TRADE UPDATE 2017

Out of the Shadows

Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi

A publication of the Small Arms Survey, with support from

the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia
Credits

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© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2017

First published in September 2017

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2  Trade Update September 2017

About the authors

Paul Holtom is a senior researcher at the Small Arms Survey. His research focuses on
efforts to regulate and monitor the international arms trade, as well as measures to
address arms trafficking and diversion. He was the director of the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfers Programme (2009–13) and served as
adviser to the 2013 and 2016 United Nations’ Group of Governmental Experts on the
UN Register of Conventional Arms.

Irene Pavesi is a researcher at the Small Arms Survey. Her work focuses on transpar-
ency issues related to the international arms trade, as well as on methods for monitor-
ing and measuring lethal violence at the global level. Since 2012, she has coordinated
the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer and the Small Arms Survey Database
on Violent Deaths.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  3

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Nic Marsh and Rachel Stohl for providing valuable
comments on a draft of this report and Olivia Denonville for her crucial assistance
with scoring national reports and validating the 2017 Small Arms Trade Transparency
Barometer scores. The authors also extend thanks to Vincent Baumgartner, Torgeir Pande
Braathen, Marco Centurione, Kristina Duric, Sven Richters, Juliana Sokolová, Richard
Steyne, and Vânya Tsutsui for their assistance in translating and scoring national reports.
Andrea Berger provided useful materials for the research on North Korea.

4  Trade Update September 2017

Contents

List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables ........................................................................................ 7

List of abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................................................ 10

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 11
Key findings 13

I. Authorized transfers ................................................................................................................................ 15

Top and major exporters in 2014 16
Top and major importers in 2014 21
Regional trends in small arms imports 24
Africa 24
The Americas 28
Asia and the Pacific 30
Europe 34

II. Small Arms Trade Transparency .................................................................................................. 39

The 2017 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 40

Small arms transfers in the first ATT annual reports 47
Use of the ATT annual reporting template 48
National definitions of small arms in ATT annual reports 50
Do the first ATT annual reports boost transparency on
small arms transfers? 50
Recent developments in reporting to the UN Register 56

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  5

III. Casting light on the least transparent major exporters ...................................... 59
South Africa 62
Iran 63
North Korea 69
Saudi Arabia 71
The UAE 73

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................. 75

Annexe ...................................................................................................................................................................... 78

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................. 85

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................... 87

6  Trade Update September 2017

List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables

Boxes
1 Note to the reader: UN Comtrade data 14
2 Defining top and major small arms exporters and importers 16
3 Africa’s five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order 27
4 The Americas’ five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order 30
5 Asia and the Pacific’s five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order 33
6 Europe’s five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order 36
7 A brief review of Israel’s Transparency Barometer score 41

Figures
1 Export values of the top small arms exporters (USD million), 2013–14 18
2 Values of global small arms exports (USD million), by category, 2013–14 19
3 Import values of the top small arms importers, 2013–14 22
4 Global trends of small arms imports by region,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 25
5 Value of small arms supplied to Africa, by category,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 25
6 Value of small arms supplied to Africa, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 26
7 Value of small arms supplied to the Americas, by category,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 28

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  7

8 Values of small arms supplied to the Americas, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 29
9 Value of small arms supplied to Asia and the Pacific, by category,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 31
10 Value of small arms supplied to Asia and the Pacific, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 32
11 Value of small arms supplied to Europe, by category,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 34
12 Value of small arms supplied to Europe, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 35
13 Key differences between the ATT reporting template and the UN
Register standardized form 49
14 Extract from the South African arms export report covering 2014 63

Map
1 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017, based on 2014 trade 42

Tables
1 Tier classification of top and major exporters and importers
of small arms 16
2 Top and major small arms exporters, as reported to
UN Comtrade data, 2014, with transparency indicators 17
3 Top and major small arms importers,
as reported to UN Comtrade data, 2014 21
4 Value of small arms supplied to Africa, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 27
5 Value of small arms supplied to the Americas, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 29
6 Value of small arms supplied to Asia and the Pacific, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 32
7 Value of small arms supplied to Europe, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 35
8 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017,
covering major exporters 45
9 Reporting on international transfers of small arms in the first
ATT annual reports and in submissions to the UN Register
provided prior to or on 31 December 2016 51

8  Trade Update September 2017

10 Reporting on small arms transfers to the UN Register, 2004–15 57
11 The least transparent major small arms exporters based on the
Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, 2006–17 60
12 Value of small arms exports by the five least transparent major exporters,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2004–14 61
13 Reported seizures of suspected Iranian exports or re-exports of
small arms and ammunition, 2009–16 65
14 Reported seizures of suspected North Korean exports or re-exports of
small arms and ammunition, 2009–16 70
A1 Major exporters’ annual authorized small arms and light weapons
exports (of at least USD 10 million), 2014 [online]
A2 Major importers’ annual authorized small arms and light weapons
imports (of at least USD 10 million), 2014 [online]
A3 Regional breakdown of countries and territories 78
A4 The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017: scoring guidelines 79

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  9

List of abbreviations and acronyms

ATGM Anti-tank guided missile

ATT Arms Trade Treaty
CAS Continental Aviation Services
CSP Conference of States Parties for the Arms Trade Treaty
GGE Group of Governmental Experts
HS Harmonized System
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MANPADS Man-portable air defence system
NCACC National Conventional Arms Control Committee
NISAT Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers
SEESAC South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small
Arms and Light Weapons
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN Comtrade United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
UN Register United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

10  Trade Update September 2017

 The 2017 edition of the
Trade Update seeks to shed further
light on the sometimes murky,
authorized international trade in
small arms, with a focus on recent
developments in small arms trade
transparency and on the trade of the
least transparent major exporters.”

Introduction

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  11

I
n August 2016, Egypt intercepted a cargo of around 30,000 PG-7 rocket-propelled
grenades and related subcomponents that were hidden under 2,300 tons of iron
ore aboard the vessel Jie Shun (UNSC, 2017b, paras. 61–71). The seized cargo
originated in North Korea and was estimated to be worth several million US dollars,
yet data compiled for the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN
Comtrade) indicates that North Korea rarely exports more than USD 100,000 worth of
small arms in a given year. The 2017 edition of the Trade Update seeks to shed further
light on the sometimes murky, authorized international trade in small arms, with a focus
on recent developments in small arms trade transparency and on the trade of the least
transparent major exporters.
The 2017 Trade Update addresses the following key questions:

Which countries were the top and major exporters and importers in 2014?
What are the trends in values transferred at the regional and subregional levels from
2001 to 2014?
Which countries are the most, and least, transparent top and major exporters?
Has the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) increased the transparency of international transfers
of small arms?
Is it possible to determine whether an untransparent country is in fact a top or
major exporter?
What does reliable open source data reveal about the value of small arms trans-
ferred by untransparent exporters and trends in such trade?

The Trade Update 2017 comprises three main sections. The first provides an overview
of regional and subregional trends in small arms imports since 2001, using Comtrade
data (see Box 1). It identifies the top and major exporters and importers of small arms
in 2014. Section II presents the 2017 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency
Barometer. It also considers the implications for small arms trade transparency of the
first set of annual reports provided by states parties to the ATT and of the 2016 Group
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register).
Section III shifts the spotlight to the least transparent exporting countries, using a
wide array of data sources to assess the scale of their small arms exports. The conclusion
summarizes some of the key messages of this Trade Update and highlights several
developments to monitor.

12  Trade Update September 2017

Key findings
The main findings include the following:
In 2014, the top exporters of small arms (those with annual exports of at least USD
100 million), in descending order, were: the United States, Italy, Brazil, Germany,
South Korea, Austria, Turkey, the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, Belgium,
Croatia, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, and Japan. Brazil exported more than USD 500
million worth of small arms for the first time during 2001–14.
In 2014, the top importers of small arms (those with annual imports of at least
USD 100 million), in descending order, were: the United States, Canada, Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia, Germany, Australia, Iraq, France, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. The United States remains the world’s largest importer, but the value of
its imports declined for the first time since 2001, from USD 2.5 billion in 2013 to
USD 2.2 billion in 2014.
The international small arms trade was worth at least USD 6 billion in 2014.
Ammunition accounted for 38 per cent of global transfers. The value of ‘military
firearm’ shipments increased by 49 per cent between 2013 and 2014, from USD
475 million to USD 708 million. In contrast, the value of the trade in pistols and
revolvers declined by 16 per cent, from USD 1 billion to USD 845 million.
The 2017 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Germany,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Serbia as the most transparent top and major
small arms exporters. Iran, Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) are the least transparent major exporters.
The average score in the 2017 Barometer is 11.33 out of 25 points. The areas that
have seen the most improvement over the past year are: comprehensiveness (+17
per cent), access and consistency (+12 per cent), licences denied (+11 per cent), and
clarity (+4 per cent).
In their first ATT annual reports, Austria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and
Liberia—none of which had reported small arms transfers to the UN Register—pro-
vided information on small arms transfers, thus increasing overall transparency on
international small arms transfers.
Although Iran, North Korea, and the UAE rarely, if ever, recorded small arms exports
worth USD 10 million or more in Comtrade, Survey research indicates that they are
major small arms exporters. It is more difficult to determine the status of Saudi
Arabia, which appears to be a significant re-exporter of small arms.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  13

 Box 1 Note to the reader: UN Comtrade data

The figures on the international small arms trade in

Sections I and II of this report are based on an analy-
sis of customs data that states provide voluntarily
to UN Comtrade. While UN Comtrade captures much
international commercial activity, it does not capture
all small arms transfers as many states do not report
them to UN Comtrade, or do so only partially. If both
an exporter and importer of a specific transaction do
not share any details of a transfer with UN Comtrade,
the activity will not be reflected in the estimates on
the global small arms trade contained in Sections I
and II of this report. Moreover, transfers of some light
weapons, light weapons ammunition, and accessories
for small arms and light weapons are not discerni-
ble from the non-small arms trade that UN Comtrade
tracks, and therefore are not covered in this analy-
sis. As a result, this Trade Update is skewed towards
documenting more transparent countries and most
certainly underestimates the total value and extent
of the global trade in small arms.
To compensate for non-reporting, and to help resolve
discrepancies between information provided by an
exporter and an importer, the analysis uses the
Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT)
Reliability Index (Marsh, 2005). It attributes a ‘reli-
ability score’ that can be used to determine whether to use the data provided to UN
Comtrade by an exporter or importer if their figures conflict. The state with the higher reli-
ability score is used.
The UN Comtrade data used for the analysis of the documented trade in 2014 is correct as
of 28 November 2016. The analysis does not take into account information that states
have reported or amended since that date.

14  Trade Update September 2017

 Top and major exporters,
as defined by the Small Arms Survey,
account for almost 99 per cent of the
global authorized small arms trade,
as documented by UN Comtrade.
Comtrade data for these states
indicates that the financial value
of the small arms trade in 2014
was worth at least USD 6 billion.”

I. Authorized transfers

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  15

T
his section presents data and analysis of authorized small arms transfers
undertaken in 2014. It uses the financial value of small arms1 imports and
exports reported by states to UN Comtrade, as compiled by the Norwegian
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT, n.d.).2 According to this data, top
and major exporters, as defined by the Small Arms Survey (see Box 2), account for
almost 99 per cent of the global authorized small arms trade, as documented by
Comtrade. Comtrade data for these states indicates that the financial value of the
small arms trade in 2014 was worth at least USD 6 billion. This figure represents a
4 per cent increase over the estimated value of the small arms trade in 2013 (USD
5.8 billion).

Top and major exporters in 2014

Between 2013 and 2014, the number of top and major exporters increased from 40
to 42. This total represents the largest number of states accorded top and major
exporter status since the Small Arms Survey began collecting trade data for the calen-
dar year 2001. Table 2 presents the list of top and major exporters by tier (see Box 2);

Box 2 Defining top and major small arms exporters and importers

The Small Arms Survey identifies top and major exporters and importers by assessing
the financial value of their annual documented small arms exports and imports, based on
UN Comtrade data, as elaborated by NISAT (Marsh, 2005). Top exporters and importers
are states that traded at least USD 100 million worth of small arms and light weapons in
a calendar year. Major exporters and importers are states that traded at least USD 10
million worth of small arms and light weapons in a calendar year. For the purposes of this
analysis, top and major exporters and importers are classified according to a tier system,
as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Tier classification of top and major exporters and importers of small arms
Category of exporter or importer Value traded (USD)

Top Tier 1 ≥500 million

Tier 2 100–499 million

Major Tier 3 50–99 million

Tier 4 10–49 million

16  Trade Update September 2017

it also indicates each exporter’s level of
transparency in reporting on transfers, as In 2014, Brazil
assessed by the 2017 Small Arms Trade
Transparency Barometer (see Section II). recorded exports worth
The 15 top exporters of 2014 accounted for
80 per cent of the value of documented
more than USD 500
small arms exports (USD 4.9 billion). The
million for the first time
three largest exporters accounted for close
to 40 per cent of those transfers: the United since the Small Arms
States exported USD 1.1 billion worth of
small arms, Italy USD 689 million, and Survey began collecting
Brazil USD 591 million (see Figure 1). In
2014, Brazil recorded exports worth more data, in 2001.”
than USD 500 million for the first time
since the Small Arms Survey began col-
lecting data, in 2001. In contrast, according to Comtrade, China recorded a 26 per
cent decline in its small arms exports, from USD 126 million in 2013 to USD 93 mil-
lion in 2014. Table A1 of the Annexe to this Update contains information on the total
value of exports, types of small arms exported, and main trading partners for each
major exporter.

Table 2 Top and major small arms exporters, as reported to UN Comtrade data,
2014, with transparency indicators
Category Export value (USD) Exporters (in descending order of export value)

Top Tier 1 ≥500 million United States♣, Italy♠, Brazil♥

exporters
Tier 2 100–499 million Germany∗, South Korea♥, Austria♣, Turkey♥, Russian
Federation♣, Czech Republic♣, Belgium♠, Croatia♣,
Israel♦, Spain♠, Switzerland♠, Japan♥

Major Tier 3 50–99 million Finland♣, China♥, France♠, United Kingdom♠, Canada♣,
exporters Mexico♥, Serbia♠, Norway♣, Sweden♠

Tier 4 10–49 million Philippines♥, India♥, South Africa♥, Poland♠, Slovakia♠,

Portugal♠, Hungary♠, Taiwan♥, Bulgaria♣, United Arab
Emirates♦, Singapore♥, Australia♣, Bosnia and
Herzegovina♦, Netherlands♠, Denmark♣, Cyprus♥,
Romania♠, Argentina♥

Note: Transparency indicators are based on Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017 scores: * Level 1
(20.25–25.00); ♠ Level 2 (15.25–20.00); ♣ Level 3 (10.25–15.00); ♥ Level 4 (5.25–10.00); ♦ Level 5 (0.00–5.00).
Sources: NISAT (n.d); Small Arms Survey (2017)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  17

Figure 1 Export values of the top small arms exporters (USD million), 2013–14
2013 2014

Country

United States

Italy

Brazil

Germany

South Korea

Austria

Turkey

Russian Federation

Czech Republic

Belgium

Croatia

Israel

Spain

Switzerland

Japan

China
0 125 250 375 500 625 750 875 1,000 1,125 1,250

Value of exports (USD million)

Note: China was a top exporter in 2013 but not in 2014.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Four states that were not among the major exporters in 2013 recorded exports above
USD 10 million in 2014. In alphabetical order, they are:

Denmark (whose exports increased from USD 9 million to 14 million);

the Netherlands (USD 7 million to 14 million);

18  Trade Update September 2017

 Singapore (USD 4 million to 21 million);
and Military firearms
the UAE (USD 1 million to 22 million).
accounted for the most
Two countries that were among the major
exporters in 2013, Peru and Ukraine,
significant increase in
dropped out of this category in 2014, with
the value of exported
exports of USD 6 million and USD 7 million,
respectively. small arms between
Figure 2 shows changes in the value of
global small arms exports between 2013 2013 and 2014 . . . This
and 2014. Ammunition accounted for 38
per cent of the 2014 value, up from 35 per
surge is primarily due
cent in 2013. It continues to constitute
to a large increase in
the largest of the six categories of small
arms-related exports identified in Comtrade the value of Brazil’s
data (Holtom, Pavesi, and Rigual, 2014,
p. 115). Transfers of ammunition in 2014 documented exports of
were worth USD 2.3 billion, 12 per cent
more than in 2013. military firearms.”
Figure 2 Values of global small arms exports (USD million),
by category, 2013–14
2013 2014

Category

Ammunition

Sporting and hunting

rifles and pistols

Pistols and revolvers

Parts and
components

Military firearms

Light weapons
0 250 500 750 1,000 1,250 1,500 1,750 2,000 2,250 2,500

Value of global exports (USD million)

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  19

20  Trade Update September 2017
Military firearms accounted for the most significant increase in the value of exported
small arms between 2013 and 2014: the total transfer value rose by 49 per cent, from
USD 475 million to USD 708 million. This surge is primarily due to a large increase in
the value of Brazil’s documented exports of military firearms, as recorded through
importer (mirror) data, from less than USD 1 million in 2013 to USD 198 million in
2014. The value of global exports of light weapons increased by 19 per cent, from USD
166 million in 2013 to USD 197 million in 2014. The 16 per cent decline in the value of
exports of pistols and revolvers, from USD 1 billion to USD 845 million, is primarily
due to lower recorded exports values for Austria, Brazil, and Germany. The drop in
exports of pistols and revolvers by Austria and Brazil is also documented by Comtrade
mirror data.

Top and major importers in 2014

In 2014, 63 countries—six more than the previous year—qualified as top and major
importers in that they recorded at least USD 10 million worth of imports (see Table 3).
Comtrade data shows that these 63 states accounted for 96 per cent of the reported
value of small arms imports in 2014 (see Figure 3). The data reveals a decline in the
value of US small arms imports for the first time in the Trade Update time series: from
USD 2.5 billion in 2013 to USD 2.2 billion in 2014. Despite that dip, the United States

Table 3 Top and major small arms importers, as reported to UN Comtrade

data, 2014
Category Import value (USD) Importers (in descending order of import value)

Top Tier 1 ≥500 million United States

importers
Tier 2 100–499 million Canada, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Australia,
Iraq, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom

Major Tier 3 50–99 million Israel, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, United Arab
importers Emirates, Belgium, Italy, Thailand, Colombia, Russian
Federation, Turkey, Egypt, Denmark, Switzerland

Tier 4 10–49 million Portugal, Spain, Japan, Austria, South Africa, Poland,
Finland, Oman, Czech Republic, Sweden, South Korea,
Lebanon, Jordan, Brazil, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malawi, Singapore, Qatar,
Slovakia, Chile, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Ukraine, Côte
d’Ivoire, Argentina, Paraguay, Hungary, Afghanistan,
Morocco, Bulgaria, Algeria, Peru, Greece, Malaysia,
Guatemala, Botswana

Sources: NISAT (n.d.); Small Arms Survey (2017b)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  21

Figure 3 Import values of the top small arms importers, 2013–14
2013 2014

Country

United States

Canada

Indonesia

Saudi Arabia

Germany

Australia

Iraq

France

Netherlands

United Kingdom

Norway

United Arab Emirates

0 250 500 750 1,000 1,250 1,500 1,750 2,000 2,250 2,500

Value of imports (USD million)

Norway and the United Arab Emirates were top exporters in 2013 but not in 2014.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

accounted for more than one-third (36 per cent) of that year’s value of small arms imports.
Table A2 of the Annexe to this Update contains information on the total value of imports,
types of small arms imported, and main trading partners for each top and major importer.

Four states changed their status from major importer in 2013 to top importer in 2014
(in alphabetical order):

Indonesia (whose imports increased from USD 81 million to USD 331 million);

Iraq (USD 10 million to USD 139 million);

the Netherlands (USD 37 million to USD 111 million); and

the United Kingdom (USD 91 million to USD 109 million).

22  Trade Update September 2017

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  23
Most notably, Iraq became a top importer for the first time since data collection began.
In contrast, the UAE’s imports dropped from USD 168 million in 2013 to USD 75 million
in 2014.
Nine states that recorded imports below the USD 10 million threshold in 2013 qualified
as major importers in 2014. In alphabetical order, they are:

Afghanistan (whose imports increased from USD 6 million to USD 13 million);

Algeria (USD 2 million to USD 12 million);
Botswana (USD 4 million to USD 10 million);
Bulgaria (USD 9 million to USD 12 million);
Côte d’Ivoire (USD 9 million to USD 16 million);
Greece (USD 8 million to USD 11 million);
Luxembourg (USD 7 million to USD 24 million);
Malawi (USD 3 million to USD 22 million); and
Morocco (USD 6 million to USD 13 million).

The Dominican Republic, Latvia, and Sudan were among the major importers in 2013
but recorded imports below the USD 10 million threshold in 2014.

Regional trends in small arms imports

This section uses Comtrade data to assess regional trends for authorized—and reported—
imports for the period 2001–14. It covers imports to all states in four geographic regions—
Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe—including imports from one
state to another in the same region (see Figure 4).3 The Americas accounted for 40 per
cent of global small arms imports, followed by Europe (30 per cent), Asia and the
Pacific (26 per cent), and Africa (4 per cent). The following sections break down the
trend data by type of small arm, subregion, and top importers in each region.

Africa
Although the Africa region had the lowest value for documented small arms imports
in 2001–14, the value almost tripled, from USD 82 million to USD 237 million. Thirteen
African states imported more than USD 10 million worth of small arms at least once during
this period. Egypt is the only African state that qualified as a top importer in 2001–14,
with USD 148 million worth of small arms imports in 2004, mostly from the Czech Republic.

24  Trade Update September 2017

Figure 4 Global trends of small arms imports by region,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Africa  Americas  Asia and the Pacific  Europe

Value of imports (USD million)

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Figure 5 Value of small arms supplied to Africa, by category,

as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Military firearms  Light weapons  Pistols and revolvers 
Sporting/hunting firearms  Parts and components  Ammunition

Value of imports (USD million)

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. UN Comtrade category 930120 (light weapons) was
introduced in the 2002 Harmonized System.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  25

Small arms ammunition accounted for 37 per cent (USD 87 million) of all documented
African small arms imports in 2014 (see Figure 5).
Northern Africa accounts for the largest share of small arms imports to Africa (see
Figure 6). UN Comtrade registers an average annual flow of small arms to Northern
Africa equal to USD 62 million (see Table 4). The subregion’s documented small arms
imports were worth USD 93 million in 2014, a 51 per cent increase compared to 2013.
The largest importing states in the subregion in 2014, starting with the largest importer,
were Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria (see Box 3).
Table 4 shows that, in the region, Western Africa was the second-largest importer of
small arms, with imports worth an average of USD 35 million per year. Southern Africa
was the third, with USD 27 million in imports; the increase in the value of small arms
supplies to this subregion correlates with a growth in imports of sporting and hunting
firearms, which accounted for more than 50 per cent of imports to Southern Africa during
this period. Eastern Africa registered the highest percentage increase (130 per cent) in
the value of documented imports between 2013 and 2014. In the subregion, Malawi
increased its small arms imports by 633 per cent, from USD 3 million in 2013 to USD
22 million in 2014, making it the third-largest African small arms importer in 2014.

Figure 6 Value of small arms supplied to Africa, by subregion,

as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Eastern Africa (1 top/major importer)  Middle Africa (0 top/major importers)
Northern Africa (3 top/major importers)  Southern Africa (2 top/major importers) 
Western Africa (1 top/major importer)

Value of imports (USD million)

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

26  Trade Update September 2017

Table 4 Value of small arms supplied to Africa, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Subregion Value of small arms imports % change in import
(USD million) value, 2013 vs. 2014

2001 2014 Average, Change from

2001–14 2001 to 2014

Eastern Africa 17 36 21 20 130%

Middle Africa 6 9 8 4 6%

Northern Africa 22 93 62 71 51%

Southern Africa 17 58 27 41 24%

Western Africa 20 41 35 21 7%

Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. Due to rounding, individual values may not add up.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Box 3 Africa’s five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,

in alphabetical order 4

Côte d’Ivoire. The value of Côte d’Ivoire’s small arms imports increased significantly
in 2003–04, 2005–06, 2010–11, and 2013–14. In 2014, Comtrade recorded imports
of small arms ammunition from France worth USD 15 million, or 95 per cent of Côte
d’Ivoire’s total imports.
Egypt. A top importer in 2004, Egypt acquired USD 62 million worth of light weapons
and USD 121 million worth of small arms. The country’s small arms imports increased
tenfold between 2001 and 2014, from USD 5 million to USD 58 million. In 2014, more
than half of Egypt’s small arms imports consisted of pistols and revolvers, USD 32
million worth of which hailed from the Czech Republic, Italy, and Serbia.
Morocco. In 2011, Morocco registered its highest value of small arms imports (USD
34 million). In 2014, the country imported USD 13 million worth of small arms. That
year, its three main trading partners were Italy, the United States, and Spain.
South Africa. The value of small arms imports by South Africa increased from USD 3
million in 2005 to USD 43 million in 2014 (its highest recorded value). The country’s three
largest trading partners in 2014 were the United States, Italy, and the Czech Republic.
Sudan. Documented small arms deliveries to Sudan fluctuated from less than USD
100,000 in 2001 to a high of USD 23 million in 2003. Sudan’s three main trading part-
ners in 2014 were Turkey, the Russian Federation, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  27

The Americas
Since 2005, the Americas region has consistently accounted for the largest share of
global small arms imports (see Figure 4). The value of small arms imports into this region
increased from USD 921 million in 2001 to almost USD 2.9 billion in 2014.

Since 2007, small arms ammunition has represented almost one-third of the value of
the Americas’ small arms imports; data for 2013–14 trade activities shows that this
proportion is on the rise (see Figure 7). In 2014, when imports into the region reached
USD 1 billion, ammunition accounted for 36 per cent of documented deliveries, an
increase of 4 per cent (USD 122 million) compared to 2013.

Northern America is a significant outlier in the Americas (see Figure 8). The United
States and Canada accounted for one-third of global small arms imports and about
87 per cent of small arms supplies to the Americas during 2001–14 (see Table 5 and
Box 4). However, the value of small arms deliveries to Northern America decreased by
11 per cent between 2013 and 2014, with notable declines in the value of imported
pistols and revolvers and sporting and hunting firearms (see Table 5).

Despite this decrease, Northern America accounted for 47 per cent (USD 2.8 billion) of
global imports in 2014.

Figure 7 Value of small arms supplied to the Americas, by category,

as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Military firearms  Light weapons  Pistols and revolvers 
Sporting/hunting firearms  Parts and components  Ammunition

Value of imports (USD million)

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. UN Comtrade category 930120 (light weapons) was
introduced in the 2002 Harmonized System.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

28  Trade Update September 2017

Figure 8 Values of small arms supplied to the Americas, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Caribbean (0 top/major importers)  Central America (2 top/major importers) 
North America (2 top/major importers)  South America (6 top/major importers) 

Value of imports (USD million)

3,600

3,000

2,400

1,800

1,200

600

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

On average, imports to Southern America represent less than 10 per cent of small arms
imports to the Americas. There were, however, significant increases in documented small
arms imports to the subregion in 2006 and 2010, driven in both cases by Colombia’s
and Venezuela’s imports of military firearms. The increase in 2010 was also influenced
by Peru’s small arms imports, as the country imported USD 39 million worth of small
arms, including USD 25 million worth of ammunition from Israel.

Table 5 Value of small arms supplied to the Americas, by subregion,

as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Subregion Value of small arms imports % change in import
(USD million) value, 2013 vs. 2014

2001 2014 Average, Change from

2001–14 2001 to 2014

Caribbean 14 16 17 2 -27%

Central America 34 107 68 73 9%

Northern America 759 2,580 1,538 1,821 -11%

South America 114 172 140 57 31%

Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. Due to rounding, individual values may not add up.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  29

 Box 4 The Americas’ five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order

Canada. In 2005, Canada became a top small arms importer. The value of the coun-
try’s documented small arms imports increased from USD 71 million in 2001 to USD
364 million in 2014. The United States is the source of two-thirds of Canada’s small
arms imports, in particular sporting and hunting firearms and small arms ammunition.
Other trading partners in 2014 were South Africa and Italy.
Chile. Chile imported an annual average of USD 20 million worth of small arms from
2005 to 2014. In 2012, the country imported USD 52 million worth of military weapons
from Norway. In 2014, Chile imported USD 24 million worth of small arms. Its three main
trading partners that year were, in decreasing order, the United States, Brazil, and Spain.
Colombia. With average annual imports of USD 55 million, Colombia has been a major
small arms importer since 2001. On average, military firearms, light weapons, and
small arms ammunition account for 96 per cent of Colombian annual imports. In 2010
alone, Colombia imported USD 62 million worth of military weapons. In 2014, the coun-
try imported USD 67 million worth of military firearms, light weapons, and small arms
ammunition from, in decreasing order, South Korea, the United States, and Israel.
Mexico. The average annual value of Mexico’s documented small arms imports during
2001–14 was USD 41 million. In 2014, Mexico imported USD 78 million worth of small
arms imports. The United States, Italy, and China, in that order, were Mexico’s three
main trading partners in 2014.
The United States. During the period 2001–14, the United States was the world’s
largest small arms importer. Having first crossed the USD 1 billion mark in 2007,
the documented value of US small arms imports exceeded the USD 2 billion mark in
2013. The United States imported USD 1.5 billion worth of small arms ammunition,
pistols and revolvers, and sporting and hunting firearms in 2014. The country’s three
main trading partners in 2014 were, in decreasing order, Italy, Austria, and Germany.

Mexico accounts for about half of the value of Central America’s small arms imports,
which consist largely of military firearms and small arms ammunition. Mexico also
recorded a significant increase in the value of its imports of small arms parts and
components, from USD 12 million in 2012 to USD 116 million in 2013 (see Box 4).

Asia and the Pacific

Asia and the Pacific accounted for one-quarter of global small arms imports during
2001–14.Imports by states in the region increased by more than 60 per cent between
2001 and 2014, from USD 945 million to USD 1.6 billion (see Figure 4). The region is
home to four top and 17 major small arms importers. Small arms ammunition and

30  Trade Update September 2017

military firearms accounted for the largest shares of small arms imports from 2004 to
2014 (see Figure 9). Documented imports of military firearms fluctuated significantly
during this period, from USD 598 million in 2001 to USD 83 million in 2005 and up to
USD 484 million in 2014.
Western Asia, which is home to the largest number of top and major importers in the
region, accounts for the largest share of imports to Asia and the Pacific (see Figure 10).
Cyprus, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE imported more than USD 100 million worth of
small arms in at least one year during 2001–14 (Box 5).5 The value of Western Asia’s
small arms imports declined from 2002 to reach a subregional low of USD 250 million
in 2006. The subregion’s average annual value of small arms imports for the period
2007–12 was USD 384 million. As of 2013, following the outbreak of the armed conflict
in Syria and the rise of the non-state armed group Islamic State, the value of docu-
mented small arms deliveries to Western Asia increased significantly. Iraq and Saudi
Arabia have emerged as particularly significant importers in recent years. In 2014, Iraq
became a top small arms importer for the first time. Its USD 78 million worth of ammu-
nition imports accounted for more than half of its USD 139 million worth of imports that
year. Saudi Arabia’s documented imports crossed the USD 100 million threshold sev-
eral times during 2001–14.
South-eastern Asia accounted for the second-largest share of the region’s imports from
2007 to 2014. The annual average value of documented small arms flows to South-eastern

Figure 9 Value of small arms supplied to Asia and the Pacific, by category,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Military firearms  Light weapons  Pistols and revolvers 
Sporting/hunting firearms  Parts and components  Ammunition

Value of imports (USD million)

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. UN Comtrade category 930120 (light weapons) was
introduced in the 2002 Harmonized System.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  31

Figure 10 Value of small arms supplied to Asia and the Pacific, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Central Asia (1 top/major importer)  Eastern Asia (2 top/major importers) 
South-eastern Asia (5 top/major importers)  Southern Asia (2 top/major importers)
Western Asia (10 top/major importers)  Oceania (2 top/major importers)

Value of imports (USD million)

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 6 Value of small arms supplied to Asia and the Pacific, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Subregion Value of small arms imports (USD million) % change in import
value, 2013 vs. 2014
2001 2014 Average, Change from
2001–14 2001 to 2014

Central Asia 2 19 19 17 3%

Eastern Asia 205 101 145 -104 21%

South-eastern Asia 46 517 214 471 56%

Southern Asia 11 62 68 52 -4%

Western Asia 608 748 466 140 12%

Oceania 74 207 148 134 12%

Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. Due to rounding, individual values may not add up.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

32  Trade Update September 2017

Asia for 2001–14 was USD 214 million (see Table 6). Indonesia and Thailand qualified
as top small arms importers at least once during 2001–14; during that period, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, and Singapore were consistently major importers. The share of
South-eastern Asia’s imports represented 5 per cent of the region’s imports for 2001
but accounted for 36 per cent in 2014.
The average annual value of small arms imports by all states in Central Asia, Eastern
Asia, Oceania, and Southern Asia for 2001–14 was below USD 200 million.

Box 5 Asia and the Pacific’s five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order

Australia. Australia was the largest small arms importer in Oceania from 2001 to 2014.
The highest value for Australia’s small arms imports during this period was USD 195
million, in 2011. Most of the country’s documented small arms imports are ammuni-
tion and sporting and hunting firearms. Its main trading partners in 2014 were the
United States and Italy, while a third, ‘unspecified’ country accounted for 20 per cent
of its imports that year.
Indonesia. The value of Indonesia’s small arms imports increased significantly between
2013 and 2014, from USD 83 million to USD 331 million. The import of USD 222 million
worth of military firearms in 2014 accounted for more than two-thirds of the country’s
imports, followed by small arms ammunition and sporting and hunting firearms. Brazil
was the source of more than 80 per cent of Indonesia’s small arms imports in 2014.
Saudi Arabia. The value of Saudi Arabia’s small arms imports fell—from USD 253
million in 2001 to USD 32 million in 2003—in line with Western Asia's imports. Between
2006 and 2012, the overall value of Saudi imports remained below USD 100 million.
The country joined the ranks of top importers again in 2013, with documented small
arms imports worth USD 164 million that year. The following year, its recorded imports
rose further, to USD 209 million. Saudi Arabia’s three main trading partners in 2014
were, in decreasing order, the United States, Croatia, and South Korea.
South Korea. In 2001–14, South Korea was consistently one of the largest importers
of documented small arms in Eastern Asia. During that period, the country imported
an annual average of USD 71 million worth of small arms. The value of its small arms
imports declined from 2011. In 2014, South Korea imported USD 37 million worth of small
arms, two-thirds of which were military firearms and light weapons. Its three main trad-
ing partners that year were, in decreasing order, the United States, Germany, and Italy.
Thailand. Documented small arms flows to Thailand increased steadily between 2005
and 2011, reaching a value of USD 166 million in the latter year. Since then, the value
of Thailand’s small arms imports has declined, with USD 71 million worth of imports
recorded in 2014. Military firearms, light weapons, small arms ammunition, and pistols
and revolvers accounted for the majority of its imports in 2014. The country’s main trad-
ing partners were, in decreasing order, the United States, Singapore, and South Korea.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  33

Europe
European states imported a total of USD 17.5 billion worth of small arms from 2001
to 2014. The total annual value of small arms imports increased by 82 per cent during
this period, from USD 768 million in 2001 to USD 1.4 billion in 2014. Europe’s peak
year for small arms imports was 2008, with USD 1.7 billion in documented imports
recorded that year. In 2014, the value of documented small arms flows to Europe was
USD 1.4 billion, a 2 per cent increase in comparison to 2013. Small arms ammunition
and sporting and hunting firearms constituted the largest categories of imports to
the region in 2014, accounting for 41 per cent and 26 per cent of imports, respectively
(see Figure 11).
Western Europe accounted for 41 per cent of total European small arms imports during
2001–14, with annual average small arms flows to the subregion worth USD 509 million
(see Figure 12 and Table 7). All countries in the region qualified as either top or major
importers during 2001–14. Germany ranked as a top importer from 2003, France from
2004 (see Box 6).
Northern Europe was the second-largest subregional importer of small arms from 2001
to 2014. The United Kingdom accounted for one-third of Northern Europe’s small arms
imports, strongly influencing the overall trend for Northern Europe.

Figure 11 Value of small arms supplied to Europe, by category,

as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Military firearms  Light weapons  Pistols and revolvers 
Sporting/hunting firearms  Parts and components  Ammunition

Value of imports (USD million)

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. UN Comtrade category 930120 (light weapons) was
introduced in the 2002 Harmonized System.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

34  Trade Update September 2017

Figure 12 Value of small arms supplied to Europe, by subregion,
as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Eastern Europe (7 top/major importers)  Northern Europe (6 top/major importers) 
Southern Europe (4 top/major importers)  Western Europe (7 top/major importers) 

Value of imports (USD million)

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

The average annual value of Southern Europe’s small arms imports during 2001–14
was USD 231 million. This was the only European subregion that registered a decrease in
the value of imports between 2001 and 2014, from USD 245 million to USD 196 million.
Eastern Europe recorded the lowest annual average (USD 164 million) but had the larg-
est recorded increase during 2001–14 (see Table 7).

Table 7 Value of small arms supplied to Europe, by subregion,

as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Subregion Value of small arms imports % change in import
(USD million) value, 2013 vs. 2014

2001 2014 Average, Change from

2001–14 2001 to 2014

Eastern Europe 54 218 164 164 -7%

Northern Europe 174 360 346 185 -2%

Southern Europe 245 196 231 -49 -6%

Western Europe 295 627 509 332 11%

Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. Due to rounding, individual values may not add up.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  35

 Box 6 Europe’s five largest small arms importers, 2001–14,
in alphabetical order

France. From 2001 to 2004, France’s small arms imports increased from USD 66 mil-
lion to USD 179 million. The country’s average annual value of imports was USD 129
million. In 2014, France imported USD 125 million worth of small arms, a 9 per cent
decrease compared to 2013. Small arms ammunition and sporting and hunting fire-
arms were the main import categories in 2014. The principal trading partners were,
in decreasing order, Germany, Italy, and the United States.
Germany. From 2001 to 2014, Germany was the largest small arms importer in Europe
and the world’s second-largest importer. It became a top small arms importer in
2003. From 2011 to 2014, Germany’s imports accounted for one-third of Western
Europe’s total small arms imports. In 2014, the country imported USD 198 million
worth of small arms, a 7 per cent decrease compared to 2013. Its imports included
ammunition and small arms parts and components, primarily sourced from, in decreas-
ing order, the United States, Italy, and Switzerland.
Italy. In 2001–10 and in 2012–14, Italy’s small arms imports were consistently between
USD 50 million and USD 99 million. Only in 2011 did Italy secure top importer status,
with documented small arms imports worth USD 114 million. In 2014, the country
imported USD 71 million worth of small arms, an 8 per cent decrease compared to
2013. Italy’s three main trading partners in 2014 were, in decreasing order, the United
States, Turkey, and Germany. That year it mainly imported small arms parts and
accessories, ammunition, and sporting and hunting firearms.
Spain. A well-established major importer, Spain acquired small arms worth an annual
average of USD 72 million during 2001–14. The largest percentage increase in Spain’s
documented small arms imports occurred between 2002 and 2003, when imports
rose sharply, from USD 35 million to USD 124 million, marking the first time the coun-
try passed the USD 100 million threshold.6 Spain’s small arms imports declined in
2014—to USD 46 million. Small arms ammunition accounted for almost half of that
sum. Italy, Germany, and the United States, in decreasing order, were Spain’s main
trading partners in 2014.
The United Kingdom. The UK’s small arms imports increased from a low of USD 70
million in 2002 to a high of USD 204 million in 2009. The average annual value of UK
small arms imports from 2001 to 2014 was USD 125 million. The imports increased
by 18 per cent between 2013 and 2014. In 2014, the UK imported USD 109 million
worth of small arms. The country’s three main trading partners that year were, in
decreasing order, Italy, the United States, and Germany.

36  Trade Update September 2017

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  37
38  Trade Update September 2017
 The Barometer assesses
the transparency of top and major
exporters—countries that are
believed to have exported at least
USD 10 million worth of small arms
and light weapons, including their
parts, accessories, and ammunition,
during any calendar year from 2001
to 2014.”

II. Small Arms Trade Transparency

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  39

T
his section presents the 2017 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency
Barometer covering transfers that took place in 2014. The Barometer assesses
the transparency of top and major exporters—countries that are believed to have
exported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms and light weapons, includ-
ing their parts, accessories, and ammunition, during any calendar year from 2001 to
2014. The assessment is based on information gathered from the following sources:

national arms export reports, including submissions to regional reports;7

the UN Register; and
UN Comtrade (NISAT, n.d.).

The Barometer measures the provision of arms export information, but it does not verify
the accuracy of that information.
This section also provides an overview of the provisions on reporting of international
transfers of small arms under the ATT and an analysis of the first set of ATT annual
reports, which cover trade activities that took place during 2015. It assesses the extent
to which these annual reports provide more comprehensive information on small arms
transfers. The next edition of the Barometer, which will examine reporting on 2015 trade
activities, will include an assessment of ATT annual reports.
In addition, this section takes note of the conclusions of the 2016 Group of Governmental
Experts on the UN Register and considers their implications for reporting on small arms
transfers. It concludes with a review of ten years of information that states have provided
on their small arms transfers to the UN Register using a standardized reporting form.

The 2017 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer

The 2017 Barometer evaluates the reporting practices of 49 top and major exporters—
countries that exported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms during any calen-
dar year from 2001 to 2014 (see Table 8). It examines official information that these 49
countries made publicly available during 2014–16 regarding trade activities that were
conducted during 2014. Detailed scoring guidelines are presented in Table A4 in the
Annexe to this Update.
The Barometer identifies Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Serbia as the most
transparent exporters for the year 2014. The least transparent exporters were Iran, Israel,
North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, each of which scored zero points.
Switzerland moved up from fifth to second place in the Barometer, following the receipt
of complete UN Comtrade data and of a ‘nil report’ on ‘intangible transfers’,8 which
earned the country 1.25 more points than it had received in the 2016 Barometer.

40  Trade Update September 2017

More than half (55 per cent) of the exporters reviewed for the 2017 Barometer have
improved their scores since the previous edition. The following exporters recorded the
largest increase in their scores between the 2016 and 2017 Barometers:

Hungary gained 3.25 points due to more detailed reporting on small arms exports to
the UN Register in 2014 compared to 2013 (reporting on more categories, new infor-
mation on transit and end users).
Austria gained 2.00 points because it reported more information to the UN Register
and included information on licence refusals in its submission to the EU Annual Report.
Croatia obtained 2.00 points for having provided a nil report on licences refused.

For about one-third of the exporters under review, scores declined since the last edition
of the Barometer. Poland, for instance, dropped from ninth place in the 2016 Barometer
to 15th place this year. It lost 1.25 points because its 2014 national report does not
include information on the number or value of export and brokering licences (Poland
MFA, 2015, p. 20). The following exporters recorded the largest decreases in their score
compared to the previous edition of the Barometer:

Israel. The 2017 Barometer marks the first time Israel received a score of 0. The coun-
try lost 7.75 points because it did not report on small arms exports that took place
during 2014 to any of the instruments reviewed by the Barometer (see Box 7).

Box 7 A brief review of Israel’s Transparency Barometer score

Israel recorded an average Barometer score of 7 out of 25 points during 2001–13, ranging
from a low of 3.50 for reporting on 2002 trade activities to a high of 10.75 for 2009 trade
activities (Lazarevic, 2010, p. 180; Herron et al., 2011, pp. 16–17). Israel does not publish
a national arms export report but has a long history of reporting to the UN Register and
UN Comtrade. Israel’s Barometer points have primarily been awarded in recognition of infor-
mation it provided to UN Comtrade on a range of small arms and light weapons transfers.
Israel submits information to the UN Register on its exports of conventional weapons (the
established seven categories) but has not reported specifically on its small arms exports.
In the 2017 Barometer, Israel scores zero points because it did not report to UN Comtrade
on its 2013 or 2014 activities and because its submission to the UN Register for 2014 only
became available online in May 2017. As the latter did not include a date of submission, it
is presumed that Israel did not report before the Barometer cut-off date of January 2016;
consequently, Israel did not earn points for timeliness in reporting. Israel’s nil report to the
Register on the export of conventional weapons in 2014 does not entitle it to any Barometer
points because it lacks small arms-specific information. Israel’s report to the UN Register
covering its 2015 trade activities will be analysed and scored in the 2018 Barometer.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  41

Map 1 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017, based on 2014 trade

Canada

United States

Mexico

Brazil
Peru

South
Africa
Argentina
20.25–25.00 Most transparent
15.25–20.00
10.25–15.00
5.25–10.00
0.00–5.00 Least transparent
Not applicable

Top exporter
Major exporter

42  Trade Update September 2017

 Russian Federation

North
Korea
Turkey Japan
Cyprus China
Israel Iran
South
Pakistan Korea
Saudi UAE India Taiwan
Arabia

Thailand Philippines

Singapore

Australia
Norway Finland
uth Denmark Sweden
ca United Kingdom Germany
Netherlands Poland
Belgium Slovakia
Czech Republic Ukraine
Switzerland Hungary
France
Austria Romania
Bulgaria
Spain
Serbia
Portugal
Bosnia and
Italy Herzegovina
Croatia

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  43

44  Reports August 2017
 Table 8 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017, covering major exporters*
Total National UN UN Timeliness Access and Clarity Comprehensiveness Deliveries Licences Licences
(25.00 report**/ Comtrade** Register** (1.50 max) consistency (5.00 (6.50 max) (4.00 max) granted refused
max) Regional (2.00 max) max) (4.00 (2.00
report*** max) max)

Germany 20.25 X/EU X X 1.50 2.00 4.25 4.00 3.50 3.50 1.50

Switzerland 20.00 X X X 1.50 1.50 4.00 5.25 3.00 4.00 0.75

Netherlands 19.50 X/EU X X 1.50 2.00 4.25 5.75 2.50 2.50 1.00

Serbia 19.50 X/SEE X X 1.50 1.50 3.75 5.50 3.00 3.00 1.25

United 19.25 X/EU X X 1.50 2.00 4.50 4.75 3.50 1.50 1.50
Kingdom

Romania 18.75 X/EU X 1.50 2.00 2.25 5.00 2.50 3.50 2.00

Sweden 16.75 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 4.00 5.00 2.50 1.50 0.75

France 16.25 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 3.75 4.50 3.00 1.50 0.50

Slovakia 16.25 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 3.00 4.25 2.50 1.50 2.00

Belgium1 16.00 X/EU X X 1.50 2.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50

Portugal 16.00 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 3.25 5.00 3.00 1.50 0.25

Italy 15.75 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 3.50 5.25 2.50 1.50 0.00

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017 

Spain 15.50 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 2.75 3.75 3.00 1.50 1.50

45
Hungary 15.25 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 2.00 4.75 3.50 1.50 0.50

Poland 15.25 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 3.50 4.25 3.00 1.50 0.00

Croatia 15.00 X/EU/SEE X X 1.50 1.50 2.50 3.50 2.50 1.50 2.00

Norway 15.00 X X X 1.50 1.50 4.00 4.25 3.00 0.00 0.75

Czech 14.75 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 2.50 4.00 3.00 1.50 0.75
Republic

Finland 14.50 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 3.25 3.50 2.50 2.00 0.25

United 14.25 X X X 1.50 1.50 2.75 4.00 2.50 2.00 0.00

States2

Denmark 14.00 X/EU X X 1.50 1.50 2.00 4.25 3.00 1.50 0.25

Bulgaria 13.50 X/EU X 1.50 1.50 2.25 3.00 3.00 1.50 0.75

Austria 12.25 EU X X 1.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 0.25

Canada 12.25 X X X 1.50 1.50 2.25 3.50 3.50 0.00 0.00

Australia 12.00 X X 1.50 0.50 1.50 4.50 3.00 1.00 0.00

Russian 10.50 X X 1.50 1.00 1.50 3.50 3.00 0.00 0.00

Federation

Thailand 10.25 X 1.50 0.50 1.50 3.75 3.00 0.00 0.00

Turkey 10.00 X X 1.50 1.00 1.50 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00

Mexico 9.75 X X 1.50 1.00 1.50 2.75 3.00 0.00 0.00

Japan 9.25 X X 1.50 1.00 1.50 2.75 2.50 0.00 0.00

South Korea 9.25 X X(13) 1.50 0.50 1.50 3.25 2.50 0.00 0.00

Cyprus 8.75 X X 1.50 1.00 1.25 2.50 2.50 0.00 0.00

India 8.75 X X 1.50 0.00 1.50 3.25 2.50 0.00 0.00

 Total National UN UN Timeliness Access and Clarity Comprehensiveness Deliveries Licences Licences
(25.00 report**/ Comtrade** Register** (1.50 max) consistency (5.00 (6.50 max) (4.00 max) granted refused
max) Regional (2.00 max) max) (4.00 (2.00
report*** max) max)

Philippines 8.75 X 1.50 0.50 1.50 2.25 3.00 0.00 0.00

China 8.50 X X 1.50 1.00 1.00 2.50 2.50 0.00 0.00

Pakistan 8.50 X 1.50 0.50 1.50 2.50 2.50 0.00 0.00

South Africa3 8.25 X 1.50 1.00 0.75 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00

Argentina 7.50 X X 1.50 0.50 1.50 1.50 2.50 0.00 0.00

Brazil 7.50 X X 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.50 0.00 0.00

Ukraine 7.50 X X 1.50 1.50 0.75 1.75 2.00 0.00 0.00

Taiwan4 7.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.75 2.00 0.00 0.00

Singapore 7.00 X X 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.00 0.00 0.00

Peru 5.50 X 1.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.00 0.00

Bosnia and 4.50 SEE X(13) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.50 0.00
Herzegovina

Iran 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Israel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

North Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Saudi Arabia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

United Arab 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Emirates

Notes: The online version of the Transparency Barometer incorporates corrections that may affect states’ scores and rankings. For this reason, the online version—rather than
the printed one—should be considered definitive. See Small Arms Survey (n.d.).
* Major exporters are countries that export—or are believed to export—at least USD 10 million worth of small arms, light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammuni-

46 
tion in a given year. The 2017 Barometer includes any state that qualified as a major exporter at least once during the 2001–14 calendar years.
** X indicates that a report was issued or submitted by the cut-off date; X(year) indicates that, as a report was not issued or submitted by the cut off-date, the state was
evaluated on the basis of its most recent submission, covering activities for the year reported in brackets.
*** The Barometer assesses information provided in the following regional reporting instruments: 1) the EU’s Seventeenth Annual Report (CoEU, 2016), which reflects
military equipment exports carried out by EU member states in 2014 and appears as ‘EU’ in the Barometer; and 2) the regional report compiled by the South Eastern
and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, or SEESAC Regional Report (SEESAC, 2015), which covers data on the 2013 trade
of South-eastern and Eastern European exporters and appears as ‘SEE’ in the Barometer. The SEESAC Regional Report for 2014 trade was not available at the time the
2017 Barometer was finalized.

Reports August 2017

Scoring system
The scoring system for the 2017 Barometer allows exporters to earn up to 25 points via 43 criteria in seven parameters: timeliness; access and consistency; clarity; comprehen-
siveness; and the level of detail provided on actual deliveries, licences granted, and licences refused. For detailed scoring guidelines, see Table A4 in the Annexe to this Update.

Explanatory notes
The 2017 Barometer is based on national arms export reports that were made publicly available between 1 January 2014 and 31 January 2016. It also reflects information
submitted by states to regional reporting mechanisms that were published after 31 January 2016 and before the Barometer was finalized (July 2017)—although the
submission of this data does not receive points for timeliness.
The 2017 Barometer takes account of national submissions to the UN Register from 1 January 2014 to 31 January 2016, as well as information submitted to UN Comtrade
on 2014 exports up to and including 28 November 2015.
The fact that the Barometer is based on multiple reporting mechanisms—international, regional, and national—works to the advantage of exporters that publish data
at all of these levels. While Barometer scores acknowledge the provision of information to any of the reporting mechanisms, the same information is not credited twice.

State-specific notes
1 In addition to the national report issued by the Belgian federal government, each Belgian region (Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia) reports separately on its arms exports.
2 For the purposes of the Barometer, the US national report refers to the State Department report, issued pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act on direct
commercial sales, as well as the report on foreign military sales, which is prepared by the US Department of Defense.
3 In the evaluation of South Africa’s national report, the term ‘conveyance’ is interpreted to mean transit.
4 Data on Taiwan was retrieved from the Directorate General of the Customs Administration of Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance (Taiwan MoF, n.d.).9

Source: Small Arms Survey (2017a)

 South Africa. Improvements in South
Africa’s national report, such as a new Twenty-seven
reporting template, boosted its Barom-
eter score in the 2016 Barometer; this exporters (55 per cent)
template continues to prop up the
country’s score for 2017 (Pavesi, 2016). increased their Barometer
South Africa lost 3 points this year,
however, because it did not make a UN
scores over the past year,
Register submission for 2013 or 2014
while 16 others (33 per
trade activities; as a result, less infor-
mation is available on actual exports cent) saw their scores
and on the types of small arms it trans-
ferred (see Section III). decrease.”
The 2017 Barometer shows that overall transparency has not changed significantly over
the past year. The average score of 11.33 out of 25 possible points in this edition repre-
sents a 1.5 per cent increase over the 11.16 average in the previous Barometer. Twenty-
seven exporters (55 per cent) increased their Barometer scores over the past year, while
16 others (33 per cent) saw their scores decrease. The greatest scoring increases were
concentrated in the following categories:

comprehensiveness of data on small arms transfers, including re-exports and transit/

transhipment (17 per cent increase over the 2016 Barometer scores);
access to and consistency of reporting (12 per cent increase);
information on the denial of export licences (11 per cent increase); and
clarity of information provided (4 per cent increase).

Small arms transfers in the first ATT annual reports

One of the declared purposes of the ATT is to promote transparency in international trans-
fers of conventional arms, including small arms (UNGA, 2013a, art. 1). ATT states parties
are legally obliged to provide to the ATT Secretariat an annual report on authorizations
and/or actual exports and imports of conventional arms, including small arms (art. 13.3).
Sixty-one states parties were due to submit their first ATT annual report on 2015 trade
by 31 May 2016 (see Table 9). By 31 December 2016, 47 (77 per cent) of these states
parties had submitted an ATT annual report; one of these reports has not been made
publicly available.10 Liberia and Switzerland were not among the 61 states parties obliged
to submit an annual report by 31 May 2016 because they were not ATT states parties by
31 December 2014. Nevertheless, both states have submitted their first annual reports
for transfers undertaken in the 2015 calendar year.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  47

This section addresses the following questions regarding the first 48 publicly available
ATT annual reports:

What format or template did ATT states parties use when providing information on
authorizations or actual exports and imports of small arms that occurred in 2015?
Did ATT states parties provide information on their national definition of small arms?
Do the first ATT annual reports boost transparency in international small arms transfers?

Use of the ATT annual reporting template

The ATT itself does not provide a template for the annual report. Article 13.3 indicates
that a state party can provide the same information in its ATT annual report as in its sub-
mission to the UN Register. States parties agreed in late 2014 to establish an informal
working group to develop standardized templates for the ATT initial reports on implemen-
tation measures and annual reports (ATT Secretariat, 2015a). The informal working group
produced a draft annual reporting template, which combined two UN Register forms:
the standardized form for reporting on international transfers of conventional arms and
the form for information on international transfers of small arms.11
The yellow areas in Figure 13 highlight the three key differences between the ATT annual
reporting template and the UN Register standardized form:

First, the ATT annual reporting template provides space for states parties to indicate
if the data provided relates to authorizations and/or actual exports and imports.
Second, it offers the option to report on the number of units exported or imported
and/or their financial value.
Third, the UN Register standardized form provides a column for ‘intermediate loca-
tion’, which is not included in the ATT annual reporting template.

The annual reporting template was not adopted at the first Conference of States Parties
(CSP1) for the ATT in 2015 (ATT Secretariat, 2015b, para. 36). Following minor revisions
in 2016, CSP2 endorsed the template and recommended it for use by states parties.
The Conference also decided to keep the template and procedures for making reports
publicly available ‘under review’ (ATT Secretariat, 2016, para. 25).
The ATT Secretariat recorded that of the first 49 annual reports covering 2015 trade,
47 used this template.12 France and the UK provided a version of their UN Register
submission.13 Senegal used the ATT template cover sheet and nil report template for
exports, and also provided a copy of its import authorization request form for the ECOWAS
Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related
Materials (ECOWAS, 2006).

48  Trade Update September 2017

 Figure 13 Key differences between the ATT reporting template and the UN Register standardized form
ATT reporting template

Category of Authorised or actual imports5 Extent of imports6 Exporting State of origin Remarks11
arms4 [I–VIII] (choose one or both) State9 (if not exporter)10

Auth. Act. Number Value8 Description Comments on

of items7 of item the transfer

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

A. I–VII UN Registry Categories12 (national definitions shall not cover less than the definitions provided in Annex 1)13

I. Battle tanks 

II. Armoured 
combat
vehicles

UN Register standardized form

A B C Db Eb REMARKSa

Category Exporter Number State of origin Intermediate Description Comments on

[I–VII] States(s) of items (if not exporter) location (if any) of item the transfer

I. Battle tanks

II. Armoured

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017 

combat
vehicles

49
National definitions of small arms in ATT annual reports
The ATT does not define small arms and light weapons, referring instead to ‘the descrip-
tions used in relevant United Nations instruments’ (UNGA, 2013a, art. 5.3). The ATT
annual report template includes the same six subcategories for small arms and seven
subcategories for light weapons contained in the UN Register form (see below). The
use of the subcategories is optional. Aggregated information for the category of ‘small
arms and light weapons’ is permitted.
Forty-seven ATT states parties provided public information on small arms transfers that
were carried out in 2015, including two nil reports for small arms exports or imports
(by Samoa and Uruguay). South Africa did not provide information on its small arms
transfers in its publicly available report.14 Forty-two of the 45 states parties that provided
information on small arms used the template subcategories for some or all of their
exports and imports.15 Austria and Belgium used the definition provided by Category
1 of the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and EU Common Military List to define
small arms for their ATT annual reports, while Japan provided information on small arms
transfers disaggregated by Comtrade categories 9301, 9302, and 9303 (CoEU, 2015;
Wassenaar Arrangement, 2016).
Three states parties provided national small arms definitions. New Zealand defined small
arms in accordance with Category 1 of its Strategic Goods List, which is based on the
Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List. It provided additional information on its defi-
nitions of military-style semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, and medium and general-
purpose machine guns. Germany indicated that it used a definition contained in an
EU Council document on small arms.16 Switzerland noted that its annual report did not
include ‘arms for recreational, cultural, historical and sporting purposes’, but that it
did include ‘exports to private entities’.

Do the first ATT annual reports boost transparency on small

arms transfers?
Fifty-two of the 61 states parties due to provide an ATT annual report in 2016 (on their
2015 trade) have provided information on international transfers of small arms to
the UN Register at least once, as has Switzerland (see Table 9). Twelve of the 18 ATT
states parties that have provided such information to the UN Register only once or twice
have also provided information on small arms transfers in their first ATT annual reports.
Significantly, four of the ten states parties that have never provided information on their
small arms transfers to the UN Register included such information in their ATT reports.
States do not usually indicate whether information in their UN Register submission refers
to authorizations or actual small arms transfers (Holtom, 2008, pp. 23–26). The ATT
template, however, requests this information. Only two states did not provide such data in

50  Trade Update September 2017

Table 9 Reporting on international transfers of small arms in the first ATT
annual reports and in submissions to the UN Register provided prior to or on
31 December 2016
State party ATT annual report UN Register submission containing information
covering 2015 on international small arms transfers

Number submitted Last trade year covered

Albania X 6 2013

Antigua and 3 2010

Barbuda

Argentina X 7 2014

Australia X 7 2014

Austria X 0 n/a

Bahamas 1 2012

Belgium X 1 2009

Bosnia and X 4 2011

Herzegovina

Bulgaria X 7 2015

Burkina Faso 0 n/a

Costa Rica X 0 n/a

Croatia X 6 2015

Czech Republic X 7 2015

Denmark X 9 2015

Dominican X 0 n/a
Republic

El Salvador X 1 2007

Estonia X 2 2015

Finland X 2 2015

France X 9 2015

Germany X 10 2015

Grenada 2 2015

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  51

State party ATT annual report UN Register submission containing information
covering 2015 on international small arms transfers

Number submitted Last trade year covered

Hungary X 9 2015

Iceland 1 2011

Ireland X 5 2015

Italy X 5 2015

Jamaica X 2 2015

Japan X 10 2015

Latvia X 9 2015

Liberia* X 0 n/a

Liechtenstein X 7 2013

Lithuania X 9 2015

Luxembourg X 1 2008

Macedonia, the X 2 2012

former Yugoslav
Republic of

Mali X 1 2007

Malta 6 2013

Mexico X 9 2015

Montenegro X 3 2012

Netherlands X 12 2015

New Zealand X 3 2009

Nigeria 0 n/a

Norway X 8 2015

Panama X 2 2009

Poland X 12 2015

Portugal X 9 2015

52  Trade Update September 2017

 State party ATT annual report UN Register submission containing information
covering 2015 on international small arms transfers

Number submitted Last trade year covered

Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 n/a

Saint Lucia 1 2007

Saint Vincent and 1 2009

the Grenadines

Samoa X 2 2012

Senegal X 1 2007

Serbia X 5 2015

Sierra Leone 0 n/a

Slovakia ** 9 2015

Slovenia X 6 2015

South Africa *** 0 n/a

Spain X 3 2015

Sweden X 10 2015

Switzerland* X 8 2015

Trinidad and 4 2015

Tobago

United Kingdom X 12 2015

Uruguay X 2 2015

Total: 63 states 47 states 53 states

Notes:
* Liberia and Switzerland were not obliged to provide a report on their authorized and/or actual exports and
imports of conventional arms for 2015.
** Slovakia provided an ATT annual report in 2016, but the report has not been made publicly available. It is
therefore not possible to determine if this report contains information on its authorized and/or actual exports
and imports of small arms for 2015.
*** South Africa provided an ATT annual report in 2016 but did not include information on its authorized and/
or actual exports and imports of small arms for 2015.
Sources: ATT Secretariat (n.d.); UN Register (n.d.)

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  53

 their first ATT annual reports: Bosnia and
Nine states Herzegovina and the UK.17 Austria and the
Dominican Republic provided information
parties indicated that they on both authorizations and actual transfers,
while Panama reported on authorizations
had excluded information for exports and actual imports. Germany
reported actual exports for the first seven
from their ATT annual categories of items covered by ATT Article
2.1 (major conventional weapons) and
report because of national authorizations for its small arms exports.

security and/or commercial States provide information on the number

of units exported or imported—rather than
considerations, which is values—in their UN Register submissions.
ATT states parties take different approaches
allowed under the ATT.” to their small arms transfers reports:

35 reports contain information on the number of units transferred;

2 reports contain information on the value of authorizations; and
8 reports contain information on the number of units and the value of small arms
exports and/or imports.18

Nine states parties indicated that they had excluded information from their ATT annual
report because of national security and/or commercial considerations, which is allowed
under the ATT (UNGA, 2013a, art. 13.3). Australia, for instance, indicated that informa-
tion on imports for the Australian National Defence Forces had been ‘withheld’. Sweden
provided information on the destinations of its light weapons exports but did not indi-
cate either the number of units or the value. Several states parties aggregated data or
omitted certain types of information. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Jamaica
aggregated the list of importers and exporters for each small arms subcategory. Denmark
and Norway identified only some of their export destinations and import sources. Croatia
identified importers by subcategory in its UN Register submissions for 2011–15 but did
not identify importers, in any form, in its ATT annual report.
The ATT template indicates that a ‘description’ of small arms transferred and ‘comments
on the transfer’ are ‘voluntary’ information. Twenty-four states provided a description—
that is, the model and type—for at least some of the small arms being transferred.
Specifically, certain states included:

descriptions of all items transferred (for example, Albania, Liechtenstein, and Slovenia);
descriptions of most items transferred (for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary,
and Romania);

54  Trade Update September 2017

 descriptions of light weapons only (for example, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland); and
specifications of subcategories within the reporting template’s subcategories (for
example, France and the UK).

Germany did not provide descriptions of small arms exports in its ATT annual report, but it
did provide a description of some small arms exports in its 2015 UN Register submission.
Seven of the ten ATT states parties that used the subcategory ‘other’ indicated the type
of small arms covered, as follows:

‘sniper rifles’ (Bosnia and Herzegovina);

‘shotguns’ or ‘airguns’ (Denmark, El Salvador, Hungary, Ireland, and Jamaica);19
‘AMR semi-automatic destroyer rifle’ (Hungary); and
‘20 mm anti-aircraft guns’ (Serbia).

Ten of the 13 states parties that gave ‘comments on transfer’ provided information on
the end use or end user of some of their small arms transfers. The practices in this regard
are comparable to those used in reporting to the UN Register.
Several states parties provided information on transfers of additional categories of con-
ventional arms or related materiel:

‘gun barrels’ (New Zealand);

munitions, parts and components of firearms, and other ‘personal security items and
accessories’ (the Dominican Republic); and
ammunition (Norway and Sweden).20

This analysis indicates that the ATT’s reporting provisions have resulted in an overall
increase in transparency in international transfers of small arms. Austria, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, and Liberia have not provided information on small arms trans-
fers to the UN Register, but they did provide such information in their first ATT annual
reports. Africa and the Americas had the lowest ATT reporting rates in 2016 (covering
2015 small arms transfers). Of the African states parties that were required to report,
only 29 per cent (2 of 7) did so, although Liberia submitted voluntarily; of the states
parties in the Americas, only 50 per cent (8 of 16) fulfilled the obligation. The number
of states parties in the Americas due to report in 2017 increases from 16 to 20, while
the number in Africa will rise from 7 to 13 states parties. Efforts must be made to main-
tain the positive momentum seen in 2016, so that more states parties may fulfil their
obligation to provide an annual report and, for the purposes of transparency, make the
report publicly available. Wherever needed, international assistance could help states
parties fulfil their ATT reporting obligations.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  55

Recent developments in reporting to the UN Register
The UN Register marked two significant anniversaries in 2016: the 25th anniversary of its
establishment (1991) and the 10th anniversary of the provision of a standardized form
for the submission of background information on international transfers of small arms
(2006). UN General Assembly resolutions call upon member states to provide informa-
tion to the UN Register on their international transfers of seven categories of conven-
tional arms as a transparency and confidence-building measure (UNGA, 1991).21 Small
arms were not included in the scope of the UN Register when it was established. Some
states have, however, provided information on their small arms transfers, acquisitions,
and holdings since the Register’s establishment.
The UN Secretary-General has appointed a GGE every three years since 1994 to consider
the operation and further development of the UN Register.22 The inclusion of small arms
in the UN Register has been considered at length by all GGEs since 1997. In 2003, the
GGE recommended that the UN Register include small arms by:

lowering the threshold for the large-calibre artillery category to 75 mm to cover some
light weapons;
including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) as a subcategory of missiles
and missile launchers; and
inviting states to provide ‘background information’ on their international small arms
transfers (UNGA, 2003, paras. 112–13).

The 2006 GGE introduced a standardized form to facilitate the provision of informa-
tion on international small arms transfers (UNGA, 2006, para. 125). While the GGE did
not provide a definition of small arms, the form contains six subcategories for small
arms and seven subcategories for light weapons, based on the subcategories con-
tained in the 1997 report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA,
1997, para. 26).23
Subsequent GGEs have considered making small arms and light weapons a formal
eighth Register category. The 2009 and 2013 GGEs recommended that states provide
their views on this issue to the UN Secretary-General in order to inform the deliberations
of the 2016 GGE (UNGA, 2009, para. 75; 2013b, para. 70). Fourteen states and the EU
provided their views.24 Ten of these states and the EU explicitly supported a small arms
category (UN Register, n.d.).
Since 2004, 88 states have provided information on their small arms transfers to the UN
Register at least once (UNGA, 2016, para. 26). Overall UN Register participation is in
decline, and reporting on small arms transfers mirrors this decline (see Table 10). Twenty-
nine of the 54 UN Register submissions for 2015 include information on international

56  Trade Update September 2017

Table 10 Reporting on small arms transfers to the UN Register, 2004–15
Year of 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
submission

No. of 5 6 5 37 48 47 43 49 32 34 23 29
reports
covering
small arms

Total no. 113 115 115 113 91 80 72 86 52 69 59 54

of UN
Register
submissions

% of reports 4% 5% 4% 33% 53% 59% 60% 57% 62% 49% 39% 54%
covering
small arms

Note: The data in this table was verified via correspondence with the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs, 11 May 2017.
Sources: UNGA (2006, para. 32; 2009, para. 28; 2013b, p. 13, Table 2; 2016, para. 26 and p. 14, fig. III)

small arms transfers, down from 49 of the 86 submissions for 2011. Most states utilize
the six subcategories for small arms and seven for light weapons, while identifying
exporters and importers. Some states provide information on the model or type of small
arms and the end use or user.
The 2016 GGE report provides a detailed account of the GGE’s deliberations on the
inclusion of small arms in the UN Register (UNGA, 2016, paras. 60–61). The 2016 GGE
made two recommendations in this regard. First, the Group recommended the distri-
bution of a questionnaire to all UN member states to gather information on reporting
practices, challenges, and national positions on the inclusion of small arms in the UN
Register. Second, it recommended that the UN Secretary-General ‘appeal to Member
States in a position to do so’ to submit reports to the UN Register using a ‘seven plus
one formula’ for a trial period (UNGA, 2016, para. 83). Accordingly, these member states
would submit the standardized reporting form for international transfers of small arms
and light weapons ‘in parallel with the seven categories of the Register’, rather than
as an eighth category on the standardized reporting form (para. 75). As of mid-2017, it
was unclear whether the response to the questionnaire and the trial period would
persuade the next GGE to create an eighth category for small arms.
The 2016 GGE recommendations should enable the alignment of UN Register submis-
sions with ATT state party annual reports. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
‘seven plus one formula’ will help bolster reporting to the UN Register, or whether the
Register’s relevance will diminish in the shadow of the ATT.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  57

58  Trade Update September 2017
 Based on their Barometer
scores from the 2006–17 editions,
the five least transparent major
small arms exporters are: Iran,
North Korea, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, and the UAE. These states
do not provide information on their
small arms exports to Comtrade or
the UN Register.”

III. Casting light on the least

transparent major exporters

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  59

T
he Trade Update relies on UN Comtrade and other government-source data to
identify the largest small arms exporters each year. Yet these sources are of
limited value for documenting the small arms exports of the least transparent
major exporters (Dreyfus et al., 2009; Herron et al., 2010; Grzybowski, Marsh,
and Schroeder, 2012). If an exporter’s main trading partners are also untransparent—
that is, if they do not provide information to Comtrade or the UN Register either—then
it is not possible to determine the value of its small arms exports using ‘mirror data’.
Thus, this section examines a range of open sources to address the following questions:

Can open sources other than Comtrade provide sufficient information to construct
patterns of supply that could help to provide reliable estimates for the value of an
untransparent state’s small arms exports?
What are the main challenges in estimating the value of an untransparent state’s
small arms exports?
Whatever the challenges of estimating these exports, is it possible to conclude
that the five least transparent exporters are, in fact, major exporters (exporting at
least USD 10 million worth of small arms in a given calendar year)?

Based on their Barometer scores from the 2006–17 editions, the five least transparent
major small arms exporters are: Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the
UAE (see Table 11). These states do not provide information on their small arms exports
to Comtrade or the UN Register. Information provided to Comtrade by importing states
indicates that these five states do not consistently export USD 10 million or more of
small arms per year. 25

Table 11 The least transparent major small arms exporters based on the Small
Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, 2006–17
State Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer score (25.00 max)

’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’16 ’17 Average

Iran 9.00 7.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.50

North 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea

Saudi 5.50 7.50 7.25 8.75 7.25 3.25 2.75 0 0 0 0 3.80

Arabia

South 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.50 11.25 8.25 3.60
Africa

UAE 0 8.50 8.00 9.25 9.00 8.50 0 0 0 0 0 3.90

Source: Small Arms Survey (n.d.)

60  Trade Update September 2017

Table 12 Value of small arms exports by the five least transparent major
exporters, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2004–14
State Value of small arms exports (USD million)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Iran 6.68 1.31 1.46 0.51 0.38 0.85 0.80 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.28

North 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00
Korea

Saudi 0.02 0.06 0.66 0.47 0.09 8.07 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
Arabia

South 8.31 10.82 0.26 15.48 0.88 8.86 5.99 6.55 6.86 21.62 33.17
Africa

UAE 0.31 8.31 1.96 11.16 8.58 1.56 1.41 3.58 2.29 0.77 22.21

Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. The value 0.00 indicates that Comtrade recorded
exports worth less than USD 10,000 or no exports.
Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 12 shows that Iran and the UAE have each exported more than USD 10 million in
a single year since 2004 (in 2004 and 2014, respectively), and South Africa has done
so six times (in 2005–08 and 2013–14). South Africa is an anomaly in this group of
states. It is a participating state in the Wassenaar Arrangement, regularly reports to the
UN Register, and produces an annual arms export report. Until recently, however, these
sources did not provide information on small arms exports. The case of South Africa
is considered in the following section; the remaining cases are reviewed thereafter, in
alphabetical order.
In addition to data provided by importing states to Comtrade and the UN Register, the
following materials have been reviewed to determine the value of small arms exports
for these states:

official press releases and interviews that provide information on deals and deliv-
eries, or the total annual value of arms exports;
arms industry literature;
reports from UN panels of experts and field-based research; and
open source media, including social media.

There are several key limitations in relying on such sources to estimate the value of
untransparent states’ small arms exports. First, the available sources do not provide a

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  61

full accounting of the different types of transfers undertaken by untransparent export-
ers, such as licensed production arrangements, donations, gifts, or barter. Second,
open source data rarely provides a verifiable value for arms deals and deliveries by un-
transparent states. Third, while social media such as Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and You-
Tube can show that small arms have been sent from a particular country, it is not useful
for estimating the scale of an untransparent state’s small arms exports.
Two of the countries examined in this section—Iran and North Korea—have both been
subject to UN arms embargoes during the period under review, with restrictions on
small arms exports in place since 2007 and 2009, respectively (UNSC, 2007; 2009).
Even though exports from these countries can be considered illicit, as they contravene
international law, this review is based on the assumption that documented small arms
exports from the two countries are authorized by the relevant authorities in both states—
thus qualifying them for consideration in this Trade Update. Because of the UN embar-
goes, the arms trading activities of Iran and North Korea have been subject to consid-
erable scrutiny in recent years. As a result, UN panels of experts and field researchers
have provided sufficient information to allow patterns of supply and the scale of small
arms exports from these countries to be determined.

South Africa
South Africa has consistently received one of the lowest scores in the Transparency
Barometer. This is somewhat surprising since South Africa regularly reports to the UN
Register and its National Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002 requires the National
Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to produce an annual report on arms
transfers (South Africa, 2002, s. 23). Yet, during 2003–13, the NCACC annual reports
did not provide disaggregated data on small arms exports (Merten, 2013; PMG, 2013).
Nor did South Africa provide information on its small arms exports to UN Comtrade or
the UN Register. The estimated value for South Africa’s small arms exports according
to Comtrade ‘mirror data’ fluctuates from year to year, from a low of USD 5.99 million in
2010 to a high of USD 33.17 million in 2014.
South Africa’s parliamentary opposition has called for greater transparency and over-
sight of the country’s arms exports because of concerns that arms are being exported
to countries with poor human rights records or that they contribute to regional instability,
particularly in Africa (PMG, 2016). The quality of South Africa’s annual reports improved
after the adoption of the National Conventional Arms Control Regulations of 2012 (South
Africa, 2012). In particular, the 2014 annual report included:

a category description (‘heavy weapons’, ‘light weapons’, and ‘ammunition’);

a description of the items (such as ‘machine gun, 7.62 mm’), as well as their quan-
tity and value in rand; and
other information relating to arms transfer authorizations (see Figure 14).

62  Trade Update September 2017

Figure 14 Extract from the South African arms export report covering 2014
Exports authorised  Annual Report 2014 01 January to 31 December 2014

A B C D E F

TYPE AND FINAL ITEM QUANTITY RAND REMARKS

DESCRIPTION EXPORTER DESCRIPTION VALUE

Ammunition Botswana Rounds 1 000 140,000.00

France Rounds 1 512 786,240.00

Rounds 300 161,400.00

Rounds 200 57,000.00

Indonesia Rounds 10 940 4,345,923.00

Jordan Rounds 9 000 8,074,950.00

Rounds 6 000 5,604,875.00

Malawi Rounds 2 000 000 9,673,540.00

Malaysia Rounds 2 400 1,706,738.00

Rounds 1 000 288,442.00

Philippines Rounds 12 500 7,585,789.00

United Kingdom Rounds 55 260 44,814,062.00

Reproduced from: South Africa (2015, p. 5)

The most recent South African annual reports reveal authorizations for the export of
111 million rand (USD 9.5 million) worth of small arms and ammunition in 2013 and
198 million rand (USD 18.1 million) for the same type of materiel in 2014 (South Africa,
2014; 2015).26 This data refers to authorizations and is therefore not directly comparable
to the delivery data provided to Comtrade by importing states. Yet, the South African
reports provide an official annual value for small arms export authorizations that con-
firms that the country is a major small arms exporter—and that, due to changes in the
2014 annual report, it is no longer one of the least transparent major exporters.

Iran
Iran’s Transparency Barometer score has declined from 9 points in 2006 to 0 for all
editions since 2008. Iran last provided information to Comtrade on its small arms
exports in 2004, and NISAT estimated exports worth USD 16.68 million (in constant
2014 US dollars) for that year.27 In 2013, recipient states notified Comtrade of imports
from Iran worth USD 727. The dramatic decline in the value of Iranian small arms exports

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  63

reported to Comtrade correlates with the imposition of a UN arms embargo on the
country in March 2007 (UNSC, 2007). Information gathered by UN panels of experts,
researchers, and other analysts nevertheless indicates that Iranian small arms exports
have continued, although their scale is unclear.
The first point to be made regarding such exports is that open source reporting on them
can be contradictory. In early 2014, it was reported that the Iraqi government had signed
eight contracts with Iran for USD 195 million worth of military equipment, including
small arms and ammunition (Rasheed, 2014). The Iraqi authorities firmly denied the
deal to the Iran Sanctions Committee (UNSC, 2014c, para. 17). A UN panel of experts
has asserted, however, that Iran supplied arms and ammunition to Kurdish forces for
use against Islamic State forces in Iraq (UNSC, 2015c, para. 30). One observer has
alleged that Iranian deliveries to Iraqi militias during 2014–16 ‘have increased so much
that all semi-heavy artillery equipment, sniper weapons and many other types of per-
sonal and armored weapons presently used by Iraqi paramilitary forces are Iranian-
made’ (Qaidaari, 2016); others have made similar assertions (Gordon and Schmitt, 2014;
Knights, 2015). It is possible that some or all of these deliveries were made to subnational
or paramilitary forces without being authorized or registered with the Iraqi government.
Second, researchers have indicated that arms and ammunition that originated in Iran are
being re-exported from other states, but it is not clear if these re-exports have been
authorized by Iranian authorities. Conflict Armament Research, for example, reports that
‘the Yarmouk Industrial Complex (YIC) in Khartoum serves as a production/onward ship-
ment facility for Iranian/Iranian-designed weapons’ (CAR, 2012, pp. 25–27). Licensed
production arrangements in Syria also increase the difficulty of determining if new arms
and ammunition in use in Syria are from Iranian or Syrian production (Jenzen-Jones,
2014). As a result, when Iranian-produced small arms and ammunition are seized, it
can be difficult to determine if the shipment was authorized by Iranian authorities or
re-exported without Iranian authorization.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015 and the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) changed the terms of the UN arms embargo on arms exports from
Iran (UNSC, 2015d).28 The resolution permits Iran to export arms on a case-by-case
basis, once the Security Council has authorized the transfers. In theory, this measure
should increase transparency, since it requires Iran and importing states to provide
information on proposed arms transfers to the Security Council. In practice, however,
that goal will remain elusive, as suggested by the most recent report of the UN Panel of
Experts on Iran. Although the panel did not receive information on Iranian exports from
UN member states, its report featured numerous media accounts of Iranian arms exports
to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, as well as to non-state armed groups (UNSC, 2015c,
para. 28).29 UN panels of experts and field researchers have also documented seizures
of Iranian small arms destined for recipients in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa
in volumes that would confirm that Iran remains a major small arms exporter (see Table
13). If that is the case, it is unlikely to change in the near future. In early 2017, Iranian
officials announced plans to export more small arms and ammunition (PressTV, 2017).

64  Trade Update September 2017

Table 13 Reported seizures of suspected Iranian exports or re-exports of small
arms and ammunition, 2009–16
Date of Means of Location of Destination Seized items
incident transport seizure

19 January Monchegorsk Red Sea Syria 560 barrels of 7.62 mm ×

2009 (Russian ship, 39 mm bullet shells
Cypriot flag) (estimate);
270 cases of increments of
120 mm mortar shells
(estimate);
5,000 AZ 111-A2 type fuses;
792 cases of single-hold
propellant SF3-23/1-37-type
powder;
600 50-kg cases of black
powder pellets;
132 45-kg cases of single-
hold propellant 15/1–365/
SBP type;
540 40-kg cases of single-
hold propellant 15/1–365/
SBP type;
660 62-kg cases of yellow
powder pellets of approx.
1 cm 12/7.SBP type;
132 70-kg cases of black pow-
der pellets 5/7–SBP type;
6,780 kg of T4 (RDX).

April 2009 ‘Unnamed n/a Yemen ‘Crates of weapons.’

vessel’

12 October Hansa India Red Sea Syria 12,170,000 7.62 mm × 39 mm

2009 (German ship bullet cases;
and flag) 248,644 brass discs of
40 mm and 7 mm thickness
(estimates).

25 October Mahan 1 Yemen Yemen ‘Weapons.’

2009 (Iranian ship)

3–4 November Francop Mediterranean Syria 566,220 rounds of 7.62 mm

2009 (Cypriot ship, Sea × 39 mm ammunition;
Antiguan and 690 122 mm rockets;
Barbudan flag)
2,125 107 mm rockets;

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  65

Date of Means of Location of Destination Seized items
incident transport seizure

690 122 mm fuses;

5,680 60 mm mortar shells;
2,316 81 mm mortar shells;
774 120 mm mortar shells;
3,046 106 mm anti-tank
shells;
20,100 fragmentation hand
grenades.

26 October Everest Nigeria Gambia 1,664,490 rounds of 7.62 mm

2010 (Iranian ship, ammunition;
Marshall 40,380 rounds of 12.7 mm
Islands flag) ammunition;
75,000 cartridges for BKC/
Kalashnikov;
294 107 mm rockets;
360 fuses;
5,341 60 mm mortar shells;
4,162 81 mm mortar shells;
4,885 120 mm mortar shells;
640 hand grenades;
294 firing pins.

5 February Truck Afghanistan Taliban, 48 122 mm rockets;

2011 Afghanistan 49 fuses;
1,000 rounds of 7.62 mm
ammunition.

15 February Truck Turkey Syria 2 boxes of gunpowder M9,

2011 with a total weight of 890 kg;
2 boxes of propelling charge;
2 boxes of slow-burning
material, with a total weight
of 30 kg;
1 box of sensitive materials
(detonators);
6 pallets of solid rockets;
2 pallets of RDX explosives
with a total weight of 1,700 kg.

21 February ‘Unnamed Yemen Yemen 900 Iranian-made anti-tank

2011 vessel’ and anti-helicopter rockets.

66  Trade Update September 2017

Date of Means of Location of Destination Seized items
incident transport seizure

15 March 2011 Victoria Mediterranean Egypt 66,240 7.62 mm bullets;

(German ship, Sea 2,280 60 mm mortar shells;
Liberian flag)
232 120 mm M61 mortar
shells with AZ 111-A2 fuses;
6 Nasr 1 (C-704) anti-ship
missiles;
2 radars;
2 naval control stations.
19 March 2011 Ilyushin cargo Turkey Syria 60 Kalashnikov rifles;
aircraft (YasAir 14 BKC/Bixi machine guns;
Cargo Airlines)
7,920 rounds of BKC/
Kalashnikov ammunition;
560 60 mm mortar shells;
1,288 120 mm mortar shells.
14 August 2011 Nafis 1 n/a Yemen Allegedly transporting arms.
(Iranian ship)
May/June 2012 Imdad 1 n/a Yemen Allegedly transporting arms.
23 January Jihan (dhow) Yemen n/a 10 launch tubes for 9M32M
2013 missiles;
10 launch tubes for QW-01M
missiles;
2 gripstocks for 9M32M
missiles;
5 gripstocks for QW-01M
missiles;
95 PG-7 launchers;
66 suppressors;
29 PG-7 launcher sights;
20 battery coolant units for
9M32M missiles;
20 battery coolant units for
QW-01M missiles;
12,495 12.7 × 108 mm rounds;
316,000 7.62 × 39 mm rounds;
62,920 7.62 × 54R rounds.
5 March 2014 Klos-C Red Sea Gaza 40 M-302 rockets;
(Marshall 180 120 mm mortars;
Islands ship,
Panamanian around 400,000 rounds of
flag) 7.62 mm ammunition.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  67

 Date of Means of Location of Destination Seized items
incident transport seizure

March 2015 ‘Unnamed’ n/a Yemen Reportedly 180 tons of

(Iranian ship) weapons and military
equipment.

24 September Nassir (dhow) Oman Somalia or 56 Toophan tube-launched,

2015 Yemen optically tracked, wireless-
guided (TOW) anti-tank
guided missiles (ATGMs);
4 TOW optical sights;
4 TOW tripod mounts;
4 TOW launch tubes;
2 TOW battery sets;
2 TOW launcher assembly
units;
3 TOW missile guidance
systems;
14 TOW battery assemblies;
19 9M113 Konkurs ATGMs.

27 February Al Mansoor Arabian Sea Somalia or 1,989 Kalashnikov-type

2016 (Samer) (dhow) Yemen assault rifles;
100 RPG-7 variant launchers;
49 PKM general-purpose
machine guns;
39 PKM spare barrels;
20 60 mm mortar tubes.

20 March 2016 ‘Unnamed’ Arabian Sea Somalia 1,999 Kalashnikov-type

(dhow) assault rifles;
64 Dragunov sniper rifles;
9 9M133 Kornet anti-tank
missiles;
6 PKM machine guns.

28 March 2016 Adris (dhow) Arabian Sea Somalia or 1,500 Kalashnikov-type

Yemen assault rifles;
200 RPG launchers;
21 DshK .50 calibre
machine guns.

Sources: CAR (2016); UNSC (2011b; 2012a, annexe 9; 2013b, paras. 46–55; 2014c, para. 40; 2015c, annexe 1;
2016a, annexe 12; 2017a, pp. 27–28, table 2)

68  Trade Update September 2017

North Korea
North Korea has received a score of 0 in every edition of the Transparency Barometer to
date. It has never provided information on its small arms exports to Comtrade or the UN
Register.30 In 2013, Comtrade recorded the highest value for North Korean small arms
exports: USD 300,000. However, the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea found that Fiji,
Paraguay, and Qatar had mistakenly identified imports from the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) as imports from North Korea (UNSC, 2016b, annexe 72, pp. 182–84). Nevertheless,
experts estimate that North Korea’s total arms exports are worth at least USD 100 million
annually (UNSC, 2010, para. 65). South Korean media reported an even higher figure for
2015, valuing North Korean arms sales at USD 300 million (Chosunlibo, 2016).
It is difficult to verify such claims, but knowledge of North Korea’s small arms trade
practices and recipients has increased in recent years. In the small arms market, it
appears that North Korea has established a niche business in the supply of low-cost
weapons, parts for old systems, and assistance in establishing or renovating production
lines (Berger, 2015, pp. 152–53). The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea has noted
that ‘although the precise income it earned from this trade is subject to debate, there
is no question that it is one of the country’s most profitable revenue sources’ (UNSC,
2014b, para. 65).
New information on North Korea’s established arms clients underlines the difficulty of
estimating the value of its arms exports. First, North Korea reportedly charges lower prices
than its competitors for similar items (Berger, 2015, pp. 56–57). This could translate
into a low overall financial value for North Korean arms exports, which may obscure the
volume of materiel the country contributes to the international arms trade. Second,
North Korea has provided assistance for the development, upgrade, or overhaul of small
arms and ammunition factories in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia,
Namibia, Yemen, and possibly Uganda during the period under review (p. 45). The finan-
cial value of such assistance has not been revealed and is difficult to estimate.
Third, the use of seizure data to estimate the value of North Korea’s small arms trade
is rendered more challenging by the fact that the country facilitates the transfer of, or
directly transports, small arms and ammunition on behalf of other states, making it
difficult to attribute specific shipments to North Korea (UNSC, 2012b, para. 75). For
example, it has been reported that North Korea arranged the transfer of 60 .50 calibre
machine guns from China to Burundi via a Ukrainian broker for more than USD 3 million
in 2009 (Charbonneau, 2011).
Nevertheless, seizure data remains a useful source for indicating the scale of North
Korea’s small arms exports. Table 14 provides an overview of seizures of small arms
documented by the UN panel, including two particularly significant seizures. The first
concerns an estimated USD 18 million worth of small arms and ammunition in a cargo
plane that was inspected in Thailand in December 2009; the second involves around

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  69

Table 14 Reported seizures of suspected North Korean exports or re-exports of
small arms and ammunition, 2009–16
Date of Means of Location of Destination Seized items
incident transport seizure

22 July 2009 ANL Australia UAE Iran 10 containers of North Korean

(Australian weapons, including rocket
ship, Bahamian launchers.
flag)

11 December Ilyushin-76 Thailand Iran 35 tons of conventional

2009 aircraft (AWG arms and munitions worth
732, Air West USD 16–18 million, including:
Company) • 240 mm rockets;
• RPG-7s;
• thermobaric grenade-7s;
and
• MANPADS.

January 2010 Chong Chon Ukraine n/a A small number of handguns,

Gang (North ammunition, narcotics, and
Korean ship other illegal goods.
and flag) Relevant Ukrainian agencies
did not believe North Korean
authorities were involved.

November MV San n/a Syria Brass discs and copper rods

2010 Francisco used to manufacture artillery
Bridge munitions (pellets and rods
(Panamanian for crimping cartridges and
flag) driving bands);
aluminium alloy tubes usable
for making rockets.

May 2011 ‘Unnamed’ Indian Ocean n/a 15 tons of rockets; and

USD 15 million worth of
explosives.

23 January Jihan I (dhow) Yemen n/a Ammunition produced in

2013 North Korea.

July 2013 Chong Chon Panama Cuba– 73 mm rocket-propelled

Gang (North North Korea projectiles (PG-9/PG-15
Korean ship anti-tank and OG-9/OG-15
and flag) fragmentation projectiles)
to be fired with recoilless
rifles;

70  Trade Update September 2017

 Date of Means of Location of Destination Seized items
incident transport seizure

1 PG-7VR round;
10 lots of 5–8 shell casings
(packed with samples of pro-
pelling charge but without
primers) of various diameters
(57 to 152 mm) for various
purposes (fragmentation,
high explosive, armour-
piercing and/or tracer);
1 box of 7.62 mm cartridges
(440 rounds);
1 machine tool for loading
shotgun cartridges (12-gauge
calibre ammunition);
1 machine tool for manufac-
turing 5.56 mm cartridges.

11 August 2016 Jie Shun Egypt n/a 24,384 disassembled PG-7

(Chinese ship, rocket-propelled grenades;
Cambodian materials for the assembly
flag) of 4,616 rocket-propelled
grenades.

Sources: Berger (2015); Nicholson (2009); UNSC (2010, paras. 61, 80–81; 2012b, paras. 67–72; 2013c, paras.
75–79, 86–90, annexe 13; 2014b, paras. 69–77, 112, annexe 8; 2015b, para. 94; 2017b, paras. 61–65)

30,000 PG-7 rocket-propelled grenades and related subcomponents that were concealed
beneath 2,300 tons of iron ore on a North Korean vessel, which was intercepted in Egypt
in August 2016 (UNSC, 2010, para. 65; 2013c, para. 75; 2017b, para. 61). Such sei-
zures, which in some cases are estimated to be worth at least USD 10 million, coupled
with other documented small arms trade activities, are sufficient to justify North Korea’s
status as a major small arms exporter.

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia received an average score of 6.0 in the 2006–12 editions of the Trans-
parency Barometer, before plunging to 0 for 2013–17. The drop reflects the fact that
Saudi Arabia stopped providing information to Comtrade on its small arms exports for
2009 and has not resumed reporting since, which was first captured by the 2013
Transparency Barometer. Comtrade data, including mirror data, never recorded Saudi
small arms exports equalling or exceeding USD 10 million during the period 2004–14.31

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  71

 The volume of exports as recorded by
Saudi Arabia Comtrade has fluctuated from a high of
USD 8 million in 2009 to a low of only
has produced small arms USD 11,014 in 2014. There is good evidence,
however, to indicate that this Comtrade
and ammunition under data includes neither the export of small
arms that Saudi Arabia produces under
licence on the condition licence from other countries, nor unauthor-
ized re-exports from Saudi Arabia.
that these items be used Saudi Arabia has produced small arms and
ammunition under licence on the condi-
only by its national tion that these items be used only by its
security forces.” national security forces (Batchelor, 2002,
pp. 52–53). It appears, however, that some
of the materiel has been exported in vio-
lation of this condition. Germany reportedly put on hold the supply of parts and compo-
nents for the production of G36 rifles in Saudi Arabia due to concerns that the country
had supplied G3 rifles it had produced under licence to Yemen, in violation of assur-
ances that these arms would only be used by Saudi forces (Mascolo and Baars, 2015;
Shalal, 2016). As there is little information on exports of small arms produced under
licence in Saudi Arabia, it is not possible to estimate their value.
Another difficulty in estimating the value of Saudi small arms exports—and thus deter-
mining whether the country is a major exporter—relates to the unauthorized re-export
of small arms after delivery to Saudi Arabia, or direct delivery to a third country of
arms that have been authorized for delivery to Saudi Arabia. Open sources indicate
marked changes in Saudi Arabia’s main small arms exporters in recent years. According
to the UN Register, during 2006–10 Saudi Arabia acquired most of its small arms imports
from Austria, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK. Since 2011, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia have accounted for most small arms exports to
Saudi Arabia. Eight Central and South-east European states, previously not major sup-
pliers of arms to Saudi Arabia, authorized the export of hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of military equipment to the country during 2012–15, including 10,000 rifles,
6,301 machine guns, 18,500 grenade launchers, and more than 350 million rounds of
various types of ammunition. Military bases in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have
been identified as intermediate destinations for such arms shipments, which were
re-exported for distribution to non-Saudi forces in Yemen and Syria (Marzouk, Angelovski,
and Patrucic, 2016; Petkova, 2015).
Investigations into these deliveries, and into the former US train-and-equip programme
for anti-Assad forces in Syria, have revealed that in cases where Saudi Arabia was not
the authorized destination, the country has nonetheless funded arms purchases that
were delivered to non-Saudi forces in Syria and Yemen (Chivers and Schmitt, 2013;

72  Trade Update September 2017

Mazzetti and Apuzzo, 2016). Such open source information indicates that Saudi Arabia
also re-exports significant quantities of small arms to armed forces and non-state actors
in the Middle East, although it is not possible to determine if the value of such deliv-
eries equals or exceeds USD 10 million per year. It is clear, however, that the value of
the country’s financial support for the abovementioned arms transfers to the region have
been worth more than USD 10 million annually in recent years.

The UAE
To some extent, the UAE’s small arms trade—and its associated trade transparency—
has followed a trend similar to that of Saudi Arabia. The UAE received an average score
of 5.26 in the 2007–11 editions of the Transparency Barometer, before dropping to 0 for
2012–17. The country provided information on small arms exports to Comtrade for trade
in 2005, 2007–08, and 2013–14. During 2004–13, Comtrade recorded the UAE’s annual
small arms exports as below USD 10 million. For 2014, Comtrade registered exports worth
USD 22 million for the UAE (see Section I). As described below, this increase probably
reflects the UAE’s recent efforts to establish a small arms industry that not only meets
domestic demand, but that is also capable of exporting small arms for security forces
in the region and civilian end users around the world.
Specifically, the UAE small arms producers Caracal and Burkan Munitions Factory were
established in 2007 to supply small arms and ammunition to UAE security forces, and
also to export to other security forces and the global civilian market (Saab, 2014, p. 40).
In 2015, they were joined by the UAE’s Continental Aviation Services (CAS), which con-
cluded a deal with Indonesia’s PT Pindad to produce SS2 assault rifles and ammunition
and serve as the main distributor of Indonesian arms in the Middle East (Jakarta Post,
2015). There is limited open source information on the exports of Burkan Munitions
Factory and CAS, but some is available on Caracal’s exports.
Caracal has the capacity to produce 30,000 pistols per year and has estimated that 30
per cent of annual production is exported (Elewa, 2007; Rahman, 2015). The company
has exported pistols for the security forces of Bahrain and Jordan, Italian police, and
civilian markets in France, Germany, Italy, Thailand, and the United States (Baldwin,
2010). The first delivery of 5,000 pistols for the US civilian market took place in 2010 (worth
an estimated USD 3.6 million), with annual deliveries thereafter projected at approx-
imately 10,000 pistols (Baldwin, 2010; WAM, 2012). Poland and Slovakia reported to
the UN Register on their imports of very small quantities of small arms from the UAE in
2011, while Italy reported importing 5,220 handguns during 2009–10. The UN Panel of
Experts on Libya documented the delivery in 2013 of 5,000 Caracal F pistols and 1 million
rounds of ammunition to the Libyan Ministry of Interior (UNSC, 2015a, paras. 125–31).
This delivery was reportedly part of a deal for 15,000 Caracal F pistols and 5 million
rounds of 9 mm ammunition, which was not notified to the UN Sanctions Committee in

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  73

accordance with Security Council Resolution 2009 of 2011 (UNSC, 2011a; 2015a, paras.
125–31). Such anecdotal evidence indicates that the UAE is worth monitoring as an
emerging small arms exporter for security forces in the Middle East and North Africa,
as well as civilian markets in Asia, Europe, and the United States.
UN expert panels and researchers have also collected evidence indicating that the
UAE has played a role similar to that of Saudi Arabia in re-exporting small arms and
facilitating small arms transfers from Central and South-eastern Europe to the Middle
East and North Africa. For example, the UN Panel of Experts on Libya concluded that
UAE-based companies diverted small arms and ammunition from Albania to Libya and
re-exported rifles and ammunition, initially received from Ukraine, to Libya (UNSC, 2013a,
para. 88; 2014a, annexe V). The UAE also reportedly financed the 2010 transfer of
40,700 assault rifles, 900 hand-held grenade launchers, and 170 60 mm mortars from
Bulgaria to the government of Yemen (Petkova, 2015; UNGA, 2011, pp. 82–83). In short,
accounts of the UAE’s nascent small arms industry, coupled with the abovementioned
reports of unauthorized re-exports, suggest that in recent years the UAE has been a
major small arms exporter.

74  Trade Update September 2017

 While this edition of the
Trade Update shows further, year-on-
year fluctuations in the composition
of the world’s top and major small
arms importers, the US remains the
largest importer although it recorded
a drop in the value of its imports:
from USD 2.5 billion in 2013 to USD
2.2 billion in 2014.”

Conclusion

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  75

O
fficial, publicly available data on small arms transfers enables the identifica-
tion of major exporters and importers, the mapping of significant changes in
small arms flows, and the assessment of policies designed to regulate small
arms exports and imports. According to UN Comtrade data, the financial value of the
small arms trade in 2014 was at least USD 6 billion, a 4 per cent increase compared to
the estimated value for the trade in 2013 (USD 5.8 billion).
While this edition of the Trade Update shows further, year-on-year fluctuations in the
composition of the world’s top and major small arms importers, the US remains the
largest importer although it recorded a drop in the value of its imports: from USD 2.5
billion in 2013 to USD 2.2 billion in 2014. The US demand for small arms continues to
determine the global trend in small arms imports, accounting for the largest share of
documented transfers by some distance. Both Western Asia (the Middle East) and West-
ern Europe continued to record a high volume of small arms imports through 2014. Yet
this ‘numbers game’ only reveals so much.
The 2017 Trade Update pays close attention to some of the more subtle features of the
small arms trade—including exporting countries that do not provide information on
their small arms trade. The 2017 Transparency Barometer shows a continuation of the
slight upward trend in small arms trade transparency that was reported in the 2016
Barometer. In fact, based on this Trade Update’s analysis of the first round of ATT annual
reports, the positive trend is likely to persist, as the ATT’s reporting provisions have clearly
given rise to an overall increase in transparency in international small arms transfers.
The 2018 Barometer, covering reporting on transfers conducted in 2015, will assess
further developments in transparency as the number of ATT states parties that are due
to submit reports increases. The UN Secretary-General’s call to UN member states to
provide information on their small arms transfers to the UN Register could also bolster
the Register’s contribution to small arms trade transparency (and arrest the somewhat
dramatic recent decline in Register reporting, including reporting on small arms transfers).
The norm of transparency in international small arms transfers is not universally shared,
however. This edition of the Trade Update, using a wide array of publicly available infor-
mation, highlights the huge gap between reported exports and actual exports in some
states. Of the five least transparent major exporters of the early 21st century, as defined
by the Barometer, South Africa is the country that appears most likely to follow the
trend towards greater transparency due to new reporting practices propelled by the South
African legislature.
There are no signs that the four other countries on the list of least transparent exporters—
Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—will follow the South African example any
time soon. A lack of reporting does not necessarily mean a lack of information, however.
While the main trading partners of these countries are also untransparent states, and
thus preclude the use of importer data to gain information on their exports, other sources

76  Trade Update September 2017

can fill the gap. Open source information
gathered by UN experts, field researchers, Some transfers,
and the media can help to reconstruct the
broad trading patterns of these countries, even though untransparent,
allowing independent observers to deter-
mine not only the significance of these may help strengthen
states for the global small arms trade,
but also the implications of their trading
security forces that are
activities for international peace, security, on the front line of the
and stability.
UN expert reports, field research, and sei- fight against terrorist
zure data has helped confirm that Iran and
North Korea are in fact major small arms
groups in the Middle East
exporters—with annual exports worth at and North Africa.”
least USD 10 million. It appears clear that
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both re-
exported, or facilitated the transfer of, significant quantities of small arms in recent
years. Available information indicates that both Iran and the UAE are stepping up their
production and export of small arms.
Many of the details of this trade remain to be filled in. Some transfers, even though
untransparent, may help strengthen security forces that are on the front line of the
fight against terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa. Yet it is clear that a
significant share of the concealed small arms trade is helping to fuel conflict, insecu-
rity, and instability in this region and others. The assumption of those countries that
prefer to keep their small arms trade secret is presumably that, by so doing, they will
prevent others from determining whether and how such trade contributes to, or under-
mines, peace and security—to cite the terms of the ATT. But as reporting improves, oth-
er sources of information fill reporting gaps, and as ATT norms diffuse more broadly,
a lack of trade transparency increasingly raises the question of what, exactly, is being
left unsaid.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  77

Annexe

Table A1 Major exporters’ annual authorized small arms and light weapons
exports (of at least USD 10 million), 2014
Available online at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/trade-update.html

Table A2 Major importers’ annual authorized small arms and light weapons
imports (of at least USD 10 million), 2014
Available online at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/trade-update.html

Table A3 Regional breakdown of countries and territories

Region Subregion Country or territory

Africa Eastern Africa Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda,
Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Middle Africa Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of
the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe
Northern Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
Southern Africa Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
Western Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
Americas Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica,
Martinique, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Sint Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama
Northern America Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, United States
South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland
Islands, French Guyana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay, Venezuela
Asia and Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
the Pacific
Eastern Asia China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Mongolia, North Korea,
South Korea, Taiwan

78  Trade Update September 2017

Region Subregion Country or territory

Oceania Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam,

Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand,
Niue, Norfolk Island, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu,
Wallis and Futuna

South-eastern Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,

Asia Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam

Southern Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives,

Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Western Asia Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel,

Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian Territories,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
Yemen

Europe Eastern Europe Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine

Northern Europe Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Ireland,

Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom

Southern Europe Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar,

Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia

Western Europe Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands,

Switzerland

Table A4 The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2017:

scoring guidelines
Parameter Criteria Points earned
(max. points)
Yes (for Comprehensively Partially or
yes/no or consistently occasionally
questions)

1. Timeliness 1.1) Did the state submit data 0.5 – –

(1.50) in 2014 or 2015?

1.2) Did the state submit data 0.5 – –

in 2015?

1.3) Did the state submit data 0.5 – –

in 2015 that concerned activities
in 2014 or 2015?

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  79

Parameter Criteria Points earned
(max. points)
Yes (for Comprehensively Partially or
yes/no or consistently occasionally
questions)

2. Access and 2.1) Did the state make its 0.5 – –

consistency national report available
(2.00) online free of charge?
2.2) Did the state provide interim 0.5 – –
information (such as biannual
or quarterly reports) in addition
to a consolidated annual report?
2.3) Did the state use the same 0.5 – –
tool to report on activities in
2012, 2013, and 2014?
2.4) Did the state use a single 0.5 – –
additional tool to report on activi-
ties in 2012, 2013, and 2014?
3. Clarity 3.1) Did the state distinguish – 1.0 0.5
(5.00) between government- and private
industry-supplied transactions?
Note: a nil report (no private sales
exist/are permitted) earns 1 point.

3.2) Did the state distinguish – 0.5 0.25

small arms and light weapons
and/or their ammunition from
other types of conventional arms?
3.3) Did the state distinguish – 0.5 0.25
small arms and light weapons
ammunition from ammunition
for other conventional arms?
3.4) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25
mation on temporary exports?
(Examples include transfers for
exhibitions or demonstrations
that must be returned, transfers
to troops in peace operations,
and materiel sent to be repaired
and returned.)
Note: a nil report (no temporary
exports) earns 0.5 point.

3.5) Did the state provide infor- See 3.5.1–3.5.4.

mation on its small arms laws,
regulations, and administra-
tive procedures, as well as its
multilateral commitments?

80  Trade Update September 2017

Parameter Criteria Points earned
(max. points)
Yes (for Comprehensively Partially or
yes/no or consistently occasionally
questions)

3.5.1) Did the state provide a refer- 0.25 – –

ence to a webpage offering free,
full-text access to its transfer con-
trols legislation (covering small
arms export, transit, and/or import)
AND explain how such legislation
is implemented?

3.5.2) Did the state provide a refer- 0.25 – –

ence to a webpage offering free,
full-text access to its brokering
control legislation AND explain how
such legislation is implemented?
ALTERNATIVELY, did the state explain
how its transfer control legislation
covers brokering activities (with
free, full-text, online access to
such legislation)?

3.5.3) Did the state provide a refer- 0.25 – –

ence to a webpage offering free,
full-text access to information on
the measures it uses to prevent
and detect the diversion of interna-
tional small arms transfers OR
provide such information in its
national export report?

3.5.4) Did the state provide informa- 0.25 – –

tion on its subregional, regional, and
international commitments relating
to the control of international small
arms transfers, including brokering?

3.6) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25

mation on aggregated totals of
deliveries?

3.7) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25

mation on aggregated totals of
licences granted and refused?

3.8) Did the state provide infor- 0.5 – –

mation on authorized (small)
arms brokers?
Note: a nil report (no authorized
brokers) earns 0.5 point.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  81

Parameter Criteria Points earned
(max. points)
Yes (for Comprehensively Partially or
yes/no or consistently occasionally
questions)

4. Compre- 4.1) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25

hensiveness mation on its exports of guided
(6.5) light weapons, such as man-
Note: each nil portable air defence systems
report (no exports (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided
of the specified weapons (ATGWs)?
arms, ammuni-
4.2) Did the state provide – 0.5 0.25
tion, or parts
information on its exports of
and accessories
unguided light weapons apart
listed in 4.1–4.8;
from heavy machine guns and
no intangible
anti-materiel rifles (that is,
transfers of
rocket launchers such as
small arms and
‘RPGs’ and anti-tank weapons;
light weapons;
grenade launchers; mortars;
no re-exports,
recoilless rifles and guns)?
transit, or tran-
shipment of 4.3) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25
small arms and mation on exports of sporting
light weapons or and hunting firearms?
their ammuni-
tion) earns 0.5 4.4) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25
point for the mation on exports of pistols
relevant criterion. and revolvers?

4.5) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25

mation on exports of military
firearms (automatic rifles; light,
medium and heavy machine
guns; sub-machine guns; anti-
materiel rifles; military shotguns)
apart from pistols and revolvers?

4.6) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25

mation on exports of ammuni-
tion of 12.7 mm calibre and
below, as well as shotgun shells?

4.7) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25

mation on exports of ammuni-
tion larger than 12.7 mm calibre
that is used in light weapons?
(Single-use light weapons sys-
tems that contain both the
launcher and the projectile are
treated as light weapons in either
4.1 or 4.2 above, and are not
treated as ‘ammunition’ here.)

82  Trade Update September 2017

Parameter Criteria Points earned
(max. points)
Yes (for Comprehensively Partially or
yes/no or consistently occasionally
questions)
4.8) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25
mation on exports of parts and
accessories for small arms and
light weapons?
4.9) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25
mation on ‘intangible transfers’
concerning small arms and light
weapons, their ammunition,
and/or their parts and acces-
sories? (Intangible transfers
include the provision of techni-
cal plans, blueprints, know-how,
schematics, and software for the
production of small arms, light
weapons, their ammunition, and/
or their parts and accessories.)
4.10) Did the state provide – 0.5 0.25
information on permanent
re-exports of small arms and
light weapons and/or their
ammunition, not including tem-
porary exports covered in 3.4?
4.11) Did the state identify the – 0.5 0.25
origin and destination of
re-exports of small arms and
light weapons and/or their
ammunition?
4.12) Did the state provide – 0.5 0.25
information on transit and/or
transhipment of small arms
and light weapons and/or their
ammunition?
4.13) Did the state identify the – 0.5 0.25
origin and destination of the
transit and/or transhipment of
small arms and light weapons
and/or their ammunition?
5. Deliveries 5.1) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
(4.0) mation on delivery recipients?
5.2) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
mation on the state of import
AND specific end user (such
as riot control police, air force,
museum, or private dealer)?

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  83

Parameter Criteria Points earned
(max. points)
Yes (for Comprehensively Partially or
yes/no or consistently occasionally
questions)
5.3) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
mation on the state of import
AND the types and quanti-ties
of weapons and/or ammuni-
tion delivered?
5.4) Did the state provide informa- – 1.0 0.5
tion on the state of import AND
the types and value of weapons
and/or ammunition delivered?
6. Licences 6.1) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
granted (4.0) mation on licence recipients?
6.2) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
mation on the intended state of
import AND intended end user
(such as riot control police, air
force, museum, or private dealer)?
6.3) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
mation on the intended state of
import AND types AND quanti-
ties of weapons and/or ammu-
nition for export?
6.4) Did the state provide infor- – 1.0 0.5
mation on the intended state
of import AND types AND value
of weapons and/or ammunition
for export?
7. Licences 7.1) Did the state identify the – 0.5 0.25
refused (2.0) applicants and/or countries of
Note: a nil report prospective import that were
(no licences refused licences?
rejected) earns 7.2) Did the state provide a – 0.5 0.25
2.0 points. reason/explanation for its
refusal to grant a licence to
the applicant and/or state of
prospective import?
7.3) Did the state provide – 0.5 0.25
information on the types AND
quantities of weapons and/or
ammunition that were the sub-
ject of a licence refusal?
7.4) Did the state provide infor- – 0.5 0.25
mation on the types AND value
of weapons and/or ammuni-
tion that were the subject of a
licence refusal?

84  Trade Update September 2017

Endnotes

1 The following UN Comtrade commodity categories are used in this analysis of the small arms
trade: 930120, 930190, 930200, 930320, 930330, 930510, 930520, 930521, 930529, 930621,
and 930630. This list includes categories from different versions of the Harmonized System
(HS), some of which states may still use to report on their transfers. In HS 2002, four catego-
ries replaced category 930100 (military weapons): 930111 and 930119 (which were dropped
by HS 2012) for artillery weapons, 930120 for light weapons, and 930190 for other military
weapons. Similarly, in HS 2012, category 930520 replaced categories 930521 (shotgun barrels)
and 930529 (parts and components of shotguns and rifles).
2 NISAT considers countries’ self-reported exports as well as mirror data—imports reported by
destination countries—to generate a single value by transaction; see Marsh (2005).
3 The geographic approach used in this assessment is loosely based on the UN’s geographic
regions and subregions defined by the United Nations Statistics Division; for details, see UNSD
(n.d.). Due to the marginal role of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia in the small arms
trade, this report treats Oceania as a subregion of the Asia and the Pacific region. See Table A3
in the Annexe to this Update for the regional breakdown of countries and territories.
4 Comtrade data includes the transfer of small arms and ammunition to contributing troops in
African Union and UN peacekeeping missions; however, it is not possible to identify this type
of transfer. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, for example, data relating to imports and exports of
small arms most probably includes data for international peacekeeping missions.
5 Cyprus imported more than USD 100 million worth of small arms in 2001–03; Iraq did so in
2014; Saudi Arabia in 2001–02, 2004–05, 2009, and 2014; and the UAE in 2013.
6 This finding is based on values expressed in 2014 US dollars. Raw data (not adjusted for inflation)
indicates that Spain had exceeded USD 100 million worth in small arms imports only in 2007.
7 For the purposes of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, national arms export reports
also include national submissions (1) by EU member states to the EU Annual Report on military
exports (CoEU, 2016), and (2) by South-east European states for the regional report compiled
by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and
Light Weapons (SEESAC) (CoEU, 2016; SEESAC, 2015).
8 States may submit ‘nil reports’ to indicate that they do not or have not engaged in any export or
import of particular types of weapon during the applicable reporting period. ‘Intangible transfers’
include the provision of technical plans, blueprints, know-how, schematics, and software for
the production of small arms, light weapons, their ammunition, and their parts and accessories.
9 In 1971 the UN recognized Taiwan as a province of China.
10 The ATT Secretariat website displayed 28 annual reports on 1 June 2016. Slovakia is the only
state party that submitted a 2016 report but restricted access. Slovakia’s 2016 submission
to the UN Register was made publicly available on the UN Register website.
11 For more details, see pp. 54–55 of this Trade Update.
12 This section utilizes ATT annual reports that are publicly accessible on the website of the ATT
Secretariat (n.d.).
13 The first version of Australia’s ATT annual report was a copy of its UN Register submission. In
December 2016, Australia resubmitted its first ATT annual report, using the template that
CSP2 endorsed.
14 Austria, Italy, and the UK provided information on small arms exports but did not provide any
details on small arms imports or a nil report for such imports.

Holtom and Pavesi Trade Update 2017  85

15 Australia used the subcategories when reporting on small arms imports but did not use the
subcategories for reporting authorizations for firearms exports. Sweden utilized the light
weapons subcategories contained in the ATT reporting template but also used Category 1 of
the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and EU Common Military List to define small arms
for its ATT annual reports.
16 Germany used the definition contained in the annexe to the Council Joint Action of 12 July 2002
(CoEU, 2002).
17 A questionnaire prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and com-
pleted by a UK authority indicates that the UK provides information on authorizations for
small arms transfers to the UN Register (Holtom, 2008, p. 26). That data presumably serves
as the source for the ATT annual report.
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Slovenia indicated that the currency in
use was euros; Japan indicated yen; and Montenegro indicated euros for some exports and
US dollars for others. Panama did not provide information on the currency used for imports.
19 The UK reported exports of shotguns and sniper rifles under the subcategory ‘rifles and carbines’.
20 Norway and Sweden also provide this information in their national arms export reports (Norway,
2016; Sweden, 2016).
21 The seven categories of the UN Register are: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-
calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; and missiles and mis-
sile launchers.
22 The exception to this rule is the 2013 GGE, which took place four years after the 2009 GGE.
23 The subcategories for small arms on the standardized form include: revolvers and self-loading
pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; light machine guns; and others.
The subcategories for light weapons are: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and
mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable anti-tank
missile launchers and rocket systems; mortars of calibres less than 75 mm; and others. The
form omits two subcategories for light weapons contained in the 1997 report of the UN Panel
of Governmental Experts on Small Arms: portable anti-aircraft guns and portable launchers of
anti-aircraft missile systems. The portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems are covered
by the MANPADS subcategory of the UN Register’s ‘missiles and missile launcher’s category.
24 The 14 states were: China, Colombia, Germany, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Mauritius,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States.
25 Thirteen states reported small arms imports from South Africa to the UN Register during 2006–15
and three states have done so for imports from the UAE. Trinidad and Tobago reported tempo-
rary ‘imports’ from the UAE when Trinidadians took weapons to the UAE and returned with them.
26 South Africa’s annual reports also provide information on authorizations for conveyance (transit).
These reports exclude authorizations for the export of fewer than ten firearms per type and
20,000 related rounds of ammunition. Information can also be excluded ‘if disclosure is pro-
hibited in terms of a confidentiality clause in the contract of sale’ (South Africa, 2002).
27 Iran provided information to Comtrade on small arms exports in 2000 and 2002. No UN member
state provided information on small arms imports from Iran to the UN Register during 2007–16.
28 The JCPOA was concluded between Iran, the permanent members of the Security Council plus
Germany, and the European Union on 14 July 2015 regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The
agreement focuses on limiting nuclear weapon proliferation risks connected with Iran’s pro-
gramme, but it is also connected to the EU and UN sanctions regimes. Therefore, the JCPOA
contains provisions that relate to Iranian conventional arms transfers, including small arms.
29 See also CAR (2016).
30 The UN Register does not provide information on any small arms exports from North Korea.
31 Comtrade data for 2001 indicates that Saudi small arms exports were worth USD 13 million.

86  Trade Update September 2017

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