Happy Renault-Nissan Marriage

Student: Laura AMBARDARYAN

EEIB College of Europe
PROFESSORS: AIMÉ HEENE AND PHILIPPE DE BUCK
ASSISTANT: DAVID RINALDI
 CASE STUDY

Student: Laura AMBARDARYAN

EEIB, College of Europe
PROFESSORS: AIMÉ HEENE AND PHILIPPE DE BUCK
ASSISTANT: DAVID RINALDI

Word Count: 3970 words

Bruges, 2015
 TABLE OF CONTENT
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 0
Nissan before the Alliance .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 0
Nissan facing financial difficulties ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
The last hope for Nissan ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Nissan and ELV Directive ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2
Renault-Nissan Alliance ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
“Mr. Fix-it”...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Synergies .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Nissan after Nissan-Renault Alliance ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
Questions for discussion ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Annexes ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
Annex 1: Nissan’s sales before the Alliance ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Annex 2: Nissan’s growth of sales before the Alliance ......................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Annex 3: Geographical Synergy ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Annex 4: Alliance sales on the world in 2003....................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Annex 5: One year after the creation of the Alliance Nissan becomes profitable. ............................................................................................................................... 5
References............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
 5,188,000 Vehicles representing 6.2% of Global Market Share in 2013. It
INTRODUCTION
employs 142,925 people and generates ¥605.7Billion of operating profit2.
In this case study I will try to investigate the success story of the
Europeanization of Nissan through the creation of an international In the 1990s, Nissan was the most global of all Japanese carmakers. It was
Alliance with European car manufacturer-Renault. The foundation of the well established in Japan, North and South Americas but to a less extent in
Alliance was a step forward for both companies to address the issues that Europe. The entry of Nissan in the European market was barred by several
each of players was facing in the late 1990s. The signature of a unique economic and political constraints. More precisely, the trade between
Alliance between a Japanese and a French competitors is known as a Japan and Europe was restricted by several policy measures such as “VER
corporate fairy tale as Nissan was almost bankrupt due to huge debt and (Voluntary Export Restraints), national quotas, antidumping, local content
losses. One year after the creation of the Renault-Nissan Alliance, Nissan rules often specifically targeting Japanese firms”3. So that is why the first
becomes again profitable. The new Alliance helped Nissan to influence steps of Nissan in Europe started quite late with the acquisition of an equity
more effectively the decision making in the EU. interest in Motor Iberica, S.A. in Barcelona, Spain 4 . In 1980s Nissan
established Nissan Motor Iberica S.A., in Spain and started the production
NISSAN BEFORE THE ALLIANCE of the Patrol.

Nissan Motor Company Ltd, usually known as Nissan, is a However, few years after the establishment of Nissan in Europe, the
Japanese multinational automobile manufacturer which was created in economic and political environment becomes much more favorable for
1933, in Yokohama. The company is one of the pioneers in car Nissan. The creation of the Single Market opened several doors of
manufacturing which is specialized in manufacturing and selling opportunity for Nissan to increase its investments in Europe, because most
mainstream cars and trucks. of the restrictions such as national quotas, VERs, restrictive use of rules of
origin, local content rules were eliminated within the commitment to
More than 80 years after its creation, Nissan has become the world’s 9th
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the EC. So in the mid-
car manufacturer and enjoys the 111th rating within Global 2000 Leading
1980s, the most of the disputes between Japan and EU were solved and
Companies 1 . According to its annual report of 2014, Nissan produced

1 3
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eimi45eilh/no-9-nissan-motor/ Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national
2
NISSAN MOTOR CORPORATION Annual Report 2014 characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 22), Doctoral
dissertation, University College London
4
http://www.newsroom.nissan-europe.com/EU/engb/Corporate/EuropeHistory.aspx
European market became more open to welcome Japanese car top management at Nissan failed to take notice of changing trends in the
manufacturers, among which was Nissan. customer tastes especially in the US, its biggest export market”5.
What were the reasons for these hard times for Nissan? Firstly,
Following the opening of the European market for Japanese car
following the asset boom of 1991, a gap was created gap between the
manufacturers, the European market represented a huge opportunity for
investment yield and guaranteed return on Nissan paid to policyholders.
Nissan to expand its activity to a larger extent in Europe. In 1991, Nissan
Due to asset deflation and extremely low interest rates, actually Nissan was
established Nissan Motor Ltd in the United Kingdom. The next year, it
paying 4.7% to policyholders, while the return on investments was less
opened Nissan Design Europe in Germany.
than 3.1%6. Moreover, almost the half of Nissan Life’s assets represented

NISSAN FACING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES contracts of individual pension funds promising very high revenue of
almost 5.5%. This was 7% of Japanese insurer’s portfolios. So the fact of
In the late 1990s, the global player Nissan entered the transition taking excessive risk made Nissan exposed to the risk of unexpected fall
period. Several important global development such as globalization, of yield. Nissan continued promising high return and in this way worsened
increasing competition on the global scale, raise of environmental issues, the solvency problem. So by 1997, Nissan had the burden of ¥25.1 of debt.
Asia’s economic turmoil, Japanese recession and prolonged stagnation in During one of his speeches in Automotive News World Congress in
the consumer spending hampered the further advancement of Nissan, Detroit, Nissan’s CEO Carlos Ghosn’s noted about the unfavorable
which entered into a period of recession. According to its annual report, evolution of Nissan’ debt “Nissan was buckling under $20 billion of
the consolidated sales in fiscal 1999 declined by 1.0% to 2,542 thousand automotive debt. For most of the ‘90s, Nissan lost share and revenue in all
units, and net sales increased only by 0.2% to ¥6,580 billion. Even in Japan markets. It was delivering a 1% operating profit margin. Our competitors
Nissan’s market share decreased from 34% in 1974 to below 19% in the were averaging 4%. Return on invested capital averaged 1%. Our
late 1990s. Many analysts were of the opinion that in the early 1990s, “the competitors averaged 10%”7.

5
Nissan’s turnaround story 7
http://nissannews.com/en-US/nissan/usa/releases/bb933d39-b8c4-46ae-a23a-
6
The spectacular failure of Nissan Mutual Life Reported by Rayman Yan 1db992a1ddee?mode=print
https://riskviews.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/the-spectacular-failure-of-nissan-mutual-
life.pdf
 These circumstances had led to a delay of dividend payments for The analysis of the growth rate of sales (See: Annex 2) shows that the
the fiscal year 1999. The company was doing a lot of effort to reduce the overall sales of Nissan cars fell significantly. Only European market could
interest-bearing debt 8 . Under Nissan’s Global Business Reform Plan have been considered as the last hope of Nissan because even if the growth
“Nissan set itself the target, in its “global business reform plan” in 1998 of sales in Middle East and Africa were increasing sharply, but that
May, of cutting short-term debt from ¥2.5 trillion to ¥1 trillion by March represented only a small fraction of the overall sells of Nissan respectively
2001”9. 5% and 1% of total sales in 1999. After North America’s sales, the Nissan’s
However, due to extraordinary losses related mainly to the Global Business the second biggest market was the European one- 22% of total sales in
Reform Plan, the net income represented a ¥27.7 billion loss. To some 1999.
analysts the revival plan of Nissan looked much more like a “survival”
“Sales in Europe were approximately 10% above the previous year’s level”
plan. The company was bearing second consecutive annual loss in 1999.
stated Yoshikazu Hanawa, Chairman, President and Chief Executive
Due to the dark age of debt problem10, Nissan was near-bankruptcy. Carlos
Officer of Nisssan. The Overall performance of Nissan was bad but there
Ghosn in November 2002 stated “Nissan was in a difficult situation not
was light at the end of tunnel for Nissan because “Nissan’s European
only for the short term but for the future”. So to sum up, the overall
operations, which broke even in fiscal 1998, achieved a further
performance of Nissan on all over the world was less encouraging.
improvement in fiscal 1999, resulting in a net income of approximately ¥7
billion.”11
THE LAST HOPE FOR NISSAN

Despite this recession of the Nissan in almost all markets where it

NISSAN AND ELV DIRECTIVE
The growing role of Nissan’s (4.1% market share in August 1995)
was operating, only in the European market Nissan was performing. The
in the European market has contributed to the fact that Nissan grew into a
volume of sales was quite promising. (See: Annex1)
full player in the European market. Thereby Nissan had incentives to

8 10
A NewAlliance for the Millennium ANNUAL REPORT 1999 Fiscal Year Ended March http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1999-04-04/the-debt-thats-dragging-nissan-
31, 1999 downhill-intl-edition
9 11
The Economist: Renault and Nissan Renissant?-Mar 18th 1999 (TOKYO) A New Alliance for the Millennium (1999)- Yoshikazu Hanawa Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
influence the decision making process and exploit policy’s possible influential pan-European association to represent car manufacturers’
channels. In the Europeans market, the main problems related to the interests. ACEA had a lot advantages. However becoming a member of
Nissans activity were environmental policy issues, safety measures in the ACEA was nearly impossible because from the beginning it was composed
EU which were gaining more and more importance in 1990s with more of only European car manufacturers. Even the biggest Japanese car
focus on car manufactures due to the growing importance of recycling the manufacturer Toyota applied several times for the membership but it was
waste of end-of-life vehicles. So the proposal of the ELV (2000/53) not accepted12.
directive was addressed to car manufacturers to insure the production of
Nissan was a member of JAMA (Japan Automobile Manufacturer
the cars that would be more recyclable upon its end-of-life. The proposal
Association) which was the only channel to represent its interests as a
had 3 main targets being recycling, reuse and saving energy.
Japanese car manufacturers at EU level. However, JAMA was not
However, gaining insider status for Nissan in policy making was necessarily effective because issues concerning lobbying in the EU needed
not easy because of several reasons. Nissan as many of Japanese car to be decided in Tokyo office which made fast decision making process
manufacturers had to adapt their lobbying strategy to the new environment. impossible13. Moreover, in the 1990s mainly regarding the ELV directive
JAMA was a following ACEA without having some influence on
Firstly, Nissan had no member state to champion its interests and concerns
negotiations. The Commission awaited on ACEA being sure to get reliable
related to the future regulations. Whereas the individual European firms
information from ACEA considering Japanese car manufacturers as a
were able to use both national and European channels of influencing the
secondary source of information14.
decision making process.
It will be further illustrated how Nissan addressed the issue of lobbying in
Secondly, the dominant player in lobbying was ACEA (European
the section of Nissan after the Alliance.
Automobile Manufacturers Association) which was at that time the most

12 14
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national
characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 139), Doctoral characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 149), Doctoral
dissertation, University College London dissertation, University College London
13
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national
characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 141), Doctoral
dissertation, University College London
RENAULT-NISSAN ALLIANCE
In Europe, since the 1990s, French car manufacturer Renault was
attempting to widen its geographical coverage by finding a partner to
internationalize its production. Even though Renault was strongly present
in the European market, which was becoming more and more maturated, it
exported only a small fraction of its production outside the Europe. For this
reason, in February 1990 Renault attempted a merger with Volvo which
ultimately failed, because of several reasons. De jure, the alliance was
called merger but de facto it was a takeover of Volvo by Renault, because
the players were too different and the conditions were not equal. Formally
both companies would have kept their independence but in reality this
alliance would have been more favorable for Renault because the latter After this unsuccessful merger with Volvo, Renault continued its attempts

would have hold the “Golden Share” of 65% of the new Renault-Volvo to find a strategic partner and the next possible partner was Nissan, which

Alliance having more say on distribution of shares. was the most international of Japanese car manufacturers by creating the

The “Golden share” would imply that the French government during a fourth largest car manufactures on the world. But Nissan was struggling

stock exchange introduction keeps at least one share, which would give the from financial problems. At the same time, due to debt problems, Nissan

French government the right to approve or disapprove if other shareholders was negotiated with 2 other possible partners which were Daimler

would exceed the limit of 10 to 20 % of capital and votes in the alliance (Germany) and Ford (US). After several years of negotiations, despite all

between Volvo and Renault 15 ."From a shareholder's point of view, I kind of universal skepticism (on early 1999, BusinessWeek wrote, "But for

couldn't think of a worse arrangement," said Forsgardh (Forsgardh's group a recently turned-around Renault, the Nissan link is a dangerous liaison)

represents individuals who together hold only 10% of Volvo stock)16. Nissan and Renault created an Alliance based on cross-shareholding, on

15 16
Affärsvärlden 27 of October Nr 43/93 Why Volvo Kissed Renault Goodbye- Bloomberg, December 19, 1993
March 27, 1999 which is known as “corporate fairy tale” because it was The Structure of the Alliance was as follows:
the first cooperation in the history between a Japanese and French car
manufacturers which had no cross-regional links before, no common
language to communicate. Within the Alliance both players engaged to
keep their brand identities independent from each other.
After the signature of the Alliance Renault acquired 36.8% of Nissan’s
equity for a total of “¥643 billion including the acquisition of these shares
and Nissan’s financial subsidiaries in Europe” 17 . Afterwards, Renault’s
participation increases to 44.4%. The acquisition Nissan’s shares was the
only way to inject money to solve cash problem of Nissan and reduce its
debt. In its turn, Nissan acquired 15% of Renault’s shares.

“MR. FIX-IT”
Carlos Ghosn is the main character of this Alliance. Being currently
both the Chairman & CEO of Renault and Chairman & CEO of Japan-
based Nissan he is the founding father of the Renault-Nissan Alliance. He

17
A New Alliance for the Millennium (1999) Annual report Nissan
is known as one of the “automobile industry's great turnaround artist”. companies”20 in many contexts. Geographically, Nissan was operating in
Being the main character of Nissan-Renault Alliance he is known as "le addition to Japan in almost all markets- Mexico, Asia, the Middle East, and
cost killer" but also with a more telling nickname:"Mr. Fix-It." 18 . His South Africa, United States. At the same time, Renault started operating in
leadership, cross cultural awareness was crucial for the success of the Mercosur, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European markets. (See:
Alliance. Mr. Ghosn have been awarded with several awards such as ‘Most Annex 3 geographical complementarity).
Respected CEOs’ by CEO Quarterly Magazine (2010) and ‘Asia Business
The principle of geographical expansion of the Alliance is that the player
Leader of the Year’ by CNBC (2011). In 2019, Carlos Ghosn was elected
who is well established in a region assists to firmly establishment of the
as the president of ACEA for 2010 and was re-elected in December 5,
partner in the new region. In Annex 4 we see that already in 2003, both
201519.
companies covered a more expanded coverage compared to even estimate
geographical synergies before the Alliance (Annex 3).

Renault’s objectives Nissan’s objectives

Quality improvement Cost reduction
Internationalization Combat the debt problem
Europeanize
Common objectives
Create synergies
As to products, Renault was mainly specialized in the production of
medium-sized cars such as Mégane which represented its main business
SYNERGIES
while Nissan was focused on the production of bigger cars to a greater
The ideal complementarity of two firms as once noted G. Douin
extent.
was an “almost miraculous complementary relationship between two

18 20
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Carlos_Ghosn.aspx Behind the Scenes of the Renault-Nissan Alliance by Georges DOUIN- 5th April,
19
http://www.acea.be/press-releases/article/carlos-ghosn-re-elected-president-of-acea- 2002
for-2015
The excellence of Nissan engineers was another essential asset that was  Consolidated net automotive debt reduced to less than ¥700 billion
offered by Nissan, while Renault brought to the table its favorable financial by fiscal year 2002”22.
stability, innovation and R&D. “The complementary relationship was also In 2001, one year ahead the planned schedule, Nissan met all 3 of these
noticeable in terms of organization and know-how”21. commitments. In the Annual report of 2001, Nissan reported that “….net
The Alliance was favorable for both companies in term of approaches, for profitability was achieved in the first year with net after-tax profits of
example Renault put emphasis on cost management, on the style of ¥331.1 billion. This then grew in fiscal year 2001 to ¥372.3 billion—the
products and innovation while Nissan used much resources for R&D, highest yearly profit in the company’s history”23. Nissan reduced its debt
advanced technologies, factory productivity and quality control. These from ¥2.1trillion in 1998 to 953 billion in 2000. Nissan’s stock moved up
differences were opportunities for both companies to learn from each other by of $15.97 per share on NASDAQ in 2001.
expertise by creating a common platform, participate to value-creation and
The NRP was beneficial for Nissan not only to resolve its problems, but
harvest apart of created value.
also to strengthen its brand identity by launching the 22 new vehicles.
Nissan created not merely an enhanced identity of the company being in
NISSAN AFTER NISSAN-RENAULT ALLIANCE
the center of the growth of the company, sustainable profitability and brand
7 months after the creation of Nissan-Renault Alliance, Nissan with the image.
supervision Carlos Ghosn introduced a 3-year plan of structural reforms The creation of the Renault-Nissan Alliance contributed to operating
named the Nissan Revival Plan. When the NRP was first announced, profits in the European market and further Europeanization of Nissan24. In
Nissan’s executive committee announced 3 commitments with promise to 2001, Renault-Nissan set up the first single Legal Entities (SLEs) in
resign if any of these 3 were not met. The commitment were as follows: Switzerland and in Netherlands. In 2002, Nissan set a new headquarter
Nissan Europe SAS in Paris. In 2003, Nissan opens European design center
 “A return to net profitability in fiscal year 2000,
 A minimum operating income to sales margin of 4.5 percent by
fiscal year 2002,

21 24
Behind the Scenes of the Renault-Nissan Alliance by Georges DOUIN- 5th April, 2002 Nissan has significantly increased its market share in Europe from 2.9% in 1989 to
22
The Nissan Revival Plan- Success Ahead of Schedule, Nissan Annual Report 2001 9.5% in 2013.
23
The Nissan Revival Plan- Success Ahead of Schedule, Nissan Annual Report 2001
in London. Already in 2003, Renault-Nissan had established 4 SLEs. before the entry into force of the Directive. This would have meant for
Nissan NV200 awarded International Van of the Year 2010 in Europe25. Nissan another huge burden of additional cost which was already suffering
from financial problems.

Renault-Nissan partnership was beneficial not only for creating Prohibited materials
synergies but also to vital for Nissan in lobbying context. Nissan was not
Another concern for Nissan of the proposal of the ELV Directive
able to become a member of the most-influential association representing
was that component of the cars that contain “lead, mercury, cadmium and
car manufacturers’ interests (ACEA). However, at the same time Renault
hexavalent compounds of chromium had to be removed in the process of
was a member of ACEA, which meant that Renault had access to internal
subsequent recycling from all vehicles sold as from 2003”27. This created
information and transmitted to its partner as well. Even Nissan’s “lobbying
conflicts of the targets of the Directive as the use of some materials such
division shares the facilities with Renault’s office in Brussels”26. That’s
as steel and aluminum alloys is much more useful to reduce energy
how the 39 amendments on “ELV directive” proposed by ACEA
consumption.
represented Nissan’s interests as well through its new partner. Below are
presented the aspects of the proposal of the ELV directive that were Spare parts
unfavorable for Nissan.
Another inconsistency was related to spare and replacement details

Producer responsibility that comprise the materials listed above. The problem was that if Nissan
would have to change the materials of the cars produced before the entry
One of the aspects which was of strategic importance for Nissan
of force of the Directive, it would not be able to produce the same detail or
was that of the producer responsibility. More precisely, Nissan raised
part with banned materials. This means that new parts produced would no
disagreement with the proposal that the complete cost of the take-back of
longer be compatible with the design of a car. So upon the demand of the
the end-of-life vehicles would also be applied to the cars manufactured
consumers willing to replace a specific detail or part of the car that have

25 27
History of Nissan in Europe, Nissan Newsroom, Europe Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national
https://newsroom.nissan-europe.com/ characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007, Doctoral dissertation,
26
Japanese firms in the EU: Europeanization of lobbying strategies and enduring national University College London
characteristics- Yukihiko Hamada, London, October 2007 (page 140), Doctoral
dissertation, University College London
been produced before 2002, Nissan would no longer be able to replace that of 2003. This was the first time any carmaker had used existing
part if it has even one of the prohibited materials mentioned in the incineration facilities at its own plant to process ASR”29.
Directive. Consequently, this would mean that the whole vehicle must be
Also, Renault’s membership to ACEA was another tool for Nissan
replaced which would ultimately increase the damage to the environment
to indirectly cope with its main competitor Toyota. The latter applied
more.
several times to become a member of the ACEA but its application was
So the Alliance with Renault was not only profitable for Nissan in term of
rejected because the voting was by unanimity. The huge resistance was
creating synergies and overcoming financial difficulties but also in term of
mainly from the part of Renault30.
representing its interest concerning ELV directive through a member of
ACEA.
CONCLUSION
It has contributed somehow that now Nissan has become the leader To conclude, due to an International Alliance with one of the
of the application of the requirements of the ELV directive. Thanks to its leaders of the European market-Renault, Nissan took advantage to
good performance in recycling ASR(The Automobile Shredder Residue), Europeanize its activity, avoid bankruptcy, resolve its financial problems
Nissan was selected as team leader of ART (The Automobile Shredder and come back to profitability. With the leadership of Carlos Ghosn,
Residue Recycling Promotion Team). This is because it has made a Nissan successfully implemented NRP and was back on the track. Very
significant progress in recycling ASR28. “Nissan rebuilt part of their waste different but at the same time complementing partners created a number of
incineration facilities at the Oppama plant, tested and achieved solutions synergies in geographical, technological context, successfully
to technical problems and started energy recovery of ASR towards the end implemented a common and a more efficient research and development
platform by exchanging know-hows, expertise, staff, and represented their

28
The European ELV Directive (2000/53/EC) requires Member States to achieve a reuse
and recovery rate of 95% for all ELVs by average weight by 2015. Since ASR typically 29
A Study to Examine the Costs and Benefits of the ELV Directive – Final Report,
represents 14-20% of the ELV weight - depending on the amount of prior manual Annexes
dismantling - it is widely acknowledged that developing post-shredder technologies (PST) Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/pdf/study/annex4.pdf
for treating ASR is crucial to reaching the 95% target.
30
Source: Interview with Ivan Hodac, ACEA Secretary-General 19/02/2015
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.cfm?fuseaction=search.dspP
age&n_proj_id=4006&docType=pdf
interests to policymakers. At the same time, both companies preserved QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
their brand identity. Following this successful partnership, Renault-Nissan 1. What are the differences between Renault-Volvo Alliance and Renault-
became the 4th biggest car manufacturer on the world. Nissan Alliance?
2. What were the alternative solutions for Nissan and Renault if the
Alliance would have not been created?
3. How Nissan has become much more powerful than Renault after the
Alliance?
4. How long can such an Alliance last?
5. Up to what extent can Renault continue to represent the interests of
Nissan to the European level, through ACEA?
ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: NISSAN’S SALES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE

Units 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995

Domestic 872507 981512 1140010 1,146,131 1063469

Overseas total 1669219 1586366 1570033 1524901 1636305

North America 656789 678488 809133 814541 833224

Europe 549547 494092 451809 464,714 460222

Middle East 139432 99311 70831 37508 38781

Asia 38706 86291 75731 66787 66059

Africa 22211 19853 10514 10350 11458

Latin America and 204539 162347 116141 99525 193137

Caribbean

Oceania 56544 45064 35240 31005 32094

Others 1451 920 634 471 1330

Total 2541726 2567878 2710043 2671032 2699774

Source: Annual Report, Nissan 1999

ANNEX 2: NISSAN’S GROWTH OF SALES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE

Growth 1999 1998 1997 1996

Domestic -11.11% -13.90% -0.53% 7.77%

Overseas total 5.22% 1.04% 2.96% -6.81%

North America -3.20% -16.15% -0.66% -2.24%

Europe 11.22% 9.36% -2.78% 0.98%

Middle East 40.40% 40.21% 88.84% -3.28%

Asia -55.14% 13.94% 13.39% 1.10%

Africa 11.88% 88.82% 1.58% -9.67%

Latin America 25.99% 39.78% 16.70% -48.47%

and Caribbean

Oceania 25.47% 27.88% 13.66% -3.39%

Others 57.72% 45.11% 34.61% -64.59%

Total -1.02% -5.25% 1.46% -1.06%

Source: Own calculation

ANNEX 3: GEOGRAPHICAL SYNERGY

Source: Annual Report Nissan 1999

ANNEX 4: ALLIANCE SALES ON THE WORLD IN 2003
ANNEX 5: ONE YEAR AFTER THE CREATION OF THE ALLIANCE NISSAN BECOMES PROFITABLE.

Source: Annual Report Nissan 2001

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 Interview with Ivan Hodac, ACEA Secretary-General  THE ECONOMIST RENAULT AND NISSAN
19/02/2015 RENISSANT?-MAR 18TH 1999 (TOKYO)
 http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1999-04-04/the-
 Affärsvärlden 27 of October Nr 43/93
debt-thats-dragging-nissan-downhill-intl-edition
 Why Volvo Kissed Renault Goodbye-Bloomberg,
 Nissan Annual Report 1998
December 19, 1993
 http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eimi45eilh/no-9-nissan-  Nissan Annual Report 1999
motor/  Nissan Annual Report 2000
 http://www.newsroom.nissan-  Nissan Annual Report 2001
europe.com/EU/engb/Corporate/EuropeHistory.aspx  Nissan Annual Report 2005
 Nissan’s turnaround story  Nissan Annual Report 2011
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.  Nissan Annual Report 2014