PART FIVE

UNION REPRESENTATION: ESTABLISHING UNION MAJORITY STATUS

Pre-Condition – Employer-Employee Relationship

Election – Pre-requisite
Case
1. Allied Free Workers Union v. Compania Maritima, 19 SCRA 258 [1967] - RAGILES

FACTS: This is a consolidation of 3 cases involving both parties. Respondent Compania Maritima (MARITIMA), a
local corp. engaged in shipping entered into a contract for lease of services with petitioner Allied Free Workers’ Union
(AFWU), a duly registered legitimate labor union. In the contract, it was stipulated that AFWU will do and perform all
the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all vessels or boats of MARITIMA in Iligan City; that the contract is
good and valid for 1 month starting Aug.12, 1952, but may be renewed by agreement of the parties with
the reservation that MARITIMA has the right to revoke said contract even before the expiration of the term, if and
when AFWU fails to render good service.

-Towards the end of 1953, MARITIMA complained to AFWU of unsatisfactory and inefficient service. To remedy the
situation, MARITIMA was forced to hire extra laborers from among “stand-by” workers not affiliated to any union.
-On July 1954, AFWU sent a written proposal to MARITIMA for a CBA, but the latter did not reply. Thereafter, AFWU
instituted an action in the CIR praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit composed of all the
laborers doing arrastre and stevedoring work for MARITIMA, to which action MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of
EREE relationship. On Aug.1954, MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the contract because of the
inefficient service rendered by the latter which had adversely affected its business. The termination was to
take effect as of Sept.1, 1954. MARITIMA then contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring Union for the arrastre and
stevedoring work. The latter agreed to perform the work subject to the same terms and conditions of
the contract with AFWU. The new agreement was to be carried out on Sept.1, 1954.

-On Aug.26, 1954, AFWU charged MARITIMA of unfair labor practices (ULPs) before the CIR. MARITIMA answered,
again denying the ER-EE relationship between the parties. On Sept.9, 1954, MARITIMA filed an action to rescind
the contract, enjoin AFWU members from doing arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with its vessels, and for
recovery of damages against AFWU and its officers. The CFI ordered the rescission of the contract and permanently
enjoined AFWU members from performing work in connection with MARITIMA’s vessels.
AFWU was later able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the maintenance of the status quo prior to
Jan.6, 1961. Thus, after Jan.18, 1961, AFWU laborers were again back doing the same work as before.

-On Nov.4, 1963, after almost 10 years, the CFI finally rendered its decision: In pursuance of the provisions of Sec.12
of R.A. 875 and the Rules of this court on certification election, the Honorable Secretary of Labor or any of
his authorized representative is hereby requested to conduct certification election among all the workers and/or
stevedores working in the wharf of Iligan City who are performing stevedoring and arrastre service aboard Compania
Maritima vessels docking at Iligan City port in order to determine their representative for collective bargaining with
the employer, whether these desire to be represented by the petitioner Allied Free Workers Union or neither; and
upon termination of the said election, the result thereof shall forthwith be submitted to this court for further
consideration. From this ruling, both parties appealed, AFWU claiming that it should be declared outright as the
majority union while MARITIMA contends that said court could not even have correctly ordered a certification
election considering that there was an absence of ER-EE relationship between it and said laborers.

ISSUE: WON the order of a certification election by the CIR was proper. (WON there was an ER-EE
relationship between AFWU and MARITIMA)

HELD:

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NO. Before a certification election can be held, there must exist an ER-EE relationship between the ER and the
petitioner union. Ratio The duty to bargain collectively exists only between the “employer” and its “employees.”
Where there is no duty to bargain collectively, it is not proper to hold certification electionsin connection therewith.
Reasoning In its findings, the CIR observed that after the rescission, the AFWU laborers continued working in
accordance with the “cabo system,” which was the prevailing custom in the place. Under this system, the union was
an independent contractor. The CIR also made a finding that prior to the contract between MARITIMA and AFWU,
the former had an oral arrastre and stevedoringagreement with another union, the Iligan Laborers Union (ILU),
which agreement was also based on the “cabo” system. After unsatisfactory service, MARITIMA cancelled this
oral contract and entered into a newcontract with AFWU, the terms and conditions of which were similar to the
oral contract with ILU. The written contract between AFWU and MARITIMA was signed under the assurance by AFWU
that the same arrangement previously had with the former union regarding performance and execution of arrastre
and stevedoring contract be followed in accordance with the custom of such kind of work in Iligan. Thus, petitioner
union operated as a labor contractor under the so-called “cabo” system.
-From these findings, Insofar as the working agreement was concerned, there was no real difference between
the contract and the prior oral agreement. Both were based on the “cabo” system. Hence, since the parties observed
the “cabo” system after the rescission of the contract, and since the characteristics of said system show that the
contracting union was an independent contractor, it is reasonable to assume that AFWU continued being an
independent contractor of MARITIMA. And, being an independent contractor, it could not qualify as an “employee”.
With more reason would this be true with respect to the laborers. Moreover, there is no evidence at all regarding the
characteristics of the working arrangement between AFWU and MARITIMA after the termination of the CONTRACT.
All we have to go on is the court a quo’s finding that the “cabo” system was observed-a system that negatives
employment relationship.
-Since the only function of a certification election is to determine, with judicial sanction, which union shall be
the official representative or spokesman of the “employees” will be, there being no ER-EE relationship between the
parties disputants, it follows that there is neither a duty to bargain collectively. Thus, the order for certification
election in question cannot be sustained.

Disposition
Appealed decision of the CIR is AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the charge of ULP, but REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as it ordered the holding of a certification election. The petition for certification election should be DISMISSED.

Methods of Establishing Majority Status

Elections – Certification and Consent Election; Consent Election; and Run-off Election Section 1(h) and
(ss), Rule I, Book V

Case
2. National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants, Allied Industries Manila Pavillion Chapter v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, 594 SCRA 767 [2009] – BAUTISTA1

Facts: A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of respondent
Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the ffg results:

EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS’ LIST = 353

TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
HIMPHLU = 169
NO UNION = 1
SPOILED = 3
SEGREGATED = 22

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Due to the significant number of segregated votes, petitioner NUHWHRAIN-MPHC and respondent Holiday Inn
Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter to decide which among those
votes would be opened and tallied. Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed
employees, but the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six (6) other votes were
segregated because the employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the
election. Still five (5) other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees
and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. However, the
vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee, was counted.

By Order of August 22, 2006, Med-Arbiter ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, especially
those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.
HIMPHLU was ordered certified by Med Arbiter. Petitioner appealed with the Sec of Labor and contended that
HIMPHLU should not be certified since majority votes was not obtained and also argued that the votes of the
probationary employees be opened.

Sec of Labor affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. On appeal, CA likewise affirmed.

Issue:
1. Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote.
2. Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent.

Ruling:

1. Yes, probationary employees should be allowed to vote at the time of certification election.
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
"labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall
be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." The Code
makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification
election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the
petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."

Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003 states [xxx] For purposes of this section, any
employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be
eligible for membership in any labor organization.

Rule XI states Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - All employees who are members of the
appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the issuance of the order
granting the conduct of a certification election shall be eligible to vote. An employee who has been dismissed from
work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the
issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her
dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.

2. No, HIMPHLU did not obtain a majority vote out of the validly cast votes. It is well-settled that under the so-
called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have
voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Under Art. 256 of the Labor
Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence,
50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170. HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes only.

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The true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the
required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it follows
that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the
rank-and-file employees.

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a
certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in
none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number
of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.8 With 346 votes cast,
337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151
and the choice "NO UNION" receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and
petitioner is in order.

Petition granted, Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of Labor Relations were ordered to conduct run-
off election.

Distinctions – Certification and Consent Elections

Case
3. Warren Manufacturing Workers Union v. BLR, 159 SCRA 387 - BUAQUEN

Facts: There was an intra-union rivalry between the petitioner WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION
(WMWU),and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU for short)
since 1985.On August 25, 1985, consent election was held, and yielded the following results:PACIWU;94 and
WMMU 193. On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification election followed by the filing of a
petition for the same purposes by the Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were both opposed by Warren
Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the one-
year no certification election law and the existence of a duly ratified CBA.Ministry of Labor and Employment,
ordered on August 8, 1986 the holding of a certification election within twenty 20) days from receipt to determine
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the Warren se Manufacturing
Corporation, with the above-mentioned choices.Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein
filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed the same for lack of
merit.Hence, this petition.This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing Workers Union, with the
company itself opting not to appeal.Petitioner contends that no certification election may be held within one (1)
year from the date of the issuance of the declaration of a final certification result and Article 257, Title VII, Book V
of the Labor Code provides:
No certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any Collective Bargaining Agreement existing
between the employer and a legitimate labor organization.

Issue: Whether or not the one-year no certification election rule applies on the case.

Held: No. The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August 25,1985 at the Company's
premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent election and not a certification election
(Emphasis supplied). As correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed one, its
purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit while a certification election is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very
nature of consent election, it is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of
a certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof to

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immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to
choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom period.

It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of determining
which labor union should be the bargaining representative in the negotiation for a collective contract, there being
an existing collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to determine which labor union
shag administer the said existing contract.
Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor Code apply:
ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.—When there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate
or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to
keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Corollary to the above, Article
257 of the New Labor Code expressly states that No certification election issue shall be entertained if a collective
agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of this Code exists between the employer and
a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified
collective bargaining agreement." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied Workers Association v. the Director of the Bureau of labor
Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a
certification election at the proper time. that is, within 60 days prior to the expiration of the three year period ...
Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not
adversely affect the petition for certification election filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly provides:
Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.—There representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a
collective agreement submitted before or during the last sixty days of a subsisting agreement or during the
pendency of the representation case.

Doctrine: A consent election is an agreed one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority
representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a certification election is aimed
at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a separate and distinct process
and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a certification election.

Consent Elections
Case
4. Algire v. De Mesa, 237 SCRA 647 [1994] - GONZALES

FACTS:

Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU) filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for
the holding of an election of union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).

DOLE’s med-arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing that such an election be
held.

In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the 3 Section 3, Rule V, Implementing Rules and Regulations,
election by secret ballot be conducted between Catalino Algire, et al. (petitioner) and Regalado de Mesa, et al.
(respondents) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer.

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 In filling out the ballots, instructions were given to mark choices with either a check mark or an ‘X’ mark. There should
also be no other markings on the ballot. De Mesa and Algire both got 133 votes each. Total votes cast were 272. 6
were declared as spoiled ballots. Algire filed a petition, alleging that one of the ballots which had two check marks was
erroneously declared to be a spoiled ballot. The checks supposedly made it clear as to the choice made by the voter.

The med-arbiter issued an order in Algire’s favor and certified the latter’s group to be the unions validly elected
officers. De Mesa appealed to the DOLE secretary which was granted. Another order for a new election of officers
was made by the Med-Arbiter and another pre-election conference was scheduled.

Algire’s group filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. He contend that a representation
officer (referring to a person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule
VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on- the-spot questions
arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned ballot is not within
his competence.

ISSUE

WON the act of the DOLE secretary in denying Algire’s motion was in excess of its authority since the case is an intra-
union activity

HELD

NO. The certification election was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority
representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process
and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.

What is at question in this case was a consent election, not a certification election. If indeed petitioner’s group had
any opposition to the representation officer’s ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so
seasonably during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot’s validity shall be deemed a waiver
of any defect or irregularity arising from said election.

Policy
Union Voluntary Recognition
DOLE Order No. 9, Rule X (1997)

Case
5. Samahang Mangagawa sa Premex v. Sec. of Labor, 286 SCRA 692 [1998] - RAGILES

FACTS: A certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter
Corporation with ‘No Union’ winning [NFL lost]. Later however, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor
organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department
of Labor and Employment and then affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU). (SMP-
PIILU) wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
employees at the Permex Producer and was granted. They then entered into a CBA. A year later, NFL filed gain for a
petition for certification election but was dismissed. Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it
is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their
sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting themselves into an
organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain collectively,
the employer may do one of two things.

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 First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees’ claim the employer may voluntarily recognize the union by
merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective
bargaining agreement.
Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the
Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for
certification election, the union claiming to represent the employees may submit the petition so that it may be
directly certified as the employees’ representative or a certification election may be held.

ISSUE: Whether or not Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-
PIILU) should be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees

HELD: NO.
The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja is particularly apropos: “. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized
establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is
no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily
recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it
as the bargaining representative of the employees — A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO
AUTHORITYTO GIVE, for it is the employees’ prerogative (not the employer’s) to determine whether they want a
union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be.” In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should
not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as
exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have the power to
declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective bargaining. It is not enough
that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining
unit be given the opportunity to express himself.

Law
Case
6. Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Sec. of Labor, 294 SCRA 640 [1998] – BAUTISTA2

Facts: Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company, Inc. (the company) entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to
expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the company's rank-and-file employees authorized the Federation
of Free Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election. On March 10, 1994, however, this petition was
repudiated via a written waiver 2 by 115 of the signatories who, along with other employees totaling 897, ratified
the CBA on the same date.

Federation of Free Workers (OTCWU-FFW) filed a petition for certification election with the National Capital Region
office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The petition was accompanied by the "authentic
signatures" of 25% of the employees/workers in the bargaining unit.

The OTCLU filed a motion for the dismissal of the petition for certification election on the ground that it was not
endorsed by at least 25% of the employees of the bargaining unit. Some of the employees who initially signed the
petition had allegedly withdrawn in writing such support prior to the filing of the same. Meanwhile, the DOLE
issued a certificate of registration of the CBA pursuant to Article 231 of the Labor Code.

Med-Arbiter Renato D. Paruñgo dismissed the petition for certification election for the withdrawal of support to the
petition by 115 workers, the remaining 133 of the 1,020 employees were clearly less than the 25% subscription
requirement.

On appeal, the Undersecretary of Labor, ruled in favor of OTCWU-FFW and stated that when the said CBA was
registered there was a pending representation case. Consequently, said CBA cannot bar the election being prayed
for

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 Issue:
1. Whether certification of election may be conducted in spite of the majority of employees ratifying the new CBA.
2. Whether certification election may be conducted even if the support requirement of 25% is not complied with.

Ruling:

1. Yes, certification election may be conducted.

The Labor Code imposes upon the employer and the representative of the employees the duty to bargain
collectively. 14 Since the question of right of representation as between competing labor organizations in a
bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, 15 the law governs the choice of a collective bargaining
representative which shall be the duly certified agent of the employees concerned. An official certification becomes
necessary where the bargaining agent fails to present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority authorization
and where the employer demands it, or when the employer honestly doubts the majority representation of several
contending bargaining groups. 16 In fact, Article 255 of the Labor Code allows the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit to designate or select the labor organization which shall be their exclusive
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.

The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going through the process set out
by law for the conduct of a certification election applies only when representation is not in issue. There is no
problem if a union is unanimously chosen by a majority of the employees as their bargaining representative, but a
question of representation arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the
employees' representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the supervision of the
proper government authority.

The filing of a petition for certification election by one of the two unions in the bargaining unit is enough basis for
the DOLE, through its authorized official, to implement the law by directing the conduct of a certification election

2. Yes, certification election may be conducted even if the 25% support requirement is availing.
The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in determining the true will of the
workers instead of frustrating the same. In line with this policy (that the holding of a certification election is a
certain and definitive mode of arriving at the choice of the employees' bargaining representative), we feel that the
administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of the
petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate
representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks
to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is
sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission of
the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

No Direct Certification
Case
7. Colgate Palmolive Phils. v. Ople, 163 SCRA 323 [1988] - BUAQUEN

Facts:

The COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground
of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing
employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the
union.After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner

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 assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.The respondent Union, on the other hand, in its position paper, reiterated
the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under
Registry No. 10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen (nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen
presently employed by the company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of the Union up to the
present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen employed are already members of the Union, leaving no doubt that
the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union and no
opposition was made on thuIs.The MOLE dismissed the unfair labor practice case but certified the respondent
Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company.

Issue: Whether or not the mere fact that no opposition is made does warrant a direct certification.

Held:No.Even in a case where a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no
opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. More so as in the case at bar, when the records of the
suit show that the required proof was not presented in an appropriate proceeding and that the basis of the direct
certification was the Union's mere allegation in its position paper that it has 87 out of 117 regular salesmen. In
other words, respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving assertion of the respondent Union that it
enjoyed the support of the majority of the salesmen, without subjecting such assertion to the test of competing
claims. As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed
orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the law for representation cases because:

(a) He has created havoc by impliedly establishing a procedural short-cut to obtaining a direct certification-by
merely filing a notice of strike.

(b) By creating such a short-cut, he has officially encouraged disrespect for the law.

(c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, he has in effect arrogated unto
himself the right, vested naturally in the employees, to choose their collective bargaining representative.

(d) He has in effect imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority
representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the blessing of the
Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable
for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has not been legally established.

Effect One Union Only

Case
8. George and Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82 [1985] - GONZALES

FACTS

George and Peter Lines, Inc. (petitioner) is involved in shipping, while Associated Labor Unions (ALU, respondent) is
a legitimate labor organization. On July 16, 1878, a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by ALU praying that it be
certified as the SOLE and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of petitioner
corporation, there being no labor union.

Petitioner opposed the petition stating that the Union does not represent the majority of the employees concerned,
and that more than 80% of the licensed/ unlicensed crew of its vessels claims they are not members of any union.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 9

 Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration alleging that 80% of the employees denied their membership. Corporation moved that a certification
election should be called.

Bureau of Labor Relations Director, upon examination of the documents, opined that there existed a doubt regarding
the majority of status of respondent ALU because of the withdrawal of the members, and directed a certification
election.

Upon a motion for reconsideration by ALU, the BLR Director reconsidered its Resolution and directly certified ALU as
sole bargaining agent.

ISSUE

WON employees of the corporation are entitled to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative with
petitioner thru a certification election;

WON petitioner is entitled to file petition for certification election.

HELD

1. YES. Employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization which it desires to join. The
exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose
in a certification election. Reasoning The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.

The best forum to determine if there was indeed undue pressure exerted upon the employees to retract their
membership is in the certification election itself (in secret ballot where they can freely express their choice).

The fact that there are no competing Unions should not affect the freedom of choice (they can always choose ALU or
‘No Union’).

Policy Consideration
Case
9. Progressive Development Corp. v. DOLE, 2005 SCRA 802 [1992] - RAGILES

FACTS: The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation may file a
petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's
employees. On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred
to as Kilusan) filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees
Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book
V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and
by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.

On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted
the necessary documentary requirements for registration,
In its "Supplemental Position Paper", the petitioner insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did
not bear the corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 10

 signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private respondent therefore failed to
substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by the rules.

Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of the
chapter.

PDC filed an appeal – denied

.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is
fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.

HELD: YES. The failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition
of a legitimate status.
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers be certified
under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent. The submission
of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the
application for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is entitled to all the rights
and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the
union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or
misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked
degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and
misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a
criminal charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They
likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or
fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends

Effect of Receipt of Benefits

Case
10. Barbizon c. Nagkaisang Supervisors, 261 SCRA 738 – BAUTISTA3

Facts: In a certification election conducted among the rank and file employees of Barbizon Philippines Inc.
PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB (ALAB) and BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE
CORPORATION (BUKLOD) were the two contenders and BUKLOD was eventually certified.

While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into the Nagkakaisang Supervisors Ng
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees Ng Barbizon,
Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) allegedly because they were excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA between
petitioner and BUKLOD. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election but on appeal to the
Office of the Secretary of Labor this was reversed. Consequently, Barbizon Philippines Inc. filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied, hence, the petition to SC.

Issue: Whether the receipt by NSBPI and NEMPEBPI employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD
and Barbizon Philippines Inc is sufficient to deny their petition for certification election.

Ruling: No. The receipt by NSBPI and NEMPEBPI employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and
petitioner is not sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the labor organization formed by
the excluded employees. It is not equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of the excluded
employees to self-organization and collective bargaining.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 11

 The Supreme Court in the cases of General Rubber and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations said:
“The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were extended to the monthly paid employees, even if
true will not preclude them from entering into a CBA of their own. Neither is the inconvenience that may befall
petitioner for having to administer two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid employees of their
constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining.”

Finally, we take this opportunity to reiterate the standing rule that a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers, hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same.

Religion / Past Non-Participation

Case
11. Reyes v. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484 [1992] - BUAQUEN

Facts: The certification election was conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union
Industries Corporation on October 20, 1987. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized
Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the
election, conducted under the provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their
votes were 141 members of the INK.The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast,
of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor. organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and,
conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: "NO UNION."

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1

TUEU-OLALIA 95

NO UNION 1

SPOILED 1

CHALLENGED 141

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final
count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the
INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to
participate in the previous certification elections."

Issue:Whether or not the INK employees' votes during the certification election be rendered invalid on the ground
of their religious belief and for not previously participating in the past elections.

Held: No.Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." This is made plain by no less than three
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 2 Article 243 of the Code provides as follows: 3

ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial
and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed
people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid
and protection.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 12

 Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in
previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form,
join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes
forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the
petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their
discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED; the Decision of the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Labor Relations dated December 21, 1987 (affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated July 22, 1988) is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the petitioners are DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to vote, and their
ballots should be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for the choices written
therein. Costs against private respondents.

Rationale
Case
12. National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Sec. of Labor, 227 SCRA 821 [1993] - GONZALES

FACTS

Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly registered with the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of
respondent QCC, a domestic corporation engaged in the metal industry.

38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC,
respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital
Region (NCR-OD-M-91-09-106) a petition for certification election. The petition was accompanied by a list of
signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank and file
employees of QCC.

Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required
consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition
was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no
personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.

The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC in a decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the assailed decision was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

HELD

1. Although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had disaffiliated himself therefrom and
joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The
eventual dismissal of De Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification
election was filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.
2. Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is
formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of
the pleading accordingly.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 13

3. Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is
definitely more than 75. Moreover, the fact that the list of signatures is undated does not necessarily mean that the
signatures were obtained prior to the 60-day period before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining
agreement. What is important is that the petition for certification election must be filed during the freedom period
and that the 25% requirement of supporting signatures be met upon the filing thereof. These requirements have
been compiled by respondent FFW-SMQCC in their first and second petitions, and it was thus incumbent upon the
Med-Arbiter to order a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of the company
(Labor Code of the Philippines, Art. 256; Warren Mfg. Workers' Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387
[1988]; Samahang Mangagawa ng Pacific Mills v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]).

Forum Issue
Case
13. Kamada v. Ferrer-Calleja, 278 SCRA 531 [1997] - RAGILES

FACTS: Petitioner claims to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all workers in Ocean Terminal Services, Inc.
(OTSI).[6] After a certification election, it concluded a collective bargaining agreement with the company. Soon
thereafter, in September 1990, private respondent union (ASTEUO) -- allegedly composed also of OTSI workers -- was
registered.Upon learning of such fact, Petitioner KAMADA filed a suit to cancel the registration of ASTEUO on the
ground that the latter’s members were already covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement. Private
respondent, on the other hand, claimed that its existence as a union could not be disturbed, as its registration was
made during the freedom period when there was no collective bargaining agreement concluded as yet.

Private respondents registration was cancelled by the med-arbiter in his resolution dated November 27, 1990, finding
that the organization of another union covering the same workers can no longer be considered as a labor protective
[sic] activity under P.D. 1391[7] and that this will even be against the present policy of one union in one company.[8]
Private respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. As earlier stated, Public Respondent Pura Ferrer-
Calleja, director of the said office, reversed the decision of the med-arbiter and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of one company-one union policy.

HELD: As regards petitioners battle cry of one union in one company, this Court has already laid down in Knitjoy
Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja[14] the exceptions to that policy. The Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., held:
1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union policy, anchored on the greater
mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could
undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and dissension, is not
without exceptions.
The present Article 245 of the Labor Code expressly allows supervisory employees who are not performing managerial
functions to join, assist or form their separate union but bars them from membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees. It reads:
ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. --
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.
This provision obviously allows more than one union in a company.
Even Section 2 (c), Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to
implement the policy, also recognizes exceptions. It reads:
SEC. 2. Who may file. -- Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when requested to bargain collectively,
may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization shall contain, among others:

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 14

 xxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant
unit, or a subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to assure employees
of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. (PASCUAL. C., Labor Relations Law, 1986, ed., 109) Otherwise stated,
the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for
purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others,
which the Constitution guarantees. (Section 8, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Venue of Petition
Case
14. Cruz Valle Inc. v. Laguesma, 238 SCRA 389 [1994] - 4BA UTISTA

Facts: UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (UFW) filed with the DOLE, Regional Office No. IV, a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner Cruzvale Inc. Said worker’s place of work was in one
of the offices of petitioner located in Cainta, Rizal; petitioner’s principal place of business was in Quezon City.

Petitioner filed its comment on the petition for certification election and sought for its denial, and one of
petitioner’s grounds was the lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE, since petitioner
Company's place of business was located at Cubao, Quezon City, which was outside the jurisdiction of the said
Regional Office. Consequently, it was the National Capital Region office of the DOLE which has jurisdiction over said
petition.

Both the Med Arbiter and DOLE Undersecretary ruled in favor of UFW, hence, the instant petition to SC by
petitioner Cruzvale Inc.

Issue: Whether the petition for certification election should have been filed with the regional office which has
jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer in accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code:

Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over
the principal office of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.

Ruling: No, SC ruled that Section 1 does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election where the place
of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the territorial
jurisdictions of different regional offices.

The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be
filed. Venue touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. Section 1, Rule V,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the
employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Office where the petition for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing
of petitions for certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of
the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices.

The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as
the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 15

 disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in
another place to the inconvenience of the worker

Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before
the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business
of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification
election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila.

Certification Election Process

Rule VIII, Book V
Rule IX, Book V

The Union as Initiating Party

Article 242

Case
15. Lopez Sugar Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, 247 SCRA 1 [1995] - BUAQUEN

Facts: Private respondent National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP ("NACUSIP-
TUCP") filed with the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") Regional Office No. VI, Bacolod City, a
petition for direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar Corporation ("LSC"), at its sugar
central in Fabrica, Sagay, Negros Occidental.In its petition, NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national
labor organization; that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of whom were members of the
union; that no other labor organization was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that there was
no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said employees; and that there was no legal impediment
either to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification election. On 18 August 1989, the
Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization ("CAILO"), a registered labor organization also claiming to count
substantial membership among the LSC supervisory employees, moved to intervene. 3 The motion was granted. At
the hearing of 20 September 1989, both NACUSIP-TUCP and CAILO failed to appear. Hearing was re-set for 29
September 1989 8 but, again, neither NACUSIP-TUCP nor CAILO appeared. On 16 October 1989, nonetheless, Med-
Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued an Order 9 granting the petition. He ruled that under Article 257 of the Labor
Code, as amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with no option but to order the conduct of a certification election
immediately upon the filing of the petition, holding that the subsequent disaffiliation or withdrawals of members
did not adversely affect the standing of the petition.Petitioner promptly retorts that it has no quarrel with public
respondent on the objectives of the law but it points out that the application of Article 257 clearly must first be
occasioned by a genuine petition from a legitimate labor organization.

Issue:Whether or not a petition for certification election must be initiated by a legitimate labor organization (to
allow the application of art 257.)

Held:Yes.But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election
in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a
legitimate labor organization. Article 242 enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization among
which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor
organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof."

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 16

(Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor
organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate
thereof." (Emphasis supplied)Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly
be set to impulse by the mere filing of a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself that all
the conditions of the law are met, and among the legal requirements is that the petitioning union must be a
legitimate labor organization in good standing.

The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local
organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the federation's bona fide status alone
would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization in good standing.

A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the
BLR:

1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and

2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by
its president.

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor
organization. The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar
Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else.

Note:In this case however, the union was not a legitimate labor organization because of the absence of second
requirement,thus it cannot initiate a certification election.

Organized Establishment
Articles 256 and 253
Section 1(LL), Rule I, Book V

Definition Case 16.

California Manufacturing
Corp. v. Laguesma, 209
SCRA 606 [1992] -
GONZALES

FACTS

A petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation was filed by the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter
(CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while
FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990
that the employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union
existing in the company; that the petition is filed in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial member of signatures of the
employees concerned.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 17

In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding of a certification
election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and
that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors as they have no
subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the powers and functions which under the law would classify them as
supervisors.

The Med-Arbiter ruled in favor ordered that a certification election be conducted among the supervisory employees
of California Manufacturing Corporation.

ISSUE

Whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to a bargaining unit or
a business establishment;

HELD

The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor
organizations and not to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the management Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent ). In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute
a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus they correctly filed a
petition for certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization.

Freedom Period
Definition
Case
17. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. Manila, Inc. v. Laguesma, 212 SCRA 281 [1992] - RAGILES

FACTS:

Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is engaged in the construction and fabrication business and
conducts its construction business in different construction sites here and abroad while its fabrication operations are
conducted by its Steel and Marine Structures Group at its Batangas Marine and Fabrication Yard (BMFY) in Bauan,
Batangas where the steel structures and other heavy marine works are fabricated.

The Company constantly adopts the practice of hiring project employees when existing fabrication capacity cannot
absorb increases in job orders for steel structures and other heavy construction works.o These project employees
are automatically terminated after expiration of their contracts, or rehired if the projects they were assigned to were
not yet finished.

June 8, 1990 – Atlantic Gulf executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the AG&P United Rank & File
Association (URFA or UNION 1) Said Collective Bargaining Agreement was subsequently registered on July 9, 1990
with the Bureau of Labor Relations June 29, 1990 - private respondent Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG&P-SMSG-
National Federation of Labor (LAKAS-NFL or the second UNION) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the
Med-Arbitration Unit to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the regular non-project employees
of the Steel and Marine Structure at the BMFY representing approximately 1,000 employees or that a certification
be conducted among said employees.

Med-Arbiter ordered certification election in Atlantic Gulf be conducted immediately.

The only choices were:
o Lakas-NFL
o No Union

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 18

This was opposed by Atlantic Gulf, which filed an appeal to DOLE. This was eventually denied by DOLE
Undersecretary Laguesma for lack of merit. October 26, 1990 - 691 alleged project employees sought to be
represented by private respondent LAKAS-NFL were formally issued regular employment appointments by the
petitioner effective November 1, 1990 which were accepted by said project employees.

The project employees not regularized went on strike, which paralyzed operations in Batangas Conciliation was held
between the striking employees and Atlantic Gulf:o Agreement was reached by the petitioner and private respondent
LAKAS-NFL wherein COMPANY agreed to formally regularize all the remaining alleged project employees with at least
one year of service pending the final outcome of the certification election case.

o Thereafter, 686 additional regular project employees were regularized URFA (1st Union) informed Atlantic Gulf
that 410 regularized project employees (under the agreement with Lakas-NFL or second Union) are now members of
URFA Thus, Atlantic Gulf filed a Motion for Reconsideration on their denied motion for dismissal of the petition for
certification election of Lakas-NFL, stating that:
o employees sought to be represented by the private respondent LAKAS-NFL are regular employees of the petitioner
and are deemed already included in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement of the regular rank-and-file
employees (this was the CBA negotiated with URFA) MfR denied again.

ISSUE: Can a petition for certification election for another Union prosper when there is already an existing CBA
between Company and Rank-and-File employees, who are already included in the CBA?

HELD:
NO. Atlantic Gulf’s petition is MERITORIOUS.
COURT SAYS: ON EFFECT OF THE REGULARIZATION OF PROJECT EMPLOYEES TO THEIR INCLUSION IN CBA
- The regularization of all the regular project employees with at least one year of service and the subsequent
membership of said employees with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees whom respondent
LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent are, in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in the
appropriate bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreement - Consequently, the bargaining unit which
respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist

The Labor Code provides:

Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. — The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election
or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreements
affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.

Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations likewise provides:
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the
expiry date of such agreement.

Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA,
which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner
including the regular project employees with more than one year of service, bars any other labor organization from
filing a petition for certification election except within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was
designed to ensure industrial peace between the employer and its employees during the existence of the collective
bargaining agreement.

When Applied
Case

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 19

18. Pambansang Kapatiran v. Sec. of Labor, 253 SCRA 96 [1996] – BAUTISTA5

Facts: The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY), formed a local union known as Pambansang
Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) and filed
a Petition for Certification Election with the DOLE Med-Arbiter on April 22, 1993.

FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition and another union known as KAMAPI intervened and also moved to dismiss
the petition on the ground that there was already a duly registered CBA covering the period January 1, 1992 to
December 31, 1996, hence, the "contract bar rule" would apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both motions to dismiss
claiming that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was fraudulent and defective, since the one
certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI and it was a federation. Being a federation, it only served as mere agent
of the local union, thus, without legal personality to sign in behalf of the local union.

Med-Arbiter ruled that there was a valid and existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI, and this effectively
barred the filing of the petition for certification election. This was affirmed by DOLE Undersecretary.

Issue: Whether Kapatiran’s petition for Certification Election may be entertained.

Ruling: No, there is a validly executed collective bargaining agreement between FORMEY and KAMAPI; hence,
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to
the expiry date of such agreement.

Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides that "(n)o petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor
and Employment outside of the sixty (60) day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term
of the collective bargaining agreement." Sec. 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides that ". . . (i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of
the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60)
days prior to the expiry date of such agreement."

The subject agreement was made effective January 1, 1992 and is yet to expire on December 31, 1996. The petition
for certification election having been filed on 22 April 1993 it is therefore clear that said petition must fail since it
was filed before the so-called 60-day freedom' period.

Petition Beyond Freedom Period

Case
19. National Congress of Unions in Sugar Industry v. Ferrer-Calleja, 205 SCRA 478 [1992] - BUAQUEN

Facts:

Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate
national labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.Dacongcogon Sugar and
Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500)
workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-milling season.On November 14, 1984, private
respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a
term of three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987.When the CBA expired, private respondent
NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years
with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment.However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 20

optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a
cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions.On December 5, 1988, petitioner
NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rak and file workers of
Dacongcogon.On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the
following grounds that Petition was filed out of time and that

there is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-central.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.

Held: Yes. The clear mandate of the law is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-
TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than
one (1) year after the CBA expired.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly
certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor
Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as
embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable.This rule simply
provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty
days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the
filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within
the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure
stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any
collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to stress what was held in the case of Lopez Sugar
Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990,
189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly
executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its
answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was submitted to the
Labor Management Council.

Filing Party
Case
20. Progressive Development Corp. v. Sec. of DOLE, 205 SCRA 802 [1992] Progressive
Development Corp. Laguesma, 271 SCRA 593 [1997] - GONZALES

Check case digest # 64

Form of Petition
Signature Verification
Case
21. National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Sec. of Labor, 227 SCRA 821 [1993] - RAGILES
FACTS:

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 21

 Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation engaged in the metal industry.
On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner
and respondent QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations
Division, National Capital Region (NCR-OD-M-91-09-106) a petition for certification election. The petition was
accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election
among the rank and file employees of QCC (Rollo, pp. 79-83).
Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required
consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition
was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no
personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.
On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification election, this time signed and
verified by De Pedro (NCR-OD-91-10-131).
On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC in a
decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a certification election be conducted among the rank-and-file
employees of Quality Container Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the
usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics and other details of the
election. The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used
as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
The choices are:
a) Federation of Free Workers (FFW)- Samahang Mangagawa sa Quality Container Corporation
Chapter;
b) National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU); and
c) No union (Rollo, pp. 24-25).
Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor (OS-A-4-102-92). On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor
rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of the second petition for certification election did cure the defects in the first petition.
(baka lng maitanong)

HELD: YES.
The verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite (Buenaventura v. Uy, 149 SCRA 22 [1987]; In the
Matter of the Change of Name of Antonina B. Oshita, 19 SCRA 700 [1967]). Even if verification is lacking and the
pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of
correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases;
and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely
investigative and non-adversarial in character (Associated Labor Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]);
Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]). Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in the
first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election.

MAIN ISSUE:
Whether the total number of company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election
was met.

YES.
Attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300
employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent
QCC sought to delete from the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise,
submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 22

Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is
definitely more than 75 — i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by law to support a petition
for certification election. The disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own
personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not question the same.
Moreover, the fact that the list of signatures is undated does not necessarily mean that the signatures were obtained
prior to the 60-day period before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement. What is important is
that the petition for certification election must be filed during the freedom period and that the 25% requirement of
supporting signatures be met upon the filing thereof. These requirements have been compiled by respondent FFW-
SMQCC in their first and second petitions, and it was thus incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to order a certification
election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of the company (Labor Code of the Philippines, Art. 256;
Warren Mfg. Workers' Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387 [1988]; Samahang Mangagawa ng Pacific
Mills v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]).

Substantial Support
Effect Disclosure
Case
22. National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Sec. of Labor, 227 SCRA 821 [1993] – BAUTISTA6

Facts: Petitioner NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF) and respondent FFW-SMQCC are
local chapters of labor federations duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the
former was the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of Quality Container Corporation (QCC).

On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the CBA between petitioner NAMAWU-MIF and QCC,
respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE NCR a petition for certification election. The
petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a
certification election among the rank and file employees of QCC.

NAMAWU-MIF moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required
consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the
petition was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of NAMAWU-
MIF, had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.

FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro. Med-
Arbiter granted the petition for certification election and this was affirmed by Sec of Labor, hence, the petition.

Issue:
1. Whether the failure to verify the petition for certification election rendered the petition defective.
2. Whether the supporting signatures attached to the certification election were substantial.

Ruling:
1. No. Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite (Buenaventura v. Uy, 149 SCRA 22 [1987]; In
the Matter of the Change of Name of Antonina B. Oshita, 19 SCRA 700 [1967]). Even if verification is lacking and the
pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of
correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor
cases; and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely
investigative and non-adversarial in character (Associated Labor Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]);
Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]). Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in
the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 23

2. Yes. Attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the
300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC.
Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified.
Petitioner, likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.

Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is
definitely more than 75 — i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by law to support a
petition for certification election. What is important is that the petition for certification election must be filed
during the freedom period and that the 25% requirement of supporting signatures be met upon the filing
thereof. These requirements have been compiled by respondent FFW-SMQCC in their first and second petitions,
and it was thus incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to order a certification election to be conducted among the rank
and file employees of the company.

Submission
Case
23. Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Sec. of Labor, 294 SCRA 640 [1998] - BUAQUEN

Facts:

Respondent (in G.R. No. 116751) and petitioner (in sister case G.R. No. 116779), Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet
Manufacturing Company, Inc. (the company) is engaged in the manufacture of tin can containers and metal sheets.
On March 3, 1994, it entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor
Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the company's rank-
and-file employees authorized the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election. 1 On
March 10, 1994, however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver 2 by 115 of the signatories who, along
with other employees totalling 897, ratified the CBA on the same date.On March 18, 1994, armed with Charter
Certificate No. IV-MEE-089, respondent Oriental Tin Can Workers Union — Federation of Free Workers (OTCWU-
FFW) filed a petition for certification election with the National Capital Region office of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE), pursuant to Article 256 of the Labor Code. Purporting to represent the regular rank-and-
file employees of the company, the petition was accompanied by the "authentic signatures" of 25% of the
employees/workers in the bargaining unit.The OTCLU filed a manifestation and motion on April 15, 1994, praying
for the dismissal of the petition for certification election on the ground that it was not endorsed by at least 25% of
the employees of the bargaining unit. Some of the employees who initially signed the petition had allegedly
withdrawn in writing such support prior to the filing of the same.The OTCWU-FFW filed a reply to said
manifestation and motion, claiming that the retraction of support for the petition was "not verified under oath"
and, therefore, had no legal and binding effect. It further asserted that the petition had the required support of
more than 25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.

For its part, the company filed a comment alleging inter alia that the new CBA was ratified by 897 out of the 1,020
rank-and-file employees within the bargaining unit. The OTCLU then filed a motion to dismiss and/or position paper
reiterating its position that the petition did not comply with the 25% signature requirement and maintaining that
the new CBA was a bar to a certification election.

Issue: Whether the 25% support requirement for filing the petition for certification election had been met.

Ruling: Yes. The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in determining the true will
of the workers instead of frustrating the same. Thus, in Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) v. Laguesma,
22 this Court declared that:

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 24

 In line with this policy (that the holding of a certification election is a certain and definitive mode of arriving at the
choice of the employees' bargaining representative), we feel that the administrative rule requiring the
simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of the petition for certification election
should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers.
Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the
more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere
filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order
for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable
period from such filing.

As regards the 25% support requirement, we concur with public respondent's finding that said requisite has been
met in this case. With regard to the finding that the "waiver" document executed by the employees "was the
product of duress, force and intimidation employed by the company after it learned of the petition for certification
election.

All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the holding of a certification election should,
therefore, be resolved by going through such procedure. It is judicially settled that a certification election is the
most effective and expeditious means of determining which labor organizations can truly represent the working
force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company. 23 If the OTCLU wanted to be retained as the rank-and-file
employees' bargaining representative, it should have sought their vote, not engaged in legal sophistry. The
selection by the majority of the employees of the union which would best represent them in the CBA negotiations
should be achieved through the democratic process of an election.

The fear expressed by the OTCLU that granting the petition for certification election would be prejudicial to all the
employees since the new CBA would run the risk of being nullified and the employees would be required to
restitute whatever benefits they might have received under the new CBA, is to be dismissed as being baseless and
highly speculative.

The benefits that may be derived from the implementation of the CBA prematurely entered into between the
OTCLU and the company shall, therefore, be in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining representative
is chosen and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement is thereafter concluded. 25 A struggle
between contending labor unions must not jeopardize the implementation of a CBA that is advantageous to
employees.

When Not Required

Case
24. Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 127 [1989] - GONZALES

FACTS

The associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed GAW Trading, Inc. (GAWTI) that majority of the latter’s employees have
authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested GAW Trading Inc., for a
conference for the execution of an initial CBA. GAWTI recognized ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for
the majority of its employees and for which it set the time for conference and/or negotiation at 4PM on May 12,
1986 at the Pillsbury Office, Aboitiz Building Juan Luna Street, Cebu City. On May 15, 1986, ALU in behalf of the
majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. and GAWTI signed and executed the CBA.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 25

In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa
GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a srike after it failed to get the management of GAWTI to sit for a conference respecting
its demands in an effort to pressure GAWTI to make a turnabout of its standing recognition of ALU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, as to which strike GAWTI filed a petition for Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction, and which strike Labor Arbiter Tumamak held as illegal.

On May 19, 1986, GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation filed a Certification Election petition but as
found by Med-Arbiter Cumba, without having complied with the subscription requirement for which it was merely
considered an intervenor until compliance thereof in the other petition for direct recognition as
bargaining agent filed on MAy 28, 1986 by southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)

In the meantime, CBA executed by ALU and GAWTI was duly filed with the MOLE,Cebu city. Nevertheless, Med-
Arbiter Cumba ruled for the holding of a certification election in all branches of GAWTI in Cebu City, as to which ALU
filed MFR, which was treated as an appeal. So the entire record of subject certification case was forwarded for the
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), MOLE, Manila.

BLR Director Trajano, granted ALU’s appeal (MFR) and set aside the questioned Med-Arbiter, on the ground that the
CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable; Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU)
and Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) filed MFR, supplemented by the ‘Submission of Additional
Evidence.’ GAWTI and ALU opposed. Trajano’s decision was reversed by herein public respondent Calleja. ALU filed
MFR but was denied. Hence this petition.

Calleja ordered the holding of a certification election ruling that the “contract bar rule” relied upon by her
predecessor Trajano does not apply in the present case. Calleja ruled that CBA is defective because it “was not duly
submitted in accordance with Sec. I, Rule IX, Book V of the Implementing Rules of BP 130.” There’s no proof that CBA
has been posted in at least 2 conspicuous places in the establishment at least 5 days before its ratification and that
it has been ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.”

ISSUE

WON Calleja erred in reversing Trajano’s ruling and ordering the holding of a certification election.

HELD

NO The CBA in question is defective.

The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are
present: (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees’ representative in accordance with
any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority
representation; and

(3) a demand to bargain under Art.256, par. (a) of the Labor Code

The standing of ALU as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by GAWTI appears to have
been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit.

In cases where the then Minister of Labor directly certified the union as the bargaining representative, SC voided
such certification where there was a failure to properly determine with legal certainty whether the union enjoyed a
majority representation. In such a case, the holding of a certification election at a proper time would not necessarily
be a mere formality as there was a compelling reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 26

CBA was defective also because of: [a] the failure of GAWTI to post the CBA in at least 2 conspicuous places in the
establishment at least 5 days before its ratification, [b] the finding of Calleja that 181 of the 281 4 Art. 256.
Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning
the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the DOLE within the 60-day period before the
expiration of a CBA, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition
is supported by the written consent of at least 25% of all the EEs in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid
election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When
an election which provides or three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast,
a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided
that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least 50% of the number of votes cast. workers who
“ratified” the same now ” strongly and vehemently deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and ratification
of the CBA.

Finally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the fact that when the disputed
agreement was filed before the Labor Regional Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already
been filed on May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of 30% of the workers in the
bargaining unit, it was enough to initiate certification election.

Discretion Rule Application

Case
25. California Manufacturing Co. v. Laguesma, 209 SCRA 606 [1992] - RAGILES

FACTS: On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing
Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation with
registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry
certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs one
hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union existing in the company; that the
petition is filed in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the
petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E"
and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding of a certification
election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and
that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors as they have no
subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the powers and functions which under the law would classify them as
supervisors (Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under the law, when there is no existing unit yet
in a particular bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories
does not apply; that the "organized establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a "company"per se but
rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which may be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at
least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and the rank-and-file (organized); that
the signatories to the petition have been performing supervisory functions; that since it is CMC which promoted them
to the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are not supervisors; that the said
supervisors were excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees;
and that the contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January
2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).
On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, directing a certification. The payroll of the company three (3)
months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which - affirmed

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 27

ISSUE: Whether or not the Med- Arbiter has the discretion to order a certification election even though the required
25% of the labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly compiled with.

HELD:
YES.

The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor
organizations and not to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the management. Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA
490).
In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit separate
and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. Thus, they correctly filed a petition for certification
election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's insistence on the
25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining
agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has
consistently ruled that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force asking
for a certification election had not been strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered
to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be
the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905,
May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565).
The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all
other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a
petition for certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722,
June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification election (Asian Design and
Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern
of the workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant
to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively.

Mandatory Election
Case
26. Belyca Corp. v. Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 [1988] – BAUTISTA7

Facts: Private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization filed a petition for
direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca
Corporation. ALU-TUCP alleged, among others, (1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement
between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate labor unions; (2) that there
had neither been a certification election conducted in the proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12)
months prior to the filing of the petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the. sole and
exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a majority of respondent
employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as
of the date of the filing of the petition, have signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their
written consent and authorization to the filing of the petition.

Belyca opposed the certification and contended among others that that due to the nature of its business, very few
of its employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and regular
employees; that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing of the
petition many have already left; and that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not been
complied with by the union.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 28

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union and consequently respondent
employer Belyca Corporation, appealed to the BLR Manila. Both Belyca’s and motion for reconsideration were
denied. Hence, the petition to SC.

Issue: Whether statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit asking
for a certification elections had been strictly complied with.

Stated otherwise to conform with the topic on the Syllabus: Whether the circumstances in the instant case were
those that called for a mandatory election.

Ruling: Yes. Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory requirement is met, the Director of Labor
Relations has no choice but to call a certification election. It becomes in the language of the New Labor Code
"Mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the representative
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all employees in the unit, more so when there is no existing collective bargaining agreement.

It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205 employees of the Belyca Corporation have expressed
their written consent to the certification election or more than a majority of the rank and file employees and
workers; much more than the required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive
Order No. 111 issued on December 24, 1980 and applicable only to unorganized establishments under Art. 257, of
the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation belong. More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of
signatures to the petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted. Even doubts as to
the required 30% being met warrant holding of the certification election. In fact, once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of
the petition for certification election will not affect said petition.

As stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.

Motion Intervention – Support

When Not Required

Case
27. Phil. Assn. of Free Labor union v. Calleja, 169 SCRA 491 [1989] – BUAQUEN

Facts:A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the Hundred Island Chemical
Corporation was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent Malayans Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan, for short). A motion to intervene, accompanied
by the written consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees of the said corporation was filed by
petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987,
Likewise the Katipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene on 1 June
1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's workers. Due to such want of a written
consent, PAFLU moved for the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter
Renato D. Parungo issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for intervention and allowing
PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. On 17 June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's order to
the respondent Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order. Thus, on 17 August 1987, this petition was
filed. And as prayed for in the said petition,temporary restraining order was issued dated 24, August 1987.
Respondent Samahan has contested the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted since the
delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional right of labor to organize.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 29

Issue: Whether or not KAMAPI should be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a motion for
intervention without a prior showing that it has the required support expressed in the written consent of at least
twenty (20%) percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit.

Held: Yes. In taking the negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules Implementing Executive
Order No. 111, which reads:

SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for
appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working days within which to grant or dismiss the
petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter
shall grant the petition upon verification that the same is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%)
of all the employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%) support shall be satisfied upon the filing of
the petition for certification election, otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed.

In either case, he shall cite the ground.

Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the former relates, and which provides:

SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines are hereby amended to read as follows:

xxx

Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining
agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the
written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt of such
petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of a certification election.

Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari. The respondent
Director did not abuse her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from the said provisions that
the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for
certification election only, and not to motions for intervention. Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it
appear that a motion for intervention in a certification election must be accompanied by a similar written consent.
Not even in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously,
the percentage requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election, and nothing else.

This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20% requirement is to ensure that the petitioning
union has a substantial interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, that a considerable number of workers desire their representation by the said petitioning union for
collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their
support to the petition by their written consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-Arbiter to order the
holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs.
Noriel, 134 SCRA 152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to petitions for certification election.

In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the certification election since the essence
of such proceeding is to settle once and for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them (PAFLU
vs. BLR, 69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and
timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so
even if the eventual purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in the certification election. After all
the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 30

 Doctrine:The 20% requirement applies only to petition for certification elections not in motion for intervention in
the petition for certification elections.

Unorganized Establishment
Articles 242 and 257

Definition
Case
28. PT&T v. Laguesma, 223 SCRA 452 [1993] – GONZALES

FACTS

PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a petition before the Industrial
Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment praying for the holding of a certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T, for brevity).

UNION amended its petition to include the allegation that PT&T was an unorganized establishment employing
roughly 100 supervisory employees from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining unit sought to be established

PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground that UNION members were performing
managerial functions and thus were not merely supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a certified
bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees which barred the filing of the petition.

UNION opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code supervisory employees are
not eligible to join the labor organization of the rank-and-file employees although they may form their own.

The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered that “a certification election . . . (be)conducted among the
supervisory personnel of the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T).”

ISSUE

WON there should be a certification election pushed by the UNION

HELD

YES. The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the Labor Code. It reads — “Art. 257. Petitions in
unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification
election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization” (emphasis supplied)

The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time the
UNION, which is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, filed
the petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory employees,
PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code. The fact that
petitioner’s rank-and-file employees were already represented by a certified bargaining agent does not make PT&T
an organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are “not . .
. eligible for

membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.” Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by
public respondent, committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for certification election among

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 31

the supervisory employees of petitioner PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that said election should
be automatically conducted upon filing of the petition. In fact, Sec. 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election. It reads —
“Sec. 6. Procedure. — Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for
appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of the assigned petition, shall have twenty (2) working days from
submission of the case for resolution within which todismiss or grant the petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate
organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a
certification election . . .”

The Employer as Initiating Party

Article 258

Role Employer
Case
29. Phil. Fruits v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 [1992] – RAGILES
FACTS: On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order granting the petition for Certification election filed
by the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Said order directed the holding of a certification
election.
After a series of pre-election conferences, all issues relative to the conduct of the certification election were
threshed out except that which pertains to the voting qualifications of the hundred ninety four (194) workers
enumerated in the lists of qualified voters submitted by TUPAS.
Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order allowing 184 of the 194 questioned workers to vote, subject to challenge.
On December 12, 1988 the notice of certification election was duly posted. One hundred sixty eight (168) of the
questioned workers actually voted on election day.
In the scheduled certification election, petitioner objected to the proceeding, through a Manifestation (p.
262, NLRC, Records) filed with the Representation Officer before the close of the election proceedings. Said
Manifestation pertinently reads:
By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS, workers whose names were inadvertently omitted in the list of
qualified voters were allowed to vote. Thirty eight of them voted on election day.
Initial tally of the election results excluding the challenged votes showed the following:
Total No. of the Votes 291
Yes votes 40
No votes 38
Spoiled 7
Challenged (Regular) 38
——
Total No. of Votes Cast 123
On January 6, 1989, Management and TUPAS agreed to have the 36 challenged votes of the regular rank-and-file
employees opened and a canvass thereof showed:
Yes votes 20
No votes 14
Spoiled 4
——
Total 38
Added to the initial election results of December 16, 1988, the canvass of results showed:
Yes 60
No 52
Spoiled 11
——
Total 123

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 32

 Based on the foregoing results, the yes votes failed to obtain the majority of the votes cast in said certification
election, hence, the necessity of opening the 168 challenged votes to determine the true will of the employees.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a position paper arguing against the opening of said votes mainly
because said voters are not regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly rendered work for less than
180 days.
Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), on the other hand, argued that the employment
status of said employees has been resolved when Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Martinez, declared that said employees
were illegally dismissed.
In an Order dated February 2, 1989 (pp. 278-280, NLRC, Records) Med-Arbiter Basa ordered the opening of
said 168 challenged votes upon his observation that said employees were illegally dismissed in accordance with the
foregoing Decision of Labor Arbiter Martinez. As canvassed, the results showed
Yes votes 165
No votes 0
Spoiled 3
——
Total 168
On February 23, 1989, petitioner formally filed a Protest claiming that the required five day posting of notice
was not allegedly complied with and that the list of qualified voters so posted failed to include fifty five regular
workers agreed upon by the parties as qualified to vote. The Protest further alleged that voters who were ineligible
to vote were allowed to vote.
Med-Arbiter Basa, -dismissed said Protest which Order was affirmed on appeal in the Resolution dated
December 12, 1989 of then Secretary of Labor, Franklin Drillon.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration -denied

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has a concomitant right to oppose a petition for certification election.

HELD:
None. The Court would wish to stress once more the rule which it has consistently pronounced in many earlier
cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers and the employer is regarded as nothing more
than a bystander with no right to interfere at all in the election. The only exception here is where the employer has
to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain
collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the "Bystander Rule", the instant petition would have been dismissed
outright.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can oppose the certification election on the ground that non-regular seasonal
workers who have long been separated from employment prior to the filing of the petition for certification election
were allowed to vote and participate in a certification election. 4
HLED: NO
The public respondent Secretary of Labor did not completely disregard the issue as to the voting rights of the
alleged separated employees for precisely, he affirmed on appeal the findings of the Med-Arbiter when he ruled
The election results indicate that TUPAS obtained majority of the valid votes cast in the election —
60 plus 165, or a total of 225 votes out of a possible total of 291.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby denied and the Med-Arbiter's order dated 7
March 1989 affirmed. Petitioner TUPAS is hereby certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of all regular rank-and-file and seasonal workers at Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries,
Inc. 9 (p. 26, Rollo)
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present,
unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections. 10 Thus, and to
repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair
labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections. 11

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 33

30. Phil. Scouts v. Torres, 224 SCRA 682 [1993] – BAUTISTA 8

Facts: PGA Brotherhood Association - Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), filed a petition for Certification Election
among the rank and file employees of Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM
Security and Investigations Agency, Inc. (GVM). and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These
three agencies were collectively referred to as the "PGA Security Agency”.

Petitioners filed a single comment alleging that the said three security agencies have separate and distinct
corporate personalities, hence, the labor union cannot seek a certification election in three separate bargaining
units in one petition.

The Med-Arbiter issued an Order in favor of the labor union finding that PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA should be deemed
as a single entity and bargaining unit for the purpose of union organizing and the holding of a certification election.
On appeal to the Sec of Labor, the order of the Med-Arbiter was affirmed, hence, the petition to SC.

Issue: Whether a single petition for certification election can validly or legally be filed by a labor union in three (3)
corporations each of which has a separate and distinct legal personality instead of filing three (3) separate
petitions.

Ruling: Yes, valid because the three companies were actually a single business entity. The facts and circumstances
extant in the record indicate that the Med-Arbiter and Secretaries Drilon and Torres were not mistaken in holding
that the three security companies are in reality a single business entity operating as a single company called the
"PGA Security Group" or "PGA Security Services Group." Factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding
on the Court when supported by substantial evidence.

As to the role of an employer, SC said:

Finally, except where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively, it has nothing to do with a certification election which is
the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a
certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter's orders related thereto. An
employer that involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company
union.

The three security agencies should not even be adverse parties in the certification election itself. We note with
disapproval the title given to the petition for certification election of the Union by the Med-Arbiter and the
Secretary of Labor naming the three security agencies as respondents. Such is clearly an error. While employers
may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered
parties thereto with concomitant right to oppose it. Sound policy dictates that they should maintain a strictly
hands-off policy.

31. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Filystems v. Sec. DOLE, 290 SCRA 680 [1998] - BUAQUEN

Facts:

Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) is a registered labor union with Certificate of
Registration dated October 25, 1995. On November 6, 1995, petitioner union filed a Petition for Certification
Election among the rank-and-file employees of private respondent FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE — National
Capital Region (NCR). Private respondent,the employer,opposed the petition. It questioned the status of petitioner

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 34

as a legitimate labor organization on the ground of lack of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU
has been submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution. In reply,
petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor union, it has "all the rights and privileges . . . to act as
representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining with employers.

Issue: Whether or not an employer has the role/right to be a party on a petition for certification election of its
employees.

Held: No. Finally, we bewail private respondent's tenacious opposition to petitioner's certification election petition.
Such a stance is not conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we have emphasized that when a petition for
certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization, it is good policy for the employer not to have any
participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining representative. While employers may rightfully be
notified or informed of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with an
inalienable right to oppose it. An employer that involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact
that it wants to create a company union.

Thus, in Consolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel, 19 we declared that "[o]n a matter that should be the exclusive
concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His
participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to
such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. . . . [While] it is true that there may be
circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being heard on the matter, . . . sound policy dictates
that as much as possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For it is does not, it may lend itself
to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of the contending unions. That is repugnant to the concept of
collective bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and
promote social justice. The judiciary then should be the last to look with tolerance at such efforts of an employer to
take part in the process leading to the free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative of
the workers."

Doctrine: The employer has no role in certification election.

Motion to Dismiss
Case
32. PT & T Corp. v. Laguesma, 223 SCRA 452 [1993] - GONZALES

FACTS

PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a petition before the Industrial
Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment praying for the holding of a certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T, for brevity).

UNION amended its petition to include the allegation that PT&T was an unorganized establishment employing
roughly 100 supervisory employees from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining unit sought to be established

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 35

PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground that UNION members were performing
managerial functions and thus were not merely supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a certified
bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees which barred the filing of the petition.

UNION opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code supervisory employees are
not eligible to join the labor organization of the rank-and-file employees although they may form their own.

The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered that “a certification election . . . (be)conducted among the
supervisory personnel of the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T).”

ISSUE

WON there should be a certification election pushed by the UNION

HELD

YES. The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the Labor Code. It reads — “Art. 257. Petitions in
unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification
election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization” (emphasis supplied)

The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time the
UNION, which is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, filed
the petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory employees,
PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code. The fact that
petitioner’s rank-and-file employees were already represented by a certified bargaining agent does not make PT&T
an organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are “not . .
. eligible for

membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.” Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by
public respondent, committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that said election should
be automatically conducted upon filing of the petition. In fact, Sec. 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election. It reads —
“Sec. 6. Procedure. — Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for
appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of the assigned petition, shall have twenty (2) working days from
submission of the case for resolution within which todismiss or grant the petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate
organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a
certification election . . .”

Parties
Case
33. Transport Corp. v. Laguesma, 227 SCRA 827 [1993] - RAGILES
FACTS: On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP), filed with the Med-
Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the petitioner
(NCR-OD-M-91-01-002).
On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be
represented by respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors
and conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys.
On May 10, 1991, respondent. CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election,which
included all the rank and file employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 36

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition
constituted res judicata. Petitioner argued that respondent CLOP should have interposed an appeal to the dismissal
of the first petition and its failure to do so barred it from filing another petition for certification election.
On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision, which ordered that a certification election among the
regular rank and file workers of petitioner company be conducted (Rollo, pp. 87-91).
On October 16, 1991, the Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a motion for intervention (NCR OD-M-91-01-002)
and alleged that it has members in the proposed bargaining unit. Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) filed a separate petition for certification election (NCR-OD-M-91-10-058) and a motion to consolidate
related cases to avoid confusion.
Dissatisfied with the Decision dated July 3, 1991 rendered by Med-Arbiter R. Parungo, petitioner appealed to the
DOLE Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, affirmed the Med-Arbiter

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certification election should be dismissed under the principle of res judicata.

HELD: NO.
The principle of res judicata can be operative, the following requisites must be present: a) the former
judgment or order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties; and d) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).

In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were identical. The first
action was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the bargaining unit such as
inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys. The second petition included all the employees who were
excluded in the first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the second petition
for certification election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.

Agency
Conducting Agency
Articles 226, 232, 258 and 259

Case
34. Ilaw at Bukod ng Manggagawa v. Dir., 91 SCRA 482 [1979] – BAUTISTA 9

Facts: Within sixty days prior to the expiration on August 19, 1976 of the unregistered collective bargaining
agreement between the Associated Labor Unions and the General Milling Corporation, the Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa, filed with Regional Office No. 7 in Cebu City a petition for certification election. The med-arbiter
granted the petition and ordered the holding of a certification election within twenty days from notice among the
rank-and-file employees of General Milling Corporation at Lapu-Lapu City. The Associated Labor Unions appealed
from that order to the Director of Labor Relations.

Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over the record of the case to the Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines TUCP a federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an arrangement between the
Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases involving its member-unions must first be referred to it for
possible settlement in accordance with its Code of Ethics.

The TUCP has not decided the controversy. On September 14, 1978, or more than twenty months after the
federation received the record of the case, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa filed in this Court the instant petition
for mandamus to compel the Director of Labor Relations to decide the case, or, in the alternative, to require the
TUCP to return to the Director the record of the case.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 37

Issue: whether it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the appeal of the
Associated Labor Unions in a certification election case.

Ruling: No. We hold that the referral of the appeal to the TUCP is glaringly illegal and void. The Labor Code never
intended that the Director of Labor Relations should abdicate delegate and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives
in favor of a private person or entity or to a federation of trade unions. Such a surrender of official functions is an
anomalous, deplorable and censurable renunciation of the Director's adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation
cases.

Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the labor
relations divisions in the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor "shall have original and exclusive authority to act,
at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all
disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether
agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration."

Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working
days." Article 260 of the same Code provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should decide appeals in
representation cases, within fifteen (15) working days", or twenty working days, according to section 10, Rule V,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Section 10 further provides that "the decision of
the Bureau in all cases shall be final and unappealable."

The Director's act of referring the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions to the TUCP is not only contrary to law but
is a patent nullification of the policy of the Labor Code to avoid delay in the adjudication of labor controversies.

Requisite for Validity of Election

Article 256

Test
Case
35. Benguet Electric Coop. Inc. v. Calleja, 180 SCRA 740 [1990] – BUAQUEN

Facts:

Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLU-
ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and
file employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BENECO) at Alapang, La Trinidad,
Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file
employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the
petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is
no collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco
Employees Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter on October
20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor Relations Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO
involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any
representation question.On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition
for certification election. The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986. Prior to the conduct
thereof BENECO's counsel manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-
consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 38

of collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." Petitioner submitted a certification
showing that only four (4) employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are
eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the
eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.

The med arbiter Certified respondent BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and file
employees of BENECO.

Issue:Whether or not the election of respondent union as the representative of the employees valid.

Held:No.Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:

To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor
union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers
in the unit .

In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the
bargaining unit since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the cooperative because of
their membership therein were allowed to vote in the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the Court
finds that respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner cooperative.

Nature of Proceeding
Nature
Case
36. Port Workers Union of the Phils. V. DOLE, 207 SCRA 239 [1992] – GONZALES

FACTS:

The CBA between the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI and Associate Port
Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU) was about to expire. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in
the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of
at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the petition.

Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention. Still another petition for certification
election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent
signatures were submitted 35 days after the filing of the petition. The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were
consolidated for joint decision. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with
the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, which requires that the signatures
be submitted upon filing of petition. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter.

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written
consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP’s appeal.

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was ratified by
a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 39

ISSUE/S

WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in application of Art 256 of the Labor.

PWUP argues that under A256, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition
is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with
the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing the petition.

PWUP complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own petition for intervention,
had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI
employees.

HELD

Doctrine in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines
vs. Trajano: “it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a
certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization
to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept, this Court recognized that
the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding
the failure to meet the 30% requirement”.

SC: In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%
consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the
determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found
in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given
only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the
freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the
submission of theconsent signatures within a reasonable period from suchfiling.

Certification Election – Process and Procedure

Rule VIII, Book V
Rule IX, Book V

Effect of Private Agreement

Case
37. PLUM Fed of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 199 SCRA 299 [1982] - RAGILES

FACTS: Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers filed a petition, praying that it be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Manila Jockey Club, Inc. The Manila Jockey Club Race Day
Operation Employees Labor Union-PTGWO filed a motion to intervene and opposition to said petition and alleged
among other things, that it is the recognized collective bargaining representative of all the employees of the company
and that it is in the process of negotiating a modification of thecollective bargaining agreement.
-Another supplemental MTD was filed by intervenor PTGWO, this time invoking the “No Union Raiding Clause” of the
“Code of Ethics” adopted by the members of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (T.U.C.P.) wherein both
petitioner and intervenor are members, and claiming that the petition failed to satisfy the 30% requirement of the
law. The entire record of the case was forwarded to the Office of the President of the T.U.C.P. for the purpose of
submitting the matter to the Congress for decision. The entire record of the case was re turned by the T.U.C.P.
President to the Office of then Secretary of Labor which in turn transmitted the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations
Office with a forwarding letter signed by the late Roberto S. Oca in his capacity as President of the Congress, stating,
among other things, the following: 1 “In a National Executive Board meeting of the Katipunang Manggagawang
Pilipino (TUCP) held last March 7, 1977 at the Army & Navy Club, it was duly approved that the above-captioned case

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 40

be referred back to the BLR and that MJCR-OELU-PTGWO be declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, thus
dismissing the petition of PLUM.” The BLR endorsed the case to Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leodegardo, Jr., of Region
IV for appropriate action. On May 5, 1977, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief, Med-Arbiter Section of Region IV, Department
of Labor, promulgated an order dismissing the case pursuant to the letter of the President of the T.U.C.P. Petitioner
PLUM filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations predicated on the ground that TUCP has no authority in law
to grant or deny election under the Labor Code which mandated the secret ballot to elect the true union
representative. On September 17, 1977, the Bureau Director issued a resolution dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the TUCP President has the power to declare MJCR-OELU-PTGWO to be the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent because of the "No Union Raiding Clause" of the "Code of Ethics" adopted by the TUCP.

HELD:
NO.
Contention of petitioner –
Nowhere in the Labor Code or in the new Constitution has TUCP been granted any authority to supersede or
impair the holding of a certification election or deny the majority employees of their right to elect their own union;
that public respondent and the PTGWO acted without jurisdiction in defiance of the rule of law and popular
democracy, that it, is not within the Code of Ethics to suppress the employees' freedom to choose their own union;
and that the TUCP, while asserting itself to be a Labor Center did not call the parties involved for conference, to
submit evidence or to make a fair judicious and rational evaluation of the dispute.
Contention of Respondent -
Respondent Noriel in his comment (answer) made it clear that he is not opposed to the conduct of a certification
election, and in fact he is ready to hold such election if the case is returned to the jurisdiction of his office. However,
he stressed that the TUCP Code of Ethics and General Council Resolution No. 76-2 are clear expressions of consent
by the signatory members, including their locals or affiliates, to settle their disputes among themselves in accordance
with the decision of the National Executive Board and the decision he made was made pursuant to such an
agreement.
A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present state of affairs of the employees wherein they
are deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, for management refused to bargain with the union.
If this situation continues, the employees would stand to lose a long-line of cases that the workers' welfare can be
promoted through the bargaining process. Certification election is the fairest and most effective way of determining
which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the win of the
majority if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is
controlling. 4 Protection to labor and freedom of peaceful assembly and association are guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Since there has been no certification election for the past three (3) years as well as a certified collective bargaining
agreement which should govern the economic and working conditions of the workers, a certification election should
immediately be ordered. This Court had repeatedly made it clear that in labor controversies, time is of the essence.6

Posting Notice
Waiver
Case
38. Jiesor Independent Union c. Torres, 221 SCRA 699 [1993] – BAUTISTA 10

Facts: Petitioner JISSCOR Independent Union (JIU) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of the Jacinto Iron and Steel Sheets Corporation (JISSCOR) before the Med- Arbitration Unit of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila. By agreement of JIU, the intervenor
Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU (SMJ-ALU) and the JISSCOR management, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order
on August 29, 1990, setting the certification election on September 4, 1990. However, on the appointed date,
another agreement was entered into by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJ-ALU, providing that the election would be conducted

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 41

on September 6, 1990 from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and that "the mandatory five (5) days posting is hereby waived
by agreement of the parties.

After the election, JIU got 46 votes while SMJ-ALU got 50 votes, hence, the latter won. JIU registered a protest in
the minutes of the election stating that: "we file protest on the following grounds using visor, emblem". On
September 11, 1990, the JIU filed a formal protest before DOLE upon the grounds, among others: non-compliance
of mandatory posting of notice of certification election, Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU officers and members,
forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by posting of a very big streamer with print stating “Vote! Samahang
Manggagawa Ng JISSCOR-ALU” and Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by wearing of sunvisors and pins with
printed words: Vote! SMJ-ALU before and during voting inside the polling place.

Med-Arbiter declared the certification election null and void while on appeal to Sec of Labor, this was reversed,
hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:
1. Whether the certification election is void for not complying with the requirement of posting of notice of
certification election.
2. Whether JIU’s protests on the certification election were timely filed.

Ruling:
1. No. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the non-posting of the notice of the certification
election as prescribed by Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus Rules Implementing the labor Code misled
and confused the workers regarding the mechanics of the election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that
issue for it signed an agreement with the private respondent to waive the mandatory five (5) days posting of
election notices. The doctrine of estoppel is based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice,
and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one
to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.

2. No, JIU failed to file all grounds of protests and only filed protest against use of emblem, visor, pin. Section 3,
Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the grounds of a protest may be
filed on the spot or in writing with the representation officer and shall be contained in the minutes of the
proceedings. Protests not so raised are deemed waived.

The minutes of the certification election show, however, that JIU only protested against the use of emblem, visor,
pin. Hence, other "protests [such as the posting in the chapel entrance of a huge streamer with the words: "Vote!
Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU"]not so raised are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).

Nothing in the records shows that the alleged wearing of sunvisors and pins, the posting of huge streamers, as well
as the alleged escorting of voters by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured, influenced, vitiated, or in any manner
affected the choice of the workers of their bargaining agent.

SC affirmed Sec of Labor’s decision and dismissed petition.

Voting List and Voters

Voting List
Case
39. Acoje Workers Union v. Torres, 221 SCRA 699 [1993] - BUAQUEN

Facts:

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 42

 A "consent election" among the workers of the aforementioned Company, in which five (5) labor unions
participated, namely, the Acoje United Workers' Union, the Acoje Labor Union (PELTA), the Acoje Labor Union
(PLUM), respondent National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU), and petitioner Acoje Workers' Union.
On June 21, 1961, theDepartment of Labor certified the result of the election NAMAWU as the winner by 282 votes.
Petitioner union had filed a motion to invalidate said election upon several grounds:acts of terrorism, force, threat
and intimidation employed by" agents of respondent Union. More specifically, petitioner alleges that, "if heard or
given its day in Court" it could have proven that: a) not less than 310 workers of the Company were threatened the
night immediately preceding theelection by agents of respondent Union individually "to cast their vote for said
Union ... or else;" b) the agents of respondent Union were even aided by the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,
Zambales, and his policemen, and, as a consequence, said Municipal Mayor was suspended from office; c) the acts
performed by said agents of respondent Union "resulted into unlawful disorder, damaged belongings, and physical
injuries suffered by the workers"; d) many workers were unable to vote for justified causes; and e) many workers,
subject of unfair labor practice case actually pending in Court, were not allowed to vote, contrary to law.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may contest the accuracy of the voters list.

Held.No.It appears that on April 24, 1961, the labor unions concerned agreed, not only to the holding of the
aforementioned election, but, also, to the use of the Company payroll of March 31, 1961, as the basis for
determining who are qualified to vote subject to the approval of the lower court. On May 8, 1961, the Company
presented its aforementioned payroll to said court and stated that the labor unions had been furnished copy
thereof, at least three (3) days prior thereto. Said labor unions were given an opportunity to make their comments
and observations on the list of workers contained in the payroll and to ask or suggest the inclusion or exclusion of
names therein or therefrom. Petitioner's representative then stated that it would abide by whatever ruling the
court may make on the matter of inclusion and exclusion of voters. Indeed, on May 19, 1961, the court issued the
corresponding order for the holding of the election and in made its ruling on the question as to who were qualified
to vote, and petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of said ruling, although two (2) other Labor Unions and
that Company did so, and their motions for reconsideration were denied by the Court en banc. Hence, petitioner
may no longer contest the accuracy of the aforementioned voters list.

Pursuant thereto that Company had 1,019 workers, excluding department heads foremen, but including 48
security guards. Excluding the latter, there were, therefore, only 971 qualified voters. Of these, 904 had voted, so
that only 67 qualified voters had to cast their votes. It is obvious, that this number plus the 19 ballots challenged in
the election are insufficient to offset the plurality of 282 votes obtained by respondent

In connection with the duress claimed to have been used upon the voters, it should be observed that in its motion
dated June 12, 1961, petitioner maintained that the election should be invalidated because of alleged: a)
insufficiency of the notice of said election; b) failure to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the list of qualified
voters; c) inclusion among those who voted of confidential employees, supervisors and security or police officers; d)
failure of many workers to vote due to said insufficient notice "as well as the cases of violence that occurred on the
eve of election". None of these grounds is now invoked by petitioner herein. Worthy of notice is the fact that
petitioner did not claim that any voter had been coerced to vote for respondent Union.

In fact, in its supplemental motion of June 22, 1961, petitioner made more specific allegations to bolster up its
pretense "that the election held on June 9, 1961, is inconclusive because of the alleged "failure of more than 300

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 43

workers to vote which, as above indicated, is not a fact. It is true that the last ground — out of the seven (7) —
relied upon in the aforementioned supplemental motion was to the effect that "there are many cases where the
workers were threatened, coerced and intimidated to vote for the NAMAWU." But this general allegation, without
anything to indicate the number of workers involved, without the supporting affidavit of any of them, and without
an offer to introduce their testimony or the testimony of any of them was — in the light of the attending
circumstances clearly insufficient to warrant the invalidation of the aforementioned election.

As regards the disorder that had allegedly characterized the election, the minutes thereof suffice to refute
petitioner's pretense. We quote from said minutes:

Balloting went on smoothly up to closing time at 7:00 p.m. There was spirit of comraderie among the
representatives of the contesting unions throughout the proceedings.

Peace and order was maintained by the 18th PC Company at Iba, Zambales, graced by the presence of the
Provincial Commander in person.

Voting Day
Case
40. Asian Design and Manufacturing Corp. v. Calleja, 174 SCRA 477 [1989] - GONZALES

FACTS

Petitioner Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation (ADMACOR) is a corporation duly organized and existing by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It operates a rattan furniture factory at Maguikay, Mandaue City, Cebu.

Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP), one of several labor unions at ADMACOR'S factory, the
Labor Relations Division, Regional Office VII (Cebu City) ordered a certification election to be conducted on May 21,
1986, a regular business day. On May 19,1986, several factory workers of ADMACOR held a strike. No previous notice
of strike was filed by the factory workers with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office. On May 20,1986,
ADMACOR filed a for the indefinite resetting of the scheduled certification election, which petition was not acted
upon by the Labor Relations Division.

On May 21, 1986, the scheduled certification election was conducted, despite the strike.

On May 23, 1986, ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the certification election conducted on May 21, 1986 as null
and void on the ground that there being a strike by some workers in the premises of the factory on the day of the
certification election, such day cannot be considered a regular business day, pursuant to Section 2, Rule VI, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:

Section 2. Election conducted during regular business day. - The election shall be set during the regular business day
of the company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.

On August 5, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed ADMACOR's complaint to annul the May 21, 1986 certification election
and certified SPFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of ADMACOR.

ISSUE

WON the certification election was invalid.

HELD

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 44

Anent complainant's contention that the certification election was conducted not on regular business day, the same
is devoid of merit. The records further show that during the pre- election conference the contending parties agreed
that the election should be conducted on May 21, 1986 winch was, on that time, a determined regular business day
of the company. This was in accordance with Section 2, Rule VI Book V, of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
which explicitly provides:

The election shall be set during the regular business day of the company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.

The alleged strike and/or picketing of some employees at the company's premises which coincided with the actual
conduct of certification election might, perhaps have affected the actual performance of works by some employees,
but did not necessarily make said date an irregular business day of the company to go against the aforesaid Rule

Election Conduct
Case
41. Hercules Industries Inc. v. Sec. of DOLE, 214 SCRA 129 [1992] - RAGILES

FACTS:
On July 1987, National federation of Labor filed a petition for certification election, alleging that the CBA would expire
in August 1987, and that it [NFL] enjoys the support of more than 20% of Hercules rank and file employees.
By the parties’ agreement, the Med -Arbiter issued an order for the conduct of a certification election —1. NFL, 2.
Hercules Employees Labor Union [HELU], 2. No Union.
In the pre-election conference, the parties were not able to agree on the list of qualified voters, because the company
charged that the list included 98 scabs, 16 capatazes, 8 security guards, and 9 managerial employees. The Med-
Arbiter ordered the conduct of a certification election, but excepted the following: managerial employees, security
force department, and the striker employees who executed quitclaims and accepted separation pay.
NFL appealed this order to the BLR; however, pending its resolution, a certification election was
conducted.Eventually, the BLR director declared the election null and void, and ordered a new election, saying that
the July1987 payroll, excluding the 98 scab replacement, will be the basis for the voters list.
NFL won in the certification election, garnering 89 out of 91 votes [2 votes were spoiled / invalid], and so theMed-
Arbiter declared and certified NFL as the SEBA of the rank-and-files.
Hercules’ [the company] MfR was denied by the DOLE Undersecretary on the following grounds:
1. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code on protests had not been
followed.
2. The records disclose that no protest was made before the election, nor formalized within 5 days after the
election.
3. DOLE has not found any legal obstacle to NFL’s proclamation as the SEBA of the rank-and-files

ISSUE: Whether or not Hercules Industries, Inc., as employer, may question the validity of the certification
election among its rank-and-file employees.

HELD: NO.
n a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a party to a certification
election which is the sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431).
In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation,
to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp.
v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211).

The only instance when the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to file a petition for
certification election on its workers’ request to bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code. After
the order for a certification election issues, the employer’s involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral
bystander. (Rizal Workers’ Union v. Calleja, supra.).

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 45

In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed that while the employees themselves never requested the
petitioner to bargain collectively, still, they did not object to the results of the certification election. Hence,
petitioner’s appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations from the Med-Arbiter’s Order certifying the NFL as the
exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file employees, and its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be
rejected. The employer’s intervention in the certification election of its workers is frowned upon by law.

Protest
Section 13, Rule IX, Book V

Period
Case
42. Rimbungco v. Castro, 183 SCRA 140 [1990] – BAUTISTA 11

Facts: On July 15, 1984 and within the "freedom period", a general meeting of all the members of the Kapisanan
ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation (Kapisanan) was convoked by then union
president Timbungco. At that meeting, the body unanimously approved, among others, the disaffiliation of the
Kapisanan from the mother union, Federacion FOITAF, and the amendment of its constitution and by-laws. A new
set of officers was also elected which included Timbungco, who was re-elected president without opposition. These
events were set forth in the minutes drawn up by the Kapisanan's Secretary, which also recorded that the body had
agreed to dispense with the formation of a COMELEC (committee on elections) and the preparation of a tally sheet
showing the number of votes received by each candidate, the members simply having entered individual
nominations to the different positions and listed their choices therefor. Another three-year collective bargaining
agreement was executed by Kapisanan and Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation (Corporation).
In April 1986, certain officers of Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (ADLO), sent a letter to BLR advising
that the majority of the members of the Kapisanan had affiliated with ADLO and that in view of the consequent loss
by the Kapisanan of its status as recognized representative of the bargaining unit, the Corporation should stop
deduction of union dues and thenceforth ignore and otherwise refuse to deal with Timbungco and his group.

Delicano Pajares a member of Kapisanan filed with BLR a petition for election of officers of the Kapisanan, and he
alleged that he and his co-workers numbered 700, 62% of whom had signed the petition that the election of
officers held on July 15, 1984 was invalid, and they wished to exercise their right to vote for and elect their union
officers.

The Med-Arbiter declaring invalid the election of union officers which took place on July 15, 1984 and ordering
another election of union officers to be conducted. This was affirmed by the BLR Director.

Issue:
1. Whether the validity of election of Kapisanan officers held on July 15, 1984 may still be protested after the lapse
of nearly two years.
2. Whether the election conducted on July 15, 1984 was attended to by irregularities that warrant for its
invalidation.

Ruling:
1. No. Under the Rules implementing the Labor Code, protests against elections should be formalized before the
med-arbiter within (5) days from the close of the election proceedings and must be decided by the latter within
twenty (20) working days. 13 In this case, the protest against the election was presented to the med-arbiter only
after the lapse of almost two (2) years after it was held. And in that interval, no informal protest, oral or written,
was ever presented against the election. Indeed, there was tacit acceptance of the regularity of the elections and
the results thereof, for during that period of almost two (2) years, certain significant events took place without
demur or objection of any sort on the part of private respondents and the rest of the members of the Kapisanan.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 46

2. No. It does not at all appear that the dispensing by the membership of the Kapisanan with certain technical
requirements or formalities in relation to the election of July 15, 1984 had resulted in the deprivation of any
substantial right or prerogative of anyone, or caused the perpetration of a fraud or other serious anomaly, or more
importantly, precluded the expression and ascertainment of the popular will in the choice of officers. In the second
place, as the Office of the Solicitor General points out, the private respondents' objections to the elections of July
15, 1984 have come too late, and they must be deemed in the premises to have forfeited their right to impugn the
same.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated September 9, 1986 and September 30, 1986
— sustaining that of Med-Arbiter Danilo Reynante dated July 3, 1986, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.

Grounds / Allegations
Case
43. Jiesor Independent Union v. torres, 221 SCRA 699 [1992] - BUAQUEN

Facts:On June 27, 1990, petitioner JISSCOR Independent Union (JIU) filed a petition for certification election among
the rank-and-file employees of the Jacinto Iron and Steel Sheets Corporation (JISSCOR) before the Med- Arbitration
Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila.By agreement of the
petitioner, JIU, the intervenor SMJ-ALU and the JISSCOR management, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order on August
29, 1990, setting the certification election on September 4, 1990.

However, on the appointed date, instead of an election, as previously agreed upon by all the parties, another pre-
election conference was held in the Department of Labor and Employment. Another agreement was entered into
by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJ-ALU, providing that the election would be conducted on September 6, 1990 from 8:00 A.M.
to 3:00 P.M., and that "the mandatory five (5) days posting is hereby waived by agreement of the parties".

The results of the certification election held on September 6, 1990 were the following:

JISSCOR Independent Union 46

Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU 50

No Union 0

Spoiled 3

Total Votes Cast 99

The JIU, which obtained only the second highest number of votes.In the minutes of the election,JIU only protested
against the use of emblem, visor, pin. In its protest filed,JIU raised many grounds not in the minutes of election such
as:The election was conducted very disorderly and irregular (sic) as there was no compliance of (sic) mandatory
posting of notice of certification election and necessary list of qualified voters in accordance to (sic) Section 1 of
Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations;

II. The lack of the required posting had mislead (sic) and/or misinformed the voters/workers of the manner of
voting, thus it resulted to some spoiled votes;

III. Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU officers and members, especially a certain Rene Tan from their place of work
to the election registration;

IV. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by posting of a very big streamer with printed words: Vote! Samahang
Manggagawa Ng JISSCOR-ALU at the entrance front door of the chapel where the election was held;

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 47

V. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by wearing of sunvisors and pins with printed words: Vote! SMJ-ALU
before and during voting inside the polling place (chapel). (pp- 45-46, Rollo.)

On November 21, 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued an Order declaring the September 6, 1990
certification election null and void.On December 12, 1990, the winner, respondent SMJ-ALU appealed to the DOLE
Secretary and prayed that it be declared the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
JISSCOR.On January 18, 1991, a decision was rendered by the Secretary of Labor and Employment granting the
appeal of SMJ-ALU and setting aside the Order dated November 21, 1990 of the Med-Arbiter. A new order was
entered certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of JISSCOR
pursuant to the results of the certification election conducted on September 6, 1990.

Issue: Whether or not the grounds as contended by the petitioner nullifies the election.

Held:No.Section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the grounds
of a protest may be filed on the spot or in writing with the representation officer and shall be contained in the
minutes of the proceedings. Protests not so raised are deemed waived.The minutes of the certification election
show, however, that JIU only protested against the use of emblem, visor, pin. Hence, other "protests [such as the
posting in the chapel entrance of a huge streamer with the words: "Vote! Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-
ALU"]not so raised are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code).

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the non-posting of the notice of the certification election as
prescribed by Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus Rules Implementing the labor Code misled and confused
the workers regarding the mechanics of the election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that issue for it signed
an agreement with the private respondent to waive the mandatory five (5) days posting of election notices. The
doctrine of estoppel is based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were
directed and who reasonably relied thereon (PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357).

The results of the certification election belie the petitioner's allegation that the workers were misinformed about
the election for the records show that out of 104 eligible voters, 99 were able to cast their votes and only 3 were
spoiled ballots.

On the alleged use of sunvisors, pins, emblems and the posting of a huge streamer, the Undersecretary found:

. . . nothing in the records shows that the alleged wearing of sunvisors and pins, the posting of huge streamers, as
well as the alleged escorting of voters by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured, influenced, vitiated, or in any manner
affected the choice of the workers of their bargaining agent. (p. 49, Rollo.)

That finding of fact of the head of an administrative agency is conclusive upon the court (Reyes vs. Minister of
Labor, 170 SCRA 134).

Appeal Period Case

44. Phil. Fruits and Vegetable Industries v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 [1992] - GONZALES

FACTS

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 48

On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order granting the petition for Certification election filed by the
Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Said order directed the holding of a certification election
among the regular and seasonal workers of the Philippine Fruits and Vegetables, Inc.

After a series of pre-election conferences, all issues relative to the conduct of the certification election were threshed
out except that which pertains to the voting qualifications of the hundred ninety four (194) workers enumerated in
the lists of qualified voters submitted by TUPAS. Based on the foregoing results, the yes votes failed to obtain the
majority of the votes cast in said certification election, hence, the necessity of opening the 168 challenged votes to
determine the true will of the employees.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a position paper arguing against the opening of said votes mainly because said
voters are not regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly rendered work for less than 180 days.

In the scheduled certification election, petitioner objected to the proceeding, through a Manifestation filed with the
Representation Officer before the close of the election proceedings. Said Manifestation pertinently reads:

The posting of the list of eligible voters authorized to participate in the certification election was short of the five (5)
days provided by law considering that it was posted only on December 12, 1988 and the election was held today,
December 16, 1988 is only four days prior to the scheduled certification election.

By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS, workers whose names were inadvertently omitted in the list of qualified
voters were allowed to vote, subject to challenge. Thirty eight of them voted on election day.

ISSUE

(1) The Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and committed manifest error in upholding the certification of TUPAS as the sole bargaining agent mainly
on an erroneous ruling that the protest against the canvassing of the votes cast by 168 dismissed workers was filed
beyond the reglementary period.

(2) The Honorable Secretary of Labor committed an abuse of discretion in completely disregarding the issue as to
whether or not non-regular seasonal workers who have long been separated from employment prior to the filing of
the petition for certification election would be allowed to vote and participate in a certification election.

HELD

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

For it is to be noted that the formal protest of petitioner PFVII was filed beyond the reglementary period. A close
reading of Sections 3 and 4, Rule VI, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which read as follows:

Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any-on-the-spot questions. — The Representation officer may rule on any
on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with
the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.

Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protest shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. — Where the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter
with five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20)
working days from the date of formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest shall be

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 49

deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as
provided under Rule V. (Emphasis supplied).

would readily yield, as a matter of procedure, the following requirements in order that a protest filed thereunder
would prosper, to wit:

(1) The protest must be filed with the representation officer and made of record in the minutes of the proceedings
before the close of election proceedings, and

(2) The protest must be formalized

Annulment
Allegations / Grounds
Case
45. Nat’l. Fed. of Labor v. Sec. of DOLE, 287 SCRA 599 [1998] - RAGILES

FACTS:
Petitioner National Federation of Labor was chosen the bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees of the Hijo
Plantation Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at a certification election. Protests filed by the company
and three other unions against the results of the election were denied by the DOLE but, on motion of the company
(HPI), the DOLE reconsidered its resolution and ordered another certification election to be held. The DOLE
subsequently denied petitioner NFLs motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of the Hijo
Plantation, Inc. resulting in the choice of no union. However, on July 3, 1989, on allegations that the company
intervened in the election, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations nullified the results of the certification
election and ordered a new one to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the supervision of the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City
with the following results:
Total Votes cast --------------------------- 1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU) ------- 39
TRUST KILUSAN ----------------------- 5
National Federation of Labor (NFL)---- 876
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor ------- 4
SANDIGAN ------------------------------- 6
UFW ---------------------------------------- 15
No Union ----------------------------------- 55
Invalid -------------------------------------- 13
The TRUST-Kilusan, the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union
and the Hijo Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results of the certification election on the ground that it
was conducted despite the pendency of the appeals. HPI claimed that it was not informed or properly represented
at the pre-election conference. Private respondent also alleged that the certification election was marred by massive
fraud and irregularities .
Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura investigated the company’s claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were not
able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the election
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the election.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the representation officer, did not tally with the 41-page
listings submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 50

 But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres complaining that it had not been informed of the
investigation conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter
was directed by the Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition for the annulment of
the results of the certification election. Hijo Labor Union manifested that it was joining private respondent HPIs
appeal, adopting as its own the documentary evidence presented by the company, showing fraud in the election of
August 20, 1989.
On the other hand, petitioner NFL reiterated its contention that management had no legal personality to file an
appeal because it was not a party to the election but was only a bystander which did not even extend assistance in
the election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers voted in the election. It claimed that out of 1,692
qualified voters, 1,012 actually voted and only 680 failed to cast their vote. It charged management with resorting to
all kinds of manipulation to frustrate the election and make the Non Union win.
The DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989 certification election. With respect to claim that election could not be
held in view of the pendency of the appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the order of the Med-Arbiter
denying their motions for intervention,
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter.
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of the rule that the choice of the exclusive
bargaining representative is the sole concern of the workers. It said: If indeed there were irregularities committed
during the election, the contending unions should have been the first to complain considering that they are the ones
which have interest that should be protected.[2]
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the election filed by the ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN,
HLU and the HPI and instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees of private respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, reversed his resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL
filed a motion for reconsideration but its motion was denied.Petitioners second motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2nd certification election should be annulled.

HELD: YES!
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his earlier resolution because
workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with their letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively
expressing their wish to have a new certification election conducted and that as a result the firm position we held
regarding the integrity of the electoral exercise had been somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of the workers,
now speaking in their sovereign capacity.
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its earlier rulings was not the petition
of the employer but the letter-appeals that the employees sent to his office denouncing the irregularities committed
during the August 20, 1989 certification election. The petition of private respondent was simply the occasion for the
employees to voice their protests against the election. Private respondent HPI attached to its Supplemental Appeal
filed on September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or less 784 employees who claimed that they had been
disfranchised, as a result of which they were not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the
protests of employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February 14, 1991, upholding
the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the election. Private respondent is
the employer. The manner in which the election was held could make the difference between industrial strife and
industrial harmony in the company. What an employer is prohibited from doing is to interfere with the conduct of
the certification election for the purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly an employer has an abiding interest
in seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.

Irregularities

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 51

Case
46. Confederation of Citizens Labor Union v. Noriel, 116 SCRA 694 [1984] – BAUTISTA 12

Facts: On August 7, 1980, a certification election was held in the premises of Redson Textile Manufacturing
Corporation (Corporation) but no majority vote was attained among the four contending unions. The two unions
with the highest votes were CCLU and ALU and both agreed that a run-off election be held on November 6, 1980
from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock in the evening. On said date, three election supervisors from the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, arrived but they were not allowed by the security guard to enter the company
premises. Consequently, supervisors decided to hold the certification election "outside the premises of the
company in a small store outside of the annex building" and they used as ballot box "an improvised carton box."
The union representatives did not object to the improvised polling place and ballot box.

During the election and just before it was closed at six-thirty in the evening, the ALU representative, Taneo,
executed a written protest, alleging that the management of the Corporation did not allow the run-off election to
be held within its premises; that it prevented fifty percent of the workers from voting by not allowing them to get
out of the company premises and inducing them to work overtime; that its security guards "manhandled" the ALU
vice-president and that their "active intervention" caused "chaos and confusion" for around thirty minutes; that the
company refused to furnish election paraphernalia like the polling place and the ballot box and that the election
supervisors declared the election closed in spite of ALU's objection.

Of the 692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against CCLU's 313 votes, or a margin of 53 votes. There were 1,010
voters. Because ALU won, representative Taneo, withdrew his protest. On November 7, CCLU representative
Fresnoza filed with the BLR a protest wherein he prayed that nullification of the November 6 and 7 certification
election. Fresnoza alleged that the previous day's certification election was irregular and disorderly because (a) no
booths were provided for by the company; (b) the election started much later than the hour agreed upon by the
parties, and (c) ALU distributed white T-shirts printed with "ALU TAYO", gave free tricycle rides to ALU voters and
hired around fifteen husky men and around twenty-five women who "forced" voters to vote for ALU.

Carmelo C. Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the BLR, in his resolution of February 26, 1981, dismissed CCLU's protest for
lack of merit. He observed that CCLU failed to submit the pleadings and evidences required in the hearing on
January 19, 1981 and that CCLU failed to file a protest either "before or during the election proceeding" and,
therefore, pursuant to section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the aforementioned rules, CCLU is deemed to have waived its
right to protest.

Issue: Whether the certification election was valid.

Ruling: No, it was invalid.

We hold that the certification election is invalid because of certain irregularities such as that (1) the workers on the
night shift (ten p.m. to six a.m.) and some of those in the afternoon shift were not able to vote, so much so that out
of 1,010 voters only 692 voted and about 318 failed to vote (p. 88, Rollo); (2) the secrecy of the ballot was not
safeguarded; (3) the election supervisors were remiss in their duties and were apparently "intimidated" by a union
representative and (4) the participating unions were overzealous in wooing the employees to vote in their favor by
resorting to such tactics as giving free tricycle rides and T-shirts.

The purpose of a certification election is to give the employees "true representation in their collective bargaining
with an employer" (51 C.J.S. 969). That purpose was not achieved in the run-off election because many employees
or union members were not able to vote and the employer, through apathy or deliberate intent, did not render
assistance in the holding of the election.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 52

It should be noted that ALU's written protest (later withdrawn) was based on the same grounds invoked by CCLU in
its protest. That fact alone should have alerted Noriel to disregard the technicality that CCLU's protest was not
filed on time.

47. Timbungco v. Castro, 183 SCRA 140 [1990] - BUAQUEN

Facts:
The petitioner, Emmanuel Timbungco, was the president of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo
American Tobacco Corporation composed of employees of Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation. The
union had a three-year collective bargaining agreement with said Corporation (hereafter, simply AAATC). The
stipulated expiration date was August 24, 1984.On July 15, 1984 — or within the so-called "freedom period" of sixty
(60) days — a general meeting of all the members of the Kapisanan was convoked by Timbungco. At that meeting
the body unanimously approved, among others, the disaffiliation of the Kapisanan from the mother union,
Federacion FOITAF, and the amendment of its constitution and by-laws. A new set of officers was also elected
which included Timbungco, who was re-elected president without opposition. A new registration certificate was
thereafter issued in due course to the Kapisanan, indicating its independence of Federacion FOITAF.

About seven months later, on April 8, 1986 to be exact, Leodegario L. Zapanta, 1st National President of the
Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (ADLO, for short), sent a letter to the Bureau of Labor Relations
advising that Bureau that the majority of the members of the Kapisanan had affiliated with ADLO. 4 And on April 10,
1986, ADLO's Executive National Vice-President Tayo, wrote AAATC to the same effect and requested — in view of
the consequent loss by the Kapisanan of its status as recognized representative of the bargaining unit — that
AAATC stop deduction of union dues and thenceforth ignore and otherwise refuse to deal with Timbungco and his
group. Another letter, also asking AAATC to stop deducting union dues, or hold such dues in trust pending
resolution of the representation issue, was sent on April 12, 1986 by Delicano Pajares, a member of the Kapisanan.

AAATC replied to Tayo's letter. It stated that it could not accede to the request to stop deduction of union dues
since it had been dealing over many years with the Kapisanan as its workers' authorized bargaining representative.
On April 23, 1986 Delicano Pajares filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for election of officers of the
Kapisanan, which was docketed as Case No. NCR LRD-M-4-23486. He alleged that he and his co-workers numbered
700, 62% of whom had signed the petition; that the election of officers held on July 15, 1984 was invalid, and they
wished to exercise their right to vote for and elect their union officers. He also adverted to the existing collective
bargaining agreement between Kapisanan and AAATC.

After appropriate proceedings, Med-Arbiter L. Reynante issued an Order dated July 3, 1986 declaring invalid the
election of union officers which took place on July 15, 1984 and ordering another election of union officers to be
conducted in the premises of AAATC under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Issue: Whether or not the irregularities during the conduct of elections maybe raised after the lapse of two years.

Held: No. In the first place, it does not at all appear that the dispensing by the membership of the Kapisanan with
certain technical requirements or formalities in relation to the election of July 15, 1984 had resulted in the
deprivation of any substantial right or prerogative of anyone, or caused the perpetration of a fraud or other serious
anomaly, or more importantly, precluded the expression and ascertainment of the popular will in the choice of
officers. In the second place, as the Office of the Solicitor General points out, the private respondents' objections to
the elections of July 15, 1984 have come too late, and they must be deemed in the premises to have forfeited their
right to impugn the same. Under the Rules implementing the Labor Code, protests against elections should be
formalized before the med-arbiter within (5) days from the close of the election proceedings and must be decided
by the latter within twenty (20) working days.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 53

 In this case, the protest against the election was presented to the med-arbiter only after the lapse of almost two
(2) years after it was held. And in that interval, no informal protest, oral or written, was ever presented against the
election. Indeed, there was tacit acceptance of the regularity of the elections and the results thereof, for during
that period of almost two (2) years, certain significant events took place without demur or objection of any sort on
the part of private respondents and the rest of the members of the Kapisanan: Timbungco officially made known to
the Bureau of Labor Relations the Kapisanan's disaffiliation from the Federacion FOITAF and obtained a new
certificate of registration for the union after complying with the requisites prescribed therefor; he and the other
officers of the Kapisanan negotiated with the AAATC management and succeeded in bringing about the execution
of a new collective bargaining agreement which was afterwards filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations in
accordance with pertinent regulations; and Timbungco and the entire membership of the Kapisanan accepted
benefits granted and assumed the obligations set out in said collective bargaining agreement.

Certification of Designated Majority Union

Articles 255 and 256

Majority Union
Case
48. Milante v. NLRC, 246 SCRA 365 [1995] - RAGILES

FACTS:
The Golden Taxi Employees and Workers Union - ANGLO (GTEWUANGLO), represented by Ernesto Serrano, as union
president, filed a case against respondent Golden Taxi Cab Co. (Company) and/or Lorenzo Zamora and Jose Zamora
for illegal lock-out, unfair labor practice, and payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
In his decision, Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on found that the closure of respondent company was illegal, and
ordered private respondents to pay the members of GTEWU-ANGLO P22,947,200.00 as separation pay and the
equivalent of 10% of the award as attorney’s fees
Upon appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in lieu thereof directed private respondents to pay,
as financial assistance, the workers named in the list attached to its decision the amount of P5,646,699.95 as
attorney’s fees
On January 25, 1993, a complaint was filed by Danilo Q. Militante against Lorenzo Zamora, Dona Nena Zamora and
Dona Pacing Zamora for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal, non-remittance of SSS deduction, deduction for burial
benefits, non-payment of premium pay for rest day, thirteenth-month pay and separation pay with a prayer for
reinstatement, upgrading of SSS payments, payment of separation pay, thirteenth-month pay and premium pay for
rest.
On March 9, 1993, another complaint was filed by Miguel C. Salonga against respondent Company, Lorenzo Zamora,
Dona Nena Zamora and Dona Pacing Zamora, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of retirement benefits with a
prayer for payment of retirement benefits and other benefits.
On March 15, 1993, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the grounds of res judicata and
prescription.
On March 19, 1993, another complaint was filed against respondent company, Lorenzo Zamora, Dona Nena Zamora
and Dona Pacing Zamora by Bernardino O. Tejada..
On April 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ramon V. C. Reyes issued an order dismissing the three consolidated cases on the
ground of bar by prior judgment. Upon appeal, NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the causes of actions of the petitioners are barred by prior final judgment in the NLRC.

HELD: YES!
The legal conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the binding effect of the judgment in the NLRC NCR CA No.
003194-92 on petitioners finds support in Article 255 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Said article
provides:

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 54

 “Exclusive bargaining representative and workers participation in policy and decision making. —
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.”
Inasmuch as GTEWU-ANGLO was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent in the consent election conducted on
March 17, 1989, petitioners cannot now claim that they were not parties in the first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO,
which represented not only PACIWU-TUCP but also GTEWU-ANGLO. Hence, all the requisites of res judicata being
present, said principle should be made to apply, thus barring any subsequent action such as the consolidated cases
subject of this petition.

Bars to Certification Election

One Year Bar Rule

Section 3, Rule VIII, Book V

Period Covered
Case
49. Transport Corp. v. Laguesma, 227 SCRA 827 [1993] – BAUTISTA 13

Facts: On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP), filed with the Med-
Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the
petitioner. Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be
represented by respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors
and conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys. CLOP
rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election, which included all the rank and file
employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions. Subsequently two more
unions filed a petition for certification election which were NAFLU and ALU-TUCP.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition
constituted res judicata. Petitioner further argued that the second petition for a certification election by
respondent CLOP, NAFLU and ALU-TUCP were barred at least for a period of one year from the time the first
petition of CLOP was dismissed pursuant to Section Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code as amended which provides:

When to file — In the absence of collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of
the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time. However, no certification election may be held
within one year from the date of the issuance of a final certification election result.

On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter rendered a decision, which ordered that a certification election among the regular
rank and file workers of petitioner company be conducted. On appeal to DOLE Sec, Undersecretary Laguesma,
affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action.

Issue:
1. Whether there is a bar to hold a certification election within one year as contemplated under Section 3, Rule V,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
2. Whether petitioner company has a right to interfere on the certification election.

Ruling:
1. No bar exists, petitioner misinterpreted the rule. Likewise, untenable is petitioner's contention that the second
petition for certification election should have been filed after one year from the dismissal of the first petition
certification election under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 55

amended. Apparently, petitioner misread the above-mentioned provision of law. The phrase "final certification
election result" means that there was an actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there was a counting
of votes. In this case, there was no certification election conducted precisely because the first petition was
dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not include all the employees who should be properly
included in the collective bargaining unit.

Note: Res judicata does not apply since parties in the first and second actions were not identical. On the second
action, CLOP included all the employees who were excluded in the first petition such as inspectors, inspectresses,
dispatchers and washer boys.

2. No, right to interfere. It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most
tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification election. This must not be so for the choice of a collective
bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is
merely regarded as a bystander.

Deadlock Bar Rule

Section 3, Rule VIII, Book V

Requirements
Case
50. Nat’l. Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry v. Trajano, 208 SCRA 78 [1992] - BUAQUEN
Facts:

Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate
national labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.Dacongcogon Sugar and
Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500)
workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-milling season.On November 14, 1984, private
respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a
term of three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987.When the CBA expired, private respondent
NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years
with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment.However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and
optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a
cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions.On December 5, 1988, petitioner
NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rak and file workers of
Dacongcogon.On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the
following grounds that Petition was filed out of time and that

there is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-central.

Issue:Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.

Held: Yes.The clear mandate of the law is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-
TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than
one (1) year after the CBA expired.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly
certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 56

Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as
embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable.This rule simply
provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty
days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the
filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within
the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure
stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any
collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to stress what was held in the case of Lopez Sugar
Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990,
189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly
executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its
answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was submitted to the
Labor Management Council.

No Deadlock
Case
51. Divine Word Univ. of Tacloban v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 213 SCRA 759 [1992] - RAGILES

FACTS:
Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is the sole and bargaining agent of the Divine Word University.
Sometime in 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals. The University replied and requested a
preliminary conference which unfortunately did not take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA proposals.
Because of this, the union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice.
Then, an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU were held after the filing of the notice of strike.
DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective bargaining proposals but was ignored by the
University.

ISSUE: Whether the Divine Word University of Tacloban cannot file a petition for certification election because of a
bargaining deadlock.

HELD: There is no bargaining deadlock.

A “deadlock” is defined as the “counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill.”
There is a deadlock when there is a “complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed
forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or legislature.” The word is synonymous with the word impasse which, within the
meaning of the American federal labor laws, “presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite
noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties.”
A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no “reasonable effort at good faith bargaining” specially on
the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of
the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the
DWUEU-ALU, there was no “counteraction” of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should
be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some
manner to such acts.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 57

The Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or an impasse in the collective bargaining process. As
the Court earlier observed, there has not been a “reasonable effort at good faith bargaining” on the part of the
University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of an agreement, the record is
replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly certified
bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the University evidently had no intention of bargaining
with it. Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically, the University has the right to file the petition for
certification election as there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein assailed
Orders be annulled would put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.

Contract Bar Rule

Article 232
Section 7, Rule XVII, Book V

History
52. Confederation of Citizens Labor Unoin v. NLRC, 60 SCRA 450 [1974]
[see Fernando, J., concurring opinion] – BAUTISTA 14
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to have the respondents National Labor Relations Commission
declared without jurisdiction over its cases Nos. LR-2751 and 2883 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin said Respondent from proceeding with the scheduled certification election on July 23, 1974.

G. R. No. L-38895. On February 15, 1974 the Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) renewed for another
three years or until February 15, 1977 its collective bargaining agreement with Continental Employees and Laborers
Association (CELA) an affiliate of petitioner Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions, (CCLU) and this was
acknowledged on February 21, 1974. On February 12, 1974, respondent Federation of Free Workers (FFW), another
legitimate labor organization, filed with NLRC a petition for Certification Election. A copy of this petition was
furnished CMC on February 22, 1974. Subsequently, on February 25, 1974 a copy of the CMC-CELA collective
bargaining agreement was filed with the BLR for certification. The CBA was certified on March 4, 1974. On
February 28, 1974, CMC filed its answer to the petition praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
the contract-bar rule.

G.R. No L-38956. A three-year CBA was signed on March 4, 1974 4 but to be effective as of February 16, 1974 by
Redson Textile Manufacturing Company (REDSON) and Redson Employees and laborers Association (RELA). Said
agreement was filed with the NLRC on March 7, 1974, and certified on March 15, 1974. The FFW, however, had
already filed on February 25, 1974 it, petition for certification election with the NLRC. REDSON was furnished a copy
of the petition on March 7, 1974. On March 18, 1974 REDSON filed its answer praying for the dismissal of the
petition principally on the ground that the petition was barred by the collective bargaining agreement which it
had signed with RELA.

The CELA-CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed on April 23, 1974 a motion to dismiss the petitions for certification election.
Respondent NLRC rendered its decision which consolidated the two petitions for certification election and directed
the BLR to conduct the certification elections within ten days from receipt thereof. Petitioners filed their "Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Appeal from the NLRC Decision and later on their Appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

On July 6, 1974, petitioners received a telegram dated July 5, 1974 from the BLR, requesting them to attend the
pre-election conference; in response, petitioners filed a motion to cancel the pre-election conference. Petitioners
filed on July 18, 1974 the instant petition, praying, on the basis of the irregularities allegedly committed by the
NLRC, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the NLRC from taking any action on the cases in
question.

Issue: Whether NLRC had no authority to modify the "contract-bar rule" by requiring that a collective bargaining
agreement had to be certified before it could constitute a bar to a petition for certification election.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 58

Ruling: Yes.
Presidential Decree No. 21, dated October 14, 1972, Section 2 whereof gave the NLRC, which the Decree created,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to
strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. 875. Section 9 thereof also enjoined the NLRC to promulgate rules and
regulations governing collective bargaining.

The petition for certification election filed by FFW at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation (NLRC CASE No.
LRO 2751) was filed on February 12, 1974. The collective bargaining agreement between the CMC and the CELA
(Annex A) which, as claimed, should bar said petition, had not yet been filed as of that date for certification, for it
was acknowledged before the Notary Public only on February 21, 1974. The petition for certification election at
Redson and Company (NLRC Case No. LR-2883) was filed on February 25, 1974. As of said date, no collective
bargaining agreement had been entered into between REDSON and RELA which could serve as a bar to the petition,
for their collective bargaining agreement was signed only on March 4, 1974, as admitted by REDSON in its answer,
and acknowledged only on March 7, 1974.

We do not see, moreover, any violation of the existing law which NLRC allegedly committed when it gave due
course to the petitions for certification election. Section 12 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 makes it plain that after a
certification election has been made "the court shall not order certification in the same unit more often than once
in 12 months," and under Section 12 (d) of the same law, "an employer may petition the court for an election if
there has been no certification election held during the 12 months prior to the date of the request of the
employees," which provision tends to show that after the lapse of such period of 12 months a certification election
may be requested either by the employer or by the requisite number of employees of a particular union. 20 The
petitions for certification election in both NLRC Cases Nos. 2751 and 2883 alleged "that there has been no
certification election in the company for the last 12 months," 21 which allegation was not denied by CMC and
REDSON in their answers.

Section 12 (c) of the same law furthermore provides that it shall be mandatory on the Court to order an election for
the purpose of determining the representative of the employees for the appropriate bargaining unit, where a
petition is filed by at least ten per cent of the employees in the appropriate unit requesting an election. In LR No.
2751, FFW claimed that it represented 60% of the employees and workers in CMC, and in LR No. 2883, it claimed
that it represented more than 10% of the employees in REDSON.

Fernando, J., concurring opinion

Under the circumstances, I would limit my concurrence to the National Labor Relations Commission acting in
conformity with the Industrial Peace Act.

Essentially it signifies that under certain circumstances while the right to free and unfettered choice by employees
of their exclusive bargaining representative should be respected, there are circumstances, which in the interest of
stability of labor relations, call for a relaxation in its observance. As a statement of a norm, it has something in its
favor. It should not lend itself however to denigrating the fundamental right of an appropriate bargaining unit to
determine who should speak for it. That is of the essence of industrial democracy Moreover, it is a guarantee that
labor organizations will ever be on the alert to obtain the most favorable terms of employment. That may explain
why the contract bar never obtained a secure foothold in the Philippines. Two cases were cited by petitioners, the
first being Philippine Long Distance Telephone Employees' Union v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
Free Telephone Workers' Union, 9 a 1955 decision. While it is true that in the opinion therein, penned by the then
Acting Chief Justice, later Chief Justice, Cesar P. Bengzon, there was a reference to Werne on Labor Relations to
show the existence of such a rule, there is this paragraph which explicitly indicated why the norm should not be
applied: "Now then, as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was signed December 1, 1951, it had
been in operation more than two years in August 1954 when the certification election was ordered. It is therefore
no bar to the certification even under American labor views." 10 The next case cited, that of General Maritime

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 59

Stevedores' Union of the Philippines v. South Sea Shipping Line, 11 promulgated in 1960, is far from conclusive
either. While the opinion of Justice Montemayor is notable for the grasp displayed in American labor law, there is
this all-important qualification: "In adopting the "contract-bar policy," the Board, however, was careful in refusing
to announce an inflexible rule as to its authority, and whenever possible, it avoided a determination of the
contract's effect on its power of certification election: ... ."

In American Jurisprudence:
Held, that the existing contract is not a bar and an election should be held. A contract will not act as a bar where a
schism has occurred. A schism will not be found merely because of dissatisfaction by the members of a local with
their leaders. But where the members of a local vote in open meeting to disaffiliate and where this action grows
out of a conflict over policy taking place at the highest level of the International, no genuine interest of stability
would be served by barring an election." 18 What becomes crystal-clear in the light of the above is that the
pragmatic approach has been followed, due note being taken of the varied as well as changing conditions to make
such a norm truly responsive to the needs of the occasion. It would be going too far then to affix to the contract bar
rule the element of inflexibility. Wisely, it has not been the case at all, even in the United States.

Rule Statement
Case
53. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Premex v. Sec. of Labor, 286 SCRA 692 [1998] - BUAQUEN

Facts:

A certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter
Corporation.The results of the elections were as follows:

National Federation of Labor (NFL) - 235

No Union - 466

Spoiled Ballots - 18

Marked Ballots - 9

Challenged Ballots - 7

The majority of employees voted for No Union. Some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization
known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment.The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU). The SMP-PIILU
wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
employees at the Permex Producer which the company granted and entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with it on December 1, 1991. The CBA was ratified on December 9 & 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file
employees of Permex. On December 13, 1991, such CBA was certified by the DOLE.On February 25, 1992, the
National Labor Federation (NFL) filed a petition for CE, but was dismissed. NFL's appeal led to its inclusion in the
options for CE. SMP moved for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether support by the majority of the employees makes a CBA entered by a union valid and binding.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 60

Held: No, it does not.

It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that
everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself.

This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months after the
employees had voted "no union" in the certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by
respondent Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining representative within
a year of the proclamation of the results of the certification election. Here the results, which showed that 61% of
the employees voted for "no union," were certified only on February 25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex
Producer already recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.

Doctrine: There can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the proclamation of the
results of the certification election.

Incomplete Contract
Case
54. Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, 99 Phil 16 [1956] - GONZALES

FACTS

Respondents filed a petition for a certification election for the purpose of determining the sole bargaining
representative of the employees in the Saulog Inc.

President of Buklod filed its answer stating that there is a CBA between the company and them.

Court rendered judgment directing a certification election be held among the employees and/or laborers of the
Saulog Transit Inc.

It was found that the CBA does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and
other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance
procedure.

ISSUE

Whether or not a CBA that is incomplete will constitute a bar to certification election.

HELD

No. The agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification election and even if there is a supplementary
agreement, it having been entered into after filing of the petition for a certification election, the same cannot and
does not bar a certification election.

The contention that as section 13, Republic Act No. 875, does not require that the agreement be in writing unless
either party request that it be reduced to writing, thereby insinuating that there had been a verbal understanding
before the written agreement was entered into, has no bearing and effect in a case where there is a written
agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations found incomplete.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 61

Premature Contract
Case
55. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997] - RAGILES

FACTS:
Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MALAYANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC PLASTIC are labor
unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC).
MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election,
SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration.
As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed.
MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding
of a certification election. MR- denied
A pre-election conference was held, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file
employees based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company
failed to submit the list, it was given a stern warning by DOLE that should it fail to appear at the next conference on
June 3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible
voters. [2] But the PPC again failed to appear. SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991 conference. On June
18, 1991, it moved to defer the conference, alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of union registration of
MNMPP were still pending resolution before the Med-Arbiter which constitute a prejudicial question and that there
existed a collective bargaining agreement between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification
election. [4]
MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case had already been finally decided by the DOLE
and that the execution of the subject CBA during the pendency of the representation case did not bar the holding of
a certification election. [5]
On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent company once more, reiterating its warning that should
the company fail to submit the list of its rank and file employees, the list to be submitted by private respondent
MNMPP and petitioner SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the company’s right to the
exclusion proceedings would be deemed waived. [6]
But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order. Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, SAMAHAN and MNMPP
agreed to hold the certification election on October 29, 1991 on the basis of the list of employees submitted by
MNMPP, without prejudice to the submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17,
1991. [7] Thereafter, they agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the Social
Security System. [8]
On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election was finally set for October 6, 1992. But
SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with MNMPP on September 23, 1991 to hold an election using the list
furnished by the SSS. [9] It also objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a motion for intervention. Thereafter, SAMAHAN filed a
Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the certification election and asked that the certification
election held on the same day be nullified for the following reasons: (1) it did not receive notice of the certification
as required by law; (2) its opposition to KAMAPIs motion to intervene and its opposition to setting the date of the
certification election had not been resolved; (3) there were discrepancies in the list of voters submitted by the SSS;
and (4) SAMAHANs President moved to strike out his signature at the back of the official ballot. [10]
The certification election was held on October 6, 1992. Over SAMAHANs objection KAMAPI was allowed to
participate. The following were results of the election: [11]
No. of Eligible Voters..98
Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic,...56
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic..2
Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino...0
No Union1
No. of Spoiled Ballots cast.3
Total no of Votes Cast..62

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 62

On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election
In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter, Tomas F. Falconitin, dismissed the election protest of SAMAHAN
and upheld the election of MNMPP.
Appeal and MR –denied

ISSUE: Whether a CBA prematurely renewed is a bar to the holding of a certification election.

HELD: No.
Petitioner’s contention in its Motion for Deferment of Pre-election Conference was that the CBA between it and the
PPC signed during the pendency of the representation proceedings, rendered the certification election moot and
academic. Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4 provides:
The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered
before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.
This rule was applied in the case of ALU-TUCP v. Trajano [21] where we held that the representation case will not be
adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom period or during the pendency of the
representation case. In ALU v. Calleja, [22] we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to
the holding of a certification election. Hence, the CBA entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency
of the representation case and after the filing of the petition for certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot
possibly prejudice the certification election nor render it moot.

When Applied
Case
56. Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 178 [1989] – BAUTISTA 15
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents. G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Philippine
Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) to expire on April 1, 1987. On March 23, 1987, private
respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the BLR
Regional Office in Tacloban City alleging, among others, that no certification election had been held in PASAR within
twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of the said petition. Petitioner ALU moved to intervene and
sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support
of its petition. Initially, Med-Arbiter Elorcha dismissed the petition but later on set aside and the case was
rescheduled for hearing on May 29, 1987 and he also enjoined PASAR from entering into a CBA with any union until
after the issue of representation is finally resolved. Subsequently, the petition for certification was dismissed for
failure of NAFLU to solicit 20% of the total number of rank and file employees while ALU submitted 33 pages
containing the signatures of 88.5% of the rank and file employees at PASAR.

NAFLU appealed the order of dismissal to the BLR and while the appeal was pending, petitioner ALU concluded
negotiations with PASAR on the proposed CBA. The said CBA was ratified by the members of the bargaining unit on
July 28, 1987. Thereafter, petitioner ALU moved for the dismissal of NAFLU’s appeal alleging that it had just
concluded a CBA with PASAR and that the said CBA had been ratified by 98% of the regular rank-and-file employees
and that at least 75 of NAFLU's members renounced their membership thereat and affirmed membership with PEA-
ALU in separate affidavits.

In a resolution dated September 30, 1987, the public respondent gave due course to the appeal by ordering the
conduct of a certification election. Petitioner’s MR was denied, hence, it appealed to SC.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 63

Issue: Whether the contract bar rule is applicable where a CBA was hastily concluded in defiance of a med-arbiter’s
order enjoining the parties from entering into a CBA until the issue on representation is finally resolved.

Ruling: No. The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification election for the very
reason that the same was not yet in existence when the said petition was filed. The holding of a certification
election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for certification election was filed either before or
after the freedom period. Petitioner contends that since the new CBA had already been ratified overwhelmingly by
the members of the bargaining unit and that said CBA had already been consummated and the members of the
bargaining unit have been continuously enjoying the benefits under the said CBA, no certification election may be
conducted.

However, the petition for certification election in this case was filed within the freedom period but the petitioner
and PASAR hastily concluded a CBA despite the order of the Med-Arbiter enjoining them from doing so until the
issue of representation is finally resolved. As pointed out by public respondent in its comment, the parties were in
bad faith when they concluded the CBA. Their act was clearly intended to bar the petition for certification election
filed by NAFLU. A collective bargaining agreement which was prematurely renewed is not a bar to the holding of
a certification election. Such indecent haste in renewing the CBA despite an order enjoining them from doing so
15 is designed to frustrate the constitutional right of the employees to self-organization. Moreover, We cannot
countenance the actuation of the petitioner and the management in this case which is not conducive to industrial
peace.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

NOTE: There are is another Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 127 [1989], one digested by Irene
(Case #24). In so far as this case is concerned, below are the discussion pertaining to contract bar

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, as Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR UNION (PSSLU);
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL) and GAW TRADING, INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-77282
May 5, 1989

Ruling: Contract bar is not applicable on this case.

Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select representatives can be justified
only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted from the contract which do not foster industrial stability, such
as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be
subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the type of industrial peace
contemplated by the law.

Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the fact that when the disputed
agreement was filed before the Labor Regional Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had
already been filed on May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of thirty percent
(30%) of the workers in the bargaining unit, the same was enough to initiate said certification election.

Exception
Case
57. Port Workers Union etc. v. Undersecretary of Labor, 207 SCRA 329 [1992] - GONZALES

FACTS

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 64

There was muffled excitement among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI)
because its collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union
(APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the
laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan
(SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the
bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.

On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded
on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e.,
910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by secret ballot
when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit.

ISSUE

There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not
been submitted simultaneously with the petition.

HELD

We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character where
the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical rules and objections should not hamper the correct
ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of the majority of the workers and is thus entitled
to represent them in their dealings with management.

The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the holding of the election although it was initially
only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the other petitioning unions
have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact being
reversed here. The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions had
complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should
not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.

It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed automatically
dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed to prevent a correct
determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization
and collective bargaining.

Not Registered CBA

Case
58. Registered CBA Assn. of Independent Unions v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219 [1999] - RAGILES

Expired CBA
Case
59. Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. No.
141471 [2000] – BAUTISTA 16

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 65

Facts: On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL),
initiated the renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two (2) years of the
CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, Eleanor Ambas was elected as the new union
President. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner claimed that the CBA was already
prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union
members, who eventually rejected the said CBA.

Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor
of petitioner but this was reversed on appeal before the NLRC.

Sometime in January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its
intention to strike for its refusal to bargain. Subsequently, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to
start negotiation on a new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its
proposals to petitioner, which notified the union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been
submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being
changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday which she protested. Due to petitioner's inaction, the
union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to discuss the
ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for
alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas' dismissal.

On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner
stopped the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a
petition for certification election. On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996, public respondent the
Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the union
president to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the
actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas.

On December 2, 1996, the Sec of labor issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two
counts and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages. This was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, hence, the instant appeal.

Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally
suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification has been
filed by another legitimate labor organization.

Ruling: Yes, guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain.

In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid petition for
certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply
with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification
election must be filed during the sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI,
Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " .… If a collective bargaining
agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232,8 in relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code.

No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day
freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the
formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 66

shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. The purpose is to ensure stability in the
relationship of the workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into
by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by
ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing
thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Suspension of Certification Election

Case
60. United CMC Textile Workers Union v. BLR, 128 SCRA 316 [1984] – BUAQUEN

Facts: Petitioner United CMC Textile Workers Union is the incumbent collective bargaining representative of all rank
and file workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a union seeking representation as the bargaining
agent of the rank and file workers. Petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against CENTEX and PAFLU
alleging that CENTEX had “helped and cooperated in the organization of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU
by allowing the organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees of the company who are
members of the complainant union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the respondent PAFLU, during
company time and inside the company premises on August 21, 1978 and the following days thereafter.

While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU filed a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file workers
of CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has been no certification election during the 12 months period prior to the filing
of the petition; 2) the petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the rank and file
workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining agreement between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October
31, 1978; 4) the petition is filed within the 60-day-freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA,
and 6) there is no legal impediment to the filing of the petition.[2] Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case
and filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 1978 on the grounds that: 1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a
company-dominated union is a prejudicial question and bars the holding of the certification election; and 2) PAFLU
failed to comply with the 30% requirement for mandatory certification election since only 440 of the 603 are valid
signatures and that 719 signatories are required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and file workers totalling 2,397
and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.

The Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election among CENTEX rank and file workers,
whereby qualified voters could choose either PAFLU or petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No
Union at all.This was affirmed by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in the challenged
Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to order certification election where
several unions are contending for representation and when there is doubt as to whether the 30% requirement has
been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a petition for certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in CBA
negotiations must occur prior to the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union in the certification election
proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of the election.

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 67

Held: (SC issued a TRO)

The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be answered in the affirmative. Under
settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until
decided, bars proceedings for a certification election,[10] the reason being that the votes of the members of the
dominated union would not be free.The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the
Certification Case, which was presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to
respondent public official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification
Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification Case.
The following ruling is thus squarely in point: chanroblespublishingcompany “There is no assertion that such
complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed purposely to forestall the certification election. So, no reason
existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its established practice of suspending the election proceeding. And
this seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the reason being, in the words of Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ‘if there is a union dominated by the company, to which some of the workers belong, an election
among workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said
workers and employees because the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.’ (Manila
Paper Mills Employees vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10

“And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is a prejudicial
question that until decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification election. (Standard Cigarette
Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126) “Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in
Case No. 255ULP, the Workers Union should be ordered dissolved as a company dominated union, any election
held in the meantime would be a waste of energy and money to all parties concerned.”[12]
chanroblespublishingcompany The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further
amplified as follows: “What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the
participation in a certification election of a companydominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair
labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a
proceeding before such voting could take place. In the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: ‘As correctly
pointed out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a
complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification
election when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or
are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection
of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees’ bargaining representative, and when the court
finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be
decertified and the whole election proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The next
year, the same jurist had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers
Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus: `We agree with the CIR on the reasons given
in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a certification election,
the reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the workers belong, an
election among the workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the
said workers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the
company dominated union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be free. It is equally true,
however, that the opposition to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company domination can
only be filed and maintained by the labor organization which made the charge of company domination, because it
is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification election, the reason being that its members
might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members controlled and dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15).
It is easily understandable why it should be thus. There would be an impairment of the integrity of the collective
bargaining process if a company-dominated union were allowed to participate in a certification election. The timid,

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 68

the timorous, and the fainthearted in the ranks of labor could easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the
choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the exclusive representative of labor at the
conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead a
unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization that
aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before the certification election.”[13]
With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial question, the
necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.

Party and Issue

Case
61. Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981] - GONZALES

It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this petition was filed on the question of whether or not a pending
certification election proceeding may be dismissed or held in abeyance, there being such a motion on the part of the
employer Juan S. Barrera, doing business under the firm and trade name of Machinery and Steel Products Engineering
MASPE alleging an unfair labor practice against one of the contending parties, private respondent MASPE Workers
Union, the other being private respondent Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it due
course. The unfair labor practice imputed to such labor union consisted of failure to bargain collectively, aggravated
by an illegal strike. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied such a motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds
therein alleged "appear not to be indubitable A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, this petition was filed.

Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the case of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Goodrich (Marikina Factory)
Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU. 1 such a question was given an answer by this Court, one adverse
to the claim of petitioner. This petition, therefore, must be dismissed.

The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive and scholarly brief of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo
To quote from its pertinent portion: "On September 22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera filed a motion to dismiss or hold
case in abeyance, in CIR Case No. 2759-MC. In said motion, we called attention to the admission of MASPE Workers
Union as intervenor in the case. We stated that the intervenor union, its officers and members had committed various
acts of unfair labor practice and were on illegal strike punctuated by force, violence and intimidation. We called
attention to our formal charge of unfair labor practice against the intervenor union. We called attention to the fact
that in the charge of unfair labor practice among the reliefs prayed for were to declare respondents therein collectively
and individually guilty of unfair labor practice; to declare the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in
pursuance of said unfair labor practice illegal to declare the MASPE Workers Union as consequently having lost all
rights and privileges accorded by law to a legitimate labor union; and to declare all individual respondents therein
and others as having lost their employment status by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by them. We then
pointed out that unless the case for unfair labor practice against MASPE Workers Union, its officers and members is
decided the status of that union and its members who are respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the
requested certification election and the outcome thereof). * * * Unfortunately, the respondent Honorable Court of
Industrial Relations denied our motion to dismiss or hold case in abeyance. * * * ." 2 It remains only to be added that
subsequently the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied a motion for reconsideration, failing "to find sufficient
justification to alter or to modify the aforesaid Order." 3

To repeat, the petition cannot prosper.

1. As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. decision: "There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to
whether or not a certification election may be stayed at the instance of the employer, pending the determination of
an unfair labor practice case filed by it against certain employees affiliated with respondent-unions. That is a matter
of which this Court has not had an opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled law, dating from the case of
Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 69

organization objecting to the participation in a certification election of a company dominated union, as a result of
which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must
be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place." 4

2. This is the more relevant excerpt: "The unique situation before us, however, is exactly the reverse. It is management
that would have an unfair labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in by some of its employees
concluded, before it would agree to the holding of a certification election. That is the stand of petitioner. It does not
carry conviction. The reason that justifies the postponement of a certification election pending an inquiry, as to the
bona fides of a labor union, precisely calls for a different conclusion. If under the circumstances disclosed,
management is allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organization
bent on a more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. The difficulties and obstacles that must be then hurdled would
not be lost on the rest of the personnel who had not as yet made up their minds one way or the other. This is not to
say that management is to be precluded from filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit
should not be allowed to lend itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will
of the labor group as to the organization that will represent it. It is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not likely
to enhance the prospect of respondent-unions, but also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that
management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring the full force of its undeniable power against those of its
employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid reason then for the postponement sought. This is one
instance that calls for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. Moreover, is there not in the
posture taken by petitioner a contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial Peace Act, which speaks of
the labor organizations 'designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative of all the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.' The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them.
As much as possible then, there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification
election, even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are employees
could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case." 5

3. Even on the assumption that the vigorous condenmation of the strike and the picketing were attended by
violence, it does not automatically follow that thereby the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in
the certification election for having automatically lost their jobs. So it was made clear in another B.F. Goodrich
decision: 6 What was set forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during
the picketing, certainly not peaceful, that the imputed acts of violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that
there were injuries on both sides because management did not, understandably, play a passive role confronted as it
was with the unruly disruptive tactics of labor. This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such character,
irrespective of the parties responsible. It is merely to explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in
question call for an automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be
oblivious of a 1971 decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. There it
was clearly held: 'A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken,
however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is
tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case
should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force
while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It
could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means
employed.' It must be pointed out likewise that the facts as there found would seem to indicate a greater degree of
violence. Thus: 'Respondent Court must have been unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell
Company to the effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June
14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact
Opposition
Case
62. Protection Technology v. Sec. of DOLE, 242 SCRA 99 [1995] - RAGILES
FACTS:

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 70

O n 12 January 1994, respondent Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Protection Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor
Organizations ("Union"), a newly organized union affiliated with a federation, filed a Petition for direct certification
or for certification election to determine the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the regular rank and
file employees of petitioner Protection Technology Inc. ("Company") with the National Capital Region Med
Arbitration Branch In its Comment on the petition, petitioner Company stated that the Union was not a legitimate
labor organization capable of filing the petition because it failed to submit its books of account with the Bureau of
Labor Relations at the time it was registered as a legitimate labor organization. Pursuant to the Court's ruling in ruling
Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, submission of such documentation is a "mandatory" requirement
before a union can exercise the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization.
On 14 March 1994, Med Arbiter Brigida C. Fadrigon dismissed the Union's petition and held that the submission of
the books of account, consisting of journals, ledgers and other accounting books, was one of several "preventive
measures against commission of fraud" arising from "improper or incorrect recording of union funds, inefficient
administration and even malversation of union funds." The Union appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that
the Labor Code and Progressive Development "never mentioned journals and ledgers" as part of the documentation
requirements for registration of a newly-organized local union. On 6 July 1994, respondent DOLE Undersecretary,
Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the Order of the Med Arbiter, holding that the requirement to submit books of
account applies only to labor organizations already existing for at least a year.
Undersecretary Laguesma ordered the holding of a certification election with the following as choices: (1) the Union;
and (2) no union. He also took note of the Union's submission of one sheet of paper captioned a "Statement of
Income and Expenses for the month ended September 28, 1993." This "Statement" contained one entry: "Cash on
hand P590.00;" the sheet was certified correct by the Union secretary, attested by the Union president and duly
subscribed. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the company filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for a temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking annulment of the Resolution and Order of the respondent DOLE
Undersecretary for grave abuse of discretion. On 9 November 1994, the Court issued a TRO upon the company s
posting of a sufficient cash bond. Notwithstanding this, the certification election was still conducted on 10 November
1994 in the presence and under the supervision of DOLE representation officers. Of the fifty-eight (58) votes validly
cast, the Union obtained fifty-three (53) votes. On 17 November 1994, the Union prayed that the petition should be
considered moot and academic since the results of the certification election showed that a majority the employees
had chosen it to be their collective bargaining representative. On the other hand, the Company moved that public
respondents be "admonished" for hastily conducting the certification election, "just to accommodate" the Union.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-submission of books of account certified by and attested to by the
appropriate officer is a ground for an employer to legitimately oppose a petition for certification
election.

HELD: YES
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, DOLE, the Court said: A local or chapter therefore becomes a
legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A chapter certificate within 30 days
from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the
set of officers and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the
case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. Absent compliance with these mandatory
requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.
Thus, non-submission of such books of account certified by and attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground for
an employer to legitimately oppose a petition for certification election filed by the local or chapter of a national
union. Although the federation to which the Union is affiliated submitted documents showing that the union had
offered books of account to support its application for registration as a legitimate labor organization, what was
submitted to the BLR by the Union was a mere "financial statement" Books of account are different from financial
statements. The former consist of journals, ledgers and other accounting books (which are registered with the BIR)
containing a record of individual transactions wherein monies are received and disbursed by an establishment or
entity; entries are made on such books on a day-to-day basis.
On the other hand, Statements of accounts or financial reports merely summarize such individual transactions set
out in the books of account and are usually prepared at the end of an accounting period, commonly corresponding

RAGILES | BAUTISTA | BUAQUEN | GONZALES 71

to the fiscal year of the establishment or entity concerned. Statements of account and financial reports do not set
out or repeat the basic data (i.e., the individual transactions) on which they are based and are, therefore, much less
informative sources of cash flow information. Books of account are kept and handled by bookkeepers (employees)
of the company or agency; financial statements may be audited statements, i.e., prepared by external independent
auditors (certified public accountants). Regardless of the fact that the Union, having been organized for less than a
year, would have had no real opportunity to levy and collect dues and fees from its members which need to be
recorded in the books of account. Such accounting books must still be submitted to the BLR, even if they contain no
detailed or extensive entries yet. The purpose is that the applicant local or chapter must demonstrate to the BLR that
it is entitled to registered status because it has a system for accounting for members' contributions to its fund even
before it actually receives dues or fees from its members. The intent is to minimize the risk of fraud in the course of
the subsequent formation and growth of the Union fund.

Effect, Pending Petition, Cancellation Trade Union Registration

Case
63. Assn. of CA Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja, 203 SCRA 596 [1991] – BAUTISTA 17

Facts: On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of Appeals (UCECA), a
registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations
alleging that the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is the incumbent bargaining
representative, no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA alleged
that there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989. On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its
Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred three (303)
employees was a product of fraud.

On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the UCECA in BLR
Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate
No. 159 and in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for deferment of the
resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-90. On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion
to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being dilatory.

On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ruled that BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the
holding of a certification election. It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that
UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of the seven hundred sixty two (762)
rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's motion for reconsideration was denied. On August 21, 1990, the
respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election conference. Hence, ACAE filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with SC.

Issue:
1. Whether a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification election is a bar to
the resolution of a prior petition for certification election.

2. Whether the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent to represent the rank-and-file
employees of the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:
1. No. The Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a
certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of
the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the
legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing a cancellation.

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2. No. Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives
must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary.

SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service
Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed
with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended.
Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor
Relations within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be
jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in
determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions.
At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct
of certification elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner.

The public respondent has found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance there being compliance with
the twenty (20%) percent support signatures. The factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations on this matter
appear to be supported by substantial evidence and we, accordingly, accord them great weight and respect. They
shall not be disturbed by the Court in the absence of proof of reversible error. (See Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 426 [1988]; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749
[1989]) On the basis of its findings, it was only proper for the public respondent to order the holding of a
certification election which is mandatorily required by Section 12, Executive Order No.180:

Section 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the
appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order
the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive
representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit."

WHEREFORE, the petitioner having failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the public respondent are AFFIRMED.

64. Progressive Dev’t. Corp. v. Laguesma, 271 SCRA 593 [1998] – BUAQUEN
Facts:

Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union) filed a petition for certification election
with the Department of Labor (National Capital Region) in behalf of the rank and file employees of the Progressive
Development Corporation (Pizza Hut).

Petitioner filed a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the
respondent Union's registration making it void and invalid. The motion specifically alleged that: a) respondent
Union's registration was tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in
the ratification of the respondent Union's constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers that there were
two sets of supposed attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on June
26, 1993; that the alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported by 318 members when in fact the persons
who actually signed their names were much less; and b) while the application for registration of the charter was
supposed to have been approved in the organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter certification
issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June 26, 1993 or one (1) day prior to the formation of the chapter,

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thus, there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the charter certification and the organization
meeting of the alleged chapter.

Despite of the petition questioning the registration NLM the Med-Arbiter directed the holding of a certification
election among petitioner's rank and file employees. The Order explained:

x x x Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate labor organization in contemplation of law and shall
remain as such until its very charter certificate is canceled.The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement
in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are collateral issues which could be properly ventilated in
the cancellation proceedings.

Defense of Union:As to the contention that the certification election proceedings should be suspended in view of
the pending case for the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of registration, let it be stressed that the
pendency of a cancellation case is not a ground for the dismissal or suspension of a representation proceedings
considering that a registered labor organization continues to be a legitimate one entitled to all the rights
appurtenant thereto until a final valid order is issued canceling such registration.

Issue:Whether or not CE shall be suspended upon the pendency of a petition questioning the validity of registration
of a union.

Held:If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those appearing
on the face of the application and the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as
a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor
organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance
with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for
certification election. These measures are necessary - and may be undertaken simultaneously - if the spirit behind
the Labor Code's requirements for registration are to be given flesh and blood. Registration requirements
specifically afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous
or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate
ends. Such requirements are a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest and should be
protected. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor
organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances,
the labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the right to ask for
certification election in a bargaining unit.

As we laid emphasis in Progressive Development Corporation Labor,[18] "[t]he employer needs the assurance that
the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or
misrepresentations to the Bureau." Clearly, fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a
legitimate labor organization are contrary to the Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral issues. The
invalidity of respondent Union's registration would negate its legal personality to participate in certification
election.

Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess all of the rights
and privileges granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately affect areas which are

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constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions are engaged directly
affect the public interest and should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's requirements
for the acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in order.

Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been seriously challenged, it would have been more
prudent for the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to have granted petitioner's request for the suspension of
proceedings in the certification election case, until the issue of the legality of the Union's registration shall have
been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of
discretion.

65. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997] - GOZALES

FACTS

Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic
Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election,
alleging that there were more or less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to
represent. SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration. As a result, MNMPPs
petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed. MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on
March 5, 1991, reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election among
the rank and file employees of the PPC. The PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but its motion was
denied. Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary of Labor held a pre-election conference on May 6,
1991, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file employees based on the company
payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit the list, it was
given a stern warning by the Department of Labor (DOLE) that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June
3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible
voters. [2] But the PPC again failed to appear at the conference, prompting the Department of Labor Industrial
Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a final warning.

On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election alleging the same grounds alleged
by it in its Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992. On October 15, 1992, MNMPP opposed the petition raising the
following arguments: (1) that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the holding of a
certification election under Rule V, 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code; (2) that the results of the
election showed that intervenor was resoundingly repudiated by the employees; (3) that it failed to specify the
alleged discrepancies in the list of employees furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not raised during the election
are deemed waived pursuant to Rule VI, 3 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

ISSUE

The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and void on the ground that only 62 out of 130 employees
participated in the activity.

HELD

The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid. Art. 256 of the Labor Code provides that in order to have
a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election
results show that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in the list of employees
obtained from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was met.
The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as basis
for determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the

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Implementing Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3) months preceding
the filing of the petition for certification election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be short of the
majority because, instead of only 98 employees as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs
petition for certification election.
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy
that should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union
represents the majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of
certification election is the most democratic method of determining the employees choice of their bargaining
representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to
rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

Decertification
Case
66. S.S. Ventures Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, 559 SCRA 435 [2008] – RAGILES
FACTS:
SS Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the SS Ventures Labor Union's certificate of registration invokingthe grounds
set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code alleging the following:(1) The Union included the names and forged the
signatures of more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its list of members who
attended the organizational meeting and in theadoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws(2) The Union
twice entered the signatures of three persons;(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place;
and(4) The Union's application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of
Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197- employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the 500 signatures were forged
or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum
(2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.
The Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of registration of the Union should be cancelled.

HELD: YES.
The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII,Section 3 of the Constitution and such
right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once
registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimatelabor organization endowed with the right and privileges
granted by law to such organization. While acertificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with
the concomitant right to participate in or askfor certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be
canceled or the union may bedecertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art.239(a)of the Labor Code,
such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the union's constitution and
like documents. The Court, has in previous cases, said that todecertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union
includes ineligible employees in its membership.It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false
statement, or fraud in connection with theapplication for registration and the supporting documents, such as the
adoption or ratification of theconstitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of
the constitution or by-laws, among other documents.

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Respondent Undersecretary thus acted arbitrarily in disregarding the plain terms of the Omnibus Implementing Rules
(Section 3(e), Rule III Book V) as well as the rule laid down in the Progressive Development. The statutory and
regulatory provisions outlining the requirements of registration of legitimate labor organizations are an exercise of
the police power of the State, designed for the protection of workers against potential abuse by unions and
federations of unions. The purpose is defeated if the registration requirements are relaxed arbitrarily and registered
status extended to an organization not entitled to such status. However, the Court will not set aside the certification
election, which was held in the presence of representatives of the DOLE and presumably reflected the free and
democratic will of the workers of petitioner Company, in the absence of compelling reasons to do so. Nevertheless,
respondent Union must comply with all the requirements of registration as a legitimate labor organization before it
may enjoy the fruits of the certification election and before it may exercise the rights of a legitimate labor
organization. Registration is a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by a labor organization
and the exercise of the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations. Respondent Union must
submit its books of account certified under oath by its treasurer and attested to by its president before it may demand
recognition by the Company as exclusive bargaining agent of the members of the bargaining unit and before it may
exercise any of the rights pertaining to such an agent. Petition is dismissed for being moot and academic but
respondent union is enjoined from exercising the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization until it
submits the required books of account

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