Torio vs.

Fontanilla

Facts:

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for management of
the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The
Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela"
and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was
pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages
with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council
members. In its Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from
which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn,
maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing
for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the
municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to
construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable
for damages.

Issues:

1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of
the municipality?

2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for the death
of Fontanilla?

Held:

1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta
even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy
of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public
schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in
the celebration of a town fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right
springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political
and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless
public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In
the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power.
2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers,
employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the
construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the post and braces
used were of bamboo material. The collapse of the stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers
who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to
prevent such an occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage,
particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the
stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee
on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of
the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable
for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal
consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with
the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a
rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's
employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records
do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or
that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.

Flores vs. Drilon

FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard
Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an
excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec.
8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have
received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment
in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to
the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really
has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other,
can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an
elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his
acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance
with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

Mariano vs. Comelec

Facts:

Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional
sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of
Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8
Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will restart
the term of the present municipal elective making it favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3)
Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special
law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.

2. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

3. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent
mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution.
4. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot
be made by a special law.

HELD

1. No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They
are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

2. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be
known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and
bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

3. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a
new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided,
The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall
likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a
resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

4. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more
than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law.

Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership
by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting
RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by
Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations
will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section
provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since
it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Manila vs. CA 179 SCRA 28- ???

Grego vs. Comelec

FACTS:
On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy sheriff by the court upon finding of
serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for councilor in the second district of Manila and had won
the race for 3 term. On his final term, an election protest was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to
disqualify him on the ground that he was removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative case. On
May 14, 1995, COMELEC ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply the
directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath of office.
Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have suspended the proclamation. Such act according to the
petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646, which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate
by the COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving discretion to order
the suspension of the proclamation.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the SC’s finding of serious misconduct barred Basco from running for any elective position.

2. Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it didnot suspend the
proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending final judgment ofthe case filed against it.

3. WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took
effect on January 1, 1992.

HELD:

1. NO. Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was
administratively dismissed from office, the term “reinstatement” had a technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position. Reinstatement is the reappointment of a person who was previously separated from the
service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was
permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified.
In light of this definition, there is no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective
position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive
position.

2. It did not. The use of the word “may” in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the proclamation
is merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is merelymandatory, according to
the provision itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing of the action,inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations
should be within the scope of the authority granted bythe legislature to the administrative agency. In case of
discrepancy between the basic law and arule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails
because said rule orregulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A6646,
the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to
implement, employed the word “may”, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the
COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

3. No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. Laws
operate only prospectively and not retroactively.
A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters
which transpired before its passage: “Lex prospicit, non respicit.” The law looks forward, not backward.

Borja vs. Comelec

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in 1992. In 1989, he became
Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and
served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the
Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible
to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of
the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right
to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election
because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more
a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of
Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials
concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right
of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Subic Bay vs. Comelec

FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of
the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic
Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was
merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ
including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for
local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging
that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national
law.

Issue:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the
conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to enact; i.e.,
whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations
for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at
least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns";
the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To
repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls
independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to
adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would
without action on the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet
an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it,
then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has
become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented
thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture
or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to
the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or
instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in
its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality
or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.

League of Cities vs. Comelec

Facts:

Facts: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100million income requirement of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were
approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without the
President’s signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion.
Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause, lamenting that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities would reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA).

Issues: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
and the equal protection clause.

Held: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

(1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear – the creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is
only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units follows the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code.
From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality
desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC,
as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform
exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section
450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to
convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the
letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create
one.

(2) Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity
and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is
unconstitutional.
Respondent municipalities’ theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, which resulted in
16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of officials and employees, operated to
contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws, was a misapplication of the operative fact
doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the
wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation
before the Court could declare them unconstitutional.
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under
the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they
violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and
supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized
as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to innocent people who may have relied on
the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their
unconstitutionality.

(3) There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. In short, the
classification criterion −mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress −is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of
RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the
exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to
all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
* Re: the split or tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008
Decision.
The dissenting opinion stated that “a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does
not constitute a rule with precedential value.”
However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed cases, the court
en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted
in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there
could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court
order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18
November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution denying reconsideration, and thus the
second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the
31 March 2009 resolution stand in full force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can
only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior
affirmative action.

Sta. Lucia vs. City of Pasig

Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land
with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were
located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.
Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of
Antipolo City.
Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to refund to Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the realty tax payments improperly collected and received by the former from
the latter.

Issue:
Whether payment of realty taxes through the municipality of cainta was valid payment of realty taxes?

Held:
Yes. The local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes.
A local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under its
territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably within its
geographical boundaries.
Under Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local Government Code, to wit:
Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. – All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the
current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. The Department of Finance
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal, and assessment of real
property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.
Section 233. Rates of Levy. – A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area shall fix a
uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to their respective localities as follows: x x x. (Emphases ours.)
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of
local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring
that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must
undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be
acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.
Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the
outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s
rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia
refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently, had the
territorial boundaries of the contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there
would be no controversy at all.
In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes
due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.

Ambil vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the
Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and
detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s
residence.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade
classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2. Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation
of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

Held:

1. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with a classification
of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade “27” or
higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial
governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a
salary grade of 22.

2. The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code and Administrative Code of 1917
does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by
Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if
the act was not one relative to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include
officers with such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity.
Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude
application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a
private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper.