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Why Are Spouses Prohibited From Selling To Each Other?

1. The law prohibits the sale of property between spouses to protect the institution of marriage and prevent undue influence. It aims to maintain the system of conjugal partnership and prevent one spouse from deceiving or depriving the other of property due to their mutual love and control over each other. 2. Public policy prohibits lawyers from purchasing property involved in litigation they are associated with due to the fiduciary relationship and potential for undue influence over clients. It aims to prevent greed from compromising lawyers' loyalty and impartiality. 3. An oral sale of land is generally unenforceable unless ratified in writing due to the statute of frauds, which requires written evidence to prevent fraud and perjury in
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
61 views4 pages

Why Are Spouses Prohibited From Selling To Each Other?

1. The law prohibits the sale of property between spouses to protect the institution of marriage and prevent undue influence. It aims to maintain the system of conjugal partnership and prevent one spouse from deceiving or depriving the other of property due to their mutual love and control over each other. 2. Public policy prohibits lawyers from purchasing property involved in litigation they are associated with due to the fiduciary relationship and potential for undue influence over clients. It aims to prevent greed from compromising lawyers' loyalty and impartiality. 3. An oral sale of land is generally unenforceable unless ratified in writing due to the statute of frauds, which requires written evidence to prevent fraud and perjury in
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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1. Why are spouses prohibited from selling to each other?

The law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly,
donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or con conveyances
between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in
civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to
protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed
upon the wig of the parties. (Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-57499 June 22, 1984)

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of
the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk
24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks
to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it
would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. (Matabuena vs. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771.
March 31, 1971)

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2. What is the public policy behind the prohibition for lawyers to purchase under Art. 1491 of the NCC?

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any undue
influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness.

A lawyer may not purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, in person or through the mediation of another, any
property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession. This prohibition is
entirely independent of fraud and such need not be alleged or proven.

Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the
property or rights involved which are the objects of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.
The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial
sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is
founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only if
the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the clients property.
Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the Civil Code attaches.
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer
of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v. Lopez,
respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he
registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the estate despite pendency
of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject property. In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v.
Cabanting, the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law when
he purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding. (FEDERICO N. RAMOS
vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004)

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3. Explain by way of example which remedy of the vendor is the best in case of default of the vendee in sale of
installment of a movable?

In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the
following remedies:

(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay;

(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments;

(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay
cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid
balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.

Art. 1484 is clear that "should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property be in default in the payment of two or
more of the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to either exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the
obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was
constituted. The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are considered alternative, not cumulative such that the exercise of
one would bar the exercise by the others.

Therefore there the best remedy for a vendor in sale by installment of movable is to follow the guideline provided for in
the next paragraph. The vendor may choose a remedy depending on the status of the default of the vendee.

This article was reproduced from the old art. 1454-A, which in turn was inserted by Act 4122 (Recto Law). "Three
remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal property on the installment plan: (1) He may elect to exact
the fulfillment of the obligation. (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan, 61 Phil. 409) (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay
two or more installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more
installments, the vendor may foreclose the mortgage, if one has been given on the property. The basis of the first option
is the Civil Code. The basis of the last two options is Act 4122 (inserted in the Spanish Civil Code as art. 4154-A and now
reproduced in arts. 1484 and 1485), amendatory of the Civil Code. And the proviso to the right to foreclose is that if the
vendor has chosen this remedy, he shall have no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid
balance owing by the same. In other words, as we see it, the Act does no more than qualify the remedy."

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4. Is the verbal sale of a piece of land a valid agreement.

No. As a general rule, an oral sale of a piece of land is unenforceable unless ratified.
Well known is the general rule in the Statute of Frauds precluding enforcement of oral contracts for the sale of land. In
the early case of Harry Ives Shoemaker vs La Tondeña Inc. (GR No. L-45667, May 9, 1939), the Supreme Court through
former Associate Justice Antonio Villa-Realheld thus:

“The object of the statute of frauds is defined in Section 1, page 123, of volume 27 of Corpus Juris, as follows:

‘The purpose of the statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their
evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be
evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged.’”

In our New Civil Code (NCC), Article 1403 expressly provides that compliance with the Statute of Frauds, which requires
some note or memorandum showing proof of the agreement, is required for those contracts which involve, among
others, an agreement for the sale of real property or any interest therein, to wit:

“Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement
hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein;

“In the words of former Chief Justice Moran: ‘The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud
because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute
has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud.’ [Comments on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Vol. III [1957 ed.] p. 178].
However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or
bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from the transaction in
litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him
thereby.”

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5. Discuss a point of difference between a “contract of sale” and a “contract to sell”.

In the case Mila A. Reyes vs. Victoria T. Tuparan, G.R. No 188064 the decision of the Supreme Court explains the
difference between a contract of sale and a contract to sell. A contract of sale is defined in Article 1458 of the Civil Code,
thus:

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a
contract of sale are the following: a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange
for the price; b) Determinate subject matter; and c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.

Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the first essential element is
lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer,
meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the
contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the
purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when
the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words, the full payment of the purchase price
partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and, thus,
ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.

Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, the
prospective sellers obligation to sell the subject property by entering into a contract of sale with the prospective buyer
becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.

An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if
the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.

A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the
purchase price.

A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller
may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a
conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a
contingent event which may or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of
sale is completely abated. However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such
that if there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto
automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be performed by the seller.

In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the purchase price,
ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him.
The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.

Further, Chua v. Court of Appeals, cited this distinction between a contract of sale and a contract to sell:

In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to
sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover
it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until
full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is
not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.

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