Scribd
Upload
87 views

ISC Safety Lore - Issue No3

This document summarizes two incidents involving flare systems at oil refineries. The first case describes a power outage that led to a process upset and liquid building up in a flare drum, overflowing and rupturing a line. Hydrocarbons escaped and exploded, causing fires. The investigation found the flare system was not designed for this abnormal operation and corrosion contributed to the pipeline failure. The second case discusses maintenance of a flare system valve. When bolts were removed, liquid and gas leaked from the flange. Work continued without verifying isolation, and when the valve was lifted, more liquid released, forming an ignited vapor cloud that killed two workers. Proper isolation, drainage, and risk assessment were lacking

Uploaded by

zsugyenes
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
87 views

ISC Safety Lore - Issue No3

This document summarizes two incidents involving flare systems at oil refineries. The first case describes a power outage that led to a process upset and liquid building up in a flare drum, overflowing and rupturing a line. Hydrocarbons escaped and exploded, causing fires. The investigation found the flare system was not designed for this abnormal operation and corrosion contributed to the pipeline failure. The second case discusses maintenance of a flare system valve. When bolts were removed, liquid and gas leaked from the flange. Work continued without verifying isolation, and when the valve was lifted, more liquid released, forming an ignited vapor cloud that killed two workers. Proper isolation, drainage, and risk assessment were lacking

Uploaded by

zsugyenes
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 2

ISC Safety Lore

September 2018
Issue 3

Key lessons from incidents involving flare systems

Introduction
The flare collects a range of gaseous emission and pipes them to a flare stack where the harmful gases
are burnt and then the exhaust is safely discharged to the atmosphere. The flare is a last line of defense
in the safe emergency release system in a refinery or chemical plant. It is used to dispose of purged and
wasted products from refineries, unrecoverable gases emerging with oil from oil wells, vented gases from
blast furnaces, unused gases from coke ovens, and gaseous water from chemical industries.

Case 1 – Oil refinery – power cut


A series of severe electrical storms caused refinery wide unit shutdowns, including the fluidised catalytic
cracking unit (FCCU). The crude distillation unit was shut down as a result of a fire, which had been
started by a lightning strike. A process upset in the FCCU’s gas recovery section ultimately led to a high
liquid level in the flare drum and several shutdowns of the wet gas compressor, together with other
process anomalies. As a result of the wet gas compressor shutdown, there was a large vapor load on the
FCC flare system, which led to a high liquid level in the flare drum. When the hydrocarbon liquid
overflowed into the outlet line of this drum, the line ruptured due to mechanical shock and approximately
20 tonnes of flammable hydrocarbons escaped. This mixture found a source of ignition 110 m from the
flare drum and subsequently exploded. This caused a major hydrocarbon fire at the flare drum outlet itself
and a number of secondary fires.

Key learning points


The explosion was caused by flammable hydrocarbon liquid being continuously pumped into a process
vessel that, due to a valve malfunction, had its outlet closed. The only means of escape for this
hydrocarbon once the vessel was full was through the pressure relief system and then to the flare line.
The flare system was not designed to cope with this excursion from normal operation and due to liquid
breakthrough at the FCCU flare knock out drum, a failure occurred in the outlet pipe. The investigation
revealed, that internal acidic corrosion also contributed to the pipeline rupture. Apparently, the company
did not inspect the weakest points of the pipeline which were exposed to corrosion.

Case 2 – Crude oil distillation


In a crude oil distillation unit, tests showed that the flare system valve was not providing effective isolation
and would require eventual removal for overhaul at a scheduled shutdown of the flare. A ‘cold work’ permit
to work was issued two days prior to the incident. Alternate flange bolts were removed and the other bolts
lubricated as a standard practice to save time. Sufficient bolts remained at all times to retain the flange
seals. There was at that time no need to verify line conditions. Two contractors wearing breathing
apparatus completed the work. When almost all the bolts were undone, liquid leaked from the gap
between the flanges and gas escaped from the top of the joint.
The men stopped work, came down to ground level and sought advice. The supervisor checked the
platform and saw gas issuing from the top and liquid leaking from the bottom of the flange. He concluded
that neither was under pressure and that the quantity of liquid was small. Without any further tests assured
the contractors that it was safe for work to continue. The fitters remained concerned, thus asked and
received 'spark proof' tools. Liquid continued to leak as more bolts were removed then, as the last bolt
was undone and the crane took the strain and started to lift the valve, the spacer suddenly sprang
upwards. A large quantity of liquid was released, a flammable vapour cloud formed and ignited by the
nearby compressor. Two workers died in the incident.
Key learning points
A tower scaffold with a working platform and access ladder had been erected for work on the valve but
due to access restrictions, it was necessary to climb over or under it. This seriously limited the route of
escape. Work on the valve should not started prior to verification of the isolation and should not have
continued after the first leak occurred until all doubt about the safety of the situation had been resolved.
The absence of the spark arrester on the compressor was not known of until after the incident.
The ISC believes that leadership across six key functional elements is vital
to achieve good process safety outcomes. These elements are:
systems & procedures
engineering & design
assurance
knowledge & competence
human factors
culture

In the What can I do section below you can see how each of these
elements plays a part.

Figure 1: The ISC Framework

What can I do?


Management
• Ensure that all relevant standards and codes are followed, including how to mitigate liquid breakthrough.
• Identify the hazards associated with flare systems and check that safeguards are available and adequate. Make
sure that maintenance activities are considered in sufficient detail during PHA/HAZOP reviews.

• Ensure sources of flare blockage are understood contingence plans are developed to address possible
obstructions in the flare systems.
• Ensure rigorous risk assessments have been undertaken prior to jobs of such a high magnitude and potential
hazard such as maintenance of a flare system.
• Make sure that maintenance supervisors have the competence to undertake responsibilities and to perform their
activities to a recognised standard on a sustained basis.
• Develop detailed procedures for drainage and isolation of lines, and opening of pipelines and flanges, and ensure
they are followed.
Process Engineer/Supervisor
• In case of ammonia production facilities, ensure flare systems containing ammonia are segregated from the flare
systems containing carbon dioxide, as the mixing can cause plugging problems.
• In addition to ensuring the permit to work system is used, job specific Task Risk Assessment (TRA) are needed for
higher risk activities. Ensure that deviations from the PTW/TRA are risk assessed prior to execution.
• Supervise and control the work; check that the procedures are always followed. Talk through the hazards and
maintenance procedure with the workforce before issuing a PTW.
• Ensure flare line isolation valves incorporate valve position indicators.
• Process isolation and preparation plan should be clearly documented and checked. Positive isolation and drainage
checks must be performed prior to work commencing.
• Make sure that adequate means of escape in case of an emergency are provided, especially at elevated working
platform. A single egress point is not sufficient in an emergency.
• Prepare an emergency response plan to enable workers to escape or act upon in case of emergency.
• Check that all personal protection equipment that is required for the work is present and fit for purpose. Workers
should wear fireproof suits until the lines are proved safe.
• Check for the presence of residual flammable gas, avoiding a flammable atmosphere. The use of nitrogen to purge
lines should be considered but used with caution. It could cause pyrophoric deposits to dry out, thus increasing
their flammability. Working areas should be drenched in water until open pipes have been blanked or spaded.
• In case of any abnormal situation (leak or rupture etc.) work must be stopped immediately and should not start
again until a thorough inspection if it is safe for work to continue.
Operator
• Make sure that no flammable gas/vapour is left inside the system prior to cold/hot work activities.
• In case of any emergency situation ask the supervisor for further advice on whether the work can be completed or
additional checks are necessary.
• Ensure that relevant PPE is available such as breathing apparatus.
• When completing process isolation and draining, a positive check should be conducted to prove them.

The information included is given in good faith but without any liability on the part of the IChemE or the IChemE Safety Centre.
Contact us at [email protected]

You might also like