1) Flordeliza Madria vs. Atty.

Carlos Rivera

A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court
and its processes, but also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
client and must be disbarred to maintain the integrity of the Law Profession.

Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the Atty. Rivera to inquire about the process of annulling
her marriage with her husband, Juan C. Madria. After giving the details of her marriage
and other facts relevant to the annulment, Rivera guaranteed that he could obtain for her
the decree of annulment.

Flordeliza went to the respondent's office to deliver payment and to follow up on the case.
She was advised to just wait for the resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she
did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices and processes
would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments.

Rivera informed the complainant that her petition had been granted, and according to the
complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five months to lapse after the release
of the decision before she could safely claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such
time, she declared in her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single.

Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported
decision and certificate of finality in applying for the renewal of her passport. However,
she became the object of an investigation by the NBI because her former partner, Andrew
Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision for
the annulment of her marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the certificate
of finality given by the respondent did not exist in the court records.

As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine Passport
Act. She claims that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the respondent;
and that he had taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her money
and to rely on the falsified court documents.

In his answer, the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant. He averred that
he had informed her that he would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her
petition; that she had insisted that he should prepare the draft of her petition that she
could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed upon him to simulate the
court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to fabricate the
certificate of finality; that she had assured him that such simulated documents would be
kept strictly confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had been filed in April
2003, but she had paid no attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any
of the scheduled hearings despite notice; and that he had not heard from her since then,
and that she had not even returned to his office.

Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala

submitted her Report and Recommendation wherein she concluded that the respondent
had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for a period of two years.

The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of Commissioner Villanueva-
Maala, modified the recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for two years
to disbarment

SC en banc: We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage, and
of the simulation of the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done
so only upon the complainant's persistent prodding did not exculpate him from
responsibility. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a
certificate of finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery. His
deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.

The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon
1, and Rule 15.07

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.

Even if he had committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no less
responsible. Being a lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which would have been enough to deter him from
committing the falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding
in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey
the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking
under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission." Indeed, the
ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.

Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any
of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without
authority so to do.

Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct

in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the
respondent to act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the
course of their practice of law. That he turned his back on such standards exhibited his
baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness
to continue as an officer of the Court.

We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct. In
Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera, he was suspended from the practice of law because he had
notarized documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance shows his
predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the documents that he had
falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly
removed through disbarment.
2) Renato Cayetano vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management

Black defines "practice of law" as:

“The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. “

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.

The dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before
the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs
of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management.

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the
confirmation of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null
and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. After graduating from the College of Law
(U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's
work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference
for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action
for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use
of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer

in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:

“Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary

actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services.”

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice
of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and
observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of
a business concern to be considered a practitioner.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable." The effect of the definition given
in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law
even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to
the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement,
I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one
is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.

3) IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO

Medado took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation. Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he
realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was
mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d]
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer”; and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost
its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”

When Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he

was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter
and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court and recommended that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter
lack of merit. It explained that, the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from the practice of law.
Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked
by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:

“Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung
anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the
right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.”

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law, which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having
held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the
Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his
years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more
than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief
and an honest error of judgment.”
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot
be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and
Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves
in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon
him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that
he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any
act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be
dealt with severely by this Court.

4) ROSA YAP PARAS v. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS

The Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying
his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one
(1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served
simultaneously. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court.

On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion to declare in contempt and disbar

respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that
respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by
respondent, in violation of the suspension order. Moreover, complainant claimed that
respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby
violating the suspension order. On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion
for contempt and disbarment, claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again
appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension order issued
against respondent. Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt dated June 8,
20011 and August 21, 20012 raising the same arguments.

Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension dated May 27, 2002, informing the
Court that he completed the suspension period. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he
started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift
Suspension.Also, complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an
election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In
view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for report and recommendation.

Complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order on the status of respondent's
suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the
Court's order to lift his suspension. The same inquiry was received by the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

The OBC recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that respondent cannot
engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court. OBC
opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period
stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is
necessary.

The Court directed the IBP to submit its report and recommendation on the pending
incidents. The IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter to the Court, conveying
that the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution affirming respondent's suspension
from the practice of law. However, in view of the pendency of respondent's motion for
reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as
soon as said motion is resolved. Thereafter, in a letter30 dated September 22, 2015, the
IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In the Report and Recommendation, instead of resolving only the pending incidents
referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995
complaint filed against respondent which had been resolved with finality. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's signature in the bank loan
documents and for immorality.
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated
January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.

The Issues Before the Court

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held
liable for practicing law while he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his
suspension.

The Court's Ruling

According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,]
and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience." During the suspension period
and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It must be
stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse
of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for
an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of
law.

In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became
effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter,
respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon after this filing
and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to
accepting new clients and cases. Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he
must be held administratively liable therefor.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order
of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts
which respondent is guilty of in this case – are grounds for disbarment or suspension.

However, suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just

recently, respondent had already been disbarred from the practice of law and his name
had been stricken off.

As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21,
200151 and indicating therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired
with respondent to violate the suspension order.

As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the
courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to
complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the pleading and only
requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was
dated February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the
contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.

5) ENGEL PAUL ACA v. ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO

Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through
Atty. Samuel Divina, his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a
lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses; that on the same occasion,
Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he
would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month. Complainant made an initial
investment in his business. As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued
several post-dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the
principal amount plus interests. Upon presentment, complainant was shocked to learn
that the aforementioned checks were dishonored.

Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first,
openly communicated with him, assuring him that he would not abscond from his
obligations. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant's calls
and text messages. Attempts to meet up with him through common friends also proved
futile. This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for
appropriate legal action.

Atty. Divina, who, with his filing clerk and the complainant's family, went to Atty. Salvado's
house to personally serve the demand letter but found out that Atty. Salvado was no
longer residing there.

As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant
quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate of
the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his debt
and invited complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant refused the
invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should talk inside his vehicle where his
companions were. During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he
was working on "something" to pay his obligations. He still refused to personally receive
or, at the least, read the demand letter. Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle
his obligations.

The Defense of the Respondent

Atty. Salvado filed his Answer, denying that he told complainant that he had previously
entered into various government contracts and that he was previously engaged in some
other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty.
Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest in his business, but it was
Atty. Divina's earnings of good interest that attracted him into making an investment. He
further stated that during their initial meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still
needed additional investments; that it was Atty. Divina who assured complainant of high
returns; and that complainant was fully aware that the money invested in his businesses
constituted a loan to his clients and/or borrowers.

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner

On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be

meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months for engaging in
a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and for behaving in a
scandalous manner.

The IBP-BOG Resolution

On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with
modification as to the period of suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of Atty.
Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in part.

A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence, not only
due to the unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid down, but also
by the coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The public is, indeed, inclined to
rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. A man, learned in the law like
Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful representations when dealing with persons,
clients or otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's
being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty. Salvador as a lawyer and
businessman was typical human behavior worthy of belief.

It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor
of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be
countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import
of bouncing checks.

The Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations. Instead of displaying a committed attitude to his creditor, Atty. Salvado
refused to answer complainant's demands. He even tried to make the complainant believe
that he was no longer residing at his given address.

6) CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ vs. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the
findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco
(Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from
the practice of law.

CBD received a complaint filed by Caroline Castañeda Jimenez against Atty. Francisco
for multiple violations of the CPR. Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez filed
a complaint for estafa against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel
Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion
Realty and Development Corporation which was incorporated specifically for the purpose
of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati. Jimenez transferred all
his shares to complainant by deed of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares
amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States, he learned
from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant
and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was
about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer
her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale.
The property was sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro) without
Jimenez’s knowledge. Atty. Francisco relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who
received the payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the
proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed
by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel
and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she conferred with Atty.
Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. Also, the principal
documents relative to the sale were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the
members of his law office. Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the
transactions involving the sale. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his
affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence
she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment
of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer, Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998
for the incorporation of Clarion; that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion
held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the
ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as
the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal
documentation to give effect to the said transfers.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers
and to negotiate the sale of the property; that Marcel and complainant led him to believe
that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale; that all these representations, however, turned
out to be false when Jimenez returned to the Philippines and discovered that the proceeds
of the sale were coursed through other corporations. As a witness to the fraud committed
against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the said transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the
ground that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal
counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. While he admitted that the legal
documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were
prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts
were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion.
Therefore, he served no conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a
"subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, much less
prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied
being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), found Atty. Francisco guilty of
violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the
practice of law. After weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records would show that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the
report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to
Clarion’s ownership to be reported. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were "without any
consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly executed.
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further,
when he executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and
complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule
on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of
conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the
findings and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10

of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.0 states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality. To be "dishonest" means the disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity,
integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness while conduct that is "deceitful"
means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that
is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the
party imposed upon.

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws,"
"do no falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his
sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted
to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the
significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate
shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment
and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these
transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact,
the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez.
Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of
his duties as a lawyer.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to

complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s
act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in
public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason
that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the
Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of
lawyers as officers of the court.

Lawyers’ support for the cause of their clients should never be attained at the expense of
truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, he must
do so only within the bounds of the law.

In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow
the Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,
protecting and upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty
in all their dealings, especially with the court.23

Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of Privileged Communication

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence.

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine
whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is
duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Another test is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence,

and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that
of the other.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo
the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said
privilege:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client

relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights
or obligations.

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on
record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. The complainant failed to establish
the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further
bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she
had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the
confidential communication was relayed.

The Penalty

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party
without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.

7) HEINZ R. HECK vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor?

Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos; the complainant
alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge, he violated the notarial
law as prior to him being commissioned as notary public, he subscribed and forwarded
notarized documents to the Clerk of Court.

The judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also submitted a certification
from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as follows:

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by
the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized documents
and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;

That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas
Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck,
for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned
resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.

Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following recommendation:

It is recommended that [i] respondent be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by
(a) notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial
reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration
of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the practice
of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his
present commission, if any, be revoked.

According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his
defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the charges:

It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned
as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification.
He merely alleged that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the
City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register.

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does
not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench. However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or
criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, A.M. No.
03-10-01-SC was issued stating that in order for an administrative complaint against a
retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a
year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent.

In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the
Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily
from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for
disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent did
not occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and
most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and
intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not
fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.

It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to
the judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or
acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the
respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is

invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated
as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as
it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents. For
such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from
the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting
as such, and even disbarment.

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a
violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. This is because his admission to
practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct
from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As we held in the leading
case of In re Almacen:

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
[they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proven themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative
complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed
only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing

documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED
to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

8) MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

Complainant alleges that the respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate
Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local
government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and aware that the market stall was government-
owned.

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal
and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent
without the signature of the lessees. The other contract was a sale agreement over a
property. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise that the
property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently

submitted three SPAs notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino,
complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named
therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact.

Respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However,
complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done and was
only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and
registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for
disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under
a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract with the local government unit and, technically,
she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract
over the same property in which complainant was represented as the property’s absolute
owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation of herself as owner, but her guarantee that it was
free from encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the
prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured
with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached
to the Affidavit-Complaint was new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to
complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent
prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees
would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise. Finally, SPAs submitted by complainant
as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the
documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence, the
notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the document.

As regards the purchase agreement of the inalienable property, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate

revocation of the Notarial Commission and her disqualification as notary public for two
years for her violation of her oath by notarizing documents without the signatures of the
parties. He accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale
contract, and the three SPAs. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR and recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for six months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification
that respondent be suspended from practice for one year.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix
the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a
wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules
1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant

is incredulous. If her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could
have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. A notary public should not notarize
a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it
and who personally appeared before the said notary public. In acknowledging that the
parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01
of the CPR and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.

Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective
immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and
she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public.
9) DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O.
Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents)
for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends when they were both
students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. The
paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed and Atty. Catindig started to court
her.

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez but
was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage,
and that he would eventually marry her. Consequently, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the
divorce decree was lawful and that there was no impediment to their marriage.

Years after marrying Atty. Catindig, Dr.Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty.
Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree is not recognized by Philippine laws. When
she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would
legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez.

Dr. Perez alleged that she discovered that Atty. Catindig had a scandalous affair with Atty.
Baydo when she came upon a love letter written by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo. In the
said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once
his “impediment is removed.” Sometime later, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and
their son; he moved to an upscale condominium where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew the fact that the divorce decreed by the foreign
court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty.
Catindig marry her. Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was
not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting.

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart. He asserted that while he was attracted
to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. For her part, Atty. Baydo
denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her but rejected him.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross
immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of
marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still
subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty
of disbarment. On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed as Dr. Perez failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair. The IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

Ruling of the Court

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of
bad character.

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly
immoral conduct.
Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained was not recognized in our
jurisdiction. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. This act is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding
of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on
his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous one.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s
Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. The charge of gross immorality
against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

10) MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty.
Raul H. Sesbrefio. The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were
consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño alleging that he married Virginia
Alcantara in but eventually separated. Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their
marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth (Garcia’s children with Virginia), filed an action for support against him and
his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. The case was dismissed. Sesbreño filed a Second
Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was
convicted for Homicide and that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide
is a crime against moral turpitude; and Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his
practice of law. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment
and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño alleging that Sesbreño is
practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide and despite the facts that he
is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in
the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. In his
answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted. He further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s
complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him
for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved
in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that homicide may or may not involve
moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Upon review of the convicting
Sesbreño for homicide, the CBD found that the circumstances leading to the death of the
victim involved moral turpitude and recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the CBD.

The Court’s Ruling

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty
for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow
men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be
left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

We agree with the CBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado and his companion Christopher
Yapchangco were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without
any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing
at them. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the
wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done
by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil
and political rights. There was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and
unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President
can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to
an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the
penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. The penalty
for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out.

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon

his receipt of this Decision.

11) PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its

President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ

This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael
against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz, former National Treasurer of PACE.

PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held
its 11th National Convention/Seminar. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz
was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.

The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was
submitted by Atty. Diaz only during the 12th PACE national convention; that during the
12th convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position
of National Treasurer but was not elected; that on the last day of the convention the
outgoing Board of Directors including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved a resolution
appropriating the amount of 30,000.00 as term-end bonus for each PACE official
qualified; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th convention; that
there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association despite a letter of demand,
and that the new set of PACE officers directed past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and
past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for
the Davao and Iloilo conventions.

Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11th national
convention in less than a week after the convention; that it was duly audited by the
national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was "fully
accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE accounts;" that she also filed the
Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention; that the report, together with
the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amizola and witnessed
by former PACE officers; that she denied running for re-election as PACE national
treasurer as she has filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Membber in Zamboanga;
that the approval of the ₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it
was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the
bonus.

The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:

"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty.
Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that she was able
to submit the liquidation reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also
took note that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz.
The Commissioner did not consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of
PACE to have any connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, she should be sanctioned
in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case. Commissioner
also believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never sponsored the appropriation of the
term-end bonus.

On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one
(1) year. The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of
PACE funds;(ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary;
and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer working in the
Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable actions in contravention of Rule
1.01 of the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely
not a right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and
continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.

One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Lawyers are
required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility. They are
bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best
of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election,
including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate
of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the
approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself
even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor
the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

12) ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty.
Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS)
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule
1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter
as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies.
He resigned from his post effective and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center as the
Vice President for Finance.

Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card Inc., another corporation under the
Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for “updating purposes”. The GIS4 identified
Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President. Mired with allegations
of anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution
with the SEC.

Guarin filed this complaint with the IBP CBD claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman and
President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any
share nor was he elected as chairperson or been President of LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder,
the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional
to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but
unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter.

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that she
asked Guarin to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment concerning
shareholdings. Guarin agreed to meet with her but neglected to show up. On the strength
of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS.

Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment. She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of
any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.

The CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and
thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It
noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of
LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD. Neither was there
proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank
accounts. Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to
appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this
procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed
herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman
and president of the company. The IBP Board of Governors adopted in toto the CBD
Report. We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a
dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. However, the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
Grounds for such administrative action may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice.

We agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the
corporation and ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president. We thus find
that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction
which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of
the CPR. We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business
practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the
corporation, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS.

13) Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.

(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON
AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.
AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack
Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the
notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it
enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish it and set up a fence
to deny access to AMALI’s workers, prompting AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement
of an easement of right of way in the RTC in Pasig City to which the RTC granted.

WWRAI filed an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI). The denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled
WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction in the CA. The CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an
Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a
Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration. The CA promulgated a decision granting the
petition of WWRAI.

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra
Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the
decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with deliberate intent to favor
WWRAI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were
guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01
and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.

Issue

Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through an
administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by
disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting
judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice.
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the
performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule
against it in its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis. The complaint herein
is actually the second one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation
to the performance of their judicial duty in the same case.

Other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that the CA Justices "conspired with
WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in
committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was
alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed
his duties shall prevail.

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but
also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded
administrative charges against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with
the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita,

its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI
who had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they
should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing baseless charges not only
once but twice. The filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges against
sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against

Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph
B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of
the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to bring the
administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show cause in writing
within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court
for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices, and for interfering with
the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

14) ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE

MONTERO v. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK

The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his
participation in the forcible intrusion into the complainant's property.

Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City. The complainant alleges that Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by
uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took
control of the entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty.
Tumulak had furnished several documents to the complainant, including the deed of
assignment executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the
late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee. The
documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate proceedings of the
Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez which involved the claim of the heirs to
several parcels of land.

The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to
have coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible
intrusion. As a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the
property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its
name. Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of
sanction.

Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of Nationwide
Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that Ms. Montero, the
representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge of the incident; that the
documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the intestate
proceedings; that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not himself
enter the property; and that the entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant
to a writ of execution.

IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR and recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak from the
practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the
Commissioner.

Issue

Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry
into the complainant's property?

Ruling of the Court

Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no
longer be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 892

Respondent lawyer is presumed to know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case
specifically addressing the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the
Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of
assignment" in his favor has a consideration, we did not see any agreed consideration in
the document.
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal
action. If respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is questionable,
he could have tiled an action to annul OPDC's title.

We find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. The Court in the 2005 ruling in
Evangelista v. Santiago had already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership in
land registration proceedings.

Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) setting aside the amended decision rendered by the RTC. This ruling should have
alerted Atty. Tumulak from taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him
inasmuch as he has admitted to have derived his rights from the deed of assignment
executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said amended decision. Moreover, Atty.
Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know these developments not only by virtue of his
becoming an assignee of the estate but also because of his being a lawyer with the
constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal developments.

Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion
into the property just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence
thereat at the time. In fact, such physical participation was not even necessary in order to
properly implicate him. It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been
discharging his role as the assignee since the time of the execution of the deed of
assignment. Considering that he had been in charge of doing all the actions necessary to
enforce the interest of his principal, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have
coordinated all the actions leading to the intrusion. Atty. Tumulak could not legitimately
resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate
action for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title.

Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding
settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed
his Lawyer's Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

The Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of TWO(2) YEARS
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
15) SPOUSES RODEL and ELEANOR CAÑOS vs. ATTY. LOUISE MARIE THERESE
B. ESCOBIDO, Clerk of Court V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Digos City

According to Sps. Caños, they have known Escobido when she assisted them on the
cases they filed before RTC Branch 19. When Escobido learned that Sps. Caños are
engaged in selling jewelry and imported goods, she offered to get some items to resell as
she used to be in the same business. They agreed to her proposal.

Escobido purchased on credit, various jewelry and imported goods amounting to

₱4,777,945.00. As payment for the goods, Escobido issued postdated checks, some of
which were made good during the first ten months. However, the rest of the checks
amounting to ₱3,827,299.30 were returned or refused payment by the drawee banks for
the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED." She also borrowed money from Sps. Caños. As
payment, she issued postdated checks in the total amount of ₱164,866.10. The checks
were likewise dishonored by the drawee banks. Escobido never informed Sps. Caños on
the status of her bank account until they received the returned checks and asked her on
the reason for the dishonor.

Escobido executed an Undertaking and acknowledged only ₱2,545,339.25 as the amount

she owed to Sps. Caños. Sps. Caños made verbal and written demands on Escobido for
her to pay her debts. Despite demand, she refused to pay her obligations. Sps. Caños
claimed that because of Escobido's large amount of debts, they were forced to pay some
of Escobido' s account with their suppliers.

Sps. Caños alleged that Escobido, as clerk of court and as a lawyer, also used her
position and profession to intimidate and coerce them from filing cases against her. She
allegedly told them that should they decide to file a case against her, she could always
find ways to delay the filing of the same as she has friends and batchmates in the City
Prosecution Office.

In her defense, Escobido claimed that what transpired was a business opportunity she
and Sps. Caños took advantage of, but which, unfortunately turned unsuccessful.
Escobido denied that she offered to get jewelry and other imported items from Sps.
Caños. Instead, it was Rodel who persuaded her to help them sell their goods. She
usually issued checks for the amounts due, payable in eight to ten monthly installments
per transaction. At first, she was able to pay her debts until most of her customers started
to miss their payments. Escobido allegedly told Rodel about her problem and he merely
advised her to be careful next time and gave her an extended period within which to pay.

Escobido decided to stop due to her increasing bad debts. She told them that she would
just return whatever jewelry she could get back from her customers but the Sps. Caños
refused. In addition, she allegedly requested Sps. Caños not to deposit her checks and
to give her more time to pay them with cash. Thus, contrary to their claims, she did inform
them of the status of her bank account. Escobido likewise denied refusing to pay Sps.
Caños. She was paying them even with meager amounts. She claimed that she paid
Rodel which he did not acknowledge since he gave back her checks.

When Sps. Caños realized that Escobido would never be able to pay them, they agreed
to accept the return of some of the jewelry. These were supposed to be deducted from
her outstanding accounts. When she asked for the checks covering the returned jewelry,
Sps. Caños told her that the checks were still with their suppliers and that they would just
sign the acknowledgment receipts in the meantime. However, they failed to give her the
said checks. Escobido further claimed that she executed the Undertaking upon Rodel's
initiative. The amount of ₱2,545,339.25 was arrived at after deducting the value of the
jewelry that she returned to Sps. Caños

However, Rodel gave to Escobido the final letter-demand in the amount of ₱3,604,065.40.
She was hesitant to accept and sign the letter-demand because the previous Undertaking
indicated a lower amount. She was forced to receive and sign the letter-demand in the
midst of family and financial problems. Escobido also denied the allegation that she used
her position as clerk of court or profession as a lawyer to dissuade them from filing a case
against her. Finally, Escobido argued that she should not be held liable for any
administrative violations attributed to her by Sps. Caños because she never denied her
debt. She never refused to pay, but was only unable to do so.

The Report and Recommendation of the OCA

OCA found that Escobido is guilty of deliberate failure to pay just debts. The OCA noted
the more than 100 postdated checks she issued which all bounced. The measly payments
Escobido made served as mere tokens to appease Sps. Caños and did not show a
serious intention to clear her debt.

The OCA also noted that two administrative complaints have been previously filed against
Escobido for non-payment of debt. The first complaint charged Escobido with Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer and Failure to Pay Just Debts. She allegedly failed to return
₱1,390,000.00, which was given by the complainant as part of a business transaction
between them despite repeated demands. As guarantee, Escobido issued a check which
was dishonored by the bank. The second complaint charged Escobido with non-payment
of debts to six persons despite repeated demands.

The OCA recommended that Escobido be found GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and willful failure to pay just debts and that she be
SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year.
The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA that Escobido should be held administratively liable for
willful failure to pay just debts and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
provides that a public employee's failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary
action. Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified
by Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), defines "just debts" as those: (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b)
claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor.

The Court has ruled that the penalty for willful failure to pay just debts is imposed at a civil
servant's actuation unbecoming a public official, thus tarnishing the image of the public
office. In this relation, note that the penalty imposed by law is not directed at respondent's
private life, but rather at her actuation unbecoming of a public official

We agree with the OCA that Escobido' s repeated acts of contracting loans and paying
them with worthless checks reflect bad faith on her part. Escobido is both an employee
of the Court and a member of the Bar. Thus, she is expected to meet a high standard of
uprightness and propriety. By deliberately failing to meet her contractual obligations, she
fell short of such standard.

WHEREFORE, respondent Louise Marie Therese B. Escobido is adjudged GUILTY of

willful failure to pay just debts and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
for which she is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of ONE (1) YEAR.

16) FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR. v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN,

PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN- BAUTISTA

Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman engaged the legal services of Atty. Francisco L.
Rosario, Jr. as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A.
Chong for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a
parcel of land. Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this
Court. Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While
the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident.
Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista,
Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman.

Petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees before the RTC. He alleged that
he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get
25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them would be
dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents
refused his written demand for payment. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to such
amount on the basis of quantum meruit.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. The
RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case,
as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and executory. The RTC wrote that it
had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be amended
or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes.

The Issues

I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION
TO DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE
DECISION DID NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER
HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES.

The Court’s Ruling

With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of
attorney’s fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary
concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party
as indemnity for damages.

The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is,
strictly speaking, an item of damages. The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party
litigant and not to his lawyer. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that whatever
attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer
as his compensation.

In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the
compensation for professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. The
award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in favor of Spouses de Guzman is of no moment.
The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part
of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses
de Guzman and not to petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s
fees would not result in a double award of attorney’s fees.

The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for
professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for
professional services be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-
Independent v. NLRC15 is instructive:

As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-
NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may
be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision
had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees
may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been
rendered or in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident
of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s
fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject
of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be
held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees
may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will
be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment
in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused
to sign the contract for legal services and his filing of the complaint more than nine years
after his cause of action arising from the breach of the oral point to the conclusion that
the six-year prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral contract
under Article 1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and
the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence
to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into
account the facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the
attorney’s fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. With
respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s
considered view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on
quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for

determining an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. An
attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in
pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal
fees.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de

Guzman and respondents for almost seventeen. The Court is certain that it was not an
easy task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a long period of time,
considering the heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner. It cannot be denied
that petitioner devoted much time and energy in handling the case for respondents. Given
the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the
quality of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner
clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered.

The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25%
attorney's fees based on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner
failed to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman.
A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the
property.

17) JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY

ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN
OROLA v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga, and Marjorie

Melba Orola-Calip are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola married to Emilio
Q. Orola. Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola and
Antonio L. Orola, the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of
Emilio.

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, the parties were represented by the following: (a)
Atty. Roy M. Villa as counsel for and in behalf of the Heirs of Trinidad; (b) Atty. Ely F.
Azarraga, Jr. as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs of the
late Antonio, with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator. In the course of
the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of
Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son,
Manuel Orola.

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment
complaint claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to
represent conflicting interests in the subject case; and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the
Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs
of Antonio. Complainants further claimed that while Maricar consented to the withdrawal
of respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained after he had already entered his
appearance for Emilio. Respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs
and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules.

Respondent refuted the charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel for the
Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case
show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio
were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga. He averred that he only accommodated
Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not
attend the scheduled hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge.In
fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further
communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar
before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case. He added that he had no
knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that
no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.

Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), held

respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the
records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the
consent of Karen as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code. He also held that there was
no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted
that respondent “did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he
use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.”
Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the imposition of disbarment is too
harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report and imposed the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code,
but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new
clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. It behooves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as
claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad
and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio. Hence, when respondent
proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as
administrator, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio –
particularly, Karen.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests provides
an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same
case.

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the
following factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that
respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis; third, it is likewise
undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs
aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired, hence, it can be said that he
acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any
knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were
not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio.

18) REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL vs. ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim. She
was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita. At the time of her death,
Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI),
Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus
Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.

Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged
illegitimate halfcousin continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in
declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her
requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits
coming from Pacita’s stockholdings. She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial
property in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00, despite
an existing Trust Agreement wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI,
already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same. Accordingly, she
demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding deed
of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds
therefrom, but to no avail. Rebecca claimed that it was only after she had already
instituted various legal actions that respondent and URCI agreed to transfer the subject
property.

Respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum
shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising
the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also
contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and
1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted
various suits covering the same issue.

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint for the reason that
"the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension
of the real facts surrounding their dispute." However, Bella filed a Manifestation with
Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention, praying that the investigation of the charges
against respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

The Investigating Commissioner, finding the respondent guilty of serious misconduct in

violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, recommended
the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner
observed that respondent lacked the good moral character required from members of the
Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust
agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject
property without the former’s consent. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Court’s Ruling

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty –

depends on the factual circumstances of each case.

As the Court sees it, his failure to comply with the demands of Rebecca – which she takes
as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s
acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own
assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. Rebecca states in
her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a
"misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that
respondent had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance
leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in
fact and in law.
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the
apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. Verily, members
of the Bar are expected at all times to refrain from any act or omission which might lessen
the trust and confidence reposed by the public to the legal profession. Respondent’s
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and
justice. The Court holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code.
Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

19) Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa

Atty. Catalan has 3 causes of action against Atty. Silvosa: (1) Silvosa appeared as
counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as a
prosecutor, (2) Silvosa bribed his colleague Prosecutor Toribio and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Silvosa for direc bribery. The IBP CBD held Silvosa liable only
for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. This
recommendation was modified by the IBP Board of Governors to a suspension of two
years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in the
Regional Trial Court. He appeared as public prosecutor in “People of the Philippines v.
SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al.” (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double
frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty.
Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and requested
the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart
from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives, Atty. Silvosa displayed
manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of
the Esperon case. The Provincial Prosecutor granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve
Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the
Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a
case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio
reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from
frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a
public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her ₱30,000 to reconsider her findings
and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision
convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery. Nilo Lantics filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa
before the NBI. Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in
a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas, Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded ₱15,000 from
Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas.

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of
bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused. On the
second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as “self-
serving” and “purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.”
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan, he asserts that “conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do not amount
to a crime.’” He further claims that “it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted,
but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was
convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers.

The Court’s Ruling

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.” Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule
2.01 which provides that “A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14 which provides that “A lawyer shall
not refuse his services to the needy.” Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered
his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of facts.” Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public
prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to
the reinstatement of the original bail.

The records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed.
Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it
notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude
is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude can be inferred from the third element of direct bribery “..such offer or promise
be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing
some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official
duty to do”. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which
he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public.
It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are

constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty.
Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required
of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer,
but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in
his character.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

20) ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO

Complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later
reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses
Amable and Rosalinda Yap whom he referred, in an action for partition of estate of the
late Benjamin Yap. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about ₱
40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the
same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He
then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards
required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom
he has two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children.
He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business without the required
authorization from the BSP.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25%
contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He claimed that Sps. Yap assumed
to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his letter. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one

(1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said
recommendation.

The Court’s Ruling

Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a
lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family
to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his
moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has
been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequently, we find no reason to disturb the
IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." However, we find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not
to have been sufficiently established.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation

of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

21) ALVIN S. FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in “Bobie Rose V.
Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada” suspending for 2 years Atty. Lozada for
violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

However, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the case of “Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin
S. Feliciano, et al.,” where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant
lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband,
Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case. To prove his
allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings
wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels, as well as the transcript
showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the
witnesses during the trial proceedings.

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still
suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of
the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend
the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she
believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the
prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client.

The IBP-CBD found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of
law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Lozada. The IBP-Board of Governors recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING

When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant
case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of
legal knowledge within the period of suspension. Suffice it to say that practice of law
embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. The findings of the IBP would
disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada were done within the period of her two (2)-
year suspension. When Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband she,
therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Lozada's defense of good
faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband,
she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court
about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband.

Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out
and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus,
considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband
and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it
proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found

GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

22) TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA

The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension
in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She
is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site
acquisition to Atty. De Vera.

Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month
until fully paid. However, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded
her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon, by mortgaging her
property. Atty. De Vera issued a post-dated check for P500,000. Atty. De Vera also issued
at least two more checks to cover the interest agreed upon.

Teresita alleges that Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the
amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued a post-dated
for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount
borrowed by Atty. De Vera.

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the
checks "bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to
encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the
account was closed.

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her
obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code.

In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or

suspended for violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

According to Atty. De Vera, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to
Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across
Northern and Southern Luzon. Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the
required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance
the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would cover the costs for application
of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per site.

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment on time. At that time, Teresita had
to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom. However, Teresita did not have the
funds required for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for
each cell site. Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane.
Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita
checks to guaranty the loan. Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's
sister.21 She only lent Teresita another check as "additional guaranty for the five
sites”.Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to
Teresita for value. The checks were not meant to be deposited.

Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She
points out that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under
reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the
administrative complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner
breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the
complainant."

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused. In addition, "[a] the bare
allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her
property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do
not constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]."
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious
misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the
practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner ruled that “As a lawyer, respondent is
deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the
provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.”

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also
broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the
following provisions:

Cannon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be
held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans
alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment
for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the
pendency of the criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful
conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of."

We do not believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential,
so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge against
her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not have
enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be said
that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg.
22. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar. Misconduct involves
"wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment"; it is serious or gross when it is
flagrant.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations
from Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to
answer for her liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks
were mere "show checks." However, she failed to present evidence to prove those
allegations. The Investigating Commissioner also correctly pointed out that Atty. De
Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human
experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her
acts.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year.
23) MAXIMINO NOBLE III v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES

Maximino alleged Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint for damages against his own
brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr., whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants. Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for
grave threats and estafa against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the
complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him
and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was
incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant
complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and prayed for the disbarment of
respondent as well as the award of damages.

In his defense, Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that the allegedly
offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother
communication" and were uttered in good faith. Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave
threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation
and after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting,
threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x."

IBP Report and Recommendation

The IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding
no violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on the
part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who
are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to
be published and known by third persons. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case
against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the
complaint against Orlando.

Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.

In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as
casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's
mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages
were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word
"polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the
services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in
violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the
crime of unjust vexation was an admission that he spoke ill of Maximino.

It is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in

private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his
words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as
candor is owed.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as
well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and
STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

24) MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO

I. GARCIA, JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA v. ATTY. JOSE D.
PAJARILLO

Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing
factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adeva,
Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the
Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and
Marcel N. Lukban. The complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary.

The Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I.
Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and
Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan
with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the
complainant. The Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application
because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were
allegedly not registered as stockholders, as members of the Board of Trustees. The
Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties. The
respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial capacity to
pay the loan.

RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the appointment of Librado
Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of the Board of Trustees of
the complainant. The complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC
Order. RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and
informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein
respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it
became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.

RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage. Thereafter, complainant filed a
complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.

The complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for
allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and
loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First,
respondent argued that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana
Apuya cannot represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they were not
duly authorized by the Board of Directors to file the complaint. Second, respondent
claimed that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only
to the legal counsel of complainant. Respondent argued that he merely served as the
corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third,
respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the
case for annulment of mortgage because all the documents and information related to the
loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of representing conflicting

interests and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
at least one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for
RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client. The Investigating
Commissioner cited cash vouchers showing that respondent was paid by complainant for
his retained legal services. These vouchers debunk the respondent's claim that the
complainant merely appointed him as its corporate secretary. The Investigating
Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives to file this
administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
and imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against
respondent.

The Court’s Ruling

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting
interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed
by the complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP.

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and
information in connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant
were public records. The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to
represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies
equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential
nature was revealed to the attorney by the client.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is
imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section
1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus,
in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela
Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority from
the Board of Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo is imposed.

25) TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.

CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

Among the defendants named in the case are petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin,
Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco,
who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). As members of the ACCRA
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in the PCGG case, and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a "Motion to Admit Third

Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" excluding private respondent Raul
S. Roco. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case.

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION"

with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them
as accorded private respondent Roco.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance

by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion
as party-defendant in PCGG Case

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute
petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in
PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom
he acted as nominee-stockholder.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG.

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was
denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
for certiorari, arguing that the Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the
other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity
of the client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.

The Court’s Ruling

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to

force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after
petitioners but the bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from
the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in
exchange for exclusion from the complaint.

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion
as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being
the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and
should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

In the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties
that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the
hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is
fatal to the administration of justice.

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by
the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to
him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. Passed on into
various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded
provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons

cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients
business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,"
to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect
his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in
mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds
of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for
any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under
this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.

3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is
privileged.

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege
if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity
of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result
in disclosure of the entire transaction.

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which
there would be no attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought
was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in
the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners’ ticket
to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn,
petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client’s shareholdings.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients
under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is
not privileged information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under
the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would
expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict
fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered

to exclude petitioners as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic
of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.".

26) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,

MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S.
SANSAET

The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was
the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively
the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.

The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for
a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey.
His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original
certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

The Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent
and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site
in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said
patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through
fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served
as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.

Consequent to the foregoing judgment, an information for perjury was filed against
respondent Paredes. The Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister
of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription,
hence the proceedings were terminated. In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was
likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging respondent
Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However,
a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted and the case was dismissed on
the ground of prescription.

Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that respondent
Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true
copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, and transcripts of
stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury
charge.

In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in connection with
that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case
in his court did not reach the arraignment stage.

In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, respondent Sansaet revealed

that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed
on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed
by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.

For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case
in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in
the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness
in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
pursuant to their agreement.

As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided
in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet
was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of
respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated
falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.

Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of

the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other
private respondents in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:

From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer
relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and
after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts
surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused
Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity.
Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in
the information is privileged.

The principal issue on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns is therefore
whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness,
is barred by the attorney-client privilege.

As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client

relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet, the facts
surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by
respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found
no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness
against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent.

The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these
cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep
aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to any communication, without distinction or
qualification.

In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no
particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his
attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the
client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means.

2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in

the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes
intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his
attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify
on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate
basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent
court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the
date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation
to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed
in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime
that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the
attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does
not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future
and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.

3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness
are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of
Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were
later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges. Clearly,
therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed
in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents,
later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of

falsification. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.

It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel
from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst
travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.

27) LIANG FUJI v. ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

Before this Court is an administrative complaint dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang
Fuji and his family, against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M.
Dela Cruz for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance
of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.

The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order, Fuji, a Chinese national,
was ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special Prosecutor
Dela Cruz was the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and
another person upon her finding that Fuji's work visa had expired. Special Prosecutor
Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one (1) year and six (6) months in violation
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7).

The Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation charge

against Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a valid working visa
valid under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason."

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated
since he was not afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the
deportation order was issued against him. Fuji further alleged that Special Prosecutor
Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the
Bureau of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not overstaying.

Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any grave misconduct. She claimed that
Fuji was accorded due process during the summary deportation proceedings.
Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in
the performance of her duties. She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit
any flagrant disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit
for herself or for other persons. Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in fact
dismissed the complainant's charges against her.

We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain
the facts before levying the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against
lawyers in government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the
complaint first either to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over
the erring public official or employee or the Ombudsman.

This case is an exception. The records here show that the Office of the Ombudsman had
previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the pendency of his Verified
Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and considered
the case closed.

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and
ordered his release. However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the
charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman and the apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's
administrative complaint, this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of this case,
and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to discipline respondent under its
"plenary disciplinary authority" over members of the legal profession.

Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient

cause to dismiss this administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that
proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest

of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule
is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.

Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the
Bureau of Immigration should exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing
the immigration records, whenever the legal status and documentation of an alien are at
issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person.

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents

transmitted to her, especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the
prospective deportee.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official. However,
if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a
lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility, then she may be subject to
disciplinary sanction by this Court.

Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As a special
prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the representative, not of any private
party, but of the State. Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would
have found out about the approval of Fuji's application, which would negate her finding of
overstaying.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give attention to a task due to carelessness
or indifference. In this case, respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the
fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to due process and to the
consequences of her actions.

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional

obligations consistent with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.
The ethical standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered even
more exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by
the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and
professionalism in public service. In this case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure
to cope with the strict demands and high standards of public service and the legal
profession.
The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court. Under the Civil Service
Rules,58 the penalty for simple neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months. In previous cases, this Court imposed the penalty of suspension
of three (3) months to six (6) months for erring lawyers, who were negligent in handling
cases for their clients. We find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three (3) months
considering the consequence of respondent's negligence. This suspension includes her
desistance from performing her functions as a special prosecutor in the Bureau of
Immigration.