Uriarte, Urpi. O Que É Fazer Etnografia para Os Antropólogos
Uriarte, Urpi. O Que É Fazer Etnografia para Os Antropólogos
Individuals 10
Email or Call Elected Representatives
Petition Elected Representatives
Global Petitions
Photo Petitions
Social Media
Twitter Alternatives
Online or Text Donations
Naming and Shaming a Dictator
Translation
Op-Eds
Honorary Degree Withdrawal
Online Course on Nonviolent Resistance
Nonviolent Resistance Website
HTTPS Encrypted Email
PGP Encrypted Email
Pranks
Nonviolent Resistance at Home
Global Hunger Strike
Nonviolent Peacekeeping Accompaniment
3
Denial-of-Service Attacks
Computer Viruses
Communications Jams
Diplomats
42
Statements and Démarches
Advice
Convening Activists
Connecting Activists with Foreign Governments
Trials Monitoring
Protests
Diplomatic Immunity
4
Refuge and Sanctuary for Activists
Resistance
States
45
Education for Foreign Service Corps, Military & Civil Servants
Aid
Companies
Tax Havens
Transparency in International Business
Military Aid
Export Licenses
Development Aid
Pressuring Neighbors
Dual Citizenship Withdrawal
Golden Parachutes
Radio Infrastructure in Neighboring States
Shadow Mobile Phone Networks
Membership Conditionality
UN Security Council Resolutions
Fact-Finding and UN Missions
Rome Statute
International Tribunal Indictments
ICC Indictments
International Arrest Warrants
Diplomatic Immunity Withdrawal
Diplomatic Sanctions
Travel Bans
Sports Sanctions
Arms Embargo
Technology Sanctions
Aviation Sanctions
“Smart” Economic Sanctions
Assets Freeze
Corporate Sanctions
Conditioned Sanctions
Odious Debts
5
Transparent Payments
Global Conferences
Corporate Pressure
Pressure on Businesses in Neighboring States
6
Introduction
All across the globe, democratic movements are taking root in places once thought
hostile to democracy. As these movements spread and grow stronger, many people
around the world are wondering what they can do to help.
For too long, support for democracy was treated as the exclusive prerogative of
governments and foundations, many of which returned to the same handful of policy
options again and again to little effect. Too often, the options presented within
government and the public debate were simplified into three options: doing nothing,
economic sanctions or military intervention. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens had few tools
and little knowledge about how to help activists struggling for democracy in far off lands.
That is no longer the case.
In an age of Twitter, Google, and PayPal, lending support for democracy abroad has
never been easier. In many instances, vital help for democratic activists is just a click,
donation, or tweet away. Governments, too, have an exciting new array of nonviolent
policy options that could potentially revolutionize how states can and do support
democracy abroad.
Still, for all the tools now available to individuals, organizations and governments, little
is known about how external actors support nonviolent resistance abroad. This
document is intended to change this.
The following pages are designed to kick start a global conversation on how—and how
not—to support democratic activists around the world. Included below are more than
120 nonviolent resistance tools and tactics available to governments, diplomats,
nongovernmental organizations, foundations, corporations, IT experts, and ordinary
citizens across the globe.
As can be seen, some of these methods are tried and trusted; some have never been
put into practice. A few tools could do great harm, while others may do a great deal of
good. The authors of this document are not so bold as to suggest that we know which is
best. Instead, we aim simply to provide an overview of the tools and techniques those
outside repressive regimes can and are employing to counteract authoritarianism. We
do not offer a list of instructions for how to do so.
Undoubtedly, this list is not without faults. Though it strives to be comprehensive, some
tactics have likely been missed, and others neglected. As such, this remains a working
document. Its intention is not to conclude the discussion on nonviolent resistance
assistance methods, but to start it. We therefore welcome our readers’ input and look
forward to redefining the many ways that outsides can support nonviolent resistance to
dictatorship.
The authors of this document do not endorse the use of risky or illegal activities.
Readers undertaking the activities included within this document do so at their own risk.
7
How to Read this Document
This document is the product of a two-day workshop held in New York City among more
than a dozen domestic nonviolent resistance activists, scholars, donors, and aid
practitioners. The purpose of their meeting was to re-conceptualize the methods and
tools by which external actors can and are supporting nonviolent resistance abroad.
They were asked to think big and small—to identify any support, no matter how
contentious or impractical—that could potentially affect the work of nonviolent
resistance activists confronting dictatorship. Their ambition was not to advocate a
specific method or tool to help support democracy, but rather, to get people thinking
about a larger and more creative range of options for how to assist nonviolent
resistance to dictatorship.
The discussion of nonviolent policy options is not, of course, without precedent. For
years, scholars and practitioners have deliberated the pros and cons of external
intervention abroad. Below are some of the principles that have emerged as critical
when considering if and how external actors should implement the tools and methods
listed throughout the following pages.
Local Context: All external interventions should be treated with the utmost caution and
consideration for the specific context in question. All strategies should be born from a
careful examination of the place and people in question, bearing in mind that no two
countries—and thus no two strategies—are or should be exactly alike.
Consent: This menu offers an overview of policy options for external actors. Yet it is
absolutely vital that domestic actors—those whose very lives are often at risk—are the
drivers of these options. All too often, external interventions are made without due
consideration for the wishes, concerns, and expectations of local activists and the
constraints under which they live. External actors must work hard to get consent and
input from those inside the country, and ensure that their efforts are meeting the self-
defined demands of local activists.
Risks and Rewards: External actors must also be conscious of their own ignorance. All
interventions come with their own set of risks and rewards. Whatever the policy option
selected, there are inevitably trade-offs involved. To minimize unnecessary collateral
damage, external actors must be mindful of these trade-offs and give full consideration
to the myriad of ways in which their interventions may both help and hurt domestic
activists in the short- and long-term.
Core Values: Finally, all interventions should be selected in accordance with the core
values that external actors and local activists hold dear. This means, among other things,
that interventions should be made with a reasonable degree of transparency. They
should also be made responsibly and allow for full accountability. Wherever possible,
interventions should be equitable and inclusive. Before they take action, external actors
should consider how their own values apply to the actions that they take abroad.
8
Finally, one last note on typology: This menu is organized according to types of actors.
Tools that are most applicable to governments have thus been separated from tools
that are better suited for corporations, foundations, or individuals. The order of these
tools was determined by the degree of complexity that the intervention demanded:
simpler tools were put first, more complex tools put last. This classification is designed
to make the menu more accessible and easier to implement. Where certain tools can be
used by different categories of actors, we have indicated their dual use and included
passages in each applicable category.
9
INDIVIDUALS
What individuals are doing and can do to help end dictatorship
As activists across the Middle East and North Africa protest against dictatorship, many
people around the world are wondering what they can do to help. Whether in New York
City, London or Tokyo, there are many steps individuals can and are taking to help end
dictatorships abroad. Below are a few of the ways individuals are supporting the cause
of nonviolent resistance.
Email and Call-ins: Mass email- and call-ins to the offices of elected representatives are
a quick and cheap way for individuals to voice their discontent with the status quo. Call-
ins are most effective when linked to a specific piece of legislation. Though calls and
emails to elected representatives are often dismissed as ineffective, they have the
capacity to generate impact if they are well-organized and combined strategically with
other forms of advocacy. In the US, AmericanCensorship.org offers step-by-step
instructions for how users can call their congressional representatives, and will even
place calls on users’ behalf.
Domestic Petitions: Like phone calls, petitions are an inexpensive way to signal discord
with and exert pressure on elected representatives who support legislation that would
bolster authoritarian regimes. Online petitions, in particular, have proven a time- and
cost-effective way for citizens to voice their opposition to or support of legislative
proposals. As with phone calls, however, these petitions must be well-organized and
should be combined with other forms of civic protest to have an effect.
Global Petitions: Petitions can also be used to signal global discord against repressive
regimes. Global petitions collect signatures from supporters irrespective of their
geographic origin, and often target supranational institutions. For example, in the spring
of 2011, Amnesty International collected 165,953 signatures in support of its efforts to
refer Syria to the International Criminal Court. Though cost effective, many argue that
such petitions are largely ineffective in promoting change and may convey a false sense
of accomplishment.
Photo Petitions: Another type of petition gaining prominence on the web is the photo
petition. Photo petitions rely on activists to send in visual images of collective actions,
rather than traditional signatures, to signal discord with policy or support of a particular
position. One example is 350.org, which uses photo petitions to advocate for lower CO2
emissions. These images can become powerful symbols of nonviolent resistance and
solidarity. Because they do not rely on words, they also have the advantage of being
understood cross-culturally. Like traditional petitions, however, photo petitions must be
organized strategically if they are to generate impact.
Social Media: Much has been said of the role social media had played in fueling
revolutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa. While no simple panacea,
10
evidence suggests that where the Internet is available and accessible, social media like
Facebook and Twitter can act as a widely accessible medium of communication for
domestic activists and their external supporters. Cheap and efficient, social media has
been credited with sparking the revolution in Egypt, while its influence on Iran’s 2009
uprising was thought so great that it was dubbed the ‘Twitter Revolution’. The utility of
social media to promote revolution has, however, been criticized for, among other
things, politicizing the Internet. Social media sites are also easy targets for regime
censorship, and can, potentially, be used to benefit the regime itself. In Syria, for
example, many active users of social media sites have been arrested and tortured, as
the government seeks out passwords and usernames of anti-regime protestors. Still,
social media can be a useful tool for individuals outside the regime to speak up on
democracy’s behalf. Twitter and Facebook can be used to draw attention to regime
abuses and shine a spotlight on democratic activists.
Online or Text Donations: Online fundraisers have been used to generate funds to
support local opposition actors. Most recently, online fundraisers helped purchase
satellite equipment to ship to the Middle East and North Africa. For example, Buy This
Satellite is a nonprofit that is using the Internet to raise money to buy a dormant
communications satellite that it intends to place over Africa, allowing Internet access in
areas across the continent. Through small donations from close to 1,200 donors, they
have raised almost $65,000. Online donations have the potential to raise money quickly
for critical needs—particularly humanitarian aid. Transparency in resource allocation is,
however, essential, as is having a strategic plan for how to spend funds both promptly
and effectively.
Name and Shame a Dictator: One way individuals can help raise awareness of human
rights violations is to draw attention to the specific governments, companies, or
individuals that lend their support to repressive regimes. Naming and shaming tactics
have been used to point a finger at the actors and organizations that provide funds,
weapons, or legitimacy to repressive regimes. By ‘outing’ those complicit in atrocities,
foreign actors pressure these groups to withdraw their support for repression. Many
nongovernmental organizations have been active on this front. The Burma Campaign UK,
for example, has compiled a list of companies that provide insurance services to
Burmese generals and calls on British citizens to petition those companies to stop their
unethical business practices. Efforts to name and shame clothing companies found to be
in violation of child labor laws have also been effective in stopping companies like Nike,
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Gap, and others from exploiting sweatshop labor. Like other forms of nonviolent
resistance, naming and shaming has the potential to be an effective tool in undermining
the pillars of support for a regime. However, it must be strategically organized and
implemented in coordination with other tools.
*This technique can also be used by nongovernmental organizations.
Op-Eds: External actors might also consider lending their support to domestic activists
by publishing op-eds on their behalf. Opinion pieces in widely read news outlets, like the
New York Times or the Wall Street Journal, have the capacity to draw attention to
important causes and raise awareness of little known human rights abuses. Foreign
correspondents might also consider publishing pieces in the name of local activists.
Honorary Degree Withdrawal: Throughout their long careers, dictators and their family
members occasionally accrue honorary degrees from venerable academic institutions.
To protest their descent into authoritarianism, these institutions can occassionally
consider withdrawing such degrees. Where universities do not do so of their own accord,
individuals have considered waging nonviolent resistance.
Nonviolent Resistance Websites: Websites have been credited with providing critical
information on the means and methods of strategic nonviolent action, but they also
played a role in facilitating communication between and among domestic activists and
the international community. During the Arab Spring, for example, websites like
www.accessnow.org provided information for activists on how to jump the firewall. At
the same time, websites like www.avaaz.org provided an outlet for domestic activists to
share their videos of regime-sponsored abuses. YouTube and other websites helped
circulate this footage to the masses, bringing the extent of human rights abuses
unfolding in places like Egypt, Syria, or Yemen into the homes of concerned citizens
everywhere.
12
HTTPS Encrypted Email: Regime surveillance has increased the demand for simple
technologies that allow activists to communicate without fear of interception. One form
of such communication is encrypted email. Encryption protects email content from
being read by anyone except the intended recipients. There are several types of email
encryption, some of which are offered by the major free email service providers. Emails
sent via Gmail, for example, are encrypted with HTTPS by default. Similarly, Hotmail
gives users the option to encrypt their emails via HTTPS. Yahoo, by contrast, does not
offer the option of encryption—meaning that activists who communicate via Yahoo are
particularly vulnerable to email interception. Still, even HTTPS encryption is not without
its vulnerabilities. While HTTPS emails are secure between the sender and the service
provider, these emails can be unencrypted when they reach email accounts of non-
HTTPS users. A more secure form of email communication is PGP or public key
encryption, which protects emails before they are sent.
PGP Encrypted Email: PGP encrypted email is the next step up the security chain from
HTTPS. The distribution of a public and private key (or code) ensures that only intended
recipients can read PGP emails. Because they are encrypted even before they leave
senders’ computers, PGP encryption can be used with any type of email—whether
Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo, or other providers. While an excellent way to ensure email
privacy, one drawback of public key encryption is that its use can attract the attention of
authorities. Email users who rely on encryption are often flagged as activists and may
face criminal prosecution in countries that have banned encryption (such as Pakistan).
To read more about public key encryption, click here. For more on how to increase the
privacy of Internet communications, click here.
Pranks: Pranks, like prank phone calls and hoax meetings are another way individuals
have tried to mock dictators. In Milosevic’s Serbia, for example, members of the youth
movement Otpor regularly organized pranks on the state-run police and other Milosevic
loyalists, believing that humor could counteract fear. Increasingly, pranks are also being
pulled by external actors hoping to undermine dicators abroad. In 2003, for example,
two US-based radio hosts staged a call-in to Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez,
pretending to be Fidel Castro. Members of the Diaspora and other external actors might
also considered arranging hoax meetings with the regime. Hoax meetings, ostensibly
arranged at an agreed upon time and place, have been used to divert the regime’s
attention while the opposition stages a protest at alternate locations. Pranks have also
been widely hailed as important tools in nonviolent resistance for domestic activists. Yet
external actors have yet to use them en masse. Some have suggested organizing a
global ‘prank a dictator’ day, flooding the phone lines of regime members and loyalists
with critical calls. Such efforts must be organized with caution to limit any negative
backlash against suspected informants or local activists.
13
To generate media attention, however, such acts must be well organized and employed
strategically to coincide with other forms of nonviolent resistance.
Global Hunger Strikes: One form of nonviolent resistance is the global hunger strike. A
global hunger strike occurs when a critical mass of people engage in a hunger strike
together at an agreed upon time. In July 2011, Darfur Fast for Life organized a global
hunger strike of 10,000 people, who each fasted for 24 hours in solidarity with the
victims of violence in Darfur. Hunger strikes should always be considered with great
caution and in consultation with medical experts. While global hunger strikes have the
capacity to generate media attention, it is critical that they are designed with a clear,
achievable goal, and are implemented as one part of a larger nonviolent resistance
strategy.
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NGOs, FOUNDATIONS & OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS
What NGOs, Foundations, Universities
And Other Non-State Actors can do and are doing to end dictatorship
For decades, non-state actors have worked to support democratic activists in non-
democratic contexts. Too little is known about these nonviolent interventions. While
state-sponsored sanctions receive ample discussion, nonviolent policy options
promoted by NGOs, foundations, universities and other non-state actors do not. This
section is meant to provide an overview of these options, offering insight into the
means and methods by which non-state actors can help undermine repressive regimes
around the world without resorting to violence.
Small grants: Small cash allotments may be given to political parties, sympathetic local
governments, members of the military, NGOs, civic education organizations, trade
unions, and members of the media. Where foreign bank accounts are frozen, cash may
be channeled into the country via suitcases, cars, or foreign businesses situated within
the country. Small sums of money are believed to have been critical in the case of Serbia,
where they helped anti-Milosevic movements like Otpor, pay for things like fax
machines and computers, as well as a wide array of promotional materials like T-Shirts,
pins, stickers, and pamphlets. Small cash allotments have the advantage of being easy to
transfer and require relatively few bureaucratic hassles, particularly when it comes to
larger donors. As with all forms of intervention, however, cash allotments risk providing
fodder for the regime’s demonization of the opposition as ‘foreign mercenaries’ (a
frequent accusation hurled against Otpor, which did the organization no small amount
of damage, particularly after Milosevic’s ouster).
Large grants: Governments and international NGOs may also channel larger grants to
domestic organizations, like independent media outlets, civil society organizations, and
labor unions to support long-term programming. The advantage is that unlike small cash
allotments, this funding may be more sustainable over a longer period of time and
supports larger projects. The problem, however, is that such grants often require long
waiting periods and, due to bureaucratic hurdles within aid agencies, often wind up
arriving late on the ground. Moreover, because many of these grants are awarded
transparently, they often draw attention to foreign funding of opposition movements.
Hawala: Getting funds to domestic activists is often difficult. Remittances are one way
external actors have channeled funds to domestic activists in authoritarian regimes.
Hawala, also known as Hundi, is a form of remittance that exists outside of the
traditional banking system. It is based not on the formal transfer of funds through
conventional banking channels, but on the honor of a global network of informal hawala
brokers, who agree to lend and borrow at unofficial exchange rates. Because Hawala
takes place through unofficial channels, these funds are difficult for regimes to trace.
Hawala has emerged as a frequently used form of money transfer throughout parts of
the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, enabling members of the diaspora to transfer funds to
their family members. But Hawala has also been used by external donors looking to
15
support human rights and provide emergency relief, particularly in areas that lack an
effective formal financial sector.
In Afghanistan, for example, Hawala has emerged as the chief financial
instrument for the delivery of humanitarian and development aid for the majority of
NGOs and international donors. NGOs alone are estimated to have transferred more
than $200 million through these informal money exchange dealers, with individual
payments exceeding $1 million. In lieu of an operational formal financial sector,
analysts say that Afghan Hawaladars offer a reliable, efficient and inexpensive means
for making international and domestic payments.
While a potentially useful tool for transmitting funds in countries that apply
distortive exchange rate regulations or have poorly regulated banking systems, Hawala
is not without its downsides. For one, just as it can be used by democratic activists, it
can also be used by regime loyalists and criminals to transfer funds abroad. Due to its
lack of transparency, the peer-to-peer transmission of funds has also provided a method
for laundering the proceeds of illegal activities, such as opium production. Because it
does not leave a paper trail, Hawala is also suspected of having supported the transfer
of finances to terrorist organizations.
Material Aid: Material assistance provided by external actors can support the
opposition’s efforts to reach the public and mobilize citizens. Material aid may include
the provision of laptops and printers, power generators, portable fax machines, satellite
phones, mobile phones, and campaign paraphernalia such as buttons, whistles, and
bullhorns. While useful, material aid may, however, be more difficult to transport into a
country than cash and may draw domestic attention to external support.
Web Resources: Websites and blogs have been credited for providing critical
information on the means and methods of strategic nonviolent action. The websites of
organizations like the Albert Einstein Institute, CANVAS, and the International Center for
Nonviolent Conflict offer insight into how activists can confront oppression without
resorting to violence. Blogs like iRevolution offer examples of different ways to spark
nonviolent revolution. In addition, the Project of the Communities of Democracies
website offers “A Diplomat’s Handbook,” exploring the diplomatic tools that help
promote democracy. From Egypt to Syria, these websites are teaching activists the time-
tested techniques that have worked to bring down dictatorships in other authoritarian
contexts. In 2011 alone, the Arabic translation of CANVAS’s manual for nonviolent
resistance was downloaded more than 15,000 times.
Training for Activists: Foreign experts financed by NGOs like NDI, IRI, FES, KAS, the
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, or Alfred Mozer Stichting may provide training
16
for domestic activists in nonviolent resistance, political party building, mobilization
methods, and electoral monitoring. Where foreign trainers are not permitted in the
country, training may be organized in neighboring states. Some organizations, like NDI,
have also established Trainer of Trainer programs that allow a core set of activists to
receive training in how to train other domestic activists within the country. While a
favored method of choice for donors, the impacts of training are rarely witnessed in the
short-term. Moreover, training is often criticized for being supply-driven, led by trainers
with little country-specific expertise, and often lack follow up.
Training for Party Members: Several international organizations also provide training to
party members in repressive and newly democratic regimes. Known collectively as Party
Institutes, or Party Foundations, organizations like NDI, IRI, FES, KAS, the Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, and Alfred Mozer Stichting train new party members in the
basics of how to run for office and organize on a local, regional, or national scale.
Training for party members include lessons in: public speaking, Get Out the Vote
techniques, internal party communication, campaign management, public opinion
polling, and political ideology. Organizations like IRI often bolster their training by
independently contracting public opinion polls, which parties can use to test campaign
messages and programmatic positions with the electorate.
Training for Local Independent Media: International NGOs like IREX and Freedom
House also provide training to local independent media and journalists. In repressive
contexts, these training sessions teach local journalists how to adopt standards of
objective reporting and circumvent the regime’s media stranglehold. Training also
provides insight into how to use different types of media to attract different audiences,
as well as how to fundraise.
Training for Domestic Election Monitors: Training can also target potential election
monitors. Particularly in new and faux-democracies, election monitoring can serve as an
important tool to identify electoral theft and galvanize disgruntled citizens against the
regime. The verification of falsified electoral results is widely believed to have been
critical to the unseating of authoritarian incumbents in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine in
2000, 2003, and 2005, respectively. In each of these cases, international NGOs
organized massive training for thousands of election monitors, who were taught how to
identify fraud and how to report on actual results. In Serbia’s case, domestic election
monitors proved critical in discrediting Milosevic’s calls for a second round of
Presidential elections. However, the utility of election monitors depends on the context
in question. In countries in which elections are not permitted, election monitors will
clearly serve little purpose.
Training for the Police and Armed Forces: Police and the armed forces often serve as a
critical tool in an authoritarian regime’s arsenal of repression. For this reason, foreign
governments and international NGOs strive to democratize the police and armed forces,
particularly in new democracies emerging from authoritarianism. One way to do this is
through training. Training often center on teaching regime forces how to abide by
17
international standards of human rights and to be responsive to the rule of law. For over
two decades, police training has been at the heart of US efforts to promote democracy
in Latin America. These training have become an increasingly prominent fixture of post-
conflict recovery efforts in places like Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. Unfortunately, many
efforts to assist police units, including programs sponsored by the FBI, US Drug
Enforcement Agency, and the State Department, have little bearing on democratic
practice, and may in fact conflict with efforts to support human rights in newly
democratic settings (for more on this see, see the work of Thomas Carothers).
Training for Judiciaries, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders: To promote the rule of law
in non- and newly-democratic settings, external actors have developed a multi-faceted
training toolbox that targets the very state institutions that enforce the law: judiciaries
and lawyers. Training for judiciaries, prosecutors and public defenders aim to teach
individuals how to treat and represent suspects in accordance with due process, how to
root out corruption and handle heavy caseloads, as well as how to provide citizens with
equal access to the courts.
Training by Activists: One common criticism of training is that they lack contextual
specificity. Foreign trainers are charged with failing to sufficiently analyze the political
realities faced by local activists. One way external actors have sought to remedy this is
by having foreign activists take the lead on training, rather than relying on so-called
‘experts’. In this vein, CANVAS creates opportunities for former activists with hands-on
experience in nonviolent resistance methods in Milosevic’s Serbia and elsewhere to
share lessons learned with activists struggling to unseat current dictatorships. Thus far,
CANVAS has trained activists from dozens of repressive countries around the world.
Public Opinion Polls: In authoritarian countries that permit elections, NGOs and foreign
governments sponsor public opinion polls testing popular support of existing regimes, as
well as opposition candidates. Poll results have been used to build confidence in the
possibility of regime change, and to encourage opposition forces to unite. These polls
have been heralded by foreign donors as having been instrumental in contexts such as
Milosevic’s Serbia for, among other things, increasing confidence among opposition
members and the public about the possibility of the regime’s defeat. While potentially
useful, it is important to understand that public opinion polls are often inaccurate in
repressive contexts, and may be of less consequence in areas that lack elections. Also,
opposition figures are often wary of relying on opinion polls, as they are subject to
manipulation and can easily be used in the regime’s favor.
Elections Monitors: Election monitoring has become a key way for external actors to
intervene on democracy’s behalf. IFES, OSCE, IDEA, the UN and others offer a litany of
election monitoring missions that, upon invitation, can enter repressive contexts and
monitor the quality of domestic elections. Their ability to issue condemnation of
electoral results has the capacity to propel disgruntled voters to the streets, providing a
spark for ‘electoral revolution’. Election monitors have given failing grades to
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, deeming their elections to be neither free nor
18
fair, and have found voting inconsistencies and faults in numerous other elections. But
if such assessments have undermined the self-proclaimed democratic legitimacy of
these regimes, they have done little to facilitate democracy in the short-term. Moreover,
election monitors often require the invitation of repressive governments—something
many dictators refuse to offer—and must withstand the scrutiny of regime-sponsored
election monitors, who will often report very different findings. International actors
might consider lobbying more aggressively for such monitors’ presence and/or condemn
the denial of monitors in authoritarian settings.
Films on Nonviolent Resistance: Video clips and documentaries have also served as
educational tools providing inspiration for domestic activists. The documentary Bringing
Down a Dictator traces the success and obstacles confronting Serbia’s nonviolent
resistance movement in the late 1990s. The documentary aired on public television in
both Georgia and Ukraine prior to the color Revolutions and has been translated into
Arabic, Burmese, Farsi, French, Indonesian, Mandarin, Russian, Spanish, Uzbek, and
Vietnamese. Documentaries’ impact on activists themselves is, however, difficult to
determine, though they have proven a mainstay of nonviolent resistance education in
universities across the world.
Video Games: Video games have also been used as a fun, creative way to support
education on nonviolent resistance. In Washington, DC, Breakaway Games created the
interactive video game, A Force More Powerful, to encourage users to explore strategic,
nonviolent conflict techniques to break down repressive political regimes. Designed by
former Otpor activists from Serbia, the game asks users to orchestrate nonviolent
resistance campaigns by assembling a team, building public support, and undermining
the pillars of the regime’s support.
Concerts and Public Events: External actors frequently use music and social events to
draw attention to injustices being committed abroad. Large-scale concerts featuring
notable musicians can help raise money for urgent causes and draw mainstream
attention to a specific issue. In 1984, for example, Bob Geldof founded Band Aid to raise
money for famine relief in Ethiopia. In the years since, other musicians, including Bono
of U2, have followed suit with efforts like Playing for Change. Like other celebrity causes,
19
these events have the capacity to raise attention and funds for urgent issues and the
show of solidarity can boost morale inside a repressive country. However, if
implemented without a long-term vision for lasting change or a clear vehicle through
which to disperse aid, their impact can be ephemeral.
Religious Leaders: Religious leaders have a large audience, often wield moral and
political influence, and can drive donations. By recruiting these leaders to use their bully
pulpit in support of democracy, external actors can raise awareness, funds and political
pressure both in their local communities and boost morale for local activists. Diaspora
religious leaders may be particularly effective in this. External actors of different
religious sects than the local communities, however, must be carefully considered,
particularly given any ethnic or religious tensions that may be at play in the local context.
This can also be used by an authoritarian regime as evidence of foreign meddling or
religious conspiracy.
University Chairs & Department Endowments: Universities can draw attention and
build on the existing volume of work on nonviolent democratic movements by
endowing faculty chairs or whole departments to the study of nonviolent resistance to
dictatorship. This could be in addition to establishing a socially responsible university
policy that ensures that university investments, faculty and student body meet their
stated values and do not inadvertently support dictatorships.
Rewards for Defectors: Since 2006, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation has incentivized good
governance in Africa by awarding a multimillion dollar prize to former African heads of
state who leave office within their term limits and demonstrate excellence in leadership.
The award—which consists of $5 million over 10 years, and $200,000 every year
thereafter—provides a financial incentive for heads of state to act within the bounds of
their constitutions and in so doing, promote democracy. Why not offer a similar
incentive—albeit of a more modest size and on a sliding scale to incentivize early
defection—for government defection in dictatorial regimes? Of course, steps must be
taken to ensure that human rights violators do not receive compensation or safe haven.
Assuming that this is possible, however, an award for defectors has the potential to
increase the numbers of defections in dictatorships.
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‘Dictators Index’: Another instrument through which to draw attention to authoritarian
regimes is the establishment of a Dictators Index. Several organizations, such as
Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, already
provide indexes of democracy. There are no comprehensive indexes dedicated
exclusively to authoritarianism, however. Though Parade offers a list of the ‘World’s
Worst Dictators’, it does not offer a thorough explanation for how it assembles this list.
In the future, individuals or organizations might consider developing a classificatory
schema exclusively for authoritarian regimes, and offer a mock ‘prize’ for Worst Dictator
of the Year. The event could potentially be used to attract media attention to ongoing
crimes, as well as to name and shame the world’s worst leaders.
Best Practices: External actors might consider joining forces to create a virtual platform
where best practices in nonviolent policy solutions can be debated and shared. This
platform could take the form of an interactive website, where aid providers,
policymakers, academics, and activists can discuss what works and what does not work
in the realm of foreign aid.
Online Clearinghouse: One potential idea to broaden the scope of nonviolent resistance
channels is to develop a clearinghouse dedicated to nonviolent resistance methods.
While several individual organizations concerned with nonviolent resistance already
exist, an organizational clearinghouse would help forge synergies between them,
creating a common vehicle for the sharing of best practices and allowing activists from
around the world to network and trade lessons learned. This, however, could pose a risk
for activists without secure technology or whose online presence can be tracked.
Rapid Response Advisory Team: For individuals with expertise in a relevant area,
whether sanctions, diplomacy, PR and marketing, or IT, networking with other experts
can help to create a rapid response team that can act as a resource to nonviolent
activists in the midst of a crisis. Such teams must, however, have a trusted relationship
with activists on the ground and a secure means of regular communication.
Young Activists Network: Despite the proliferation of Facebook, Twitter, and online
chat rooms, many activists worry that they know little of the struggles and lessons
learned by activists in other parts of the world. Why not create a platform for activists to
forge transnational networks with foreign colleagues engaged in similar nonviolent
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resistance struggles in places like Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, or the former
Soviet Union? This network could enable activists to learn from one another and
develop new ways to counteract oppression. The stories of their fellow revolutionaries
could provide fodder for activists’ own domestic struggles. As with an online
clearinghouse and annual convention, it is important to understand the risks of such
networking in flagging individuals as activists within their home-states.
Scholarships for Activists: Scholarships are another route external actors can take to
support activists struggling in authoritarian contexts. Scholarships for activists can be
used to provide activists with access to online training materials or to pay for their
education in their home states or abroad, which provides opportunities not only for
learning but networking and fundraising. When considering scholarships, external actors
must be mindful that they do not promote brain drain in authoritarian settings, and do
not encourage activists to leave the very countries where they are needed most. It
should be noted that sponsoring education for activists outside of their home country
could risk those very activists being painted as outsiders or foreign agents upon their
return by the regime.
Twitter Forum: Many of today’s most well known activists spread their message by way
of social media. Unfortunately, they rarely have the opportunity to share their
experiences offline. External actors can play a role in organizing and funding social
media forums, during which well known Twitter and Facebook users can meet one
another and forge relationships beyond the computer.
Dictator Exposés: Working hand-in-hand with citizens inside the country, external
actors can publish personal details of regime officials, such as email exchanges, schools
attended, or social spots frequented by members of the regime and their families. With
access to this data, domestic activists can use this information to wage nonviolent
resistance, whether sit-ins or mass protests, and external actors can implement targeted
sanctions.
Perhaps the most high-profile exposé conducted by external actors came in
March of 2012, with the publication of several thousand emails received and sent by
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his wife, Asma al-Assad. Published in international
and regional newspapers like the Guardian and New York Times, the emails shone light
on the purchasing habits, musical preferences, and strategic alliances of Syria’s first
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couple. The report of lavish spending amidst an ongoing bloodbath sparked
international outrage, and prompted a plethora of YouTube clips, online petitions, and
social media campaigns designed to galvanize Asma Assad into action. To date, the
campaign has yet to compel a shift in Asma Assad’s behavior and violence remains
ongoing.
Dictator exposés strive to compel regime loyalists to shift their allegiances.
While a potentially useful way to make the lives of the regime and their supporters
uncomfortable, exposés may not always be effective and come with potential
drawbacks. Domestic activists who publicize such information are likely to be
particularly at risk for government reprisals.
Toolkits of Contestation: One way external actors can help educate domestic activists
on nonviolent resistance techniques is by developing contextually specific toolkits for
contestation. These toolkits can, for example, teach political parties in Egypt how to
prepare for elections. They can also teach civil society groups how to hold their elected
representatives accountable, and ensure that they do not backtrack on their electoral
promises. Developed by international NGOs, these toolkits could provide a starting point
for activists to better understand the contests that exist and how they might better
contest important spaces.
Global Norms and Standards: Global norms and standards can offer a powerful tool to
draw attention to human rights abuses in far-off states. Global norms like the
responsibility to protect, the right to free speech, and freedom of assembly have been
used by domestic activists to compel dictators to end abuse, as well as to lobby foreign
governments to join their causes. Global norms and standards have also served as focal
points to rally diverse supporters behind a common, relatively uncontroversial
conviction. A shared desire for the right to free speech, for example, has the potential to
unite conservatives and liberals, secularists and Islamists, Republicans and Democrats
alike. It should be noted, however, that authoritarian regimes often pay ample lip
service to global norms and standards. Few profess an aversion to democracy, and many
tout themselves as committed democrats.
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Transparent Payments: Despite their often ample financial resources, repressive
regimes often force their citizens to live at or near abject poverty. The publish what you
pay movement seeks to promote greater transparency in the financial transactions that
governments make, so that citizens can hold them accountable. Why not extend these
efforts even further? Transparency in financial transactions should be extended to all
corporations, governments, organizations, and individual investors that do business with
dictatorial regimes. Such transparency should not merely be enforced by law, but by
secondary pressure exerted by the international community. NGOs, governments, and
international organizations should work together to ensure that businesses are not
making profits at the price of human rights.
Foreign Correspondents: One of the first steps authoritarian governments often take
before launching assaults on their citizens is to cast out foreign journalists. Foreign
correspondents risk generating unwanted attention and their coverage has the potential
to spark international condemnation. As in Yemen, these correspondents are often
denied visas, making it impossible for them to report from the country. External actors
should do more to insist that all countries are legally bound to grant visas to foreign
correspondents. This may include lobbying Western governments to exert pressure on
dictatorships.
Education for Policy Makers: Policymakers in established democracies often lack insight
into the negative repercussions their policies can have in authoritarian states. This is
particularly true in the realm of Internet technology, where laws designed for ostensibly
legal purposes can have dangerous consequences for activists in countries that can ill
afford them. For instance, legislative solutions designed to fight cyber crime, may
provide legal and technical ammunition to repressive regimes that seek to control
networks in ways that harm free speech. Likewise, laws designed to stop piracy might
threaten free speech and kill creativity. Citizens in North America and Western Europe
can play a role in educating their elected representatives about this so-called ‘collateral
damage’.
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Live-Streaming: Organizations looking to raise public awareness of regime abuses
and/or lobby policymakers to take action on specific transgressions may also consider
live-streaming images of abuse – or in the converse, of protests. Al Jazeera, for example,
provided live-stream coverage of Egypt’s revolution, while the website,
GlobalRevolution, provided live-streamed coverage of Occupy Wall Street. Live-
streaming has the potential to be very effective in documenting large-scale protests and
exposing regime abuses. These images can be used to galvanize global public opinion
against a regime, and to propel foreign policymakers to take action in favor of
democracy.
Evidence Collection & Record Keeping: External actors can also provide a vehicle for
domestic activists to act as informants against the regime. By providing a number for
activists to call or an email address to send evidence to, external actors can help
activists collect evidence of abuses that are ongoing. Unfortunately, such repositories
have the capacity to become very vulnerable. External actors must proceed with
extreme caution on this front to ensure that human rights data is properly encrypted
and safe from harm. This must be done very carefully to avoid identification of activists
and to avoid compromising evidence, which must be in a condition for use in court once
a case is filed.
Liberty Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Drones are often used to wage military warfare.
Increasingly, however, human rights activists are exploring creative options to use
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drones for good. Because drones serve as a tool for aerial surveillance, advocates
suggest that they can also be used to monitor human rights abuses as they unfold in hot
zones like Syria. The advantages of drones are believed to be manifold: Because they
operate from the air, and not from the ground, they can escape the violence that often
confronts human rights observers. They also get to places that live observers might not
have access to. And because they operate at high-definition (unlike most cell phones or
handheld cameras), drones could potentially allow human rights groups to count
demonstrators, pinpoint weapons, and identify crimes as they are being committed in
real-time. What’s more, surveillance drones are increasingly affordable, costing no more
than a few hundred thousand dollars.
As result, drones from human rights are no longer mere fantasy: they are being
used in practice. The environmental group, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, for
example, now uses drones to monitor Japanese whaling in the Southern Hemisphere.
And in Poland, protestors have used ‘robokopter’ drones to document police excesses
during city-wide riots in Warsaw. In each of these instances, drones have provided visual
evidence of crimes as they unfold. In the future, drones might also be used to transfer
materials. Instead of dropping bombs, for example, they might drop educational
information to domestic activists, or critical resources like satphones or flash drives.
While a potentially creative method to promote democracy, drones are not
without pitfalls. For one, they may well be considered illegal in the eyes of authoritarian
states. Not only will likely be considered an invasion of airspace, but if used improperly,
could potentially provide a vehicle for surveillance beyond human rights abuses.
Additionally, it is likely that targeted governments will use drones to accuse
international actors of a foreign conspiracy, Local operators of drones could also be at
risk of government reprisals.
Satellites: Satellites are another way external actors are helping to monitor the
outbreak of human rights violations as they unfold in real-time. In Sudan, the Sudan
Sentinel Project rents a surveillance satellite to monitor potential sources of violence.
Satellite communications are, however, very expensive. Moreover, evidence indicates
that regimes may be devising methods through which to avoid detection. Iran, for
example, has been accused of providing the Syrian government with technology that
blocks satellite telephone signals.
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TECH SAVVY ACTIVISTS
What IT activists are doing to end dictatorship
Over the past decade, the web has become an increasingly popular instrument for
external actors to collaborate with domestic activists. Many online communication tools
are low-tech, while others require greater sophistication. Below are some of the ways
international activists are using the Internet to support democracy abroad.
Please note that the actions listed below may represent a risk for the individuals or
groups engaged in them. Many jurisdictions have laws that provide severe penalties,
both criminal and civil, for actions that interfere with or compromise electronic
communications and commerce. The authors do not endorse such activities.
Wikis for Whistleblowers: Regime loyalists are often the best poised to expose the
regime’s underbelly and pinpoint evidence of abuse. Increasingly, democratic activists
are thinking up new and creative ways to encourage regime loyalists to come forward
and share their evidence with the international community. One way to do so may be
via the Internet. By offering a platform for potential whistleblowers to come forward,
the Internet could help to bleed a dictator of his or her supporters. Creating a Wiki, in
the vein of Wikileaks, might potentially enable the Internet to achieve this.
Launched in 2006, WikiLeaks is an online, international nonprofit that publishes
submissions of private and classified materials offered by whistleblowers, members of
the media, and others. The organization first made headlines in 2010 for publishing
footage of a US airstrike that resulted in the deaths of Iraqi journalists. Less well known
is Wikileaks’ expose of corrupt practices in several dictatorial regimes. Wikileaks’
exposure of corruption in Tunisia, for example, has been attributed in part to the fall of
President Ben Ali. Could a wiki for pro-democratic informants prove similarly significant
for the promotion of democracy in other authoritarian contexts? Some believe it could.
If properly conceived, advocates suggest that a Wiki for Whistleblowers could
offer a one-stop shop for regime informants, or anyone else with evidence of abuse, to
come forward. Not only might it help offer tangible evidence of anti-democratic
activities, but it could undermine the legitimacy of the regime, by unmasking its
authoritarian character. The development of a Wiki is not without pitfalls, however.
Informants might potentially risk reprisals from the regime. And if information is not
properly vetted, a Wiki could become a convenient means for scapegoating or settling
old scores that are not related to the abusive regime. Additionally, the release of
classified data could put those administering the Wiki at legal risk in countries with laws
protecting confidential source-journalists relationships.
Apps for Nonviolent Solidarity: Smartphones offer a cost-effective way for local activists
to stay in contact and keep abreast of activities happening abroad. The development of
new smartphone applications or ‘apps’ for nonviolent solidarity might be one way to
enhance smartphones’ utility for democracy activities. Apps for nonviolent solidarity
could take any number of forms. For example, they could document interactive manuals
of nonviolent resistance techniques, offer information on cutting-edge circumvention
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methods, network activists in other parts of the world, or help to alert friends and
families of an imminent regime crackdown. Downloadable via iTunes or the Android
store, these apps could also be updated in real-time to let activists know where protests
are happening, what actions the regime has taken to stop them from organizing, and
daily tips of the trade.
At present, there are no official nonviolent resistance apps. There are, however,
several ideas that could offer a source of inspiration. In Arizona, for example, a group of
pro-immigrant rights activists is developing a smartphone app that will allow immigrants
to notify friends, family members, attorneys, and consulates, should they be arrested.
The app will enable third parties to identify when and where the arrest took place, and
offer users’ a quick reminder of civil rights laws, such as the right to remain silent.
If designed to meet activists’ needs, these apps could help democrats wage
nonviolent resistance. But while potentially useful, the costs of app development may
outweight the benefits. For one, Nonviolent Solidarity apps risk flagging their users as
activists and could potentially help dictators monitor activists’ texts and phone calls.
App development is also expensive, costing as much as several hundred thousand
dollars. Moreover, apps’ utility ultimately depends not simply of their availability, but on
the prominence of smartphone technology in a specific context. Already, several
regimes have begun crackdown on smartphones. Syria, for example, recently banned
Apple’s iPhone in an attempt to crackdown on the social media usage of anti-Assad
activists.
Website Mirrors: Where oppositional websites are torn down by a regime, website
“mirrors” have helped Internet-savvy activists to keep them online. Widely utilized in
communities where governments heavily censor the Internet, website mirrors enable
Internet activists to create exact “mirror” copies of existing websites, by copying site
content and hosting it on a different website.
Mirrors have been widely utilized in China. For example, when Chinese
authorities banned Google in 2002, activists responded by using the mirror website,
elgooG, to circumvent government firewalls. Originally created as a Google parody site,
elgooG returns all the same hits as Google, but it presents them backwards. Unlike web
proxies like anonymizer.com or safeweb.com, Chinese activists can access elgooG
through a system designed to test China’s firewalls. elgooG thus enables tech savvy
activists to defy government censorship.
Mirroring has emerged as an important way to keep valuable information in
activists’ hands. It is not, however, without risks. Most notably, it is traceable to its
source. In other words, if local activists are doing the mirroring, they may be vulnerable
to government persecution. Mirroring is also difficult to do well. Reproducing dynamic
content from original websites is often impossible.
Open Source Technology: In recent years, open source technology has facilitated
communication between domestic and international activists. Open source technology
allows tech-savvy activists to customize existing web-technologies to better fit local
contexts. External actors can help provide activists with training in or access to open
source technologies, like Live CDs with anti-encryption tools.
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Increasing the availability of open source software is widely recognized as an
important tool for the promotion of nonviolent resistance. In 2004, for example,
members of the World Movement for Democracy called for the development of open
source applications that could be used by democracy groups to develop anti-censorship
technologies. The rush towards open source software has not been lost on aid
organizations. Eager to keep costs down, humanitarian organizations have been
increasingly keen on using open source technology. The Syria Crisis Map, for
example, relies on an open source data-mining platform known as HealthMap to
monitor thousands of English-language sources. Open source technology also powers
the Ushahidi crisis management map.
The benefits of open source software lie in its no or low cost nature, as well as its
ability to be modified to individual needs. Critics have complained, however, that such
software can suffer from poor quality and may lack reliability. Still, the benefits of open
soft software would seem to outweigh the drawbacks, hence recent moves on China
and Russia’s part to embrace open source software like Linux as an alternative to
commercial ventures like Microsoft.
Global Proxy Clouds: Where regimes monitor Internet usage, Internet activists
frequently rely on proxy clouds to outsmart censors. Proxy clouds offer their members
access to a free and open Internet through a network of supporters (often based
abroad) that allow them to bypass state censors and communicate directly with one
another, the international media, and concerned citizens worldwide, without fear of
government surveillance.
Today, several organizations are working to provide access to proxy clouds and
to promote their usage by activists in authoritarian contexts. They often do so through
Tor, an anonymity circumvention project, which is also the most prominent of the proxy
cloud methods. Tor reroutes user traffic through a network of volunteers' computers
across the globe, making it almost impossible to trace. Relying on Tor, groups like Access
have created proxy clouds that allow Internet users to avoid government surveillance.
Hotspot Shield, a free piece of software that secures Web surfing, is one popular
alternative to Tor. Faster than Tor, its main disadvantage is that it offers less anonymity,
which means that its users could potentially be flagged by an authoritarian regime.
Advocates say that proxy clouds offer a critical way to circumvent government
surveillance. But they are not without downsides. One problem with proxy clouds lies in
their ease of use. Though groups like Access are trying to make these tools user-friendly,
proxy clouds remain targeted at IT savvy activists. Moreover, because proxy clouds
depend on a pre-existing Internet, proxy clouds may not be very useful where IT sectors
are less well developed or prone to government shut-down. Where the Internet is not
widely available, low and no-tech interventions may offer an important alternative.
Where the Internet in shutdown, IT activists suggest using mesh networks. Finally,
because proxy clouds offer activists a way to divert government surveillance, they do
put activists at risk.
Mesh Networks: Where Internet access is shut down or heavily monitored, mesh
networks are enabling democratic activists to circumvent official government-sponsored
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Internet networks and defy government censorship. An increasingly popular form of net
activism, the promotion of mesh networks has emerged as a favored vehicle through
which external actors are supporting democratic activists abroad.
A mesh network is a type of wireless communications network that connects
laptops, cell phone, and other wireless devices to form a parallel communications
network capable of operating outside of the Internet. In countries where government
censor or shut-down the Internet, organizations like the Open Technology Initiative,
FabLab and FabFi are teaching activists how to establish mesh networks by turning cell
phones and regular laptops into nodes on a “mesh network.” These nodes are able to
communicate with each other, while bypassing the official network—thus allowing users
to avoid state-sanctioned Internet blackouts.
Though mesh networks are an increasingly popular tool within the IT activist
community, they are not without their own sets of problems. For one, the larger they
are, the greater their price. The cost of uplink bandwidth for large mesh network has
proven prohibitively expensive for domestic activists, which has led international
organization to seek out alternative funding arrangements. One widely discussed
solution may be for providers to buy bandwidth in bulk, or for individuals to donate
spare bandwidth.
Spare Bandwidth Donation: To send data quickly, mesh networks require large amounts
of bandwidth. But when purchased in bulk, bandwidth is very expensive. IT activists
believe that one simple way individuals could help support independent mesh networks
in authoritarian contexts is to donate their spare bandwidth.
Most Internet users use only a small portion of their monthly bandwidth
allotment. This means that most bandwidth goes unused. That is why organizations like
FabFi suggest that individual users donate their spare bandwidth. There is, however, no
easy way for Internet users to do this. IT activists are therefore looking to develop a
simpler mechanism through which individual Internet consumers can donate their
unused bandwidth to organizations or individuals in need.
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are always being developed, such manuals require constant updates to keep abreast of
evolving threats.
Digital Rights Events Calendar: Repressive regimes tend to engage in cyber assaults in a
predictable pattern—most often just before major events like elections. To help activists
prepare for an oncoming assault, Access offers a Digital Rights Events Calendar, that
predicts when such events might take place. Designed for digital rights activists,
organizations and corporations, the Calendar lists all significant meetings, conferences,
and event on the issues pertaining to global digital rights, as well as key international
events, like elections or proposed legislation, that might impact upon digital rights and
Internet freedom.
Cyber Defense Network: Internet attacks often happen quickly, leaving many activists
unsure of how to respond. To help prepare activists and independent news sites for the
event of a cyber attack, Access is developing a Cyber Defense Network aimed to
counteract censorship. As currently conceived, this network will put domestic activists in
touch with a trusted group of external experts capable of providing technical and
tactical communications advice and support as emergencies unfold.
DoSP Insurance Policy: There are many steps governments and corporations can take to
protect against DoS attacks, the most prominent of which is the installation of Denial of
Service Protection (DoSP) on servers. But DoSP installation comes with a high price tag,
meaning many nonprofits cannot afford it. By developing a DoSP insurance policy, the
costs of such protection would go down for everyone, while the ease of installation
would increase. This would make DoSP more widely available at lower prices. Though
still in the pipelines, Access is currently considering creative ways to develop such a
policy. To read more on this, please click here.
Please be advised that the following tactics carry severe legal risks to the individual or
groups engaging in them and the authors do not endorse these actions.
Computer Viruses: Computer viruses are another highly controversial tool external
actors are using to counteract dictatorship. In instances spanning from Iran to Libya,
computer viruses have been used to halt regime communications and cause damage to
infrastructure. Depending on their targets, they can have debilitating consequences for
a dictator and have far-reaching consequences both for regime loyalsts, as well as for
members of the opposition.
Undoubtedly the most notorious global cyber virus is that of Stuxnet, a computer
worm discovered in June 2010. First spread through Microsoft Windows, Stuxnet targets
Siemens industrial software and equipment, enabling external actors to spy on and
subvert major industrial systems. Five different forms of Stuxnet are thought to have
targeted Iranian Siemens facilities. In 2010, the Israeli and US governments were
reported to have used Stuxnet to infiltrate Iran’s nuclear armory (allegations both
government deny). The virus was reported to have done serious damage to uranium
centrifuge operations, causing them to spin out of control (Iranian authorities deny this).
Iran’s nuclear facilities have since been hit by an array of computer assaults, including
one in April 2012, which forced Iranian authorities to disconnect the country's main oil
export terminal from the Internet.
Like DoS attacks, computer viruses are highly risky. They may be one day be
declared acts of formal acts of war and therefore have the potential to escalate into
violence. Moreover, computer viruses risk a strong backlash effect, enabling an
authoritarian regime to label external actors as part of a larger foreign conspiracy. The
authors of this document do not condone the use of cyber viruses as a form of nonviolent
resistance.
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Jamming communications frequencies is a commonly employed method of
military warfare used by authoritarian and democratic governments alike. Traditionally
designed to stop the transmission of propaganda during formal warfare,
communications jams are increasingly being considered as a nonviolent option to
promote democratic regime change. As one military analyst acknowledges, “Jamming
is something we think about in the context of shooting wars [but] it may have its place
in social revolutions as well.” In NATO’s 2011 military intervention in Libya, for example,
government communications jams were among the most favored methods discussed
among military circles. Communications jams, it was hoped, would make it harder for
Qaddafi to communicate with his forces and help sustain the Libyan rebels.
Communications jams are widely considered to be a relatively passive military
option that can have damaging effects on targeted military or inter-governmental
communications. That said, communications jamming may be interpreted as an act of
war and risks prompting violent conflict.
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ARTISTS, JOURNALISTS & COMMUNICATIONS EXPERTS
What artists, communications professionals and others are doing to end dictatorship
Messenger Animals: Animals such as livestock, dogs, cats, and homing pigeons are
another unconventional tool activists have used to communicate messages to one
another. Particularly in areas where the Internet is not widely available, animals can
provide a no-tech way for messages to be sent from one part of a country or city to
another. Message delivery via pigeons dates back to the Persians, and has even been
used by journalistic organizations like Reuters. Under rare circumstances, external
actors might consider using such methods to communicate with domestic activists, or to
aid communication among members of the opposition. It should be mentioned,
however, that such methods are likely to be time consuming, require significant training
of animals, and may result in harm to animals.
Unconventional Message Carriers: Objects like balloons and ping-pong balls offer
another unconventional means of communication among domestic activists and the
outside world. Since 2005, for example, a group of North Korean dissidents living in
South Korea have sent millions of balloons carrying USBs, DVDs, radios, pens, and
leaflets condemning Kim Jong-il into North Korea. Propaganda balloons were also a
regular source of communication between the West and communist Soviet Union, with
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balloons stowing anti-Communist literature sent from West Germany over the Berlin
Wall. Balloons may also be used to communicate strategy or other important sources of
information, and may be particularly useful where other forms of communication have
been cut off. Flying objects are, however, an easy target for snipers, and may be of
limited effect, depending on the type of information transmitted and the geographic
reach of the vector. Such forms of intervention may also risk escalating into violence. In
early 2011, for example, North Korea threatened “direct fire” against South Korea if it
allowed balloon propaganda to continue.
Lights Signals: Like color codes, light signals are a mainstay of nonviolent resistance
methodology. Light signals—whereby individuals sympathetic to the regime switch on
(or off) lights or candles at an agreed upon time—can be an effective way to
communicate solidarity and the extent of opposition to an authoritarian regime. They
can also be used to deliver messages across short distances. For external actors, light
signals can also be a tool to communicate moral support for an opposition, and also, to
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draw attention to a foreign people’s plight. On Earth Day, for example, environmental
activists around the world agreed upon a set hour to turn off non-essential lights—
thereby signaling their collective environmental consciousness. If coordinated
effectively, global light signals can help draw attention to important causes, and also
bolster the confidence of domestic activists.
Messages via Infographics: Particularly in countries where literacy rates are low,
transmitting messages through infographics and pictures can be an important method
of communication. Leaflets and billboards conveying nonviolent resistance strategies
and other important messages via pictures rather than words are one form such info-
graphics might take. External actors can transmit leaflets through balloons, birds, or
other unconventional sources to domestic activists.
Resistance Art: Art – whether musical, poetic, dramatic or visual – can be powerful
symbols of defiance against oppressive rulers. Using humor, cultural symbolism and
colloquial language, local artists can not only ridicule regime leaders but galvanize a
public to action and pass along valuable information hidden in lyrics or images. Songs,
poetry and public art were commonly used in Tahrir Square in 2011. Outside actors can
support these artists financially, materially or morally, and can spread their messages
globally by translating and propagating videos, images or text of local art. Artists outside
of a repressive regime - particularly celebrities – have the power to attract the attention
of their followers to celebrate resistance or condemn abuse.
Billboards: Billboards offer a large, highly visible vehicle for domestic activists to take
issue with the regime. Particularly where authoritarian regimes do not rule with a total
iron fist, billboards can provide an important tool for the opposition to communicate
with potential sympathizers and to broaden the appeal of their message. In 2000,
billboards proved to be an important tool in the hands of Serbia’s opposition, helping to
legitimize anti-Milosevic candidates and raise the profile of the opposition. External
actors can help domestic activists gain access to billboards by providing funds for rental
costs (which can often be very pricey, particularly for a cash-strapped opposition) and
possibly renting them directly on the opposition’s behalf. Because of their public
exposure, billboards can serve as important communication tools. However they are
likely to be inaccessible to the opposition in traditional authoritarian contexts, where all
forms of opposition are banned.
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Posters and Stickers: Perhaps a more widely accessible tool for the opposition (even in
more hard-line authoritarian contexts) is the poster. Posters advertising anti-regime
protests or featuring pro-opposition messages are an important, inexpensive method of
communication that has the potential to reach large audiences quickly. Unlike billboards,
posters can be hung rent-free and can also be used to paste over regime-sponsored
propaganda. In Egypt, for example, the April 6 Movement and the youth wing of the
Muslim Brotherhood jointly plastered Cairo with posters advertising protests. In Serbia,
Otpor members plastered posters throughout the country, advocating resistance and
calling on patriotic Serbs to band together against dictatorship. Otpor also plastered
stickers announcing “He’s Finished” over portraits of Milosevic, thereby transforming
ostensibly pro-regime propaganda into anti-regime fodder. In Serbia’s case, external
actors helped pay for and produce posters and stickers, enabling a truly national
campaign to ouster Milosevic to emerge in late 2000. Where circumstances allow,
external actors might also consider airlifting such products into an authoritarian country.
External actors can sponsor or provide materials and design ideas for posters and
stickers but, must be mindful, however, that they do not inadvertently delegitimize the
opposition.
* This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations and governments.
Punk a Dictator: Pranks, such as prank phone calls or hoax meetings are a way
individuals can mock a regime’s claims to legitimacy but this is also a tool for those
working in TV and radio. British TV comedian and satirist Mark Thomas uses pranks and
stunts to expose questionable government and business practices. For example,
pretending to work at a PR company, he managed to film a senior Indonesian military
official to admit to torture. This tool has the potential to reach a large audience and
shame regimes publically. Such efforts must be organized with caution to limit any
negative backlash against suspected informants.
Evidence Collection & Record Keeping: External actors can also provide a vehicle for
domestic activists to act as informants against the regime. By providing a number for
activists to call or an email address to send evidence to, external actors can help
activists collect evidence of abuses that are ongoing. Unfortunately, such repositories
can become very vulnerable. External actors must proceed with extreme caution on this
front to ensure that human rights data is properly encrypted and safe from harm. This
must be done very carefully to avoid identification of activists and to avoid
37
compromising evidence, which must be in a condition for use in court once a case is
filed.
Hoax Toys and Sports Equipment: Turning conventional objects, like toys or soccer balls,
into anti-regime communication tools is another form of nonviolent resistance.
Footballs, for example, can be emblazoned with the face of a dictator and kicked around
in acts of playful defiance. Simple toys and sports equipment creatively designed to
poke fun at a dictator can bolster the confidence of activists and decrease the fear-
factor upon which many authorities depend to maintain their grip on power. External
actors can sponsor or supply such hoaxes.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations and governments.
Cell Phones: Since becoming widely available in the 1990s, cell phones have proven a
convenient, low-cost means of communication for many opponents of authoritarianism.
Mobile phones and text messaging are believed to have been particularly useful in Libya,
where they were used to set up meetings, stage protests, and discuss strategy. Research
shows that increasing access to existing, low-tech technologies like mobile phones
increases protests against repressive regimes. In addition to purchasing and distributing
cell phones, governments and INGOs have also sponsored the mass distribution of SMS
texts. In Milosevic’s Serbia, for example, foreign foundations sponsored mass SMS texts
to get out the vote on Election Day. Mobile phones with cameras have also been used to
document protests and regime-sponsored abuse. Cell phone coverage documenting
violence committed by Iranian security forces, for example, sparked widespread protest
and condemnation abroad, and helped galvanize protest around the country. In Russia,
cell phone footage of electoral fraud sparked anti-Putin protests and prompted calls for
free and fair elections.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations and governments.
Fax Machines: The transmission of messages via fax machines played an important part
in the protests of the 1980s and 1990s, helping to bring the end to the Soviet Union, and
even encouraging protestors in Tiananmen Square. But simple, low-tech fax machines
continue to serve a purpose in the midst of today’s upheavals. Where the Internet is
down, fax machines are a cost-effective way to get information into the hands of
activists. In Egypt, for example, external actors delivered medical leaflets on how to
treat tear gas via fax. It is important to note, however, that faxes are particularly
vulnerable to regime interception as there is no secure protocol for fax transmission.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations and governments.
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Bluetooth: Available on most ordinary cell phones and laptop computers, Bluetooth is a
widely accessible instrument that can transmit information among activists in short
periods of time. An oft-overlooked technology, Bluetooth was most prominently used in
Iran during the Green Revolution of 2009. Because Iranian authorities had sought to
shut off text messaging and cell phone call coverage, domestic activists turned to
Bluetooth. It was thanks to Bluetooth that the infamous video documenting the death
of “Neda” went viral. External actors can supply both Bluetooth enable devices and the
technical support to keep them up and running safely.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
Dial-Up Modems: When regimes shut down the Internet, external actors can help local
activists get back online using old-fashioned dial-up modems (traditional internet
infrastructure). We ReBuild and NDF used dial-up modems, landline phones, fax
machines and radios to re-establish contact with local activists. In Egypt, they used dial-
up to connect to the Internet in Western Europe, out of Egyptian authorities' reach. This
meant anyone in Egypt with an analog phone line capable of dialing Western Europe
was able to connect to the network. While a potentially useful last course of action in
cases where Internet has been cut-off, this can be a potentially expensive option and
relies on telephone signals being operative and power being available for computers.
Moreover, wire-lines may be prone to surveillance and numbers can be blocked by
suspicious regimes.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
Two-Way Radios: Unlike broadcast radio, two-way radio can both transmit and receive
content. Known colloquially as walkie-talkies, two-way radios are personal radio
transceivers that allow multiple users to communicate while operating at the same
radio frequency. During the Egyptian Revolution, Telecomix offered simple instructions
for how activists could turn ordinary clock radios into walkie-talkies capable of
communicating with one another within a 2-kilometer range. Outside actors are
uniquely positioned to provide both instruction and funding for this equipment or the
actual hardware.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
HAM Radio: Where Internet communication is blocked, HAM radio might provide a
vehicle for regime critics to transmit messages out of the country, depending on that
country’s spectrum policy. In 1990, for example, Boris Yeltsin used HAM radio to
communicate messages that were picked up by the BBC, Voice of America, and Radio
Free Europe, and rebroadcast back into the Soviet Union. To teach domestic activists the
utility of HAM, We Rebuild has a website detailing how users can use HAM radio to
communicate. Telecomix and Germany’s Piraten Partei also have more details. Thanks in
part to these efforts, HAM allowed communication through code from Egypt. The utility
of HAM radio is not, however, universal. Among the most avid users of HAM in Egypt,
for example, were members of the regime with military training, as Telecomix realized
39
early on. HAM’s utility depends greatly on national spectrum policies—making the
Middle East a less viable option, but a country like India more viable.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
AM/FM Radio: AM/FM radio also offers an important tool for activists. Local radio
stations, for instance, often provide alternative sources of information. For over a
decade, external actors have provided financial and material resources to local radio
stations in repressive regimes. Such assistance can be critical in helping to keep these
voices alive amidst repression. In Serbia, for instance, the alternative b92 radio was able
to maintain its criticism of the Milosevic regime in large part thanks to the support of
foreign NGOs like IREX, who helped pay for everything from office rent to transmitters.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
LPFM radio: Low power, frequency modulated (LPFM) radio allows users to transmit
electronic broadcasts using very low amounts of energy. While a normal FM radio
station transmits at thousands of watts, LPFM radio allows users to transmit at just
milliwatts, with a maximum broadcast power of 100 watts. This makes them less
expensive, but also less powerful. At best, LPFM radio can reach only a small community
of listeners.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
International Radio Broadcasting: Since World War II, international radio broadcasts
have emerged as a critical tool of foreign policy. During the Cold War, for example, the
US’s Voice of America and Radio Free Europe transmitted foreign sources of information
into the Soviet Union. More recently, broadcast radio was used to transmit Radio Free
Europe broadcasts throughout the Middle East. Because international broadcasting
boasts a long (and controversial) history, repressive regimes have responded
accordingly. In North Korea, all radio receivers are produced with fixed frequencies,
tuned to local frequencies so that North Koreans cannot access foreign broadcasts. In
2002, the Cuban government jammed the Voice of America broadcast, while Chinese
authorities jammed Radio Free Asia. There are several steps external actors can take to
mitigate such obstructionism. For example, external actors might consider developing
more effective transmitting antennas or employing frequent changes to transmitted
frequencies via Single Sideboard. In North Korea, dissidents are also reported to have
smuggled in hand-held radios capable of receiving international transmissions.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
40
Satellite Internet Modems: Satellite Internet modems allow users to bypass
government-controlled telecom companies to get news out of the country. Particularly
useful in emergency situations, or where mobile phones and Internet services are shut
down, satellite or satmodems enable data transfer via communications satellites, thus
serving as a form of circumvention technology. External actors concerned with
circumvention have, in several cases, put satmodems into the hands of local activists. In
Egypt, for example, nongovernmental organizations provided not only satphones but
also portable Internet satellite modems. Unfortunately, as with satphones, satellite
Internet modems can be monitored and their usage detected where activists are not
operating from a secure location.
*This tool also applies to nongovernmental organizations, governments, and IT experts.
Digital Stegonagraphy: One technique for activists to get information out of a country
and to communicate securely is through digital stegonagraphy. Stegonagraphy refers to
a form of encryption in which data is hidden within the blank spaces found in digital file,
like photos or sound files. Stegonagraphy is not a new method, nor is it foolproof:
decryption methods abound and some countries, like Pakistan and Iran, have banned
encryption technology altogether. If further honed and more widely taught, however,
stegonagraphy has the capacity to provide activists with a communication method that
is virtually indistinguishable from ordinary digital files. Particularly where regimes have
developed sophisticated surveillance tools, stegonagraphy—when combined with
sneakernet—may prove an important method of communication between domestic
activists and the outside world.
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DIPLOMATS
What diplomats are doing to end dictatorship
Diplomatic tools are another widely utilized method for wielding leverage over
repressive regimes. Less controversial than many of the instruments listed above,
diplomatic tools are often criticized for lacking sufficient ‘bite’ and being poor
substitutes for sanctions and/or military intervention. Still, these tools are often the
precursor to more aggressive forms of intervention and, when complemented with
other modes of foreign policy, have often proved successful.
Statements and Démarches: Foreign heads of state, foreign ministers, and diplomats
may issue statements in condemnation of undemocratic actions taken by the regime.
Statements of solidarity with regime opponents, endorsing the legitimacy of protests,
may also be issued. Statements of support have proven an inexpensive and timely way
to demonstrate opposition to repressive actions. Many argued, for example, that
President Obama should have taken a more vocal role in support of Iranian activists in
2009. Critics argue, however, that such statements often backfire by lending credence
to autocrats’ claims of foreign meddling.
Advice: Diplomatic missions, INGO offices, and other external actors residing in or near
a repressive country can also show an open door to democratic activists looking for
advice on how to administer nonviolent resistance techniques. In the 1990s, the OSCE
mission to Belarus offered advice to governmental and nongovernmental actors. In
Milosevic’s Serbia, opposition leaders sought electoral advice from foreign actors and
governments. It is important, however, that such advice be demand-driven and be well
informed. The ultimate impact of such advice will of course depend on domestic
activists themselves.
Convening Activists: Foreign actors can also help set up discussions, panels, and
conferences for opposition leaders. This can be particularly useful when opposition
candidates are bickering or adversarial. Such meetings can set the grounds for political
conciliation and provide the building blocks for coalition formation. Meeting between
regime loyalists and the opposition may even provide a vehicle for a peaceful transfer of
power or set the terms for free and fair elections. The first meetings between the ANC
and South African authorities, for example, were arranged by diplomats and took place
outside of the country. Gatherings of opposition candidates were also used to promote
the newfound unity of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia in the months leading up to
Milosevic’s unseating. Often, however, such meetings are costly and, occasionally, can
have adverse effects if a regime-held media portrays such meetings as inorganic.
Connecting Activists with Foreign Governments: External actors can also facilitate
meetings among local activists with foreign governments. In Algiers, in the 1990s,
diplomats regularly invited opposition leaders to their embassies and missions, and
fostered contacts with foreign leaders. This happens too in today’s Cuba. In Ukraine,
Serbia and Georgia, embassies also developed travel programs to capitals for opposition
42
leaders. These trips can be used as fundraising opportunities for opposition politicians,
as well as advocacy opportunities to draw attention to their country’s plight. Such
meetings can also backfire.
Trial Monitoring: Just as they monitor elections, so too can diplomats monitor the trials
of democratic activists and/or regime loyalists. In Iran, EU diplomats regularly attended
the trial of security personnel who killed a Canadian-Iranian journalist in Tehran. In 2009,
diplomats attended the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. Such monitoring can be used to spread
awareness of human rights violations and signal the diplomatic community’s disapproval
of a perceived injustice. However, their effect may be more symbolic than anything else,
as they rely on the power of public outrage to force change.
Protests: Diplomats (and other foreigners) can also take part in protests against the
regime. A diplomatic presence was regularly witnessed at protests in Budapest, Santiago,
Manila, Belgrade, Kiev, Havana and Kathmandu. Direct participation by diplomats at
opposition-organized events may bolster the confidence of domestic activists and
underline foreign countries’ discord with repressive tactics. However, they may
potentially undermine the credibility of the protests themselves, as authoritarian
regimes use them as evidence of foreign intervention. Politically engaged diplomats may
also face expulsion.
Diplomatic Immunity: Diplomats residing in repressive contexts can use their diplomatic
immunity to protect democratic activists and provide sanctuary for potential dissidents.
In 2004, diplomats in Ukraine representing the French Embassy, European Commission,
and ODIHR helped stop the arrest of a youth activist by showing up at his home and
imploring state security services to leave. In Nepal in 2005, diplomats helped protect
dissidents from arrest by accompanying them to the airport and physically blocking their
seizure. Active diplomats are, however, an easy target for the regime. While their
immunity may not be withdrawn, diplomats can be expelled as was the case in Burma,
Sudan, and Belarus. Repressive regimes have also used loyalists to intimidate diplomats
by proxy, as the Kremlin did by sponsoring the harassment of the UK Ambassador to
Russia by the Nashi, a pro-Kremlin youth group.
Refuge and Sanctuary for Activists: Where human rights violations are particularly
egregious, diplomats or foreign governments can offer refuge to dissidents. During
World War II, several diplomats offered safe haven to Jews, artists, and other minorities
persecuted by the Nazis. Diplomats also provided refuge to South African activists.
While often useful for saving the lives of a few, such actions do not, however, provide
long-term solutions to repressive regimes.
Joining the Resistance: External actors can also become active members of the
resistance within a repressive country, helping to organize protests and get information
out to foreign journalists. In Serbia, a handful of foreigners stayed in Serbia throughout
the NATO bombing of the country and helped organize protests. In Libya, several
foreigners joined the resistance, albeit often partaking in violence. Such efforts have,
43
however, been of dubious utility, as foreigners who do not speak the local language or
have much familiarity with the domestic context may be ill-equipped to offer useful help
and may in fact proven a burden on domestic forces.
44
STATES
How governments are helping to end dictatorship
States are often at the forefront of military conflict. Yet there are a variety tools state
actors can use—and are using—to undermine dictatorship abroad. Many of these tools
involve sanctions, but several move beyond the coercive. By virtue of their unparalleled
resources and sheer power, state actors have an important role to play not simply in
ending their tacit support for dictatorship abroad, but also in fostering democracy
abroad. Below are some of the tools and techniques state actors can use to support
democratic activists in authoritarian contexts.
Education of Foreign Service Corps, Military & Civil Servants: Often nonviolent
resistance is a foreign idea to democratic countries’ Foreign Service corps, military
officers and other key civil servants. By educating staff living and working for democratic
governments inside repressive regimes, democratic states can better prepare their staff
to understand, analyze and support nonviolent protestors, leading to better informed
foreign policy decisions and subtle aid to activists.
Tax Havens: Tax havens often provide a critical resource for repressive regime leaders,
loyalists, and their family members to hide their wealth. By channeling their ill-begotten
fortunes through tax havens like the Cayman Islands, the Maldives or Switzerland,
dictators can launder their money while maintaining an unrivaled powerbase back home.
To hit dictators where it hurts (i.e. their wallets), foreign governments might consider
prohibiting companies from making payments to tax havens that cater to dictators.
Funds channeled to secret bank accounts could be frozen by sympathetic governments,
as Switzerland did with respect to Gaddafi. Individual investors, companies, and tourists
45
could follow suit by boycotting tax havens, like the Bahamas, that refuse to buckle to
international pressure.
Military Aid: Like development aid, many countries provide aid in the form of military
weaponry and training. In authoritarian contexts, this aid is frequently used against
nonviolent protestors. Egypt is a prime example: U.S. military aid to Egypt totaled over
$1.3 billion annually, even as the military cracked down on protestors. Donor
governments should closely monitor the use of aid materials by recipient countries to
ensure compliance to international standards. At the very least, human rights and
international law should become mandatory components of any training by donor
countries.
Export Licenses: Along with military aid, foreign governments often provide export
licenses permitting the sale of weapons to countries with questionable human rights
records. This fall, for example, Amnesty International reported that the U.S. State
Department had provided export licenses to two U.S. companies known for selling the
very chemical irritants and riot control agents that Egypt’s military used to stifle
domestic protests. One way state-actors can push to change this is by developing an
effective global Arms Trade Treaty that would establish stricter national licensing
controls. Thus far, attempts to develop such a Treaty have met great resistance in the
U.S., where gun rights groups like the National Rifle Association have labeled it a threat
to the Second Amendment.
46
Pressuring Neighbors: Bordering states often lend passive or active support to
dictatorships in neighboring states. By doing business with dictatorial regimes or lending
diplomatic credibility to their neighbors, bordering states often (at times, inadvertently)
bolster repression. This is in large part because neighbors rarely want to destabilize the
region. Moreover, being friendly to dictators often pays. Nice neighbors frequently gain
access to lucrative state coffers, and reap the financial benefits of dictators’ financial
monopolies. Why not help to alter the costs and benefits of neighborly behavior? If
governments and corporations incentivize bordering states to stop doing business with
neighboring dictatorships, they can help to further isolate such regimes and increase the
odds that regime loyalists will abandon ship.
Dual Citizenship Withdrawal: Many dictators and human rights abusers enjoy dual
citizenship. Foreign governments might consider revoking such citizenship to protest
undemocratic acts committed by their citizens.
Golden Parachutes: Another way external actors can intervene to stop repression is to
negotiate amnesty for dictators, whereby a dictator agrees to leave the repressive
country in question in exchange for exile in a friendly country. Liberia’s Charles Taylor
was, for example, offered exile in Nigeria (though this was later rescinded after an
indictment for his arrest was released by the Special Court for Sierra Leone). Amnesty
for dictators is, however, highly controversial. While advocates say it is a realistic way to
end violence quickly, critics argue that it conflicts with international law and amounts to
impunity.
Shadow Mobile Phone Networks: Where repressive governments have full control over
mobile phone networks, foreign governments have established shadow networks to
offset governments’ ability to shut down services. In Afghanistan, the US State
Department and Pentagon are reported to have spent at least $50 million on a
‘Palisades Project’ using towers on US military bases inside Afghanistan. This highly
expensive and time-consuming project is clearly only a method that can be taken if an
external actor is committed to maintaining a long-term presence in the country.
47
Membership Conditionality: In Europe, the lure of EU membership is frequently used as
a carrot or stick to offending states thought to have violated international law or
cracked down on democracy. For example, the promise of EU membership is believed to
have been particularly effective in Slovakia’s removal of Meciar. EU conditionality has
also been used to prod Serbia into compliance with the ICTY. EU conditionality is,
however, a controversial tool with utility limited to potential EU member states and/or
close neighbors. In terms of efficacy, critics argue that conditionality’s impact of Central
and Eastern Europe has been overstated, as many of these countries were already en
route to democracy and would have made the transition irrespective of the EU’s
influence. In cases, such as Belarus, which lack a liberal democratic tradition, tools such
as conditionality appear to be far less effective in facilitating reform.
The Rome Statute: The Rome Statute is the international treaty that established the
International Criminal Court (ICC). By becoming party to the treaty, the Court
automatically exercises jurisdiction over crimes committed there or by a national of that
state. State parties must also cooperate with the Court and surrender suspects upon the
Court’s request. With fewer places available to dictators to hide in impunity, the cost of
violating human rights rises.
48
repressive regime, which can easily cast itself as a victim of global conspiracy. In
Milosevic’s Serbia, for example, Milosevic was widely hailed as a victim of global
persecution. Many would have preferred to see Milosevic tried within Serbia.
ICC Indictments: Indictments issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) targeting
dictators for violations of international law have also been heralded for acting as
deterrents against future war crimes. In 2009, the ICC issued its first ever indictment of
a sitting head of state. The indictment filed against Sudan’s President Bashir, accused
him of war crimes and crimes against humanity (originally, the indictment also included
genocide, but this was later excluded on grounds of insufficient evidence). ICC
indictments are, however, highly controversial, require considerable international
consensus, and are very time consuming. Thus far, only African heads of state have been
indicted by the ICC—a fact that has spurred resentment across the continent. Moreover,
critics argue that such indictments are of questionable utility given that the ICC itself
does not have the power to arrest and extradite the indicted, and must thus rely on
states and organizations to do its bidding. Also, many argue that the crimes the ICC can
prosecute are too limited. In the future, international actors might consider pressing for
the expansion of the crimes that the ICC can prosecute.
International Arrest Warrants: States might also consider taking legal matters into their
own hands through the deployment of international arrest warrants. Already, some
states have turned to such methods. For example, in 1998, Spain indicted Augusto
Pinochet for human rights violations committed in Chile. Unfortunately, these methods
have proven difficult to implement in practice. In Pinochet’s case, though British
authorities ultimately staged an arrest at Spain’s request, Pinochet was ultimately
released and returned to Chile, without facing justice in Spain. Outstanding questions
about rules of jurisdiction, application, and mechanisms for international arrest
warrants for human rights violators mean that few states turn to such options. In the
future, states might consider being more liberal in their use of international warrants.
49
Travel Bans: One targeted form of sanctions is the travel ban. Designed to home in on
select regime loyalists while bypassing innocent civilians, travel sanctions entail visa
bans and transit restrictions on specific individuals. Occasionally, as in Cuba, travel
sanctions will apply to entire nations. Travel sanctions have been employed against
officials in many countries, including but by no means limited to Libya, Afghanistan, the
Ivory Coast, North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Travel sanctions are regarded as an important
tool to pressurize regime loyalists. One possibility for their improvement is to broaden
their range by including regime family members and key supporters.
Sports Sanctions: One form of sanctions designed to galvanize public sentiment against
a regime is the sports sanction. Sports sanctions were used in the case of Milosevic’s
Yugoslavia. Their impact there was, however, questionable. While many Serbs lamented
their country’s exclusion from international sporting events such as the European
Championships, their anger was not always directed at Milosevic. Rather, many
attributed their exclusion to the international community, which Milosevic frequently
insisted was inherently anti-Serb. The 1980 Moscow Olympics, during with the US and
other countries refused to send their athletes to compete in protest over the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, are another example of countries leveraging soft power sports
sanctions.
Arms Embargo: An arms embargo refers to a ban on the export or sale of weapons to a
targeted country. Arms embargoes are often used to penalize regimes that have
engaged in violent conflict, either against other states or their own people. For example,
an arms embargo was used in Yugoslavia during the outbreak of the Balkan wars to stop
weapons from getting into the hands of the Yugoslav National Army. An arms embargo
was also employed against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in response to that country’s invasion
of Kuwait. Arms embargoes have also been applied to Iran, Sudan, China, and elsewhere.
Arms embargoes generally win widespread support, but are not without their share of
controversy. In Yugoslavia, for example, the UN-sponsored arms embargo was criticized
for inadvertently bolstering the Bosnian Serbs at Bosniaks’ expense, given Serbs’
unrivalled access to the Yugoslav arsenal, while the Bosniaks were prevented from
acquiring arms. More recently, the arms embargo on China—put into place after
Tiananmen Square—has come under fire by France and other EU member states. They
argue that the embargo is not only costing them business, but increasing the pace at
which China is developing its own new arms technologies. Unfortunately, a side effect
of all sanctions, but particularly arms embargoes, is the proliferation of a black market
that can play into the hands of regime interests.
Technology Sanctions: Sanctions may also be directed at banning the sale of specific
technologies. To date, the sale of nuclear weapons technology is frequently forbidden to
regimes like Iran or North Korea. In the future, technology sanctions might be more
widely applied to include the sale of Internet technologies that can be used to monitor
and/or censor domestic activists. In 2011, for example, the Dutch government
announced efforts to ban the export of Internet filters to repressive regimes, for fear
50
that they be used against citizens. In the future, countries might consider requiring tech
giants like Cisco Systems, Nokia Siemens Network or Netfirms to apply for export
licenses for networking equipment that enables such questionable tactics as ‘deep
packet inspection’.
Aviation Sanctions: Governments can also impose aviation sanctions or flight bans, to
restrict travel to and from target countries. Aviation sanctions can be used to prevent
the sale of aircraft or civil aviation parts to targeted countries. In 2010, for example, the
US imposed harsh aviation restrictions on Iran, banning the sale of Boeing aircraft to
Iran. Such tactics have been criticized on several fronts, most notably for leaving citizens
with few reliable aircraft alternatives and thus putting innocent civilian travelers at risk.
For more on the Iranian aircraft sanctions dilemma, click here.
Targeted “Smart” Economic Sanctions: Economic sanctions can take many forms,
including but not limited to: imports, exports, and even naval blockades to block
imported goods. Economic sanctions are employed for many reasons, one of which is to
protest a government’s poor treatment of its citizens. Economic sanctions were
employed against South Africa to end apartheid, North Korea since the Korean War,
Yugoslavia after the outbreak of war, and elsewhere. While widely embraced as an
alternative to armed conflict, economic sanctions are not uncontroversial. In Yugoslavia,
for example, economic sanctions are credited with giving rise to a gray economy,
stimulating hyper-inflation, and channeling resentment against the international
community, rather than Milosevic himself. In South Africa, by contrast, economic
sanctions are credited with fueling the anti-apartheid movement, though some believe
their impact may have been marginal to the movement’s ultimate success. Economic
sanctions, if used, must be carefully crafted to target specific people, companies and
industries to avoid affecting average civilians, which they often inadvertently do to
horrific results. They can also backfire if citizens blame foreign governments, not their
own; if this happens, sanctions may even build domestic support for the dictator in
question.
Assets Freeze: Another form of economic sanction is the asset freeze. Asset freezes can
be used to block the transfer or withdrawal of funds from the accounts of questionable
political leaders, their family members, or their coterie. Asset freezes are often joined
with other forms of economic and political sanctions, and are thought to be particularly
effective in isolating regime loyalists. Switzerland, for example, recently froze the assets
of Qaddafi. In November, the Arab league approved a freeze on Syrian government
assets in Arab countries.
51
Bahrain, and Thailand with communications equipment and confidential data critical to
Internet censorship and surveillance. The report calls on governments to place financial
sanctions on companies that support telecommunications surveillance in dictatorial
regimes.
Odious Debts: In recent years, scholars have proposed the creation of a new type of
economic sanction that could be used to disincentive countries from lending to
dictators: Odious debts. The theory of odious debt stipulates that any debt incurred by a
regime for purposes that do not serve the national interest are the personal debts of
that regime, rather than debts of the state. This means that once a dictator is ousted,
the state that emerges should not be held responsible for meeting the debts he or she
accrued during the time of his or her tenure. The establishment of the odious debt
sanction would mean that countries like Iraq would not be held accountable for the
debt incurred by dictators like Saddam Hussein. It would also mean that lending to
dictators would be financially undesirable for foreign states and investors, since
repayment of such loans could not be guaranteed were the regime to fall. For more on
the application of odious debt and other types of loan sanctions, click here.
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CORPORATIONS AND CONSUMERS
What corporations and consumers are doing to end dictatorship
Company Boycotts: Boycotts are perhaps the mainstay of nonviolent resistance and
they can take a variety of forms, whether cultural, financial, or academic. Boycotts may
even target companies who support authoritarian regimes, or countries that provide
tax-havens for dictators’ wealth. Perhaps the most successful boycott witnessed in
recent times was that organized by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in opposition to
South Africa’s system of apartheid. Boycotts are a potentially important way to isolate a
regime, and have in several instances—as in South Africa—been important instruments
in undermining repressive regimes. Boycotts must, however, be well organized,
sustained, and widely inclusive if they are to be effective.
White Lists: While black lists can be used to condemn companies that work with
dictators, white lists can be used to celebrate companies that do not. Genocide
Intervention’s Conflict Risk Network acts as such white list. The network includes
institutional investors, financial service providers and other stakeholders who refuse to
invest in countries with questionable human rights records. By highlighting companies
who are making profits in a politically and socially responsible way, Genocide
International draws attention to the role that corporations play in propping up dictators
in repressive regimes.
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dictatorial regimes. Such transparency should not merely be enforced by law, but by
secondary pressure exerted by the international community. NGOs, governments, and
supranational organizations should work together to ensure that businesses are not
making profits at the price of human rights.
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ANNEX
Many of the tools outlined above are controversial and may not be equally applicable to
all situations. Some may well be dangerous in a particular situation. Others may do
harm in one country, but work wonders in others. Tools and strategies must be
designed to reflect this contextual specificity. Below are some of the criteria external
actors might consider when debating the tools and strategies to employ in authoritarian
contexts.
Context
Do you understand the environment?
Who is doing what?
What are the competing interests?
What does a map of the regime’s power relations look like and how can you cut
off support?
Consent
Who needs to be consulted?
Who is not being consulted?
How do you determine consent?
How do you consult?
Core Values
Are the methods in accordance with core values of:
Transparency?
Responsibility?
Accountability?
Equity?
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