G.R. No.

131442 July 10, 2003 determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and
Bangus Fry Fisherfolk VS Lanzanas decide petitioners' complaint.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
FACTS: issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or
Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV, NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving
Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power Corporation petitioners' complaint.
("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility
in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's
power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4
megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire
province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years
counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999. Petitioners, claiming to be
fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC
issuance. Petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7,
for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the
construction of the mooring facility.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,
and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37")
on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the
implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms. TC dismissed complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause action and lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of
action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on
environmental protection and on local government participation in the implementation
of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's
ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The
subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction
of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main
prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to
 BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. NRDC(1983) [ Footnote * ] Together with No. 82-545, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
No. 82-524 et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.; and No. 82-551, Commonwealth
Edison Co. et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to
Argued: April 19, 1983 Decided: June 6, 1983 the same court.
Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal
agencies to consider the environmental impact of any major federal action. The dispute O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined,
in these cases concerns the adoption by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of a except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
series of generic rules to evaluate the environmental effects of a nuclear powerplant's
fuel cycle. In these rules, the NRC decided that licensing boards should assume, for David A. Strauss argued the cause for petitioners in all cases. With him on the briefs for
purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of certain nuclear wastes would have petitioners in No. 82-545 were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General
no significant environmental impact (the so-called "zero-release" assumption) and thus Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, John H. Garvey, Jacques B. Gelin, and E.
should not affect the decision whether to license a particular nuclear powerplant. At Leo Slaggie. Henry V. Nickel, F. William Brownell, and George C. Freeman, Jr., filed
the heart of each rule is Table S-3, a numerical compilation of the estimated resources briefs for petitioners in No. 82-524. James P. McGranery, Jr., and Michael I. Miller filed
used and effluents released by fuel cycle activities supporting a year's operation of a briefs for petitioners in No. 82-551. Raymond M. Momboisse, Sam Kazman, Ronald A.
typical light-water reactor. Challenges to the rules ultimately resulted in a decision by Zumbrun, and Robert K. Best filed a brief for respondent Pacific Legal Foundation in
the Court of Appeals, on a petition for review of the final version of the rules, that the support of petitioners.
rules were arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with NEPA because the NRC had
not factored the consideration of uncertainties surrounding the zero-release Timothy B. Atkeson argued the cause for respondents in all cases and filed a brief for
assumption into the licensing process in such a manner that the uncertainties could respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Robert Abrams, Attorney General,
potentially affect the outcome of any decision to license a plant. Ezra I. Bialik, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter H. Schiff filed a brief for respondent
State of New York.Fn
Held:
Fn [462 U.S. 87, 88] Briefs of amicus curiae urging reversal were filed by Harold F. Reis
The NRC complied with NEPA, and its decision is not arbitrary or capricious within the and Linda L. Hodge for the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.; and by Wayne T. Elliott for
meaning of 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Pp. 97-108. Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc.

(a) The zero-release assumption, which was designed for the limited purpose of Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Minnesota by Hubert
individual licensing decisions and which is but a single figure in Table S-3, is within the H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, and Jocelyn Furtwangler Olson, Special Assistant
bounds of reasoned decisionmaking required by the APA. The NRC, in its statement Attorney General; for the State of Wisconsin et al. by Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney
announcing the final Table S-3 rule, summarized the major uncertainties of long-term General of Wisconsin, and Carl A. Sinderbrand, Assistant Attorney General; Robert T.
storage of nuclear wastes, noted that the probability of intrusion was small, and found Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, and Robert Vinson Eye, Assistant Attorney
the evidence "tentative but favorable" that an appropriate storage site [462 U.S. 87, General; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana; Joseph I. Lieberman,
88] could be found. Table S-3 refers interested persons to staff studies that discuss Attorney General of Connecticut; John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, and
the uncertainties in greater detail. In these circumstances, the NRC complied with Merideth Wright, Assistant Attorney General; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of
NEPA's requirements of consideration and disclosure of the environmental impacts of Missouri, and Robert Lindholm, Assistant Attorney General; William M. Leech, Jr.,
its licensing decisions. It is not the task of this Court to determine what decision it Attorney General of Tennessee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South
would have reached if it had been the NRC. The Court's only task is to determine Dakota; Paul G. Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico; Tany S. Hong, Attorney
whether the NRC had considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational General of Hawaii; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, and
connection between the facts found and the choice made. Under this standard, the Leonard Knee, Deputy Attorney General; A. G. McClintock, Attorney General of
zero-release assumption, within the context of Table S-3 as a whole, was not arbitrary Wyoming; Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, and David Richards, Executive
or capricious. Pp. 97-106. Assistant Attorney General; Janice E. Kerr and J. Calvin Simpson; for Kansans for
(b) It is inappropriate to cast doubt on the licensing proceedings simply because of a Sensible Energy by John M. Simpson; and for Limerick Ecology Action, Inc., et al. by
minor ambiguity in the language of an earlier rule as to whether licensing boards were Charles W. Elliott. [462 U.S. 87, 89]
required to consider health effects, socioeconomic effects, or cumulative impacts,
where there is no evidence that this ambiguity prevented any party from making as full JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
a presentation as desired or ever affected the decision to license a plant. Pp. 106-108.
222 U.S. App. D.C. 9, 685 F.2d 459, reversed. Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (NEPA), requires federal agencies to consider the environmental
impact of any major federal action. 1 As part of its generic rulemaking proceedings to
evaluate the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear powerplants,
the Nuclear [462 U.S. 87, 90] Regulatory Commission (Commission) 2 decided that
licensing boards should assume, for purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of
certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact and thus should
not affect the decision whether to license a particular nuclear powerplant. We
conclude that the Commission complied with NEPA and that its decision is not arbitrary
or capricious within the meaning of 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. 706. 3

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and ruled that the NRC
had complied with the requirements of NEPA. It explained that the NEPA requires that
an agency must consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a
proposed action and for the public to be informed of this. The role of a court is to
ensure that the agency adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact
of its decision and that the agency's decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
Regarding the Table S-3 rule, it was the result of a lengthy proceeding in which the NRC
determined that it was appropriate to evaluate evaluate the general environmental
effects of the storage of nuclear wastes and not to evaluate the effects during nuclear
power plant licensing proceedings.
It devices that the NRC's choice to use that generic method in the Table S-3 regulation
was valid that and courts do not have the authority to require a different rule, under
the APA.
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission

In 1966, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company purchased property in Calvert County,
Maryland along the edge of the Chesapeake Bay.[1]Baltimore Gas and Electric bought
the property with the intention of building a nuclear power plant along the shoreline
and applied for a nuclear power plant license.[1]Baltimore Gas and Electric began
construction on the plant in 1968.[1]Concerned about the impacts to the Chesapeake
Bay's blue crab population, scientists from Johns Hopkins University analyzed the
plant's potential impacts on the Chesapeake Bay ecosystem. The scientists'
apprehension about the potential adverse impacts of the plant's radioactive emissions
as well as the discharge of heated cooling water into the Chesapeake Bay lead to the
formation of the Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee who challenged the Atomic
Energy Commission's decision to license the power plant.

Issue:
After the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970, the Atomic Energy
Commission revised its licensing rules to comply with the new Act.[1] The newly revised
rules stated that while a utility company must provide an environmental report for each
proposed plant, the Atomic Energy Commission's hearing board did not have a
mandate to consider the environmental impacts of each new plant unless a challenge
was issued to a specific plant.[1] Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee argued that the
Atomic Energy Commission's rules were inadequate and a direct violation of NEPA's
Environmental Impact Statement requirement

Held:
Judge Skelly Wright and the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the Atomic Energy
Commission is required to consider the environmental impacts of licensing a nuclear
power plant, regardless of whether a challenge was raised or not.[1] The D.C. Circuit
Court took the ruling a step further and made NEPA judicially enforceable by
establishing procedural and substantive provisions for how federal agencies should
comply with NEPA.[1] Judge Wright and the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the Atomic
Energy Commission's rules were deficient and required revision
 STRYCKER'S BAY NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL v. KARLEN(1980) Southern District of New York to enjoin the Commission and HUD from constructing
No. 79-168 low-income housing on the site. The present respondents, Roland N. Karlen, Alvin C.
Hudgins, and the Committee of Neighbors To Insure a Normal Urban Environment
Argued: Decided: January 7, 1980 (CONTINUE), intervened as plaintiffs, while petitioner Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Held: Council, Inc., intervened as a defendant.

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that when the Department of Housing and The District Court entered judgment in favor of petitioners. See Trinity Episcopal School
Urban Development (HUD) considered alternative sites before redesignating a Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (1974). It concluded, inter alia, that petitioners had
proposed site for middle-income housing as one for low-income housing it should have not violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42
given determinate weight to environmental factors such as crowding low-income U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
housing into a concentrated area and should not have considered the delay that would
occur in developing an alternative site as an overriding factor. Once an agency has On respondents' appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed all but the District Court's
made a decision subject to the procedural requirements of the National Environmental treatment of the NEPA claim. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d
Policy Act of 1969, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered 88 [444 U.S. 223, 225] (1975). While the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court
the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion that HUD was not required to prepare a full-scale environmental impact statement
of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken. Here, there is no doubt that under 102 (2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2) (C), it held that HUD had not complied with
HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the 102 (2) (E), 1 which requires an agency to "study, develop, and describe appropriate
proposed site for low-income housing, and the Act requires no more. alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. 4332
Certiorari granted; 590 F.2d 39, reversed. (2) (E). See 523 F.2d., at 92-95. According to the Court of Appeals, any consideration by
HUD of alternatives to placing low-income housing on the site "was either highly
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 79-181, City of New York v. Karlen et al.; and No. 79- limited or nonexistent." Id., at 94. Citing the "background of urban environmental
184, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development v. Karlen et al., also on petitions for factors" behind HUD's decision, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, requiring
certiorari to the same court. HUD to prepare a "statement of possible alternatives, the consequences thereof and
the facts and reasons for and against. . . ." Ibid. The statement was not to reflect
PER CURIAM. "HUD's concept or the Housing Authority's views as to how these agencies would
choose to resolve the city's low income group housing situation," but rather was to
The protracted nature of this litigation is perhaps best illustrated by the identity of the explain "how within the framework of the Plan its objective of economic integration
original federal defendant, "George Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing can best be achieved with a minimum of adverse environmental impact." Ibid. The
and Urban Development." At the center of this dispute is the site of a proposed low- Court of Appeals believed that, given such an assessment of alternatives, "the agencies
income housing project to be constructed on Manhattan's Upper West Side. In 1962, with the cooperation of the interested parties should be able to arrive at an equitable
the New York City Planning Commission (Commission), acting in conjunction with the solution." Id., at 95.
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), began
formulating a [444 U.S. 223, 224] plan for the renewal of 20 square blocks known as On remand, HUD prepared a lengthy report entitled Special Environmental Clearance
the "West Side Urban Renewal Area" (WSURA) through a joint effort on the part of (1977). After marshaling the data, the report asserted that, "while the choice of Site 30
private parties and various government agencies. As originally written, the plan called for development as a 100 percent low-income project has raised [444 U.S. 223,
for a mix of 70% middle-income housing and 30% low-income housing and designated 226] valid questions about the potential social environmental impacts involved, the
the site at issue here as the location of one of the middle-income projects. In 1969, problems associated with the impact on social fabric and community structures are not
after substantial progress toward completion of the plan, local agencies in New York considered so serious as to require that this component be rated as unacceptable."
determined that the number of low-income units proposed for WSURA would be Special Environmental Clearance Report 42. The last portion of the report incorporated
insufficient to satisfy an increased need for such units. In response to this shortage the a study wherein the Commission evaluated nine alternative locations for the project
Commission amended the plan to designate the site as the future location of a high-rise and found none of them acceptable. While HUD's report conceded that this study may
building containing 160 units of low-income housing. HUD approved this amendment in not have considered all possible alternatives, it credited the Commission's conclusion
December 1972. that any relocation of the units would entail an unacceptable delay of two years or
more. According to HUD, "[m]easured against the environmental costs associated with
Meanwhile, in October 1971, the Trinity Episcopal School Corp. (Trinity), which had the minimum two-year delay, the benefits seem insufficient to justify a mandated
participated in the plan by building a combination school and middle-income housing substitution of sites." Id., at 54.
development at a nearby location, sued in the United States District Court for the
After soliciting the parties' comments on HUD's report, the District Court again entered NEPA requires no more. The petitions for certiorari are granted, and the judgment of
judgment in favor of petitioners. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. the Court of Appeals is therefore
Supp. 204 (1978). The court was "impressed with [HUD's analysis] as being thorough
and exhaustive," id., at 209-210, and found that "HUD's consideration of the Reversed.
alternatives was neither arbitrary nor capricious"; on the contrary, "[i]t was done in
good faith and in full accordance with the law." Id., at 220.

On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded again. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d
39 (1978). The appellate court focused upon that part of HUD's report where the
agency considered and rejected alternative sites, and in particular upon HUD's reliance
on the delay such a relocation would entail. The Court of Appeals purported to
recognize that its role in reviewing HUD's decision was defined by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A), which provides that agency actions should be
set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law. . . ." Additionally, [444 U.S. 223, 227] however, the Court of
Appeals looked to "[t]he provisions of NEPA" for "the substantive standards necessary
to review the merits of agency decisions. . . ." 590 F.2d, at 43. The Court of Appeals
conceded that HUD had "given `consideration' to alternatives" to redesignating the
site. Id., at 44. Nevertheless, the court believed that "`consideration' is not an end in
itself." Ibid. Concentrating on HUD's finding that development of an alternative
location would entail an unacceptable delay, the appellate court held that such delay
could not be "an overriding factor" in HUD's decision to proceed with the
development. Ibid. According to the court, when HUD considers such projects,
"environmental factors, such as crowding low-income housing into a concentrated
area, should be given determinate weight." Ibid. The Court of Appeals therefore
remanded the case to the District Court, instructing HUD to attack the shortage of low-
income housing in a manner that would avoid the "concentration" of such housing on
Site 30. Id., at 45.

In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), we stated
that NEPA, while establishing "significant substantive goals for the Nation," imposes
upon agencies duties that are "essentially procedural." As we stressed in that case,
NEPA was designed "to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision," but not
necessarily "a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would have
reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency." Ibid.
Vermont Yankee cuts sharply against the Court of Appeals' conclusion that an agency,
in selecting a course of action, must elevate environmental concerns over other
appropriate considerations. On the contrary, once an agency has made a decision
subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that
the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot "`interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to [444 U.S.
223, 228] be taken.'" Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 , n. 21 (1976). See also FPC
v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976). 2

In the present litigation there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental
consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing.