Rubi et.al v.

The Provincial Board of Mindoro (1918-19)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• This case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. They allege that:
o The Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the officials of the provinces.
o Rubi and his companions are being held against their will on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro.
• The facts show that the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution no. 25:
o It directed “non-Christian” people of Mindoro to take up their habitation at Tigbao on Lake Naujan.
o That any Manguian show shall refuse to comply shall upon conviction, be imprisoned not exceeding
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code (RAC).
• Rubi questions the validity of section 2759 of the RAC:
o Section 2145: Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor.·With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public'
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board."
• SC first provided a brief history of the PH attitude towards “non-Christians”. These show that (1) the
government recognizes the difference between Christian and non-Christian territories in the PH, and (2) the
government has always considered their welfare and advancement.
o Spanish Rule – The attitude was to improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the
Islands by concentrating them in “reducciones”.
§ It is the duty of the government to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation
and place them under the protection of the law.
§ The provincial authorities are tasked to find the towns or settlements and shall adopt the
necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, construction of schools, fixing
up the means of communication, etc.
o United States acquisition –
§ Organic Law – In dealing with uncivilized tribes, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of the North American Indians.
• Under the Philippine Bill – the PH legislature was to have jurisdiction over the
Christian portion of the Island. The PH Commission was to retain exclusive
jurisdiction of that part of the Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian
tribes.
• Under the Jones Law – the law transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
authority exercised by the PH Commission to the PH Legislature. It also divided
the PH into twelve senatorial districts.
• Hence, PH organic law has recognizes a dividing line between the territories
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and those that are not.
§ Statute Law – Several laws, particularly the administrative codes show the regard for the
welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the PH and a settled and consistent practice with
reference to the methods followed for their advancement.
• Terminologies:
o Non-Christian – According to the intent of the law, the term is intended to relate to a degree of
civilization and not to a religious or geographical conception.
§ Secretary of Interior: “To hold that it is indicative of a religious meaning will make the law
invalid as against the Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom”
§ Collector of Internal Revenue: the internal revenue law exempts members of non-Christian
tribes from payment of cedula taxes. This does not mean that persons who profess some
form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other persons are
exempt.
• It is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that
decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on

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 whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain
tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit.
• To be categorized as non-Christian, one looks at his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some
civilized community.
o The Manguianes – Signifies “savage”, “mountaineer”, “pagan”, “negro”.
§ They are considered very low in culture and have not advanced much in civilization.
§ They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people.
o American-Indian comparisons – The comparison is important because the method used by the PH
government in dealing with non-Christians is practically identical to that followed by the US in dealing
with Indian tribes.
§ The relation between the US and the Indians is that of a guardian and ward. Indian tribes
are communities dependent on the US.
§ Hence, we look at their case law to show how to properly address the issue at hand:
• US v. Cook (Standing Bear Case)
o This is a habeas corpus case against Brigadier General Cook.
o The Indians in this case has withdrawn from the tribe and completely
severed relations with them. In fact, they have adopted the general habits
of the whites.
o They were arrested and restrained by order of Cook for escaping the
reservation.
o There are two issues in this case: (1) can an Indian avail of the habeas
corpus remedy?, and (2) can the government arrest and hold the Indians
for the purpose of being returned to the reservations?.
§ As to the first issue, an Indian is a person within the meaning of
the laws of the US. They have the right to sue out a writ of
habeas corpus.
§ As to the second issue, the Indians are being restrained of
liberty. the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as
well as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable
right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness/ so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is Rubi et.al. entitled to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in the PH courts? – YES
• The decision in the Standing Bear case is used as authority to rule that Rubi, a Manguian, a Filipino, and a
citizen of the PH islands, is a “person” within the meaning of the law.

Is there a valid delegation of legislative power to the provincial government? – YES

• The GR is that the Constitution forbids the delegation of legislative power.
• However, a distinction must be made between:
o The delegation of power to make the law which involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and
o The delegation conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.
o The first kind of delegation cannot be done. This stems from the growing “necessity” of delegation.
• Furthermore, the general rule admits of an exception: the central government can delegate legislative
powers to local authorities, sanctioned by immemorial practice.
o Applied in this case, the PH legislature has then conferred authority to the Province of Mindoro.
o As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who
but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
• Hence, Section 2145 of the RAC is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

Is the segregation of non-Chrisitians a form of discrimination based on religious beliefs? – NO

• The SC upheld the long continued meaning given to the common expression.

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 • The term non-Christian refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals on account of religious
differences.

Was there a violation of (1) liberty, (2) due process of law and (3) equal protection of laws? – NO
• Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
o However, no man can do exactly as he pleases. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens
would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
• Due process of law simply means that:
o There shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of
the Government;
o This law shall be reasonable in its operation;
o It shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
o It shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.
• There is no denial of the three rights. – See discussion on INTENT

Was there a violation of involuntary servitude? – NO

• Slavery and involuntary servitude all denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another.
• Their living together in one area does not make them slaves or put them in a condition where they are
compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. Hence, there is no
involuntary servitude.

Is there a valid exercise of police power? – YES

• Given the scope of police power, it has become almost impossible to limit.
o It is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling
necessity.'
o It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
• In the PH, the exercise of police power belongs to the legislature, and this power is limited only by Acts of
Congress.
• In this case, the court considers the fact that:
o These people do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as
the living conditions warrant.
o The placing of a penalty is a measure by the government to make sure that they stay in one place.
o As people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow
a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provided for, you can not make them live together.

Does the legislative intent of the law warrant the acts of the local government? – YES
• Under the resolution of the provincial board, it provided for the ff. reasons for the action:
o (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province;
o (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement,
o (3) The protection of the Manguianes;
o (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; and
o (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
• The purpose of the law is to “establish friendly relations with the so-called non- Christians, and to promote
their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization”. – this
method was termed in Spanish times as “bringing under the bells”.
o FOR the Manguianes –
§ Segregation will constitute protection for them.
§ The government wants to gather them into a reservation for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals of their people.
o FOR the state -
§ The manguians are engaged in the works of destruction – burning and destroying the forests
and making illegal caingins.
§ To allow this to continue will be detrimental to the state since they will eventually become a
heavy burden to the State.

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 § On account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they
will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
• The ultimate purpose of the government is to unify the people of the PH so that they may approach the highest
conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence.
• Since the petitioners Rubi are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, Habeas corpus is not an
issue.

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SEC v. Interport (2008)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Sec. 1 talks about Legislative power being vested in Congress and this case basically talks about how
administrative bodies cannot defeat this power of Congress through delaying implementation of rules.
• This is an appeal from the C.A. which enjoined the Securities and Exchange Commission from taking
cognizance of or initiating any action against respondent corp. Interpret Resources Corp. and its board
members, with respect to sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act (RSA).
o Sec. 8 - provides that the Prosecution and Enforcement Dept. has exclusive authority to investigate,
on complaint or motu proprio, any act/omission of the board of directors/trustees of corps,
partnerships, assocs., stockholders, officers, etc. in violation of any law or rules and regulations
administered and enforced by the SEC.
_
o Sec. 30 - talks about an Insider’s duty to disclose when trading
o Sec. 36 - imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity
security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a
statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer’s securities and such changes in his or her
ownership thereof.
• In 1994, through a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB), Interport acquired 100%
or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc (GEHI), which would own and operate a 102
megawatt gas turbine power-generating barge.
o The MOA also stipulates that GEHI would assume a 5-year power purchase contract with National
Power Corp (NPC).
o At that time, GEHI’s power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-
September of 1994.
• In exchange, Interport will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital tock of Interport amounting to 40.88billion
shares (total par value of Php488.44million)/
• On the side, Interport would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc (PRCI).
o Under the agreement, GHB, a member of the Vestment Group of Companies in Malaysia, would
extend a loan to Interport for this purpose.
• Interport alleged that they faxed a press release announcing the agreement with GHB to the Phil. Stock
Exchange and SEC on August 8, 1994, but that the fax machine of the SEC could not receive it. When advised
by SEC to resend, Interport complied the following day.
• SEC received reports that Interport did not disclose dealings with GHB on time, and the directors heavily
traded Interport shares using this material insider information.
• SEC Chairman issued a Directive which required Interport to submit a copy of its MOA with GHB and asked
the directors to be present in a hearing before the Brokers and Exchange Dep. to explain Interport’s failure to
disclose the information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. Interpret complied with the
order.
• SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that Interport violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in
connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with
GHB.
o SEC also pronounced that some of the officers and directors of Interport entered into transactions
involving Interport shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the RSA.
• Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, where they alleged that the SEC had no authority to investigate the
subject matter because jurisdiction was conferred upon the PED (Sec. 8) and that the SEC violated their right
to due process when it ordered that they appear before the SEC and show cause why no sanction should be
imposed on them, and this, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents.
• No formal hearing were conducted on the motions, but SEC manifested that a) there would be an investigation
body constituted; b) respondents had to show cause as to why they should not be prosecuted and c) denying
respondents‟ Motion for Continuance.
• On appeal, the CA determined that there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure,
insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly
violated.
o The CA likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit for

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 civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.
o Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the
respondents.
• While this case was pending in the SC, RA No. 8799, a.k.a. the Securities Regulation Code, took effect on 8
August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was already
repealed. Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the Securities Regulation Code has
taken the place of the RSA.

ISSUES/HELD:
Was there need for the enactment of implementing rules for SEC to exercise authority and to hold respondents
liable under the R.S.A.? — NO.
• In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the RSA,
the SC upholds these provisions as legal and binding.
o Every law has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law
is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.
• The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given.
o If the contrary were allowed, administrative bodies would be able to defeat legislative intent.
• Rules and regulations cannot have more extensive prerogatives nor deviate from their originating statutes.
The lack of implementing rules cannot invalidate these provisions.
• The provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. Their requirements are specifically set out,
and the acts which are enjoined are determinable.
o Sec. 8 is a straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities and the
particular matters which need to be reported in the registration statement thereof.
• Where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation. 


Do respondents have the right to cross-examine in the proceedings before the PED? – NO.
• In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the CA pronounced that the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V thereof failed to provide for the parties' right to cross-
examination, in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987 particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII
thereof. This ruling is incorrect.
• Proceedings before the PED are summary in nature.
• Also, the quantum of proof for administrative proceedings is substantial evidence. Respondents could defend
their cause using documents and position papers.
• Administrative agencies are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence unlike regular courts.
• What was important is that respondents had the opportunity to be heard and adduce evidence in their favor.
• Even assuming that PED also exercise adjudicative functions, in the instant case, it exercised its investigative
powers; thus, respondents do not have the requisite standing to assail the validity of the rules on adjudication.
o A valid source of a statute or rule can only be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.
o In the instant case, respondents are only being investigated by the PED for their alleged failure to
disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into by its directors involving IRC
shares. The respondents have not shown themselves to be under any imminent danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the exercise of adjudicative functions by the SEC. They are not
being or about to be subjected by the PED to charges, fees or fines, etc.

Did the SRC repeal sections 8, 30 and 36 of the RSA? – No.

• The SRC did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act since said provisions were
reenacted in the new law.
• The SRC absolutely repealed the Revised Securities Act. While the absolute repeal of a law generally deprives
a court of its authority to penalize the person charged with the violation of the old law prior to its appeal,
EXCEPT:
o when the repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the old law, or
o when the repealing law has a saving clause that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on
pending actions.
• In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the respondents despite the repeal, since Sections
8, 12, 26, 27 and 23 of the Securities Regulations Code impose duties that are substantially similar to Sections
8, 30 and 36 of the repealed Revised Securities Act.

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Has the action prescribed? – No.
• The Court explained that preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period.
• The charge had to be brought to the SEC first because the SEC is the appropriate administrative body
specialized to first take cognizance over the controversy.
• When the chairman of the SEC formed the investigation panel, this tolled the prescription.
• Also, the injunction issued by the CA against the SEC prevented the DOJ to file charges in court. The Court
said this standstill could not be sanctioned.
• The SC further held that the SEC’s investigations were akin to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ. The rules on prescription could then apply.

Dissenting Opinion (J. Carpio)


• Section 2 of Act 3326 contemplates judicial proceedings, NOT administrative proceedings, to effectively toll
prescription. The DOJ did not file any charges.
• Remember that the injunction of the CA was issued only against the SEC, NOT the DOJ. The 12-year
prescription period has expired, and the case should have been dismissed.

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Leovillo Agustin v. Romeo Edu (1979)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• 1974, former President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229 (LOI).
o This LOI mandated that, at all times, motors vehicles should have at least 1 pair of early warning
device (EWD) consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow color.
• Agustin (as an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035) alleged that the LOI violates the delegation
of police power for the LOI was “oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and unconstitutional.”
o He claims that the blinking lights that came with the cars could very well serve the motorists during
the emergencies mentioned in the LOI.
o He also contends that the LOI was “infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel, and
unconscionable to the motoring public.”
o He mentioned that the LOI was “one-sided, patently illegal, and immoral” because it would make car
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are mandated to
buy these EWD at the rate of Php 52 to 72 per set.
o He prayed for both the LOI and the Memorandum Circular (that implemented the LOI) as void and
unconstitutional.
• 1978, SC issued a TRO on the LOI and a resolution that required Romeo Edu, as LTO Commissioner, Juan
Ponce Enrile, as Minister of National Defense, Alfredo Junio, as Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication, and Baltazar Aquino, as Minister of Public Highways to answer on the allegations.
• The OSG, on behalf of the Edu et al., basically denied all the allegations of Agustin and stated that the LOI
and the MC did NOT violate the Constitution on due process of law, equal protection of law, and undue
delegation of police power.
o OSG contended that the LOI was a valid exercise of police power and the MC that served as the
implementing rules and regulations was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
o OSG cited the cases of Calalang v. Williams, Morfe v. Mutuc, and Edu v. Ericta.
o OSG also cited the 1968 Vienna Convention of the UN on Road Traffic, Road Signals and Signals,
wherein the Philippines was a signatory thereof.

ISSUES/HELD:

(SC discussed a lot of issues, but focus on the test of delegability—as stated in the syllabus)

Was the LOI a valid exercise of police power?—YES, the LOI is a valid exercise of police power.
• The broad scope of police power was explain by Chief Justice Taney of the US SC in an 1847 decision as
"nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty."
• In Edu v. Ericta, the Court identified police power as the “State’s authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” Persons and property could “be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to promote the general comfort, health and prosperity
of the state.”
o Police power was referred to as “the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.”
• Justice Malcolm said that police power was “that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.”
o He also stated that police power was “the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers. It was
to benefit all the great public needs.”
o Its wide scope provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances that assures the greatest benefits.
• Justice Cardozo said that police power is “a dynamic agency rooted in the conception was to safeguard
constitutional rights. Thus the same was enacted as measures calculated to promote communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare.”

Did the LOI and MC infringed on the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power?—NO, there
is no infringement on the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. (MAIN ISSUE)

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 • SC held that Agustin was not able to acquaint himself with the prevailing jurisprudence in Edu v. Ericta and
Calalang v. Williams.
• In Edu v. Ericta, it was held that "to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard. This
standard implies that the legislature determines matters of principle and lays down the fundamental policy.
o This standard defines that the legislative policy must sufficiently map out the boundaries and
specify the public office to implement the same. It should indicate the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be implemented. Thereafter, the executive agencies then
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
o The standard may be either express or implied. For an express standard, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. For an implied standard, the policy and purpose of the act is considered as a
whole. In this case, the legislative objective of the LOI is public safety.
• In Calalang v. Williams, the Court held that the LOI’s purpose was for a "safe transit upon the roads.”
o Justice Laurel said that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption of the principle of "subordinate
legislation."
o He further said that “with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval
of the practice by the courts. Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that
what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it
leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."
• In this case, SC held that the LOI and the MC was not in violation of the principle of non-delegability as the
same had a standard to comply with and the purpose of the LOI and MC was in furtherance of public safety.
• SC held that it was enough say that the standard of “safe transit upon the roads” is sufficient. Moreover, as a
signatory to the Vienna Convention on Road Safety, our Constitution considers the same as part of the law of
the land.
• Hence, SC held that the LOI and MC were constitutional and lifted the TRO on them.

(Teehankee dissented, but the same did not involve a discussion on the non-delegability of legislative power. The
dissent mainly tackled some allegations that were not sufficiently answered by the Edu et al. (i.e. EWD have not yet
been tested as to its effectivity and utility; no refutation on the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents; big financial
burden was not tackled.)

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Araneta v. Gatmaitan (1957)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• San Miguel Bay, hereinafter SMB (located between Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, extends to 250 sq.
miles and with an average depth of approximately 6 fathoms) is considered as the most important fishing area
in the Pacific side of the Bicol Region.
• Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to the area in order to
use trawl fishing method in San Miguel Bay.
• Other fishermen believed that the operation of trawl fishing caused the depletion of marine resources in the
area, hence, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of the coastal towns to prohibit
the operation of trawls in SMB.
o Adverse effects of trawl fishing:
§ According to the Municipal Mayors league: wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying
their eggs and the inevitable extermination of the shrimp’s specie.
§ In the brief submitted by the NAMFREL: trawls dig deep into the ocean bed, ram and destroy
the fish corals, destroy the fish foods which lies below the ocean floor, daytime catches net
millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud, bring up the life of the sea: algae, shell fish
and star fish.
o Municipal Mayor’s league issued a Resolution condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of
destruction of shrimp specie and resolved to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate
fishing and declare it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period in a year.
o Another resolution was issued to pray that the President protect the fish resources in SMB by banning
operations of trawls.
• President Magsaysay then issued EO No. 22 which prohibited the use of trawls in SMB. EO No. 22 was
amended by EO No. 66 as an answer to the Provincial Board’s resolution for the allowance of trawl fishing
only during typhoon season. EO No. 80 was also issued allowing trawl fishing only within specific portion and
period only.
• A group of trawl operators then filed a complaint for complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with
preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same
null and void.

ISSUES/HELD:

Does the President have the authority to issue the Executive Orders? Are the Executive Orders issued in
accordance with the law? – YES to both
• Under Sections 6, 13 and 75 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Law) as further amended by Commonwealth Act No.
471:
o The law declares unlawful and fixes the penalty for the taking (except for propagation, scientific or
educational purposes), destroying or killing of any fish fry or fish eggs.
o The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources) is authorized to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net or fishing device
(including the net used by trawl fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as to set aside
and establish fishery reservations or fish sanctuaries from which no person could lawfully take,
destroy or kill, or in any manner disturb or drive away any small or immature fish, fry or fish eggs.
• With or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing come within the powers of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the
criminal prosecution of those who are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.
• Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 issued by President, upon the proposition and recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, are valid and issued under the authority of law. Agriculture
and Natural Resources is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the President.

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 o Under Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution, the President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments.
o Under the Revised Administrative Code:
§ Section 63: All acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by public
employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders.
§ Section 74: all executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the
President of the Philippines in matters of general policy.

Does the exercise of the authority to issue the assailed executive issuances constitute undue delegation of
the powers of the Congress? – NO
• Delegation of the power to legislate vs. The conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law:
o The former necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall be. (this is prohibited)
o In the latter, the delegation of the authority or discretion as to the ‘execution’ of the law can be made,
but has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
• In the case of U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, the Court held that the Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to
enact any law.
o If Act No. 2868 (law assailed in Ang Tang Ho case) is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than
to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law, there is no delegation of power and it is valid.
o On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, and therefore, void and
unconstitutional.
• In this case, from the provisions of the Fisheries Act, it was declared unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs
in the territorial waters of the Philippines, it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
provide such necessary restrictions on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish fry
or fish eggs, to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish sanctuaries and to violations of the act.
• In so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving
only to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry
into effect the legislative intent.
• Since the Fisheries Act is complete as a law in itself and it does nothing more than to authorize the Executive
department and agencies to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then it can be concluded that
the creation of the entire law was made only by the Legislature. Thus, there is no undue delegation of
legislative power with the issuance of the assailed Executive Orders for the implementation of the law, and
such EOs are therefore valid.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 11

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board (2008)

ARTICLE VI. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

FACTS:
• In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented.
• Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of:
o students of secondary and tertiary schools (c)
o employees of public and private offices (d)
o persons charged before the prosecutor’s office punishable by not less than 6 years and 1 day (f)
o candidates for public office (g)
• This case is a consolidation of 3 different cases:
o Pimentel Case – assailing the validity of 36 (g) on candidates for public office
§ Alleges that it imposes additional qualifications not found in the Constitution
o SJS Case – a registered political party assailing 36 (c), (d), (f), (g)
§ Gives unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing.
§ Violates constitutional right against unreasonable searches
o Laserna Case – a lawyer, citizen and taxpayer
§ Violates constitutional right to privacy, right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE/HELD:

Is Sec. 36 (g) covering candidates for public office unconstitutional? YES

• Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards set out in the Constitution, as
it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate.
• The law illegally imposes an additional qualification on candidates for senator which as limited in the
constitution only involves (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. To wit:
o SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and,
on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
• Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations.
o The powers of each of the departments (including the legislative) are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution.
• Thus, this section is unconstitutional as it infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

Is Sec. 36 (c) covering students of secondary and tertiary schools unconstitutional? NO

• In the case of students, the validity of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing emanates
primarily from:
1. the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
2. their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
• Court looked at US Cases as persuasive sources:
o Vernonia School District: Involved a football athlete who refused random drug testing.
§ The US SC ruled that this was considered a reasonable search as the school stands in loco
parentis
§ Athletes also had a lesser expectation of privacy as, among others, they routinely undergo
physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms.
o Board of Education: Involved drug testing for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular
activities.
§ The US SC again upheld the constitutionality on the basis of the school’s custodial
responsibility and authority. There was no difference between non-athletes and athletes.
§ Schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 12

 • Thus the SC held that from these two cases:
1. Schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students;
2. Students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision
of their parents, guardians, and schools;
3. Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students
and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty
4. Schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.
• Thus, random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even
be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population.

Is Sec. 36 (d) covering employees of public and private offices unconstitutional? NO

• Summary: The constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. There is:
1. A reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees
2. A compelling state concern likely to be met by the search (minimize illegal drug use)
3. Well-defined limits in the law to guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing
• To justify an intrusion into certain rights, such as the right to privacy, the reasonableness standard is used.
• The reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.
1. First Factor: The nature of the privacy interest upon which it (the drug testing) intrudes.
2. Second Factor: The scope of the intrusion must be clearly set forth (there must be well-defined limits)
• First Factor: Nature of the privacy interest - MET
o In an office, the employees' privacy interest is circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
CBA and the right of the employer to maintain discipline in the workplace.
o Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, thus reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
• THIS SECTION IS IMPT to the case list: Second Factor: Well-Defined Limits - MET
o As set forth in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search must be "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused".
o RA 9165 itself provides that the random drug test should follow the procedure as contained in the
company's work rules and regulation
o As to the mechanics of the test it shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test.
§ Screening test – determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used
§ Confirmatory test – confirms a positive screening test.
o The test shall also be conducted by professionals in the DOH to safeguard against results tampering.
o Moreover, RA 9165 does not require the employer to report the results to the prosecuting agencies.
• The court applied all these requisites first to private employees, but also held that it should also apply to public
employees who are required to be accountable to the people they serve.
• Thus, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individual's privacy interest under the premises.

Is Sec. 36(f) covering persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable penalty
of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day, unconstitutional? YES

• This provision is unconstitutional as it violates a persons' right to privacy and right to self-incrimination.
• The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless."
o In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing
can never be random or suspicionless.
o When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will.
• In such a case, they do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.

Is Sec 36 unconstitutional for being a case of Undue Delegation of Power? NO

• There is no undue delegation of power. It expressly provides how drug testing should be conducted.
o For Students: In accordance with the school rules in the student handbook and with notice to parents.
o For officers/employee: In accordance with the company's work rules

Jaigest – PoliRev - 13

 • In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug
test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way.
• And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 14

Disini v. Secretary of Justice (Feb 18, 2014 and April 22, 2014 MR)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act unconstitutional
and void
• What is the cybercrime law?
o cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace
o It seeks to punish those with ill will and use cyberspace technology for mischief and crimes
o Therefore the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace.
• Petitioners argue that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyber activities
violate constitutional rights
• The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
• The following provisions of the Cybercrime law are challenged for being unconstitutional:
1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access
2. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference
3. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft
5. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex
6. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography
7. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications – UNCONSTITUTIONAL
8. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
11. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
12. Section 8 on Penalties;
13. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data – UNCONSTITUTIONAL
14. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
15. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
16. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
17. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
18. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data – UNCONSTITUTIONAL
19. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
20. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
21. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
22. Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC
on the crime of libel.

ISSUES/HELD:

Illegal Access: Sec. 4(a)(1) – Valid

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. - The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

• Petitioners: Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
• Strict scrutiny standard – a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 15

 o Burden is on government to prove
§ that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
§ That it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest
• SC: There is no need to apply the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom (like speech) is
involved in punishing a condemnable act – accessing the computer of another without right.
• Petitioners: this will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers
o Ethical hackers – evaluate the target system’s security and report back to the owners the
vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied.
• But this has no bearing since a client and an ethical hacker will agree on the search and its extent.
o A “get out of jail free” card
o Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would
insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Data interference: Sec 4(a)(3) – Valid

(3) Data Interference. - The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

• Petitioners: provision suffers from overbreadth in that it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression which creates a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms
• Overbreadth doctrine – a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms
• SC: this provision does not encroach on these freedoms at all
o Simply punishes what is essentially a form of vandalism of computer data, electronic documents, or
electronic data messages
§ Vandalism – the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others
o There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents
• It can be argued that all penal laws have a chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is
proper.
o But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to
render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.
• In this case, the supposed chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since this provision clearly
describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s
constitutional rights
o Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no
set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid – they were not able to do this

Cyber-squatting: Sec. 4(a)(6) – Valid

(6) Cyber-squatting. - The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

• Petitioners: this violates the equal protection clause

o Not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those
who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device
§ Example: in the case of the name of the well-known philanthropist Julio Gandolfo, the law
would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he

Jaigest – PoliRev - 16

 claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens
to be his real name.
§ Law should distinguish between the former and the latter
• SC: there is no real difference between the two.
• The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.

Identity Theft: Sec. 4(b)(3) – Valid

b) Computer-related Offenses:

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. - The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree
lower.

• Petitioners: the provision violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence,
and transgresses the freedom of the press.
• Re: the right to privacy
o Institutionalized in 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right to be protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures
o Court acknowledged its existence at early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc
• Zones of privacy
o GR: Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
o XPN: when excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process.
• Two constitutional guarantees create the zones of privacy:
o Right against unreasonable searches and seizures (basis of right to be let alone)
o Right to privacy of communication and correspondence
• In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
• The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address,
his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.
o The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to
cause damage.
o Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates
the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law
o Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water
since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech.

Cybersex: Sec. 4(c)(1) – Valid

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex.- The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.

• Petitioners: violates freedom of expression

o private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which
are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done “for
favor” in cyberspace.
o Since term “favor” includes “gracious kindness” in the the common sense, the term “favor”
encompasses socially tolerated trysts
• SC: the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention
Act give a proper perspective on the issue.
o These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize this consensual, private showing

Jaigest – PoliRev - 17

 o The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a
business” is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex
o The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration.

Child Pornography: Sec. 4(c)(2) – Valid

(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

• Merely expands scope of the existing Anti-Child Pornography Act to cover identical activities in cyberspace
• Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But
no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational
basis for such higher penalty.
• Petitioners: provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to “produce, direct, manufacture or create
any form of child pornography” clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses
that ACPA seeks to punish.
o wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is
not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop
would be.
o if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered
aiding and abetting a cybercrime. (aiding and abetting discussed later)

Unsolicited Commercial Communications: Sec. 4(c)(3) – Unconstitutional

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. - The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the
use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information
in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

• Above penalized spam, according to the Government:

o Are a nuisance and waste of storage and network space
o Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters
the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
o commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
• SC: Provision unconstitutional
o Government has no basis for saying that unsolicited electronic ads reduce computer efficiency
o people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads
by mail – these were never outlawed
o What matters is that the recipient has the option of opening or reading these mail ads (which spam
allows anyway)

Jaigest – PoliRev - 18

 • Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate form of expression
o To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
o Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection.
o The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.

Libel: Sec 4(c)(4) and under the RPC – Valid

RPC

Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos,
or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

• In the Cybercrime law, the RPC provisions are merely incorporated

Cybercrime

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

• Petitioners: two provisions on libel carry with them requirement of “presumed malice” even when jurisprudence
has already replaced this with the standard of “actual malice” (cite the case of Fermin)
o inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression
o They even go further and contend that libel laws should should be stricken down as unconstitutional
• Actual Malice – offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not
o There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published.
o prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt.
• the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual
malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who
were public figures.
• And besides, actual malice only applies to libel where the offended party is a public person
o The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
assailed statement when the victim of libel is a private person

Jaigest – PoliRev - 19

 • Petitioners: both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country’s obligations under
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
o But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute
an all-encompassing defense.
o the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply
suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of
expression.

MR
• Petitioners: effectively trample on right to free expression
• But libel is not protected speech

Aiding and Abetting: Sec 5. – UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. - Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

• Petitioners: Suffers from overbreadth. Creates chilling effect.

• Aiding and abetting is well-defined in existing law but these meanings don’t necessarily apply in cybercrimes
(with likes, retweets, reposts, and shares)
• Question: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement, “Commenting” on it, or
“Sharing” it with others, to be regarded as “aiding or abetting?”
o Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment
and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of
their response to the original posting.
• The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when
applied to cyberspace libel.
o Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and
culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of
communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
• US case Reno v. ACL regarding the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act
o Struck down as unconstitutional since it burdened free speech
• When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
• The provision is unconstitutional. I
o ts vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect
on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors
in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.

Penalty of One Degree higher: Sec. 6 – Valid

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed
by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

• Merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance
• there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means
o On the internet, the offender evades identification

Jaigest – PoliRev - 20

In the MR:
• Petitioner bloggers insist that Section 6 cannot stand in the absence of a definition of the term "information
and communication technology"
• But basic stat con: you don’t read statutes in isolation from one another.
o Parameters of ICT exist in many other laws

Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175: Sec. 7 – Valid

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

• Merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized
simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code.

Penalties: Sec. 8 – Valid

Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of
this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a
fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage
incurred or both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not
exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished
with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the “Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:” Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if
committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.

• The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
• The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some
prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with
another crime.

Real-time collection of traffic data: Sec 12 – UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized
to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying
service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 21

 Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of
the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is
being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that
will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

• Petitioners: assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real
time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse.
o invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the
messages or information that they send to one another.
• Does Sec 12 have a proper governmental purpose/serve compelling state interest? – YES
o the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to
the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good.
o To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data
to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
• Petitioner: provision invalid for violation of right to privacy
• Two aspects of privacy:
o Decisional privacy – right to independence in making certain important decisions
o Informational privacy – interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
§ This is kind of importance to this case
• Two aspects of informational privacy:
o right not to have private information disclosed
o right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion
• To determine whether or not a matter is entitled to privacy, there is the two-fold test:
o Subjective test: one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over
a certain matter
o Objective test: where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable
• While computer data constitutes seemingly unconnected traffic data (ex. In messages, only the coded IP
address of the sender and the recipient is disclosed), these data, when put together, can reveal patterns of
activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under surveillance.
• Sec 12 gives law enforcement too much power and too little restraint in the exercise of this power.
o Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from
looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains.
• Void for vagueness doctrine and overbreadth doctrine not applied since these only apply to free speech cases.

Preservation of Computer Data: Sec. 13 – Valid

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months
from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt
of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once
computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere
furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a
notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.

• Petitioners: this amounts to undue deprivation of property

• No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients
and are to be considered private communications.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 22

 o But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as
they pass its system for the benefit of users.
o By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and
subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date of the
transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their
preservation.
• In any case, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded.
o The service provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
• The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

Disclosure of Computer Data: Sec. 14 – Valid

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue
an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or
relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a
valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the
purpose of investigation.

• So basically, like a subpoena

• Petitioners: the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue
subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function
• This is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law
enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions.
o The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would
it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence.
o Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Search, Seizure, and Examinatino of Computer Data: Sec. 15 – Valid

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly
issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning
of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is
reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data
storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of
approval by the court.

• This merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection,
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant.
o The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were
taken.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 23

 o Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements
them.

Destruction of Computer Data: Sec 17 – Valid

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the
computer data subject of a preservation and examination.

• Petitioners: such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the
user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
• BUT: it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of
the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved
them

Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data: Sec. 19 – UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be in
violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

• Petitioners: stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
o OSG concedes
• The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a
restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected.
• Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal.
o But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it
is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would
make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.
• it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.

Obstruction of Justice: Sec. 20 – Valid

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from
law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of
prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for
each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

• Petitioner: this is a bill of attainder

o the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where
non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
• But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829, Section
20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein.
o If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have
had to make reference to any other statute or provision.

(Main issue) CICC’s Powers and functions: Sec. 24 and 26(a) – Valid

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.- There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned
agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.- The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

Jaigest – PoliRev - 24

 (a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of
cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT)

• Petitioners: Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow.
• How to determine undue delegation:
o Completeness test – law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
o Sufficient standard test – mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
• Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan.
o Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 25

People v. Rosenthal (1939)
Laurel, J.

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Appellants, Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña, were charged in the CFI of Manila with having violated Act
No. 2581 or the “Blue Sky Law.”
• 2 informations were filed against them, which basically states that they were “promoters, founders,
incorporators of O.R.O Oil Co. and South Cebu Oil Co” and they sold shares that were considered as
speculative without the needed certificate from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth (required under
Sec. 2 and 5).
o CASE No. 52365 (October 1, 1935 and January 22, 1936, Manila) - "The accused Nicasio Osmeña
sold 163 shares to nine different parties, and the accused Jacob Rosenthal sold 21 shares to seven
others, without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as by law required."
o CASE No. 52366 (October 1, 1935, and January 22, 1936, Manila) - "The accused Nicasio Osmeña
sold 185 shares to nine different parties, and the accused Jacob Rosenthal sold 12 shares to seven
others, without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as by law provided."
o FYI: The main purpose of the companies were to "to mine, dig for, or otherwise obtain from earth,
petroleum, rock and carbon oils, natural gas, other volatile mineral substances and salt, and to
manufacture, refine, prepare for market, buy, sell and transport the same in crude or refined
condition".
• The lower court found them guilty for both cases.
o CASE No. 52365 – Rosenthal was sentenced to pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs; Osmeña was sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs
o CASE No. 52366 - Rosenthal was sentenced to pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs; Osmeña was sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs.
o FYI. Initially, Rosenthal wanted a separate trial but the trial court also consolidated in the end (baka
naglaglagan na sila kaya gusto nila separate trial).
• On appeal to the SC, the SC disregarded factual issues because there were no material discrepancies, and
proceeded with the legal questions.

ISSUE/HELD:

(MAIN ISSUE) Does the Act No. 2581 constitute an undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular
Treasurer – NO,
Assailed provisions:
• Section 2 - Every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines
speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular
Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty pesos.
Certain securities listed in section 3 are exempted from the operation of the Act.
• Section 5 imposes upon the Insular Treasurer the mandatory duty to examine the statements and documents
thus filed and the additional duty to make or cause to be made, if deemed advisable by him, a detailed
examination of the affairs of the applicant.
o It also provides that "whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or
without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is
entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine
Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit
reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of
this Act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are
entitled to offer the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale"; that "said Treasurer shall
furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said

Jaigest – PoliRev - 26

 certificate or permit", and that "an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within
the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance."

Appellants contention:
• Act No. 2581 empowers the Insular Treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities, no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the
cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the
matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular
Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional.

SC ruling:
• The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding
the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit.
o The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership,
association or corporation applying therefor "has complied with the provisions of this Act", and this
requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit
shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied
with.
o "Public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a
decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
§ The authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation "is in the public interest."
§ The purpose of Act No. 2581 is to protect the public against "speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky" and against the "sale of stock in fly-by-
night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations.”
o Plus, it cannot be contended that the Insular Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining
influence because the law allows an appeal to the Sec. of Finance hence there is a restraining
influence to the power of the Insular Treasurer.
• SC discussed theory of separation of powers to support its argument that there was a valid delegation.
o The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and
thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism.
o However, it is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that
the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare, attributed to
Bracton but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law, has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation".
o While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide each case
according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to
be achieved.
• Rosenthal argues that the discretionary power to determine when a security is a speculative security and when
it is not" because "he is given the power to compel any corporation, association or partnership already
functioning, to surrender to him for examination its books and accounts enumerated in section 2, 'whenever
he has reasonable ground to believe that the securities being sold or offered for sale are of a speculative
character.'"
o However, Section 1 of Act 2581 defines and enumerates what speculative securities are and all the
other provisions of the Act must be read and construed in conjunction and harmony with said section.
o In Leach v. Daugherty, Blue Sky Law of Ohio was also challenged because it gave the commissioner
arbitrary power to revoke the license. The US SC said it is well-settled principle of law in this state
that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts,
upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a
regulated business.
o In the case of G.F. Redmon & Co. v. Michigan Securities Commission, where the Michigan Blue Sky
law was challenged because it gave the commissioner power to revoke a license for “good cause”
the SC court said that The term "good cause" for revocation, as employed in the statute, relates so
clearly to the conduct of the licensed business, within the limits fixed by law, as to negative any
arbitrary official action.
o State ex rel. Central Steam Heat Power Co. v. Gettle, basically same as the above cases.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 27

Does Act No. 2581 violate the equal protection clause – NO.
• Appellants contend that it violates the equal protection clause because the law discriminates between an
owner who sells in a single transaction and one who sells in repeated and successive transactions
• Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. US S.C. ruled that “We cannot give separate attention to the asserted discriminations.
It is enough to say that they are within the power of classification which a state has. A state "may direct its law
against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it
may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed . . .. If a class
is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment
allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced
in the law.”

Is Act No. 2581 vague and uncertain – NO.

• A similar contention has already been overruled by this court in the case of People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad,
An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing
that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what
the legislature in
• tended.
• In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the
ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act
will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure
the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means,
and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith."

Are the shares sold speculative - YES.

• Section 1, paragraph (b) of Act No. 2581: 'speculative securities' are "(b) All securities the value of which
materially depend upon proposed or promised future promotion or development rather than on present
tangible assets and conditions."
• The shares issued under these circumstances are clearly speculative because they depended upon proposed
or promised future promotion or development rather than on present tangible assets and conditions.
o At the beginning, and at the time of the issuance of the shares of the O.R.O. Oil Co. and the South
Cebu Oil Co., all that these companies had were their exploration leases. Beyond this, there was
nothing tangible. The value of those shares depended upon future development and the uncertainty
of "striking" oil.

Do they fall within the exception. - NO

• Appellants further contend that they come under the exception provided in section 8 of Act No. 2581.
o Under this section, there are clearly two classes of persons to whom the law is not applicable:
§ 1) Persons who hold speculative securities but who are not the issuers thereof; and
§ (2) persons who have acquired the same for their own account in the usual and ordinary
course of business and not for the direct or indirect promotion of any enterprise or scheme
within the purview of this Act, provided (the law uses the term "unless") such possession is
in good faith.
• SC: The good faith set up by appellant Rosenthal for having acted on the advice of Garcia, an officer of the
Insular Treasury, and the subsequent devolution by him of amounts collected from some of the purchasers of
the shares may be considered as a circumstance in his favor in the imposition of the penalty prescribed by
law but does not exempt him from criminal responsibility.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 28

Eastern Shipping v. POEA (1988)

Article 6, Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives, except to the extended reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

FACTS:

• Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the MV Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo in 1985.
• His widow, Respondent Kathleen Saco sued for damages under EO 797 and Memo. Circular No.2 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
• Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the SSS and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.
• Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of Mrs. Saco.
• She was awarded P192k for the death of her husband (P180k as death benefits, P12k for burial expenses).
• Eastern Shipping filed the petition with the SC to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
o It argued that Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the POEA was violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.

ISSUES/HELD:

Should this petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies? - NO
• Ordinarily, decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the NLRC, on the theory inter alia that the agency
should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates.
• But the exception is: when the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law.

Did the POEA have jurisdiction over the claim? - YES

• POEA was created under EO 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights.
• It replaced the National Seamen Board created under Art. 20 of the Labor Code in 1974.
• Under Sec. 4(a) of EA 797, the POEA is vested with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving Ee-Er relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen.
o These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the
POEA, include “claims for death, disability and other benefits” arising out of such employment.

Was Vitaliano Saco an overseas worker? - YES

• Eastern Shipping does not contend that Saco was not its employee of that the claim of his widow is not
compensable.
• What it claims was that he was not an overseas worker but a ‘domestic employee’ and consequently his
widow’s claim should have been filed with the SSS, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC).
• Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment [Rules], overseas employment is defined
as “employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract.”
• A contract worker is described as “any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment
contract and shall include seamen” or “any person working overseas or who has been employed by another
which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and
shall include seamen.”
• These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of
employment with Eastern Shipping and alongside the latter’s vessel while berthed in a foreign country.
• Eastern Shipping also performed at least 2 acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of
Saco’s employment at the time of his death in 1985.
• FIRST, is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under EO 797.
• SECOND, is its payment of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 29

 • The office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared Kathleen Saco’s signature, described the subject
of the burial benefits as “overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco.”
• While this receipt is not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of Eastern’s own previous acts, that it and the
Fund to which it had made contributions, considered Saco to be an overseas employee.

Was Memo Circular No. 2 complied with? - NO

• The award of 180k for death benefits and 12k for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its
Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on Feb. 1, 1984.
• This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies
in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
• Eastern claimed it it never entered into such a contract with Vitaliano, but that is hardly a serious argument.
• FIRST, It should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that “all parties to the
employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this
employment contract effective Feb. 1, 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract
effective that date.”
• SECOND, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into
the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State.

(IMPT) Is MC-2 violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power? - NO

• Eastern contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation’ and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle,
is not subject to delegation.
• BUT under Sec. 4(a) of EO 797, “the governing Board of Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”
• Similar authority had been granted the National Seamen Board, which had itself prescribed a standard
shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
• What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be..
• The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
• This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
• 2 Tests to Determine Whether There is a Valid Delegation of Legislative Power.
1. Completeness Test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient Standard Test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
• Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
• The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the 3 major powers of the Govt but is especially
important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted.
• The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which
they legally certain.
• In the case of the legislative power, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary.
• This led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation
the exception.
• REASON: increasing complexity of the task of govt and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the problems demanding its attention.
o The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
o Many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
o These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them.
• These reasons are applicable to administrative bodies.
• With the proliferation of specialized activities and their peculiar problems, the legislature has found it more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issues rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute.
• This is called “the power of subordinate legislation.”

Jaigest – PoliRev - 30

 o With this power, admin bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in”
the details which Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.’
o This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as
the implementing rules issued by the DOLE on the Labor Code.
o These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 31

Tablarin v. Gutierrez (1987)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Petitioners Tablarin et.al. sought admission into schools of medicine for SY 1987-88. However, they were not
able to take or was not successful in taking the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).
o The NMAT is required by the Board of Medical Education.
• In 1987, Tablarin et.al. filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory judgment and prohibition with a prayer for
TRO and preliminary injunction.
• They sought to enjoin the:
o Enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of R.A. 2382 as amended and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985,
§ R.A. 2382 or the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the standardization and regulation of
medical education:
• It created a Board of Medical Education and under Section 5 of said law, the
functions of the board is specified:
o (a) to determined and prescribe requirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine;
o (f) to accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school
and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from
said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue
to the operating fund of the Board.
§ MEC Order No. 52, s. 1985 established a uniform admission test called the NMAT as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines.
o Requirement of taking and passing the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility and
from administering the NMAT in the future.
• This was denied and the NMAT was conducted as previously scheduled
• Petitioners Tablarin filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari to set aside the order of the RTC judge denying
the petition.
• Tablarin questions the Constitutionality of the law, invoking five provisions from the Constitution:
o Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
of human rights."
o Article II, Section 13: “Role of youth in nation building…”
o Article II, Section 17: “Priority to education…”
o Article XIV, Section 1: “Promote and protect the right of all citizens to quality education and to make
sure that education is accessible to all”
o Article XIV, Section 5(3): “Right of a citizen to select a profession or course of study….”
• Tablarin initially asked the court if they could issue a writ of preliminary injunction pending the resolution of
the issue of constitutionality:
o SC held that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a
statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome,
in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right
to the remedy sought.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is the law and order unconstitutional for violation of sections under Article II of the 1987 Constitution? – NO
• Article II of the Constitution sets out the “State Policies” which the government is enjoined to pursue and
promote.
• Petitioners Tablarin et.al. have failed to demonstrate to what extent and in what manner the statute and
administrative order have violated the policies embodied under Sections 11, 13, and 17.
• They have failed to discharge the burden of proof.

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Is the law and order unconstitutional for violation of Section XIV on quality education? – NO
• Once more, petitioners failed to demonstrate how the statute and regulation they assail clash this this
provision.
• Furthermore, the statute and regulation they assail are in fact, designed to promote “quality education” at the
level of professional schools.
• The state is not enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for
any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school.
o It is enjoined, rather, to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.

Is there undue delegation of legislative power under Sections 5 (a) and (5) of R.A. 2382? – NO
• Petitioners contend that the law failed to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education.
• SC held:
o The principle of non-delegation of legislative powers must be considered with respect to certain
statutes such as the Medical Act of 1959, which deals with more complex and technical subjects
such as medical education and the practice of medicine.
§ “With the growing complexities of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts”.
o Hence, the standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract
§ The standard may either be expressed or implied. But it does not have to be spelled
out specifically. The standard can be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole.
§ In this case, the standards are set out under Section 1 of the law: "the standardization and
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of
the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non- delegation principle”.

Is the NMAT a denial of due process? –NO

• Again, petitioners have failed to specify what factors or features of NMAT render it unfair, unreasonable or
inequitable.
• Their argument that the passing of the test is an unnecessary requirement on top of other admission
requirements relate to the utility and wisdom of the NMAT requirements.
o The SC held that these kinds of questions is better addressed to the political departments of the
government and not the courts.
o Constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or
administrative regulation.
• Furthermore, the law is a valid exercise of the police power of the state: An important component of that public
order is the health and physical safety and well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.

Is there a reasonable relation between the passing of the NMAT and securing the health and safety of the
general community? – YES
• The regulation of the practice of medicine has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public.
o The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission
to medical schools.
o Hence, legislation and regulations that require those who wish to practice medicine to (1) first take
and pass a medical board exam or (2) to complete the prescribed courses in medical schools, has
long ago been recognizes as valid exercises of governmental power.
• The case before us is similarly situated: The regulation of access to medical schools.
o The government is entitled to prescribe and admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving
its stated objectives to (1) upgrade the selection of applicants in medical schools, and (2) improve
the quality of medical education in the country.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 33

 o The NMAT is reasonably related to securing the ultimate end of legislation and regulation: protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

Is the MECS Order in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution? – NO
• Petitioners argue that the order, which requires that the cutoff scores be determined every year, infringes on
equal protection and is discriminatory against the students.
• SC held that the difference is valid:
o Different cutoffs scores for different years is dictated by differing conditions during those years.
o The appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as:
§ the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year;
§ the number of places available in medical schools during the current year;
§ the average score attained during the current year;
§ the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 34

Viola v. Alunan (1997)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• This case gives an example of a valid delegation of legislative power through the LGC, wherein Congress has
delegated the power to create positions in the barangay level.
• Petitioner Viola is the barangay Chairman of Bgy. 167, Zone 15, Dist. 2, Manila. Defendants are DILG Sec.
Rafael Alunan; the pres/sec. gen. of the National Liga ng mga Bgy; and the president of Liga ng mga Bgy. of
Manila.
• This petition challenges the validity of sections 1-2, Art. III of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines
(IRG) for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers because it provides for the election of
st nd rd
1 , 2 , and 3 Vice-Presidents and for auditors, which are in excess of those provided in the Local Govt
Code.
o The LGC only mentions as elective positions: the President, VP, 5 members of the board of directors
in each chapter at the Municipal, City, Provincial, Metropolitan political subdivision, and national
levels.
o Petitioner seeks to restrain defendants from carrying out the elections for the questioned positions
on July 1994
o Petitioner argues that in providing for the said positions, the number of positions in the LGC is
expanded and this violates the principle that IRRS cannot add/detract from the provisions of the law
they are designed to implement.
• Elections are over by the time of the decision but the issues raised may arise again in the future so the SC still
decided on it.

ISSUES/HELD:

Are sections 1-2, which provide for the additional positions, of the IRG valid? – YES.
1
• The creation of the additional positions is authorized by the LGC (contrary to petitioner’s contention)
o Sec. 493, LGC in fact requires and not merely authorizes the board of directors to 
“create such other
positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the 
chapter.” – It belies petitioner’s claim
that said provision limits the officers of a chapter to the 
president, VP and 5 members of the board of
directors, secretary, and treasurer. 

o Moreover, the creation of the positions was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga
ng Mga Barangay. Such was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly on its Consti and By-
laws 

o What was done in the Consti and By-laws of their liga was to create additional positions in each
chapter, whether national or local, without however precluding the boards of directors of the
chapters as well as that of the national liga from creating other positions for their peculiar needs. 

o The creation by the board of the National Liga of the positions of 1st, 2nd and 3rd VPs, auditors and
public relations officers was intended to provide uniform officers for the various chapters in line
with the mandate in Art. 210(g)(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC to the
Barangay National Assembly to “formulate uniform constitution and by-laws applicable to the
national liga and all local chapters.” 

o The various chapters could have different minor officers depending on their local needs, but they
must have the same major elective officers, meaning to say, the additional vice presidents and
auditors.
• The Board of Directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional
positions
.
o While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs
of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power

1
Section 493. Xxx The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter. Xxx”

Jaigest – PoliRev - 35

 to create additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters
at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.
o Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the local chapters. There would then be only
so many local chapters without a national one, when what is contemplated in the above-quoted
provisions of the LGC is that there should be one Liga ng mga Barangay with local chapters at all
levels of local government units. 

o By denying to the board of directors at the National Liga the power to create additional positions in
the local chapters, would reduce such board to a board of a local chapter. 

o Section 493 grants the power to create positions to the boards of the BOTH local chapters and the
board of the Liga at the national level as well. 


[MAIN ISSUE] Was there undue delegation of the power to create positions by Congress? –NO.
• Congress can delegate the power to create positions. There is no undue delegation of power by
Congress.
o This has been settled by several SC decisions upholding the validity of 
reorganization statutes
authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, 
abolish or merge offices in the executive
department. 

• In making a delegation of this power to the board of directors of each chapter of the 
Liga ng Mga Barangay,
Congress should provide a sufficient standard so that administrative discretion may be “canalized within
proper banks that keep it from overflowing.” (phrase coined from Justice Cardozo 

• Some examples of “sufficient standards” for the purpose of valid delegation 

o Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and changes in
GOCCs for the purpose of promoting “simplicity, economy and efficiency” in their operations 

o Empowering the Secretary of Education to prescribe minimum standards of “adequate and efficient
instruction” in private schools and colleges 

• Judged by these cases, SC held that Sec. 493 of the LGC, in directing the board of directors of the liga to
“create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapters,”
embodies a fairly intelligible standard. 


Dissenting Opinion (J. DAVIDE)


• basically states that only the BOD is vested with the power to create other positions as may be necessary for
the management of the chapter.
• He says that he is unable to find any LGC provision creating or establishing the Brgy. National Assembly—
what the LGC was creates is the Liga ng mga Barangay with local chapters at the municipal, city, provincial
and metropolitan subdivision levels.
• He said that there is no showing that the Brgy. National Assembly was authorized to draft Consti and By-laws
– that it denied the board at the National Liga the power to create additional positions in the local chapters. It
would be a clear case of judicial legislation to declare that since the additional positions were created in the
Constitution and By- Laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay, then they “were as much as the creations of the local
chapters as of the national league” since this runs afoul of §493 of the LGC which vests the power to create
additional positions only in the Board of Directors of the chapter.
• Section 493 merely allows the creation of other appointive positions. The new positions which may be created
are those “deemed necessary for the management of the chapter,” which may only pertain to the day-to-day
business and affairs of the liga chapter, and not to policy formulation which may be exercised by the executive
officers and Board of Directors.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 36

ABAKADA v. Ermita [2005]

Background: RA 9337 or the VAT Reform Act was enacted. The following petitions were filed to the SC to question the
constitutionality of some of its provisions. This case involves 5 consolidated cases. Only 3 of which tackles the
delegation of legislative power.

FACTS:

(First case)
• ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of some of the
provisions of RA 9337 or the VAT law. The provisions impose a 10% VAT on the following:
o (a) Sale of goods and properties (Sec. 4);
o (b) Importation of goods (Sec. 5); and
o (c) Sale of services and use or lease of properties (Sec. 6).
• They all have a similar proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% after any of the two conditions have been met:
o (a) VAT collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds 2.8%; or
o (b) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1.5%.
• ABAKADA argues that said provisions are unconstitutional because it constitutes as abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix tax rates under Sec. 8(2), Art. 6 of the Constitution.

(Second case)
• Senator Pimentel, et al. filed a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Secs. 4-6 of RA 9337.
o They were contending that the “stand-by authority” of the President to increase the VAT to
12% subject to the grounds above amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power.
• They also contend that the increase after the two conditions have been met violates the due process clause
in Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the Constitution.
o They contend that the 12% is ambiguous, unfair, and unreasonable.
• They further claim that the “stand-by authority” granted to the President violates the “no-amendment rule”
provided for in Sec. 26(2), Art. 6 of the Constitution.

(Third case)
• Cong. Francis Escudero, et al. filed a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Secs. 4-6 of RA
9337 contending that it they constitute an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Sec. 28(2), Art.
6 of the Constitution.

• OSG contended that RA 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and that the petitions were not able
to refute such presumption.
o With regard the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, OSG contended that
the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but to increase the VAT rate to 12%
once any of the 2 conditions were met.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is there an undue delegation of legislative power to the President?—NO! The proviso in question does not
contain a delegation of legislative power, BUT it is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts.

• Sec. 1, Art. 6 of the Constitution provides that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines, which consists of both the Senate and the House of the Representatives.
o The power that Congress is prohibited from delegating are those strictly, inherently, and exclusively
legislative or the authority to make a complete law.
• However, this non-delegability of legislative power is subject to exceptions:
o Imposition of tariff rates by the President (Sec. 28(2), Art. 6 of the Constitution);
o Delegation of emergency powers to the President (Sec. 23(2), Art. 6 of Const.);
o Delegation to the people at large;
o Delegation to local governments; and
o Delegation to administrative bodies.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 37

 • In every instance of delegation of legislative power, there must be a showing that the delegation is valid. It is
valid only when the law:
o (a) Complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and
o (b) Fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions
• SC held that a sufficient standard is one that defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries,
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
o Both tests are intended to prevent a total transfer of legislative power to delegate.
o This is due to the doctrine of separation of powers of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest or “what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated.”
• SC held that the legislature has the power to delegate to executive bodies the power to determine certain facts
or conditions where the law can be implemented.
o However, the law delegating the same must still have sufficient standards, policies or limitations on
their authority.
• It is clear that the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies. However, details as to the
enforcement or the exercise of the power to tax may be left to the executive agencies.
o SC held that the rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts is not a
legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation.
o The duty of acquiring information and making recommendations is an activity wherein the legislature
may delegate to others.
o Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of society is impossible without the accurate
information on the part of the legislators. It is held that any reasonable method of securing such
information is proper, such as delegating the ascertainment of facts to the executive.
o This is also because the Constitution does not require Congress to find for itself every fact wherein
it could base its legislative action.
• HOWEVER, SC held that this case does not involve any delegation of legislative power. (IMPT!)
o It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent.
o The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective when certain conditions are met.
o The legislature leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the President.
• SC held that no discretion would be exercised by the President. The President may only implement
what is stated in the law. (IMPT!)
o It is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. The President cannot avoid such duty.
o It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the conditions are met.
o The conditions are based on the happening of a certain specified events, or upon the ascertainment
of certain facts by a body other than the legislature.
o There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible.
• With regard to ABAKADA’s contention that the law nullified the President’s power of control over the Secretary
of Finance, SC held that the word ‘shall’ in the proviso should be interpreted to mean ‘may’ in view of the
phrase “upon the recommendation of the SoF.”
o SC held that any recommendation by the SoF can easily be brushed aside by the President since
the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.
o It simply means that as head of the Department of Finance, he is the assistant and agent of the
President.
o Congress simply granted the SoF the authority to ascertain the existence of the conditions, and when
they are met, the SoF must submit such information to the President.
• Ultimately, Congress did not abdicate its functions to legislate or unduly delegated this power when
it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
• SC upheld the constitutionality of said provisions.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 38

Beltran v. Sec. of Health (2005)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• RA No. 7719 (National Blood Services Act of 1994) was enacted in order to provide adequate supply of safe
blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country.
o Section 7 of RA 7719 provides that all commercial blood banks will be phased out over 2 years from
effectivity of the Act, extendible to a maximum of 2 years by the Secretary.
• Administrative Order No. 9 was promulgated by the DOH Secretary, containing the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) for RA 7719.
o The IRR has similar provision for phasing out of the all commercial blood banks in 2 years (extendible
for another 2 years) upon careful review and study of blood supply and considerations of demand
and public safety.
• Reason for the regulation of blood banks:
o Concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified due to proliferation of AIDS
o New Tropical Medicine Foundation, assisted by US Agency for International Development (USAID)
released a report on the study of blood banking system in the Phils.
§ There were 4 major source of blood in the country namely: the commercial blood banks,
Philippine National Red Cross, government hospital-based blood banks and private
hospital-based blood banks
§ Commercial blood banks produces five times more blood than Red Cross and fifteen times
more than the government run blood banks.
§ Blood donors of the commercial blood banks and private hospital based blood banks are
paid donors (payment rate is P50-P150), making it more likely than the blood ‘sold’ is
infected with blood transfusion diseases.
§ Many of the donors are poor and students who need money. Thus, they often lie about their
medical or social history just to be able to donate blood. Blood of voluntary blood donors
are three times much safer than paid donors.
§ Filipino doctors are not fully trained on the indications for blood component transfusion and
are unaware of the lack of blood supply. Source of blood supply are often ignored.
o The case discussed the senate deliberations when RA 7719 was passed but basically, the
deliberations discussed the adverse effects of unsafe blood from commercial blood banks and the
need to secure public safety and welfare.
• Beltran and other petitioners (Beltran) have been operating commercial blood banks under RA No. 1517 which
previously allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood
processing laboratories.
• Beltran assailed the constitutionality of RA 7719 and its IRR.
o DOH was directed to comment and a TRO against RA 7719 and the IRR was issued.
o DOH, in its comment, stated that the blood from the commercial blood banks are unsafe and
therefore, the State can exercise police power to close them and protect the public.
• Beltran filed a motion for expanded TRO for the DOH Secretary to cease and desist from announcing the
closure of commercial banks, compelling public to source blood from voluntary blood donors only and
committing similar acts that will ultimately lead to the closure of commercial blood banks.

ISSUES/HELD:

Does Section 7 of RA 7719 constitute undue delegation of legislative power? – NO

• In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so
that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the
Legislature.
• Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, is incomplete and

Jaigest – PoliRev - 39

 invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
• RA 7719 is complete in itself. Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The
Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act with the implementation of RA 7719.
o It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health
of the people.
o The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in
carrying out its provisions: the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of
blood through voluntary blood donation.
o By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution, which is to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
o The power to implement the closing of commercial banks and the power to ascertain the existence
of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out
can be delegated by Congress.

Does RA 7719 and the IRR violate equal protection clause? – NO

• A classification, to be valid must be: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must
apply equally to each member of the class.
• To effectuate the aim and policy of RA 7719, a classification was made between non-profit blood
banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
• Classification is valid:
o (a) Based on substantial distinctions: non-profit blood banks/centers operates for purely humanitarian
reasons while commercial blood banks are motivated by profit.
o (b) Germane to the purpose of the law: to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood
by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity
o (c) Must not be limited to existing conditions only: intended for general application of the law;
enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended
to apply only to the existing conditions.
o Law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

Does RA 7719 and the IRR constitute valid exercise of police power? – YES
• Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to attain the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
• RA 7719 is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
o The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State and is a primordial
governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in order to promote and preserve public health and
safety.
• Therefore, the Legislature adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common
good. Police power may be exercised through legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.
• Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints in order to secure the general and the rights of the
individual may be subordinated.
• The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government.
• The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to police power and regulations
which affect them may be established by the State, and all such regulations must be subject to change from
time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change,
or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
• As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will serve the general public, the
Court stated that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be
inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers. The
wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for the Court to pass upon.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 40

Abakada v. Purisima (2008)

ARTICLE VI. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

FACTS:
• RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) was enacted to improve the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC.
o The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets
by providing a system of rewards and sanctions.
o In simple terms, if they collect more than the year’s target, they are given a reward. If they collect
less than the year’s target, they are given sanctions.
• Pursuant to the law, a Rewards and Incentives Fund was created.
o The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets
for the year.
o Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to
their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
• Petitioners (Abakada Guro Partylist and other taxpayers) filed a petition for prohibition to stop Purisima, as
the Secretary of Finance and the BIR and BOC Commissioners from implementing this law.
• They allege that it is unconstitutional since:
o By establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters.
o It violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection (should not apply only be the agencies
of BOC and BIR, but all other gov’t agencies)
o It is an undue delegation of power and it lacks sufficient standards in giving the President the power
to fix revenue targets, thus, it could be a ground in order to dismiss BIR and BOC personnel if the
President sets an unrealistic and unattainable target.
o The creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
(Note: Taken in a later digest)

ISSUES/HELD:

Is establishing a system of rewards and incentives permissible under our Constitution? YES
• A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.
o The allegation that RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and
mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis but also purely speculative.
• Public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance.
o A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability.
o Thus, in US vs. Matthews, the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the
customs for their efforts against smuggling.
• Moreover, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward cannot be claimed if it will be either the
fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activities”.
o Sec. 8 of the law clearly holds employees liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business
establishment or taxpayer as a result of any abuse in the performance of their duties.

Is limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and
BOC violative of the equal protection clause? NO
• The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
• All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. It is germane to the purpose of the law
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class
• The expressed policy of RA 9335 is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 41

 o The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common function of generating
revenues for the national government through collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
• Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.

RELATED ISSUE: Does RA 9335 unduly delegate the power to fix revenue targets to the President? NO
• Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
o (1) the completeness test and
§ A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate.
o (2) the sufficient standard test.
§ To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce
the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
• RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
o Sec. 2 sets forth the policy: to optimize the revenue-generation capability
o Sec. 4 sets the power of the President to fix revenue targets.
• Sec. 4 provides how the Rewards and Incentives Fund is to be computed.
o First, on the setting of revenue targets.
§ Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year.
§ This is then approved by the DBCC (Dev’t Budget and Coordinating Committee) and stated
in the BESF (Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing) which is submitted by the
President to Congress.
§ Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
o Second, on how much money goes to the fund.
§ If the collection of the BIR/BOC exceeds the revenue targets by 30% or below, 15% of the
said excess collection goes to the Fund.
§ If the collection of the BIR/BOC exceeds the revenue targets by more than 30%, 15% of the
first 30% of said excess collection goes to the Fund and so does 20% of the remaining
excess.
• Moreover, contrary to the claim that it will cause arbitrary removal, Sec. 7 actually lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal: That is when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%.
o This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a
ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.
o The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.
• At any rate, the SC has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
• In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC is infused with public interest.

Note: In a later digest, it will be shown that the creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, only that section (Sec. 12) was declared unconstitutional by the Court, all the other
provisions of RA 9335 are valid.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 42

Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas (1995)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner
de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office
of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City
• While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued
on 7 June 1994
o The resolution stated that the OPIA, the OPR, and the Office of Career Systems and Standards
(OCSS) were to be merged into the Research and Development Office
• Petitioners filed this petition arguing that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices,
something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in
the first place.

ISSUES/HELD:

Does the Civil Service have legal authority to merge the OCSS, the OPIA, and the OPR? -- YES.
• The Revised Admin Code sets out in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and
organization of the Commission
o Office of Career Systems and Standards – provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion
and employee incentive benefits and awards.
o Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit – develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management programs and the
exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional
Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and evaluation
systems.
o Office of Personnel Relations – provide leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and
employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and
awards systems, position classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee welfare
and benefits, discipline and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable
industry practices.
• The Admin Code then provides that:
o Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one (1) Assistant Director,
and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out their respective functions. As an
independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect chances in the organization as the need
arises. (Sec. 17, Organizational Structure)
o Therefore, the offices relate to the internal structure of the CSC
• The Resolution rearranged some of the administrative units
• The reason why the Commission did this was to streamline operations
o Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3 was
precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus generating
a need to find a replacement for him.
o Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been
necessitated by the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under investigation and
needed to be transferred immediately to the Central Office.
• The term "public office" is used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit
of the public.
• The Court cannot accept petitioner’s argument
o The Resolution does not abolish any public office

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 o When the Admin code defined the offices, it certainly did not mean to cast them in stone and freeze
them in place
o In fact, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in
the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises."

Was the security of tenure of the petitioners breached by the resolution? --

• It must be remembered that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified
public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks.
o Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the
Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil
service
o Therefore, the reassignment of Fernandez and de Lima were effected with express statutory authority
and did not constitute removals without lawful cause
• Second, there is a long line of cases that support this
o DepEd v. CA – a person who had been appointed as "Secondary School Principal II" in the Division
of City Schools, District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region, and who had been stationed as
High School Principal in the Carlos Albert High School in Quezon for a number of years, could lawfully
be reassigned or transferred to the Manuel Roxas High School, also in Quezon City, without demotion
in rank or diminution of salary
o Fernando v. Hon. Sto. Tomas – re: appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National
Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of the
Secretary of Labor.
§ They were not appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor
in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned
from one organizational unit to another of the same agency
§ No vested right can be claimed in the station where they are assigned
o Quisumbing v. Gumban – re: appointment in the Bureau of Public Schools of the DECS
§ the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the
Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a specific station
§ she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any
specific station
o Ibanez v. COMELEC – re: appointment as Election Registrars in the COMELEC without any
indication of what city, municipality, or district they were appointed to
§ since petitioners "were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any security of
tenure or permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they [could] be
transferred as the exigencies of the service required," and that they had no right to complain
against any change in assignment.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 44

Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734).
• The Organic Act called for a plebiscite to be held in the ff provinces: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos,
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga.
• Nov 16, 1989 - The plebiscite was conducted.
o Provinces who said YES for creating an autonomous region became the ARMM, these are Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
o For the provinces who said NO:
§ Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides: That only the provinces and cities voting favorably
in such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
• Oct 12, 1990 - Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Cory Aquino issued E.O.
No. 429, “Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.”
o Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439—
o (1)Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
o (2)Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of
Region IX.
o (3)South Cotabato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
o (4)General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
o (5)Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
o (6)Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
• Nov 12, 1990 - Petitioner (former legislators of South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del
Norte and Zamboanga City) wrote Pres. Cory Aquino protesting E.O. N0. 429.
o Arguments:
§ There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within
the existing regions—some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case
of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz—
and restructure them to new administrative regions.
§ The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del
Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotabato from Region XI to Region XII are
alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization
• Petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity
of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
o Jaldon alleges that the power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX
and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to
transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
• As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were
scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
o Jan 29, 1991 – SC issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and
statute in question.
• Defenses of the SolGen:
o the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 is merely the exercise of a power
"traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, and as a mere incident of his
power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus
and offices under Art. X, §16 and Art. VII, §17, respectively, of the Constitution.
o No undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide
the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

Jaigest – PoliRev - 45

ISSUE/HELD:

Is the power to “merge” administrative regions legislative in character. – NO, there is no abdication by
Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
• The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant
to authority granted to him by law.
o R.A. 5435 authorized the President, with the help of Commission on Reorganization, to
recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of
the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by
it.
o The Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated
reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to
submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of its next regular session.
§ P.D. No. 1, approved the Reorganization Plan
§ P.D. No. 742 ammended PD No. 1 which “restructured the regional organization of
Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi”
§ P.D. No. 773 further “restructured the regional organization of Mindanao and divided Region
IX into two sub-regions.”
§ P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
o The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the
approval of Congress.
• In conferring on the President the power “to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions”
following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
o The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of
executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices.
• The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries, which has been
described as “administrative in nature.”
o As this Court observed in Abbas, “while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision overlocal governments [see Art. X, §4 of
the Constitution].”
o The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays but are “mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.”

Is Art. XIX, §13 invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President’s discretion. – NO, it is valid.
• A legislative standard need not be expressed.
o It may simply be gathered or implied.
o It also need not be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
• With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same
policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive
Department, to wit: “to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue
programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the
service in in the transaction of the public business.”
o The original 11 administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to
suppose that in authorizing the President to “merge [by administrative determination] the existing
regions” in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the
Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the
organization of administrative regions.

Is the power given fairly expressed in the title of the statute – YES.
• The reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. 6734,
which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
o The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a
technical construction.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 46

 o The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute
are germane to that subject.

Does the power granted authorize the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either
did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it – YES.
• Non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the region as designated upon the creation of the
Autonomous Region, may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the
exigency of administration may require.
• Regrouping involves separating of administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.
o There will be no “transfer” of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus
be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will
become part of Region IX.
o The administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes,
not for political representation.
§ The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the
division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right
of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for.

Does the power granted to the President include the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City – YES.
• The President’s power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration.
o It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429
is irrational. In fact, petitioners do not claim that the reorganization is irrational, as they themselves
admit that the reorganization is based on relevant criteria:
(1) contiguity and geographical features;
o (2) transportation and communication facilities;
o (3) cultural and language groupings;
o (4) land area and population;
o (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies;
o (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
• Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress.
o But as, this Court said in Abbas, administrative regions "are not territorial and political subdivisions
like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays."
o The examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, and 773 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative
regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center
o It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City
may entail the expenditure of large sums of money but that contention is addressed to the wisdom
of the transfer rather than to its legality.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 47

Pichay v. Executive Secretary (2012)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition + prayer for TRO seeking to declare as unconstitutional EO 13 entitled
“Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission.”
• In April 2001, Pres. GMA issued EO 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting
it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submits its reports and recommendations to the
president.
• However, in 2010, Pres. Noynoy issued EO 13 abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
• In 2011, Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero Pichay, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board.
• This arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445, 377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank.
• Pichay then received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Ochoa requiring him and his co-respondents to
submit their explanations.
• Hence, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the
same transaction and charge of grave misconduct was already pending before the OMB.
• Pichay then filed this petition alleging that EO 13 was unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature
to:
o Create a public office
o Appropriate funds
o Delegate quasi-judicial powers to admin agencies

ISSUES/HELD:

Was the creation of the IAD-ODESLA by the President valid? – YES

• Under Sec. 31 of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), the President is vested with the continuing authority
to reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
• Sec. 31 of EO 292 sanctions the following actions:
1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President (OP) Proper by
abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another
2) Transfer any function under the OP to any other Department or Agency or vice versa
3) Transfer any agency under the OP to any other Department or Agency or vice versa.
• Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora: the President’s authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of EO 292.
• The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize
his office.
• To remain effective and efficient, the OP must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in
the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
• The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA
is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to
reorganize” his own office pursuant to EO 292.
• Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a
function from the OP to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.
• Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the OP Proper
by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less
drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.
• The distinction between the allowable organizational activities Sec. 31(a) on the one hand and Sec. 31(2) and
(3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees’ tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon

Jaigest – PoliRev - 48

 the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limits
prescribed under EO 292.
• The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an
existing office within the OPP.
• Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices/units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.
o It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.

Was the reorganization done in good faith? – YES

• A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.
• This was the purpose in mind here.
• The economical effects was shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22M for the
PAGC’s operation in the 2010 annual budget, no separate or added funding of such amount was ever required
after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
• The budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions would be sourced from
the following year’s appropriation for the President’s Offices under the GAA of 2011.

Was there usurpation of legislative power to appropriate public funds? – NAH

• The power to recommend the budget necessary for the govt dwells upon the President.
• This implies that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each govt agency
in the executive dept would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner.
• Hence, the express recognition under Sec. 78 of RA 9970 or the GAA of 2010 of the president’s authority to
“direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any dept or agency.
• To further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given constitutional
authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the
appropriation for his office.
• While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the OP, the funds may be properly sourced from the President’s own
office budget without committing any illegal appropriation.

Was IAD-ODESLA illegally vested with judicial power? – NO

• While the term “adjudicatory” appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases,
its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submissions of
recommendations.
• EO 13 states that the IAD shall “perform powers, functions and duties of PAGC.
• EO 12 grants PAGC the authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all
presidential appointees in the govt and to submit its reports and recommendations to the president.
o The IAD is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 49

Arroyo v. DOJ (2012)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Before the court are three consolidated petitions by (1) Jose Miguel Arroyo, (2) Benjamin Abalos Sr., and (3)
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. They assail the:
o Comelec Resolution No. 9266 on the Comelec and DOJ joint investigation on the alleged election
offenses committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections;
o Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating a joint DOJ-Comelec preliminary fact finding team on the 2004
and 2007 electoral fraud;
o Rule of Procedure on the Conduct of the Preliminary Investigation on the alleged election fraud, and
o Initial report of the fact-finding team.
• The antecedent facts show that:
o Comelec issued a resolution approving the creation of a joint committee with the DOJ which shall
conduct preliminary investigations on the alleged election offenses and anomalies during the 04-07
elections.
§ This was prompted by the discovery of new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses
indicating the occurrence of a massive electoral fraud and manipulation of elections.
o Comelec and DOJ then issued a joint order creating and constituting a (1) joint committee and (2)
fact-finding team.
§ The joint-committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.
§ The fact-finding team was to gather real, documentary, and testimonial evidence to be
utilized in the preliminary investigation.
o The said joint committee then promulgated its rules of procedure.
§ They agreed that the initial report would be the electoral fraud and manipulation of election
results during the 2007 elections.
o The initial report of the fact-finding team concluded that there was a manipulation of results in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao.
§ They recommended that Abalos and ten others be subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South
Cotabato.
§ 26 others (including GMA and Abalos) for electoral sabotage in manipulating the results in
Maguindanao.
§ Mike Arroyo was recommended for further investigation.
o There were now two DOJ-Comelec cases (For PI):
§ The case resulting from the investigation
§ Case by senator Aquilino Pimentel III for electoral sabotage against the petitioners and 12
others.
o The joint committee then issued a resolution which was endorsed to the comelec:
§ It found probable cause for the crime of electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and
Abalos and ordered the filing of the necessary informations before the court.
§ Pursuant to this, the Comelec Law Department filed with the RTC of Pasay City an
information against petitioners and others for violation of RA 9369 (election automation law-
tampers, increases or decreases the votes received)

ISSUES/HELD:

Is the Joint Order (creating of the joint committee) constitutional? – YES

• Background: The fact-finding team and joint committee was created pursuant to the powers and functions of
Comelec under Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
o Under the Constitution, the Comelec has the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses
pursuant to the enforcement and administration of all election laws. This is made to enable them to
insure the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 50

 o Under the Omnibus Election Code, while Comelec is given the power to (1) exclusively conduct
preliminary investigations, the same law, (2) authorizes the comelec to avail itself of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of government.
§ In fact, the Omnibus Code was amended to state that the Commission shall, through its
duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms
of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
o Under the Comelec rules of procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants are given
continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same.
o Instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the
DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
o The SC finds no impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to create the joint-committee and fact-
finding team.
• EQUAL PROTECTION violation? – NO
o Petitioners – Creation of the committee violate the equal protection clause because its sole purpose
is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents, particularly in focusing on the
04 and 07 elections.
§ They compared the joint order to create the commissions to the Executive Order No. 1
(creating the PH Truth Commission) which was already nullified by the SC. (Biraogo v. PH
Truth Commission)
o Respondents – The wide array of the possible election offenses and broad spectrum of individuals
who may have committed them, if any, immediately negate the assertion that the assailed orders are
aimed only at the officials of the Arroyo Administration.
o SC ruled that there is no violation of equal protection.
§ The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. However, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike.
§ The joint resolution is NOT similar to the PH truth commission (PTC):
• PTC was expressly created to investigate the alleged graft and corruption during
the Arroyo Administration. The joint resolution was created for the purpose of
conducting a preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 04-07
elections.
• While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subject to PI, not all of them are
linked to GMA.
§ Since the Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform its functions under
the Constitution, it usually issues resolutions prior to every election, setting forth the
guidelines to be observed.
• Every election is distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that
the rules are updated to respond to existing conditions.
• DUE PROCESS violation? – NO
o Petitioners - The joint panel does not possess the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is
both the evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge. Furthermore, doubts as to the fairness of the
proceedings is present since Secretary De Lima and Chairman Brillantes had repeatedly expressed
their prejudgment against the petitioners through the media.
o Respondents – Petitioners failed to present proof that there were statements made that will prejudice
the case. Furthermore, the Joint Order created two bodies: (1) the fact-finding, and (2) the joint-
committee, they cannot be considered as one.
o SC held that there is no violation of the due process clause.
§ First, the conduct of a preliminary investigation is subject to both substantive and procedural
due process. It is considered as a judicial proceeding where a prosecutor or investigator
acts as a quasi-judicial officer.
§ Second, there was no showing that the statements made by De Lima or Brillantes were
prejudicial to the case.
• A reading of the statements show that these were just replies to hypothetical
questions in the event that probable cause would eventually be found by the
committee.
§ Third, the joint order created two bodies: (1) the Fact-Finding Team tasked to gather real,
documentary and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation

Jaigest – PoliRev - 51

 to be conducted by the Joint Committee; and (2) the Joint Committee mandated to conduct
preliminary investigation. It is, therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which
acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge.
• SEPARATION OF POWERS violation? – NO
o Petitioners – The joint panel is a new public office as shown by (1) its composition, (2) the creation
of its own rules of procedure, and (3) the source of funding of its operation.
§ The power of the DOJ to investigate the commission of crimes and the ComelecÊs
constitutional mandate to investigate and prosecute violations of election laws do not
include the power to create a new public office in the guise of a joint committee.
§ In creating the joint panel, the DOJ and Comelec encroached upon the power of the
Legislature to create public office.
o Respondents – The committee is not new. It is merely a collaboration between two existing
government agencies sharing concurrent jurisdiction.
§ The members of the joint panel are the existing officers of the DOJ and Comelec that
exercise functions already vested in them.
o SC held that there is no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
§ The Comelec is granted the power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses.
• More recently, the Comelec is given the power, concurrent with the other
prosecuting arms of the government such as the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses.
§ On the other hand, the DOJ is is mandated to administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system.
§ The power of both Comelec and DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is granted
to them by the Constitution, statutes and rules of court. Such power does not
emanate from the Joint Order. No new power is given to them by said order.
§ Under the committee, the officers perform functions that they are already performing by
virtue of their current positions as prosecutors of the DOJ and legal officers of the Comelec.
• INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC abdicated? – NO
o Petitioner – In creating the joint panel, the Comelec has effectively abdicated its constitutional
mandate to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation of election laws
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices in favor of the
Executive Department acting through the DOJ Secretary.
o SC does not agree.
§ Under the Constitution, the Constitutional Commissions, while executive in nature, are
independent bodies which are not under the control of the President.
§ Under the Omnibus Election Code, the Comelec was given the right to avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government such as the prosecutors of the
DOJ.
• PROCESS:
o By virtue of this continuing authority, the state prosecutors and the
provincial or city prosecutors were authorized to receive the complaint for
election offense and delegate the conduct of investigation to any of their
assistants.
o The investigating prosecutor, in turn, would make a recommendation
either to dismiss the complaint or to file the information.
o This recommendation is subject to the approval of the state, provincial or
city prosecutor, who himself may file the information with the proper court
if he finds sufficient cause to do so, subject, however, to the accused’s
right to appeal to the Comelec.
§ This delegation of power, otherwise known as deputation, has long been recognized as an
effective means of disposing various election offense cases.
§ While the composition of the committee is dominated by DOJ officials, it does not mean that
the Comelec is inferior.
• Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause
for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly
with the DOJ, remains in control of the proceedings.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 52

 § Furthermore, the DOJ and Comelec exercise concurrent jurisdiction in conducting PI of
election offenses. There is no prohibition on the simultaneous exercise of power between
two coordinate bodies.
• What is prohibited is when one files a complaint with one office for PI, and then re-
files the same complaint with another office.
• SC final decision: Dismissed the petitions. (1) the joint order and the (2) initial report are valid. But the rules of
procedure on the conduct of PI is declared ineffective for lack of publication.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 53

People v. Vera (1937)

FACTS:

• This case is an example of undue delegation of legislative power, because the Probation Act provided for a
“roving commission” which enables provincial boards to exercise discretion on whether to have the Act applied
in its province or not.
• Mariano Cu Unjieng was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years of prision correccional
to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to offended party, HSBC. (the
cases didn’t really say what the offense was and I got tired of looking)
o On appeal, the sentence was modified to an indeterminate penalty of 3years and 6months to 7years,
6months and 27days, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
o Mariano eleveated the case on certiorari to the US Supreme Court, but it was denied and so was the
MR after.
• Back in the trial court, Mariano applied for probation, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 (passed by the
defunct Phil. Legislature).
o He states in his application that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has
no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future
o Judge Tuason (CFI Manila Judge), referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation
Office (IPO) which recommended denial of the same 

• Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, 7th branch, Judge Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. 

• Manila Fiscal and private prosecutor filed an opposition to the granting of probation. Private prosecutor
alleged: 

o that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV (Consti), is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11
of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise
in their respective provinces.
o supplementary opposition (private prosecutor): elaborated on the alleged unconstitutionality on
Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution)
• Judge Vera promulgated a resolution (in Spanish) and concludes that Mariano "es inocente por duda racional"
(is not guilty by reasonable doubt) of the crime of which he stands convicted, but denied the petition for
probation (reasons also stated in Spanish, so fuck that)
o Mariano filed a lot of Motions: exception to the resolution of denying 
probation, notice of intention to
file MR, alternative motion for reconsideration. Motions were set for hearing but was postponed
2
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had
just been filed with the trial court .
o Fiscal filed a motion for the issuance of an order of execution and to commit Mariano to jail; Private
prosecutor filed an opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amicus curiae.
o Judge Vera set the hearing of the motion for execution, but proceeded to consider the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. The scheduled hearing was suspended upon issuance
of TRO by this court.
• Petitioners seek for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the Judge Vera has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction
o Private prosecution further contends that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it is violates
the equal protection clause of the 1935 Constitution because it confers upon the provincial board
of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective
provinces;
o That it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several
provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature
and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly 

o and because it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII)
and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance
of different provinces without uniformity 


2
“Friend of court”; a brief filed with the court that is NOT a party to the case. One of the attorneys later withdrew
because parang napilitan lang daw sya kasi pinaikot yung motion at a banquet ng counsel ni Mariano and nahiya
lang sya sa nag-invite sa kanya LOL.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 54

 • The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on 3 principal grounds: (a) That said Act encroaches upon
the pardoning power of the Executive; (b) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (c)
that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

Does the Probation Act conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive? – NO.
• The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
o The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

Is there undue delegation? – YES.

• The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law and
in a unicameral National Assembly by the 1935 Constitution.
o Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata
non delegare potest.
o "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.)
o "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.” (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations)
• The SC, however, enumerated exceptions to the rule which forbids delegation of legislative power exceptions:
o An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities.(Rubi v. Proc. Board of Mindoro)
o On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in
the territories of the United States as it may select.
o Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though some
authorities maintain that this may not be done.
o Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph
2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." Section 16 of
the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the
National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy."
o THE CASE AT BAR does not fall under any of the exceptions mentioned.
• Test of undue delegation. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
or not, it is usual to inquire:
o whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature
o so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
§ The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards.
• In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary
power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What
standards are fixed by the Act? The SC did not find any and none has been pointed to it by the respondents.
o Sec. 11 of Act: “This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which. the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. x x x”
o The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.
o What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion.
o The legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual
surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 55

 • The true distinction lies between:
o The delegation of power to make the law (which involves a discretion as what it shall be) à this
cannot be done; and
o Conferring an authority or discretion as to the execution of the law, under and in pursuance thereof
à no valid objection can be made
• Although there can be a conditional enforcement of a law (by executive proclamation or adoption by the
people), the legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board.
o It leaves the entire operation or non-operation upon the provincial board – a discretion that is arbitrary
for being absolute and unlimited
• The statute also does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces
o in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of
probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law
should take effect or operate in their respective provinces. – the provincial boards are in reality
empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Act.
o The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its
provisions.

Does the Act violate the equal protections of laws? – YES.

• Section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed.
• The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards.
• There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial.
• Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.

Is the Probation Act unconstitutional? – YES.

• From all the foregoing and because Sec. 11 is inseparable from the rest of the Act, the SC held that although
Probation is a development of modern penology that should be welcomed, it is repugnant to the fundamental
law.
• Act No. 4221 is declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 56

US v. Barrias (1908)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:
3 4
• Ancieto Barrias was charged with violating par. 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 issued by the Collector of
Customs.
5
o Barrias was moving and navigating his lighter Maude in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the
hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power, while carrying heavy cargo.
• Counsel for Barrias contended that par. 70 was invalid for two causes: (1) Par. 70 is unauthorized by Sec. 19
6
of Act No. 355, and (2) if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing
the Collector to promulgate such law, the same is void as it constitutes an illegal delegation of
legislative power.
• The Attorney-General did not seek to sustain the conviction of Barrias, but it joins the defense in asking the
discharge of Barrias on the first ground.
o It did not comment on the issue of the delegation of legislative power to fix the penalties.
• (Basically, Barrias is assailing the undue delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Commission to the
Collector of Customs to fix the penalties for violations of the Circular.)

ISSUES/HELD:

Is there undue delegation of legislative power?—NO, there is no undue delegation of legislative power to fix
penalties. The Circular issued by the Collector of Customs to fix penalties was well within the power given by
Act No. 1136.
• By virtue of Act No. 1136, the Collector of Customs was authorized to license crafts (ships?) engaged in the
7
ligtherage or other harbor business of the ports of the Philippines.
o Sec. 5 of the said Act provides that “The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to
carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.”
o Sec. 8 provides that “Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or
regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished
by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars,
United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section
seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.”
• SC held that there is a necessity to authorize the local authority with regard to the framing, changing, and
enforcing of harbor regulations as such practice is recognized worldwide.
o Each region and harbor specifically requires a peculiar use that could be enacted by the
central lawmaking power. When this power is kept within the proper scope it does not involve
an undue grant of legislative power.
• SC held that one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated.
o SC opined that when a sovereign power of the State is placed, it must remain there.
• SC held that this doctrine is based on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment. The delegate must act within the matter
of legislation.

3
Par. 70 provides that: “No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without
being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.”
4
Par. 83 provides that: “For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not
less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.”
5
Could not find what a “Maude” is. But basing on context clues, it could be some form of ship/vessel.
6
The Philippine Commission was the name of two bodies, both appointed by the President of the United States to assist with
governing the Philippines.
7
“The transfer of cargo by means of a lighter; the charge levied for such transfer.”

Jaigest – PoliRev - 57

 • SC cited several US cases regarding this doctrine of valid delegation to fix penalties.
o In US v. Breen, US SC held that an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make rules and
regulations to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing a penalty for its violation
should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared
not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but as the Act of Congress, itself.
o In In re: Kollock, US SC upheld the law authorizing a CIR to designate and stamps on oleomargarine
packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court
saying that “that the criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation
by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The
regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself.”
o In Martin v. Witherspoon, it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and
counsel the power to make pilot regulations.
o In The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company, it
was ruled that harbor commissioners could not impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to
do so. US SC held that the legislature could delegate the authority to make rules and regulation with
reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay and the penalty for the violation of such rules. The
regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.
• In the present case, SC held that Sec. 5 and 8 of Act No. 1136 are valid. The Collector of Customs can validly
make the said penalties. SC sustained the conviction of Barrias.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 58

United States v. Panlilio (1914)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Relevant law in this case is Act No. 1760, entitled "An Act to prevent the introduction into the Philippine Islands
of dangerous communicable animal diseases, to prevent the spread of such diseases within the Islands, and
for other purposes".
• Panlilio’s carabaos were found to have been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as
‘rinderpest’.
• In accordance with the order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, the carabaos were duly
quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga.
• An information was filed against Panlilio alleging that while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in
force, he illegally permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were
quarantined and conducted from one place to another; and that his servants and agents drove the carabaos
from one place to another for the purpose of working them.
• Panlilio filed a demurrer to the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime.

ISSUE/HELD:

Do the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Act No. 1760? – NO, but the allegations in the
information constitute a violation of the Penal Code.
• The information against Panlilio failed to specify the section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated.
• While Act No. 1760, authorizes the Director of Agriculture, "to require that animals which are suffering from
dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and
for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease," a violation of the
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made in pursuance of such authority will not be held to be criminal unless
the statute expressly makes it so and provides a punishment.
• Sections of Act No. 1760 which provides for prohibition on specific acts are as follows:
o Section 3: It shall be unlawful to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal infected
with any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal which are
liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands.
o Section 4: It shall be unlawful to transport from one place to another, any domestic animal suffering
from any dangerous communicable disease or to expose such animal either alive or dead on any
public road or highway where it may come in contact with other domestic animals.
o Section 5 : Whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable
animal disease prevails in any place and that there is danger of spreading such disease by
transporting any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful to transport the kind of animals so
specified from such locality except when accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the
Director of Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be transported, their destination,
manner of transportation, and their brands and distinguishing marks.
o Section 7: Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in quarantine in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at
the place designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance.
Should the owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture may
furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance
shall be collectible from the owner or his agent.
o Section 6: Authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c): to
require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been
exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him
necessary to prevent the spread of the disease.
o Section 8: Any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 59

 • A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c) in Section 6, cannot be
considered a violation of the provisions of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation
of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful
and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a
penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
• In sum, none of the enumerated Sections of Act No. 1760 was violated by Panlilio as alleged in the Information
filed against him.
• Panlilio’s acts, as alleged in the Information, however, constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the
Penal Code. It provides:
o "A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be imposed
upon: * * *
o "2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with reference
to any epidemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar plague."
• The Court therefore, found Panlilio liable, not under Act No. 1760, but under the provisions of the Penal Code.

*The doctrine in the case can be summed as: Power to criminalize or penalize may be delegated only if the law itself
provides that specific violations are punished or if a violation is made a penal offense under the law. (Deduced only
from the ratio and was not explicitly stated in the case, please read with caution)

Jaigest – PoliRev - 60

People vs. Maceren (1977)

ARTICLE VI. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

FACTS:
• Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law, prohibits the use of any “obnoxious or poisonous” substance in fishing.
• Pursuant to this law, Fisheries Administrative Order (AO) No. 84, was issued by the Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
o The AO prohibited “electro fishing” in all waters in the Philippines.
o Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current.
• In 1967, this was later amended by AO No. 84-1 which reduced the prohibition against electro fishing only to
“fresh water fisheries” in the Philippines.
• In the morning of March 1969, it was alleged that the 5 accused resorted to electro fishing in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
o That they were using their own motor banca and an electrocuting device locally known as 'senso'
with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment.
o That with the use of these devices caught fish through electric current.
• The municipal court dismissed the case.
o It held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an “obnoxious or
poisonous substance” as contemplated in Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law.
o Electric current is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted by substances.
o Moreover, since the Fisheries Law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.
• The CFI of Laguna affirmed the dismissal. The case was thus elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is Administrative Order penalizing electro fishing valid? NO

• The Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority
in issuing AO 84 and 84-1.
• The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish "electro fishing".
o As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary and the Commissioner are powerless
to penalize it. It is devoid of any legal basis.
o Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
• The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute
a criminal offense.
o While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law
already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute.
o It can only authorize the issuance of regulations and imposition of the penalty which is provided in
the law itself.
• There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule making powers.
o The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.
o Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law.
o All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
o Consequently, the IRR must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
• Thus, what the Secretary did is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot
be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved to Congress.
• At present, there is no doubt that electrofishing in both fresh and saltwater areas is punishable under the new
Fisheries Law (PD 704) promulgated in 1975.
o It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
o However, the accused cannot be held liable under this law, since it was not yet in effect in 1969.
• Therefore, the SC affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court.

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People v. Dacuycuy (1989)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Petitioner People represented by the fiscal of Leyte seeks to set aside the decision of Judge Dacuycuy
granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by private respondents
Matondo, Caval, and Zanoria
• Hindang, Motando, Caval, and Zanoria are public school officials of Leyte and were charged before the
Municipal CFI of Leyte with violation of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
o Pleaded not guilty
o they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
§ Argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Sec 32 of the
Magna Carta is null and void for being unconstitutional
• They filed a civil action before another Leyte CFI for certiorari and prohibition
• In arguing that Sec 32 of the Magna Cart is unconstitutional, Matondo, Caval, and Zanoria argue that:
o It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to
reclusion perpetua
o It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.
• Criminal case was transferred to the branch where the civil case was being tried
• Judge Dacuycuy rendered the challenged decision where he ruled that:
o the Magna Carta to be valid and constitutional
o But cases for its violation fell outside the jurisdiction of the municipal and city courts
o He remanded the case to the CFI of Leyte for preliminary investigation only

ISSUES/HELD

Is Sec. 32 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers unconstitutional for imposing cruel and unusual
punishment? -- NO.

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise
of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions
of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

• Two alternative and distinct penalties:

o A fine (P100 - 1,000)
o Imprisonment
§ No period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment
• SC upheld Judge Dacuycuy’s judgment that the law is valid
o The prohibition against cruel and unusual or disproportionate punishment is aimed at the form or
character of the punishment, not to its severity in respect of duration or amount
o That the he penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual.

Is Sec. 32 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
legislative power? -- YES.
• Private respondents: entire penal provision in question should be invalidated as an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if
the latter were the legislative department of the government.

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 • Petitioners: counter that the discretion granted by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power.
o Argues that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the
delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same.
• According to Corwin in his commentary on the US, at least 3 ideas contributed to the development of the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated:
o Doctrine of separation of powers
o Concept of Due process of laws
o Delegatus non potest delegare ("one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate
that power")
• GR: Delegation of legislative authority to courts is prohibited
o XPN: when discretion is conferred upon said courts
§ It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere
legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which,
when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow
• In the case, Judge Dacuycuy erroneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided
for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment.
o It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided
by the legislature.
o What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of
service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law
o The absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-
an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
• Since Sec. 32 provides to an undeterminable period of punishment, with neither a minimum nor maximum
duration set by legislative authority. This is not allowed.
• Court cannot rule on the proper interpretation of the actual prison term, as may nave been intended by
Congress
o The suggested application of the “rule of parallelism” where the P1,000 fine will be equated with a
prison sentence does not merit judicial acceptance
o There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment.

Do municipal courts have jurisdiction over violation of the Magna Carta for Public School teachers? -- YES.
• Law in force at the time the complaint was filed gave jurisdiction over the case to municipal courts

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YNOT v. IAC (1987)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• January 13, 1984 - Petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of E.O. 626.
o Marcos issued E.O. 626 prohibiting the transfer of carabao and carabeefs from one province to
another.
o The EO also provides that the meat and animals confiscated and forfeited in violation thereof shall
be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions or deserving farmers as the
Chairman of National Meat Inspection Commission “may see fit.”
o Relevant provisions of E.O. 626 quoted and highlighted below.
§ SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case
of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
• The petitioner sued for recovery, and the RTC of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
• After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
o The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
• The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court, and he
has now come bef ore us in this petition for review on certiorari.
• Petitioner’s arguments:
o The E.O. is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries.
o The penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
o There was an improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment
No, 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES/ HELD:

Is E.O. 626 is valid exercise of police power? NO, the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.

1.1. Was there a lawful subject? YES.

• The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.
o SC upheld the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. (Highlights of the US v. Toribio
case below)
§ A law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
§ The defendant had been convicted for having slaughtered his own carabao without the
required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
§ The conviction was affirmed. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise
of the police power.
• The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate
killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers.

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 • An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number
had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an
incipient famine.
• Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase
in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective
measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
o The banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion

1.2. (IMPT!) But was there lawful means? Was there a valid delegation of authority when the EO provided for
the manner of distributing the confiscated carabao and meat? NO,
• The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and
disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.
o The original measure, E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.”
o SC: The object of the prohibition escapes us.
• Furthermore, even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished.
o The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers.
§ The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
o In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
§ Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure
itself, as forfeited to the government.
• (IMPT. DOCTRINE!) There is also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
o The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
§ It is subject to abuse and corruption.
§ There is no sufficient standard in the law on how the authority may effect the disposition of
the confiscated property.
o Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they
see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
o Just like in People v. Vera, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Is the police station commander who confiscated the carabaos liable for damages? NO.
• A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation of E.O. 626-A is not liable for damages
even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.
• The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce
it.
• It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 65

Pharmaceutical v. DOH (2007)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify DOH’s issuance of Administrative Order (AO) No. 2006-0012 or the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of EO 51 (Milk Code).
• EO 51 (Milk Code) was issued by Pres. Cory on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
the president under the Freedom Constitution.
• The law seeks to give effect to Art. 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
• In 1990, the PH ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
o Art. 24 of the ICRC provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant
and child mortality.
• In 2006, DOH issued the RIRR which was to take effect on July 2006.
• However, petition Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines (PHAP), representing its
members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the petition.
• PHAP alleges that:
o The RIRR goes beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law.
• On the other hand, DOH argues that the RIRR not only implements the Milk Code, but also various
international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition.

ISSUES/HELD:

From Article II issue on international agreements as part of the law of the land

• The ICMBS is part of the law of the land via transformation.

• But the subsequent WHA resolutions that were used by the DOH as basis for some parts of the IRR are not
part of the law of the land as they are only recommendations.
• These WHA resolutions are only Soft Law and not binding or obligatory.
• In the absence of proof that these resolutions are opinio juris, the executive branch cannot implement them
through the domestic agencies.
• Legislation is needed to transform the recommendations into domestic law.

Are the labeling and advertising regulations under the RIRR valid?- Section 11 and 4f are invalid.

• When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, the Milk Code specifically
delegated to the DOH the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on
breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products, and the power to control
such information.
• Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis
breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products.
o When such materials contain info about the use of infant formula, they shall include the social and
financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods;
and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and
other breastmilk substitutes. (Sec. 5)
o Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes
(Sec. 5)
• The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be
disseminated under the Milk Code to ensure that the info would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants,
and health professionals and workers in the health care systems is restricted to scientific and factual matters
and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. (Sec. 8b)

Jaigest – PoliRev - 66

 • But the DOH’s power under the Milk Code to control info regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes
is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising,
marketing and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
• Sections 13 and 26 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements, specifically:
a. That there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk
b. That there be a statement that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic
microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately.
• Section 16 prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as
claims of increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.
• Section 10(d) bars the use on containers and labels of the terms “humanized,” “maternalized,” or similar terms.
• It may be argued that Section 8 of the Code refers only to info given to health workers regarding breastmilk
substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof.
• However, such restrictive application will result in the absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors
are forbidden to claim to health workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and
yet display on the containers and labels of their products the exact opposite message.
• Sec. 26(c) which requires containers and labels to state that the product offered is not a substitute for
breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing Sec. 8b of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the
protection and promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section 2.
• The label of a product contains info about said product intended for the buyers thereof.
• The buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 merely adds a fair warning about
the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other related products when
these are prepared and used inappropriately.
• The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products cannot be questioned.
• It is its intervention into the area of advertising, promotion and marketing that is being assailed.
• The Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotion and marketing materials to an Inter-
Agency Committee (IAC).
• Sec. 11 of the RIRR also prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities
for breastmilk substitutes in line with the RIRR’s declaration of principle.
o Sec. 4f: Declaration of principles – advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula,
breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.
• The DOH, through its co-respondents, arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given to the
IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
• Section 11 and 4f of the RIRR are violative of the Milk Code.
• However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or
rejection of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials under the Code, said provision must be
related to Sec. 6 which provides that the rules and regulations must be pursuant to the applicable standards
provided for in the Code.

Are the administrative sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR valid? – No, invalid.

• Neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grant the DOH the authority to fix or impose
administrative fines.
• Thus, without any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOJ cannot provide for those fines
in the RIRR.
• Hence, the DOH exceeded its authority by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46.
• Under Section 12(b)(3) of the Milk Code, the DOH is only authorized to “cause the prosecution of the
violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on products covered by this Code.’
• Section 13 provide for the penalties to be imposed on violators.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 67

Abakada v. Purisima (2008) supra.

ARTICLE VI. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

FACTS:

• RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) was enacted to improve the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC.
o The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets
by providing a system of rewards and sanctions.
o In simple terms, if they collect more than the year’s target, they are given a reward. If they collect
less than the year’s target, they are given sanctions.
• Pursuant to the law, a Rewards and Incentives Fund was created.
o The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets
for the year.
o Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to
their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
• Petitioners (Abakada Guro Partylist and other taxpayers) filed a petition for prohibition to stop Purisima, as
the Secretary of Finance and the BIR and BOC Commissioners from implementing this law.
• They allege that it is unconstitutional since: (Note: First three issues taken in an earlier digest)
o The creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
• Sec. 12 of RA 9335 created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC.
o On May 2006, it approved the IRR and became functus officio and ceased to exist.
o Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing
the law may be considered moot and academic.
• But the court still took cognizance of this issue by saying that this “might be as good a time as any for the
Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee”

ISSUES/HELD:

Does the creation of the congressional oversight committee violate the doctrine of separation of powers? YES

• The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
• Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se.
o It neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
o Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
o It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power
in the executive branch.
• However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment, the Constitution imposes two basic and
related constraints on Congress.
1. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
2. When it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the procedures specified under the Constitution,
including the procedure for enactment of laws
• In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
1. Scrutiny based on:
§ Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it,
§ Its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and
§ Its power of confirmation
2. Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
§ This is pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
• Any action or step beyond these two above will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
• IMPT: Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to:

Jaigest – PoliRev - 68

 o present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which,
o by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove
such regulations before they take effect.
• As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.
o It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
• Congress has two options when enacting legislation:
1. It can itself formulate the details or
2. it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions
in conformity with those standards.
• In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands
of the legislature.
o Thus, what is left for the executive branch when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the
law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law
into actual operation (contingent rule-making)
• Congress, in exercising oversight functions, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp
of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution
o IMPT: In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether
or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court (the SC) by the Constitution.
• THUS: When a bill becomes a law and from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
o Thus, requiring Congress to approve the IRR after RA 8335 has already taken effect is
unconstitutional as it allows Congress or its members to overturn a directive or ruling made by the
members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
• Thus, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional.

Summary: Congressional oversight must be limited to scrutiny and investigation. The Joint Congressional Committee
whose purpose was to approve / disapprove the IRR does not fall under oversight but is actually a legislative veto which
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. By providing for the committee whose task is to determine if the IRR
confirmed to RA 9355, Congress gave itself judicial powers, which it cannot do. This is one of the constitutional
limitations placed on Congress power. Thus, Sec. 12 is unconstitutional.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 69

Philippine Coconut v. Republic (2012)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:

• These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 assailing certain issuances of the Sandiganbayan
regarding the recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the PCGG against Marcos and several individuals:
o Civil Case No. 0033-A (Republic v. Cojuangco et.al.) and Civil Case No. 0033-F (Republic v.
Cojuangco et.al.)
o These two cases are originally 8 amended complaints.
o Among those charged is petitioner Ursua with Lobregat. Both used to hold top management positions
in either the PH Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED) or the PH Coconut Authority (PCA), or
both.
• The CASES:
o G.R. Nos. 177857-58 – Class action by COCOFED, its members and a group of coconut farmers.
They seek the reversal of several judgements and resolutions of the anti-graft court. (Partial summary
judgements)
o G.R. No. 178193 – By petitioner Ursua on the shares of stock in UCPB.
o G.R. 180705 – Questions relating to Cojuangco Jr.s ownership of the UCPB shares which he
allegedly received as option shares.
• Antecedent facts:
o SUMMARY: During martial law, the coco levy fund was used to acquire the First United Bank (Now
UCPB) and its shares of stock. When the 1986 EDSA event took place, Aquino ordered the recovery
of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. One of these was the anomalous purchase of the shares of
stock with UCPB.
o R.A. 6260 was enacted in 1971 to create the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund (CIF).
§ The fund would be sourced from a levy on the sale of Copra. PhP 0.55 would be levied on
the sale of every 100kg of copra. Out of this fund, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposal of
COCOFED (the national association of coconut producers)
o When martial law was declared in September 1972, several presidential decrees were issued all to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund.
§ The PH Coconut Administration (PCA) was charged with the collection and administration
of the fund.
§ Basically, several PDs were issued regarding the collection and utilization of the coco levy
fund and how the proceeds will be dispensed and the purpose of each.
§ Relevant to us is PD No. 755 which authorized the PCA to utilize the collections to acquire
a commercial bank and to deposit the levy collections in said bank, withdrawable only when
the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital:
• It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit
facilities to the coconut farmers at a preferential rates; that this policy can be
expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the Agreement for
the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers executed
by the [PCA]; and that the [PCA] is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the
shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers.
§ The fund was used to acquire the First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB. (UCPB
also acquired a large block of SMC shares).
• FUB was a bank controlled by the Cojuangco group. The original plan was for the
PCA to buy all of Cojuangco’s share in FUB.
• However, the simple direct sale became complicated. Instead, it was made to
appear that Cojuangco Jr. has the exclusive option to acquire the controlling
interests of PCA:
o Agreement – Cojuangco accorded Cojuangco Jr. the option to buy 72.2%
of FUBs outstanding capital stock.
o Contract – Agreement for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the
benefit of the coconut farmers.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 70

 § This contract had PCA purchase from Cojuangco Jr. the shares
of stock subject to the previous agreement (Option to buy)
§ It was also stipulated that Cojuangco Jr. shall receive equity in
FUB amounting to 7.22% of the 72.2% shares.
o When the 1986 EDSA event happened, one of the priorities of then President Cory Aquino was to
recover the ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by Marcos, his family, close relatives, their
nominees and associates.
§ She issued:
• EO no. 1 creating the PCGG;
• EO no. 2 asserting that the ill-gotten assets and properties come in the form of
shares of stocks etc.
• EO no. 14 conferred upon the SB the exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-
gotten wealth cases.
§ The PCGG issued numerous sequestration orders against the shares of stock in UCPB
owned by (1) more than a million coconut farmers and (2) the CIIF companies.
§ The PCGG then instituted before the SB a recovery suit – CC No. 0033 – this first case
pivoting mainly on the series of transactions culminating in the alleged anomalous purchase
of 72.2% of FUBs outstanding capital stock and the transfer by PCA of a portion thereof to
private individuals
• On appeal with the SC, the relevant argument to us is on whether the coconut levy laws, constitute undue
delegation of legislative power in allowing the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the
distribution of the UCPB to the coconut farmers.

ISSUES/HELD:

Does the SB have jurisdiction over the offenses – YES

• There was no need for the Republic to adduce evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaints as it leaned on the averments in the initiatory pleadings to make visible
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
• The allegations easily reveal the sufficiency of the statement of matters disclosing the claim of the government
against the coco levy funds and the assets acquired directly or indirectly through said funds as ill-gotten wealth.
• Furthermore, there is no rule that directs the plaintiff to first prove the subject matter jurisdiction of the court
before which the complaint is filed. Such burden falls on the shoulders of defendant in the hearing of a motion
to dismiss anchored on said ground or a preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is alleged in the
answer.

Are the coconut farmers subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees of
Cojuangco Jr. or the Marcoses? – YES
• They are nominees. The term refers to one who is designated to act for another usually in a limited way.
o A person whose name a stock is registered, but who is not the actual owner thereof is considered a
nominee.
• To give full effect to the EOs issued by Aquino, the term nominee must be taken to mean to include any person
or group of persons, natural or juridical, in whose name government funds or assets were transferred to by
Pres. Marcos, his cronies or his associates.
o The term includes the more than one million faceless and nameless coconut farmers who are the
alleged beneficiaries of the distributed UCPB shares.
o When the bank required them to execute an irrevocable proxy in favor of the Banks manager, it
shows that the PCA had no intent to constitute the coconut farmer UCPB stockholder as a bona fide
stockholder; that the 1.5 million registered farmer-stockholders were mere nominal stockholders.

Were petitioners deprived of their right to be heard? – NO

• Their demand to adduce evidence was disallowed because it was premature. Their right to present evidence
on the main case had not yet ripened.
• The Republic as well as herein petitioners were well within their rights to move, as they in fact separately did,
for a partial summary judgment.
o Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as shown by
affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 71

Was there a violation of the right to speed trial? – NO
• Right to speed disposition v. Right to speedy trial
o Speed disposition – Obtains regardless of the nature of the case (judicial, quasi-judicial or admin).
o Speedy trial – Available only to an accused and is a criminal law concept.
• In this case, the appropriate right is the right to a speedy disposition of cases since the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth is a civil suit.
• Furthermore, petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case.
o They never alleged before the SB for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings.

Can the law of the case of COCOFED v. PCGG and Republic v. SB be invoked? – NO
• The law of the case means that questions of law that have been previously raised and disposed of in the
proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding instances where the (1) same legal question is raised, provided
that the (2) facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
• The law of the case principle cannot apply in this case:
o The issue in COCOFED v. PCGG is on the legality of the transfer of shares of stock bought with the
coco levy funds to coconut farmers.
o In this case, the issue is on whether there was a violaton of Section 29 (3) of Article VI and on whether
there was undue delegation of legislative power.
§ 29(3) of Art. VI - All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated
as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
o In Republic v. SB the court declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the coco levy laws. It did not
declare that the UCPB shares acquired with the use of the coco levy funds have become private.

What are the nature of coconut levy funds? – TAXES

• The coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent power of taxation. It is in the nature of
taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given
for free to private individuals.
• Since they are for a special purpose, the balance should revert back to the general fund.
o The PDs made during martial law classifying the coconut levy fund as a private fund to be disbursed
and/or invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary to the original
purpose for which the fund was created.

Was the delegation of legislative power under the law (PD 755 et.al) valid? – NO
• PD 755 in allowing the PCA to promulgate its own rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB
shares, involves an invalid delegation of legislative power.
o The GR is that Congress may not delegate its legislative power. What cannot be delegated is the
authority to make laws and to alter and repeal them.
o For there to be a valid delegation of legislative power, two tests must be complied with:
§ Completeness test - A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate.
§ Sufficient standard test - It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must:
• specify the limits of the delegates authority,
• announce the legislative policy and
• identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
o In this case, the standard are absent under PD 755.
§ The law authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut farmers the shares of stocks of UCPB
and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the
Agreement for the acquisition of such bank
§ However, (1) the decree does not state who are to be considered coconut farmers, (2) it did
not identify any condition as to how the disposition of the shares will redound to the
advancement of the national policy, (3) it did not provide for any guideline, standard,
condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers
that would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut industry pursuant to its national policy.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 72

 § Basically, the law gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them
exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the
avowed national policy or public purpose.
• PCA Administrative Order 1 and PCA Resolution No. 078-74 are also invalid delegations. (On how to
distribute the remaining shares)
o The provisions of the orders directs and authorizes the distribution of fractional and undistributed
shares as a consequence of the failure of the coconut farmers with Coco Fund receipts to register
them, even without a clear mandate or instruction on the same in any pertinent existing law.
o PCA Resolution No. 078-74 had a similar provision, albeit providing more detailed information. The
said Resolution identified 51,200,806 shares of the bank that remained undistributed and PCA
devised its own rules as to how these undistributed and fractional shares shall be disposed of,
notwithstanding the dearth as to the standards or parameters in the laws which it sought to
implement.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 73

Belgica v. Ochoa (2013)

• This case involves the constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund) and the
Presidential Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund).
• Because the subject matter is so complex, the Court discussed the pork barrel system’s conceptual
underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

THE FACTS:
Pork Barrel
• An appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects
• Secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district 

• Some scholars on the subject use the term to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.
• Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude
of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with
morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.
• In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of the Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of
the Executive.

History of the Congressional Pork Barrel in the PH

Pre-Martial Law Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922) is considered as the earliest form of
1992-1972 "Congressional Pork Barrel"
• Utilization of funds were subjected to post-enactment legislator 
approval 

Martial Law The Pork Barrel System was discontinued due to the era of one-man controlled
1972-1986 legislature, but in 1982, the Batasang Pambansa introduced a new item in the GAA:
the “Support for Local Development Projects”
• Practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators 
began

• Each assembylman receives ₱500k and thereafter, would 
communicate their
project preferences to the Ministry of Budget 
for approval

• Projects also began to cover not only hard projects (public works) 
but also soft
projects (non-public works such as education, health and livelihood) 

Post-Martial Law Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development
C. Aquino Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund"
1986-1992 • lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the
funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989
The clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding,
prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
• integrated into the 1990 GAA with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small
local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Post-EDSA • The pork barrel system was consistently adopted in the GAAs
Revolution In 2000, the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
• The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency
concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article
• Realignment of funds to any expense category was allowed, provided no amount
shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits
Macapagal-Arroyo 2002 GAA 

2001-2010 • Ordered release of funds directly to the implementing agency or 
LGU concerned
without further qualifications 

2003 GAA
• Expansion of purpose 

• Express authority to realign 

• DPWH and DepEd projects required prior consultation with 
Members of Congress
on implementation delegation and project list submission 

2005 GAA 

• PDAF shall be used to fund priority programs and projects under 
the ten point
agenda of the national government 

• It shall be released directly to implementing agencies 


Jaigest – PoliRev - 74

 • Program menu concept—list of general programs and 
implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be chosen by the identifying authority 

2002 to 2010 GAA

• PDAF articles were silent as to the:
o Specific amounts allocated for individual legislators 

o Their participation in the proposal and identification 
of PDAF
projects 

o DPWH and DepEd School Building Program 
provisions explicitly
required prior consultation 
with the Member of Congress 

• Allowed formal participation of NGOs in the implementation of projects
B. Aquino, III 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles
2010-present • "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list
requirement)." But as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would
choose and identify the project from the priority list
• Provisions for legislator allocations and fund realignment were included 

• Allocation for the VP was deleted 


History of the Presidential Pork Barrel in the PH

PD 910, Marcos • special fund to help intensify, strengthen and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth
PD 1869 (PAGCOR • Special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Charter), Marcos; Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to
amended by PD priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget
1993 • Sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR

Controversies in the Philippines

First Controversy
• In 1996, former Marikina representative Candazo blew the lid on huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks
• Kickbacks were SOP; ranged from 19-52% of the cost of each project
LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management
• Concerned citizens sought the nullification of PDAF in the 2004 GAA for being 
unconstitutional 

• For lack of pertinent evidentiary support as to the illegal misuse of PDAF in the 
form of kickbacks, the petition
was dismissed 

NBI Probe (Napoles)
• Began because of allegations that the government has been defrauded of some ₱10B over the past 10 years
by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for ghost
projects

• 6 whistleblowers declared that JLN Corporation swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost
projects using 20 dummy NGOs
o The NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipient of PDAF, the money was allegedly diverted into
Napoles’ private accounts
• After its investigation, criminal complaints were filed
 (Plunder, Malversation, Direct Bribery, Violation of the RA
3019)
COA Report
• 
Results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during
the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration
• Determined the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and VILP (Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects) by the DBM

• Some of the highlights:
o Amounts released for projects identified by a number of legislators exceeded their respective
allocations 

o Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts 

o Selection of NGOs was not compliant with law and regulations 

o 82 NGOs entrusted with billions of pesos were either questionable, 
submitted spurious documents
or failed to liquidate their utilization of the 
funds


Jaigest – PoliRev - 75

 • For the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistleblowers alleged that at least ₱900M from royalties intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO The Procedural Antecedents 

• This case consolidated the petitions of Alcantara, Belgica, and Nepomuceno.

ISSUES/HELD:

[PROCEDURAL ISSUE, among others] Do the Court’s decisions in the Philconsa and LAMP cases bar the re-
litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System under the principle of res judicata and stare
decisis? – NO.
• Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004
PDAF Article,
o whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System."
• Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits.

[SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on Congressional Pork Barrel] Are the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate constitutional provisions
on:

Separation of powers? – YES

• Constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of the government

• Each department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere
• When violated
o When one branch unduly encroaches upon the domain of another 

o 2 Ways: 

§ When one interferes impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally
assigned function; and

§ When one assumes a function that more properly is 
entrusted to another 

• SC: From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play ANY 
ROLE in the implementation or enforcement of law violates the
principle of powers and is thus unconstitutional 

o The enforcement of the national budget is a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
assigned to the Executive branch
o This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches is a grant of
all powers inherent in them 

o Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive should exclusively exercise all
prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget 

• Budget execution covers:
o Various operational aspects of budgeting 

o Evaluation of work and financial plans for individual 
activities 

o Regulation and release of funds 

o Other related activities that comprise the budget execution 
cycle 

• The Legislative should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget 

• Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and the
Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins
o From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional
• However, Congress may still exercise its oversight function—a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution allows which is limited to: (1) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation;
budget hearings in connection with it; power to ask department heads to appear and be heard on any matter
pertaining to their departments; its power of confirmation; and (2) Investigation and monitoring of
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation 

• Provisions of the 2013 PDAF Article have accorded legislators post-enactment authority to:
o Identify PDAF projects 

o Participate in fund release 

o Participate in fund realignment 

• Clearly, these post-enactment measures are not related to functions of congressional oversight 


Jaigest – PoliRev - 76

 • Any post-enactment measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional
basis, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions

Non-delegability of legislative power? [MOST RELEVANT ISSUE] – YES

• Legislative power should be exclusively exercised by the body to 
which the Constitution has conferred the
same 

• Legislative power shall be vested in Congress (SEC 1, ART 6, 
Constitution) 

• Only recognized exceptions:
o Delegation to LGUs which are allowed to legislate on purely 
local matters 

o Power of the President to:
§ Exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of
war and other national emergency 

§ Fix, within specified limits as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and 
wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the government
o Delegate rule-making—authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either:
§ Supplementary rule-making—filling up details of the law for its enforcement
§ Contingent rule-making—ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
• SC: The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
INDIVIDUALLY exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress
• Individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate:
o How much from such fund would go to 

o A specific project or beneficiary that they determine 

• These two acts^ comprise the power of appropriation and thus, the legislators have been conferred the power
to legislate which the Constitution does not allow

Checks and balances? – YES. [this might still be askd because this case is under sec. 27]
• President’s Item-Veto Power
o Power of the President to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to
him by Congress for approval (bill presentment) found in SEC 27(2), ART 6, Constitution
o Presentment of such bills to the President forms part of the single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered procedures for law passage as specified in the Constitution
o The President’s veto power is essentially a legislative act
o In exercising such authority, he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by
the unwise interference of the judiciary 

o Courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto 

o [I WILL SKIP THE DETAILS OF THIS PART UNTIL WE GET TO ART. 7 KASI POTA]
• When violated
o Appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes
o Such necessitates the further determination of both:
§ Actual amount to be expended; and 

§ Actual purpose of appropriation 

• SC: In the current system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator’s identification
of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on 

o Under the 2013 PDAF Article, ₱24.79B only appears as a collective allocation limit since it would be
further divided among individual legislators who would receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could effectively appropriate their PDAF based on their own discretion
o These appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, are outside
the law 

o It necessarily means that actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
GAB and thus effectuated without veto consideration 

o It subverts the procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item
veto as the President is forced to either: 

§ Accept the entire ₱24.79B allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators
which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda; or 

§ Reject the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects

Jaigest – PoliRev - 77

Accountability? – YES
• Public office is a public trust (SEC 1, ART 11, Constitution)

o Every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with
the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people’s trust

o Congressional oversight is a mechanism in the Constitution which is designed to exact
accountability from public officers
• SC: The conduct of oversight would be tainted as legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate

o Certain features in the 2013 PDAF Article affect congressional oversight

o The fact that legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it
difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of appropriation law
• SC: Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office, thereby violating SEC 14, ART 6 of the
Constitution
• Post-enactment authorization runs afoul to SEC 14, ART 6, Constitution which provides that:
o No member of Congress shall be directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract, franchise
or special privilege granted by the government during his term
o He shall not intervene in any matter before any government office for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office

Political dynasties? – NO
• The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law. (SEC 26, ART 2, Constitution)
o This provision is not self-executing; it does not by itself provide a judicially enforceable constitutional
right
• SC: Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer on ruling on this issue

o It has also not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate
political dynasties

Local Autonomy? – YES.

• The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments (SEC 25, 
ART 2, Constitution) 

• The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy (SEC 2, ART 10, Constitution) 

• The Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower LGUs to develop and ultimately,
become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy 

• How violated 

o By undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by
the officials and inhabitants of such political units
• SC: Insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby
subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional
o Guage of PDAF and CDF allocation or division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents
o Such allocation or division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration
o Even Senators, PL representatives and the VP, who do not represent any locality, receive funding
from the Congressional Pork Barrel
o The PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the control of each legislator and given unto
them on the sole account of their office
o Concept of legislator control also conflicts with the functions of various Local Development Councils
(LDC) which are already legally mandated to assist the sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development
§ With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the LDC and initiate projects on his own
and even take sole credit for its execution 

§ This type of personality-driven project identification has contributed to further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government 


Jaigest – PoliRev - 78

[SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on Presidential Pork Barrel] Are the following phrases unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power:

“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” (Malampaya Funds) – YES.
• While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for
a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule- making authority to the Executive for the purpose of:
§ Supplementary rule-making—filling in details; or 

§ Contingent rule-making—ascertaining facts to bring the law 
into actual operation 

o Two tests to ensure legislative guidelines are adequate: 

§ Completeness test—law sets forth the policy to be carried out by the delegate
§ Sufficient standard test—provides adequate guidelines to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority
o SC: The phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law
§ It may have passed the completeness test (since the policy of energy development is
clearly discernible from its text), the abovementioned phrase should be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law 

§ This notwithstanding, the rest of SEC 8 of the same law, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting 


“[the fund may be used] to [first] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to [second]
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President” (Presidential Social Fund) – YES, but only the first part.
• SC: The phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down
as unconstitutional since it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law

• While the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the fund only
for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose gives him carte blanche
authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine a “priority”
o The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same
• However, since the mentioned SEC 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993, the issue is now
moot.

Concurring opinion, CJ SERENO

• The remaining concern is founded on the need to adhere to the principle of judicial economy—for the Court
to rule only on what it needs to rule on 

• A total condemnation of lump-sum funding is an extreme position that disregards the realities of national life 

• The following were declared unconstitutional in the dispositive portion of the decision:
o Entire 2013 PDAF Article 

o All legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork 
Barrel Laws (previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and various 
Congressional Insertions) 

o All informal practices of similar import and effect 

• Extent of their unconstitutionality:
o These authorize/d legislators (individually or collectively organized into committees) to intervene,
assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of identification, modification and
revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight 

o These confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine 

• The Court made no doctrinal pronouncement that all lump-sum appropriations per se are unconstitutional
• The ponencia, in effect, considers that the PDAF’s infirmity is brought about by the confluence of:
o Sums dedicated to multiply purposes 

o Requiring post-enactment measures 

o Participated in, not by Congress, but by its individual 
Members 


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 § It is this three-tiered nature of the PDAF which makes it unconstitutional; any other type
beyond this aggregated formulation of “lump-sum allocation” is not covered by the Court’s
declaration of unconstitutionality
• Sereno concurs that the 2013 PDAF is unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers and being an
undue delegation of legislative functions, but believes that discussions on lump-sum appropriations, line-item
appropriations and item-veto are premature
o The Court must remember that its mandate is to interpret the law, not to create it
• Coequality of the three branches necessitates judicial restraint
o In any dispute before this Court, judicial restraint is the general rule
o Wholesale rejection of lump-sum allocations contrives a rule of constitutional law broader
than what is required by the precise facts in the case
§ To conclude that line-item budgeting scheme is a matter of constitutional requirement is to
needlessly strain the Constitution’s silence on the matter
o The above rule is bolstered by the fact that petitioners have raised other grounds more
supportable by the text of the Constitution
• As it stands now, the plain text of the Constitution and the Revised Administrative Code renders the
modality of budgeting to be a political question.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 80

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (2005)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 5.

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

FACTS:

• BACKGROUND: Under the 1987 Constitution, the party-list method was introduced in our presidential system
of government.
o This method allowed any national, regional, or sectoral party/organization registered with the
COMELEC to participate in the election or party-list representative to sit as regular members of the
House of Representatives (House).
o In effect, this gives the voter 2 votes for the House: one for a district congressman, and another for
a party-list representative.
8 9
o This party-list system is mandated by Sec. 5, Art. 6 of the Constitution and by RA 7941 that was
enacted in order to promote proportional representation in the election or reps. to the House.

• On May 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national election.
123 parties, organization, and coalitions participated.
o COMELEC proclaimed 13 party list representatives from 12 parties and organizations.
o APEC had 2 representatives since it garnered that highest percentage of 5.5%.
• After the special elections, COMELEC declared COCOFED was entitled to a party-list seat.
• In lieu of this, PAG-ASA soon filed a petition to fill up the number of seats as mandated by the Constitution.

8
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
9
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.—The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.

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 o PAG-ASA alleged that the filling up of the 20% membership of was mandatory.
o PAG-ASA further claimed that the literal application of the 2% vote requirement and the 3-seat limit
under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision. This was because only 25 nominees would
be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should sit in the House.
o Thereafter, 9 other party-list (Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, et al.) soon followed
seeking a seat in the House.
• COMELEC Second Division issued the assailed Resolution granting the party-lists’ petition to have a seat in
the House.
• The party lists and organizations that were earlier declared as winners objected the Resolution. They contend
that:
o (1) Under Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941, only parties/organizations/coalitions garnering at least 2% of the
votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House; and
o (2) Additional seats, not exceeding 2 for each, should be allocated to those that garnered the 2%
threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as per Sec. 11.
• COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Resolution by the Second Division.
o It held that a strict application of the 2% ‘threshold’ does not serve the essence of the Constitution.
o Additionally, it held that it “will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional
and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House.”
• Hence, this petition to the SC.

ISSUES/HELD:

WARNING: This case was eventually overturned by Banat v. COMELEC and other subsequent cases.

Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Sec. 5(2), Art. 6 of the Constitution, mandatory
or is it a ceiling? In other words, should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up completely and all the
time? —The 20% is merely a CEILING. It is not required to fill up the 20%.
• VFP et al. contended that:
o The 20% is a ceiling;
o The legislature enacted RA 7941 that stated that party-list election must obtain at least 2% of the
total votes cast in order to qualify for a seat in the House;
o The constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative requirement;
o If there is no sufficient number of participating parties/organizations/coalitions that could garner the
2% vote threshold and fill up the 20% party-list allocation in the House, then such allocation cannot
be filled up completely; and
o COMELEC cannot be faulted for the “incompleteness,” for ultimately the voters are the ones who, in
determine who and how many should represent them, as this is their right of suffrage.
• COMELEC contended that:
o The 20% allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory; and
o The 2% vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list requirement.
• SC held that Sec. 5, Art. 6 of the Constitution conveys the message that Congress was vested with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.
o It explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House reserved for party-
list representatives.
• Congress deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat, as
10
provided for in Sec. 11(b) in RA 7941.
o Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three
seats in the House.
• SC held that the 20% is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
• In the issue of the “mathematical impossibility”, SC held that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or
change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.

10
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

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 o SC task is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical
extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement
it within the context of the actual election process.
• The function of the SC is to apply the law, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
o Unless the law is declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient, or void, it remains a valid
command of sovereignty that must be obeyed at all times.

Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit provided in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? —YES, both are
constitutional.
• In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties/organizations/coalitions having
a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
• The 2% threshold is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law and also with the
essence of “representation.”
o Under a republican/representative state, all government authority emanates from the people.
o To have a meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient
number of people.
o Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the spread of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat
to the stability of Congress.
o Even legislative districts are apportioned according to “the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio” to ensure meaningful local
representation.
• With regard the 3-seat limit, an important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation.
o This is consistent with the Constitutional Commission’s pronouncements in their deliberations.
o “Qualified” means the party-list met the 2% vote threshold.
o Such 3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature. Hence, no
single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats.

How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

• There are at least 4 inviolable parameters with regard the election of the party-list:
o FIRST, the 20% allocation – the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
20% of the total membership of the House, including those elected under the party list;
o SECOND, the 2% threshold – only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House;
o THIRD, the 3-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats (1 qualifying and 2 additional seats);
o FOURTH, proportional representation – the additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”
• SC suggested Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany
as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag.
o However the SC held that this Niemeyer formula cannot be applied squarely here in the Philippines.

STEPS

• Step One. Rank all the participating parties/organizations/coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they each received.
o The ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system.
o All parties with at least 2% of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
o Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
o The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.

• Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to in order to compute
those for the other parties.
o Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to
the other parties cannot possibly exceed which the first party is entitled to.
o For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is entitled to two additional seats.

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 o Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats,
since it garnered only 50% of the votes won by the first party.
o Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party, the second party should be
given less than the first party is entitled.
• The additional seats to the first party are given due to two reasons:
o (1) The ratio between said other parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1; and
o (2) The formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a
fraction of a seat. Also, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the 20% allocation.
o SC previously held in the case of Guingona that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a
whole membership of one because it would deprive another party’s fractional membership.
§ It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
§ SC held that “no party can claim more than what it is entitled to”
§ SC left the issue to whether to round off fractions to the legislature.
• To determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, the only basis in the law is that a party receiving
at least 2% of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Given by this formula:

o Proportionally, if the first party was to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should
be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on.
• If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least 6% of the total
valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total
of 3 seats overall.
• If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than 4%, but less than 6%, then the first
party shall have 1 additional or a total of 2 seats. And if the proportion is less than 4%, then the first party shall
not be entitled to any additional seat.
• SC adopted the 6% benchmark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of
additional seats.
o This would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats.
o This is an example of an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to 3 seats each.
o In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum
number of party-list seats reserved in the House.
• Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first
party’s entitled to.
o It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties.
o The use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter.
o For example, a second party obtains 6% of the total number of votes cast. According to the above
formula, the said party would be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total of 3 seats overall.
o However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes—say, twenty percent—to
grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party
o Getting only 6% the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining 20%.
The proper solution is to grant the first party a total of 3 seats; and the party receiving 6%, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first party.

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 • Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex
fraction:

• Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the
other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each
of the other qualified parties as well.
• The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to
be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.
o Rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law.
o Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the 3-seat-per-party limit
to a maximum of 2 additional slots.
o An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would
result in a more accurate proportional representation.
o But the law itself has set the limit: only 2 additional seats.
o Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
• Justice Mendoza dissented as he criticizes the methodology of the SC for being too strict.
o SC said that their formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical
equation. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it “less strict,” then the formula
will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
• SC partially granted the present petition.

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Phil. Guardians v. COMELEC (2009)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 5 (See Veterans)

FACTS:

• Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolutions which delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
• Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941) (The Party-List System Act) provides:
o Section 6: The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
• For the May 2010 elections, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or
organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.
• Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI. It was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
• PGBI filed an opposition but was denied by the COMELEC.
o The provision of Section 4, RA 7941 means that without the required manifestation or if a party or
organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party,
organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request
for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.
o The MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
o PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of the essence of due process.
• PGBI filed a petition for certiorari which was initially dismissed by the Court.
• PGBI moved for reconsideration.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is there a legal basis for delisting PGBI? – NO

• Application of Minero ruling in the present case is misplaced.
• Based on the Senate deliberations for RA 7941, there are actually two separate grounds to delist.
o The first ground: The party list failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections.
o The second is, failure to obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in
either of the last two preceding elections.
• Section 6(8) of RA 7941 uses the disjunctive word “or”, thus, there is plain, clear and unmistakable language
of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
• What Minero ruling effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. This is a confused interpretation of the law,
given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently.
• In the case of Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC (BANAT), it
was clarified that the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should
now be understood to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.
o In Banat, it was stated that even if a party list failed to get 2% of the votes, it may still be allocated a
seat in the Congress in the second round of seat allocation.
• Stare decisis cannot be applied in this case since the most compelling reason to abandon Minero ruling exists:
it was clearly an erroneous application of the law, an application that the principle of stability or predictability
of decisions alone cannot sustain.
• PGBI’s assertion that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply to its situation must independently consider that:
o It failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
o It failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 86

 • PGBI was thus declared to be qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization during the May
2010 elections.

Is there violation of PGBI’s right to due process? – NO

• Essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.
o The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing.
• PGBI’s right to due process was not violated since it was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of COMELEC Resolution No. 8679.

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BANAT vs. COMELEC (Apr. 2009)

SECTION 5(2). (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.

FACTS:
• In June 2007, Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number (that is 20%) of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution.
o That the full 20% of party list representatives should be proclaimed
o That the 2% threshold votes should only pertain to the first party-list representative seats
o The 3 seat limit should be applied.
o That all the 2% should be given a seat (the first seat) but the additional seats should be given in
proportion of the percentage of votes in relation to the total votes caset.
• In July 2007, Comelec, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming 13 parties as winners in the
party-list elections in May 2007.
o It also announced that it would compute the total number of seats per party according to the Veterans
formula.
In Aug. 2007, Comelec declared BANAT’s petition moot and academic since they had already ruled that the
number of seats shall be computed following the Veterans formula.
o BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC saying
that using the Veterans formula was unconstitutional.
• Aside from the 13 parties initially proclaimed, the COMELEC proclaimed 3 other party-list organizations as
qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System.
• Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
• Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution
of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?Just a ceiling
• Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution.
• The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? YES

• Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections.

Is the two percent threshold to qualify for an additional seat constitutional? NO

• Note: The 2% threshold is valid for the first seat but NOT for the additional seat. In short, you don’t need 2%
to add another seat.
• The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional.
• The continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50.
• This prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives."

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How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
• In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
o The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
o The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
o Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
o Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

HOW IS IT DONE:
1. Always remember, two-percenters are given one guaranteed seats each. Then the remaining number of seats
after the guaranteed seats are given is distributed in two stages.
• For example, if there are 55 seats available and there are fifteen 2 percenters, that leaves 40 (55-
15) remaining seats.
2. In the first stage, additional number of seats is given to the two-percenters by determining the whole number
obtained when the percentage share of the party list group is multiplied by the remaining number of seats.
Suppose, for example, that there are 40 remaining seats. TPLV = Total Party List Votes
• if Party List A (PL-A) has 6% of the TPLV then 6% x 40 = 2.4. Thus, PL-A is given 2 additional seats.
• If Party List (PL-B) has 3% of the TPLV then 3% x 40 = 1.2. Thus, PL-B is given 1 additional seat.
• If Party List (PL-C) has 2% of the TPLV then 2% x 40 = 0.8. Thus, PL-C is not given an additional
seat.
3. There is a second stage if there are still vacant seats.
• In the second stage, one seat is awarded to the highest ranking (in terms of percentage share) party
list group that did not receive any additional seat in the first stage. If there are still vacant seats, then
one seat is awarded each to the next ranking party list groups until all the vacant seats are given.
4. Apply the three seat limit.

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? NO but
the court still disallowed their participation.
• Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system
• Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election
if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
o R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties
are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes
• The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors
• It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
• Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party,"
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
• Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
• However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

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BANAT vs. COMELEC (July 2009)

SECTION 5(2). (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.

FACTS:
• The House of Representatives, filed a motion for leave to intervene in the earlier April case of BANAT.
• The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in on the following issues:
o Whether the Constitutional provision on 250 members of the HOR would be violated since with the
addition of the new party-list representatives, the number of representatives would rise to 270.
o Whether there should be 55 or 54 party list representatives.
o Whether the filling up of seats is mandatory?
o Whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is the constitutional provision on 250 members in the HOR violated? NO

• The 1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise
provided by law".
• Thus, the legislature has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House
of Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase.
• Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part: The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
o Thus, for every four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one
party-list representative.
• Since there has been an increase in the number of legislative districts, there is also an increase in the number
of party list representatives.

Should there 55 or 54 party list seats available? 54.

• Initially, the number of legislative districts was 220. But this was subsequently reduced to 219 with the SC
ruling on July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.
• Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly
reduced from 55 to 54.

Is the filling up of 20% of the seats mandatory? NO

• The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends
on the number of participants in the party-list election.
• If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54seats, the
maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap.
• In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.

Is there a minimum vote requirement to qualify as party-list representative? Yes and No.
• Yes, for the first round of allocation of seats.
o Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one
seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987
Constitution.
o Thus, SC upheld the 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.
• No, in the second round of allocation of seats.
o In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a
party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation
of additional seats.
o Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives
as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.

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 • However, a party-list organization still has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second
round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances
of each election, such as:
o the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties
with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation.

To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:

1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum
number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for
every four existing legislative districts.

2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one
seat.
• The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at
least two percent of the total party-list votes.

3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed
to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes.
• The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional
seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the
filling up of the available party-list seats.
• The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according
to the two-step procedure laid down in April BANAT decision.

4. The three-seat cap is constitutional.

• The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system.
• There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute
proportionality for the party-list system.
• The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not
violative of the Constitution.

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Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC (2010)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 5 (See Veterans)

FACTS:

• Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
o Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006.
o The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base.
o Ang Ladlad tried again.
• This time, Ang Ladlad argues that:
o the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
o LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence;
o because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
o Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections
• COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds:
o COMELEC cited the Bible and the Koran as basis [Sorry guys di ko kinya *ROLLS EYES FOREVER*]
o “Ang Ladlad apparently advocates sexual immorality” in representing gays and lesbians who
consensually engage in partnerships and relationships and who are already of age
o Also found that Ang Ladlad violates Article 695 of the Civil Code (defines nuisance)
§ ‘Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality
o Also violates Art. 1306
§ The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
o Also Art. 1409
§ ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
o Also the RPC in that it penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows’ as follows

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing
such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to
satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet
traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.

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 o Also Ang Ladlad should be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
o Also we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith
• BUT IT GETS BETTER. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration and were again denied. COMELEC chairman
said this in his Opinion:
o “Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that
it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.”
§ The party list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nation’s
§ Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that
o The members of Ang Ladlad are still males and females protected by the same Bill of Rights
o As a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society
and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

ISSUES/HELD:

Has Ang Ladlad complied with the legal requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941 for accreditation? --
YES

• COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
• SC: as specifically ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani, he enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive
o crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941
• COMELEC also denied on the argument that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements re: existence of its
members and affiliate organization.
o COMELEC found that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost
all provinces in the country
• SC: There was no error in the representation
o A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province
of the Philippines.
o Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at
least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group.
o Ang Ladlad represented itself as an “umbrella organization”
• THEREFOR: Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements

Should Ang Ladlad’s application be denied on the grounds of religion? -- NO.

• it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
o Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
o At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."
• Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether
the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
o government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose.
• Estrada v. Escritor:

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 o Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.

Should Ang Ladlad’s application be denied based on the ground of public morals? -- NO.

• COMELEC: suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may
be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals.
o accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the
danger it poses to the people especially the youth
o “Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example.”
• SC: this is not true
o the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
o Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law
• Resolutions do not identify any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad
o OSG agrees: A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different
gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a
great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights"
and the gays."
• COMELEC has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth.
• SC find COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous,
at worst
• moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system.
o The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
o COMELEC’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act.
o It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Should the application be denied on the basis of the Equal protection clause? -- NO.

• Equal protection clause is not an absolute prohibition against classification

o Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.
• COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
• SC: this is not true
o No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior.
o Even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
• From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest
in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
o Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
• Are LGBTs a separate class in themselves as the OSG suggests? SC not prepared to agree.

Jaigest – PoliRev - 94

Magdalo v. COMELEC (2012)

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

C. The Commission on Elections
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. x x x.” (Emphasis supplied.)

ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime
concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.

FACTS:

• 2 July 2009 - Petitioner Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
o In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and
its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
• 26 October 2009 - The COMELEC–Second Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO. The relevant portions of the assailed Resolution read:
o “Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section
2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator
Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and
using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized
societies. x x x”
• 3 November 2009 - MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc for resolution.
• 4 January 2010 - In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by MAGDALO.
• In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that –
o (a) the COMELEC Resolutions were not based on the record or evidence presented;
o (b) the Resolutions preempted the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in which
several members of the military are being tried for their involvement in the siege of the Oakwood
Premier Apartments (Oakwood); and
o (c) it has expressly renounced the use of force, violence and other forms of unlawful means to
achieve its goals.
• MAGDALO prays for the SC to: (a) reverse and set aside the 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 COMELEC
Resolutions; (b) grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to issue a Certificate of
Registration.
o The Petition likewise includes a prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and/or Injunctive Relief to direct the COMELEC to allow MAGDALO to participate in the
10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. à SC denied this.

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ISSUE/ HELD:

(Procedural) Has the case been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National and
Local Elections? NO.
• Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date,
it specifically asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections.
• Plus, usual SC formula, which it applied here: exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
o The instant action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the
use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party registration.
o Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as
the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the
issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.

Did COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on
the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means? NO, but
without prejudice to MAGDALO’s filing anew of a Petition for Registration.
• FYI (admin process): To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation (Liberal Party v. COMELEC)
o Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws.
o Accreditation relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered
parties.
§ Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition;
stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation
can be made.
§ Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
• The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public
knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence
thereon.
o Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of “public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration.”
§ Further, the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies
to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent
men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
§ Saludo v. American Express: The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in the context
of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are “so commonly known in the
community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to
make it indisputable among reasonable men.”
o The SC, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the factual circumstances surrounding
the Oakwood standoff. (Review of history below)
§ The incident involved over 300 heavily armed military officers and enlisted men—led by the
founding members of MAGDALO—who surreptitiously took over Oakwood in the wee hours
of 27 July 2003. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around
the building and within its vicinity.
§ They aired their grievances against the administration of former President Arroyo, withdrew
their support from the government, and called for her resignation, as well as that of her
cabinet members and of the top officials of the PNP and AFP.
§ After the ensuing negotiations for these military agents to lay down their weapons, defuse
the explosives and return to the barracks, the debacle came to a close at 11:00 p.m. on the
same day.
§ That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made
it a proper subject of judicial notice.
• The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence
or unlawful means to achieve its goals.
o MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because
§ (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage;
§ (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and
§ (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.

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 o SC: These arguments present a very narrow interpretation of the concepts of violence and unlawful
means, and downplays the threat of violence displayed by the soldiers during the takeover.
§ Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means” shall be
denied registration.
• This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that “no
political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation.”
• Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the
accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury.
o It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that
force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and
against public liberty.
• On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be
a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
§ In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence and
unlawful means.
• Violence: Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top
officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO
opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle
gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods
by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and
withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
• Unlawful means: The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the
show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive
devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public.
• The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not
operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
o MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through
violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes,
which in effect, preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to
presumption of innocence.
o SC: This argument cannot be sustained. Although the registration case before the COMELEC and
the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they
nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds.
§ The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881
in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in character.
• In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
• Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability,
as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of
this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580 (2011), is nonetheless analogously
applicable
§ An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition
in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both
may arise from the same set of facts.
• In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant
to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections
as political parties (quantum of evidence: substantial evidence)
o In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its
organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment
as to whether the members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent
was not required to make that determination in the first place.
o Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO
possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications
for registration as a political party.

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 • On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging
members of MAGDALO with coup d’état following the events that took place during
the Oakwood siege (quantum of evidence: proof beyond reasonable doubt)
• Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel involved in the Oakwood standoff
o SC took judicial notice of the grant of amnesty in favor of the soldiers who figured in this standoff.
o In view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that
transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context
of the disqualifications from party registration.
§ Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
o Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the use
of violence.
§ Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for Registration, its officers
must individually execute affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means
to achieve the objectives of their organization.
§ Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include
military officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run
counter to the express provisions of the Constitution [Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1)]

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Dayao v. COMELEC (2013)

ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department. SECTION 5 (See Veterans)

FACTS:

• Petitioners Dayao, Ramirez and Capco are individual dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) while petitioner Federation of Philippine Industries Inc (FPII) is an association comprised entities
engaged in various industries in the country.
• LPG Marketing Association (LPGMA) is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry
players in the LPG and energy sector.
o It advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by household consumers.
• In May 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC,
through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 2010
elections.
o It claimed that is has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied concerns.
• After the requisite publication, verification and hearing, and without any apparent opposition, LPGMA’s petition
was approved by the COMELEC.
• 4 months after, petitioners lodged a complaint before the COMELEC for the cancellation of LPGMA’s
registration as a party-list organization.
• The complaint in essence proffered that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the society
because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they
are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market
and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants.
o FPII also alleged that LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their own interests before the
Congress and the DOE.
• LPGMA countered that Sec. 5(2), Art. 6 of the Constitution does not require that party-list representatives
must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society.
• COMELEC dismissed the complaint for 2 reasons:
1. The ground for cancellation cited by petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in RA 9741.
2. The complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long
been approved with finality on January 2010.
• The MR was also denied.
• Hence, petitioners filed the petition to determine the corrected of the COMELEC resolutions.
• Arguments of the parties:
o OSG: since the COMELEC failed to resolve the factual issue on the qualifications of LPGMA as a
registered party-list organization, the case must be remanded to the COMELEC for summary hearing
and reception of evidence.
o LPGMA: another hearing would be a superfluity because the COMELEC has already heard and
verified LPGMA’s qualifications during the proceedings for its petition for registration.
• On Dec. 26, 2012, LPGMA manifested to the SC that pursuant to COMELEC Resolution dated Dec. 13,
LPGMA passed the automatic review conducted by the COMELEC on the qualifications of party-list groups.

ISSUES/HELD:

Is there a distinction between refusal and cancellation of a party-list? - YES

• An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for
cancellation.
• Sec. 6, RA 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation.
• Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration:
o The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
1. It is a religious sect/denomination, org or ass’n, organized for religious purposes
2. Advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal
3. A foreign party or org

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 4. Receiving support from any foreign govt, political party, foundation, org, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes.
5. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections
6. Declares untruthful statements in its petition
7. Has ceased to exist for at least 1 year
8. Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
• For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the
law imposes only 2 conditions:
1. Due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned
2. Any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.
• Section 6 does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be previously interposed so that a
complaint for cancellation can be entertained.
• Since the law does not impose such a condition, COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated administrative
authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into the law that which it
does not provide.
• An opposition can be reasonably expected only during the petition for registration proceedings which involve
the COMELEC’s power to register a party-list group, as distinguished from the entirely separate power invoked
by the complaint, which is the power to cancel.
• To refuse is to decline or to turn down, while to cancel is to annul or remove.
• Refusal of registration happens during the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the
roster of COMELEC-registered party-list organizations through a petition for registration.
• Cancellation takes place after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu proprio
or upon a verified complaint.
• Refusal is handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the registration itself after
the petition has been approved.
• COMELEC’s conclusion that the complaint for cancellation, filed 4 months after the petition was approved is
actually a belated opposition, obliterates the distinction between the power to register/refuse and the power
to cancel.

May the registration still be cancelled? - YES

• The COMELEC Resolution granting LPGMA’s registration has since become final.
• Such finality, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list
organization.
• The resolution, as any other granting registration of any other organization desirous of party-list accreditation,
did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the right to participate in the party-list elections and the right to
assume office should it obtain the required number of votes.
• LPGMA’s right to run, as it did so run, during the 2010 party-list elections is already beyond challenge.
• HOWEVER, the Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its
accreditation as a party-list organization.
• Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of
the group.
• Both accreditation and the facts substantiating the same can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the
COMELEC, motu proprio or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation.
• Each accreditation by the COMELEC to party-list orgs can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress,
thru the SEC to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code.
• Franchise is a right or privilege conferred by law and emanates from a sovereign power, the grant of which Is
inherently a legislative power.
• But it may be derived indirectly from the state thru an agency to which the power has been delegated.
• The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for registration of any corp or partnership is vested
with the SEC by PD 902-A.
• RA 7941 is the legislative act that delegates to the COMELEC the power to grant franchises in the form of
accreditation to people’s orgs desirous of participating in the party-list system of representation.

Is LPGMA qualified to be a party-list organization? – Yes

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 • It is the role of the COMELEC to ensure the realization of the intent of the Constitution to give genuine power
to those who have less in life by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it
that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under
the party-list system.
• To effectively discharge this role RA 7941 grants the COMELEC the power not only to register party-list groups
but also to review and cancel their registration.
• In ruling that the finality of its Resolution stretched to the accreditation of LPGMA, the COMELEC
practically enfeebled and denied its own power to cancel what it is exclusively empowered to grant.
• Under Section 6(5), a party-list organization may be disqualified on the ground that its officers and members
do not belong to the marginalized or underrepresented sector.
• Therefore, a party or an organization that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
• After exhaustive deliberation and careful review of the records, the COMELEC found LPGMA qualified to
become an accredited party-list organization, hence its decisions under the assailed Resolutions.
• No useful purpose would be served by remanding the complaint to the COMELEC.

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