KURODA vs JALANDONI (G.R. No.

L-2662)

Facts:

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces
in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.

He also said that the participation in the prosecution of the case before the Commission in
behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not
attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of
our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our
Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

He further contended that Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution
the United State not being a party in interest in the case.

Issue:

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

Held:

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its
section 3, that – The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present
day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Although
Philippines is not a signatory in this convention, it cannot be denied that the rules and regulation
of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law.

With regards to the petitioner’s contention about the participation of two American
attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the
ground that said attorneys are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our
Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national
sovereignty, there is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before
said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with
the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are
usually military personnel who are neither attorney nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of
crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes.

BOROVSKY VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION (GR. No. L-4362)

Facts:

Victor A. Borovsky, the petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai,

On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the
petitioner was arrested for investigation as to his past activities. Following his arrest, a warrant
for deportation was issued by the Deportation Board, which is said to have been found him an
undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard. The petitioner protests that he was not given a
hearing, nor informed of the charges preferred against him. This point however is unimportant in
this proceeding.

In May, 1947, the petitioner was put on board a ship which took him to Shanghai, but he
was not allowed to land there because he was not a national of China and was not provided with
an entry visa. He was therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to the new Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa until December 8, 1947, when he was granted provisional release by the
President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of that
period, namely, on March 20, 1948, the Commissioner of Immigration caused his rearrest and he
has been in confinement in the above-mentioned prison ever since.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine government has the right to detain a stateless citizen.

Held:

No. Under the Constitution, (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed. lt was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and
rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status (Art. 2) ;
that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.

The further explained that aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum
therein (Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless,"
which the petitioner claims to be. There is no allegation that the petitioner's entry into the
Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference from the pleadings and the Deportation
Board's findings is that he came to and lived in this country under legal permit. They even cited
the case of In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201 where it said that the court "has the power to
release from custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the
Department of justice after it has become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has
been issued, the warrant cannot be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is given the
power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus
officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA

Facts:

Issue:

Whether or not LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws

Held:

Yes.