EN BANC

In 1923, the Legislature enacted Act No. 3059 (declared in force by Executive
G.R. No. L-42134 October 21, 1936 Proclamation No. 57, dated September 25, 1923); in 1930, it approved Act No.
3672 (declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 299 dated February 28,
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner-appellee, 1930), and more recently in 1934, it passed Act No. 4195 (declared in force by
vs. Executive Proclamation No. 767, dated February 7, 1935). A cursory scrutiny of
ISIDORO ABAJA, ET AL., claimants. these four Acts will show that while the titles of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 refer to
ROMAN DE ARRUZA and MARIO LUZURIAGA, appellants. "parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered etc.", those of the earlier Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672 fail to
Simeon Bitanga for appellants. make any such allusion. The title of Act No. 3059 is as follows:
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
An Act to provide that certain claims to parcels of land that have been declared
public land may be filed in the proper court within the period of one year, under
certain conditions. The title of Act No. 3672 is as follows:
LAUREL, J.:
An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land,
Negros denying the motion of the appellants to set aside the decision of that court within the period of one year from the date of the promulgation of this Act. The
in Cadastral Case No. 22, G. L. R. O. Record No. 174. declaring lot No. No. 712 title of Act No. 4043 is as follows:
public land, and to reopen the case as to said lot in accordance with the provisions
of Act No. 4043 of the Philippine Legislature. An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land, that have been declared public land, by
The facts of this case are undisputed. On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the
Lands filed in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros a petition praying approval of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) And the title of Act No. 4195 reads:
that the titles with respect to a tract of land containing about 23,443,355 square
meters, divided into lots and situated in the municipality of Ilog, Occidental An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
Negros, be settled and adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Act No. certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by
2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act. After due hearing, the lower court, virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the
in a decision dated August 15, 1925, declared lot No. 712, comprising about approval of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) Upon the other hand, the bodies of all
1,322 square meters, public land because no one appeared to claim it. On January the four Acts just mentioned speak in clear and unmistakable terms of parcels of
25, 1934, a motion was filed in the same court by the herein appellants, Roman land that "have been, or are about to be, declared land of public domain, by virtue
de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga, through their attorney, praying that the aforesaid of judicial proceedings instituted etc."
decision of the lower court be set aside in so far as lot No. 712 was concerned,
that a new trial be granted and that they be allowed to present their claim under The discrepancy between the titles and the bodies of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195
the provisions of Act No. 4043. On February 2, 1934, the provincial fiscal of may be explained. Act No. 4043 was originally House Bill No. 949 (First
Occidental Negros, on behalf of the government, filed an opposition to the Session, Ninth Philippine Legislature). The said bill as presented referred in both
appellants' motion contending that the Court of First Instance of Occidental its title and body solely to the retention of judicial decisions. The first paragraph
Negros had no jurisdiction to reopen the case with respect to lot No. 712 because of the explanatory note prepared by the authors of the bill reads:
the motion was not filed within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043. On
April 20, 1934, the judge of said court denied the motion of the appellants in an The attached bill is practically the same as Act No. 3672 approved by the Eighth
order the dispositive part is as follows: Legislature with the exception that it authorizes the filing of claims to lots that
have been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered during the
Interpretando las disposiciones de la Ley arriba acotada, el Juzgado es de opinion last ten years, whereas by Act 3672 no such claims may be authorized if the
que la oposicion del Fiscal Provincial esta bien fundada. Los procedimientos judicial proceedings were instituted more than ten years ago.
judiciales en cuanto al expediente catastral arriba especificado se han iniciado en
junio 12 de 1919, en virtud de una solicitud presentada por el Director de It is obvious that the intention of the framers of House Bill No. 949 was to alter
Terrenos, bajo la Ley No. 2259, pidiendo que se fije y declare el dominio y titulo the language and the meaning of the previous Acts of the Legislature on the same
de los lotes de terreno comprendidos en el referido expediente catastral, entre los subject. The Legislature, however, thought it proper not to make such alteration
cuales estaba el Lote No. 712 objeto de esta mocion. Desde junio 12 de 1919 and as finally approved, Act No. 4043 adopts the language used in Acts Nos.
hasta febrero 18 de 1933, en que la Ley No. 4043 entro en vigor, han transcurrido 3059 and 3672 and refers to the institution of judicial proceedings instead of the
trece años, ocho meses y seis dias y, por tanto, todas aquellas personas que decision as proposed by the authors of the bill. In enacting the bill into law,
pretendan tener derecho de propiedad sobre los terrenos comprendidos dentro del however, the corresponding change in the title was not made. It is pertinent to
expediente catastral arriba titulado ya no tienen derecho de acogerse a los observe in this connection that the title of Act No. 4043, hereinbefore quoted, is a
beneficios de la Ley No. 4043 para pedir la reapertura de dicho expediente. verbatim copy of the title of House Bill No. 949. When Act No. 4195 was passed,
the title of Act No. 4043 was almost literally retained.
The appellants assign three errors alleged to have been committed by the court
below all of which raise but one legal question, namely, whether the ten-year The fact that in all the four Acts so far passed by the Philippine Legislature on the
period mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the date the decision subject there has been a repeated and consistent reference to the institution of
was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in a cadastral judicial proceedings as the starting point in the computation of the period of ten
case. years (or fifteen years as regards Act No. 4195) therein laid down is, in our
opinion, significant. It shows beyond question the desire of the Legislature to
In determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior adhere to the one and only method of computation consistently followed by it
laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents or the legislative since the beginning. Whether the statute is in this respect wise and expedient is
history of the statute involved (Loewenstein vs. Page [1910], 16 Phil., 84, 92; U. not for us to determine (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; U.S. vs. Estapia
S. vs. De Guzman [1915], 30 Phil., 416, 419; Tamayo vs. Gsell [1916], 35 Phil., [1917], 37 Phil., 17, 26; Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234, 238). Courts
953, 963; Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking must administer the law, not as they "think it ought to be but as they find it and
Corporation [1917], 36 Phil., 27, 36; Go Chioco vs. Martinez [1923], 45 Phil., without regard to consequences." (Velasco vs. Lopez [l903], 1 Phil., 720, 723,
256, 270, 276; Portillo vs. Salvani [1930], 54 Phil., 543, 546. See also Kepner vs. 724.)
United States [1904], 195 U. S., 100; 24 Sup. Ct., 797; 49 Law, ed., 114; 11 Phil.,
669, 692; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U.S., 470; 27 Sup. Ct., 343; 51 Law. ed., It will also be observed that the body of Act No. 4043, like those of Acts Nos.
571; 11 Phil., 762, 766; Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson [1912], 21 Phil., 308, 331; 3059, 3672 and 4195, employ the phrase "are about to be, declared land of public
aff'd in 231 U.S., 106; 34 Sup. Ct., 27; 58 Law ed., 142; United States vs. Katz domain". This phrase would be meaningless if we construe the Act to refer to the
[1925], 271 U.S., 354; 46 Sup. Ct., 513; 72 Law ed., 986). rendition of judicial decisions in cadastral cases. A judicial decision may declare
lands to be of the public domain but to say that a decision is about to declare it so
Act No. 4043 was not the only Act passed by the Philippine Legislature to enable would be absurd. The fact that the construction placed upon the statute by the
persons whose lands had been declared public lands by virtue of the operation of appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it (In re
the cadastral system to recover said lands after complying with certain prescribed Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630, 643; Marin vs. Nacianceno [1911], 19 Phil., 238, 240;
conditions. Rivera vs. Campbell [1916], 34 Phil., 348, 353; Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China vs. Imperial and National Bank [1921], 48 Phil., 931, 948;
City of Manila vs. Lyric Music House [1935], 62 Phil., 125; 25 R. C. L., 1019).

The contention of the appellants that the reference made in Executive

Proclamation No. 549 to the rendition of judicial decisions as the starting point in
the computation of the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 amounts to a
contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the Executive
Department of the Government and, therefore, is entitled to great weight and
respect, is devoid of foundation. All that the proclamation did was to copy the
title of the statute to which it referred. At any rate, the intention of the
Legislature, as disclosed by a uniform trend of legislation, is clearly expressed in
the body of Act No. 4043, and it is our duty to give effect to that intention in the
case before us (sec. 288, Code of Civil Procedure).

The more recent Act No. 4195 repeals act No. 4043. But the provisions of Said
Act No. 4195 can not be availed of by the claimants and the appellants herein,
because the cadastral proceedings in question were instituted on June 12, 1919, or
more than fifteen years before the approval of that Act. It appearing, however,
that the other provisions of the Act have been complied with, that is to say, (1)
that at the time of the survey, the claimants were in actual possession of the
parcel of land involved, (2) that for some justifiable reason, they were unable to
file their claim in the proper court during the period established by law, (3) that
the land has not yet been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and (4) that all
taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid, the claimants and appellants
herein may bring the matter to the attention of the proper administrative
authorities for such action as they might deem proper and equitable.lâwphi1.nêt

In view of the conclusion reached by us on the principal question raised in the

case at bar, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other questions raised
by counsel of both parties in their briefs.

The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.