Torio vs Fontanilla If the injury is caused in the course of the

G.R. No. L-29993; 85 SCRA 399 performance of a governmental function/duty, no recovery

October 23, 1978 can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing
statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they
Facts: performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, did not act wantonly and maliciously.
passed Resolution No. 159 “to manage the 1959 Malasiqui With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule
town fiesta celebration…” The “1959 Malasiqui ‘Town is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
Fiesta Executive Committee” was created, which, in turn, persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage. suit upon contracts and its tort.
A “zarzuela” troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla
was a member, arrived for their performance on January 22.
During the “zarzuela”, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was MACASIANO v. DIOKNO, Mun. of Paranaque, and
pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but Palanyag Kilusang Bayan
died the following day. GR 97764 (Aug. 10, 1992)
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint to recover
damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal FACTS:
Council and all the Council’s individual members. On June 13, 1990, the Municipality of Paranaque
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a passed an Ordinance, which authorized the closure of several
legally and duly organized public corporation it performs streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The
sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an said Ordinance was approved by the municipal council
exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2 series of 1979, authorizing and
can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets and
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the open spaces as sites for flea market and/or vending area under
municipality’s agents in carrying out the municipal ordinance certain terms and conditions.
and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the On June 20, 1990, the municipal council issued a
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had Resolution authorizing the Paranaque Mayor to enter into a
exercised due care and diligence in implementing the contract with any service cooperative for the establishment
municipal ordinance. and operation of flea markets.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, On Aug 8, 1990, the municipality and Palanyag, a
concluding that the Executive Committee had exercised due service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the
diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market with
construction of the stage, and the collapse was due to forces the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the Mun. of
beyond the control of the committee. Consequently, the Paranaque. Consequently, Palanyag put up market stalls on
defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. subject streets.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s On Sept. 13, 1990, Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along GG
of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages:P1200.00 Cruz and J Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were
its attorney’s fees; and the costs. returned to Palanyag. Thereafter, Macasiano wrote a letter to
Palanyag, giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea
Issue: market, otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held On Oct. 13, 1990, the Mun. of Paranaque and
liable. Palanyag filed a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus
with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction. The trial
Held: court (Judge Dikono) issued an Order upholding the validity
Yes. of the Ordinance allowing the use of public streets for the
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political operation of flea markets, and enjoining Macasiano from
bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations enforcing his letter-order to Palanyag.
to be exercised by and through their respective municipal Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper Macasiano thru the OSG.
corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with. ISSUE:
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in WON an Ordinance or Resolution, issued by the municipal
character: public, governmental or political on the one hand; council of Paranaque, authorizing the lease and use of public
and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. streets as sites for a flea market is valid
Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation
in administering the powers of the state and promoting the HELD:
public welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, No. The property of provinces, cities, and
and political. Municipal powers, on the other hand, are municipalities is divided into property for public use and
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the partrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code).
community. These include those which are ministerial, As to property for public use, in the provinces, cities,
private and corporate. and municipalities, it consists of the provincial roads, city
This distinction of powers are necessary in streets, the squares, the fountains, public waters, promenades,
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its and public works for public use paid for by said provinces,
agents which result in injury to third persons. cities or municipalities. All other property are patrimonial.
Balacuit et al., v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in
Norte and Butuan City Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET
G.R. No. L-38429 (E) ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring
30 June 1988 Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void. This decision is immediately executory.
FACTS
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the
validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by TAN vs. COMELEC
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children between 7 and 12 years of Facts:
age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Special Civil No. 237 on June 30, 1969, praying that the Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the
declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
constitutional and valid. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and
contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
ISSUE complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board • The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental,
of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and was the other than those living within the territory of the new province
Ordinance a valid exercise of police power. of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros
HELD del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is
It is already settled that the operation of theaters, lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing
cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise
of delegated police power by the local government. Issue:
However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful or units affected”? NO.
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a
proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, Held:
but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Whenever a province is created, divided or merged
The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the
question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or
police power. While it is true that a business may be units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the
regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries
must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive of Negros Occidental (parent province).
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two
calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would
what prices of admission they think most for their own be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
advantage, and that any person who did not approve could composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
stay away. province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
The exercise of police power by the local Norte.
government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not
law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the
against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being “…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the
the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of
the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an
area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was
the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic concluded that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution.
the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect
for being a patent nullity. TATEL V. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts:
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992 Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta.
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the
Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner, abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s warehouse, Resolution
vs. 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of
Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to
FACTS: remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place
Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The
Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was
composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the
Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in
Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
province. distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss
Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a of lives and properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that
resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The said resolution said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process
provides that the plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and
affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of
the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO
In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of
Labo, majority of the votes cast were against the creation of  Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal
the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, power. It is a settled principle of law that
seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted throughout the municipal corporations are agencies of the State
Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
undertaken. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite government and as such are endowed with the
was a complete failure and that the results obtained were police powers in order to effectively accomplish
invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by and carry out the declared objects of their
COMELEC, should have been conducted only in the political creation.
unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the
new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa,  Its authority emanates from the general welfare
Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, clause under the Administrative Code, which
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses reads: The municipal council shall enact such
that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining ordinances and make such regulations, not
area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
Camarines Norte. In support of his stand, petitioner argues into effect and discharge the powers and duties
that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included necessary and proper to provide for the health
in the plebiscite. and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and
Issue: convenience of the municipality and the
Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and property therein.
the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo
valid?  For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the municipality
Held: to enact but must also be passed according to
Yes. the procedure prescribed by law.
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means  These principles require that a municipal
that residents of the political entity who would be ordinance
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is any statute
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," (2) must not be unfair or oppressive
is the plurality of political units which would participate in (3) must not be partial or discriminatory
the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed (5) must be general and consistent with
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the public policy, and
 (6) must not be unreasonable. plates and the confiscation of driver's
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria. licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.
 In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated
by the ordinance is the construction of ISSUE & HELD: WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
warehouses wherein inflammable materials are
stored where such warehouses are located at a RATIO:
distance of 200 meters from a block of houses  The problem before the Court is not the validity of
and not the construction per se of a warehouse. the delegation of legislative power. The question the
The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of
property in case of fire which is one of the such delegated power.
primordial obligation of the government. o A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any
 The objections interposed by the petitioner to statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
the validity of the ordinance have not been 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4)
substantiated. Its purpose is well within the must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5)
objectives of sound government. No undue must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be
restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for general and consistent with public policy.
anybody to engage in trade but merely a  PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license
prohibition from storing inflammable products plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for
in the warehouse because of the danger of fire traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.
to the lives and properties of the people residing There is nothing in the decree authorizing the
in the vicinity. As far as public policy is Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the
concerned, there can be no better policy than Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such
what has been conceived by the municipal sanctions.
government.  Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only
by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature (except only that the
Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority power to create their own sources of revenue and to
Cruz, 1991 levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).
They are mere agents vested with what is called the
FACTS: power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
 In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic Congress, the local government unit cannot
District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled contravene but must obey at all times the will of their
that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of principal. Here, the enactments in question, which
motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the
the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2)  The measures in question do not merely add to the
even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
violations was not directly prescribed by the decree sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact
nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by actually prohibits.
the Commission.  There is no statutory authority for — and indeed
 Several complaints were filed in the SC against the there is a statutory prohibition against — the
confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
and removal of license plates for alleged traffic Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
violations. These sanctions were not among those cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by
that may be imposed under PD 1605. virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
 The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case
"to detach the license plate/tow and impound that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles is an exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish
Metro Manila." violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the
o The Metropolitan Manila Authority sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
defended the said ordinance on the ground
that it was adopted pursuant to the powers
conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
conflict between the decision and the G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994
ordinance because the latter was meant to Cruz, J.
supplement and not supplant the latter.
o The Solicitor General expressed the view Facts:
that the ordinance was null and void PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
because it represented an invalid exercise Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a
of a delegated legislative power. It violated building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
PD 1605 which does not permit, and so renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license its casino there during the Christmas season.
 Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the nullified by a mere ordinance.
women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by
the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of Binay vs Domingo
the city. Date: September 11, 1991
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative Petitioners: Jejomar Binay and Municipality of Makati
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Respondents: Eufemio Domingo and commission on
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the Audit
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting
the operation of casinos. Ponente: Paras
On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869
which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all Facts:
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality,
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial
respondents. Hence, the petition for review. assistance program extending P500 to a bereaved family,
funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds
Issue: existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the
3375-93 are valid municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of
P400,000 for the implementation of the program.
Held: However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the the petitioners’ reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is connection or relation between the objective sought to be
expressly vested with the police power under what is known attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc of
as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only
as follows: benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used
for public purposes.
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local
government unit shall exercise the Issue:
powers expressly granted, those WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No.
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police
powers necessary, appropriate, or power under the general welfare clause\
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are Held:
essential to the promotion of the general Yes
welfare. Within their respective territorial Ratio: The police power is a governmental
jurisdictions, local government units function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born
shall ensure and support, among other with civilized government. It is founded largely on the
things, the preservation and enrichment maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus
of culture, promote health and safety, populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing
enhance the right of the people to a the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
balanced ecology, encourage and support Police power is inherent in the state but not in
the development of appropriate and self- municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may
reliant scientific and technological exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
capabilities, improve public morals, power by the legislature which is the repository of the
enhance economic prosperity and social inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police
justice, promote full employment among power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from
their residents, maintain peace and order, the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and
and preserve the comfort and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police
convenience of their inhabitants. powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation
which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
There is a requirement that the ordinances should expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only corporations have been construed as empowering them to do
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by the safety of the people.
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate Municipal governments exercise this power under
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall
mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of SALVADOR VILLACORTA vs. GREGORIO
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the BERNARDO
protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP
337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers FACTS:
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE
well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS
to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN was enacted by the
morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government municipal board of Dagupan City. The said ordinance was
unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the imposing additional requirements to that of the national law
inhabitants therein." Act 496. Ordinance 22 was annulled by the Court of First
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to Instance of Pangasinan and was affirmed by the Court of
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or Appeals whose decision reads as follows:
safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require
the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before
The police power of a municipal corporation is the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the
broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands
exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the
their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44
as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision
every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also
scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law
whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and does not mention of a certification to be made by the City
general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of
but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance
bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable conditions.
to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely
indicate the limits of police power. ISSUE:
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it said ordinance was correct?
incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, HELD:
"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the
state policies to provide adequate social services, the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating
promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus,
Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution
of police power in the promotion of the common good. of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to
There is no violation of the equal protection clause deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce
in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may disorder; and so on.
be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive This advice is especially addressed to the local
varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, governments which exercise the police power only by virtue
down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the
Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22
the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority
bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. to its requirements.
243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice.
The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, Dela Cruz v Paras
though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be Fernando, CJ:
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Facts:
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business,
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging
that their rights to due process and equal protection of the
 laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject
was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel
petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and termination of their business.
Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments,
Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within
within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit.
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or
council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate
by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY
of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar vs.
places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
" The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly
as RA 938. FACTS:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides for the
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was appropriation of 6% of memorial parks for charity burial of
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the paupers. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc (HPI), did not
the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way appropriate the 6% requirement. Seven years after, the
altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was Quezon City council issued a resolution to stop any further
followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
not prohibition. City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional ISSUE:
question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of
validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence the police power?
this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
RULING:
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid No. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
an assumed power to prohibit. purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
(Thus, even if it is an eminent domain, it would not have been
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one the proper measure to promote general welfare in this case)
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since Police power is usually exercised in the form of
there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property
not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, for the promotion of general health, morals, safety of the
as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of people and more so, the general welfare. It does not involve
a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a
exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
language of the Administrative Code, such competence the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as
extending to all "the great public needs. for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that between two possible interpretations by one
of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and
the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be Trust Co.
preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. G.R. No. L-24670
94 SCRA 533
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal December 14, 1979
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on Facts:
their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business,
the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong,
night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such Rizal.
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial
correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow
 On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate intendment of the word “regulation” under the provision.
agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the
Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6, implied power of a municipality should be “liberally
Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, construed in its favor” and that “any fair and reasonable doubt
1962 the vendees transferred their rights and interests over as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor
the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.” An
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon exception to the general welfare powers delegated to
payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will conflict
deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation with vested rights arising from contracts. The exception does
that the parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale “shall be not apply to the case at bar.
used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes”. The
restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates 2. While non-impairment of contacts is
of Titles covering the said lots issued in the name of Chavez. constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
with the building restrictions also annotated in their power. Invariably described as the “most essential, insistent
corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from and illimitable of powers” and the “greatest and most
Chavez “free from all liens and encumbrances” while Lot powerful attribute of government”, the exercise of police
No.6 was acquired through a “Deed of Exchange” from power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it
Republic Flour Mills. is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as been a denial of due process or a violation of any other
part of its general building scheme designed for the applicable constitutional guarantee.
beautification and development of the Highway Hills Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part
Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
commercial and industrial sites are also designated or industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal
established. Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to
Defendant maintains that the area along the western safeguard/promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River, has general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice
been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area,
Resolution No.27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA
It alleges that plaintiff “completely sold and transferred to supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA” and noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the health,
the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it “only on June safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The
23, 1962 or more than 2 years after the area xxx had been Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified under
declared a commercial and industrial zone”. the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began Thus, the state, in order to promote the general
construction of a building devoted to banking purposes but welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected
purposes. The following day, the plaintiff demanded in to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the
writing that the construction of the commercial building be general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and to this
stopped but the defendant refused to comply contending that fundamental aim of the Government, the rights of the
the construction was in accordance with the zoning individual are subordinated.
regulations.

Issues: Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes

1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise of police power. Facts:
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the
supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant- Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of
appellee. some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangay Alubog
and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA¶s express authority 3to
Held: acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never proceedings any private land within and without the tourist
questioned. In fact, it was impliedly admitted in the zones ́ for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph
stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564). The heirs of Juancho
the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject Ardona et. Al, ) filed their oppositions, and had a common
resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with
on appeal. public use under the Constitution; alleging that there is no
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of
question the validity of the said resolution, the posture is private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that
unsustainable. PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that
of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is
subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the
The law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over
an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority
having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the
City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned
immediate possession of the premises and directing the proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the
issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus
then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction Election Code, for the reason that the appointment of
before the Supreme Court. respondent Gordon to the subjectposts made by respondent
Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the
Issue: prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11May1992 Elections.
Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose
of constructing a sports complex by the Philippine Tourism ISSUE:
Authority be considered taking for 3public use. ́ Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment
Held: or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
The states power of eminent domain extends to the
expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this RULING:
specific objective is not expressed in the constitution. The Yes. Said provision of law is unconstitutional.
policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in The section expresses the policy against the
general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, concentration of several public positions in one person, so
conservation and development of the national patrimony that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with
public interest, and general welfare, among others. The dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
and according to place. To freeze specific programs like job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an
tourism into express provisions would make the constitution executive department should be allowed to attend to his duties
more prolix than bulky code and require of the framers a and responsibilities without the distraction of other
prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded
mention in the constitution of agrarian reform and transfer of from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too
utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership many positions of responsibility, which may result in
merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to haphazardness and inefficiency. The basic idea really is to
be remedied by this programs. They do not preclude nor limit prevent a situation where a local elective official will work
the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the purposes for his appointment in an executive position in government,
like tourism and other development program and thus neglect his constituents.
The subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official,i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
Flores vs Drilon government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
FACTS: constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, the proviso
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman no moment.
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan While the second paragraph of said Constitutional
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in a petition for prohibition, provision authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be
by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
the office . . . ." 2 Para graph (d) re ads — against appointment or designation of an elective official to
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a the government post, except as are particularly recognized in
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the
with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject economic and planning agency; the Vice -President, who may
to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of
ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
chiefexecutiveofficeroftheSubicAuthority:Provided,however Judicial and Bar Council.
,ThatforthefirstyearofitsoperationsfromtheeffectivityofthisA The prohibition is more strict with respect to elective
ct, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as officials, because in the case of appointive officials, there
the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic may be a law that will allow them to hold other positions. The
Authority(emphasissupplied). distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive
Said provision allegedly infringes on the following officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to
constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. As
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
that"[n]oelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesi ineligible for appointment to another public office.
gnationinanycapacitytoanypublicofficerorpositionduringhist When Congress clothes the President with the power
enure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time
elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once
Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to before a fo reign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications with in the term “fugitive from justice”.
of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest
the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his Held:
discretion to pick his own choice. When the qualifications No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and
prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of
such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice,
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such
restriction on the power of appointment. definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who
subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition
the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be
only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation
City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the of the term.
President is precluded from exercising his discretion to
choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of Mariano vs COMELEC
appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power
at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. Facts:
It is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority Suing as taxpayers, petitioners file this declaratory
to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can relief action to assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and
qualify. While the conferment of the appointing power on the 52 of R.A. No. 7854 entitled, "An Act Converting the
President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his known as the City of Makati” on the following grounds: (1)
prerogative. it did not properly identify the land area or territorial
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his Constitution, and (2) it attempts to alter or restart the "three-
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He Petitioner also contend that the addition of another
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be reapportionment cannot made by a special law; (2) the
considered a de facto officer. addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of
The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227 is the bill; and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census,
declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment standsatonly450,000.
pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent
Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID. Held:
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments Description of Territorial Limit of LGU
received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code
Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts require that the delineation of the area of a local government
otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his unit should be made by metes and bounds, with technical
authority as officer de facto of SBMA are here by UPHELD. descriptions. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
Marquez vs COMELEC within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is constitutional. The
Facts: description made in section 2 of RA 7854 did not change the
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in land area previously covered by Makati as a
Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition municipality.Section2 stated that the city's land area "shall
praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of comprise the present territory of the municipality."
Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there
of the Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification. is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City
The following persons are disqualified from running for any of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with
local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of RA
or non-political cases here or abroad. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the litigation. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the
his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed issue. We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has
Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor- also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of
elect of Quezon. land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.
Issue: Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to
of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply.
To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua
non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
the Local Government Code seeks to serve. moment.
So long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be When a person applying for citizenship by
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, any other country or government and
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the solemnlydeclaresthatheoweshisallegiancetotheRepublicofthe
law has been sufficiently served. Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation
is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Mercado vs Manzano Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts.
FACTS: The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may
were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May or should interfere with its operation and application.
11, 1998 elections. The court ruled that the filing of certificate of
Based on the results of the election, Manzano candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
States. will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
both a Filipino and a US citizen. without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
a s candidate for said elective position. his American citizenship and anything which he may have
However, in a subsequent resolution of the said before as a dual citizen.
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part
and 1998. in past elections in this country, l eaves no doubt of his
Thus the present petition. election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he
ISSUE: will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of
public elective office in the philippines. his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
RULING: the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
result of the application of the different laws of two or more anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a constituting renunciation of hisPhilippine citizenship.
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual merit.
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution FACTS:
provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
national interest and shall be dealt with bylaw." respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual Respondent was then declared the winning candidate;
allegiance, who m ust, therefore, be subject to strict process however its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine of the Philippines but of the United States.
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and,
at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code provides that
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the for any elective position.
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not Respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is VivencioSto.Domingo,Sr.diedandwasburiedinNorthCemeter
a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino ywhichlotwasleasedbythecitytoIreneSto.Domingofortheperi
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United od fromJune 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the
States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and fullamount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt,no
is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But otherdocument embodied suchlease over the
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he lot.Believingthattheleasewasonlyforfiveyears,thecitycertifie
did not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these facts, d thelotasreadyforexhumation.
respondent is a dual citizen-both a Filipino and a US citizen. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized
the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. Hi s
ISSUE: bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice- cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. During
Mayor. the next all souls day, the pri vate respondents were
shockedtofindoutthatVicencio’sremainswereremoved.Thece
HELD: meterytoldIreneto
The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from lookforthebonesofthehusbandinthebodega.
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows operated by the City Government of Manila. The court
the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of
dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was another lot. The CA a ffi rmed and i ncluded the award of
born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and damages in favor of the private respondents.
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the Issue:
citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it is 1. WONthe
possible for the following classes of citizens of the operationsandfunctionsofapubliccemeteryareagover
Philippines to possess dual citizenship: nmental,ora
(1)Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign corporateorproprietaryfunctionoftheCity ofManila.
countries which follow the principle ofjussoli; 2. WONthe cityis liablefordamages
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and Held:
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such 1.Proprietary.Petitionersallegedin theirpetition thatthe North
children are citizens of that country; Cemeteryisexclusivelydevoted
(3)Thosewhomarryaliensifbythelawsofthelatter’s forpublicuseorpurposeasstatedinSec.316of the Compilation
countrytheformerare of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that
consideredcitizens,unlessbytheiractoromissiontheyaredeeme since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of
d to have renouncedPhilippinecitizenship. its
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in governmentalfunction,itisimmunefromtortliabilitywhichmay
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, becausedbyitspublicofficersandsubordinateemployees.
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is Privaterespondents maintain that the City of Manila entered
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s into a contract of lease which involves the exercise of
volition. proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The ci ty a nd
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present i ts officers therefore can be sued for a ny-vi olation of the
post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in contract of lease.
effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
citizenship, effectively removing any exercised byand throughits city government in conformity
disqualificationhemighthave asadualcitizen. with law, and in its proper corporate name. It maysue and be
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support one hand, and corporate, priva te and proprietary on the other.
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and Governmental powers are those exercised in administering
allegiance thereto and that he does so wi thout mental the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this they include the legislative, judicial, public and political.
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American ci Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the
tizenship and anything which he may have said before as a special benefit and advantage of the community and include
dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In
ofallegian ce to the Philippine, when considered with the fact connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity,
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code
in past elections in this divides such properties into property for public use and
country,leavesnodoubtofhiselectionofPhilippinecitizenship. patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates
Manila vs IAC the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets,
Facts: municipal s treets, the squares, fountains, public
waters,promenades,and public works for publicservice paid
for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other of 5 eligibl es for the mayor to choose one to be appointed as
propertyis patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not choose
special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Cou rt declared anyone from the list because the name of his protégé was
that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is notincludedtherein.
that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third The City of Cebu fileda complaintagainst the petitioner to
persons ex contractu. require him to include the mayor’s protégé in the list of
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a 5eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police
special law, the North Cemetery is a patrim onial property of Director to the mayor.
the City of Manila. The administration and government of the
cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and Petitionerrefusesstatingthatasidefromthefactthatsaidprotégéi
police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or snotqualified;thepowertodesignate thechiefofpoliceofCebu
tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the Cityisvested with the Regional Director. However, the mayor
same are under the charge and responsibility of the is authorized to choose the chief of police from a list of 5
superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, eligibles submitted by the Regional Director.
there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class Under RA 6975, Sec 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be
of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary deputized as representative of the National Police
or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the Commission in his territorial jurisdiction and as such the
burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. mayorshall have authority to choose the chief of police from
Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of a list of 5 eligibles recommended by the Police Regional
law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract Director. Then
executed by the lessorand lessee remains as the law between theRegionalDirector,RPCNo.7,appointstheofficerselected
them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the bythemayorastheChiefofPolice,CebuCity.
other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is Issue:
prescribed in the contract. WON the ma yor has the authority to a ppoint the Chief of
2. Yes. All things considered,even as the Court commiserates Police.
with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening complained of Held:
and untimelydesecration ofthe restingplaceand No. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor
remainsoftheirdeceaseddearlybeloved,itfindsthereliefsprayed is very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he
forbythemlackinginlegalandfactualbasis.Underthe has only the limited power of selecting one from among the
aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that list of 5 eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually,
plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject lot with the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu Cityis
another l ot of equal size and similar location in the North vestedin theRegionalDirector.
Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of with Moreover, it is the prerogative of the Regional Police
out paying any rental to the city government for a period of Director to name the 5 eligibles from a pool of eligible
forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days officers without interference from local executives. Hence,
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the the mayor cannot require the petitioner to include the mayor’s
lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978 when the remains of protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the
the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely Regional Police Director to the mayor.
removed from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants xxx
to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio FACTS:
Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot   On January 3, 1996, the position of City Director
adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder. of Cebu City Police Command became vacant after
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of P/Supt Antonio Enteria was relieved command.
grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for   Petitioner Jose S. Andaya of Regional Police
50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as Command no. 7 submitted to Cebu City Mayor
clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy Alvin Garcia a list o f 5 eligible from which the
treasurer o f the City of Manila and sealed by the city Mayorshall choose one for the stated position.
government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the However, the mayor did not choose anyone from the
reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the Inte list.Instead, he requested Andaya to include the
rmediate Appellate Court tothe name of Sarmiento.
effectthatthereceiptisinitselfacontractoflease.   Andaya refused the request on the ground that
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Sarmiento was not qualified for the position
Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memorandum
act co mmitted byits agents who failed to verify and check the Circularno.95-04.
duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the   CityofCebufiledwiththeRTCacomplaintfordeclar
petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative atoryrelief.TCrenderedadecisioninfavorofplaintiff,d
OrderNo.5,seriesof1975datedMarch6,1975oftheCityofManil eclaringSarmientoqualified for the position a nd his
aforfive(5)yearsonlybeginningfromJune6,1971is name was ordered to be i ncluded in the l ist of
notmeritoriousforthe said administrative order covers new eligible. Hence, this petition.
leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ISSUE:
ready for exhumation, the lease contract for WON the mayor of Cebu may require the regional
fifty(50)yearswasstillin fullforceandeffect. director of regional police command no 7, to include
Andaya vs RTC the mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligible
Facts: candidates to be recommended by the Reg. Police
Petitioner Andaya, Regional Director, Regional Police Director to the mayor from which the latter shall
Command No. 7, submitted to the City Mayor of Cebu a list
 choose the a City Director, City Police Grego vs COMELEC
CommandforCebu. Facts:
RULING: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local
  SCresolvesagainstthepositionofCityMayor. Government Code of 1991, private respondent Humberto
  RA no. 6975, Section 51 gives authority to the Basco was removed from his pos ition as Deputy Sheriff by
Mayor of Cebu City to choose the chief of police no l ess than the Supreme Court upon a finding of s erious
from a list of 5 eligible re commended by misconduct i n a n administrative complaint.
the RD, Regional Police Command. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the
  The NAPOLCOM has issued Memo Circular for Second District of the City of Manila in the January 18, 1988
the implementation of RA 6975. It provides that local elections. He won and
among the qualifications od the chief of assumedoffice.Hewassuccessfullyre-electedin1992and1995.
p o l ice o f h ighly u rb anized ci ties. Ma yo r su Itwashislatestre-
bmits th at su ch is n ot va lid as i t co ntrave nes th electionwhichisthesubjectofthepresentpetitiononthegroundth
e law. atheisdisqualifiedunderSection40(b)oftheLGCof 1991. Unde
  SC does notagree with mayor. Under Republic r s aid section, those remove d from office as a re sult of an
Act No. 6975, Section 51, the mayor of Cebu administrative case are disqualified to run for any e lective
Cityshall be deputized as representative of local position.
the Commission in his territorial jurisdiction and as Issue:
such the mayor shall have authority to choose the Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991
chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles apply retroactively to those removed from office before it
recommended by the Police Regional Director. The took effect on January 1, 1992?
City Police Station of Cebu City is under the direct Held:
command and control of the PNP Regional Director, TheSupremeCourtheldthatitsrefusaltogiveretroactiveapplicat
Regional Police Command No. 7, and is equivalent iontotheprovisionofSection40(b)isalreadyasettledissueand
to a provincial office. Then, the Regional Director, thereexistno compelling reason for the Court to depart
Regional Pol i ce Command No. 7 a ppoints the therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does
officer s elected by the mayor as the Ci ty Di rector, not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office and
Ci ty Police Command (chief of police) Ce bu City. that itis couched in the past tense should not deter the Court
  Police Director has prerogative to name 5 from applying the law prospectively. A statute, despite the
eligibles. generality in its language, must not be so construed as to
  It is the prerogative of the Regional Police overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its
Director to name the five (5) eligibles from a pool of passage.
eligible officers screened by the Senior xxx
Officers Promotion and Selection Board, FACTS:
Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Camp In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy
Crame, Quezon City, without interferen ce from Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a
localexecutives candidate for councilo r in the
SecondDistrictoftheCityofManiladuringthe
  Powertoappointisvestedinpoliceregionaldirector
1988,localelections.Hewonandassumedoffice.Afterhisterm,
  As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the
Bascosoughtre-election.Again, he won. However, he found
mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no power of
himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted to
appointment; he has only the
dislodge him from his position.
limited power of selecting one from among the list
Petitionerargues that Basco should be disqualified from
of five eligibles to be named the chief of police.
running foranyelective position since he had been “removed
Actually, the power to appoint the
from office as a resultof an a dministrative ca se” pursuant to
chi e f of police of Ce bu Ci ty is ve sted i n the
Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
Regional Director, Re gional Police Command No.
Fora third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995.
7.
Expectedly, his right to office was again contested.In 1995,
  Incaseofdisagreementbetweenthepoliceandthema petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a
yor,theregionaldirectoroftheNAPOLCOMwilldecid petitionfordisqualification.TheCOMELECconducteda
e hearingandorderedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememora
  Mayorhasnopowertorequirepoliceregionaldirecto nda.
rtoincludenameofanyofficerinthelistof5eligibles However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May
  Much less may the mayor require the Regional 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of
Director, Regional Police Command, to include the Manila, placing sixth among s e ve ral candidates who vi ed
name of any officer, no matter how for the s eats. Basco i mmediately took his oath of office.
qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for
mayor. The purpose is to enhance police disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
professionalism and to isolate the police said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence,
service from political domination. this petition.
  The court GRANTS the petition and sets aside the ISSUE:
decision of the RTC. Sole discretion of RC, WhetherornotCOMELECactedinwith
Regional Police Command no. 7 to submit to ci ty graveabuseofdiscretionin dismissingthepetition
ma yor of Ce bu a list of 5 e ligibles which the mayor fordisqualification.
shall choose therefrom the chief of police. I n ca se RULING:
of re fusal, RD will decide.
No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion The term served must therefore be one “for which *the
on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the petition for official concerned+ was elected.” The purpose of this
disqualificati on, however, the Court noted that they do not provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed the number of terms an elective official may serve.
resolution. Conversely, if he is not s erving a term for which he was
The Court reiterated that being merelyan implementing rule, elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to
override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony have fullyserved the term not wi thstanding his voluntary re
with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative nunciation of office prior to i ts expiration.
rules and regulatio ns are intended to carry out, neither to The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve i n
extended to amending or expanding the statutory the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
requirements or to embrace mattersnotcovered an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
bythestatute.An administrative agencycannotamend elective local office, he must also have been elected to the s
anactofCongress. ame position for the same number of times before the
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or disqualification can apply.
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law xxx
prevails be cause said rule or regulations cannot go beyond Facts:
the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on
Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On
COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law,
employed the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter,
highly irregular for the COMELEC to have Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms,
usedinsteadtheword“shall”initsrules. from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U.Borja, Jr., who
Borja vs COMELEC wasalso a candidate for mayor,sought Capco’s
Facts: disqualification on the ground that Capco would
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor havealreadyservedas Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June
of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco
of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision
next two succeeding electi ons in 1992 and 1995, he was and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was
againre-elected as Mayor. subsequently voted andproclaimedas mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a Issue:
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of
May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s term is considered to have s e rve d a te rm in that office for
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have a l the purpose of the three-term l imit.
ready s erved a s mayor for thre e consecutive te rms by June Held:
30, 1998 a nd would therefore be i neligible to s erve for a No. The termlimit for elective local officials must be taken to
nother t e rm a fter that. refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the
TheSecondDivisionoftheCommissiononElections same elective position. Consequently,itis not enough thatan
ruledinfavorofpetitioneranddeclaredprivaterespondentCapco individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
disqualifiedfromrunning for re e l ection as mayor of Pa teros local office,he mustalso have been elected to the same
but i n the motion for re consideration, majority ove rturned position for the same number of times before the
the original decision. disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again
Issue: as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to
WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
Mayor? thrust into it by operati on of law. Neither had he served the
Held: full term because he only continued the service, interrupted
No. ArticleX,Sec.8ofthe Constitutionprovides that “...the by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s
termofofficeofelectivelocalofficials......shallbe three assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
yearsandnosuchofficialshall more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in
serveformorethanthreeconsecutiveterms. that office should not be counted in the applicationof anyterm
Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnot limit.
beconsideredasaninterruption inthe The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X,
continuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.” §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
Thisprovisionisrestatedinpar.43(b)oftheLocalGovernmentCo dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
de(R.A.No.71)whichstatesthat people. A consideration of the historical background of Art.
“...nolocalelectiveofficialshallserveformore than three (3) X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
considered as an with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
interruptioninthecontinuityofserviceforthefulltermforwhicht discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so
heelective officialconcernedwaselected....” on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving
by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the REFERENDUMonly.
first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the
reelection footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27
wouldbenotonlytofalsifyrealitybutalsotoundulyrestricttherig times, but "initiative"is not mentioned atall. The Comelec
htof thepeopletochoosewhomtheywishtogovernthem. labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
Subic Bay vs COMELEC were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
FACTS: "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not
Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution
Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an I NI TI
implement the declared national policy of converting the ATIVE.
Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls indepen
Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. dent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or
task, particularly the preservation of the sea -ports, airport, reject any act or measure which has been passed bya
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American legislative bodyand whichinmostcaseswouldwithoutactionon
navy. thepartofelectorsbecomea law.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to
expressing therein its absolute concurre nce, as re quired by its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making
said Se c. 12 of RA 7227, to joi n the Subic Special Economic powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Zone a nd s ubmitted such to t he Office of the President. Commission cannot control or change the substance or the
On Ma y 24, 1993, re s pondents Garcia filed a petition with content of legislation.
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pa mbaya ng 2. The localinitiative
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Se rye 1993. isNOTultraviresbecausethemunicipalresolutionisstillin
The petition prayed for the following:a) to nullify Pambayang theproposalstageandnotyetanapproved law.
Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. Itis not
Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to joinprovidedconditions yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there
are met. would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
1993, requesting Congress of the Phi lippines s o amend enforced orimplemented thereunder. At this point,itis
certain provisions of RA 7227. merelya proposaland the writor prohibition cannotissue upon
Notsatisfied,respondentsresorted to a mere
theirpowerinitiativeundertheLGCof1991. conjectureorpossibility.Constitutionallyspeaking,courtsmayd
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local ecideonlyactualcontroversies,nothypotheticalquestions
initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a orcases.
resolution and not an ordinance. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does
therein the portion of the not have the same authority in regard to the proposed
formernavalbasewithintheterritorialjurisdictionoftheMunicip initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
alityof Morong. passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has
No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues
local referendum and providing for "the rulesand guidelines brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
to govern the conduct of the referendum verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari Hence, there is really no decision oraction made bya
contesting the validityof Resolution No. 2848 alleging that branch,instrumentality or court which this Court could take
public respondent is intent on proceedingwitha cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of
localinitiativethatproposesanamendmentofanationallaw its review powers.
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion League of the Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC
in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs (April 12, 2011 & February 15, 2011)
the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal PambayangKapasyahan Blg. 10 Facts:
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA
within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code
i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
a national law." of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million
HELD: to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities to convert into
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
FIRST.TheprocessstartedbyprivaterespondentswasanINITIA Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
TIVEbutrespondentComelecmadepreparationsfora independence.
 Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average
24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the following requisites:
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100)
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities square kilometers, as certified by the Land
mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed Management Bureau; or
between November and December of 2006, through their (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
containing a common provision, as follows: National Statistics Office.
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population
under Republic Act No. 9009. and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from herein.
March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
failed to sign them. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
city shall be properly identified by metes and
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X apply where the city proposed to be created is
of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share more islands.
of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set (c) The average annual income shall include the
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
Code. special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Issue: Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for

1. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
protection clause amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from
2. Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision the increased income requirement.
it already rendered.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits
Held: a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and
the equal protection clause 1. The classification must rest on substantial
distinctions;
Ratio: 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be conditions only; and
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary 4. The classification must apply equally to all members
substantially altered, except in accordance with the of the same class.
criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. the requirement that the classification must apply to all
(Emphasis supplied) similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the
16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the
units must follow the criteria established in the Local exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria protection clause.
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion
of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such 2. Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the
operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides: unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code)
operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of requires cities to pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for
the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, Section 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government
the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they unit may, through its chief executive and acting
violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are Provided however, That the power of eminent
valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left definite offer has been previously made to the
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the further, That the local government unit may
Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their immediately take possession of the property upon
unconstitutionality. the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
Spouses Yusay vs CA property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That,
FACTS: the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
The petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as fair market value at the time of the taking of the
their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other property.
families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only
source of income. A resolution like Resolution No. 552 merely expresses the
sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of
1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
inhabitants. The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the
annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
and effect. The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the members. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from
legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the
definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant
hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature. circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion
through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang
ISSUE: Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all
Whether or not the validity of Resolution No. 552 can be gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
assailed before its Implementation? constitutionally protected right.

HELD:
No. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is Sta. Lucia Realty vs City of Pasig
equivalent to lack of cause of action. In view of the absence
of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and Facts:
providing for the expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed Pasig filed a complaint against Sta. Lucia for the collection of
in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action. As of Real estate Taxes. The subject properties are alleged to be
then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any within the boundaries of Cainta and STa. lucia has been
judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be paying the taxes to Cainta like its predecessors-in-interest did
exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified although the TCTs of the subject properties indicate that the
complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the properties where in the locality of Pasig. Cainta has already
expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no filed a petition for the settlement of land boundary dispute
expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, with Pasig before an RTC in Antipolo when the complaint by
the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of Pasig was filed. Said boundary dispute case is still pending
their property under the power of eminent domain. before the Antipolo RTC. the RTC which handled the tax case
ruled in favor of Pasig and ordered STa. Lucia to pay Pasig
real estate taxes on the properties and its improvements. It
held that the titles were conclusive as to where the properties
were located and that the pending case in antipolo does not d. RTC denied this. TCTs were conclusive
pose a prejudicial question to the case at bar since both are evidence as to the ownership and location. It
civil cases. ordered Sta lucia to pay P273349.17
representing unpaid real estate taxes and
The Supreme Court stated that the Municipality, before it can penalties among others
exercise its powers in a certain area, must show first that the
area is within its geographical boundaries. A certificate of i. Judgment was also rendered against Cainta
title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does and was ordered to refund to Sta. Lucia the
not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of improperly collected and received tax
attacking the statements therein. Antipolo RTC would be able payments amounting to P358,403.68
to best determine once and for all the precise metes and
bounds of both Pasig’s and Cainta’s respective territorial e. Sta lucia and Cainta filed their notices of
jurisdiction. And this would then ascertain as to which Appeal. Pasig on the other hand filed an MR
municipality can exercise its powers over the subject i. RTC granted the MR and modified its
properties. Although the general rule is that for there to be a decision to include the realty taxes due on
prejudicial question, one must be acriminal case while the the improvements of the subject lots. Sta
other is a civil case, the SC has relaxed the application of the Lucia now ordered to pay P5,627,757.07
rule and at one time allowed one civil case to be held in representing unpaid taxes and penalties on
abeyance while another civil case was pending that was the improvements
interrelated to it. For the meantime Sta. Lucia is asked to f. Sta. Lucia filed an amended notice of appeal to
deposit the taxes due in an escrow account with Land Bank. include the modified ruling

1. Sta. lucia realty is the registered owner of several 5. Pasig filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
parcels of land with TCT nos. 39112, 29110 and STa lucia and Cainta opposed this but RTC still
28457 all of which indicated that the lots were ordered the issuance of A writ of Execution against
located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Sta. Lucia
Pasig 6. Sta. Lucia filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA.
this was raffled to the first division which granted
a. 39112 was consolidated with TCT 518403 the petition and set aside and declared null and void
(another lot) which was situated in Barrio the order granting the motion for execution. That the
Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, boundary dispute presented a prejudicial question
province of Rizal. The lot was later partitioned which must be decided before Pasig can collect
into 3 which now bear the cainta address realty taxes over the subject properties
b. 39110 was divided into 2 lots
c. 38457 was not segregated but a commercial a. Pasig filed a petition for Certiorari before the
building was built on it SC but this was denied for being filed out of
time
2. The land registration court, upon Pasig’s petition,
ordered the amendment of the TCTs with respect to 7. Meanwhile the appeal filed by STa. lucia and Cainta
TCT no. 39112 to read that they were located in was raffled to the Seventh division of CA which
Pasig. ruled that the appealed decision is affirmed with the
modification of deleting the attorney’s fees
3. Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of land (P50,000)
boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC Br 74
of Antipolo. Case is still pending a. There was no proper legal basis to suspend the
proceedings. There can be no prejudicial
4. Pasig filed a complaint against Sta. Lucia for the question since both are civil cases. That the
collection of Real estate taxes including penalties elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping
and interests on the lots covered by the subject were not met.
properties b. MRs were denied
c. STa .Lucia and Cainta filed separate petitions
a. STA. Lucia: it had been religiously paying to for Certiorar ibut in this case STa. lucia is the
cainta just like what its predecessors-in-interest subject of the decision.
did by virtue of the demands and assessments
made by Cainta. ISSUES
b. Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in- 1. Whether RTC and the CA were correct in deciding
intervention when it moved to intervene on the Pasig’s complaint without waiting for the resolution
ground that its interest would be greatly of the boundary dispute case between Pasig and
affected by the outcome of the case. That it had Cainta.
been collecting taxes on the properties even 2. Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real
before Sta. Lucia acquired them. property taxes to Cainta (or should it now pay its
c. STa. lucia and Cainta moved for the suspension taxes to Pasig)
of the proceedings claiming tha the pending
petition before the Antipolo RTC (fact #3) HELD:
presented a prejudicial question to the
resolution of the case
1. The resolution of the boundary dispute would determine confusion between litigants and courts. It bears
which local government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes stressing that whether or not the RTC would suspend
from Sta. Lucia the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted
 Sec. 5 and Sec. 57 of PD 464 or the Real Property to its sound discretion.
Tax Code and Sectons 201 and 233 of the RA 7160  Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the
or the 1991 Local Government Code (see annex) proceedings in the civil case before it in view of the
tells us that while a local government unit is fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case
authorized under several laws to collect real estate before the Antipolo RTC will undeniable affect both
tax on properties falling under its territorial Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. Had the territorial
jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these boundaries of the contending local government units
properties are unquestionably within its herein been delineated with accuracy, then there
geographical boundaries would be no controversy at all.
 Mariano Jr. v. COMELEC: The importance of
drawing with precise strokes the territorial 2. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties,
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines
they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of
a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise Petition GRANTED. CA resolution SET ASIDE. Pasig and
powers of government only within the limits of its Cainta are both directed to await the judgment before the
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts Antipolo RTC to determine which LGU is entitled to collect
are ultra vires. the real property taxes.
 The local government unit entitled to collect real
property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly Related Laws:
show that the subject properties are situated within Presidential Decree No. 464 or the “Real Property Tax Code,”
its territorial jurisdiction, otherwise, it would be
acting beyond the powers vested to it by law. Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. — All real
 While the SC agrees that a certificate of title is property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does appraised at the current and fair market value
not preclude the filing of an action for the very prevailing in the locality where the property is
purpose of attacking the statements therein situated.
 While certificates are indefeasible, unassailable and
binding against the whole world, they do not create Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of
or vest title. They merely confirm or record title treasurers. — The collection of the real property tax
already existing and vested and cannot be used to and all penalties accruing thereto, and the
protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they enforcement of the remedies provided for in this
be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; Code or any applicable laws, shall be the
neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or
expense of other. municipality where the property is situated.
 Although the TCTs state Pasig as the locality of the
subject properties, both Sta. lucia and Cainta aver Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local
that the metes and bounds as described in the TCTs Government Code
are actually within Cainta’s boundaries.
 The Antipolo RTC would be able to best determine Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. – All real
once and for all the precise metes and bounds of both property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
Pasig’s and Cainta’s respective territorial appraised at the current and fair market value
jurisdiction. This would then ascertain the extent prevailing in the locality where the property is
and reach of each local government’s authority, a situated. The Department of Finance shall
prerequisite in the proper exercise of their powers promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for
including the power of taxation. the classification, appraisal, and assessment of real
property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.
 Although the general rule is that there is no
prejudicial question when both cases are civil, the
Section 233. Rates of Levy. – A province or city or
court held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros oriental Br.
a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area
42 that in interest of good order, the SC can very
shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax
well suspend the action on one case pending the final
outcome of another closely interrelated or linked to applicable to their respective localities as follows: x
x x.
the first.
 In any case, under the Rules of Court, a trial court
Rule 135
may control its own proceedings according to its
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court shall have
sound discretion (Rule 135 Sec. 5(g))
power:
 The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the xxxx
power inherent in every court to control the
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering
them conformable to law and justice.
its time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants.
But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done
in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments,
New Sun Valley Homeowners’ Association, Inc. vs. reserved for public use; ownership of which is
Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley, automatically vested in the Republic of the
Parañaque City Philippines although it is still registered in the name
[G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011] of the developer/owner, its donation to the
government is a mere formality. The power or
authority to close or open the said streets is vested in
Facts: the local government units and not on homeowner’s
associations, pursuant to Section 21 of the local
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the Government Code. Hence there is no right
“BSV Sangguniang Barangay”) issued BSV Resolution, whatsoever on the part of Plaintiff NSVHA entitled
entitled “Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners to the protection of the law.
Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to
Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic.” After considering the arguments of the parties, the case was
thereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction was
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. lifted. Thereafter, NSVHAI filed a Motion for
(NSVHAI), represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC. The
a Petition for a “Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent petitioners raised the matter to the CA, but the latter affirmed
Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO with the Regional the decision of the RTC to dismiss the case. The CA likewise
Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City. It was claimed that the denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence,
implementation of BSV Resolution would “cause grave this petition.
injustice and irreparable injury.”
Issue:
NSVHAI went on to state that a deterioration of the peace and
order condition inside the subdivision would be inevitable; Whether or not the Barangay has the power to pass such
the traffic condition would worsen and criminal elements resolution to open the roads in the said subdivision?
would take advantage of the opening to public use of the
roads in question. Ruling:

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order, but on Yes. In the case, the petitioner dared to question the
November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order stating that, barangay’s ownership over the subject roads when it should
by agreement of the parties, the status quo shall be have been the one to adduce evidence to support its broad
maintained, and that the case was set for hearing on the prayer claims of exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did not submit
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership. Despite such
November 20, 1998. lack of authority, the homeowners moved for the closing the
subject roads that belonged to the then Municipality of
NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition, wherein it claimed Parañaque and were already being used by the public,
that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over limiting their use exclusively to the subdivision’s
the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the "subject homeowners, and even collecting fees from delivery vans that
roads"). NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended Petition would pass through the gates that they themselves had built.
its Position Paper, which set forth its objection to the opening
of the subject roads for public use and argued that a Barangay On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close
Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local
roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:
such an act.
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. – (a) A
The RTC heard the case, wherein it granted the petition a writ local government unit may, pursuant to an
of preliminary injunction prohibiting the Sangguniang ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open
Barangay from implementing Resolution. In opposition, the any local road, alley, park, or square falling within
BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed a Motion for its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of
Reconsideration and to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction (with permanent closure, such ordinance must be
Memorandum of Authorities). approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the Sanggunian, and when necessary, an
Despite the petitioner moving to expunge the motion for adequate substitute for the public facility that is
reconsideration filed by the respondents, the RTC subject to closure is provided.
subsequently dismissed the case in an Order, stating as
follows: The court quoted the ruling of the CA as follows:

In summary, defendant alleges that the subject Contrary, however, to Petitioner-Appellant’s

streets Aster and Rosemallow inside Sun Valley position, the above-quoted provision, which requires
Subdivision are owned by the local government. the passage of an ordinance by a local government
Such streets have long been part of the public unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have
domain and beyond the commerce of man. In no applicability to the instant case since the
support of this, defendant cited the case of White subdivision road lots sought to be opened to
Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow
wherein it was held that road lots of subdivisions and Aster Streets – have already been donated by the
constitute a part of the mandatory open space Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto
 already issued in the name of, the City Government
of Parañaque since the year 1964. This fact has not Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused
even been denied by the Petitioner-Appellant in the guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper.
proceedings below nor in the present recourse.
Having been already donated or turned over to the
City Government of Parañaque, the road lots in Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
question have since then taken the nature of public
roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of Facts:
man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by
claims of herein Petitioner-Appellant. the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
The Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and Maguindanao.
interests of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision, but it
miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its In response to this, on November 24, 2009 President Arroyo
ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a “state of
remedy prayed for. As petitioner has failed to establish that it emergency” in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
has any right entitled to the protection of the law, the Supreme City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in
Court denied their petition. Thus, the decision of the CA was Central Mindanao.
affirmed.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Ambil vs Sandiganbayan Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except
Facts: for identified areas of the MILF.
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial
warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Two days later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo
Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. submitted her report to Congress in accordance with sec. 18,
3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her,
Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to
detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her
transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s action. In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted
residence. based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The
Issues: President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement
suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified of their heavily armed units in strategic positions, the closure
to be cognizable before the lower courts. of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal
2) Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal
mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars
Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act. with unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.

Held: On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened

The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one pursuant to sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
of the 2 accused held a position with a classification of Salary review the validity of the President’s action.
Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies
a position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive But, two days later or on December 12, 2009, before
jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has Congress could act, the President issued Presidential
jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
offense although he had a salary grade of 22.

The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local

Government Code and Administrative Code of 1917 does not Petitioners’ contention:
include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the
the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President
was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao on the
applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative following grounds:
to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision
was meant to include officers with such duty to the list 1. For gross insufficiency of the factual basis in
already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide proclaiming a state of martial law and
exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the suspending the [writ] in the Province of
reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude Maguindanao.
application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, 2. It is patently illegal and unconstitutional for
which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a lack of any factual basis.
private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity 3. The validity of Proclamation No. 1959,
to protect his personal interest. declaring a state of martial law in the province
 of Maguindanao, except for the identified areas In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, the COMELEC
of the MILF, and suspending the writ in the Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent,
same area. declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty
post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy
Respondents’ contention: for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to
President Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the
martial law and restoring the writ in the province of law.
Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the present
petitions moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010
petitions have ceased to present an "actual case or Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which
controversy" with the lifting of martiallaw and the restoration the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he
of the writ, the sufficiency of the factual basis of which is the was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after
subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is allegedly garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said
a "supervening event" that rendered of no practical use or position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the
value the consolidated petitions. COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

Issue: In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the COMELEC en

Respondents’ also questioned the legal standing of the banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
petitioners. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for
Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the
WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a
law and restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
rendered the issues raised in the petitions moot and academic. 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26
January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the
Held: COMELEC.
Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the
petitions raised moot and academic because the court has ISSUE:
nothing to review. The Proclamation on Martial Law and Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Writ of habeas corpus was already lifted through in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-
Proclamation No. 1963 before the Congress could perform its year residency requirement for local elective officials.
duty to review and validate.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President RULING:

and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence.
habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only However, exceptions thereto have been established, including
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is
of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and
not have. correct the COMELEC's error.

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact

Sabili vs. Commission on Elections definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;"
FACTS: the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) to an evasion of a positive duty.
for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the one year
residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We
mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant
that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
eight (8) months. decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition
during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of
at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by
Batangas. Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.
filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of
that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years judgment, not of jurisdiction.
and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action
on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the Ruling:
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of R.A. No. 6055 granted tax exemptions to educational
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave institutions like petitioner which converted to non-stock, non-
abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. profit educational foundations.

Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s On February 19, 1977, P.D 1096 was issued adopting the
use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue National Building Code of the Philippines. The said Code
of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of requires every person, firm or corporation, including any
his residency qualification in his COC as to order its agency or instrumentality of the government to obtain a
cancellation. building permit for any construction, alteration or repair of
any building or structure.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not Exempted from the payment of building permit fees are:
sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least
one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the Public buildings and Traditional indigenous family
evidence adduced by the parties and the COMELEC’s dwellings.
appreciation thereof.
Not being expressly included in the enumeration of structures
Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are to which the building permit fees do not apply, petitioner’s
tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in denying his COC claim for exemption rests solely on its interpretation of the
committed grave abuse of discretion. The court here defined term “other charges imposed by the National Government” in
what grave abuse of discretion is; and by that chose and ruled the tax exemption clause of R.A. No. 6055.
to review the acts of COMELEC under its jurisdiction.
A “charge” is broadly defined as the “price of, or rate for,
Eventually he was able to prove that he was a resident of Lipa something,” while the word “fee” pertains to a “charge fixed
and the SC granted his petition. by law for services of public officers or for use of a privilege
under control of government.” As used in the LGC, charges
refers to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons
Angeles University Foundation vs. City of Angeles or property, while fee means a charge fixed by law or
ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
Facts: activity.
 Petitioner is an educational institution and was
converted into a non-stock, non-profit education Note that the “other charges” mentioned in Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
foundation under the provisions of R.A. 6055 6055 is qualified by the words “imposed by the Government
 Sometime in August 2005, petitioner filed with the on all property used exclusively for the educational activities
Office of the City Building Official an application of the foundation.”
for a building permit for the construction of an 11-
storey building Building permit fees are not impositions on property but on
 Said office issued a Building Permit Fee Assessment the activity subject of government regulation. While it may
in the amount of P126,839.20 and P238,741.64 as be argued that the fees relate to particular properties, i.e.,
Locational Clearance Fee. buildings and structures, they are actually imposed on certain
 Petitioner claimed that it is exempt from the activities the owner may conduct either to build such
payment of the building permit and locational structures or to repair, alter, renovate or demolish the same.
clearance fees, citing legal opinions rendered by the
DOJ. That a building permit fee is a regulatory imposition.
 Petitioner also reminded the respondents that they
Thus, ancillary permits such as electrical permit, sanitary
have previously issued building permits
permit and zoning clearance must also be secured and the
acknowledging such exemption from payment of
corresponding fees paid before a building permit may be
building permit fees on the construction of
issued.
petitioner’s 4-storey AUF Information Technology
Center building
Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they
 Petitioner stresses that the tax exemption granted to
are not impositions from which petitioner is exempt.
educational stock corporations which have
converted into non-profit foundations was
As to petitioner’s argument that the building permit fees
broadened to include any other charges imposed by
collected by respondents are in reality taxes because the
the Government as one of the incentives for such
primary purpose is to raise revenues for the local government
conversion.
unit, the same does not hold water.
Issues:
A charge of a fixed sum which bears no relation at all to the
1. Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of
cost of inspection and regulation may be held to be a tax
building permit and related fees imposed under the
rather than an exercise of the police power. In this case, the
National Building Code; and
Secretary of Public Works and Highways who is mandated to
2. Whether the parcel of land owned by petitioner
prescribe and fix the amount of fees and other charges that
which has been assessed for real property tax is
the Building Official shall collect in connection with the
likewise exempt.
performance of regulatory functions, has promulgated and After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent
issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations which Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
provide for the bases of assessment of such fees Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-
EMB RVI) issued to the Province Environmental Compliance
Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the bases of assessment Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for
were arbitrarily determined or unrelated to the activity being Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64
regulated. Neither has petitioner adduced evidence to show hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing
that the rates of building permit fees imposed and collected jetty port.
by the respondents were unreasonable or in excess of the cost
of regulation and inspection. On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA
with PRA which stated that the land use development of the
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and
the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that
measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public
will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some consultation meetings.
form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is
primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the
exercise of the police power of the state, even though Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and
incidentally, revenue is generated. petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization
composed of some 160 businessmen and residents in
Concededly, in the case of building permit fees imposed by Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation
the National Government under the National Building Code, project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.
revenue is incidentally generated for the benefit of local
government units. Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their
objections and issued a notice to the contractor on December
Section 208: the Building Official is hereby authorized to 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project.
retain not more than twenty percent of his collection for the Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the
operating expenses of his office. instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance
of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court
The remaining eighty percent shall be deposited with the issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
provincial, city or municipal treasurer and shall accrue to the and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments
General Fund of the province, city or municipality concerned. to the petition.

Now, on petitioner’s claim that it is exempted from the The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among
payment of real property tax assessed against its real property others:
presently occupied by informal settlers. a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable
endorsement of the LGU concerned;
Petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that its real b) the Province failed to conduct the required
property is actually, directly and exclusively used for consultation procedures as required by the
educational purposes. While there is no allegation or proof Local Government Code (LGC).
that petitioner leases the land to its present occupants, still
there is no compliance with the constitutional and statutory The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with
requirement that said real property is actually, directly and the requirements of DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the
exclusively used for educational purposes. The respondents approval of the reclamation project by the said government
correctly assessed the land for real property taxes for the agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the Barangay
taxable period during which the land is not being devoted Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
solely to petitioner’s educational activities. Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said project,
had “categorically addressed all the issues” raised by the BFI
in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature
Boracay Foundation, Inc. vs. Province of Aklan for lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI to fully
exhaust the available administrative remedies even before
FACTS: seeking judicial relief.
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1
million in the future, respondent Province of Aklan planned ISSUES:
to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, 1. WON the petition is premature because petitioner
Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7, 2009, the failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a filing this case?
resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file an 2. WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public
application with respondent Philippine Reclamation consultation for the project?
Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore
area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated RULING:
on the possible expansion from its original proposed On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust
reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in administrative remedies
order to maximize the utilization of its resources.
The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to
exhaust administrative remedies and to observe the hierarchy Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a
of courts as claimed by the respondents. national project since it affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the
The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals Court noted that such national projects mentioned in Section
where they clarified that the rule regarding exhaustion of 27 of the LGC include those that may cause pollution and
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not bring about climate change, among others, such as the
applicable where, among others, there are circumstances reclamation project in this case.
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the
instant case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy or where the should “initiate public consultations early in order to ensure
protestant has no other recourse. that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are
taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation
Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental of the management plan”.
Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the
under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special PRA’s power to reclaim land in this case, to conduct prior
civil action that may be availed of “to compel the consultations and prior approval. However, the information
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law” and dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already
which provides for the issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary been issued was insufficient to comply with the requirements
remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.” under the LGC.

The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and
to file a verified petition in the proper court when any approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of
government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of
“unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were
specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or Province.
regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
Such proper court may be the Regional Trial Court exercising City of Manila vs. Alegar Corporation
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme FACTS:
Court. This case is about the issues that a local government unit has
to cope with when expropriating private property for
Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or socialized housing. The City Council of Manila passed
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine Ordinance 8012 that authorized the City Mayor to acquire
the questions of unique national and local importance raised certain lots belonging to respondents Alegar Corporation,
that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection. Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda,
for use in the socialized housing project of petitioner City of
Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus “permits the Manila. The City offered to buy the lots at P1,500.00 per
court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure square meter (sq m) but the owners rejected this as too low
the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under with the result that the City filed a complaint for expropriation
the court’s decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may against them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
compel the submission of compliance reports from the Manila.
respondent government agencies as well as avail of other
means to monitor compliance with its decision.” The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the City
did not comply with Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) 7279
On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, (Urban Development Housing Act) which set the order of
and sufficient public consultation for the project priority in the acquisition of properties for socialized housing.
Private properties ranked last in the order of priorities for such
The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and acquisition and the City failed to show that no other properties
sufficient public consultation for the project. were available for the project. The City also failed to comply
with Section 10 which authorized expropriation only when
The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of resort to other modes (such as community mortgage, land
national government agencies in the maintenance of swapping, and negotiated purchase) had been exhausted. On
ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
consultations and approval of local government units. In Hence, this petition.
Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court
emphasized that, under the Local Government Code, two ISSUE:
requisites must be met before a national project that affects 1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s
the environmental and ecological balance of local ruling that the City failed to comply with the
communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 in
the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the trying to acquire the subject lots by expropriation;
project by the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either 2. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to set aside
of such mandatory requirements will render the project’s the RTC’s ruling that the City failed to establish the
implementation as illegal.
 existence of genuine necessity in expropriating the property owner rejects the offer but hints for a better
subject lots for public use or purpose; and price, the government should renegotiate by calling
3. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that the property owner to a conference.
the owners’ withdrawal of its P1.5 million deposit
constituted implied consent to the expropriation of The government must exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain
their lots. by agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will
warrant the dismissal of the complaint. Article 35 of the Rules
HELD: and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
1. The CA correctly ruled that the City failed to show that it provides for this procedure. Thus:
complied with the requirements of Section 9 of R.A. 7279
which lays down the order of priority in the acquisition Article 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale —
through expropriation of lands for socialized housing. This
section provides: (a) The offer to buy private property for public use
or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the
Section 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its
acquisition, and the price offered. x x x x (c) If the
Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but
following order: (a) Those owned by the at a price higher than that offered to them, the local
Government or any of its subdivisions, chief executive shall call them to a conference for
instrumentalities, or agencies, including the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling
government-owned or controlled corporations and price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance
their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any
domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its
lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas for representative, shall participate in the conference.
Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program When an agreement is reached by the parties, a
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement contract of sale shall be drawn and executed. Here,
Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) the City of Manila initially offered P1,500.00 per sq
Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services m to the owners for their lots. But after the latter
or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; rejected the offer, claiming that the offered price was
and (f) Privately-owned lands. Where on-site even lower than their current zonal value, the City
development is found more practicable and did not bother to renegotiate or improve its offer.
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities The intent of the law is for the State or the local
mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government to make a reasonable offer in good faith,
government units shall give budgetary priority to on- not merely a pro forma offer to acquire the property.
site development of government lands. (Emphasis
supplied) The City of course argues that it did not The Court cannot treat the requirements of Sections 9 and 10
have to observe the order of priority provided above of R.A. 7279 lightly. It held in Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-
in acquiring lots for socialized housing since it Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. City ofManila, that these
found on-site development to be more practicable requirements are strict limitations on the local government’s
and advantageous to the beneficiaries who were exercise of the power of eminent domain.
these lots’ long-time occupants. But the problem
remains. The City did not adduce evidence that this They are the only safeguards of property owners against the
was so. exercise of that power. The burden is on the local government
to prove that it satisfied the requirements mentioned or that
Besides, Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the acquisition they do not apply in the particular case.
of private property by “negotiated sale” over the filing of an
expropriation suit. It provides that such suit may be resorted 2. Admittedly, the City alleged in its amended complaint that
to only when the other modes of acquisitions have been it wanted to acquire the subject lots in connection with its
exhausted. Thus: land-for-the-landless program and that this was in accord
Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.— with its Ordinance 8012. But the City misses the point. The
owners directly challenged the validity of the objective of its
The modes of acquiring land for purposes of this Act action. They alleged that the taking in this particular case of
shall include, among others, community mortgage, their lots is not for public use or purpose since its action
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land would benefit only a few. Whether this is the case or not, the
banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture owners’ answer tendered a factual issue that called for
agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: evidence on the City’s part to prove the affirmative of its
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be allegations. As already stated, the City submitted the issue for
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition the RTC’s resolution without presenting evidence.
have been exhausted; Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned 3. The City insists that it made a deposit of P1.5 million with
by small property owners shall be exempted for the RTC by way of advance payment on the lots it sought to
purposes of this Act. x x x (Emphasis supplied) expropriate. By withdrawing this deposit, respondents may be
There is a sensible reason for the above. Litigation assumed to have given their consent to the expropriation. But
is costly and protracted. The government should also the advance deposit required under Section 19 of the Local
lead in avoiding litigations and overburdening its Government Code constitutes an advance payment only in the
courts. Indeed, the Court has held that when the event the expropriation prospers. Such deposit also has a dual
purpose: as pre-payment if the expropriation succeeds and as the national government which delegates to local
indemnity for damages if it is dismissed. This advance governments the power to tax.
payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of
possession, should not be confused with payment of just Issue:
compensation for the taking of property even if it could be a Whether or not Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is
factor in eventually determining just compensation. an incorporated instrumentality of the national government
and is, therefore, exempt from payment of real property tax
If the proceedings fail, the money could be used to indemnify under sections 234(a) and 133(o) of Republic Act 7160?
the owner for damages.
Held:
Here, therefore, the owners’ withdrawal of the deposit that Yes it is a Government Instrumentality.
the City made does not amount to a waiver of the defenses
they raised against the expropriation. With the dismissal of In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither
the complaint, the amount or a portion of it could be awarded a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered
to the owners as indemnity to cover the expenses they as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock
incurred in defending their right. divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 74 of
P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends,
surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. PRA is a
Republic of the Philippines vs. City of Parañaque government instrumentality vested with corporate powers
and performing an essential public service pursuant to
Facts: Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, Paranaque City instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property
(RTC), which ruled that petitioner Philippine Reclamation tax.
Authority (PRA) is a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore, not Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate
exempt from payment of real property taxes. powers but they do not become stock or non-stock
corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. The fundamental
corporation created by virtue of P.D. No. 1084 toprovide a provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, through special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC
and the administration andoperation of lands belonging to, must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC
managed and/or operated by, the government with the object must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA
of maximizing their utilization and hastening their may have passed the first condition of common good but
development consistent with public interest. failed the second one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the
On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal- purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or
Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA into PRA, commercial activities.
which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA
relating to reclamation activities. Clearly, respondent has no valid or legal basis in taxing the
subject reclaimed lands managed by PRA. On the other hand,
By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of Section 234(a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o),
the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay,including exempts PRA from paying realty taxes and protects it from
those located in Parañaque City. Parañaque City Treasurer the taxing powers of local government units.
issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties
based on the assessment for delinquent real property for tax Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code states that real
years 2001 and 2002. property owned by the Republic of the Philippines (the
Republic) is exempt from real property tax unless the
PRA claimed that it is not a GOCC under the Administrative beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person.
Code, nor is it a GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the
1987Constitution because it is not required to meet the test of Section 133 of the Local Government Code states that "unless
economic viability. otherwise provided" in the Code, local governments cannot
tax national government instrumentalities.
It is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers and performing an essential public service. It insists In this case, there is no proof that PRA granted the beneficial
that it may not be classified as a non-stock corporation use of the subject reclaimed lands to a taxable entity. There is
because it has no members and it is not organized for no showing on record either that PRA leased the subject
charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, reclaimed properties to a private taxable entity.
recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service,
or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the
chambers as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, Parañaque City, is
Thus, PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
the National Government, it is exempt from payment of real
property tax except when the beneficial use of the real
property is granted to a taxable person. PRA claims that based Pimentel vs. Ochoa
on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local governments cannot tax
FACTS:
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy Sec 14 Art 10 1987 Constitution). To fully secure to the LGUs
with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries.Dubbed the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop
"Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it was pre-pilot tested in the them into self-reliant communities, Section 17 LGC vested
municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
the municipalities of Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis delivery of basic services and facilities. However, par (c) of
Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the cities of Pasay and Sec 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving
Caloocan upon the release of the amount of P50 Million nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
Pesos under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
issued by the Department of Budget and Management. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued AO 16, series of 2008, decentralization of power.
setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed
"Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps), also referred  Decentralization of administration - when the
to as CCTP, which provides cash grants to extreme poor central government delegates administrative powers
households to allow the members of the families to meet to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base
certain human development goals.” Eligible households of government power and make local governments
selected from priority target areas are granted health and ‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their
education benefits for a total annual subsidy of P15k. fullest development as self-reliant communities.’
The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over
AO 16 also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
network among DepEd, DOH, DILG, the National Anti- administered according to law.’ He has no control
Poverty Commission (NAPC) and LGUs. DSWD as lead over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
implementing agency “oversees and coordinates the judgments with his own.
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program”
while the LGU is responsible for the availability of health and  Decentralization of power - involves an abdication
education supply, and providing technical assistance for the of political power in favor of LGUs declared to be
Program implementation, among others. DSWD executed autonomous. The autonomous government is free to
MOAs with each participating LGUs to outline the obligation chart its own destiny and shape its future with
of both parties during the 5-year implementation period. minimum intervention from central authorities. This
Congress then provided funding for the project as follows: amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since the autonomous
P298K in 2008, P5 Billion in 2009, P10 Billion in 2010, and government becomes accountable not to the central
P21 Billion in 2011. authorities but to its constituency.

It is thus clear that the LGC does not imply a complete

relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
ISSUE: of providing basic facilities and services. The national
Whether or not the CCTOP budget allocation under the government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
DSWD violates Article II, Sec. 25 and Article X, Sec. 3 of the formulation and implementation of national development
1987 Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC of 1991 programs especially where it is implemented locally in
by providing for the recentralization of the National coordination with the LGUs concerned.
Government in the delivery of basic services already
devolved to the LGUs Ganzon v. Court of Appeals - while it is through a system of
decentralization that the State shall promote a more
RULING: responsive and accountable local government structure, the
No. The LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of
central government powers on the matter of providing basic local government units into "mini - states." With local
facilities and services. The national government is not autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break
precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs
implementation of national development programs especially of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the "the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
LGUs concerned. central administration and local government units."

The petitioners argued that the manner by which CCTP is

implemented is questionable. It is the LGU’s responsibility to Team Pacific Corporation vs. Daza
deliver social welfare, agriculture, and health care services.
Giving DSWD full control over the identification of Facts:
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be Team Pacific Corporation (TPC), a domestic corporation
delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with would engaged in the business of assembling and exporting
have enhanced its delivery of basic services. This results in semiconductor devices, conducts its business at the FTI
the "recentralization" of basic government functions”, which Complex in the then Municipality of Taguig. It appears that
is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the avowed since the start of its operations in 1999, TPC had been paying
policy of decentralization. local business taxes assessed at 1/2 rate pursuant to Section
75 (c) of the Taguig Revenue Code (TRC).
The court ruled that Petitioners have failed to discharge the
burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the When it renewed its business license in 2004, however,
GAA of 2011. The Constitution declares it a policy of the TPC’s business tax for the first quarter of the same year was
State to ensure the autonomy of local governments (Sec 3, computed by Josephine Daza, in her capacity as then
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, by applying the full value of
the rates provided under Section 75 of the TRC, instead of the Velasco vs. Sandiganbayan
1/2 rate provided under paragraph (c) because, according to
her, Section 75 (c) of the TRC applies only to exporters of Facts:
essential commodities – e.g., (1) rice and corn; (2) wheat or Philip Corpus Velasco then Mayor of the municipality of
cassava flour, meat, dairy products, locally manufactured, Bacarra in Ilocos Norte filed a complaint against his
processed or preserved food, sugar, salt and other predecessor regarding the purchase of a road grader. The
agricultural, marine, and fresh water products, whether in purchase is alleged to be anomalous.
their original state or not; (3) cooking oil and cooking gas; (4)
laundry soap, detergents, and medicine; (5) agricultural Then on December 11 2002 the Deputy Ombudsman for
implements, equipment and post- harvest facilities, fertilizers, Luzon issued a resolution dismissing the complaint for lack
pesticides, insecticides, herbicides and other farm inputs; of probable cause. Then Acting Mayor Nicomedes Dela Cruz
(6)poultry feeds and other animal feeds; (7) school supplies; moved for reconsideration on 2003.
and (8) cement.
The case was reviewed and the Office of Legal Affairs of the
Constrained to pay the assessed business tax on January 19, Ombudsman recommended the filing of technical
2004 in view of its being a precondition for the renewal of its malversation against the petitioner.
business permit, TPC filed on the same day a written protest The petitioner asserts that the acting mayor has no legal
with Daza, insisting on the 1/2 rate on which its business tax capacity (standing) to file a Motion for reconsideration
was previously assessed. Subsequent to its demand for the pertaining to an earlier resolution dismissing the complaint
refund and/or issuance of a tax credit for the sum of P104, against him.
054.88 which it considered as an overpayment of its business
taxes for the same year, TPC filed s Rule 65 petition for Issue:
certiorari before a Regional Trial Court (RTC). Does the acting mayor has the legal capacity to file an MR or
to continue the action of the mayor?
Issue:
Whether or not TPC availed of the correct remedy against Held:
Daza’s illegal assessment when it filed its petition for Yes, the acting mayor has the legal capacity to file a Motion
certiorari before the RTC? for reconsideration on behalf of the local government. Under
Section 46 of the Local Government Code, the vice-mayor
Held: automatically assumes the powers and duties of the mayor in
No. The rule is settled that, as a special civil action, certiorari case of the latter’s temporary absence, thus:
is available only if the following essential requisites concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer SEC. 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the Local Chief Executive. - (a) When the governor, city
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in or municipal Mayor, or punong barangay is
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (3) there is physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to,
no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from
ordinary course of law. Judicial function entails the power to office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions member shall automatically exercise the powers and
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial perform the duties and functions of the local chief
function, on the other hand, refers to the action and discretion executive concerned, except the power to appoint,
of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required suspend, or dismiss employees which can only be
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold exercised if the period of temporary incapacity
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their exceeds thirty (30) working days.
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
In fact, Acting Mayor Dela Cruz explained that at that time
Gauged from the foregoing definitions, Daza cannot be said he filed the motion, Mayor Philip Velasco was "on official
to be performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function in vacation leave and out of the country." It is likewise
assessing TPC’s business tax and/or effectively denying its incontrovertible that Mayor Philip Velasco instituted the
protest as then Municipal Treasurer of Taguig. For this complaint in his capacity as then Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos
reason, Daza’s actions are not the proper subjects of a Rule Norte. Petitioner premises his challenge on legal standing on
65 petition for certiorari which is the appropriate remedy in the mere failure of the complainant to state in his complaint
cases where a the tribunal, board, or officer exercising that he was suing on behalf of the municipality. His argument
judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in grave is specious. As correctly asserted by Mayor Philip Velasco in
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction his Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Strike, the property
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate sought to be recovered in the complaint will revert to the
remedy in law. Narrow in scope and inflexible in character, municipality and not to him.
certiorari is an extraordinary remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
It is likewise considered mutually exclusive with appeal like Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan
the one provided by Article 195 of the Local Government
Code for a local treasurer’s denial of or inaction on a protest. FACTS:
 Leovegildo R. Ruzol was the mayor of General o Cited §5, PD 705 (Forestry Code): [The DENR]
Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. shall be responsible for the protection,
 Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral development, management, regeneration, and
Consultative Assembly composed of civil society reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and
groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders supervision of the operation of licensees,
with the end in view of regulating and monitoring lessees and permittees for the taking or use of
the transportation of salvaged forest products within forest products therefrom or the occupancy or
the vicinity of General Nakar. use thereof…
 At the organizational meeting for the assembly, the o Likewise invoked EO 192 (Reorganizing the
participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged DENR).
forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through o Finally, citing RA 7160, determined that since
Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment the authority relative to salvaged forest products
of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer. was not included in the above enumeration of
 From 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) devolved functions, the correlative authority to
permits to transport salvaged forest products were issue transport permits remains with the DENR,
issued to various recipients, of which forty-three and thus cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
(43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining
one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his ISSUES/HELD:
co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then 1. WoN the authority to monitor and regulate the
municipal administrator of General Nakar. transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the
 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the DENR, and no one else. (NO)
RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official 2. WoN the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are valid.
Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria. (NO)
o Claimed that the authority to issue such permits 3. WoN Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official functions.
belonged to the DENR and not to the Office of (NO)
the Mayor.
 Ruzol’s defense: RATIO:
o As Chief Executive of the municipality of 1. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority
General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor
issue permits to transport forest products and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the
pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been
only express powers but also those powers that faithfully complied with.
are necessarily implied from the powers  While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government
expressly granted as well as those that are instrumentality charged with the mandate of
necessary, appropriate or incidental to the promulgating rules and regulations for the
LGU’s efficient and effective governance. protection of the environment and conservation of
 Invoked the General Welfare Clause (§16, natural resources, it is not the only government
LGC) instrumentality clothed with such authority.
o RA 7160 has devolved certain functions and  While the law has designated DENR as the primary
responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not
the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR
the devolved function to manage and control the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function.
communal forests with an area not exceeding Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word
fifty (50) square kilometers. “primary” can never be taken to be synonymous
o Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the with “sole” or “exclusive.”
Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title  The General Welfare Clause of the LGC states:
One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186,
Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
power to create its own sources of revenue and as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to levy fees in accordance therewith. for its efficient and effective governance, and those
o The only kind of document the DENR issues which are essential to the promotion of the general
relating to log, timber or lumber is denominated welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
“Certificate of Timber Origin” or CTO for logs local government units shall ensure and support, among
and “Certificate of Lumber Origin” or CLO for other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
lumber. promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
o No proof of conspiracy between the two people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
accused. development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
o The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly technological capabilities, improve public morals,
authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
permits through the Provincial Environment full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. their inhabitants.
 Sandiganbayan: Acquitted Sabiduria but found
Ruzol guilty as charged.  Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal
governments are clothed with authority to enact such
 ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any
responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and person who shall knowingly and falsely represent
such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for himself to be an officer, agent or representative of
the health, safety, comfort and convenience, any department or agency of the Philippine
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, Government or of any foreign government, or who,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the under pretense of official position, shall perform any
municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the act pertaining to any person in authority or public
protection of property in the municipality. officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
 There is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring government, or any agency thereof, without being
and regulation of salvaged forest products through lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of
the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared prision correccional in its minimum and medium
responsibility which may be done either by DENR periods.
or by the LGUs or by both.
o DAO 1992-30: LGUs shall share with the  There are two ways of committing the crime:
national government, particularly the DENR, o First, by knowingly and falsely representing
the responsibility in the sustainable himself to be an officer, agent or representative
management and development of the of any department or agency of the Philippine
environment and natural resources within their Government or of any foreign government.
territorial jurisdiction. (Usurpation of authority)
o Second, under pretense of official position,
2. The Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for shall perform any act pertaining to any person
his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set in authority or public officer of the Philippine
forth by law for its enforcement. Government or any foreign government, or any
 Ruzol insists that the permits partake of the nature agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled
of transport fees levied by the municipality for the to do so. (Usurpation of official functions)
use of public roads.  In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of
 Ruzol is correct to a point. usurpation of official functions for issuing 221
o Nevertheless, We find that an enabling permits to transport salvaged forest products under
ordinance is necessary to confer the subject the alleged “pretense of official position and without
permits with validity. being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority
o As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the properly belonging to the Department of
power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is Environment and Natural Resources.”
exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through  However, contrary to the ruling of the
the enactment of an appropriate ordinance Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the the events surrounding this case failed to prove that
fees are prescribed. Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
 Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the committing the crime of usurpation of official
management and control of communal forests functions of the DENR.
within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that o We note that this case of usurpation against
this authority should be exercised and enforced in Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s
accordance with the procedural parameters theory that the DENR is the only government
established by law for its effective and efficient instrumentality that can issue the permits to
execution. transport salvaged forest products.
 §17, LGC provides that the LGU’s authority to o But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is
manage and control communal forests should be not the sole government agency vested with the
“pursuant to national policies and is subject to authority to issue permits relevant to the
supervision, control and review of DENR.” transportation of salvaged forest products,
 Before an area may be considered a communal considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
forest, the following requirements must be clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
accomplished: (1) an identification of potential  Moreover, Ruzol acted in good faith.
communal forest areas within the geographic o The conduct of a public consultation was a sign
jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate
forest land use plan which shall indicate, among and monitor the movement of salvaged forest
other things, the site and location of the communal products to prevent abuse and occurrence of
forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through untoward illegal logging.
a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DISPOSITION: Acquitted.
DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a
communal forest.
 In the present case, the records are bereft of any League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. Department of
showing that these requirements were complied Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
with.
FACTS:
3. Razol’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
 Art. 177 of the RPC provides: praying that this Court order the following: (1) declare as
unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code (2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR
of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of
otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of
1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No.
control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and
respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring
Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was
cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-
Provincial Governor of Bulacan. Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor,
emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR
ISSUES: Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and
and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for decide the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-
providing for executive control and infringing upon the local Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as
autonomy of provinces. recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function,
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what
voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to
amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
usurps the devolved powers of all provinces. facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under
R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
HELD: to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with
the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in
has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the
Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of
respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections
the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the Facts:
country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small- On 20 November 2009, Svetlana Jalosjos (Jalosjos) filed her
scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the Cert of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis
supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated that
Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale her place of birth and residence as Brgy. Tugas. The private
Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale respondents (resp) filed against her a Petiion to Deny Due
Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Course to or cancel the COC arguing that she has falsely
Secretary in coordination with other concerned local represented her place of birth and residence. On the other
government agencies. The Court has clarified that the hand, Jalosjos averred that she had established her residence
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land
Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local in Brgy. Tugas, and that she had been staying in the house of
government units or the decentralization of government a certain Mrs. Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the
authority. It does not make local governments sovereign construction of her house. She added that the same is not a
within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully material misrepresentation that would lead to
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the disqualification.
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in On 10 May 2010, Jalosjos was proclaimed as the duly elected
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out mayor. However, on 04 June 2010, the COMELEC rendered
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the a resolution disqualifying her from running for the position of
exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural mayor. The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the
resources. COMELEC. Furthermore, in its decision, it pronounced that
the vice-mayor shall occupy the vacancy.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-
equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears The resp filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration stating
emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time- that the second-placer should occupy the seat. Jalosjos also
honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This filed a Motion for Reconsideration averring the following:
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers 1. Court erred in hilidng that there are
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the inconsistensies in the Joint Affidavit of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This witnesses she presented;
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, 2. Her stay with Mrs. Yap should be considered in
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and determining the one-year residency requirement
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the Court.
 3. Her registration as voter presupposes that she The finding of the COMELEC that Jalosjos lacks the one year
has stayed in the municipality at least 6 months residency requirement to run for local elective position
prior to her registration directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is eligible
4. Her COC should not be cancelled, absent any to run for public office. The fact that she failed to prove that
finding that there was a deliberate attempt to she has been a resident of the locality for at least one year
deceive the electorate prior to the elections reveals the falsity of her assertion in her
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective position.
decide on the question of qualification after she This false material representation justifies the cancellation of
was proclaimed the winner. her COC.

Issue/s: 3. COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide on the question of

1. W/N Jalosjos has satisfied the residency requirement [NO] qualification after the proclamation of the winner in the
2. W/N the COC of Jalosjos should be cancelled [YES] election.
3. W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide on the question
of qualification after the proclamation of the winner [YES] Even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by
4. W/N the vice-mayor should occupy the seat [NO] Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of RA 6646 to continue to
hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
Held/Ratio: candidates. As such, not only is a disqualification case against
1. Jalosjos was not able to satisfy the residency requirement. a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does
not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension
since 2009 is contradicted by statements that petitioner was or termination of the proceedings against him when the
staying in Mrs. Yap’s house while her residential unit is under evidence of guilt is strong. This provision applies to cases
construction. According to the witnesses of Jalosjos, they under Section 68 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
know her to be an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas.
However, this was contradicted by their statements that: 1) 4. The proper person to occupy the seat is the second-placer.
they have started the construction of the house since January
2009, 2) until present (until December 2009 when affidavits Decisions holding that the second-placer cannot be
were executed), the construction is still on-going, and 3) at proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or
times when Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she used to stay with declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray. certificate of candidacy of the first placer was valid at the time
of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that
have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In
modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a this case, since the candidacy is void ab initio, the votes
parcel of land does not make it one’s residence. The fact that would be considered as stray votes and should not be counted.
the residential structure where Jalosjos intends to reside was
still under construction on the lot she purchased means that The ineligible candidate who assumed office is considered a
she has not yet established actual and physical residence in de facto officer. The rule on succession under Sec. 44 of the
the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that Local Government Code (LGC) does not apply since the
she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy
since 2008. as contemplated under the LGC. There is no vacancy to speak
of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections,
The claim that what is still being constructed is not the has the legal right to assume the position.
residential structure is belied by the fact that Jalosjos was not
able to present any evidence that her residential unit was
completed. The absence of any photograph of the alleged Sy vs. Quezon City
residence bolsters the Court’s conclusion.
FACTS:
The temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to  On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor
residence since the same is only temporary and intermittent. Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for
There was no intention on the part of Jalosjos to stay in Brgy. expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a
Punta Miray and Jalosjos also failed to show by what right 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered
she stayed in Mrs. Yap’s house. under the name of Henry L. Sy, which was intended
to be used as a site for a multipurpose barangay hall,
The approval of registration as a voter does not and cannot day-care center, playground and community activity
carry with it an affirmation of the falsehood and center for the benefit of the residents of Barangay
misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy. Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City. The requisite
Tugas. At best, the approval of her registration as a voter ordinance to undertake the aforesaid expropriation
carries a presumption that the registrant will be able to meet namely, Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted
the six-month residency requirement for the elections in on April 12, 1994.
which the registrant intends to vote.  On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 198 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise
2. The COC of Jalosjos should be cancelled. known as the “Local Government Code of 1991,”
the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with
the Office of the Clerk of Court, representing 15%
 of the fair market value of the subject property based upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
on its tax declaration. provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
 During the preliminary conference on November 8,
2006, Sy did not question the City’s right to
expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the Legaspi vs. City of Cebu
amount of just compensation remained at issue.
 On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco FACTS
(Commissioner Ostaco), Engr. Victor Salinas The constitutionality and validity of one ordinance on the
(Commissioner Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara ground of due process by authorizing the immobilization of
(Commissioner Alcantara) as commissioners to offending vehicles through the clamping of tires.
determine the proper amount of just compensation
to be paid by the City for the subject property. Jan 27 1997 – Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu –
Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and Ordinance 1664 - authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City
Alcantara, in a Report dated February 11, 2008, to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
recommended the payment of P5, 500.00 per sq. m., restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801
to be computed from the date of the filing of the (Traffic Code of Cebu City).
expropriation complaint, or on November 7, 1996.
On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a The vehicle immobilizer may not be removed or released
separate Report dated March 7, 2008, without its owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer
recommending the higher amount of P13, 500.00 per of Cebu City through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all
sq. m. as just compensation. the accumulated penalties for all prior traffic law violations
that remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative
ISSUE: penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the
Whether the taking of the private property was expropriated immobilization of the said vehicle
with just compensation?
Section 1. POLICY – It is the policy of the government of the
HELD: City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any
 NO. The Court cannot sustain the amount of P5, provision of any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or
500.00/sq. m. as just compensation which was set by Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise
the RTC and upheld by the CA. The said valuation known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as amended, in order
was actually arrived at after considering: (a) the to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in
September 4, 1996 recommendation of the City the City of Cebu at all times.
Appraisal Committee; (b) several sworn statements
made by Sy himself; and (c) Sy’s own tax Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES – Any vehicle
declaration for 1996.48 It is well-settled that the found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the
amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the
of the time of the taking. However, the above-stated parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire
documents do not reflect the value of the subject of the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot
property at the time of its taking in 1986 but rather, vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to
its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the case must immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any
be remanded to the RTC in order to properly traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu
determine the amount of just compensation during City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby
such time the subject property was actually taken. authorized to immobilize any violating vehicle as
 Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 was the law applicable hereinabove provided.
at the time of the subject property’s taking in 1986
as RA 7160 took effect only in January 1, 1992. Section 3. PENALTIES – Any motor vehicle, owner or driver
Under Section 9, Book 1, Title 1, Chapter 2 of the violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations
former law, a resolution was the proper and/or restrictions, as may be provided under Ordinance No.
authorization to institute condemnation 801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall be
proceedings, thus: penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the
ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle immobilizer
SEC. 9. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may not be removed or released without its owner or driver
may, through its head and acting pursuant to a paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu City through the
resolution of its head and acting pursuant to a Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated
resolution of its Sanggunian, exercise the right of penalties for all prior traffic law violations that remain
eminent domain and institute condemnation unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five
proceedings for public use or purpose. Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said
vehicle, and receipts of such payments presented to the
 Meanwhile, under Section 19 of RA 7160, an concerned personnel of the bureau responsible for the release
ordinance is required: of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released
by any of the following officers:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government
unit may, through its chief executive and acting a) Chairman, CITOM
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
eminent domain for public use, or purpose or c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an The owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo
immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer
denver boot vehicle immobilizer or other such special who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting
gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector.
prosecuted for such loss or destruction under pain or penalty
under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing CA – reversed RTC, declared Ord 1664 valid. LGC general
ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition grant of the police power – general welfare clause two
to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
Philippines; Provided that any such act may not be municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially. regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and council by law. The second branch of the clause is much more
constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard independent of the specific functions of the council, and
thereof shall be towed to the city government impounding authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and
area for safekeeping and may be released only after the proper to provide for health, safety, prosperity and
provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully complied convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.
with.
Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a legitimate exercise of the
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance police power
shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not
less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or of a Hence, certiorari petitions
fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor
more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), or both such ISSUES
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.[2] 1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit
of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu - YES
July 29, 1997 – two lawyers (father and son) brought suit 2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly
unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes
being contrary to law, and damages - YES

Jaban Sr – parked his car in a paying parking area but his car HELD
was immobilized after 10 mins; car impounded for 3 days, WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review
had to pay 4.2k fine without court hearing or due process of on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
reason why the car was immobilized promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Happened again on Nov 20 while car was parked properly in
a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil market, had to RATIO
pay 1,5k fine Tests for a valid ordinance (formal: 1 and 2; substantive: 3)
May 19 – Jaban Jr - secluded place where there was no sign 1. must be within the corporate powers of the local
prohibiting parking, paid 1.4k government unit to enact
2. must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi – sued in RTC Cebu to law,
demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of 3. must also conform to the following substantive
nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages. requirements
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
July 29 1997 – left his car outside the gate of his house, statute;
occupying part of the road and the sidewalk to make way for (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
allowed to unload his materials and equipment with the (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
assurance that the unloading would not take too long; that (5) must be general and consistent with public
while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, policy; and
the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling (6) must not be unreasonable
him to go into the house to answer the call; that after a short
while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons had Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal
clamped the front wheel of his car; City Attorney of Cebu said requirements
officers only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the  Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within
plaintiffs the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of
Cebu? Yes
Jan 22 1999 – RTC declared Ordinance No. 1664 as null and  No issues were raised against the formalities of the
void – for violating due process - In both procedural and enactment of the ordinance, so compliance is
substantive due process, a hearing is always a pre-requisite; presumed
depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole  Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law
determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s
personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. great powers, namely: the police power, the power
of eminent domain, and the power of taxation, but
with parameters and limitations
  Police power cannot be exercised by any group or include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else
body of individuals not possessing legislative obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks
power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and Petitioners say that they were not accorded the opportunity to
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles,
bodies of municipal corporations or local or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the
government units. immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was
oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.
LGC Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Composition. – (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the Any vehicle owner may protest such action of a traffic
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. – the
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of ordinance permits the release of a vehicle upon a protest
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of
as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña, even
without payment of the fine
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and
effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as None of the petitioners resorted to this - did not diminish the
provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the
said services and facilities, shall: ordinance.

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, The immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner
and approve the construction, improvement repair was around at the time of the apprehension. In that situation,
and maintenance of the same; establish bus and the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move
vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the the vehicle or issue a traffic citation
same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the
public; regulate garages and operation of The towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not
conveyances for hire; designate stands to be equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent
occupied by public vehicles when not in use; the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings
and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural
lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and due process? NO
public places;
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under
prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, our laws in which the absence of one or both of such
when necessary in the interest of public welfare, requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal process.
constructions in public places; Example: cancellation of the passport of a person being
sought for the commission of a crime, preventive suspension
The LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the restraint
codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking
to their communities. of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing
obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se, arrest
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive of a person in flagrante delicto
requirements
 The first substantive requirement for a valid Same with / applies to the clamping of the tires of the vehicles
ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional of the Petitioners
guaranty of due process of law.
 Two kinds of due process As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked
1. procedural due process - procedures that the government vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension.
property notices and hearings
2. substantive due process - adequate reason for taking away Lack of a hearing does not constitute a breach of procedural
a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse
substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient the apprehensions through a timely protest
justification for the government’s action.
 Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of The clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its
the limitations under the Constitution and the transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness liability by simply driving away.
and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
 terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section Legaspi refers to a different ruling in the Astillero case – but
458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to SC says this is an irrelevant ruling - it should be the RTC that
had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case
despite the appeals in these cases being already pending in the installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric,
CA. telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other
apparatus, and provide for the correction, condemnation or
The same RTC should have exercised a “becoming modesty” removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective
on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitant.
the Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of
the Court sitting en banc to determine. It was also envisioned to address the foreseen "environmental
depredation" to be brought about by these "special projects"
to the Municipality. Pursuant to these objectives, the
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Municipality of Malvar Municipality imposed fees on various structures, which
included telecommunications towers.
FACTS
Smart constructed a telecommunications tower within the The fees are not imposed to regulate the administrative,
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality. The construction technical, financial, or marketing operations of
of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and transmitting telecommunications entities, such as Smart’s; rather, to
cellular communications within the covered area. regulate the installation and maintenance of physical
structures – Smart’s cell sites or telecommunications tower.
On 30 July 2003, the Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18,
series of 2003, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the ISSUE
Establishment of Special Projects." 1. WON the fees are taxes.
2. WON CTA should have take cognizance of the case.
On 24 August 2004, Smart received from the Permit and 3. WON the fees are unjust and unreasonable.
Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor of the HELD
Municipality an assessment letter with a schedule of payment 1. NO. The fees are NOT taxes.
for the total amount of P389,950.00 for Smart’s 2. NO. CTA correctly refused to take cognizance of the case.
telecommunications tower. Due to the alleged arrears in the 3. NO. The fees are not unjust and unreasonable.
payment of the assessment, the Municipality also caused the
posting of a closure notice on the telecommunications tower. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.

On 9 September 2004, Smart filed a protest, claiming lack of RATIO

due process in the issuance of the assessment and closure Issue #1
notice. In the same protest, Smart challenged the validity of Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate
Ordinance No. 18 on which the assessment was based. certain construction activities of the identified special
projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications
In a letter dated 28 September 2004, the Municipality denied towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily
Smart’s protest. regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While
the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality,
RTC partially granted Smart’s petition, but did not rule on the this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in
legality of Ordinance No. 18. It declared that Smart is only Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.
liable for fees starting October 1, 2003, and null and void
insofar as the assessment made from 2001 to 2003. MR Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City: if the
denied. CTA denied. CTA MR also denied. CTA en banc generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation
denied. CTA en banc likewise denied. is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation
is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is
SMART’s arguments: also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.
CTA erred in refusing to take cognizance of the case and for
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction considering the Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias: the
“unique” factual circumstances involved. purpose and effect of the imposition determine whether it is a
tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such
The fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes since imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
they are not regulatory but rather, revenue-raising.
Ordinance No. 18 expressly provides for the standards which
Municipality is encroaching on the regulatory powers of the Smart must satisfy prior to the issuance of the specified
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). Smart permits, clearly indicating that the fees are regulatory in
cites Section 5(g) of Republic Act No. 7925 which provides nature.
that the NTC, in the exercise of its regulatory powers, shall
impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover These requirements are as follows:
reasonable costs and expenses for the regulation and
supervision of the operations of telecommunications entities. SECTION 5. Requirements and Procedures in Securing
Thus, Smart alleges that the regulation of Preliminary Development Permit.
telecommunications entities and all aspects of its operations
is specifically lodged by law on the NTC. The following documents shall be submitted to the SB
Secretary in triplicate:
Malvar’s arguments: a) zoning clearance
Said Ordinance is not a tax ordinance but a regulatory fee b) Vicinity Map
imposed to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, c) Site Plan
 d) Evidence of ownership Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City vs. Jadewell
e) Certificate true copy of NTC Provisional Authority Parking Systems Corporation
in case of Cellsites, telephone or telegraph line, ERB
in case of gasoline station, power plant, and other FACTS:
concerned national agencies On February 9, 2005, this Court issued a writ of preliminary
f) Conversion order from DAR is located within mandatory injunction directing Baguio City Mayor Braulio
agricultural zone. D. Yaranon, his agents, representatives and/or any person or
g) Radiation Protection Evaluation. persons acting upon his orders or in his place or stead to
h) Written consent from subdivision association or the immediately reopen the streets and/or premises operated
residence of the area concerned if the special and/or occupied by Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation
projects is located within the residential zone. (Jadewell). They were further directed to let the said streets
i) Barangay Council Resolution endorsing the special and premises remain open until further orders of this Court.
projects.
However, Jadewell subsequently informed this Court that,
SECTION 6. Requirement for Final Development Permit – contrary to the representation of Mayor Yaranon and in
Upon the expiration of 180 days and the proponents of special violation of the writ (of preliminary mandatory injunction),
projects shall apply for final [development permit] and they the parking spaces, roads and streets operated and/or
are require[d] to submit the following: occupied by Jadewell remained closed. It presented pictures
a) evaluation from the committee where the Vice taken on March 1, 2005 showing the continued closure of the
Mayor refers the special project parking spaces at Burnham Park and the adjoining Abad
b) Certification that all local fees have been paid. Santos Drive, Lake Drive and Harrison Road. It also
submitted affidavits of pay parking customers attesting to the
Even if the fees do not appear in Section 143 or any other fact that until now, the parking spaces and streets that
provision in the LGC, the Municipality is empowered to Jadewell previously utilized for pay parking has not been
impose taxes, fees and charges, not specifically enumerated opened. Further, counsel for Jadewell furnished with a copy
in the LGC or taxed under the Tax Code or other applicable to the court of its February 15, 2005 letter to Mayor Yaranon
law according to Section 186 of the LGC. Thus they don’t urging the latter to comply with the writ.
encroach on NTC’s powers.
Faced with the conflicting manifestations of the parties, this
Issue #2 Court directed Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes, Executive
Considering that the fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not in the Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, to
nature of local taxes, and Smart is questioning the determine whether or not Mayor Yaranon in fact complied
constitutionality of the ordinance, the CTA correctly with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and to
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, submit a report thereon. Investigation of the Judge are as
Section 187 of the LGC, which outlines the procedure for follows: That on March 21, 2005 at around 2:25 in the
questioning the constitutionality of a tax ordinance, is afternoon, the Honorable Executive Judge instructed the
inapplicable, rendering unnecessary the resolution of the undersigned together with Gilbert Evangelista to go to
issue on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Jadewell Parking Systems particularly along Harrison and
Ganza Areas to verify whether said premises are already open
Issue #3 for business, but it is still closed with G.I. pipe railings
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The measuring about 74 feet at the main entrance and exit; April
question of reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry. 4, 2005, the undersigned were again instructed by the
Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal Executive Judge to check on the premises of Jadewell Parking
authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as Systems, particularly located at the aforementioned areas to
unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be find out whether there were changes in the physical set up but
prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or there was none; Judge Cabato-Cortes personally visited the
confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that premises on April 4, 2005. She found that the account of
factors relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal sheriff Bacolod accurately reflected the actual condition in
conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made the said premises. She observed that there were several
subject to imposition. policemen posted at the parking area adjacent to Ganza
Restaurant. When she interviewed some of the policemen,
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, they confirmed that the entrance and exit to the parking area
there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach were indeed closed.
of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain Issue:
legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on xx x Whether or not the City Mayor of Baguio committed direct
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of and indirect contempt by disobedience and acting opposition
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which to its authority.
approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed Held:
an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that only a willful disregard or defiance of the court's orders but
the challenged act must be struck down. also such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court
arid the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice. Under the
Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either direct or only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
presence of or so near a court or judge. It can be punished
summarily without hearing.If the pleading containing Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the
the same court where the proceedings are pending, it is direct proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
contempt. It is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main
presence of or so near a judge. Contemptuous statements argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted
made in the pleadings filed with the court constitute direct in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He
contempt. Similarly, false or misleading allegations in a argues that while the conversion in question does not involve
pleading or other document filed with the court having the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the
cognizance of the case tending to frustrate the due spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of
dispensation of justice constitute direct contempt. Candidness the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever
to the court is essential for the expeditious administration of there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities.
justice. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the
LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters
Here, Mayor Yaranon misled this Court into believing that he of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
had already obeyed the directive contained in the writ. The those in the component city proposed to be upgraded.
very caption of his paper itself manifested his intention to Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the
make believe that the writ had been fully complied with. It various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion
attempted to create the impression that the premises and and how it will cause material change not only in the political
streets previously operated by Jadewell were already open and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of
pursuant to this Court's order when in fact they were not. the province as a whole.
Indubitably, it constituted fraud on the court punishable as
contempt. On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16,
2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-2 ruled in
His continuing refusal to carry out and implement the writ is favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute
a willful disregard of and disobedience to this Court's lawful Resolution 12-0925.
orders. His defiance controvertibly proves his intention to tie
the hands of justice and prevent it from taking its due course. Issue:
Hence Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon is hereby Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province
found GUILTY of (1) direct contempt for the falsehood he of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can
deliberately foisted on this Court and (2) indirect contempt participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of
for his continued disobedience to and defiance of the writ of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a Highly
preliminary injunction the court had issued. Urbanized City (HUC).

Held:
Umali vs. Commission on Elections Entire province of Nueva Ecija

Facts: Ratio:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of The upward conversion of a component city, in this case
Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It
the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province
from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory
highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence.
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the
2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces
to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part
as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the
of 1991.” province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose
282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent
the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads: to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km.
area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it alteration be “substantial.”
hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from component city to highly-urbanized city, only Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers vs. Lim
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should
participate in the said plebiscite. FACTS
 On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the was entered into by oil companies (Chevron, Petron
Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion and Shell) and Department of Energy for the
cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban creation of a Master Plan to address and minimize
City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where the potential risks and hazards posed by the
proximity of communities, business and offices to
 Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention
and reliability of supply and distribution of on the Rights of the Child
petroleum products. o The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to
 On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when it
Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and  On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al.
its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial and the intervenors oil companies contend that:
I. o The petitioners have no legal standing to sue
 Owners and operators of the businesses affected by whether as citizens, taxpayers or legislators.
the reclassification were given six (6) months from They further failed to show that they have
the date of effectivity to stop the operation of their suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result
businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003. of the act complained of
 On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was o The petition should be dismissed outright for
filed before the Supreme Court (SC) to enforce failure to properly apply the related provisions
Ordinance No. 8027. of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or
 Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
the Regional Trial Court of Manila an action to relative to the appropriate remedy available
annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs o The principle of the hierarchy of courts is
of preliminary prohibitory injunction and violated because the SC only exercises
preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance
other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004. under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
 On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Constitution
Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An Ordinance o It is the function of the SP to enact zoning
Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan ordinance without prior referral to the Manila
and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus,
the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment it may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance
thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil depot area as sought to be modified
a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone. o There is a valid exercise of police power
 On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for  On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No.
mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza to 8283 which essentially amended the assailed
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum
declared that the objective of the ordinance is to refineries and oil depots are located from the
protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor
devastation that will surely occur in case of a Lim.
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
 The oil companies filed a Motion for ISSUES
Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March 2007 1. WON there are violations of environmental laws
Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 2. WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
8027 is constitutional and that it was not impliedly 3. WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue
repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no 4. WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation
irreconcilable conflict between them. to the Pandacan Terminals
 SC later on denied with finality the second MR of
the oil companies. RULING
1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for
 On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor
Environmental Cases is embodied in Section 2, Part I, Rule I
Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP enacted
thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in
Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
civil, criminal and special civil actions before the MeTCs,
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial
Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs, and the RTCs involving the
enforcement or violations of environmental and other related
Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A.
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly
No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A.
allowed.
No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141; and
 Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor
other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for certiorari under
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the
Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No.
environment and natural resources.
8187. Their contentions are as follows:
o It is an invalid exercise of police power because
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While,
it does not promote the general welfare of the
indeed, there are allegations of violations of environmental
people
laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that
o It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of
would support the other position of the petitioners – the
the 1987 Constitution as well as health and
protection of the right to life, security and safety.
environment related municipal laws and
international conventions and treaties, such as:
2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have
Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and
been filed with the RTC, it having concurrent jurisdiction
Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions
on nuisance and human relations; Universal
with the SC over a special civil action for prohibition, and their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the
threat.”
However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of The same best interest of the public guides the present
hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well- decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote convincing reason to persuade the Court that the life, security
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that the
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is
be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375) invalid and unconstitutional.

3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at
which ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right one point or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived
to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the by one or some, the SC cannot allow the right to life be
subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and
residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the theories of probability have no place in situations where the
implementation of the ordinances of the city. very life of not just an individual but of residents of big
neighbourhoods is at stake.
No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the
enforcement of the assailed ordinance, and who deal with the DISPOSITIVE PORTION
same subject matter that concerns a public right. 1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and
invalid with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety Terminals.
of the people is indisputably a right of utmost importance to 2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to
the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of Manila, cease and desist from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to
have the required personal interest to seek relief to protect oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of
such right. the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of
4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the forty-five (45) days, submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an
assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which
depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months
7 March 2007 decision, to wit: from the date the required document is submitted.

“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of

promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public Villafuerte vs. Robredo
safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The
Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the FACTS:
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this examination and audit on the manner the local government
objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
ordinance from industrial to commercial. calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an
official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20%
The following facts were found by the Committee on development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City development projects but was diverted to expenses properly
of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance: chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A.
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
highly flammable and highly volatile products of 1991 (LGC). In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as
which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum DILG Secretary, issued the assailed Memorandum Circular
gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel (MC) No. 2010-83, entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget
oil among others; and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and promote good governance through enhanced transparency
air; and accountability of LGUs. The MC requires the posting
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near within 30 days from the end of each fiscal year in at least three
Malacañang Palace; and (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, government unit a summary of all revenues collected and
the fire could spread to the neighboring funds received including the appropriations and
communities. disbursements of such funds during the preceding fiscal year.
The foregoing circular also states that noncompliance will be
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not regulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued
just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or another MC, reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall
wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental
that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional
objective of a quality of life for all. It also enumerated a list strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all
for which the fund must not be utilized. matters relating to official transactions and those involving
public interest. Pertinently, Section 28, Article II and Section
Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the 7, Article III of the Constitution.
Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant
petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances
of the respondent for being unconstitutional for violating the Ferrer vs. Bautista
principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the
Constitution and the LGC. FACTS
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance,
ISSUE: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, which will collect
Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php
of local and fiscal autonomy? 100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
RULING: assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special
No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere account to be established for the purpose. On the other hand,
reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was enacted collecting
intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive garbage fees on residential properties which shall be
stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special
the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner,
with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was questions the validity of the said ordinances.
issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial
portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not ISSUES
actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to 1. Whether the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation 2. Whether the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on
of Section 287 of the LGC. double taxation.

Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’s posturing, however, the RULING

enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the 1. The SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of Quezon
LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at liberty City Government to impose. LGUs may be considered as
to map out their respective development plans solely on the having properly exercised their police power only if there is
basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs a lawful subject and a lawful method. Herein, the tax is not a
accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is
expended for development projects. They may even spend levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
their IRAs for some of the enumerated items should they exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the
partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects. entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. On the
question of inequality, the disparities between a real property
Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too
that the provision of sanctions therein is a clear indication of obvious and need not be discussed at length. The
the President’s interference in the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice
Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of
It did not particularly establish a new set of acts or omissions the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may
which are deemed violations and provide the corresponding legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature
penalties therefor. It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that to impose the tax was to favor one over another. Further, the
there are existing rules to consider in the disbursement of the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be
20% development fund and that non-compliance therewith disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax
may render them liable to sanctions which are provided in the being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually
LGC and other applicable laws. allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance
grants a tax credit.
Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other
documents in the mentioned issuances went beyond the letter 2. No. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper
and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, exercise of its corporate powers under Section 22 of the same,
otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local
Act, by requiring that budgets, expenditures, contracts and legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve
loans, and procurement plans of LGUs be publicly posted as resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that Local the city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall
treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other share with the national government the responsibility in the
accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the management and maintenance of ecological balance within
end of the fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly their territorial jurisdiction. The Ecological Solid Waste
accessible and conspicuous places in the local government Management Act of 2000, affirms this authority as it
unit. R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires the posting expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, implementation and enforcement of its provisions.
and approved contract in the procuring entity’s premises, in Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and
newspapers of general circulation, and the website of the collect such reasonable fees and charges for services
procuring entity. In particular, the Constitution commands the rendered. The fee imposed for garbage collections under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of
an activity as provided by the same. As opposed to ISSUE:
petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not Whether or not the power of Judicial Review over the validity
being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under of a local tax ordinance has been restricted by section 187 of
Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation the Local Government Code
must necessarily fail.
HELD:
The Court recognized exceptional circumstances that justify
Alta Vista Golf and Country Club vs. City of Cebu noncompliance by a taxpayer with Section 187 of the Local
Government Code. In the case of, Ongsuco v. Malones, it
FACTS: stated that, it is true that the general rule is that before a party
Alta Vista Golf & Country Club is a non-stock and non-profit is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
corporation operating a golf course in Cebu City. Sometime should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
in June 1993, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu enacted administrative processes afforded him or her. The doctrine of
CTO No. LXIX known as the Revised Omnibus Tax exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical
Ordinance. It stated therein that an amusement tax of 20% of and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy
gross receipts on entrance, playing green, and/or admission entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition
fees will be charged on golf courses and polo grounds. In of controversies. However, there are several exceptions to
1998, Alta Vista Golf was assessed deficiency business taxes, this rule. The rule on the exhaustion of administrative
fees, and other charges amounting to P3,820,095.68, remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto
including amusement tax on its golf course. Cebu repeatedly itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
attempted to collect from petitioner. However, the latter over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
refused to pay the amusement tax arguing that the imposition special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a
of said tax by Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax purely legal question, well within the competence; and the
Ordinance, as amended, was irregular, improper, and illegal. jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency,
Also, petitioner said that amusement tax can be only imposed would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, or places where law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws,
one seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a show or constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is
performance. Teresita Camarillo sought to collect once more exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower
from Alta Vista Golf but the latter still argued for the same courts the Legislature may establish.
reason.
Since the parties in this case raised the issue whether
After some time, Mayor Osmefia sent petitioner a Closure Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable
Order which states that the latter committed violations of the despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing
laws and Cebu City Ordinances. This prompted Alta Vista held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing
Golf to file with RTC a Petition for Injunction, Prohibition, Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This
Mandamus, Declaration of Nullity of Closure Order, is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence
Declaration of Nullity of Assessment, and Declaration of and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Nullity of Section 42 of Cebu City Tax Ordinance, with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Moreover, Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the
Preliminary Injunction against respondents alleging that said Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction
Closure Order was unconstitutional. Also, it alleged that of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original
Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the
amended, is null and void for being ultra vires or beyond the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance. The Supreme
taxing authority of respondent Cebu City, and consequently, Court is vested the power to review, revise, reverse, modify
the assessment against petitioner for amusement tax for 1998 or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
based on said Section 42 is illegal and unconstitutional; and Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
assuming arguendo that respondent Cebu City has the power courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
to impose amusement tax on petitioner, such tax for 1998 any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
already prescribed and could no longer be enforced. On the presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
contrary, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ordinance, or regulation is in question.
following grounds, lack of jurisdiction of RTC, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, noncompliance with
sec. 187, 252 of Local Government Code and sec 75 of RA Chua vs. Commission on Elections
3857. RTC denied the prayer of Alta Vista Golf for issuance
of TRO. Meanwhile, petitioner paid respondent the assessed FACTS:
amusement tax including its penalties, interests and Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua filed her Certificate of
surcharges. Candidacy for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila.
On the date of Chua's proclamation, however, Imelda E.
RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss adjudging that Fragata, a registered voter, filed a Petition captioned as a
when a taxpayer questions the validity of a tax ordinance "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate" and "to
passed by a local government legislative body, a different deny due course and/or cancel [Chua's] Certificate of
procedure directed in Section 187 is to be followed. Thus, Candidacy." Moreover, Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene
said provision is mandatory. The Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation and Motion to Annul Proclamation.
filed by Alta Vista Golf was denied. Hence, a petition was
filed before the Supreme Court raising pure questions of law.
Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the
unqualified to run for Councilor. Moreover, Chua allegedly certificate of candidacy, her Certificate of Candidacy was
continued on using her American passport and did not void ab initio. She was correctly considered a non-candidate.
execute an oath of renunciation of her American citizenship. All votes casted for her were stray, and the person legally
With Chua being a dual citizen at the time she filed her entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle Marie C.
Certificate of Candidacy, Bacani prayed that the Commission Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes
on Elections annul Chua's proclamation. among the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections
did not gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua's
COMELEC held that it the petition was one for proclamation and subsequently proclaiming private
disqualification, regardless of the caption stating that it was a respondent Bacani. SDA
petition to declare Chua a nuisance candidate. The Petition
alleged a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the 2. It was a petition for disqualification. What remedy to avail
Local Government Code, specifically, that Chua was a himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If
permanent resident in the United States. Considering that the false material representation in the certificate of
Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission held that Chua was candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification, the
disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due
Local Government Code. Consequently, Chua's Certificate of course or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for
Candidacy was void ab initio, and all votes casted for her disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with
were stray. Chua's proclamation was likewise voided, and per the requirements under the law. Before the Commission on
Maquiling, Bacani was declared to have garnered the sixth Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing
highest number of votes. Thus, in the Resolution, the either a petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
Commission on Elections Second Division ruled in favor of certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification. In
Fragata and Bacani. MR was denied. Chua filed before this her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that
Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for petitioner made a false material representation in her
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a
preliminary injunction. permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private
ISSUES: respondent Fragata's Petition, therefore, was a petition for
1. Whether or not Chua should be disqualified to run for disqualification.
public office.
2. Whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a
petition for disqualification or a petition to deny due course/ City of Pasig vs Manila Electric Company
cancel certificate of candidacy. [G.R. No. 181710, March 7, 2018]

RULING Facts:
1. YES. A person intending to run for public office must not
only possess the required qualifications for the position for On 26 December 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also Municipality of Pasig enacted Ordinance No. 25 which, under
possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the its Article 3, Section 32, imposed a franchise tax on all
law. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal business venture operations carried out through a franchise
renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate requirements, within the municipality, as follows:
the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to
run for public office. With petitioner's failure to execute a Section 32. Imposition of Tax. - Any provision of
personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, laws or grant of exemption to the contrary
petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her notwithstanding, any person, corporation,
Certificate of Candidacy. Under Section 40 of the Local partnership or association enjoying a franchise and
Government Code, she was disqualified to run for Councilor doing business in the Municipality of Pasig, shall
in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and pay a franchise tax at the rate of fifty percent (50%)
Local Elections. of one percent (1%) of its gross receipts derived
from the operation of the business in Pasig during
Elections are more than a numbers game. Hence, in the preceding calendar year.
Maquiling: The ballot cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications By virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7829, which took effect
of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to on 25 January 1995, the Municipality of Pasig was converted
be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Pasig.
by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a On 24 August 2001, the Treasurer’s Office of the City
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for Government of Pasig informed the Manila Electric Company
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the (MERALCO), a grantee of a legislative franchise, that it is
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure liable to pay taxes for the period 1996 to 1999, pursuant to
the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule Municipal Ordinance No. 25. The city, thereafter, on two
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law separate occasions, demanded payment of the said tax in the
that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of amount of ₱435,332, 196.00, exclusive of penalties.
candidates.
On 8 February 2002, MERALCO protested the validity of the to levy franchise tax. The enactment of an ordinance is
demand "claiming that the same be withdrawn and cancelled indispensable for it is the legal basis of the imposition and
for the following reasons: (1) Ordinance No. 25 was declared collection of taxes upon covered taxpayers. Without the
void ab initio by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for being ordinance, there is nothing to enforce by way of assessment
in contravention of law, which resolution was reiterated in and collection.
another case that questioned the validity of the franchise tax,
etc.; (2) The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) It is not disputed that at the time the ordinance in question
ordered the Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, to was enacted in 1992, the local government of Pasig, then a
refund MERALCO the amount the latter paid as franchise tax municipality, had no authority to levy franchise tax. Being
because the former lacked legal foundation in collecting the void, it cannot be given any legal effect. An assessment and
same, as municipalities are not empowered by law to impose collection pursuant to the said ordinance is, perforce, legally
and collect franchise tax pursuant to Section 142 of the LGC; infirm.
(3) The CA affirmed the RTC decision; and (4) The petition
for certiorari filed by the then Municipality of Pasig before Consequently, the CA was correct when it declared that the
the Supreme Court, assailing the decision of the CA that demand of the City of Pasig upon MERALCO for the
sustained the RTC, was likewise dismissed and the motion payment of the disputed tax was devoid of legal basis. It bears
for reconsideration of the Municipality of Pasig was denied emphasizing that the DOJ and the RTC of Pasig City had
with finality. previously declared Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No.
25 as void ab initio. Even the City of Pasig, it seems, does not
In view of the inaction by the Treasurer's Office, MERALCO contest the invalidity of said ordinance.
instituted an action before the RTC for the annulment of the
said demand with prayer for a temporary restraining order and The cityhood law of Pasig did not cure the defect of the
a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled in favor of questioned ordinance. A void ordinance, or provision thereof,
the City of Pasig. is what it is - a nullity that produces no legal effect. It cannot
be enforced; and no right could spring forth from it. The
cityhood of Pasig notwithstanding, it has no right to collect
Issue: franchise tax under the assailed ordinance.

Whether or not the City of Pasig had no valid basis for its The doctrinal rule on the matter is that the conversion of the
imposition of franchise tax for the period 1996 to 1999? municipality into a city does not remove the original infirmity
of the subject ordinance. Such doctrine, evoked in Arabay and
Ruling: SMC, is squarely relevant in the case at bar. In these two
separate cases, the sales taxes were paid by the petitioners
Yes. The power to impose franchise tax belongs to the pursuant to ordinances enacted prior to the conversion of the
province by virtue of some provisions of the LGC which respondents into cities, or at which time the latter were
states: without authority to levy the said taxes. Finding the municipal
ordinances to be void, the Court declared the payments of
Section 137. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any taxes under the ordinances to be without basis even if
exemption granted by any law or other special law, subsequently the respondents became cities. Fittingly, the
the province may impose a tax on businesses Court ordered the refund of the said taxes to the petitioners.
enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding fifty
percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross As we see it, the cited law does not lend any help to the City
annual receipts for the preceding calendar year of Pasig's cause. It is crystal clear from the said law that what
based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its shall continue to be in force after the conversion of Pasig into
territorial jurisdiction. a city are the municipal ordinances existing as of the time of
the approval of R.A. No. 7829. The provision contemplates
Section 142. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as ordinances that are valid and legal from their inception; that
otherwise provided in this Code, municipalities may upon the approval of R.A. No. 7829, their effectivity and
levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by enforcement shall continue. To 'continue' means (1) to be
provinces. steadfast or constant in a course or activity; (2) to keep going:
maintain a course, direction, or progress; or (3) to remain in
Section 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as a place or condition. It presupposes something already
otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy existing.
the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or
municipality may impose: Provided, however, That A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding
the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by force and effect. Such is Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance
highly urbanized and independent component cities No. 25 and, being so, is outside the comprehension of Section
shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance 45 of R.A. No. 7829
with the provisions of this Code.
We are not in full accord with the explanation given by the
The LGC further provides that the power to impose a tax, fee, City of Pasig - that Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829 intended to
or charge or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the prevent the City of Pasig from becoming paralyzed in
Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through delivering basic services. We can concede that Section 45 of
an appropriate ordinance. This simply means that the local R.A. No. 7829 assures the City of Pasig continued collection
government unit cannot solely rely on the statutory provision of taxes under ordinances passed prior to its conversion. What
(LGC) granting specific taxing powers, such as the authority the petitioner fails to realize is that Section 32, Municipal
Ordinance No. 25 is not the singular source of its income or
funds necessary for the performance of its essential functions.
The argument of the City of Pasig is at best flimsy and
insubstantial. The records, it should be noted, bear no
evidence to demonstrate the resulting paralysis claimed by
the City of Pasig. An unsupported allegation it is, no better
than a mere conjecture and speculation.

In fine, the City of Pasig cannot legally make a demand for

the payment of taxes under the challenged ordinance, which
is void, even after its conversion into a city. The CA, thus,
committed no reversible error.

The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in is affirmed.