; . . . Provided, however, That this
the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or
or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to
the same to persons, corporations, associations or lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or
partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this residence purposes, while used for such purposes: . . .
Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly (Emphasis supplied.)
legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts.
(Emphasis supplied.) Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No.
2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be
suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or
productive purposes other than agricultural, provides: lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No.
2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar
Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The
or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified
or association authorized to purchase or lease public persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands
and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need
purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the of implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the
provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, lots for Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in
townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear indication
citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not
nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used
2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to for residence. The term "private agricultural land" means
exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of the public privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of
domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of
the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes.
the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial, The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding
industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with all other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and
timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded,
mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly because these lands could not and can never become private
sixteen years — from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded lands. From the land grants known
in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to
regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from those under the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13
the policy theretofore adopted. February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law,
Act No. 2874, the Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141,
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from
Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease lands of alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth
the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121
industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private
the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution
from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial and understood by the people that adopted it.
or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public domain The next question is whether the court below was justified under
and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or the in confirming the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Manila
residence purposes were not included in the prohibition found in to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to
section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing the appellant who is an alien.
that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the
law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale
prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant — whether it
to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act
residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of No. 141; or a private land that had never been a part of the
proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449;
which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the
the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or
141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat — Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation
No land originally acquired in any manner under the of the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts.
provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret
royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in such provisions acting on matters coming within their
force in the Philippines with regard to public jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only persuasive
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on what is the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of
public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision
organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize by the poeple that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of
them to do so: . . . the instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and
especially what the people understood it to be when they
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on
held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it violates the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding
section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of last
known as the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs.Ramirez, 40 Phil., resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other
883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to
rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the
unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of
Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might
upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree
law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit alienation to to the interpretation placed upon such provision, that eagerness
foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the
must avoid offending against the constitutional provision majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to
referred to above. will be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the
government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an
by the Court in considering the merits of the case, despite the amendment to the Constitution — a costly process — would
withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted
appellee. If discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to
exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question.
upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act
are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last according to their wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They, too,
resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional question possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the
exclusive possession of the members of this Court. The end The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of
sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be the term "agricultural land" as used in this section? Before
carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory
out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as
repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law
amendment. authors.

In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions
appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and consented to by the that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect
appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the to the intention of the people who adopted it. This
reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the
should be reversed. apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken
as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption
would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black
on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)

TUASON, J., dissenting: Every word employed in the constitution is to be

expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,
The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no unless the context furnishes some ground to control,
choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as we see qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for
it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of
of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of
of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness
light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical
it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the nature founded on the common business of human life
decision by-passed what according to our humble adapted to common wants, designed for common use,
understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped and fitted for common understandings. The people make
out of its way in search of the ideal result. The denial by this them, the people adopt them, the people must be
Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor supposed to read them with the help of common sense,
General gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite
that the decision cannot be helped. meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec.
451.)
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except The framers of the Constitution, and the people who
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to adopted it, "must be understood to have employed words
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the in their natural sense, and to have intended what they
Philippines.
 have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or
ed., 23). used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never
understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings,
constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction communities are divided into residential, commercial and
where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not
clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention
into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as
general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and agricultural land.
pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the
genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the
at liberty to declare an act void because they deem it constitutional provision under consideration will dispel all doubts
opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702- that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the
703.) Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.

There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional
Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation of the Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee on
words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural
phrase has no technical meaning, and the same could not have resources in its report recommended the incorporation into the
been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood Constitution of the following provision:
by the men in the street.
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by
inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the sovereign. the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which no public domain in the Philippine Islands; and the
one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of
private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by necessary land now owned by persons, or corporations,or
implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private associations not qualified under the provisions of this
property. The express mention of one thing excludes all others Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine
of the same kind. Islands.

Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of
that by process of elimination we can see what lands do not fall the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven embodied the
within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New following provision which had been recommended in the reports
international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to of the committee on agricultural development, national defense,
agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands and other
agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." natural resources:
According to this definition and according to the popular
 SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way,
of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's decision are
the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the the conclusions do not follow the premises.
public domain in the Philippines.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural"
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted was not intended to change the scope of the provision. It says
to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n General that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other
Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
prepared by the committee in consultation with President
Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that
as follows: could not have devised a better way of messing up and
obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties," the
land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land"
by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and
public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well
the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.) enough alone.

The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction
Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in the of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as "merely one of
phraseology. words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the
Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional
sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the Constitution all Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and
proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter
land of private ownership without regard to its nature or use, but mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the
that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that President, without intending to give it its natural signification and
proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word connotation. "We are not at liberty to presume that the framers
"land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self- of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not
evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32
lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any
do not partake of agricultural character. The insertion of the reasonable indication that its authors made the change with
word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby intention that it should not operate according to the rules of
eliminating any possibility that its implication was not grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences.
comprehended. The theory is against the presumption, based on human
experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed
themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with
the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification
little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then
Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require prevailing."
no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly
and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or
enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people legal basis for this assumption. The classification of public lands
who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification
their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." of private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made
(Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.) clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act
of Congress which declared that public lands which were not
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the
kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the prohibition was background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the
changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the
of reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The enactments which came up for construction, will bring into relief
elementary rules of speech with which men of average the error of applying to private lands the classification of public
intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional lands.
Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive
adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same
this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est manner as public lands for the very simple and manifest reason
exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of interpretation often that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public
quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason. lands — agricultural — can find their way into the hands of
private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is
agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral land, possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral
or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it
susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only be would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones
residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not which section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution wants to
agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The
to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution which
devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the
decided according to the value of the property, its size, and conveyance of private forests and mines.
other attending circumstances.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the conditions and with a different object in view. Classification of
public domain which are suitable for home building are public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for
considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that the purpose principally of segregating lands that may be sold
private residential, commercial or industrial lands should be from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of
considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what the United States Congress designated what lands of the public
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the
State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial
natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some lands should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.
exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands may be disposed of
by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution
was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are important parts treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court is not now
of the country's natural resources. Private non-agricultural land confronted with any problem for which there is no specific
does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural provision, such as faced it when the question of determining the
resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as character of public residential land came up for decision. This
materials supplied or produced by nature. The United States Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is
Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands. forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to
private lands, in the position where it found itself with reference
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a
Congress of the United States above mentioned was an organic name to call public residential lands, agricultural lands. When it
law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural
enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines
familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest
circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private
"words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be
ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of
distinctions. "The United States Congress was content with Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of
laying down a broad outline governing the administration, the laws covering public lands, we have to have different
exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this
details to be worked out by the local authorities and courts constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective.
entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it
stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural?
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within
a definition of the status of scattered small parcels of public the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.
lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with
which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood
separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty by agricultural land. Stripped of the special considerations which
to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit dictated the classification of public lands into three general
for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands groups, there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural
that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus regarded,
agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and
often inevitable in a law or constitution, and this Court merely no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Its
filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of
agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more
their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of suitable for purposes other than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we
most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice Story and are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from
Professor Cooley: the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While
in the construction of a constitution words must be given the
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is technical meaning which they have acquired, the rule is limited
used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution. to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be
Here again, however, great caution must be observed in supposed to have had in view in adopting them." To give an
applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law,
observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, it means a law technically known by that designation; the
that because a word is found in one connection in the meaning of the phrase having become definite in the history of
Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is
adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This would not necessary to employ language of a more popular character
be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the
words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it
objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical sense in these
has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the
narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history
minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, where they have been employed for the protection of popular
having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.)
which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the
made that the standard by which to measure its use in every quality of a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and
other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the
were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public
seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than
seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully
unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to said of members of the Constitutional Assembly.
adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he
gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it is The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve
very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. as a means of interpretation. The sentiments expressed in those
So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may
merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first
different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If they were,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.) those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for
reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support
As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention
been given a technical meaning and that the Constitution has of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward
employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article XIII
reference to public lands. If a technical import has been affixed wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and
to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not absolute nationalization of all lands, without exception, offers
itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
change was not "merely one of words" but represented under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino
something real and substantial. Firm and resolute convictions Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as
are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and public agricultural lands under said statute and under the
unqualified language. This is specially true when the instrument Constitution."
is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human
writings, always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning
endurance." in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is that there is no
logical connection between the premise and the conclusion.
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that
Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the principles Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's
underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the
lands, minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands
the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence of
word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to
exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. be noted that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies disposable lands
It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And
expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form these are lands of the public domain.
of expression." It is an expression that "lies but does not
deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands
and every one knows we don't. happens to be included in Article XIII, which is entitled
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no
The decision says: ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same
footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural
141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as
same as "public agricultural lands" under the we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense
Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the
commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted
simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range
both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or of the prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign policy,
general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces economics and politics.
all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad
meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939,
Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for the majority can not derive any comfort unless we cling to the
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In
strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for that opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of
agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not
commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary
answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public
private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of
opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say
the construction placed by the law-officer of the government on should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not
a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the carry such prohibition. For if the Constitution already barred the
majority say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions
the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would
Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as have been superfluous.
interested counsel for the government in a judicial action is —
as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the
incorrect both in theory and in practice — then this Court should Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jeepney for
have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he
appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in allowed to own a piece of land." There is no similitude between
line presumably with the opinion of the head of his department. owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a
jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed.
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars,
be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that that of his friends and relatives. He can not use a jeepney for
"it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to
agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so Filipino nationals, and the operation of a jeepney happens to be
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe
hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that
should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon performs a vital function in the country's economic life, closely
in the majority opinion, prevent private lands that have been associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so
acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien fundamental for communal living and for the development of the
possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be country's economy, that the government finds need of
well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we subjecting them to some measure of control and the
precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by
synonymous, be they public or private. The fear would not Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire
materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office
agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of
citizens. the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the
political complexion or scene of the nation.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the
majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII. Prohibiting This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's
the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural lands' is to be
any manner under its provisions or under the provisions of any construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar
previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other nature, the result will be that aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the
entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced
may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry
schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses, such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion
playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses and purposes which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given
that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any
Arguments like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be
the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J.,
a provision that is clear and certain simply because its 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that
enforcement would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to "many members of the National Assembly who approved the
what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do new Act (No. 141) had been members of the Constitutional
with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the
sound principles of constitutional government and is so well author of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a
known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous. leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional
Convention?
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which
this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we should not
overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to
curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the menace
should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not
prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-
agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from
passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define
the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple,
or to specify the uses for which lands may be dedicated, in order
to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation
resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could,
if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the
country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the
alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may
have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better
policy to leave to the political departments of the Government
the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by
foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing
conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that
with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly
during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all
G.R. No. 194199 That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use
the above-described portion of land subject of the present
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by donation for no other purpose except the construction of its
GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named
JR.,Petitioner DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines
vs Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions
BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers'
D. CABRAL, Respondent Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni
Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE
DECISION shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated
including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party
JARDELEZA, J.: and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or
buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period
The Case of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation,
otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked
This is a verified petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 and voided and of no further force and effect.8
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Province of Camarines
Sur (petitioner) challenging the Decision2 of the Court of CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the
Appeals (CA) promulgated on May 31, 2010 (assailed Decision) formalities of law and complied with the conditions stated in the
and its Resolution3 dated October 12, 2010 (assailed deed. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a
Resolution). The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision4 of the Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 26 (RTC Naga City), property.9 Under the Contract of Lease, CASTEA leased the
which in turn, reversed the ruling5 of the Municipal Trial Court of property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on
Naga City, Branch 2 (MTC Naga City) in the action for ejectment September 1, 1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega
filed by the petitioner against respondent Bodega Glassware took actual possession of the property on September 1, 1995.10
(Bodega).
Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer
The Facts of the Province of Camarines Sur wrote Bodega regarding the
building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in requested Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal
Peñafrancia, Naga City under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) document as legal basis for his possession. Bodega failed to
No. 22.6 On September 28, 1966, through then Provincial present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega
Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600 undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the
square meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur property.11
Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivas (Deed of Donation).7 The Deed of Donation On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega dated
included an automatic revocation clause which states: October 4, 2007.12 In this letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner.13 As it now intended to use the property for its
developmental projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega 2) [T]o pay plaintiff the amount of Php15,000.00 a month from
vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. date of judicial demand until it vacates the subject properties as
Bodega refused to comply with the demand.14 reasonable compensation for the use of the same.

Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund Defendant's counterclaim is hereby ordered DISMISSED with
F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its donation through a Deed of costs against defendant.20
Revocation of Donation15 (Deed of Revocation) dated October
14, 2007. It asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which
Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. Thus, reversed it in a Decision21 dated May 13, 2009. The dispositive
invoking the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of portion states:
Donation, petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void the
Deed of Donation.16 It appears from the record that CASTEA WHEREFORE premises considered, the decision of the court a
never challenged this revocation. quo is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered
DISMISSING the above case for failure of the plaintiff to present
On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful evidence to sustain its cause of action[. ]22
detainer against Bodega before the MTC Naga City. It prayed
that Bodega be ordered to vacate the property and surrender to The petitioner then went up on appeal to the CA which rendered
petitioner its peaceful possession. Petitioner also prayed for the the now assailed Decision. The CA disposed of the appeal thus:
payment of ₱15,000 a month from October 2007 until Bodega
vacates the land.17 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May 13, 2009 of the
In a Decision18 dated December 11, 2008, the MTC Naga City Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City is
ruled in favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to vacate the hereby AFFIRMED.23
property and to pay ₱l 5,000 a month as reasonable
compensation.19 The dispositive portion of this Decision states: In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC
Naga City that the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate
Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered, plaintiff having the property. The CA explained that Bodega's possession of the
established by preponderance of evidence its cause of action property is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA.
against the defendant, the latter is ordered: CASTEA, in turn, claims ownership of the property by virtue of
the Deed of Donation. According to. the CA, while petitioner
1) To immediately vacate and surrender to plaintiff, Province of alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and
Camarines Sur, the peaceful possession of the portion of the thus, the automatic revocation clause applies, it should have
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22 registered in first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against
the name of the plaintiff with an area of Six Hundred (600) CASTEA. The CA theorized that judicial intervention is
square meters subject of the lease contract executed by necessary to ascertain if the automatic revocation clause
CASTEA in favor of the herein defendant dated 7 September suffices to declare the donation revoked. In support of its
1995 where the defendants (sic) building is constructed, and, argument, the CA cited the ruling of this Court in Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals.24
The CA also found that petitioner's action has already of the parties' claims of possession-which, in the case of the
prescribed. According to it, Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code petitioner, involves an assertion of ownership--this determination
applies in this case. Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an is only provisional and done solely to settle the question of
action for reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was possession.
violated. As the Contract of Lease was entered into on
September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this date The Ruling of the Court
to file the action. Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer
was filed more than 12 years later. Further, the CA added that Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of
even the revocation of thedonation was done beyond the 10- forcible entry and unlawful detainer. These actions are summary
year prescriptive period. The CA also denied petitioner's motion proceedings and are devised to provide for a particular remedy
for reconsideration.25 for a very specific issue. Actions for unlawful detainer and
forcible entry involve only the question of actual possession.28 In
Petitioner filed this verified petition for review these actions, courts are asked to ascertain which between the
on certiorari challenging the assailed Decision. It argues that the parties has the right to the possession de facto or physical
CA wrongly applied the doctrine in Roman Catholic Archbishop possession of the property in question.29 Its purpose is to
of Manila. It asserts that the assailed Decision in fact restore the aggrieved party to possession if he or she
categorically stated that in donations containing an automatic successfully establishes his or her right to possess the property.
revocation clause, judicial intervention is not necessary for the The essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to
purpose of effectively revoking the donation. Such a revocation lawfully recover the property through lawful means instead of
is valid subject to judicial intervention only when its propriety is unlawfully wresting possession of the property from its current
challenged in court.26 occupant.30 Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible
entry is a summary proceeding and is an expeditious means to
In its comment, Bodega anchors its right of possession on its recover possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership,
Contract of Lease with CASTEA. It insists that the Contract of courts may only pass upon that issue for the purpose of
Lease is valid because CASTEA is the owner of the property. ascertaining who has the better right of possession.31 Any ruling
The automatic revocation clause did not immediately revoke the involving ownership is not final and binding. It is merely
donation in the absence of a judicial declaration. It also agrees provisional and does not bar an action between the same
with the CA that the petitioner's action has already prescribe d. 27 parties regarding the title of the property.32

The Issues An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to

specific circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a situation
The core issue in this case is who between petitioner and where the current occupant of the property initially obtained
Bodega has the right to the actual physical possession of the possession lawfully.33 This possession only became unlawful
property. The resolution of this issue requires us to look into the due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a
basis of their claims of possession. Essential to this is the contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.34
determination of the effect of the automatic revocation clause in
the Deed of Donation. We note, however, that an action for An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the
unlawful detainer pertains only to the issue of possession de following key jurisdictional facts:
facto or actual possession. Thus, while we may rule on the basis
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; clause in donations in the case of De Luna v.
Abrigo37promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by automatic revocation clauses by first identifying the three
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may
possession; be simple, remuneratory or onerous. A donation is simple when
the cause is the donor's pure liberality. It is remuneratory when
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the the donor "gives something to reward past or future services or
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said
services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate donation."38 A donation is onerous when it is "subject to
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 35 burdens, charges, or future services equal (or more) in value
than that of the thing donated x x x. "39 This Court found that the
When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery donation in De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to
of possession alleges that the opposing party occupied the build a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten. We then went on
subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly to explain that an onerous donation is governed by the law on
and the acts of tolerance established.36 Further, the party contracts and not by the law on donations. It is within this
seeking possession must identify the source of his or her claim context that this Court found an automatic revocation clause as
as well as satisfactorily present evidence establishing it. valid.

In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code
asked Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for occupying allows the parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
by allowing it to continue using its building and conducting policy."40 In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both
business on the property. Petitioner demanded that Bodega of them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to
vacate the property in November 2007. This presents a clear an automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation. The
case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance. jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of contracts
law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based
on its ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on its position that the Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the
property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was Philippines v. De las Angeles41 and Angeles v.
revoked as provided in the automatic revocation clause in the Calasanz42 where we held that an automatic rescission clause
Deed of Donation. effectively rescinds the contract upon breach without need of
any judicial declaration.
We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for
the purpose of ascertaining who between petitioner and Bodega In University of the Philippines, this Court held that a party to a
has the right to possess the property. contract with an automatic rescission clause, who believes that
there has been a breach warranting rescission, may consider
the contract rescinded without previous court action. Speaking clause, the occurrence of the condition agreed to by the parties
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we said: as to cause the revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider
the donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A
x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the contracting judicial finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary
party who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a when the other party actually goes to court for the specific
judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation.
Otherwise, the party injured by the other's breach will have to Nevertheless, even in such a case, "x x x the decision of the
passively sit and watch its damages accumulate during the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in
pendency of the suit until the final judgment of rescission is itself the revocatory act. "45 We also explained in this case that
rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise in ascertaining the prescription of actions arising from an
due diligence to minimize its own damages x x x.43 automatic revocation clause in donations, the general provisions
on prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764-which
We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to
extrajudicial rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the revoke the donation in case of breach of a condition-governs an
rescinder. It is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the instance where the deed of donation does not contain an
issue becomes necessary. automatic revocation clause.46

Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D.
Luna that: Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas.47 We once again held
that if a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for reversion in case of a breach of a condition and the donee
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing automatically reverts back to the donor without need of any
for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to judicial declaration. It is only when the donee denies the
determine whether or not the rescission was proper.44 rescission or challenges its propriety that the court can intervene
to conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper. This
While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous was also the import of our ruling in Zamboanga Barter Traders
donations with an automatic revocation clause, we extended this Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata.48
doctrine to apply to donations inter vivas in general in Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila. We explained in this case that In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic
Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the general provisions revocation clause. The clause states:
on obligations and contracts shall govern donations inter
vivas in all matters not determined in Title III, Book III on That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use
donations. Title III has no explicit provisions for instances where the above-described portion of land subject of the present
a donation has an automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules donation for no other purpose except the construction of its
in contracts law regarding automatic rescission of contracts as building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named
well as the jurisprudence explaining it find suppletory DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines
application. We then reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions
Manila that where a donation has an automatic revocation under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers'
Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its finding that
Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance. This
shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and
including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party renders nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or clause.
buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period
of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and
otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively
and voided and of no further force and effect.49 reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the
prope1ty, petitioner sources its right of possession on its
The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a
the property shall be used for "no other purpose except the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in
construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by order to recover it.
the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the
said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is
with its functions under its charter and bylaws and the Naga City anchored on its Contract of Lease with
Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High CASTEA.1âwphi1CASTEA's act of leasing the property to
School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic
and all improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an
construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease
be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the
execution." The last clause of this paragraph states that property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the
"otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked authority to lease it out.51 None exists in this case. Bodega finds
x x x."50 We read the final clause of this provision as an no basis for its continued possession of the property.
automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three
conditions of the donation. When CASTEA leased the property As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's
to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions. right to file this ejectment suit against Bodega has not
prescribed.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA
leased the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared
Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically that Article 764 on the prescription of actions for the revocation
reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation. The of a donation does not apply in cases where the donation has
records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. an automatic revocation clause.52 This is necessarily so
Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman Catholic because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation
Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders of a donation. It cannot govern cases where a breach of a
Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered the donation condition automatically, and without need of judicial intervention,
revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this revokes the donation.
revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of
Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is
petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance of entitled to recover damages, which refer to "rents" or " the
the property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
did not file the action within 10 years. This reveals a failure to premises," or "fair rental value of the property"54 and attorney's
understand the nature of a donation with an automatic fees and costs. More specifically, recoverable damages are
revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the breach of the "those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
condition in the donation causes the automatic revocation. All possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
the donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of the occupation of the property."55
revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the
donee questions the propriety of the revocation. Even then, In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of Pl5,000
judicial intervention is required to merely confirm and not order monthly as damages. Petitioner argued that considering that the
the revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive Contract of Lease between CASTEA and Bodega shows that
period to file an action to speak of. When the donee does not the monthly rent for the property is ₱30,000, the amount of
contest the revocation, no court action is necessary. ₱l5,000 which it prays for is fair and reasonable.56 We agree
with the petitioner's position. The amount of rent in the Contract
Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is of Lease is evidence of the fair rental value of the property. That
entitled to its possession. The petitioner's action for ejectment is the petitioner asked for half of this amount as damages is
anchored on this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the reasonable given the circumstances.
Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject another from a property
for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
year from the last demand to vacate.53 This is the prescriptive Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010
period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. which AFFIRMED the Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch
The records show that the petitioner served its last demand 26 dated May 13, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on Decision of the MTC Naga City is REINSTATED.
March 13, 2008 or around four months from the last demand.
The action is clearly within the prescriptive period. SO ORDERED.

We also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the petitioner. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum
justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and
costs. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)