G.R. No.

L-6583 February 16, 1912

FACTS:

On September 21, 1909 the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 124, which is an amendment of section 107 of the
Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, enacted June 13, 1908 relating to the issuance of permits for the erection
of buildings. Sec. 107 of the of the said ordinance provides: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street
or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved."

Ramon Fabie, et al sought to obtain a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the
their property which forms a part of Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa in the City of Manila. Their application was
denied on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not conform to the requirements of section 107.

The appellees contend that the provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the
property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these Islands and by the Constitution
of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process of law. The lower
court ruled in their favor and declared the ordinance null and void, at least to the extent of the above-cited provision.

ISSUE: WON the Sec. 107 of the amended Ordinance No. 124 is constitutional. That is if the requirement set by the
City Council of Manila is a valid exercise of it police powers on behalf of the public

HELD:
The court held that purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and secure the health,
lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of fire and disease. The provision that denies permits
for the construction of buildings within the city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion reasonably necessary to secure the end
in view.
There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the ordinance under discussion. It is
manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of Manila generally and was not
conceived in favor of any class or of particular individuals. Those charged with the public welfare and safety of the
city deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these purposes, and it cannot be doubted that if its
enactment was reasonably necessary to that end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power.
The court opined that that the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the public good, and that it
should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the people is the highest law" (salus populi suprema est lex).
We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing: "That the building shall abut or face upon a
public street or alley which has been officially approved," is valid, and that the judgment of the lower court should
be reversed, without special condemnation of costs.
Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to
Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez,
upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be
exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5,
1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for
residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building
was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area
along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in
favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act
empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality.
Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”,
“to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material
progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment
of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and
commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution. However,
the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further
in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition
before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:

(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or
is it merely a ceiling? (2)
Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Held:

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of
the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the
-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.