NEWMAN’S CONCEPT OF DOCTRINAL

DEVELOPMENT
Newman draws a distinction between “development” and “change,” or what he calls
“corruption.” He defines an authentic development as the “germination and
maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a large mental field” (1.1.5.). For
example, the seed form of the doctrine of the Trinity may be seen in Scripture (“the
Father and I are one” (John 10:30)), but it isn’t until the fourth century at the
Council of Nicea (325) that a nuanced articulation is attempted, such that we now
say that the persons of the Trinity are “consubstantial” (homoousios).

A corruption, on the other hand, is “the breaking up of life preparatory to its

termination. This resolution of a body into its component parts is the stage before
its dissolution; it begins when life has reached its perfection, and it is the sequel, or
rather the continuation, of that process towards perfection, being at the same time
the reversal and undoing of what went before” (5.3.). For example, Newman saw the
fourth century Arians, who did not believe that the persons of the Trinity are
consubstantial, as offering a corruption when they introduced the idea that the
Logos is part of God’s creation and, as Arius famously said, “there was a time when
the Logos was not,” which stands in contrast to John’s claim that “In the beginning
was the Logos and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God” (1:1).

How can we know what is a development and what is a corruption? In order to

determine the difference between the two, Newman offers seven “Notes,” or litmus
tests, that may be applied to any doctrine.

First Note of a Genuine Development: Preservation of Type

Newman defines this first note: “all great ideas are found, as time goes on, to
involve much which was not seen at first to belong to them, and have developments,
that is, enlargements, applications, uses and fortunes, very various, one security
against error and perversion in the process is the maintenance of the original type
which the idea presented to the world at its origin, amid and through all its
apparent changes and vicissitudes from first to last” (6.intro). In order to illustrate
this point, Newman offers an example: “the adult animal has the same make as it
had on its birth; young birds do not grow into fishes” (5.1.1).

Second Note of a Genuine Development: Continuity of Principles

Newman defines this second note: “doctrines grow and are enlarged, principles are
permanent; doctrines are intellectual, and principles are more immediately ethical
and practical. Systems live in principles and represent doctrines” (5.2.1). In other
words, while doctrines may develop, the principles that rest underneath those
doctrines do not change. For example, while social and moral doctrines of the
Church develop, the underlying principle of the dignity of the human person does
not change.

Third Note of a Genuine Development: Power of Assimilation

Newman defines this third note: “doctrines and views which relate to [humans] are
not placed in a void, but in the crowded world, and make way for themselves by
interpenetration, and develop by absorption. Facts and opinions, which have
hitherto been regarded in other relations and grouped round other centres,
henceforth are gradually attracted to a new influence and subjected to a new
sovereign. They are modified, laid down afresh, thrust aside, as the case may be. A
new element of order and composition has come among them; and its life is proved
by this capacity of expansion, without disarrangement or dissolution. An eclectic,
conservative, assimilating, healing, moulding process, a unitive power, is of the
essence” (5.3.1). In other words, the Church may absorb or appropriate from the
culture around it that which is healthy and compatible with the gospel, but hold off
that which is not.

Fourth Note of a Genuine Development: Logical Sequence

Newman defines this fourth note: “each argument is brought for an immediate
purpose; minds develop step by step; without looking behind them or anticipating
their goal, and without either intention or promising of forming a system.
Afterwards, however, this logical character which the whole wears becomes a test
that the process has been a true development, not a perversion or corruption, from
its evident naturalness; and in some cases from the gravity, distinctness, precision,
and majesty of its advance, and the harmony of its proportions, like the tall growth,
and graceful branching, and rich foliage, of some vegetable production” (5.4.1.). In
other words, any authentic development must be a consequence of an earlier,
orderly sequence that logically flows into the conclusion. Newman offers the
example that penance and purgatory are logical sequences following from baptismal
cleansing (9.1-4). If (A) baptism washes away sin, and (B) infant baptism has
become the norm, but (C) we still sin after our baptisms and are therefore in need of
forgiveness, then (D) it is perfectly logical that the sacrament of reconciliation and
purgatory have developed from the earlier claims.

Fifth Note of a Genuine Development: Anticipation of Its Future

Newman defines this fifth note: “since, when an idea is living, that is, influential
and effective, it is sure to develop according to its own nature, and the tendencies,
which are carried out on the long run, may under favourable circumstances show
themselves early as well as late, and logic is the same in all ages, instances of a
development which is to come, though vague and isolated, may occur from the very
first, though a lapse of time be necessary to bring them to perfection. And since
developments are in great measure only aspects of the idea from which they
proceed, and all of them are natural consequences of it, it is often a matter of
accident in what order they are carried out in individual minds; and it is in no wise
strange that here and there definite specimens of advanced teaching should very
early occur, which in the historical course are not found till a late date. The fact,
then, of such early or recurring intimations of tendencies which afterwards are fully
realized is a sort of evidence that those later and more systematic fulfillments are
only in accordance with the original idea” (5.5.1). In other words, any later
developed doctrine may be seen, in its infancy, from the very beginning and its
development may be anticipated. For example, one may see the outlines of the
features of a baby’s face in the first months that are only developed later into
adulthood.

Sixth Note of a Genuine Development: Conservative Action Upon Its Past

Newman defines this sixth note: “as developments which are preceded by definite
indications have a fair presumption in their favour, so those which do but contradict
and reverse the course of doctrine which has been developed before them, and out of
which they spring, are certainly corrupt; for a corruption is a development in that
very stage in which it ceases to illustrate, and begins to disturb, the acquisitions
gained in its previous history” (5.6.1.). In other words, an authentic development
will retain that which came before, while a corruption reverses or removes that
which came before.

Seventh Note of a Genuine Development: Chronic Vigour

Newman defines this seventh note: “since the corruption of an idea, as far as the
appearance goes, is a sort of accident or affection of its development, being the end
of a course, and a transition state leading to a crisis, it is, as has been observed
above, a brief and rapid process. While ideas live in men’s minds, they are ever
enlarging into fuller development; they will not be stationary in their corruption
any more than before it; and dissolution is that further state to which corruption
tends. Corruption cannot, therefore, be of long standing; and thus duration is
another test of a faithful development…The course of heresies is always short”
(5.7.1-2.). In other words, Newman believes that any authentic development, by its
very nature, robustly will endure, rather than wither away in short order.

Thus, a general framework exists for us when we ask this question: “How can we,
the Body of Christ, constructively apply these “Seven Notes to the canon of issues in
order to gain a clearer vision of the path forward when addressing the doctrinal
crises of our day?”
Ripperger’s Binding Force of Tradition

Didn’t you know, Vatican II got rid of that! Or so you thought. How many countless times, more than what
space in this journal could recount, have traditional Catholics along with conservative minded faithful been
told such and such by priests and even bishops, by “habitless” nuns running a parish office, and self-annointed
apologists even. How many times have we sent our children to a “catholic” school and they came back saying
that the we just need to follow the Bible and not what the Church says, or that everything can change? And on
the other side when we look squarely at the real source of the problem, namely the Council and its ambiguities,
we are told no, the council is great and beautiful, it is just the implementation that caused all these problems.
Yet the above mentioned, even members of the magisterium1 have not gotten the memo.

The average faithful of a conservative or traditional mind, who has the goal of recouping and restoring the
tradition of the Church not only in liturgy or in devotion but also in theology, often feels assaulted on all fronts
by theologians and clergy who have forgotten that Jesus Christ is pre-Vatican II. Yet most books written by and
for traditionalists on current miscellanea address effects of the problems in the Church today, or various facets
of the problems around liturgy, doctrine, ecumenism and the like. None of the works out there go back to the
very core of the problem, they do state the effects, namely the prior magisterium universally taught “x”, but
today clergy, prelates and even members of the magisterium at least appear to be saying the opposite. The real
question is what is the “Tradition”, and what principles have been deviated from that we should see the crisis in
the Church not only unfold but continue?

Thankfully, we have at last, a clear and concise statement of principles on the tradition and our duties toward it
in Fr. Ripperger’s brief but exacting The Binding Force of Tradition (BFT). At 55 pages it is not a lengthy read,
but page after page is a clear laying out of principles. In fact, it could be rightly said that the strength of the work
is in the very fact that it does not attempt to take up specific examples of teaching or practice which are, or at
least appear, at variance with the universal Tradition. Instead, Fr. Ripperger lays out exactly what it is, where it
comes from, what authority it has, what the misconceptions are, and what the duty not only of the lay faithful,
but even more of the clergy is toward it. Better still, for the lay reader who does not have the benefit of formal
orthodox training in philosophy and theology, is that it is a succinct read, well ordered and to the point. As Fr.
James McLucas says in his Foreword to the work, “Father Ripperger utilizes the exacting scalpel of Thomistic
precision to explain the problem and its solution.”

The work is broken up into three sections, the first chapter on the Rule of Faith, the second on The Tradition as
Precept, and thirdly on Sins against the Tradition. In the first chapter, Fr. Ripperger begins by explaining what
the rule of Faith is from the Fathers, theologians and formal definitions, and then the misconception of Tradition
as being merely Scripture. He does this by focusing on one of the main expositors of confusion, namely Yves
Congar, OP. There are several figures that could be discussed, yet by focusing on Congar he is able to take the
main principle which is opposed to Tradition and thus take in all the rest who are under that umbrella. Better
still, he does not turn Congar into a whipping post for all that is wrong, but fleshes out where Congar had deviated
from doctrine on Tradition, and where he was in fact correct.

In the first place, the Rule of Faith is God. This is important because God is immutable, the same yesterday and
today. If God is the rule of Faith, then the rule is not able to change. Moreover that rule is something outside of
ourselves, thus we, individually or as a community, cannot determine it. Yet how does the rule of faith get to us?
This is why there must be a secondary rule, subordinated to the first. For this there can be several rules which
constitute “a rule” but not “the” rule, for God alone is “the” rule of faith. From here, Fr. Ripperger begins
exploring the historical usages of the term rule of faith (regula fidei), namely, what in the past Fathers and
doctors have proposed as the rule subordinated to the primary rule, which is God.
The first rule he gives is whether the virtue of faith should be considered the rule. That is, the rule is the
theological virtue of Faith, since this has God as its proper object. Yet, while this is so extrinsically, intrinsically
the believer may not have the virtue of faith in the same degree as others, or, “[he] can say he gives assent to the
proposition but he may not understand the same thing by that proposition as the Church understands. For this
reason, we are forced to seek a different rule by which we can know whether what we believe is true or not.”2 This
is the fundamental distinction between Catholics and Protestants, at least conservative ones. The latter hold that
faith is the only rule, (sola fide) and Scripture is the only means of knowing what the rule is (sola Scriptura). On
the other hand, how is this mediated to us? For Luther, the principle is that God teaches each man inwardly, yet
as Cardinal Franzelin shows in his theological classic De Divina Traditione, immediate revelation, that is the
grace of internal illustration by God, while theoretically possible is not what Christ promised us, and does not in
fact exist:

“Yet, in the first place, the grace of internal illustration is rightly and necessarily joined with the proposition of
external faith, which is also especially suited to it, in order that one is able to have assented supernaturally;
grace truly ought to supply that very external proposition. Yet, there will either be nothing, or the very thing will
fall away entirely, if there is one with insufficient knowledge, and therefore each man is unable to use it, because
as I said the grace of illustration is immediate revelation, whether simply or equivalently. To be given
illustrations of this sort in the present economy [i.e. the Catholic understanding of the magisterium to safeguard
and conserve doctrine] would be an extraordinary charism as it were, which whenever God concedes it in the
supernatural-psychological order there is no doubt; and we do not contend, that the economy is absolutely
disagreeable, in which the charism of immediate revelation might be ordinary, where concerning the necessity
of an external proposition there would then be no question; but really and historically it is certain that such an
order of revelation was never promised, has not existed and does not exist. Moreover, it has never existed at any
time nor can it exist.”3

Thus when we consider Revelation, how God, Who is the rule of faith, is made known to us, there is in fact a
vehicle, and that is Scripture and Tradition. Before launching into Congar, however, Fr. Ripperger takes time to
define what Tradition is. “Here the term “tradition” is being used in its more restrictive sense as referring to
those things handed down which are contradistinguished from Scripture and not in the broader sense in which
tradition is taken as comprising everything that is passed on, even the Scriptures.”4 The exactitude of laying out
what terms and propositions mean before exploring them and their consequents is the very thing one can expect
throughout the work.

Next, he brings to the fore that Scripture and Tradition taken together are the rule of faith and this is a dogmatic
fact, taught clearly and infallibly by Trent, Vatican I, and even Vatican II. Congar’s approach, as he notes, is
more nuanced, namely that everything that is true is contained in Scripture. Yet Fr. Ripperger shows, not only is
it not the case since there are doctrines (which Congar himself admits) that are not in Scripture but are necessary
for salvation, but even more because “THE rule is God and Scripture is a means of transmission of the Deposit,
not the Deposit itself, and therefore the Deposit of Faith would take precedence even over Scripture.5 Thus, as
he notes, Scripture can be “a” rule, but logically it cannot be “THE” rule.

Fr. Ripperger goes on to note that it is in fact Tradition which is the Rule of Faith, as a secondary rule
subordinated to the first, which is God, as is clear from the Fathers and Theologians, particularly St. Vincent of
Lerins in the Commonitorium. Yet even this must be subdistinguished, for though every aspect of the faith has
been handed on to us, it is done so by a certain mode, which is the organ of conservation and propagation of the
faith (organum conservandi et propagandi fidem), namely the Magisterium. Thus he moves to the next
consideration, the Magisterium as the rule of faith, and this is done considering the whole of the prior
magisterium before our time (the remote rule) and the current living magisterium (the proximate rule). This
distinction will be very important when considering the question of whether the magisterium can err or be
ambiguous to the point where one should question what is being taught. Nevertheless, in either sense “It is not
the Magisterium as such that is the rule of faith, but the definitions of the magisterium that are the rule.”6

After laying these out, in summation he notes that Tradition, properly understood is the Rule of Faith.
Yet how can this be if we examine what he said above, that Scripture cannot logically be the rule of faith
since it is a means of transmission. Isn’t Tradition also a means of transmission? It is, but in a broader sense
than Scripture, in as much as it embraces all the teaching of Christ handed down by the Apostles, and
summarizing Cardinals Franzelin and Billot, constitutes the object of faith, that is the truth to be believed, while
the rule of faith is that which contains the truth to be believed (the object of faith), and to which we must conform
our belief, therefore the magisterium, the organ of Tradition, is an authoritative body established by Christ
through the apostles to pass on the rule of faith.

Yet, what happens when a member of the magisterium deviates from the rule of faith? Today, most neo-
conservative apologists would deny this is even possible. Yet history shows, though it is rare, that this is indeed
possible at the level of the ordinary magisterium, while not in the extraordinary magisterium. Essentially, after
examining the issues involved, as well as our assent, if a member of the magisterium teaches error, then the
faithful should fall back to the remote rule, which is the prior magisterium. This is buttressed with an argument
from St. Thomas, and works like this. God is THE rule of faith, and the secondary rule is the tradition, passed
on by the living magisterium which is subdivided into the remote rule of faith (the whole prior tradition) and the
proximate rule of faith (the current magisterium). Since we cannot get to God directly we need this secondary
rule, so that if the proximate rule has some error in it, the remote rule should be followed since the whole Church
could not have erred century after century, and the very notion of tradition is adherence to what has been passed
down by the authentic magisterium. This does not make one judge of the magisterium, but rather, allows us to
rest safe on the judgments of the prior magisterium for those things necessary for salvation.

One of the most important distinction to come out in the first chapter is that the Magisterium has limits, it is
bound to the tradition and, as St. Thomas teaches, obligated to pass on the tradition because that is the very
purpose for which Christ founded it.

From this it follows in chapter 2, that the Magisterium is bound to pass on the tradition, it may not block the
passing on of doctrine or only pass on its particular alterations in the Tradition. With this, Fr. Ripperger examines
how it is that the Tradition actually binds us as a precept, in what way and what degrees of the tradition do in
fact bind us irrespective of what we may be told today. On the other hand, some view tradition through the lens
of the Hegelian dialectic, which holds that change must necessarily creep in, whereas the nature of Tradition in
the Church is completely opposed to this idea. In the history of the Church novelty is equivalent with heresy, at
least until the 20th century. Moreover, today there is an attempt to distinguish Tradition in a novel fashion,
between “big ‘T’ Tradition” (doctrine) and “small ‘t’ tradition” (not only rites, ceremonies, devotions, but even
the older formulations of teachings) the former being matters of faith and morals passed down by the Apostles
which, as we saw above, broadly considered take up all teaching both apart from and contained in Scripture;
whereas the latter are things that can change, which in themselves are not important for the faith, good for one
generation but not another.

This division is so broad as to be erroneous, though it is frequent today amongst pop-apologists. In the first place,
small “t” traditions so called, cannot be defined merely as “changeable things”, because in the first place, many
of them are connected with the Church’s doctrine. Secondly, changing them (when it is theoretically possible to
do so) can have bad effects, such as suggesting that the teaching is no longer in force. One of the reasons for
negative reaction to the 2nd Council of Constantinople was the three chapters controversy, that the Emperor
Justinian wanted a condemnation of three dead catholic theologians who had at one time taught heresy but had
abjured their errors and died in union with the Church, since he thought it would reconcile the Monophysites
(which it didn’t). One of these three, Ibas of Edessa, was closely connected with the formulation at the Council
of Ephesus, and to many in both the East and West, the condemnation of the three chapters suggested an affront
to the teaching of Ephesus, and consequently many refused to even acknowledge the Council until generations
after it was concluded. Little wonder that the summary change of nearly everything connected with doctrines
necessary for our salvation, not just the liturgy, but even the mode of expression of the magisterium, gave rise
to the idea that the whole Church had completely changed her doctrine. Small “t” traditions are not only
connected with truths of faith, but they must be passed down as well and even bind us to varying degrees.

In this vein Fr. Ripperger brings to the fore an excellent quote from St. Robert Bellarmine:

“Indeed, traditions have the same force as divine precepts, either divine doctrines written in the Gospels and
similarly the apostolic traditions non-written have the same force as the written apostolic traditions, as the
Council of Trent in the fourth session asserts… Moreover ecclesiastical Traditions have that same force as
decrees and written constitutions of the Church.”7

As Fr. Ripperger breaks down this important point, he shows that although traditions have a different degree of
authority, and therefore a different degree of binding force, they must be passed down both actively, that is on
the side of the magisterium, and passively, that is on our side. Furthermore to understand the principles of how
a traditional teaching binds under pain of sin, he enters a discussion of the notae theologicae, or theological notes
(marks). Theological notes are categories of teaching, both positive and negative, which in the case of the former,
declare the status of a doctrine as being at the highest point de fide, or in the least being common teaching, and
thus debatable. In the case of negative propositions, they can range from propositions properly heretical and
opposed to faith, to things which are not properly heretical in themselves, but are scandalous or rash. These last
two, error theologicus and propositio temeraria are the most interesting, because they are or would be readily
denied to be valid or useful today. A propositio temeraria for example, the idea that it is rash to oppose the
common teaching of theologians without sufficient and substantive reason, goes against the grain of modern
theological thinking. Who cares what they said back then, all that matters is…Vatican II! And indeed since
Vatican II there has been a constant stream of rash propositions propounded in books and pulpits. Thus, the
degree of certitude to how much a prior tradition in teaching or practice binds us morally is based on what type
of theological mark it would have.

Yet, it is even deeper than that, as Cardinal Franzelin notes:

“Let us take for example the question, if one were to reject the sacred ceremonies for the administration of the
sacraments and the celebration of the Sacrifice of the Mass, or of the sign of the cross on the forehead, the use
of lustral water and other traditions partly apostolic and partly ecclesiastical, he likewise denies the revealed
authority of both apostolic and ecclesiastical power, which is to be believed to be infallible from the assistance
of the Holy Spirit in these matters pertaining to Christian morals and to the religious cult and intimately
connected with revealed faith.”

From here, he considers the way in which traditions of different degrees bind and to what degree it is sinful
based on these principles to deny them, or to refuse to pass them to the next generation.

Lastly, in the 3rd part of the book, Fr. Ripperger widens the discussion of what virtues are violated when one
does not pass on the tradition. Perhaps he best summarizes the whole section in his examination of sins against
justice:

“Wholesale modifications in the past, would have been considered, by the saints, as an act of impiety because
the sweeping modifications block or deny to the subsequent generation the perfection of form of worship and the
feasts of the saints that were removed. Our ancestors would have considered the constant drive to change each
and every aspect of the Catholic tradition, the inability to leave any aspect of the tradition unchanged, as a sign
of moral and spiritual problems and disorders. It is also impious because wholesale modification presumes that
prior saints were not adequately directed by the Holy Spirit in the composition of the prayers of the Mass. No
saint would dare to presume to affect the liturgy passed to him by his ancestors to such a degree, particularly
because of the reverence he would have had regarding the guidance of past saints by the Holy Spirit. To presume
to block the passing of a monument, not by perfecting it, which is actually an authentic part of the tradition, but
by modifying it in such a way as to deny many of the elements in that monument is to presume that one is greater
than one’s ancestors.9

That is precisely the problem with modern man in general, and modern ecclesiastics in particular. Modern
man presumes on the basis of technology that we are so much better than those who came before us, even
though more people have been murdered and systematically exterminated throughout the world not merely by
numbers but also by percentage than in any previous age. Likewise, in spite of the banality and lack of
precision in theological expression today, the massive loss of faith around the world, banal liturgies and
liturgical abuse that does not get better, and the continual attack on priests by the state and hierarchy alike,
some pretend we have a renewal, that everything is better than in bygone ages, when that is manifestly not the
case.

What is manifestly brilliant about this work, is that it is not another “traditionalist tract” that will end up being
limited to the traditionalist sphere, and by prescinding from critique of particular elements, either of Vatican II
or of the subsequent issues, and instead by delineating clear principles, he has produced a work that is a timeless
and excellent summary of the relevant principles and teachings on Tradition’s binding force and necessity
otherwise contained in lengthy Latin treatises. Therefore, this is a work for everyone, if for no other reason than
to raise awareness of how everyone in the Church, including “traditionalists”, are required to recoup and maintain
the tradition that has been passed down to us by generations of Catholics, of saints both known and unknown,
of theologians and simple laity, through temptation, persecution and the sword.