DY YIENG SEANGIO, et. al., vs. HON. AMOR A.

REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006

Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners opposed contending that Segundo
left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause,
thus, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will. A petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo
was subsequently filed by petitioners before the RTC. Private respondents moved for its dismissal
on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not
contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a
will under Article 783 of the Civil Code as the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance and
nothing else. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent and that the rule on preterition
does not apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The RTC issued its order dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings as the will clearly shows that there is preterition since the other heirs were
omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. Petitioner filed for motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: WON the will executed is a holographic will.

Ruling:
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words,
the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Holographic wills, therefore, should be
construed in a manner where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and
the intention of the testator should be taken into account. Considering that the questioned
document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.

FISCHER v. JOHNSON
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1969
441 S.W.2d 132

FACTS:
Daniel and Nellie Peterson, a childless couple, each executed a will leaving their property to the
survivor. Nellie died in July 1966. On October 10, 1966, Daniel wrote to the lawyer who had
prepared his and his wife’s will, a handwritten letter containing instructions on how to dispose of
his properties and leaving the balance after funeral expense to one L.Fischer. L.Fischer was also
named by Daniel as executrix without bond or surety. In the letter, Daniel instructed his lawyer to
“put these explanations in my Will if you think it advisable” and “In the event this doesn’t reach you
before my death, try to make this as legal and binding as possible.” Daniel died February 1967.
The letter was offered and denied probate by the court. Hence, this appeal by L.Fischer.
ISSUE: Whether the handwritten letter of Daniel Peterson constitute his will?

HELD:
No. Mr.Peterson and his wife had previously executed a formal will drawn by their attorney and it
appears that he had considerable knowledge of the requirements of drafting and executing a will,
which is verifi ed by the letter to his attorney. The letter in question shows that it was not regarded
by Mr. Peterson as a will but was simply a direction to his attorney, Mr.Burt, to write a will. It said
“Put these explanations in my will if you think advisable”, and then he set out six items and to
whom he wanted them bequeathed. The next sentence in the letter stated,
“In the event this doesn’t reach you before my death, try to make this as legal and binding as
possible”. This letter was written three months and twenty days before Mr.Peterson’s death. A will
was prepared according to its instructions and given Mr.Peterson for execution and he visited the
office of his lawyer who prepared it on four or five different occasions and made no effort to
execute it or legalize it. In the case of Nelson v. Nelson, 235 Ky.189, 30 S.W.2d 893 (1930), it is
stated: “We take it there will be no disputing the fact that the determination of whether an
instrument is testamentary in character depends wholly upon the intention of the maker, and that,
in the absence of a testamentary intent, there can never be a will.”

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR.

Facts:
Father Pascual Rigor, herein deceased, left a will which was executed on Oct. 29, Dec. 1933 and
contained a provision that his ricelands shall be given to his nearest male relative who shall enter
priesthood, and that during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was
studying for the priesthood or the testator's nephew became a priest and was excommunicated,
the parish priest of Victoria would administer these propertied. When a new administrator was
appointed as prayed by herein petitioner, a petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church
as trustee was filed by petitioner. The intestate heirs of the deceased countered with a petition
praying that the bequest be inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the
said ricelands since no nearest male relative of the testator has ever studied for the priesthood.
The lower court granted the legal heirs’ petition. This was reversed on Dec. 10, 1957 in a motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew, Edgardo
Cunanan, who was a seminarian. On appeal to CA, the order was reversed, hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Cunanan entering the seminary shall affect the legal heirs right to inherit the
subject ricelands

Held:
No. As provided in Article 1025 of the Civil Code, in order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper. In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his
three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao.
Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his
nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died
in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire
to follow the ecclesiastical career. This was answered in the negative.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. There being no
substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said
ricelands. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative. Hence, CA’s decision is affirmed.

IN RE ESTATE OF RUSSELL
Supreme Court of California,1968
69 Cal.2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal.Rptr.561

FACTS:
Thelma Russell died testate leaving a validly executed holographic will which stated: “I leave
everything I own Real & Personal to Chester H. Quinn & Roxy Russell. My ($10) Ten dollar
Gold Piece & diamonds I leave to Georgia Nan Russell.” Chester Quinn is a close friend of the
testatrix, while Roxy Russell was her pet dog. Georgia Nan Russell, herein plaintiff is testatrix’
niece and only heir-at-law. In her petition for determination of heirship, plaintiff Georgia alleged
that Roxy Russell was a dog, who under the law can not inherit, and that the gift of one-half of the
residue of testatrix’ estate to Roxy Russell is invalid and void and thus plaintiff was entitled to such
one-half as the testratrix’ sole heir at- law. The court ruled that the testatrix intended to and did
make an absolute and outright gift to Mr.Quinn of all the residue of her estate, adding “there
occurred no lapse as to any portion of the residuary gift to CHESTER H.QUINN by reason of the
language contained in the Will concerning the dog, ROXY RUSSELL, such language not having
the effect of being an attempted outright gift or gift in trust to the dog. The effect of such language
is merely to indicate the intention of Testatrix that CHESTER H. QUINN was to take the entire
residuary estate and to use whatever portion thereof as might be necessary to care for and
maintain the dog, ROXY RUSSELL’. Thus, this appeal by Georgia Nan Russell.

ISSUE: Whether the court was correct in interpreting the words of Russell’s Will to mean that
Quinn would take the entire residuary estate and use a portion thereof for the care of Roxy
Russell?

HELD:
No. ‘The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will
is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention
must be given effect as far as possible. ‘ Extrinsic evidence of the circumstances under which a
will is made (except evidence expressly excluded by statute) may be considered by the court in
ascertaining what the testator meant by the words used in the will. If in the light of such extrinsic
evidence, the provisions of the will are reasonably susceptible of two or more meanings claimed to
have been intended by the testator, ‘ an uncertainty arises upon the face of a will and extrinsic
evidence relevant to prove any of such meaning is admissible. If, on the other hand, in the light of
such extrinsic evidence , the provisions of the will are not reasonably susceptible of two or more
meanings, there is no uncertainty arising upon the face of the will and any proffered evidence
attempting to show an intention different from that expressed by the words therein, giving them the
only meaning to which they are reasonably susceptible, is inadmissible. Viewing the will in the
light of the surrounding circumstances as are disclosed by the record, we conclude that the will
cannot reasonably be construed as urged by Quinn and determined by the trial court as providing
that testatrix intended to make an absolute and outright gift of the entire residue of her estate
to Quinn who was ‘to use whatever portion thereof as might be necessary to care for and maintain
the dog’. No words of the will gave the entire residuum to Quinn, much less indicate that the
provision for the dog is merely precatory in nature. Such an interpretation is not consistent with a
disposition which by its language leaves the residuum in equal shares to Quinn and the dog. A
disposition in equal shares to two benefi ciaries cannot be equated with a disposition of the whole
to one of them who may use ‘whatever portion thereof as might be necessary’ on behalf of the
other. Neither can the bare language of a gift of one-half of the residue to the dog be so expanded
as to mean a gift to Quinn in trust for the care of the dog. The trial court’s interpretation of the
terms of the will was erroneous. Interpreting the provisions relating to testatrix’ residuary estate in
accordance with the only meaning to which they are reasonably susceptible, we conclude that
testatrix intended to make a disposition of all of the residue of the estate to Quinn and the dog in
equal shares, and as a dog cannot be the benefi ciary under a will, the attempted gift to Roxy
Russell is void. The residue of testatrix’ estate should be distributed in equal shares to Chester
H.Quinn and Georgia Nan Russell, testatrix’ niece.

BELLIS VS. BELLIS

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his
2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis
executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the
following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the
entire bequest therein. Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported,
inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000
each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7
equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children.

The lower court dismissed the opposition fi led by plaintiffs and admitted the Project of Partition
relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code which states that the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law shall be applied. Texas law did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: Whether which law should apply – Texas law or Philippine law?

HELD:
Texas law should apply. Article 16, par.2 and Article 1039 of the Civil Code state that the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, shall govern with regard
to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (4) the capacity to succeed. The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.