BOOK R E V I E W S 169

decision of the will is the monarch. The first statement is empirical, the second twists
the empirical fact into a metaphysical axiom." (It will be seen that, pace Marx, this
is not a simple transposition of subject and predicate.) Moreover, " Hegel's true inter-
est is not the philosophy of right but logic " (i.e., metaphysics). " Logic is not used to
prove the nature of the state, but the state is used to prove the logic." Thus the
comment (on paragraph 294) t h a t " Hegel develops the salary of the civil servants out
of the Idea " is purely ironic. I t is not t h a t Hegel's account of the state is entirely
on the wrong lines. On the contrary, " Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the
nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for presenting what is as the essence of
the state ". Whether or not Marx has correctly understood the Hegelian view of the
concrete universal and the relation between the actual and the rational, it is clear t h a t
his objections are first to Hegel's methodology and second to his ideology, but hardly
at all to his sociology. The only trouble with t h a t is its frequent banality when shorn
of its " logical " trappings. The prevailing note is far more t h a t of " external " t h a n
of " immanent " criticism. The puzzle—which O'Malley does not go far towards solving
•—is how Marx came subsequently to regard Hegel as " t h a t mighty thinker " from

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whose dialectical method the " rational kernel " had at length been extracted.
In the course of his discussion Marx touches on a number of important themes
which he will soon develop much more fully—alienation, private property, class divi-
sions, etc. Primogeniture and bureaucracy are given extended treatment. The " uni-
versal class ", which for Hegel was the bureaucracy, is identified in the Einleitung
(though not in the Critique itself) as the proletariat. Democracy (in the sense of uni-
versal suffrage) and the Aufhehung of the state are dealt with in a cryptic manner in
which the first is said to lead to (or to constitute) the second. I t seems that a t this
stage a t least—and some would say for much longer—Marx failed to make his ideas
on this matter clear even to himself.
The translation generally reads as smoothly as faithfulness to the original allows,
though the spelling hovers a t times between American and English (we have both
' fulfillment' and ' fulfilment ' on page 136) and there are a few stylistic lapses such
as ' the possibility of every citizen to dedicate himself ' (p. 50). To British ears at least,
' How come this phenomenon ? ' (p. 120) sounds less like Karl than Groucho Marx.
' Zentralkomittee ' (p. vii), ' accomodated ' (p. xiii), ' letiende ' (p. xxii), ' engliche '
and ' ein Beitrage ' (p. xxxix), ' Recherches Internationaux ' (p. lxvii) and ' principle
feature ' (p. 140) need correction. More importantly, the omission of a host of quotation
marks on page 9 conceals the fact t h a t much of the text is taken verbatim from Hegel
(paragraph 262) ; and in one such passage the substitution of ' to human beings as a
mass ' for ' viz., human beings as a mass ' makes an already highly complex sentence
totally unintelligible.
ANTHONY HOLLOWAY

Karl Jaspers : An Introduction to his Philosophy. By CHABEES F . WALLKAFF. (Princeton

University Press and Oxford University Press. 1970. P p . xvii + 232. Price
£3.60 ; paper £1.25.)

Professor Walraff, Professor of Philosophy a t the University of Arizona, has con-

structed a welcome bridge between Continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophic thought,
and it may be hoped t h a t there will be a steady traffic across it, not only of students,
but also of those maturer philosophers who do not command a knowledge of German
and who, in Passmore's phrase " ordinarily avert their eyes " when confronted with
utterances in the Kantian tradition.
I n this compact, well-printed volume, the key ideas of Jaspers' original but complex
philosophizing are set out in eight relatively terse chapters. I t is an exposition, not a
critique. There is a short, matter-of-fact biography; then a chapter on a number of
assumptions t h a t need to be held a t bay if sympathetic understanding is to be achieved.
" Gaining acquaintance with the world of the existentialists ", Walraff remarks, " re-
quires considerable orientation, especially on the part of representatives of other stand-
points, who must proceed ab extra ". Hence a t the start the student or critic is invited
to lay aside temporarily any presuppositions he may have t h a t philosophy is not con-
cerned with the concrete problems of life, t h a t it is a contemporary specialism of un-
biased experts, t h a t clarity (precise definition and demonstrable proof) are philosophical
ideals, t h a t impalpable meanings are dispensable, t h a t feelings cannot have a cognitive
function, and t h a t there is no pure ego or innermost self.
After this effort to get a receptive hearing from even the most intransigent of
experimental psychologists or linguistic analysts, we are offered Jaspers' views on the
nature of science and its indispensability for philosophy at each of the four separate
170 BOOK EEVIEWS

yet interpenetrating levels of matter, life, psyche and " spirit " (Materie, Leben, Seele
and Geist)—the respective fields of the natural, biological, psychological, and social
sciences. Jaspers came to philosophy through law, medicine, psychiatry and psy-
chology ; this seems to give his work a rich basis in experience and accounts in part,
maybe, for his sharp insights into the value and limitation of science and scientific
methods as such in relation to philosophy. A pregnant quotation from the Philosophie
Bd.l closes the chapter on science and introduces those emotive and controversial
terms ' Transcendenz ' and ' Existenz ' in a comparatively understandable context.
We come then to a discussion of those agencies (in particular the State, religious
institutions and medico-psychological counselling), whereby values are transmitted
throughout the generations, and to the arguments as to why for the questing individual
these are not enough. References here—as indeed throughout the book—are to a wide
miscellany of essays, lectures, pamphlets as well as to the major works. Die Atombombe
figures here as well as Von der Wahrheit and the 3-volume Philosophie. I n this respect
Jaspers recalls another great international philosopher, Bertrand Russell—his polar
opposite in so many respects, not least in pellucidity of thought and style. Yet each

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man displays a passionate concern with " t r u t h as lived " and a vulnerability to the
contemporary scene, which together cut across the equally passionate desire to establish
a universal world of t r u t h " in abstracto ". They were both tractarians a t heart and
engaged themselves in trying to create, against a backcloth of illiberal violence and
propaganda, a climate of opinion t h a t would bring about a better, freer and more
truthful world. Logic and epistemology are meaningless by themselves ; ethics and
metaphysics demand also to be taken into account. This was their philosophic faith,
and both lost their university status for attempting to translate it into action. Both
may perhaps be cited as excellent paradigms for what Jaspers seems to have meant
by " Existenz " manifesting through the individual.
The remaining chapters endeavour to fill out this elusive notion of " Existenz ",
t h a t over-arching idea of Reason (Vernunft) to which we are ineluctably drawn, so
Jaspers argues, if following through all the twists and turns of experiential fact, we t r y
to give adequate answers to the perennial philosophical questions : what can we know,
what should we do and what can we hope for ?
A discussion of the meaning of existential freedom leads to the scrutiny of speech
and its limitations as a vehicle for the direct expression of philosophic t r u t h ; ordinary
discourse is always ambiguous, more often a weapon, subterfuge or falsification. The
conclusion is drawn that authentic communication between individuals is extremely
rare ; there is no great urge to join in the struggle for t r u t h with another in equal degree ;
we pontificate, make verbal games, our arguments are eristic, we fall back on the gun.
We communicate our authentic selves to others hardly ever.
Existential freedom is manifested more clearly through indirect communication,
through life as biology knows it, thinking as known to psychology and logic, and through
" spirit " as exemplified in the arts and institutions of civilization. I t also speaks
indirectly through wonder, doubt and catastrophe—through the insoluble problems
which each individual must go down under or somehow master, through suffering,
conflict and death. These " ultimate situations " provide us with occasions, if impulse
and habit fail us, to exercise original, unpredictable choices, i.e., existential freedom
and a moral autonomy. There is no way of eluding these ultimate situations ; one
cannot predict or repeat them at will. They provoke us to philosophize, to search for
truth. But as our historicity ties us to our conceptual tools, no way of structuring our
experience can be said to have absolute and universal validity, and the search is con-
tinuous for what lies beyond our categories. The final antinomies of existence spur us
to transcend on the one hand into knowledge and on the other into the t r u t h of Being
itself. For Jaspers, philosophical thought has no choice but to end in metaphysics.
The final chapters of the book present the discussion of the three levels of awareness
(concepts of objects, signs of Existenz and symbols or ciphers of Transcendenz) which
lie at the root of the " Grundwissen "—the basic wisdom of all mankind. The closing
excursus into the idea of the " encompassing "—the nearest Jaspers gets to the idea
of totality—is drawn from many references in his writing, together with the schema
from Von der Wahrheit, setting out the seven modes of encompassing—the physical
world (Welt), transcendence (Transcendenz), human empirical existence (Dasein),
consciousness in general (Bewusstsein ilberhaupt), " spirit " (Geist), individual exis-
tential freedom (Existenz), and the bonding activity of Reason (Vernunft). The goal
of search, we find, is not ontology but " periechontology ".
Thus Walraff has sought to encapsulate Jaspers' ramifying thought within a small
compass ; he has culled widely from the texts, which to many would otherwise remain
closed books. The key thoughts are there and in the circumstances of the language
barrier it would be carping to ask for much more. There are drawbacks to all summaries
 BOOK REVIEWS 171
and quotations from other men's works ; and these are increased if translation has to
be added. The Anglo-Saxon tongue does not lend itself willingly to the task. Not to
follow the march of the protracted argument in the subtle if ponderous original German,
with its curious cumulative effect on the mind, means as the reviewer can testify a
certain loss of power. Moreover, though Professor Walraff, himself a former student
in Heidelberg, manfully strives to weave his quotations into a consistent whole, there
are times when one does not feel altogether clear whose voice is speaking. However,
insofar as the reader is stirred, puzzled and prodded, perhaps aware of a certain seduc-
tion to take the matter further, Jaspers would surely feel satisfied that in this small
book an attempt a t authentic communication, as he understood it, had taken place.
M. W. HAMILTON

Contemporary German Philosophy and Its Background. By FBITZ-JOACHIM VON R I N -

TELEN. With a Foreword by Herbert W. Schneider. Mainzer Philosophische For-
schungen, ed. b y Gerhard Funke, Vol. I I . (Bonn : H . Bouvier. 1970. P p . viii,
177. Price DM 26.—.)

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Contemporary German philosophy is not exactly well known outside Germany. So
in a sense this book fills a gap. The way in which this is done, however, might lead one
to doubt t h a t this particular gap needed filling. Ostensibly a hand-book for non-German
students, it can hardly be of value to anyone not already familiar with the main trends.
And those familiar with the scene will want the meat, not the diluted broth. As a cata-
logue of names, tendencies, schools and directions, the book looks impressive enough
at first glance. A second glance soon reveals the limited value of the " information ",
processed by the author's likes and dislikes which masquerade as assessments. The
book seems to me symptomatic of an approach to philosophy which appears to die
harder in Germany t h a n anywhere else, with the possible exception of J a p a n and some
Indian Seats of Learning. The method is t h a t of listing who-said-what-where and
differed-from-whom-why ; the content has the character of an inventory, and the tone
is magisterial. The galaxy of names is t h a t of the academically respectable and well-
established. Von Rintelen wastes no time on what cannot be identified in relation to
familiar landmarks, or referred to, as of old, by means of master-pupil relationships.
The foreign reader is likely to look for something which can facilitate access to an
unfamiliar region. There is, of course, K a n t and modern Kantianism ; and there is
Wittgenstein. A reader well-informed on both scores will find t h a t his qualifications
are of no use. Neo-Kantianism is presented as an odd conglomeration of squabbles
and scoring of points. Also, it does not go beyond the Marburg school, which was,
after all, some time ago. There is no trace in this book of anything like a living debate
around Kantian premises, or of a re-thinking of logical problems along Kantian lines
such as a t present invigorates Anglo-Saxon returns to Kant.
I t may be true t h a t analytic philosophy is not exactly a noticeable feature on the
German philosophical scene. Yet one begins to suspect the barrenness here presented
when one discovers, under " Analysis of Language ", that this is a form of " neo-
positivism and physicalism " which the author does not much like. " Can we ever
grasp the t r u t h of life and existence this way ? " he asks, and leaves us with this rhetor-
ical question. One should have thought t h a t a book of this kind would not miss the
chance of claiming at least the Tractatus Wittgenstein as a German-speaking philosopher.
But no : he ranks a mere mention in five supercilious lines which deserve to be quoted
in full : " The circle [Vienna] was close to the Austrian-born Ludwig Wittgenstein
(fl951) of Cambridge who undertook a critique of language and unequivocally asserted
that purely logical statements and their rules of operation must be as such devoid of
meaning (in contrast to the Neo-Kantians). But we do come to a limit, for ' whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent ' " (p. 30). So much for Wittgenstein.
His name does not appear again, either as an influence on others, or as a polemical focus.
Studies of Wittgenstein's work, such as those by B . K. Specht, are not mentioned, and
linguistic analysis is equated with linguistics.
Perhaps it would be unfair to make too much of this, as the emphases in German
philosophy clearly lie elsewhere. What, then, are the important contributions according
to von Rintelen ?
Neo-Kantianism and its variants share with Neo-Positivism the dubious distinction
of belonging to " Philosophy of Logos " (c. II)—dubious because " the problematic
of life has m a n y more levels t h a n logical formulation is able to explain. If we answer
it with purely logical formulas and with a priori concepts, in the end we come out
empty-handed " (p. 35). So Lebensphilosophie, rather clumsily rendered as " Life-
Philosophy " (c. I l l ) is the other extreme. With the thought of Klages, Spengler and