SPOUSES IMBONG V. OCHOEA JR. G.R. No.

184740
KEY TAKE-AWAY: The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and enhancement of existing
reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance the population control program of the government in
order to promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are found within the law,
provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution
by infringing on the rights of the people.
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS
 Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No. 10354 as unconstitutional
 Factual Antecedents
 December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
 The president’s imprimatur and support for the said law lead to a range of petitions
against the law leading to iuris controversy in court. Petitions for certiorari and
prohibition were placed by numerous parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitions-
in-intervention were filed.
 March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took place
 March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments raised, the court issued
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120 day halt on the implementation of
the legislation
 Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties, the SQAO was extended
until further orders of the court last July 16, 2013
 Statute Involved:
 Republic Act 10354, “The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012”
 Position of Petitioner:
o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are unconstitutional as they
violate the rights to life, to health, to freedom of expression and speech, to the
privacy of families, to academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal
protection, and against involuntary servitude. They also intrude on the autonomy
of local governments and the ARMM, and violate natural law. Furthermore, they
claim that Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which
should be included in the EDL is invalid.
 Position of Respondent
 There is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe
for judicial determination
 Some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law
  The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.
 ISSUES
 Procedural
o Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule
 Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
 Right to Life
 Right to Health
 Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
 The Family
 Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
 Due Process
 Equal Protection
 Involuntary Servitude
 Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM
 Natural Law
o Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which
should be included in the EDL is valid
 HELD
 Procedural
o Whether or not the court may exercise its power of judicial review - YES
 While the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results. The following requisites for judicial review were
met: (a) there mustbe an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota
of the case
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy – YES
 Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
 seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
 Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other benefits.
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge – YES
 The scope of application of facial challenges extends to the regulation of free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.
 Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny.
o Whether or not Locus Standi applies – YES
 Regardless of whether the petitioners are directly injured of affected by the
RH Law or not, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." The RH
Law falls under transcendental importance as it drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion
and expression and other constitutional rights.
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief - YES
 Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs, not declaratory reliefs,
and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule – NO
 In a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law, both "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. Thus, the Court finds no
 reason to believe that Congress had the intention to deceive the public
regarding the contents of the said law.
 Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
 Right to Life – NO
 Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to the time of
fertilization and 2.) the protection of the unborn upon said fertilization
 Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a fertilized
ovum)
 Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg are thus permissible
 It is the intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to prevent the
enacting of a law that legalizes abortion.
 RH law prohibits abortion
 RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
 RH law prohibits abortifacients
 Right to Health - NO
 With the provisions of RA 4729 still in place, the status quo on the sale of
contraceptives is maintained and the Court believes that there are
adequate measures that ensure that the public has access to
contraceptives that have been determined safe following testing,
evaluation, and approval by the FDA
 Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech – NO and YES
 RH law does not violate guarantee of religious freedom via the state-
sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious
beliefs of the people including the petitioners. This is because in doing so,
the state would be adhering to one religions, making a de facto state
religion which is contrary to religious freedom.
 The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
 There limits to the exercise of religious freedom (compelling state interest
test)
 Benevolent neutrality
 RH law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring
would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition (sec.7, 23, 24)
 However, RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
 providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections
 The Family - YES
 Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which needs only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision in order to undergo reproductive
procedures intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against
the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Not only that, but the exclusion of parental consent in cases
where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which declares that the rearing of
children by parents is a natural right.
 Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom – UNDECIDED
 The court decided that making a ruling on Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education, is premature. The Department of
Education has not yet created a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education, thus the constitutionality of the specifics in
such a curriculum still cannot be determined. The exclusion of private
educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.
 Due Process - NO
 The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the petitioners in the RH
Law are not vague.
 Private health care institution = private health care service provider.
 “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include giving
information and performing medical procedures, so hospitals run by
religious groups can be exempted.
 “incorrect information” connotes a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead the public.
 Equal Protection - NO
 It is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers.
  Involuntary Servitude - NO
 The State has the power to regulate the practice of medicine in order to
ensure the welfare of the public. Not only that, but Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to give pro
bono service; they do not incur penalties if they refuse. Conscientious
objects are exempt if their religious beliefs do not allow them to provide
the said services.
 Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM – NO
 The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments.
Under paragraph (c) of Section 17, unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over
a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual General Appropriations Act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction
of the LGUs. Not only that, but LGUs are merely encouraged and not
compelled to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Lastly, Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 deor the
Organic Act of the ARMM merely outlines the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government and does not indicate the State’s
abdication to create laws in the name of public welfare.
 Natural Law – disregarded
 Natural law, according to the Court, is not recognized as proper legal basis
for making decisions
o Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining
which should be included in the EDL is valid- YES
 Under RA 3720, the FDA, being the primary and sole premiere and only agency
that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, has the
power and competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods
 Final Ruling
o Petitions partially granted. The RA 10354 is declared constitutional, and Status
Quo Ante Order lifted with respect to provisions of RA 10354 that have been
declared as constitutional. However, the following provisions and their
corresponding provisions in the RH-IRR have been declared unconstitutional:
 Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
 to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
 Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
 Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
 Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
 Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
 Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
 Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
 Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Dissenting Opinion
Leonen, J.
I. Preliminary Considerations
  None of the petitions properly present an “actual case or controversy” which deserves
the exercise of judicial review. The consolidated petitions do not provide the proper
venue to decide on fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social legislation.
 An actual case or controversy is “one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion
of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court
of justice.”
 No locus standi. Petitioners, by no stretch of the imagination, cannot be representative
of the interests of “the entire Filipino nation.” Not all Filipinos are Roman Catholics. Not
all Filipinos are from the Visayas. Certainly not all Filipinos have a common interest that
will lead to a common point of view on the constitutionality of the various provisions of
the RH law.
II. Substantive Discussions
 The court cannot make a declaration on the beginning of life. Any declaration on this issue
will be fraught with contradictions. Even the Constitutional Commissioners were not in
full agreement; hence, the use of the word “conception” rather than “fertilized ovum” in
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. There were glaring factual inaccuracies peddled
during their discussion.
 The Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not true that the issue of
when life begins is already a settled matter. There are several other opinions on this issue.
The Constitutional Commissioners adopted the term “conception” rather than “fertilized
ovum.”
 Insisting that we can impose, modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is
usurpation of the executive power of control over administrative agencies. It is a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, which recognizes that “[e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.” The system of checks and balances only allows us to declare, in
the exercise of our judicial powers, the Food and Drugs Administration’s acts as violative
of the law or as committed with grave abuse of discretion. Such power is further limited
by the requirement of actual case or controversy.
 The petitions have failed to present clear cases when the provisions for conscientious
objection would truly amount to a violation of religion. They have not distinguished the
relationship of conscience and specific religious dogma. They have not established
religious canon that conflict with the general provision of Sections 7, 17 and 23 of the law.
The comments in intervention in fact raise serious questions regarding what could be
acceptable Catholic doctrine on some issues of contraception and sex as only for
procreation.
Separate Concurring Opinion
Carpio, J.
I. Preliminary Considerations
The court is not competent to declare when human life begins. The issue with regards to
this must be settled within the scientific and medical community.
II. Substantive Discussions
RA No. 10354 protects the ovum upon its fertilization (without actually saying that life
begins here). The issue then, of whether life begins during fertilization or when the ovum
plants itself on the uterus wall, is covered as this protects at both stages.

Although the law does not provide a definition of conception, it has provisions that
embody the policy of the state to protect the travel of the fertilized ovum to the uterus
wall. The law states that it will provide means which do not prevent implantation of a
fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug Administration.
Separate Concurring Opinion
Brion, J.
I. Preliminary Considerations
 The petitions are ripe for judicial review. The petitions allege actions by the legislature
and by the executive that lie outside the contemplation of the Constitution. A controversy
exists appropriate for this Court's initial consideration of the presence of grave abuse of
discretion: and consequent adjudication if the legislative and executive actions can be so
characterized.

II. Substantive Discussions

 While the RH Law generally protects and promotes the unborn’s right to life, its Section 9
and its IRR fail in their fidelity to the Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law
itself. It fails to adopt the principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.
 The Court should formulate guidelines on what the government can actually procure and
distribute under the RH law, consistent with its authority under this law and Section 12,
Article II to achieve the full protection the Constitution envisions.
 The attack on Section 14’s constitutionality is premature because that the lack of an
implementing curriculum by the Department of Education makes it premature to rule on
constitutionality. The court cannot determine yet how parental rights will be affected
since the specifics of what would be taught under the RH education program do not yet
exist.
 The RH Law’s implementation could have political and economic consequences. It could
also produce social consequences by ushering in behaviors and perceptions about sex,
marriage, and family that are vastly different (in a negative way) from the norm.
 Section 23(a) (l) of the RH Law is an unconstitutional subsequent punishment of speech.
It has overreached the permissible coverage of regulation on the speech of doctors and
other health professionals. The existing information dissemination program found in the
RH law is sufficient in providing information about available reproductive health services
and programs, and the existing regulatory framework for their practice already
sufficiently protects against such negligence and malpractice. Furthermore, the said
section can create a chilling effect for those in the profession.
BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR NO 208566

Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa

(2013) Subject:
Justiciable Controversy, Ripeness for Adjudication, Political Question, Locus Standi, Res Judicata, Stare
Decisis, Pork Barrel, Congressional Pork Barrel, Presidential Pork Barrel, Mandamus, Right to
Information, SARO, Operative Fact Doctrine

Facts:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” has
been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although,
its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.

The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.

The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under the regular budget.

In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that
huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks.

in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form
of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition
was dismissed.

In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits
of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated
the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the
disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.
As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties
in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared
unconstitutional

Held:
I. Procedural issues
Justiciable Controversy
1. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power operates only when there
is an actual case or controversy.

2. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

3. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement
of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Also, the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for
their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869
for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Ripeness for Adjudication

4. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness, meaning
that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action

5. The cases at present have not become moot. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.

6. The Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which,
being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing.

7. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already abolished the PDAF render the issues on
PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify
or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done
either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of
unconstitutionality

8. Moreover, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(c) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the four exceptions
are applicable in this case.

Political Question

9. The issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its
province to resolve. A political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
10. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith under
the expanded concept of judicial power under Section1, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution

Locus Standi

11. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute
or ordinance, he has no standing.

12. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing Pork
Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound
to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.

13. Moreover, as citizens, petitiones have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest

Res Judicata (does not apply)

14. Res judicata means “a matter adjudged”. The focal point of res judicata is the judgment.The
res judicata principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

15. The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case. The required identity is not present since
Philconsa and LAMP, respectively, involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and
2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork
Barrel System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality –
and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits .
Stare Decisis (does not apply)

16. Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis) means “follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled”. The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The stare
decisis principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike.

17. The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the
contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of the entire Pork Barrel System. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered
as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
18. In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to
stare decisis.
19. As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and,
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues
in these cases.

II. Substantive issues

Pork Barrel System

20. The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including
its members.

21. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
(a) Congressional Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the
fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.
(b) Presidential Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President
to determine the manner of its utilization.

Constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel

22. The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and
its predecessor, the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) are unconstitutional.
23. The Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been authorized to participate
in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers
principle. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in Congress and must be
exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar
as the 2013 PDAF Article has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine, it has violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power;

(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would
be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending. This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President’s power of item veto.

Insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations
bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the
power to veto items
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

(e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and
of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action.

(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding
as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped”
compared to the former. This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with
the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs).
Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy.

Constitutionality of the Presidential Pork Barrel

24. While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is
sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of
(a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.

25. The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

26. Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law
for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under
the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has transgressed the principle
of non-delegability.

Previous Rulings on PDAF/CDF

27. In Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the then known Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The petitioners in the said
case claimed that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and
activites to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power. They argued
that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof which is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project
or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress
wants
it to be. The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers
and other priority projects and activities and other credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries..." It was
Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. On the other hand, the Executive was
responsive for the implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects
to be implemented by the President. Under the GAA of 1994, the President must examine whether the
proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which
the CDF was set up, and if qualified, the President next determines whether they are in line with other
projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding, it is the President
who shall implement them. The proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are
merely recommendatory.

In addition, the Supreme Court stated that the CDF is a recognition that individual members of Congress,
far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely o be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given to each project.

28. In Sarmiento v. Treasurer, G.R. Nos. 125680 & 126313, September 4, 2001, the petitioners
questioned the constitutionality of the CDF under the GAA of 1996. Seeking the reversal of Philconsa v.
Enriquez, the petitioners alleged that the proposal and identification of projects by members of Congress
were not merely recommendatory considering that requests for releases of funds under the CDF are
automically released. The Solicitor General argued that since the questioned provision is basically the
same provision found in the 1994 GAA held as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Philconsa v.
Enriquez, the instant case should be resolved in the same manner, following the principle of stare decisis.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the CDF under the 1996 GAA.

29. In League Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management,
G.R. 164987, April 21, 2012, petitioners assailed the constitutionality and legality of the implementation
of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in the GAA of 2004. According
to the petitioners, the provision in the GAA as regards the PDAF is silent and therefore prohibits an
automatic allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for funding of projects. It
does not give the individual members of Congress the mandate to propose, select and identify programs
and projects to be funded out of PDAF. The petitioners submitted that such a situation violates the
principle of separation of powers because in receiving and thereafter spending funds for their chosen
projects, the members of Congress in effect intruded into an executive function. Further, the authority to
propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid
of constitutional sanction and therefore impermissible and must be considered nothing less than
malfeasance.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the PDAF. The Court stated that no convincing proof
was presented showing that, indeed there were direct releases of funds to members of Congresss, who
actually spent them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement
of funds by the DBM in favor of the members of Congres was presented by the petitioner to convince
the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. The Court further stated that the authority granted to
members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa v. Enriquez, and
there is no need to review or reverse the pronouncements made in said case so long as there is no
showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget.

Mandamus

30. Petitioners prayed that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management
be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed
reports related to the availments and utilization of the PDAF and Malampaya funds.
31. Petitioners‘ prayer was grounded on Section 28, Article II (policy of full public disclosure) and Section
7, Article III (right of the people to information on matters of public concern) of the 1987 Constitution.

32. The court denied the prayer of petitioner on procedural grounds. The proper remedy to invoke the
right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. Citing Legaspi vs CSC: “ the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part
of said agencies. Xxx The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled
by a writ of mandamus in a proper case”

33. Moreover, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. In the
same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the applicant has a well defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for
information.

34. In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to
be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested

35. Nevertheless, petitioners are not denied access to official documents which are already existing and
of public record.Inclusion of Funds in Budgetary Deliberations

36. The Court also denied petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of the subject funds in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.

TRO Enjoining Release of Remaining PDAF

37. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular 2013-8 which authorized the continued
implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: (a) covered by a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO); and (b) that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency
concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.

38. As to the issue of lifting the TRO, the present decision has rendered it moot and academic.
The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect
of
converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision,
the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

39. As to the coverage and application of the TRO, the Court agreed with the petitioners’ position that
"the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only
triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). As such, PDAF disbursements, even if
covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
A SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking,
the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of
the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will
prevent the actual release of funds

40. Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by
obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund

Operative Fact Doctrine

41. the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,
and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

42. The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
 JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERNATIVE COALITION V. LIM

petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of

Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, "CREATING AND
DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER
CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227.

the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," which was enacted on
March 13, 1992, set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound
and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military
bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their
extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in
the City of Baguio. |||

On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and

Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd.
(TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private
corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands,
preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro
Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and
recreation centers. Four months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA,
TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement 6 whereby
they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the
Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would
lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning
such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned
by the parties under their Memorandum of Agreement. Ca|||

The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition 17 for
prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995
challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public
respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the following:
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990
(sic) IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS IS
INVALID AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED
ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE.
 II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT
LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE
AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID,
ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE RULE
THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND
EQUITABLE.
IV. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
HAVING BEEN ENTERED INTO ONLY BY DIRECT
NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL. HSEcTC

V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF

AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT BASES
CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS sic
ILLEGAL.
VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF
RESPONDENTS NOT HAVING UNDERGONE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING
ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A VALID
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT .

(1) Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this
Court's exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues;
(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for
national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and
(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or
interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City;
An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. 30 The
controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of
parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal
interests. 31 There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights
between petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential
proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into
a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation contains unconstitutional
provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.
 R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the
country. 32 The grant by the law on local government units of the right of
concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on
them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby
or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation
No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged. 33 Theirs is a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely
an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest, 34 for what is at stake
in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social
existence of the people of Baguio City.
Petitioners' locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other residents of
Bataan, specially of the town of Limay, in Garcia v. Board of Investments 35 where
this Court characterized their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant
in their place as actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect not only their
economic life but even the air they breathe.
Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly
elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of
Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their
constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of
the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall
and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against 36 the sanggunian Resolution No.
255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation
No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.
That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond
doubt. The mootness of the issues concerning the questioned agreements
between public and private respondents is of no moment.
"By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of
the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty." 37
As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no
question that they have been complied with in the case at bar. This is an action
filed purposely to bring forth constitutional issues, ruling on which this Court must
take up. Besides, respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites,
hence, they are deemed waived.
 Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality
of Proclamation No. 420, as framed in the second and third issues above, must
now be addressed squarely.
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and
success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay
SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only
to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no
support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ
find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420,
which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the
enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax
exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state
constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of
property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to
tax. 42 Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax
exemptions, 43 or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from
local taxes. 44
The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's
imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress. 45 In the same vein, the other kinds of
privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress
to legislate upon.
With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over
Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it, subject to certain limitations
provided for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency of the John
Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it
has been granted.
The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives
as contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the
Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by
means of a proclamation. 51 The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City
government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly
enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation
had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. 52 This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No.
420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are
separable from the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal
force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the
aforesaid void provision.
(John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, [October
|||

24, 2003], 460 PHIL 530-554)

 PORMENTO V ESTRADA

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP"

EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

CORONA, C.J : p

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any
reelection?"TADCSE

The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this

case present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law
students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates that this
Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already been
mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional requirement
of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for they proper exercise
of they power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure of making a
grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding
opinion.
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent
was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections
held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections
held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private
respondent's candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his
petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). 1 His motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the COMELEC en banc.2
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari 3 on May 7, 2010.
However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the
execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is
sought to be reviewed. 4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private
respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President
in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number
of votes. 5
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will
be premised on a person's second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
 conflict of legal rights exists. 6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. 7No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon
by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. 8 As such,
one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review,
the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. HSIaAT

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing

controversies. 9 The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. 10 In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. 11
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. 12
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation
of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will
serve no useful or practical purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.
(Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988 (Resolution), [August 31, 2010], 643
|||

PHIL 735-739)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATIONS OF COLLEGES, UNIVERSITIES V. SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws
that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be
granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of
Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It
also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being
used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted
to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary
must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts
to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

"Bona fide suit. — Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual

cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes
is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under
the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy
between litigants." (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
p. 1138.)
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S.
W. 2d. 771.)
LACSON V. PEREZ

LACSON VS. PEREZ

[357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ;10 May 2001]
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001
as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter
effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected
by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition
is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests
and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the
instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from
the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless
arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law:
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered
to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for
the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be
charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor
were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold
departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that
purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is
premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore,
the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
 [G.R. No. 192302. June 4, 2014.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-

MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL A.
MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-
YAP, respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated
May 21, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated May 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102724 which nullified and set aside the Joint
Order 4 dated August 8, 2007 and the Order 5 dated January 10, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24 (Manila RTC) in Civil Case Nos.
03-107325 and 03-107308, denying the separate Motions for Leave to Intervene
and Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention filed by respondents Rafael A. Manalo,
Grace M. Oliva, and Freida Z. Rivera-Yap (respondents).
The Facts
On July 18, 2003, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed a
complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. R.A.B. Realty, Inc., et
al.," 6 docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107308, before the Manila RTC.
Subsequently, or on July 21, 2003, it filed a second complaint for civil forfeiture,
entitled "Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et al.," 7 docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107325
(collectively, civil forfeiture cases), also before the same RTC. 8 In the said civil
forfeiture cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits
and government securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants
therein, which were related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting
investments from the public, 9 in violation of the Securities Regulation Code 10 as
well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001. 11
On September 25 and 27, 2006, herein respondents filed separate Motions
for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention 12 (separate
motions for intervention), in the civil forfeiture cases, respectively, alleging, inter
alia, that they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof. In this
relation, they asserted that in a separate petition for involuntary insolvency
proceedings, i.e., Spec. Proc. Case No. 03-026 filed before the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 204 (insolvency case), they were appointed as assignees of the properties
of Spouses Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay) (as well as their
conduit companies) who were impleaded as defendants in the aforementioned civil
forfeiture cases. 13
 The Manila RTC Ruling
On August 8, 2007, the Manila RTC rendered a Joint Order 14 denying
respondents' separate motions for intervention, citing Section 35 of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture 15 (Civil Forfeiture Rules) which states:
Sec. 35. Notice to file claims. — Where the court has issued an
order of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture
petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been
impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by
verified petition, for a declaration that the same legitimately belongs
to him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument
or property corresponding thereto. The verified petition shall be filed
with the court which rendered the order of forfeiture within fifteen days
from the date of finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the
said order shall be executory and bar all other claims. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the remedy stated in the foregoing provision, the Manila RTC thus
ratiocinated that respondents "need not unduly worry as they are amply protected
in the event the funds subject of the instant case are ordered forfeited in favor of
the [Republic]." 16 EaScHT

Dissatisfied, respondents moved for reconsideration, which was likewise

denied by the Manila RTC in an Order 17 dated January 10, 2008, prompting them
to elevate the case to the CA on certiorari. 18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 19 dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition,
ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents'
separate motions for intervention. It found that respondents were able to establish
their rights as assignees in the insolvency case filed by Sps. Baladjay. As such,
they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject of the civil forfeiture
cases. 20 Moreover, a reading of Section 35 of the Civil Forfeiture Rules as above-
cited revealed that there is nothing therein that prohibits an interested party from
intervening in the case before an order of forfeiture is issued. 21
Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 22 dated May 17, 2010, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred
in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Joint Order dated August 8, 2007 and the Order dated January 10, 2008 which
denied respondents' separate motions for intervention in the civil forfeiture cases.
 At this point, the Court duly notes that during the pendency of the instant
petition, the Manila RTC rendered a Decision on September 23, 2010 in Civil Case
No. 03-107325, and, thereafter, a Decision dated February 11, 2011 and Amended
Decision dated May 9, 2011 in Civil Case No. 03-107308, all of which ordered the
assets subject of the said cases forfeited in favor of the government. 23 In view
thereof, the Republic prayed that it be excused from filing the required
reply, 24 which the Court granted in a Resolution 25 dated June 3, 2013.
The Court's Ruling
The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication
of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In
such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness, 26 as a judgment in a case which presents a moot question can no
longer be enforced. 27
In this case, the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision dated September
23, 2010 in Civil Case No. 03-107325, as well as the Decision dated February 11,
2011 and the Amended Decision dated May 9, 2011 in Civil Case No. 03-107308,
by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of
the government, are supervening events which have effectively rendered the
essential issue in this case moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents
should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they
have a legal interest in the forfeited assets. As the proceedings in the civil forfeiture
cases from which the issue of intervention is merely an incident have already been
duly concluded, no substantial relief can be granted to the Republic by resolving
the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED. TcAECH

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Manalo, G.R. No. 192302 (Resolution), [June 4, 2014])
 [G.R. No. 192302. June 4, 2014.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-

MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL A.
MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-
YAP, respondents.

The Facts
On July 18, 2003, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed a
complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. R.A.B. Realty, Inc., et
al.," 6 docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107308, before the Manila RTC.
Subsequently, or on July 21, 2003, it filed a second complaint for civil forfeiture,
entitled "Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et al.," 7 docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107325
(collectively, civil forfeiture cases), also before the same RTC. 8 In the said civil
forfeiture cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits
and government securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants
therein, which were related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting
investments from the public, 9 in violation of the Securities Regulation Code 10 as
well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001. 11
On September 25 and 27, 2006, herein respondents filed separate Motions
for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention 12 (separate
motions for intervention), in the civil forfeiture cases, respectively, alleging, inter
alia, that they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof. In this
relation, they asserted that in a separate petition for involuntary insolvency
proceedings, i.e., Spec. Proc. Case No. 03-026 filed before the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 204 (insolvency case), they were appointed as assignees of the properties
of Spouses Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay) (as well as their
conduit companies) who were impleaded as defendants in the aforementioned civil
forfeiture cases. 13
The Manila RTC Ruling
On August 8, 2007, the Manila RTC rendered a Joint Order 14 denying
respondents' separate motions for intervention, citing Section 35 of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture 15 (Civil Forfeiture Rules) which states:
Sec. 35. Notice to file claims. — Where the court has issued an
order of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture
petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been
impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by
verified petition, for a declaration that the same legitimately belongs
 to him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument
or property corresponding thereto. The verified petition shall be filed
with the court which rendered the order of forfeiture within fifteen days
from the date of finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the
said order shall be executory and bar all other claims. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the remedy stated in the foregoing provision, the Manila RTC thus
ratiocinated that respondents "need not unduly worry as they are amply protected
in the event the funds subject of the instant case are ordered forfeited in favor of
the [Republic]." 16EaScHT

Dissatisfied, respondents moved for reconsideration, which was likewise

denied by the Manila RTC in an Order 17 dated January 10, 2008, prompting them
to elevate the case to the CA on certiorari. 18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 19 dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition,
ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents'
separate motions for intervention. It found that respondents were able to establish
their rights as assignees in the insolvency case filed by Sps. Baladjay. As such,
they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject of the civil forfeiture
cases. 20 Moreover, a reading of Section 35 of the Civil Forfeiture Rules as above-
cited revealed that there is nothing therein that prohibits an interested party from
intervening in the case before an order of forfeiture is issued. 21
Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 22 dated May 17, 2010, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred
in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Joint Order dated August 8, 2007 and the Order dated January 10, 2008 which
denied respondents' separate motions for intervention in the civil forfeiture cases.
At this point, the Court duly notes that during the pendency of the instant
petition, the Manila RTC rendered a Decision on September 23, 2010 in Civil Case
No. 03-107325, and, thereafter, a Decision dated February 11, 2011 and Amended
Decision dated May 9, 2011 in Civil Case No. 03-107308, all of which ordered the
assets subject of the said cases forfeited in favor of the government. 23 In view
thereof, the Republic prayed that it be excused from filing the required
reply, 24 which the Court granted in a Resolution 25 dated June 3, 2013.
The Court's Ruling
The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
 A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication
of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In
such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness, 26 as a judgment in a case which presents a moot question can no
longer be enforced. 27
In this case, the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision dated September
23, 2010 in Civil Case No. 03-107325, as well as the Decision dated February 11,
2011 and the Amended Decision dated May 9, 2011 in Civil Case No. 03-107308,
by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of
the government, are supervening events which have effectively rendered the
essential issue in this case moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents
should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they
have a legal interest in the forfeited assets. As the proceedings in the civil forfeiture
cases from which the issue of intervention is merely an incident have already been
duly concluded, no substantial relief can be granted to the Republic by resolving
the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
||| (People v. Manalo, G.R. No. 192302 (Resolution), [June 4, 2014])
 Province of Batangas Vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004

Relevant Background:

It was a case filed by Hon. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, Governor of Batangas petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked (allocated) for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos
(P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

It started in 1998 when then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled
“ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION” to facilitate
the process of enhancing the capabilities of local government units in the discharge of the
functions and services devolved to them pursuant to the Local Government Code. Included in
the EO No. 48 is the appointment of the Oversight Committee authorized to issue the
implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said
fund to the LGUs..

Subject of the case are the resolutions passed by the Oversight Committee (Chaired by the
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora). These are the resolutions with numbers OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006, and OCD-99-003. Further, these OCDs were approved by then Pres. Estrada on
October 6, 1999. The guidelines along with these OCDs as formulated by the Oversight
Committee requires the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of
LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before
the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of corresponding funds.

For the year 2000 and 2001, the same LGSEF of 1999 GAA were adopted due to failure of
Congress to enact general appropriation laws.

The standing point was when Gov. Mandanas received the LGSEF in the GAA of 1991.

The 5Billion LGESF for 2001 were as follows:

Modified Codal Formula P3.0Billion

Priority Projects P1.9 Billion
Capability Building Fund P0.1 Billion, Total = P5Billion

Furthere, the P3.0Billion of the abovementioned LGESF shall be allocated according to the
modified codal formula and be released to the four levels of LGUs., ie., provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays as follos:
Provinces, 25% - P0.750Billion
Cities, 25% - 0.750
Municipalities, 35% - 1.050
Barangays, 15% - 0.450, Total = P3Billion
Resolved Further, the P1.9Billion earmarked for Priority Projects shall be distributed according to
the following criteria:

1. For projects of the 4th, 5th, and 6th class LGUs, or

2. Projects in consonance with the President’s SONA

Upon Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual
members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-2002-
001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution as it
violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 but otherwise, approved by
Pres. Arroyo on January 25, 2002.

The Petitioner Points the Following Issues:

1. Unconstitutionality and void provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001.

2. Unlawful and illegal imposition of conditions issued by the Oversight Committee requiring
project proposals and documentary requirements prior to the release of LGU’s ‘just
share” in the IRA is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 (and that the possible disapproval
by the Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs is a diminution to then latter’s
share in the IRA).

The petitioner contends the following:

In issue No.1 & 3, the respondent theorized that Section 285 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs was not
intended to be a fixed determination of share in the national taxes as the Congress may enact
other laws, including the aforementioned oppropriations law providing for a different sharing
formula. Section 285 merely intended to be the “default share” of the LGUs to do away with
the need to determine annually.

Further, the respondent avers that the petition has already been rendered as moot and
academic as it no longer presents a justifiable controversy because the IRAs of the years 1999,
2000 and 2001 have already been released and therefore, nothing more to prohibit, aside
from the fact that the petition should not have been filed with the Supreme Court because
this court is not a trier of facts, but, the lower courts of jurisdiction.

In issue No.2, the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not
constitutionally infirm. The respondents stands that Section 6 of Article X of the Constitution
 does not specify the “just share” of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local
Government Code of 1991 and that the phrase “to be determined by law” in the same
provision means that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what
is the “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. In effect, the Congress serves as the
arbiter of what should be the “just share.”

Court’s Ruling:

The Court finds the petition to involve a significant legal issue. Issue No.1 is the crux of the instant
controversy as contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions infringe
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 and undoubtedly a legal question.
However, the earmarking of the LGSEF, the promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions and the
release of the LGSEF to the LGU following the requirements are not disputed.

Substantive issues stated above, in the course of the argument, although the supervening events
as the IRA including the LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001 had already been released, still, there
was a compelling reason to resolve the substantive issue raised in the instant petition, whether
intended or incidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if grave violation of
the Constitution is proved even where the supervening events had made the cases moot in order
to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public.

The court held that, “the state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.” (Art. II Sec. 25
of the Constitution). Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines
the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision and has no power to control

The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the mandate of the Constitution.
The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources.

Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding year the amount of five billion
pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto, transgress
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the
national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules
and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the
Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant
violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be
automatically released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.

That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote local
autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and
Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts
of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SANLAKAS V. REYES
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]

Facts:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report
to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v.
Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The
issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President,
in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is
a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is
present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained
its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
 [G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997.]
Alunan vs Mirasol
GR No. 108399 July 31, 1997

Facts:
 LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7 members, a secretary
and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections were to be held 30 days after the next local
elections. The Local Government Code was enacted January 1, 1992.
 The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC provided guidelines for
the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30, 1992, which also placed the SK elections under
the direct control and supervision of DILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After
postponements, they were held December 4, 1992.
 Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21 registered, 15,749 of them
filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.
 September 18, 1992 – The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolution exempting Manila from
holding SK elections because the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the
first SK elections under the new LGC. DILG acted on a letter by Santiago, acting President of the KB
(Kabataang Barangay) City Federation of Manila and a member of the City Council of Manila, which stated
that elections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26, 1990. In this resolution, DILG stated that
the LGC intended to exempt those barangay chapters which conducted their KB elections from January 1,
1998 to January 1, 1992 from the forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be
extended to coincide with the terms of those elected in the SK elections
 Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no power to amend the resolutions of the
COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs, and that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.
 RTC – issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the DILG
Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement the
general elections. The case was reraffled to a different branch of the same court, and the new judge held
that DILG had no power to exempt Manila from holding SK elections, because that power rests solely in
COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not previously held elections for KB by
calling for a general election, and that the exemption of Manila violated the equal protection clause
because of the 5,000 barangays that previously held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there
no elections.

Issue:
Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and supervision over the SK elections
with the technical assistance of COMELEC
Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK elections

Held:
 Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
 DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK elections.
o COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election for SK officers are not
subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same way that contests involving elections of SK
officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.
o Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated that the provision in the
Omnibus Election Code that states that COMELEC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
contest involving elective barangay officials only refer to elective barangay officials under the
laws in force at the time the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.
o Moreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to the framework of detailed
and comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of COMELEC. Although it is argued that no
barangays were named in the resolution, DILG was not given discretionary powers because they
merely used the time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating exempted barangays.
Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to be curative, and thus should be given retroactive effect,
giving the mayor the authority to call elections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and
void for being conducted without authority.
o The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not be determined from the
records of this case. The mere showing that there were other barangays that held KB elections
during the set period but were not exempted from the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to
prove that violation. An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan did not have
elections in 1992 because they held elections on January 1, 1988.
Araullo v Aquino (2014)

Petitioners: Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan; et al

Respondents: Benigno Simeon Aquino III, President; Paquito Ochoa, Executive Secretary; and Florencia
Abad, DBM Secretary

Requirements as to appropriation laws

FACTS:
● 2013 - Senator Jinggoy Estrada revealed that some Senators had been allotted Php50 million each as
incentive for voting to impeach then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
● DBM Secretary Florencio Abad stated that the allotted funds were part of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
● DAP was designed to ramp up government spending in order to accelerate economic expansion.
● 2014 - Abad manifested that DAP had been discontinued.

ISSUES:
● WoN the termination of DAP had rendered the case moot
○ The Court proceeded with the case because of:
■ supposed grave violation of the Constitution
■ situation of exceptional character, of paramount public interest
■ necessity of formulation of principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public
■ capability of repetition yet evading review
● WoN DAP was unconstitutional for allowing the disbursement of public funds without a prior law
authorizing the disbursement - NO
○ Petitioners say that DAP violated Art. 6 Sec. 29(1) of the Constitution: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
○ Court says that Congress did not need to legislate for DAP (other than to provide for DAP in the
General Appropriations Acts [GAAs]) because the adoption of DAP is a function pertaining to the
Executive as the main actor during budget execution, under its mandate to faithfully execute the
laws. During the budget execution stage, the President had sufficient discretion to adapt the budget
to changes in the country's economic situation.
○ The pooling of savings pursuant to DAP, and the identification of the projects to be funded under
DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had already been allocated
by Congress through the GAAs.
● WoN the GAAs for 2011 and 2012 have validly authorized the transfers of funds under DAP - NO
○ The sections in the 2011 and 2012 GAAs that supposedly authorize transfers of funds under DAP
state that: “The President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
○ The sections referred to above violate Art 6 Sec 25(5) of the Constitution, which says that the
President, Senate President, etc. may only augment items in the GAA for their respective
offices, not any item in the GAA.
○ Hence, the provisions for DAP in the 2011 and 2012 GAAs are unconstitutional.
● WoN DAP is unconstitutional for allowing cross-border augmentations from savings -YES
● Whether the doctrine of operative fact applies once DAP is declared unconstitutional -YES
○ Some of the consequences of DAP could no longer be undone.
○ E.g. if a bridge has been built using DAP funds, we should not demolish the bridge just because
DAP has been declared unconstitutional.
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental

organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s
to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in
the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement
is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform
to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act.

Discussions:
 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled
by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-
aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After
reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
 G.R. No. 119694. May 22, 1995.]
PETITIONER - PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented
by its President Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F.
RESPONDENT - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PPI vs. COMELEC

Facts: On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 stating that the Commission shall have
free print space of not less than one-half page in at least one newspaper in every province or city as “Comelec
Space”. This ad space will be used by candidates for their campaign and platforms of government, and for the
Commission’s dissemination of vital information. Moreover, COMELEC released a letter-directive ordering the
different newspapers to comply with the said resolution. The petitioner Philippine Press Institute (PPI) filed a
petition contending that COMELEC violated the prohibition imposed by the Constitution against the taking of
properties without just compensation due to Sec 2. Moreover, the directive of COMELEC amounts to involuntary
servitude and violation of the freedom of expression and of the press due to Sec 8. On the other hand, COMELEC
asserts their directive is not mandatory and compelling. They only ask for a donation. They aver that even if the
order is mandatory, it would still be valid through the use of police power.

Issue: Is COMELEC’s action constitutional through the exercise of police power?

Held: No. Looking at Sec 2, it seems that respondent is correct that the order to give a free space to COMELEC is
not mandatory as there is no compelling language or any criminal or administrative charges for violation. The
respondent’s reason for creating the resolution was due to the voluntary offers given by the newspaper company
in the 1992 elections to help them advertise important election matters. However, the court will have to disagree
that even if the order is mandatory, it would still be valid as an exercise of police power. First, only the legislature
can exercise police power except if it is delegated to some other body. The COMELEC did not give any effort to
specify evidences that they were given police power. According to the Constitution, when a property is taken, it
must be given a just compensation. In the case at bar, there is no just compensation as the newspapers will give the
space for free as a donation. Moreover, there was no showing of reasonable necessity or emergency for the taking
of print space confronted the Commission. However, Sec 8 still stands as it is within the power of COMELEC to
control the media influences of candidates to prevent unequal campaigns.

Petition is partially granted. Sec 2 is not mandatory and Sec 8 is valid

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. V COMELEC
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print
media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property
without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the
element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering
that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property
for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation.
Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In
the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
 CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
(CREBA), petitioner, vs. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) and
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondents (Chamber of |||

Real Estate and Builders' Association, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission,

G.R. No. 174697, [July 8, 2010], 638 PHIL 542-561)
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
The petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit corporation, organized under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal office at 3/F CREBA
Center, Don Alejandro Roces Avenue cor. South "A" Street, Quezon City. It has
almost 4,500 members, comprising of developers, brokers, appraisers,
contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, engineers, architects, and other persons
or entities engaged in the housing and real estate business. 2
The ERC is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative regulatory body created
under Section 38 of the EPIRA, with office address at the Pacific Center
Building, San Miguel Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. It is an administrative
agency vested with broad regulatory and monitoring functions over the
Philippine electric industry to ensure its successful restructuring and
modernization, while, at the same time, promoting consumer interest. 3
Respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal office
at Lopez Building, Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. It is engaged primarily in the
business of power production, transmission, and distribution. It is the largest
distributor of electricity in the Philippines. 4 aDIHTE

Pursuant to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA, the ERC

promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna
Carta), which establishes residential consumers' rights to have access to
electricity and electric service, subject to the requirements set by local
government units and distribution utilities (DUs). 5 Article 14 of the Magna
Carta pertains to the rights of consumers to avail of extension lines or additional
facilities. It also distinguishes between consumers located within 30 meters
from existing lines and those who are located beyond 30 meters; the latter have
the obligation to advance the costs of the requested lines and facilities, to wit:
Article 14. Right to Extension of Lines and Facilities. — A consumer
located within thirty (30) meters from the distribution utilities' existing
secondary low voltage lines, has the right to an extension of lines or
installation of additional facilities, other than a service drop, at the expense
of the utility inasmuch as said assets will eventually form part of the rate
base of the private distribution utilities, or will be sourced from the
reinvestment funds of the electric cooperatives. However, if a prospective
customer is beyond the said distance, or his demand load requires that
 the utility extend lines and facilities, the customer may initially fund the
necessary expenditures.
Article 14 of the Magna Carta continues with a provision on how the costs
advanced by the residential end-user can be recovered:
To recover his aforementioned expenditures, the customer may either
demand the issuance of a notes payable from the distribution utility or
refund at the rate of twenty-five (25) percent of the gross distribution
revenue derived for the calendar year, or, if available, the purchase of
preferred shares.
Revenue derived from additional customers tapped directly to the poles
and facilities so extended shall be considered in determining the revenues
derived from the extension of facilities.
The same article specifies that if a developer initially pays the cost of the
extension lines but passes it to the registered customer, the customer would
still be entitled to recover the cost in the manner provided under this article:
When a developer initially paid the cost of the extension of lines to provide
electric service to a specific property and incorporated these expenses in
the cost thereof, and that property was purchased and transferred in the
name of the registered customer, the latter shall be entitled to the refund
of the cost of the extension of lines, and exercise the options for refund
provided in this article.DHSaCA

On January 18, 2006, the ERC modified this provision when it issued the
DSOAR. Section 2.6.1 reiterates the old rule requiring consumers located
beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance the costs of the requested
lines and facilities. Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs advanced by
consumers may be refunded at the rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution
revenue derived from all customers connected to the line extension. However,
Section 2.6.2 amends Article 14 of the Magna Carta by limiting the period for
the refund to five years, whether or not the amount advanced by the consumer
is fully paid. Section 2.6 of the DSOAR decrees that:
2.6. MODIFICATIONS AND NEW PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS:
RESIDENTIAL
2.6.1 RIGHT TO EXTENSION OF LINES AND FACILITIES — In
accordance with the Magna Carta, a residential End-user located within
thirty (30) meters from the distribution utilities' existing secondary low
voltage lines has the right to an extension of lines or installation of
additional facilities, other than a service drop, at the expense of the utility.
However, if a prospective customer is beyond the said distance, the
customer shall advance the amounts necessary to cover the expenditures
on the facilities beyond thirty (30) meters.
 2.6.2 REFUND — To recover the aforementioned advanced payment, the
customer may either demand the issuance of a notes payable from the
distribution utility or a refund at the rate of twenty-five (25) percent of the
gross distribution revenue derived from all customers connected to the
line extension for the calendar year until such amounts are fully refunded
or for five (5) years whichever period is shorter, or, if available, the
purchase of preferred shares. Revenue derived from additional customers
tapped directly to the poles and facilities so extended shall be considered
in determining the revenues derived from the extension of facilities.
Distribution Connection Assets paid for through advances from residential
End-users shall be deemed plant in service in the accounts of the DU.
Unpaid advances shall be a reduction to plant in service. If replacement
becomes necessary at any time for any Distribution Connection Assets
paid for by residential End-users, the DU shall be solely responsible for
the cost of such replacement which shall become plant in service in the
accounts of the DU, and shall not require another advanced payment from
the connected residential End-users unless the replacement is due to
End-user fault.
The petitioner alleged that the entities it represented applied for electrical
power service, and MERALCO required them to sign pro forma contracts that
(1) obligated them to advance the cost of the construction of new lines and
other facilities and (2) allowed annual refunds at 25% of the gross distribution
revenue derived from the customer's electric service, until the amount
advanced is fully paid, pursuant to Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. 6 AaIDHS

The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on the following
grounds: (1) it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it violates the due
process and equal protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of
the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the principle of unjust enrichment. 7
Petitioner claims that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as it
is oppressive to the affected end-users who must advance the amount for the
installation of additional facilities. Burdening residential end-users with the
installation costs of additional facilities defeats the objective of the law — the
electrification of residential areas — and contradicts the provisions of the
legislative franchise, requiring DUs to be financially capable of providing the
distribution service. Moreover, the questioned provision violates the equal
protection clause since the difference in treatment between end-users residing
within 30 meters of the existing lines and those beyond 30 meters does not rest
on substantial distinctions. 8
In addition, the petitioner alleges that the assailed provision contravenes
Sections 2, 23, 41 and 43 of the EPIRA 9 which are geared towards ensuring
the affordability of electric power and the protection of consumers. 10 Lastly,
requiring consumers to provide the huge capital for the installation of the
facilities, which will be owned by distribution utilities such as MERALCO, results
in unjust enrichment. 11
THE RESPONDENTS' CASE
a. The ERC Position
Contradicting the petitioner's arguments, the ERC avers that it issued
Section 2.6 of the DSOAR as an exercise of police power directed at promoting
the general welfare. The rule seeks to address the inequitable situation where
the cost of an extension facility benefiting one or a few consumers is equally
shared by them. 12
The ERC likewise asserts that the equal protection clause is observed
since the distinction between end-users residing within 30 meters of the existing
lines and those beyond 30 meters is based on real and substantial differences,
namely: (1) proximity of end-user service drop to the main distribution lines; (2)
manner of checking status service; (3) system loss risk; (4) cost in installing the
facilities; and (5) additional risk posed by the possibility of the customer
defaulting in his electric service with the DU. 13
The ERC also maintains that Section 2 of the DSOAR is consistent with
Sections 2, 23, 41 and 43 of the EPIRA. By not subjecting most consumers to
the payment of installation costs benefitting customers located beyond a
reasonably-set boundary, the provision in question gives effect to
the EPIRA policy to ensure that the prices of electricity remain affordable,
transparent, and reasonable to the majority. The policy of accelerating the total
electrification of the country is also served when the residents of far-flung areas
are given the option to apply for extension lines. This option is subject only to
the condition that the cost of the extension of existing lines is advanced by the
end-user, who will eventually be reimbursed; without such condition,
businesses will be reluctant to provide service connection in remote areas. 14
Additionally, the ERC points out that the DSOAR provisions do not result
in unjust enrichment since the DUs do not stand to be materially benefited by
the customers' advances. The DUs have the obligation to reimburse the
customers the advances within five years, and whatever advances are unpaid
during the five-year period are recorded as reductions in "plant in service." 15 cTIESa

Finally, it argues that petitioner lacks the standing to file the present suit
since the petitioner is not an end-user who will sustain a direct injury as a result
of the issuance and implementation of the DSOAR. The ERC likewise maintains
the petition for certiorari must fail since petitioner fails to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the ERC. 16
b. The MERALCO Position
 MERALCO reiterates the defenses raised by the ERC. It also contends
that the present petition does not involve the ERC's judicial and quasi-judicial
functions so that a petition for certiorari is an improper remedy. MERALCO
likewise argues that the petition for certiorari, assuming it to be a correct
remedy, should be dismissed since the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts by filing an original petition with this Court.
On the merits, MERALCO points out that even if Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR is struck down, the provision in the Magna Carta, on the same point,
would nevertheless require end-users located beyond 30 meters from existing
lines to advance the cost. The petitioner's members are not also end-users, but
subdivision developers, brokers, and various entities who are not affected by
the questioned provision; if a developer would apply for electric service, the
terms and conditions of the service will not be governed by Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR. 17 aESIDH

MERALCO also elaborates on why the provision does not result in unjust
enrichment and justifies the distinction between end-users within the 30-meter
limit and those located outside of this limit. The DSOAR provides that the
unpaid amounts that the end-users advanced for the electrical facilities are not
included in "plant in service." The total "plant in service" is the basis in fixing the
rates collected by the DU from all its customers. By having the end-users,
located 30 meters away from existing lines, advance the amount, this amount
is no longer included in the rates passed on to regular consumers. The DSOAR
further limits the subsidies by regular consumers, by limiting the amount to be
recovered to 25% and to five years. Thus, if the costs of the lines are too great
and the revenues are too small, it is the end-user who would bear the cost and
not the regular customers. 18
(Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association, Inc. v. Energy
|||

Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 174697, [July 8, 2010], 638 PHIL 542-561)
THE ISSUES
The petitioner summarizes the issues as follows:
Procedural Issues:
A. Whether petitioner can challenge the constitutionality of a quasi-
legislative act (i.e., the Rules) in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
B. Whether the Honorable Supreme [Court] has original jurisdiction over
this case.
C. Whether petitioner has legal standing to sue.
D. Whether petitioner is authorized to file this suit.
Substantive issues:
 A. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules violates the due process and equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
B. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules violates R.A. No. 9136.
C. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules violates the rule against unjust
enrichment.
D. Whether Section 2.6 of the Rules is a valid exercise of police
power. 19 cAHIaE

THE COURT'S RULING

We resolve to dismiss the petition for its serious procedural and
technical defects.
a. The Petitioner Has No Legal Standing
We do not see the petitioner as an entity with the required standing to
assail the validity of Section 2.6 of the DSOAR.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a party's personal and substantial
interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain
as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal standing calls for more
than just a generalized grievance. The term "interest" means a material interest,
an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a
person's constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or
governmental action, he has no legal standing to challenge the statute or
governmental action. 20
The petitioner expressly enumerates its members to be the following:
developers, brokers, appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers,
engineers, architects, and other persons or entities engaged in the housing and
real estate business. 21 It does not question the challenged DSOAR provision
as a residential end-user and it cannot because the challenged provision only
refers to the rights and obligations of DUs and residential end-users; neither the
petitioner nor its members are residential end-users. In fact, the DSOAR has
separate provisions for the extension of lines or installation of additional
facilities for non-residential end-users, under its Section 2.7 entitled
"Modifications and New Connections: Non-Residential." Thus, neither the
petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as residential end-users, arising
from the challenged Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, nor cite any benefit accruing to
them as residential end-users that would result from the invalidation of the
assailed provision.
The petitioner meets the objection to its capacity to bring suit through the
claim that subdivision developers are directly affected by the assailed provision
because MERALCO has asked them to advance the cost of installing additional
lines and facilities, in accordance with Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. 22 This claim
is specious.
Section 1, Rule I of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree (PD 957) and Other
Related Laws provides the minimum design standards for subdivisions. These
minimum standards include an electrical power supply, described under
subsection C (7) thus:
7. Electrical Power Supply System
Mandatory individual household connection to primary and/or alternate
sources of power.
xxx xxx xxx
Provision of street lighting per pole is mandatory at 50-meter distance and
every other pole if distance is less than 50 meters.
Thus, subdivision developers are obligated under these rules to include
in their design an electrical power supply system that would link individual
households within their subdivision to primary and/or alternate sources of
power. This requirement is intended to protect the rights of prospective
subdivision homeowners, 23and exists regardless of the validity of Section 2.6
of the DSOAR. cTADCH

In other words, the invalidation of Section 2.6 of the DSOAR would not
permit subdivision developers to renege from their duty to ensure power supply
and to pass the costs of installing a proper electrical power supply system to
MERALCO. In this light, it is immaterial that MERALCO did require certain
developers to sign the Agreement for Extension of Lines and/or Additional
Facilities 24 as this was required under the provisions of the Magna Carta, not
under the assailed DSOAR provision that, in the first place, does not govern the
relationship of subdivision developers (who are not residential end-users) and
MERALCO.
a.1. No Transcendental Issue Involved
The petitioner cites instances when the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, waived the procedural rule on standing in cases that raised issues
of transcendental importance. We do not, however, view the present case as
one involving a matter of transcendental importance so that a waiver of
the locus standirule should be recognized.
The Court, through Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano (now
retired), provided the following instructive guides as determinants in
determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised. 25DTIaHE

In this case, the three determinants are glaringly absent. Public funds are
not involved. The allegations of constitutional and statutory violations of the
public respondent agency are unsubstantiated by facts and are mere
challenges on the wisdom of the rules, a matter that will be further discussed in
this Decision. In addition, parties with a more direct and specific interest in the
questions being raised — the residential end-users — undoubtedly exist and
are not included as parties to the petition. As the Court did in Anak Mindanao
Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary, 26 we cannot waive the rule on
standing where the three determinants were not established.
b. Rule 65 is both a Wrong and Misapplied Remedy
The petitioner's choice of remedy — a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court — is an incorrect remedy.
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court mandates that the remedy
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. EAcCHI

Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority

to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy. 27 Quasi-judicial function is a term that
applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies
given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action
using discretion of a judicial nature. 28 Thus, in Philnabank Employees
Association v. Estanislao, we did not grant a petition for certiorari against the
Department Secretary who did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
but merely promulgated the questioned implementing rules under the mandate
of Republic Act No. 6971, the applicable law in this cited case. 29
Contrary to Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court, the petitioner and its
members are not even parties who are aggrieved by the assailed DSOAR
provision, as already discussed above. Even if they had been properly
aggrieved parties, the petition must still be dismissed for violation of yet another
basic principle applicable to Rule 65. This rule requires, for a petition
for certiorari to be an appropriate remedy, that there be no appeal or plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 30 Since the
petitioner assails the validity of a rule or statute and seeks our declaration that
the rule is unconstitutional, a petition for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court 31 provides a remedy more appropriate than certiorari.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari; the rule on hierarchy of
courts determines the venue of recourses to these courts. In original petitions
for certiorari, the Supreme Court will not directly entertain this special civil
action — as in the present case — unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained elsewhere based on exceptional and compelling circumstances
justifying immediate resort to this Court. 32
In the present case, the petitioner alleges that the constitutionality and
legality of the assailed provision are of "immense importance to the
public" 33 and are a "recipe for financial ruin of the affected
parties." 34 Moreover, it maintains that its petition raises transcendental and
weighty issues that would merit the Honorable Court's exercise of original
jurisdiction. 35 To support its position, it cites the cases of the Senate of the
Philippines v. Ermita 36 and Ople v. Torres. 37
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita 38 was a case for certiorari and
prohibition, while our Decision in Ople v. Torres 39 did not clearly state whether
the case was filed as a petition for certiorari. But granting that both cases were
filed as petitions for certiorari, they prompted the Court to suspend its rules of
procedure as they involved clear violations of the Constitution which urgently
needed to be addressed. Moreover, they were unquestionably filed by the
proper parties.
The petitioners in the Ermita case included the Philippine Senate, which
assailed Executive Order No. 464 for infringing on their prerogatives as
legislators, to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40 We had to immediately
resolve this case since the implementation of the challenged order had already
resulted in the absence of officials invited to Senate hearings. DCAHcT

In the Ople case, Senator Blas F. Ople sought to

invalidate Administrative Order No. 308, which "establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in its scope, [and that] affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident." 41 The petition was based
on two important constitutional grounds: (1) usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate and (2) impermissible intrusion into the citizenry's
protected zone of privacy.
 In the present case, the petitioner cannot come before this Court using
an incorrect remedy and claim that it was oppressed, or that its rights to due
process and equal protection have been violated by an administrative issuance
that does not even affect its rights and obligations. The writ of certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy that the Court issues only under closely defined grounds
and procedures that litigants and their lawyers must scrupulously observe. They
cannot seek refuge under the umbrella of this remedy on the basis of an
undemonstrated claim that they raise issues of transcendental importance,
while at the same time flouting the basic ground rules for the remedy's grant. 42
These conclusions render any further discussion of the improperly raised
substantive issues unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition
for its serious procedural and technical defects. Costs against the petitioner.
(Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory
|||

Commission, G.R. No. 174697, [July 8, 2010], 638 PHIL 542-561)