Rosenbloom vs. Metromedia Inc.

The judicial travails in defamation cases took the United States Supreme Court further.
In New York Times versus Sullivan, the actual malice standard was galvanized as the applicable rule in
defamation cases involving public officials in relation to their ofifical conduct. In the same year, the U.S. Supreme
Court applied the actual malice doctrine in criminal cases in Garrison vs. Louisiana.
In 1967, the actual malice doctrine was held applicable to public figures, and not just public officials in a divided
court in Curtis Publishing Co. vs. Butts.
The next case the U.S. Supreme ruled upon was a case involving plainitffs who were neither public officials nor
public figures, but private individuals.
There was a seeming trend to provide greater accomodations to press freedom as the Supreme Court introduced
a new standard, which is the public interest standard.
In the case of Rosenbloom vs. Metromedia Inc. (1971) the Supreme Court applied the actual malice standard
regardless of the status of the plainitff, as long as the matter involved was one of public interest.
This became a highly controversial case, in view of the very wide latitude accorded to the press in defamation
cases.
But more significantly, the Rosenbloom case in the United States would be relevant to later defamation cases
decided by the Philippine Supreme Court, which I will discuss later.
See below my digest of this important (significant to Philippine defamation laws) case.
Rosenbloom v Metro Media, Inc.
403 U.S. 20
June 7 1971

In 1963, petitioner was a distributor of nudist magazines in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Respondent
Metromedia’radio station, which broadcast news reports every half hour, broadcast news stories of petitioner
Rosenbloom’s arrest for possession of obscene literature and the police seizure of "obscene books," and stories
concerning petitioner's lawsuit against certain officials alleging that the magazines he distributed were not
obscene and seeking injunctive relief from police interference with his business. These latter stories did not
mention petitioner Rosenbloom’s name, but used the terms "smut literature racket" and "girlie-book peddlers."
Following petitioner's acquittal of criminal obscenity charges, he filed this action seeking damages under
Pennsylvania's libel law.
Issue:
Whether the New York Times' knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard applies in a state civil libel action brought not
by a "public official" or a "public figure" but by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a news
broadcast by a radio station about the individual's involvement in an event of public or general interest

Held:
The actual malice standard applies.
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content,
effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. The present case
illustrates the point.
The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area such as
obscenity where a number of highly important values are potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in
seeing that the criminal law is adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not used unconstitutionally to
suppress free expression. Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distributor or a
"private" businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining whether the public has an
interest in the issue. We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First
Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of
public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.

SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G R NO 82585; 14 NOV 1988]

Facts:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie
case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or
not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President. (2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause
(2)
Held:
With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation
is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings
Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of
the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses.
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution"
was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval
of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating
four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian have developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or
picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted
from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint
was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff
which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary
profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was,
in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of
public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to
film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent
at least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech
and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.