Employment related laws - Assignment

SUBMITTED BY

Rounaq Dhar E 43

MASTERS OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 2017-19

SUBMITTED TO

Prof. V Awati

SUBMITTED ON

26th July 2018

CASE 1- INTERNAL INJURY
BRIEF FACTS ABOUT THE CASE
The Branch Manager, United India vs Srinivasa S/O Late Velayudhan
In this appeal for consideration is whether the death of one Velayudhan following heart attack
can be attributed to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The
appellant-Insurance Company is aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner for workmen's
Compensation, Madikeri, in holding that the deceased died during the course of
employment.Mr. P K filed a plea with High Court at Calcutta that he was not permitted to be
retained.

1. The learned Counsel for the appellant Shri A.N. Krsihnaswamy submitted that it is an
admitted fact that the deceased though was a driver by occupation, vent home as he had a
pain in the heart and there afterwards, he was taken to the hospital where he died out of
heart attack. Both sides had not disputed this aspect of the matter, but the question is
whether the death which occurred in the hospital could be linked to the employment of
the deceased under 5th respondent.

2. The learned Counsel for the appellant/insurance company referring to the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De
Costa and Anr., submitted that by no stretch of imagination can it be inferred from the
facts and circumstances of this case that the death of velayudhan come within the ambit
expression of arising out of and in the course of employment. The Commissioner,
Workmen's Compensation (1st Court), West Bengal held on 24.6.2010 that the
Applicant/Respondent had met with an accident on 27.12.1999 while in the employment
of the M/s Dredging Corporation of India and that considering his age, wages and injury
he was entitled to compensation computed at Rs.12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lac) which
is the maximum awardable, together with simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per
annum till the date of realization.

3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents-claimants submitted that the
deceased was driving the Lorry belonging to the 5th respondent and while the Lorry was
going from Kudlur on the way the deceased had a pain in the heart and thereafter, the
deceased went to his home and then he was brought to the hospital where he died and
therefore, in the instant case the death will have to be construed as one having taken place
during the course of employment and arising out of employment.It held that the
Respondent, at the concerned time, was on duty on Board on one of M/s Dredging
Corporation of India vessels and that this would mean that he was on duty, any affliction
or injury during such time would come within the ambit of Section 3 of the Employee's
Compensation Act, 1923

CONTENTION OF THE COMPLAINT

The learned Counsel for the appellant Shri A.N. Krsihnaswamy submitted that it is an
admitted fact that the deceased though was a driver by occupation, vent home as he had a
pain in the heart and there afterwards, he was taken to the hospital where he died out of heart

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attack. Both sides had not disputed this aspect of the matter, but the question is whether the
death which occurred in the hospital could be linked to the employment of the deceased
under 5th respondent..

The Employee’s Compensation Act is intended for the benefit of an employee, and
quintessentially is a no-fault liability. It appears to us that both the Courts below had
misdirected themselves in law in that because the illness of the employee was discovered
while he was in actual service it has led them to the conclusion that compensation is payable
under Section 3 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923.

Workmen compensation Act - whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as
a consequence of any stress or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company. -
remanded The Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation West Bengal held on 24.6.2010
that the Applicant/Respondent had met with an accident on 27.12.1999 while in the
employment of the Appellant and that considering his age, wages and injury he was entitled
to compensation computed at Rs.12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lac) which is the maximum
awardable, together with simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum till the date
of realization.

So far as the arguments of the Company are concerned, especially in the Appeals filed
assailing the decision of the Commissioner, the emphasis has been that the ischemic heart
condition of the employee discovered while he was actually serving with the Appellant, was
not related to his service.

The learned Commissioner had satisfied himself fully on this aspect of the case rather than
come to a conclusion that an accident had occurred, for which the evidence is extremely
scanty.

Faced with this predicament, learned counsel appearing for the employee has endeavoured to
establish that an ischemic heart condition can result from job stress which was continuously
encountered by the employee.

For these reasons, it appeared, learned Counsel for the respondents-claimants submitted that
the deceased was driving the Lorry belonging to the 5th respondent and while the Lorry was
going from Kudlur on the way the deceased had a pain in the heart and thereafter, the
deceased went to his home and then he was brought to the hospital where he died and
therefore, in the instant case the death will have to be construed as one having taken place
during the course of employment and arising out of employment.

They also leaned on to the fact that a specific issue be struck as to whether the employee’s
ischemic heart condition developed as a consequence of any stress or strain of his
employment with the Appellant-company. There can be no opposing that the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a beneficial legislation requiring some play at the
joints so far as considering a disabled employee’s claim is concerned. In these circumstances,
parties shall appear before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation West Bengal or its
successor Court, as the case may be, on 11.11.2013.

DEFENCES OF THE EMPLOYER

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 In the case or Regional Director, KSI corporation and Anr. v. Francis DA Costa and Anr.
, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No. 11 thus: Construing
the meaning of the phrase "in the course of his employment", it was noted by Lord
Damning that the meaning of the phrase had gradually been widened over the last 30
years to include doing something which was reasonably incidental to the employee's
employment. The test of "reasonably incidental"' was applied in a large number of
English decisions. But Lord Denning pointed out that in all those cases the workman was
at the premises where he or she worked and was injured whila on a visit to the canteen or
other place for a break.

Take a case where a man is going to or from his place of work on his own bicycle, or in
his own car. He might be said to be doing something ''reasonably incidental" to his
employment. But if he has an accident on the way, it is well settled that it does not "arise
out of and in the course of his employment". Even if his employer provides the transport,
so that he is going to work as a passenger in his employer's vehicle (which is surely
"reasonably incidental" to his employment), nevertheless if he is injured in an accident, it
does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. It needed a special "deeming"
provision in a statute to make it "deemed" to arise out of and in the course of his
employment.

 Company was liable to pay compensation only if the company was guilty of negligence.
Even in case of proved negligence, as per the employee’s Compensation Act, the
employer tried to get rid of his liability by using any of the following defences:

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Workmen‘s Compensation Act, 1923 is one of the earliest labour welfare and social
security legislation enacted in India. It recognizes the fact that if a workman is a victim of
accident or an occupational disease in course of his employment, he needs to be
compensated. The same was not in this case as it was not readily decided that whether the
compensation comes under the ambit of Workmen’s’ compensation Act or not and hence
justice was delayed.

2. The Act does not apply to those workers who are insured under the Employees State
Insurance Act, 1948. Section 53 of the Employees State Insurance Act provides that an
insured person or his dependents shall not be entitled to receive or recover whether from
the employer of the insured person or from any other person any compensation or
damages under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act, 1923 or any other law for the time
being in force or otherwise in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured
person as an employee under this Act.

3. The court could not decide whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as
a consequence of any stress or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company.
This led to delay in the verdict of the case. A proper brief should have been done on
behalf the employer of the working conditions so provided to its employees. This was not
taken into consideration where workers from the company protested against the
conditions prevalent in the company.

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4. The Council ought to have satisfied himself fully on this aspect of the case rather than
come to a conclusion that an accident had occurred, for which the evidence is extremely
scanty. Faced with this predicament, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing for
the employee should have attempted to establish that an ischemic heart condition can
result from job stress which was continuously encountered by the employee.

5. The court should have been mindful of the fact that the Commissioner, being the Court of
first instance, has held that the employee met with an accident on 27.12.1999, and that he
suffered 100% loss of earning capacity as he was permanently unfit for sea-service. It
ought to have distinguished between the discovery of the health condition while in service
and the health condition having occurred during service.

6. So far as the arguments of the Company are concerned, especially in the Appeals filed
assailing the decision of the Commissioner, the emphasis has been that the ischemic heart
condition of the employee discovered while he was actually serving with the Appellant,
was not related to his service.

7. The Appellant approached the High Court of Calcutta but without success as the Division
Bench has dismissed the Appeal. It held that the Respondent, at the concerned time, was
on duty on Board on one of the Appellant’s vessels and that “this would mean that he was
on duty, any affliction or injury during such time would come within the ambit of Section
3 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (the erstwhile Workmen’s Compensation
Act, 1923, till its amendment by Act 45 of 2009).”

CONCLUSION

I am unable to support the view expressed by the learned Counsel for the claimants
respondents. The facts of this case which are not in dispute does not give impression that
death of valayudhan took place while he was on duty and that it had happened in the course
of his employment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law in this regard in
number of cases and the said question also came up for consideration in the decision cited by
the learned Counsel for the appellant.

In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Jyothi Ademma v. Plant
Engineer, Nellore and Anr. it has been held at paragraph-6 thug:

Under Section 3(1) it has to be established that there was some causal connection between the
death of the workman and his employment. If the workman dies as natural result, of the
disease which he was suffering or while suffering from a particular disease he dies of that
disease as a result of wear and tear, of the employment no liability would be fixed upon the
employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death, or if the
death was due not only to the decease but also the disease coupled with the employment, then
it can be said that the death arose out or the employment and the employer would be liable.

In the light of the above-cited provision of law, the instant case is not one coming within the
ambit of Section 3 of the Act and neither can it be said that death of Velayudan arose out of
and in the course of his employment. Therefore, no liability can be fastened on the insurance
company.

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One other submission made by the appellant's Counsel is that the policy in question was a
policy taken under the M.V. Act and it is an exclusive policy under the said act and therefore,
even on this ground also, no liability can be put on the appellant/company.

Having held that the death of a deceased did not take place in the course of his employment
as there toeing no nexus between the employment and the death which took place following
heart attack, the impugned order fastening the liability on the Insurance company will have to
be set-aside.

His argument is that this health malady has not arisen as a consequence of the Respondent’s
services with the Appellant, and hence no compensation was payable under Section 3 of the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 which comes into operation only in the event of an
employee suffering personal injury caused by an accident arising out of his employment.

Whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as a consequence of any stress
or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company. There can be no gainsaying that the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a beneficial legislation requiring some play at the
joints so far as considering a disabled employee’s claim is concerned.

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CASE 2- EXTERNAL INJURY
BRIEF FACTS ABOUT THE CASE

Pratap Narain Singh Deo V/S Srinivas Sabata

 This appeal by special leave is by Pratap Narain Singh Deo who is the proprietor of
two cinema halls in Jeypore, district Koraput, Orissa. It is not in dispute that Srinivas
Sabata, Respondent 1, (hereinafter referred to as “the respondent”) was working as a
carpenter for doing some ornamental work in a cinema hall of the appellant on July 6,
1968 when he fell down, and suffered injuries resulting in the amputation of his left
arm from the elbow.
 He served a notice on the appellant dated August 11, 1968 demanding payment of
compensation as his regular employee. The appellant sent a reply dated August 21,
1968 stating that the respondent was a casual contractor, and that the accident had
taken place solely because of his own negligence. The respondent then made a
personal approach for obtaining the compensation, but to no avail. He therefore made
an application to the Commissioner for Workman's Compensation, Respondent 2,
stating that he was a regular employee of the appellant, his wages were Rs 120 per
mensem, he had suffered the injury in the course of his employment and was entitled
to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred
to as “the Act”).
 Notice of the application was served on the appellant on October 10, 1968 calling
upon him to show cause why penalty to the extent of 50 per cent and interest at 6 per
cent per annum should not be imposed on him under Section 4-A of the Act on the
amount of compensation payable by him because of the default in making the
payment of the compensation.
CONTENTION OF THE COMPLAINT
The Commissioner held in his order dated May 6, 1969 that the injury had resulted in
the amputation of the left arm of the respondent above the elbow. He held further that the
respondent was a carpenter by profession and “by loss of his left hand above the elbow he has
evidently been rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work of carpentry cannot be
done by one hand only”. n that basis, he calculated the amount of compensation at Rs 9800
and ordered the payment of penalty to the extent of 50 per cent, together with interest at 6 per
cent per annum, making a total of Rs 15092.
The appellant felt aggrieved and filed a writ petition in the High Court of Orissa, but it was
dismissed summarily on October 10, 1969. He has therefore come up in appeal to this Court
by special leave.
It has not been disputed before us that the injury in question was caused to the respondent by
an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the appellant. It is
also not in dispute that the injury resulted in amputation of his left arm at the elbow. It has
however been argued that the injury did not result in permanent total disablement of the
respondent, and that the Commissioner committed a gross error of law in taking that view as
there was only partial disablement within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Act which
should have been deemed to have resulted in permanent partial disablement of the nature
referred to in Item 3 of Part II of Schedule I of the Act.
The expression “total disablement” has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act as follows:
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“(1) ‘total disablement’ means such disablement whether of a temporary or permanent nature,
as incapacitates workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the
accident resulting in such disablement.”

DEFENCES OF THE EMPLOYER

It has not been dispute that the injury was of such a nature as to cause permanent disablement
to the respondent, and the question for consideration is whether the disablement incapacitated
the respondent for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident.
The Commissioner has examined the question and recorded his finding as follows:
“The injured workman in this case is carpenter by profession .... By loss of the left hand
above the elbow, he has evidently been rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work
of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only.”
This is obviously a reasonable and correct finding. Counsel for the appellant has not been
able to assail it on any ground and it does not require to be corrected in this appeal. There is
also no justification for the other argument which has been advanced with reference to Item 3
of Part II of Schedule 1, because it was not the appellant's case before the Commissioner
that amputation of the arm was from 8” from tip of acromion to less than 4 below the tip of
olecranon. A new case cannot therefore be allowed to be set up on facts which have not been
admitted or established.
It has next been argued that the Commissioner committed a serious error of law in imposing a
penalty on the appellant under Section 4½″A(3) of the Act as the compensation had not fallen
due until it was “settled” by the Commissioner under Section 19 by his impugned order dated
May 6, 1969. There is however no force in this argument.

RECOMMENDATION

The WCA dictates that if that if the employer and injured employee cannot come to an
agreement on compensation, the dispute will be settled in a court of law. Any such court case
will likely involve testimony from the employee’s family, co-workers and workplace
supervisors. These cases are costly and time-consuming for both the employer and the injured
employee. Moreover, such disputes can have a serious impact on morale within small
businesses.

To avoid such burdens, employers should regularly audit human resource materials and
policies to ensure that their business is compliance with relevant health and safety laws.
Small offices that do not maintain India-based human resource personnel, or use documents
drafted for other international offices, should consider consulting local experts to audit their
human resource materials and policies. This, combined with employee training, can help
ensure that businesses are able to manage workplace injuries effectively.

CONCLUSION
Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. sub-section (1) of
that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if “personal injury

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is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment”. It
was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under sub-
section (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in
respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore
became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to
the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the
employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after
the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969 under Section 19.
It was the duty of the appellant, under Section 4-A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at
the rate provided by Section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the respondent.
He failed to do so. What is worse, he did not even make a provisional payment under sub-
section (2) of Section 4 for, as has been stated, he went to the extent of taking the false pleas
that the respondent was a casual contractor and that the accident occurred solely because of
his negligence. Then there is the further fact that he paid no heed to the respondent's personal
approach for obtaining the compensation. It will be recalled that the respondent was driven to
the necessity of making an application to the Commissioner for settling the claim, and even
there the appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and
prevailed on the respondent to file a memorandum of agreement settling the claim for a sum
which was so grossly inadequate that it was rejected by the Commissioner. In these facts and
circumstances, we have no doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an
order for the payment of interest and the penalty.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.

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CASE 3- NOTIONAL EXTENSION OF EMPLOYMENT

BRIEF FACTS ABOUT THE CASE

RANI BALA SETH V. EAST INDIAN RLY

1. This is an appeal preferred by a widow whose claim to compensation for the death of her
husband was dismissed by the Comr. for Workmen's Compensation.
2. The workman was one B.K. Seth by name & at the time of his death he was employed as
an engine driver in the East India Rly. On 2nd March 1947, he finished his duty at Chitpore
Locomotive Shed at 5.45 A.M. At about 6.15 A.M. he was knocked down by a train at
Ultadanga Rly. Station & killed. His widow Ranibala Seth claimed compensation & alleged
that the average wages of the workman was between Rs. 100/- & Rs. 200/- per month.
3. The learned Comr. came to the conclusion that the accident did not arise out of & in
the course of the employment of the workman. He was actually killed on a rly. platform & in
the view of the learned Comr. that was a public place to which the public had access. The
risks of that place were not risks of the employment, but were risks to which the general
public were exposed & therefore he was of the opinion that death was not due
to accidentarising out of & in the course of his employment.
4. Mr. Sanyal on behalf of the applt has contended that the workman was admittedly killed on
the employers' premises as he was leaving his employment after finishing the day's work. It is
contended that as long as he was on the employers' premises he was in the course of his
employment & as the accident happened when he was on the rly. platform, which was part of
the employers' premises he had not left the sphere of his employment & the accident arose
out of & in the course of his employment.
5. The learned Comr. has found that Seth had been allotted a quarter in the rly. colony, but it
seems that owing to communal disturbances he had moved his family to Ranaghat for greater
safety. Whether on the day in question Seth after finishing his work was going back to his
quarters or going to Ranaghat is difficult to say. He was undoubtedly on that morning leaving
the sphere of his employment & the only question which we have to decide is whether or not
he had reached a point outside the sphere of employment or whether he was still within the
sphere or ambit of his employment when he was knocked dawn & killed.
6. The learned Comr. has found that there were four ways of reaching the public roadfrom
this locomotive shed. Two of the ways the Comr. has found were impracticable in March
1947 because of communal trouble. The ways led through a Moslem area & the learned
Comr. agrees that it would be wholly unsafe for any Hindu to traverse those routes
particularly at dawn or thereabouts. The other two routes were: one right across the rly. track
& the other a route which led eventually to the rly. station & then to the public road.
CONTENTION OF THE COMPLAINT
Obviously no rly. would tolerate their workmen taking a route across a number of rly. tracks
as such would be far too dangerous. The learned Comr. does not really suggest that this is a
route which the workman could have rightly taken. The workman took the route which
eventually led through the rly. station & the finding of the learned Comr. is as follows :
''Seth (the workman) was following a route usually taken by the workmen, a route which was
practically connived at by the employers. While passing along this route he did not share any

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danger in common with the public. His employment took him there. Seth in my opinion was
in course of his employment till he reached the platform or the public road."
It is clear from this finding that Seth was using the only practicable way of leaving the
locomotive shed & the learned Comr. was of opinion that had the accident happened before
he reached the rly. platform, it would undoubtedly have been an accident arising out of & in
the course of his employment.
The accident in fact happened in the platform area. The learned Comr. deals with the facts in
these words :
"Motilal O. P. W. 2 says that Seth was knocked down at a place to the south of the northern
stairs emerging out of the platform to the public road. Now this is the platform area in which
the public had the right of access & in fact had access & the risk at that spot was shared by
Seth in common with the members of the public."
From this finding, it seems clear that the accident occurred on rly. premises because it is
difficult to understand how he could have been knocked down if he had reached the
public road in safety. In fact the learned Comr. expressly finds that it happened in what he
describes as the platform area. From this finding it seems quite clear that Seth had not left the
premises of the East India Rly. when the accident actually occurred.
The learned Comr. however appears to have thought that though Seth was still on the
premises of the East India Rly. he was in what was virtually a public place & that the risks of
the place were risks to which all members of the public using the platform were exposed to.
The risks which Seth was exposed to were no greater on the platform than the risks to which
the general public were exposed. The learned Comr. refers to an observation of Lord
Macmillan who delivered the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of McCullum v.
Northumbrain Shipping Co. Ltd., (1932) 147 L. T. 361 : (101 L. J. K. B. 664). Lord
Macmillan observed:
"This at least, however, can be said, that the accident In order to give rise to a claim
for compensation must have some relation to the workman's employment & must be due to a
risk incidental to that employment as distd. from a risk to which all members of the public are
alike exposed."
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is true that Lord Macmillan made the observation but that observation must be read in the
light of the facts of McCullum's case (1932-147 L. T. 361: 101 L. J. K. B. 664). In McCullum
v. Northumbrian Shipping Company Ltd. (1932. 147 L. T. 361 (101 L. T. K. B. 664) the
deceased workman signed articles for a voyage in a foreign-going ship then berthed in his
home port. Under the articles he agreed to serve as boatswain, & there was an added term that
he should act as watchman while the ship was in port with extra wages. He went home each
day, & on Saturday evening, 4-10-1930 he was returning to the ship for his duty as
watchman, & at the side of the-docks stopped for a short time at an inn, the last place in
which he was seen alive. The night was very wet and half a gale was blowing. Three days
afterwards his body was found in the water about a thousand yards from the ship, the spot
being one which was on his way from the inn to the ship. There was no question of suicide or
violence. On a claim for compensation under the Work-men's Compensation Act, 1925, by
those dependent on his earnings, the county Ct. Judge found that it was the practice for
seamen who signed on at a home port to sleep at home & to go to & from the ship while it
was being got ready for sea, that practice being recognised by ship-owners. He, therefore,

Page 10
decided that the deceased workman must be treated as if he had been an ordinary workman
going to his day's work when he went to the dock premises & therefore his position was not
that of a seaman who had gone ashore for his own purposes. The case consequently must be
treated as falling within the principle which prevailed in John Stewart and Son Ltd. v.
Longhurst, (1917) A. C. 249: (86 L. J. K. B. 729) rather than within that in Davidson and Co.
v. M' Robbor Officer, (1918) A. C. 304: (87 L. J. P. C. 58). And applying the principles laid
down with regard to unexplained accidents he held that the accidents arose out of & in
the course of the employment. The House of Lords held that the seaman, who, on his way
back to his ship, had left the public highway, with its risks common to all wayfarers, & had
entered the private premises of the harbour in which his ship lay, with its special risks to
which only those who had business at the harbour were exposed, came within the protection
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, for if he sustained an accidentwhile using that
access he sustained it by reason of risks incidental to his employment which he would not
have encountered but for his employment.
In earlier cases the House of Lords had taken the view that a seaman returning to his ship
could not be said to have entered the sphere of his employment until he had, for example,
reached the gangway of his ship. In the case of Kitchenham v. Owners of S.S. Johannesburg,
(1911) A. C. 417: (80 L. J. K. B. 1102). The House of Lords held that where a sailor having
been on shore with leave fell into the water & was drowned whilst returning to the ship, a
claim for compensation failed as there was no evidence that the seaman had or had not
reached the gangway when he fell. There can be no doubt that McCullum's case (1932-147 L.
T. 361: 101 L. J. K. B. 664) differs very greatly from Kitchenham's case (1911 A. C. 417: 80
L. J. K. B. 1102).
Dealing with the law applicable Lord Macmillan in MCcullum's case (1932-147 L. T.
361 101 L. J. K. B. 664) at p. 366 observed:
"It has been recognised time & again that the sphere of a workman's employment is not
necessarily limited to the actual place where he does his work. If in going to or coming from
his work he has to use an access which is part of his employer's premises or which he is only
entitled to traverse because he is going to or coming from his work, he is held to be on his
master's business while he is using that access. Take the analogy of a domestic servant, which
is peculiarly in point, for a domestic servant, like a seaman, 'lives in', & the scene of a
domestic servant's employment is the master's house just as the ship is the scene of the
seaman's employment. I imagine no one would doubt that a maid servant returning home
from her night out & meeting with an accident in the private avenue of her master's house,
though at a point a quarter of a mile from the house, would be entitled to compensation. .....
The seaman who on his way back to his ship has left the public highway with its risks
common to all wayfarers & has entered the private premises of the harbour in which his ship
lies with its special risks, to which only those who have business at the harbour are exposed,
seems to me to have come within the protection of the Act, for if he sustains
an accident while using this access he sustains it by reason of risks incidental to his
employment, which he would not have encountered but for his employment."
CONCLUSION
It appears to me that on the findings of the learned Comr. there can be no doubt that the only
practicable means which the workman had to leave the place of his employment was this
route which led through Ultadanga Rly. Station. Once he had passed through the station he
would be on a public road & therefore in a public place. The learned Comr. appears to have
thought that when he reached the platform the workman had reached a public place. But it

Page 11
appears to me that there is no justification for that view. A railway station just as a dock or
harbour is private property & members of the general public have no right to use that
property. They use it by permission. For example, in a busy harbour thousands of people go
back & fore to the wharves, to the ships lying at the wharves, & to the warehouses lying
along the dock side. It is very much like a public place & is resorted to by all & sundry who
have business connected with the dock. It seems to me that a Rly. station is much the same
sort of place. It is resorted to by the public who have business with the rly. or who are
travelling or are connected with persons who are travelling. A member of the public has no
right to use a rly. platform for an evening walk. It is private property just as a harbour is a
private property. But it is private property which members of the public in large numbers use.
But it is user connected with travelling or business with the rly. not user as of right. It seems
to me that the position of a rly. platform is precisely similar to the dockside or a harbour.
There are special risks attached to a rly. station & a rly. platform--the risk of slipping &
falling under a train or the risk when reaching a platform of being knocked down by an
incoming train. These are risks which everybody using the platform are exposed to. But they
cannot be described as risks which the general public are exposed to. They are the same sort
of risks as the public legitimately using a harbour are exposed to. They are risks special to
that particular area.
We have to ask ourselves, why was Seth on this particular morning exposed to dangers from
passing trains ? Was he exposed to that danger merely as a member of the public, or was he
exposed to those dangers because he was still within the sphere of his employment & had not
left his employers' premises? It seems to me that Seth was killed because as an employee of
the East India Rly. he had to use a certain track & the platform of the rly. station to reach the
public road to get to his quarters or to get away from the scene of his work. Up to the moment
Seth was killed he was traversing a way across his employers' premises, the only practicable
way to get away from his employers' premises. He was knocked down & killed & it appears
to me that it must be held that the accident arose out of & in the courseof his employment. It
must be held therefore that the learned Comr. was wrong in dismissing this claim. The
learned Comr. held that the average wages of the deceased workman were between Rs. 100/-
& Rs. 200/- per month & this seems to have been agreed. That being so, the amount
of compensation is fixed by Schedule 4 to the Act & the amount is Rs. 3,500/-.
Once it is held that the accident arose out of & in the course of the employment it follows that
the widow who admittedly is a dependent, is entitled to compensation & the amount is, as I
have said, a fixed amount of Rs. 3,500/-.
Before concluding I should state that learn-ed advocate for the resps. at one time suggested
that the learned Comr. should have held that the deceased met his death owing to his having
exposed himself to some added peril or that he was killed as the result of some misconduct. I
should observe that these points are not taken in the written statement & no evidence at all
was led to show that Seth had been guilty of anything improper up to the time when he met
his death.. For the reasons which I have given, I should allow this appeal, set aside the order
of the Commr. for Workmen's Compensation & award the applt., the widow of the deceased
man, a sum of Rs. 3,500/- as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

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