TOPIC 19 GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JUDGES AND JUSTICES

[A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.September 17, 2002] RE:AUTOMATIC CONVERSION OF SOME ADMINISTRATIVE

CASES AGAINST JUSTICES OF THE CA & THE SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17 SEPT 2002.

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC(Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers
as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.)

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for
the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.

This Resolution shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and shall take effect on the first day of
October 2002. It shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been
required to comment on the complaints.

This Resolution shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

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BELLO III VS. DIAZ

Doctrine:
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these
judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites
for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative,
or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.

Facts:
● Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello III charged Judge Augustus C. Diaz of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 37) with Rendering an Unjust Decision in Civil Case No. 37-17388, entitled
"Spouses Jose B. Luriz and Amelia M. Luriz vs. Victor S. Clavel".
● In Civil Case No. 37-17388, respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated September 15, 1997 ordering
Clavel and "all persons claiming rights under him, or whoever is found in possession of subject
properties" to immediately vacate Lots 8 and 10 of Block 260 located at No. 68-A Maria Clara Street,
Quezon City and restore peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs spouses Luriz.
● respondent Judge issued an Order dated October 20, 1997 granting the issuance of a writ of execution.
● Respondent Judge rendered an unjust decision because the ejectment case is a personal action
against Clavel, the Administrator of POC, and POC was not impleaded as a party defendant. The POC
is the owner of the disputed property and has been in continuous and peaceful possession of the same
since 1953 by virtue of Proclamation Nos. 438.
● Errors of the respondent judge according to complainant:
(a) the Order dated October 20, 1997 which granted plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution without
the required 3-day notice of hearing;
(b) the Order dated October 27, 1997 which denied defendant Clavel’s motion for reconsideration and
motion to suspend implementation of the writ of execution that was issued without the benefit of a
hearing; and,
(c) the Order dated October 28, 1997 which denied defendant Clavel’s appeal on the false premise and
flimsy ground that the appellate court docket fee was not paid on time.

Issue: WON the action against respondent judge is premature

Held:
● Yes. Administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to
the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory
that the Judges’ orders had caused him ‘undue injury.’ This is impermissible, as this Court has already
more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that ‘administrative or criminal remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof’.
● Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions;
and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally
liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally,
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 prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and **
also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil
Code.
● The records lay bare that complainant has utilized the available judicial remedy of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the RTC of Quezon City for the review of the questioned decision of respondent
Judge and has further elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.
● Therefore, a decision on the propriety of the decision of respondent Judge in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Complainant, in effect, abuses court processes by prematurely
resorting to administrative disciplinary action even before the judicial remedies are settled.

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE GEDORIO

FACTS:
● The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would
allegedly lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to
"selling" his cases in order to support his gambling addiction.
● The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship, claiming
that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit in Manila,
and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the
anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his mistress and her whole family,
made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.
● Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs showing Justice Pizarro
sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.
● On 21 November 2017, the Court issued a Resolution noting the 27 September 2017 Letter of the
Ombudsman referring the anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file his comment
on the anonymous letter-complaint.
● On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment5 wherein he admitted to his indiscretion. He
stated that he was indeed the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a casino table. He
explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that
they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities
introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by
people with ulterior motives considering his plan for early retirement.

ISSUE: Whether Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him for which he may be held
administratively liable.

HELD:
● Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts
as well as justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu
proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge
of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.

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 ● The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be
accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy and virtually
unsubstantiated charges against them.
● In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a
mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct.
● These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported by any
evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption and
immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and immorality
against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.
● it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the operation of the government or
any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance
and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as
conferred on them by law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a "government official connected
directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" is a government officer who performs
the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion – essentially, a government officer
under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292.
● Applying the above definition to the present case, it is dear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the term
"government official connected directly with the operation of the government."
● Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.

LEOPOLDO G. DACERA, JR. vs Judge TEODORO A. DIZON, JR. A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000

Facts:
● Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. was the complainant in a prosecution for Qualified Theft filed with Branch 37 of
the RTC of General Santos City with Judge Teodoro Dizon presiding. The said accused, members of
the Blaan tribe plus one (1) Indonesian, were suspected of stealing coconuts from the Dacera
plantation formerly belonging to the estate of the father of Leopoldo Dacera, Jr.
● The prosecutor of the sala later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Dacera had executed and
signed an Affidavit of Desistance from pursuing the prosecution. Dacera, however, opposed the Motion
to Dismiss, alleging that said affidavit was the "outcome of undue influence applied by certain quarters
(Judge Dizon) upon Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. who was persuaded to execute the same without being
appraised of the full import and consequences of such relinquishment of legal right." The Supreme
Court assigned an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (Justice Delila Vidallon-Magtolis) to
investigate into the matter.

Issue: Whether respondent Judge has shown bias in the performance of his judicial duties.

Held:
● NOT GUILTY.
● The investigation did not find any conclusive evidence that Judge Dizon was personally biased in favor
of either party in the disposition of the case in question. It must be noted that respondent judge did not
actually dismiss the case upon motion of the prosecutor and even voluntarily inhibited himself upon
motion of Dacera to disqualify him.
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 ● However, the investigation did reveal that Judge Dizon had made telephone calls to Dacera and even
had discussions with him inside his chambers in order to verify the truth about the Affidavit of
Desistance. Privately calling any party even just to verify something is suspicious and does not speak
well of the cold neutrality of a judge. While there is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations, the acts of respondent in calling and meeting with the complainant still leave much to
be desired and are deserving of reprimand. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also
appear to be impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.
● Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct basically provides that judges should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities whether in his public or private life and should so behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is clear
that the acts of the respondent judge have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself
free from any appearance of impropriety and should have endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
● The complaint filed by Dacera against Judge Dizon, Jr., was dismissed for lack of merit. However,
respondent Judge was admonished to refrain from making calls to any parties-litigant and/or counsel
with cases pending in his sala and sternly warned that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely.

BAUTISTA V. ABDULWAHID

Doctrine:
It is a settled principle that magistrates are not expected to be infallible in their judgments. A judge cannot be
held administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision rendered, as it would be nothing short of
harassment, making the position doubly unbearable.3 Consequently, the failure to interpret the law or to
properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge administratively liable.

Facts:
● A verified complaint affidavit was filed by Normandy Bautista charging the Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Akim Abdulwahid for gross ignorance of the law and procedure relative to a case within which
he himself was the respondent. The case filed was an ejectment case which was affirmed by the RTC
but dismissed by the CA for lack of signatures and failure to present the necessary documents pertinent
to the petition.
● The complainant averred the following:
- That the CA Justice reinstated the case after a Omnibus Motion for the issuance of a TRO was filed
by the Petitioners without awaiting for a Comment by the respondents.
- That the TRO was issued without any Bond and the Justice failed to resolve the TRO within the
mandatory 60 day period.
- That no resolution was made despite a letter forwarded to him asking him to resolve the TRO petition.
● Due to his failure to act upon the petition within 60 days, the complainant charged him with violation of
Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
● Defense of the CA Justice:
- That he dismissed the resolution on technical grounds.
- That they reinstated the dismissed petition by granting the Motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners.
- That the resolution of the TRO was intricately connected to the merits of the case, therefore it must
resolved with the main case.
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 - He pointed out the three instances where a TRO could be issued ex parte.
- The Urgent Motion For Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction alleged
that "a copy of the sheriff's final notice to vacate directing them to vacate the premises subject of the
ejectment case was served on them on August 10, 2004, but no copy of the order issued by the court of
origin on August 3, 2004 affirming the writ of execution issued on June 22, 2004, as well as the same
final notice to vacate, was served on petitioners' counsel. Thus, he issued the TRO due to the proximity
of the dates and the urgency it brings.
- That the issuing court has discretion on whether to issue the bond or not considering the extreme
urgency of the issue.
● Recommendation of the OCA: The OCA recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of factual and
legal basis and found merit to the defenses of the CA justice.

Issue: Whether or not the CA Justice should be disciplined for the alleged delay in resolving the TRO

Held:
● The Court ruled in the negative
● The Court stresses that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy where judicial
recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari,
unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. In this case, the
remedy of complainant as the prevailing party in the case was to file a motion in the trial court for the
implementation of the writ of execution issued by the MTC in the ejectment case.
● It is also a settled principle that magistrates are not expected to be infallible in their judgments. A judge
cannot be held administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision rendered, as it would
be nothing short of harassment, making the position doubly unbearable.3 Consequently, the failure to
interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge
administratively liable.
● It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint with substantial evidence falls on the complainant. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before a judge can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly
performed his or her duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a magistrate should be
disciplined for a graver offense, the evidence against the magistrate sought to be held liable should be
competent and derived from direct knowledge.
● It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered by Justice
Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members
reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate
court is inappropriate.

SINSUAT VS HIDALGO

Doctrine: A judge’s retirement pending an administrative case against him shall not divest the court
administrative jurisdiction over him.

Facts:
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 ● This case started when the counsels, Atty. Sinsuat and Atty. Paps, for PNOC-Energy in the civil case
Nerwin Industries vs PNOC- Energy Development Corporation filed a motion to Resolve Defendants’
motion for reconsideration against the issuance of Judge Hidalgo of a TRO and preliminary injunction
enjoining PNOC-Energy from holding a bidding for wooden poles required for the government’s
electrification project. During the pendency of the case, Resondent Judge Hidalgo retired on July 19,
2006.
● The complainants claimed that the issuance of TRO and injunction is a clear disregard of the
proscription of P.D 1818 and R.A. 8975 and the Court’s Admin Circular against the issuance of TROs
and writs of injunction on government infrastructure projects. Atty. Paps, on a letter to expound said
allegations, contended that the respondent judge issued TRO despite a clear showing that the plaintiff
in Nerwin Industries vs PNOC-Energy did no have cause of action against PNOC-Energy and that a
critical government infrastructure project was involved.
● Complainants sent again a letter to OCA in which they requested that the respondent be held liable for
gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law highlighting the CA’s finding that respondent gravely
abused his discretion in issuing the TRO/preliminary injunction a palpable violation of RA 8975 which
was already existing at the time the respondent judge issued the assailed orders and in blatant
disregard of a simple unequivocal mandate and prohibition.
● The OCA did not give due course as the complainant failed to comply with Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. Respondent thereafter sought the dismissal of the complain on the bass that OCA’s denial of
due course and the complaint against him should be dismissed as it must be considered filed only on
Nov. 8, 2006 when Atty. Sinsuat complied with the resolution of OCA requiring the submission of a
copy of Oct. 22, 2004 decision of the CA. Thus, the filing of the complaint was made after his
compulsory retirement on July 19, 2006 at which time the court no longer had administrative jurisdiction
over him.

Issue: WON the court still has administrative jurisdiction over Judge Hidalgo despite his compulsory retirement,
thus may be subject to sanctions.

Held:
● The OCA found respondent to have displayed gross ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned
TRO in light of the provisions of P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975.
● Respondent's challenge against this Court's jurisdiction over the present case is unavailing. Indeed, the
pleadings of the parties and the communications of the OCA clearly show that the disciplinary
proceeding against him was set in motion in November 2003 when the OCA received a copy of
complainants' Motion. Respondent's retirement in the interim does not per se warrant the dismissal of
the administrative complaint. Respondent's retirement in the interim does not per se warrant the
dismissal of the administrative complaint.
● The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its
above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban
imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the
rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Court's
various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure
projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975.

RE: CECILIA BUTACAN

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Facts:
● Jimmy R. Butacan was appointed as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Tuguegarao City, on June 19, 1995. Prior to his appointment to the judiciary, February 14, 1995,
Butacan, as Chief of the Legal Division, Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 2 was charged
with grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty by the CSC, in connection with the tampering of
evidence in the custody of the Legal Division.
● On April 12, 1996, the CSC found Judge Butacan guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and was imposed the
penalty of "dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties including disqualification from
holding public office and forfeiture of benefits." Because of his gross negligence, the CSC held, that the
Picture Seat Plan and application form, which were vital evidence in a case, were tampered with and
the photographs originally attached thereto were substituted. Through a letter dated June 26, 1996, the
CSC informed the Office of the Court Administrator of its Resolution dismissing Butacan from the
service.
● The Court in a Resolution dated October 2, 1996, treated the CSC Resolution as an administrative
complaint, docketed the same as and required Judge Butacan to comment thereon. Judge Butacan
filed his Comment adopting the Petition for Review dated August 8, 1996 which he filed with the Court
of Appeals. On July 2, 1997, the Court resolved to hold the administrative matter in abeyance, pending
the resolution of the CA case.
● Ten months later Judge Butacan died. Mrs Butacan then asked for the release of whatever benefits are
due to them. The OCA Legal Office, in its Memorandum dated October 27, 2006 opined that A.M. No.
MTJ-96-1101 must be resolved on the merits notwithstanding the death of Judge Butacan in order to
determine the rights of the heirs to gratuity benefits.
● The Court does not agree with the OCA Legal Office and the OCA. The dismissal of the administrative
case against Judge Butacan by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge Eduardo
where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is
inappropriate to impose any administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared the administrative
complaint against the respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated. where the Court held that
in view of the death of Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to impose any
administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared the administrative complaint against the
respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated.

Issue: Whether or not Cecilia Butacan is entitled to gratuity benefits?

Held:
● Forfeiture of benefits under the CA Decision refers only to benefits arising in the CSC prior to his
appointment in the Judiciary.
● In fine, considering that Judge Butacan was in active service when he died on July 28, 1995, the Court
finds that his heirs should be given the gratuity benefits provided for in Section 2 of R.A. No. 910.
However, from such benefits should be deducted the amount of P10,000.00 which he was ordered to
pay as fine by the Court in its Decision dated November 22, 2000 in A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, entitled
"Antonio Bangayan v. Judge Jimmy Butacan" for Gross Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Discretion
which according to the OCA Docket and Clearance Division has not yet been paid.

GUEVARRA V. EALA
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Doctrine:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

Facts:
● Joselano Guevarra filed a disbarment case against Atty Jose Eala for “grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath.”
● It was alleged that Guevarra noticed that his wife Irene was receiving from respondent Atty Eala
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at
Megamall.”
● Complainant also noticed that his wife habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When asked, she replied that she slept at
her parents’ house in Rizal or was busy at work.
● Complainant saw his wife and atty Eala on two occations. It was on the second occasion where
Guevarra, the petitioner, confronted them following which his wife abandoned the conjugal house.
● Complainant went uninvited to his wife’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
● Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You"
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of
his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do. Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it
only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but
then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us? I hope that you have
experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today,
as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved
you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your
single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together
again. Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS . . .
AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS
BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" Eternally yours, NOLI
● In addition, complainant alleged that: Respondent and Irene were flaunting their adulterous relationship
as the attended social functions together
● That respondent’s adulterous conduct with the complainant’s wife, demonstrate his gross and moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage, calling it a “piece of paper” Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter
to complainant’s brind on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her “until we are
together again,” as now they are.
● The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family

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 ● Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.

Issue: Whether or not respondent be disbarred

Held:
● Yes. The court in this case granted the disbarment case, disbarring Atty. Jose Emmanual E. Eala for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Cannon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rules 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
● Respondent contends, in his comment that there is no evidence against him. While it may be true that
the love letter do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with the
complainant’s wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of the
complaint against respondent.
● Moreover, the answer made by the respondent was coupled with a negative pregnant, that he denies
having flaunted an adulterous relationship, that their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families, is an admission that indeed a “special” relationship
between them exists.
● Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven
by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other –
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

ALDAY VS CRUZ

Doctrine: While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a motion for reconsideration, the filing
and pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order. Directives issued by
this Court are not to be treated lightly, certainly not on the pretext that one has misapprehended the meaning
of said directives. Effective and efficient administration of justice demands nothing less than a faithful
adherence to the rules and orders laid down by this Court, and in this regard, respondent judge failed to show
such adherence. Instead, he demonstrated his defiance of the Court's clear order that should have been
obeyed by him without delay.

Facts:
● Court promulgated a decision suspending respondent Judge Escolastico U. Cruz, Jr., for a period of
one year and imposing on him a P50,000 fine, after finding him guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to
the service, with a warning that commission of a similar act will be dealt with more severely. The
suspension came as a result of a complaint filed against respondent judge by herein complainants
whom he threatened with a gun during a traffic altercation.
● Respondent judge's suspension was to have been immediately executory. He received a copy of our
decision, and thus should have begun to serve his suspension on that day. It appeared, however, that
despite our suspension order, respondent judge continued to discharge the duties and exercise the
functions of a judge. This was relayed to us in a letter by Executive Judge Leticia P. Morales of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City. She posed a query as to the legality and validity of the orders and
decisions rendered by respondent judge during his suspension.
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 ● Thus, we issued another resolution voiding the orders, decisions, and other issuances of respondent
judge that were done during the period of his suspension. We stressed that when suspension is "to take
effect immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension should commence on the day
respondent judge receives notice of the decision suspending him from office.
● In the same resolution, we likewise ordered respondent judge to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt or otherwise penalized for disobedience in disregarding our decision.
● In an explanation submitted to this Court, respondent judge stated that he thought he did not have to
serve suspension immediately since doing so would have rendered the decision final, thus foreclosing
any other recourse to this Court. He also argued that had he immediately served his suspension, he
would have been deemed to have abandoned his office as judge. He pointed out that he had to act on
matters pending in his sala lest his docket reach "unmanageable limits". He averred that he intended to
abide by this Court's decision, and pointed out that he promptly relinquished his office when his motion
for reconsideration was denied.
● We referred this matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report, and
recommendation. In explaining its recommendation, the OCA cited respondent judge's obstinate refusal
to heed the directive of this Court, which constitutes grave misconduct. The order of suspension clearly
stated that it was "to take effect immediately", but respondent judge chose to disregard it.

Issue: W/N Judge should be dismissed

Held:
● YES. While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a motion for reconsideration, the
filing and pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order. Contrary
to respondent judge's contention, our decision suspending him was not "in suspense" during the time
his motion for reconsideration was pending. Otherwise, as we stressed in our resolution dated
September 18, 2001, the phrase "to take effect immediately" would be for naught.
● Respondent judge, however, chose to disregard our decision suspending him, explaining that he was
impelled "by an honest misappreciation of the legal import of the adjudication's decretal clause." 3 We
fail to see, however, how respondent judge could misappreciate, as he claims, the legal import of our
order, given our ruling in Development Bank. Judges are expected to have more than a cursory
acquaintance with law and jurisprudence, and respondent judge is no exception to this rule.
● Directives issued by this Court are not to be treated lightly, certainly not on the pretext that one has
misapprehended the meaning of said directives. Effective and efficient administration of justice
demands nothing less than a faithful adherence to the rules and orders laid down by this Court, and in
this regard, respondent judge failed to show such adherence. Instead, he demonstrated his defiance of
the Court's clear order that should have been obeyed by him without delay.

CAMPOS V. CAMPOS, A.C. NO. 8644 (RESOLUTION), [JANUARY 22, 2014], 725 PHIL 132-151

Doctrine: Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. This Court shall not
countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect and is
regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly
dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity.

11
Facts:
● Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and
dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos (Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos (Aida), and
their children, Alistair R. Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine)
● In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan, Agusan del
Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in Alistair's
name. Alistair was then a student without an income and a capacity to buy the property. In 2006,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28258 covering the property was issued in Alistair's name.
Meanwhile, Alistair got married and his wife and child likewise resided in Eliseo's house until 2008.
● On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Branch
7, a Petition 3 for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. He claimed that during the
first few days of their marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual
intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He also averred that Aida experienced
severe pain when she delivered Alistair. Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to bear children. He
likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.
● On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss 4 wherein he represented himself as the
owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the owner's
certificate of title which used to be in his files.
● On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan, Agusan
del Sur a complaint for perjury 8 against Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner's copy of OCT No.
P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was aware of such fact, but he still deliberately and maliciously
asserted a falsehood. Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur
dismissed for lack of probable cause Alistair's complaint for perjury against Eliseo.
● On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of Conjugal
Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a homosexual.
However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession when he admitted to Alistair and Charmaine
that he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that Eliseo is
temperamental and had stopped giving support to their family.
● On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
an administrative complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal
investigation was thereafter conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct

HELD:
● This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that Eliseo deserves to be sanctioned for
his unbecoming behavior.
● In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a penalty of two years of suspension from the practice
of law, the IBP Board of Governors considered all the three charges of immorality, dishonesty and
misconduct against the former.
● However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon Eliseo
a fine of Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair's
name when the subject property actually belongs to the former. The charges of (a) immorality in
engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on September 10,
2008, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the evidence of the
12
 complainants as insufficient or the issues raised being already the subjects of Eliseo's pending Petition
for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
● It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored
upon almost the same set of facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurrence of the scuffle on
September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same
acts especially since they pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in connection with
the performance of his functions as a magistrate before.
● In Samson v. Caballero, 33 the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz.:

This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled
"Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,"
provides:

"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. . . . .
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution."

xxx xxx xxx

● Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show
cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member
of the Bar." . . . In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation
on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a
member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative
cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers.
● This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary
replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also
as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary
proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case
against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first-
or second-level court. 34 (Citations and emphasis omitted)
● The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against a lawyer
when an administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a magistrate.

● What Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own children inside the chamber of a
judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon
by people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and
13
 conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its
sanctity and dignity.
● Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and restraint was
then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the court and lend credit to
the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession.

JAMSANI RODRIGUEZ VS. ONG A.M. 08-19-SB-J, AUGUST 24, 2010

Doctrine: Respondents violated Sec. 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judges to
manifest partiality by asking lawyers where they come from, thereby raising suspicion on favouritism and for
not being circumspect in their language as required under Section 3, Canon 4.

FACTS:
Validity of decisions rendered by Justices of Sandiganbayan; Justices prohibition of on favoritism Respondents
are justices of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner charges respondents for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming
a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of justice, improprieties in hearing the case when they
divided themselves in hearing cases with Justice Ong trying some alone and the other justices also hearing
different cases and for hurling unnecessary comments against lawyers appearing before Justice Ong;
falsification of public documents for issuing orders that they heard such decisions as a collegial body when
they did not; and manifest partiality by asking lawyers what schools they come from.

ISSUE: Are the respondents guilty of the charges against them?

RULING:
Yes. Respondents violated Sec. 3 of PD 1616 which requires that a decision to be valid, must be heard and
voted upon by majority of the three justices sitting in division. But, respondents cannot be faulted for
falsification as such act ensued only from flawed proceedings and cannot be treated a separate offense.
Respondents violated Sec. 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judges to manifest
partiality by asking lawyers where they come from, thereby raising suspicion on favouritism and for not being
circumspect in their language as required under Section 3, Canon 5. They are guilty therefore of unbecoming
conduct.

TITLE: POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR NESTOR B. BELGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE MAMERTO M. BUBAN,
respondent.

DOCTRINE: Ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment, absent any
bad faith or malice. Nonetheless, they have an obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and principles.
There is no excuse for ignorance of elementary notions and jurisprudence

FACTS:
● Nestor B. Belga, then Chief of Police of Tabaco, Albay, led an Information for Illegal Possession of
Firearms against one Noel Bodota de Rama which was docketed as Criminal Case No. T-2497 and
ra ed to respondent Judge Mamerto M. Buban of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch
18. Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty.

14
 ● On August 18, 1993, accused Noel Bodota de Rama was driving at a fast speed so that he almost
sideswiped one of the policemen standing at the side of the road.
● Subsequently he was chased by the policemen, got his gun, scuffle ensued for 5 minutes before the
accused gave his .38 caliber. He was requested to prove his authority to carry firearm, he presented a
Mission Order No. 010, series of 1993 from NBI, stated “Procee to NCR or Bicol.” He had no permit to
carry a firearm.
● October 29, 1995: Respondent Judge rendered a decision acquitting the accused for failure of
prosecuting to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
● Present administrative case was filed by complainant Nestor Belga charging respondent Judge Buban
of gross ignorance of the law and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) in rendering the acquittal.
● Complainant avers, respondent judge cause undue injury to the government and gave the accused an
unwarranted benefit(s), advantage or preference in the discharge of his judicial functions thru manifest
partiality and gross inexcusable negligence.
● Respondent Judge in his Comment, alleges that no law was ignored in answering the judgment of
acquittal, that the charge of gross ignorance of the law seemed from the finding in the decision that the
accused has a mission order which although was testified to be issued without the proper authority, he
had to consider the testimony of Atty. Carillo to the effect that the Chief of Office in any sub-office or
regional officer is authorized to sign a mission order, , that there being two conflicting claims, the doubt
had to be resolved in favor of the accused.
● Court Administration: recommending finding respondent judge guilty of ignorance of the law and
negligence in the performance of his duties in rendering an “erroneous” decision, that although no
corruption was involved, the respondent was negligent in his study of the facts of the case and of the
law, as no law or jurisprudence was applied in the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge, in rendering the judgment of acquittal, was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.

HELD:
● Yes, a mission order cannot take the place of the required license to carry firearm provided in P.D.
1866.
● The acquittal of the accused was based primarily on that fact that he was in possession of a mission
order. It is clear from P.D. 1866 that a license is necessary in order to possess a firearm.As held in
the case of Pastrano vs. Court of Appeals, a mission order cannot take the place of a license. Verily,
respondent judge committed an erroneous conclusion in acquitting the accused in the criminal case.
● Ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment, absent any bad
faith or malice. Nonetheless, they have an obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and principles.
There is no excuse for ignorance of elementary notions and jurisprudence. A judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he
be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should
strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personifi cation
of justice and the Rule of Law.
● We reiterate the pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as
well as with latest decisions of the Supreme Court. The role of justices and judges in the administration
of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence lest public confidence in the
judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent and irresponsible conduct of judges. This is consistent

15
 with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
● WHEREFORE, for ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Mamerto M. Buban is hereby FINED in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court.

LIWANAG VS LUSTRE

Facts:
● Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court 1 praying that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be
dismissed from the service due to "gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his
profession."
● The following are her allegations: Her husband Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of
B.P. 22 against the Chuas. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna presided by Judge Paterno Lustre. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994.
However, when the date came, Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to
December 15, 1994. I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to inquire about the case filed by my
husband, why the accused have not yet been arraigned. At that point, she asked Judge Lustre if it is
possible to reschedule the hearings. He responded in the affirmative and told her to come back in his
chamber after the hearing. The date of the hearing arrived and Judge Lustre then rescheduled the
hearings.
● As requested, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., she went to see Judge Lustre at his
chamber. There, he told rh that he prepared an order for the accused. She thanked him and told him
that if the accused will pay them, her husband will give the Judge five (5%) percent of it as token of
gratitude. At that point, he stood up and told me he does not need money. While he was giving her a
copy of the order, he touched her shoulder, down to her breast. He was telling her that he acceded to
her request.
● Later, he told one that he is available during Mondays and Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings
and for me to come back to him before the hearing on January 17, 1995. Liwanag did not go back to
see the Judge. Despite the previous order setting the case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he
cancelled hearings on all dates as per request of the counsel for the accused. By the way things were
going, Judge Lustre is delaying the case, granting postponement after postponement. She went back to
see the Judge. He told Liwanag that she must obey for the case to go smoothly.
● After that, the Judge told her to wait outside the courtroom. They boarded his car and kissed her and
caressed her breasts. She could not do anything as the cases are with the Judge. The Judge then
ordered Liwanag to come back on March 13, 1995. As ordered, she came back in his chambers. The
Judge exposed his penis and ordered her to masturbate him. She obeyed.
● The Judge then asked him to go with him in an inn on March 23. The day came and the Judge was
early in the inn, but Liwanag did not appear. The scheduled hearing then was cancelled at the instance
of the accused’s lawyer. Liwanag went to the Judge’s chambers and requested to give them monthly
hearings. The Judge then ordered her to give him fellatio. She initially refused, but eventually acceded
to the order the following day. The same thing happened on another day in Riverview Complex. The
Judge appears to have been delaying the prosecution of the case to prolong his abusive acts.
● Respondent denied the allegations, pointing his age and health renders incapable of sex. He sought
the dismissal of the complaint. In support of his claims, he submitted affidavits executed by court
employees stating that he arrives at 7:45 in the morning, attestations as to his moral uprightness, and
16
 affidavits of his doctor. Complainant alleged that the Judge set their meetings at 7AM because nobody
from his staff reported for work that early, and that all she did not engage in sexual intercourse with
him, only oral sex on him, in responses to the allegations about his health and age.
● The matter was referred to The RTC of Calamba, which recommended dismissal of the complaint. In
the OCA, it recommended that the case be docketed as an administrative complaint and that
respondent be dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not there the Judge should be penalized for misconduct.

Held:
● Yes. As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only
substantial evidence is required. The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and
respondent in various places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andok's Litson Manok,
another shows respondent's car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The car is seen
leaving in the next photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in the driveway of what
appears to be one of a row of room.
● Next are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming out of the room together
and heading towards respondent's parked car. Complainant claims that the photographs were taken
when respondent took her to the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. It is true that the pictures do
not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress.
● However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of
photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the
hearing of their B.P. 22 cases.
● But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes
against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual
misadventures with respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be
exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule.
● She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise save the hope that her dignity may somehow be
vindicated in the process. If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why
was respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant
and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs, respondent
would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and under what circumstances, in order
to extricate himself from his present predicament.
● This, he failed to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible
explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private room. The
Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the
administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public's faith and trust in the judiciary.
Respondent's disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of
November 1, 1998. For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140,
Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.
● We are not in accord with the OCA's recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of all retirement
benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while directed at respondent,
might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his retirement
gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of
P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.
ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO VS. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA A.M. NO. CTA-01-1. APRIL 2, 2002
17
Doctrine: A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within the purview
of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877.

Facts:
● On November 21, 2000, Aquino reported for work after her vacation in the U.S., bringing gifts for the
three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room
and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her
cheek.
● In another occasion, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he
will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted
her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by
slightly pushing him away.
● On the first working day in 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his
chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss
her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt.
● Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while
complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly
placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.
● The last incident: Respondent called complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the
Senate bill on the CTA. Complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to
know about the Senate bill. Respondent then approached complainant saying, “me gusto akong gawin
sa iyo kahapon pa”.
● Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but
respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away, and
then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with
his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that
incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, “Sorry, it won’t happen again.”

Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment.

Ruling:
● No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated of the charges against him and
is advised to be more circumspect in his deportment.
● Rationale: “A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within
the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:
'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions or privileges; or the refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating
18
 or classifying the employee which in anyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employees;
2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws; or
3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as follows:
1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, or any other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request
or requirement of a sexual favor.”
● Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded, requested or
required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the
Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA) V. PASCUAL 259 SCRA 604 | JULY 29, 1996

Doctrine: Before any member of the Judiciary could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and
after presentation of competent evidence derived from direct knowledge, especially since the charge is penal in
character.

FACTS:
● Administrative Case against JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL
● One CEFERINO TIGAS wrote a letter, addressed to OCA of SC, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the RESPONDENT Presiding Judge of MTC
● Letter was referred to NBI for “discreet investigation” of respondent. Proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in
order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer but realized was a fictitious character.
● Proceeded to the residence of CANDIDO CRUZ, an accused in respondent’s sala. In affidavit, Cruz
declared that he was the accused in a criminal case for Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge decided
that the crime he committed was only physical injuries
● Cruz made to understand that, in view of such action, Cruz was to give him P2,000. Respondent judge
also believed to be a drunkard. NBI entrapped Respondent judge with help of Cruz, for which reason,
the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto.
● Result of investigation and Respondent referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery (Art.
210 RPC)
● Executive Judge NATIVIDAD G. DIZON submitted report and recommendation that Respondent judge
be penalized for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct (A Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform official duties
honestly, and with impartiality and diligence).

ISSUES: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to
convict him

19
HELD: No. Respondent was not afforded right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses
against him and present evidence in his defense. Only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. Before any member of the
Judiciary could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent
evidence derived from direct knowledge, especially since the charge is penal in character. ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE IS DISMISSED

MACALINTAL V. TEH

DOROTEO, DIOSDADO AND URSULA, ALL SURNAMED LAGCAO, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE
IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CEBU CITY, BRANCH 5, RESPONDENT

DOCTRINE: Inferior courts must be modest enough to consciously realize the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. Occupying as he does a court much
lower in rank than the Court of Appeals, respondent judge owes respect to the latter and should, of necessity,
defer to the orders of the higher court. The appellate jurisdiction of a higher court would be rendered
meaningless if a lower court may, with impunity, disregard and disobey it.41 This utter disrespect for the
judgment of a higher court constituted grave abuse of authority.

FACTS:
● Complainants filed an ejectment case against the "settlers" occupying their lot no. 1029. the MTCC
rendered a decision in favor of complainants, ordering defendant "settlers" to vacate the lot. On appeal
to the RTC of Cebu, the decision was affirmed.5 Hence, in January 1999, the MTCC issued a writ of
execution. In February 1999, this was followed by an order for the demolition of certain structures of the
"settlers" who refused to leave. However, the MTCC suspended its implementation for 1206 days in
deference to a written request of then City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who cited humanitarian reasons and
asked for time to look for a relocation site for the "settlers." The court granted this request.
● In the meantime, the "settlers" organized themselves and formed Green Pasture Homeowners
Association, Inc. (association), a non-stock corporation.
● Ordinance No. 1772 entitled "An Ordinance Further Amending Ordinance No. 1656 as amended by
Ordinance No. 1684 otherwise known as the 1996 Revised Zoning Ordinance of the City of Cebu, by
Incorporating therein a New District called Socialized Housing Sites." was passed. This ordinance
identified subject lot no. 1029 as included in the "Socialized Housing Sites"
● Thereafter, the association filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in the RTC of Cebu against complainants.
● In a resolution dated March 27, 2000 penned by respondent, the RTC of Cebu granted the writ of
preliminary injunction.11 The complainants' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated
May 22, 2000.12
● Complainants elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via petition for certiorari. The CA set
aside respondent's March 27 and May 22, 2000 resolutions. It held that respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction in the absence of a clear legal right
of the association.13
● However, on February 26, 2002, respondent issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) stopping the
demolition scheduled on that day.16
20
 ● Meanwhile, the association filed an amended complaint dated February 18, 2002 alleging a
supervening event (i.e.,the subsequent sale of the lot to the association) that would make execution of
the decision of the MTCC inequitable.17
● Complainants charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and grave
misconduct for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in his March 27, 2000 resolution and TRO in his
February 26, 2002 order. They argue that respondent was aware that the MTCC's judgment was
already final and executory as in fact there was already a writ of execution and demolition order yet he
still issued a writ of preliminary injunction.20 Moreover, the TRO issued in his February 26, 2002 order
was in brazen defiance of the CA's ruling.
● In his defense, respondent claimed that he issued the writ of preliminary injunction because there was a
Cebu City Ordinance No. 1772 converting complainants' lot no. 1029 into a socialized housing site and
making the members of the association program beneficiaries under RA 7279.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge shall be held administratively liable

HELD:
● The court held in the affirmative. Respondent judge is administratively liable for issuing a TRO in
defiance [of] the decision of the Court of Appeals.
● To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.27
● Respondent had legal basis in issuing the writ in his March 27, 2000 resolution. It is true that
complainants had in their favor a final and executory decision by the MTCC which had become
immutable and unalterable.33 However, one of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final
judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire or
new circumstances which develop after the judgment acquires finality, rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.34
● Respondent considered Ordinance No. 1772 as one such supervening event and we do not think he
committed grave abuse of discretion in doing so. The ordinance did include lot no. 1029 as one of its
socialized housing sites and indicated the association as potential beneficiaries for being occupants
thereof.35 An ordinance is presumed valid unless repealed or declared invalid by the courts.36
● With the foregoing, we cannot say that respondent acted with bias, arbitrariness or prejudice in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction.
● Bias and partiality can never be presumed.... The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. Similarly, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or
order is adverse to a party.... There being absolutely no evidence to the contrary, the presumption that
the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.37
● As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official
duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although said acts may be erroneous.40
● Respondent's issuance of a TRO in his February 26, 2002 order was a different matter. By this time,
there was already a CA decision setting aside the injunctive writ that he had issued. Yet he persisted in
issuing a TRO which had the same effect as the writ. This act was clearly an act in defiance of the CA
decision. Respondent should have known his place in the judicial hierarchy:
xxx. Inferior courts must be modest enough to consciously realize the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. Occupying as he does a court
much lower in rank than the Court of Appeals, respondent judge owes respect to the latter and should,
21
 of necessity, defer to the orders of the higher court. The appellate jurisdiction of a higher court would be
rendered meaningless if a lower court may, with impunity, disregard and disobey it.41 This utter
disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constituted grave abuse of authority.42
● Indifference or defiance to the orders or resolutions of higher tribunals may be punished with dismissal,
suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances.44 The penalty of suspension recommended by
OCA can no longer be imposed considering that respondent retired from the judiciary on September 20,
2006. Having previously warned him, we deem it fair and reasonable to impose on him a fine of
₱20,000 which is the maximum amount that a division can impose.45
● Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present administrative case moot and academic.
Neither does it free him from liability. Complainants filed the case on July 18, 2002, before respondent
retired from office. As such, the Court retains the authority to pursue the administrative complaint
against him. Cessation from office because of retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service.46 Hence, the imposed fine
shall be deducted from the proceeds of his retirement benefits.
● All members of the bench are enjoined to behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.47 Respondent's act of issuing a TRO in blatant defiance of a
higher court's decision failed to live up to such high standards of judicial conduct.48
● WHEREFORE, Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, is
hereby found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for defying a decision of a higher court. He is ordered
to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000), to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

EDMUNDO & CARMELITA BALDERAMA, complainants, vs. JUDGE ADOLFO F. ALAGAR, respondent.

DOCTRINE: A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his personal
behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be
beyond reproach.

FACTS:
● On April 7, 1997, Spouses Edmundo and Carmelita Balderama filed a letter-complaint dated March 21,
1997 against respondent Judge Adolfo Alagar of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 66 with the Office of the Court Administrator for partiality and bias and impropriety.1
● In their complaint, they alleged that they are the accused in Criminal Case No. 4252, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Spouses Edmundo and Carmelita Balderama" for Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents pending before Judge Alagar. In one occasion, Judge Alagar called them together with their
lawyer, Atty. Celso Alex M. Laudenorio, Atty. Roman Villalon, private prosecutor and Public Prosecutor
Oscar Corpuz for a conference in his chamber. In the presence of the three (3) lawyers, they were
forced to enter a plea of "guilty" in said criminal case. And every time there was a hearing of their
criminal case, Judge Alagar would reiterate his demand which they refused to accede.
● Complainants also charged respondent Judge for impropriety as he was seen fraternizing with the
private complainants in the criminal case, Spouses Jamie and Bernarda Ader, who are their neighbors
in Barangay Pandan, Bacnotan, La Union.
● 1) On February 20, 1997 at about 8:30 in the morning, they saw Judge Alagar riding in his car with
Plate No. ABL-368 and fetched the private complainants to attend the scheduled hearing in his sala.
This was repeated on February 26, 1997, and March 5, 1997;

22
 ● 2) On March 11, 1997 at 11:30 in the morning, Judge Alagar, riding in an LTO Service Car, visited the
private complainants at their residence;
● 3) On March 15, 1997, Judge Alagar and some of his friends attended a party at the residence of the
private complainants.

ISSUE:
i. whether or not there is a reasonable ground to believe that the proceedings conducted by the respondent
judge in criminal case no. 4252 is tainted with prejudice by his act of forcing the complainants to enter into a
plea bargaining agreement.
ii. whether or not there is a reasonable ground to believe that respondent judge transgressed the high standard
of moral ethics mandated of magistrates by allowing himself to be seen at the residence of the private
complainants.9

HELD:
● I. NO. It is important to point out that during these in-chambers sessions with respondent Judge Alagar,
counsel of the complainants was also present which very well show that Spouses Balderama were not
at all really prejudiced in their rights by virtue of such advice of the respondent Judge. It was proven
that during every conference held inside respondent Judge Alagar’s chambers, the Spouses
Balderrama were always accompanied by their counsel, and the public and private prosecutors, among
others.
● In some cases, it was not only respondent Judge Alagar but the Spouses Balderama’s own counsel, as
well, who advised them to enter a guilty plea. In such a case, the Spouses Balderama cannot therefore
say that they had been forced or intimidated into doing anything against their own will or interest.
● Given these facts and circumstances, Investigating Justice Ibay-Somera observed that "the fact that he
has aired his advice in the presence of the parties and their counsels tends to eliminate the idea that he
only suggested the same for his personal gains."16 There is sufficient evidence to prove that
respondent Judge Alagar’s actuations were motivated by good faith.

● II. YES. As to the second issue, the following facts have been established: (1) respondent Judge Alagar
sent his driver with his car twice or three times a week, to buy fish at the seashore of Barangay
Pandan, Bacnotan, La Union, which place was near the residence of both Spouses Balderama and the
Spouses Ader, the private complainants in all the aforementioned criminal cases for Estafa through
Falsification filed against herein complainants;18 (2) on at least two occasions Oscar D. Bugain, driver
of respondent Judge Alagar, offered the Spouses Ader a ride to the court wherein they had a hearing
before the sala of respondent Judge,19 (3) there were also times when Oscar D. Bugain would park
respondent Judge Alagar’s car in front of the Spouses Ader’s residence while buying fish in the area.20
● What has not been clearly proven, however, was whether or not Judge Alagar had knowledge of his
driver’s actuations, and also whether or not he ever personally went to the Spouses Ader’s residence or
fetched them for a hearing any time. Notwithstanding this lack of direct proof of fraternizing with the
party litigants in a case pending before his sala, this Court holds that Judge Alagar should nonetheless
have exercised a greater degree of diligence in the supervision of his driver, Oscar Bugain.
Investigating Justice Ibay-Somera was correct when she stated:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid not only actual acts of
impropriety, but equally also the appearance thereof in all his activities, whether inside or outside of the
courtroom. A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his
personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life should be beyond reproach.22 This is premised on the truism that a Judge’s official life
23
 cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judge’s attributes
depend the public perception of the Judiciary.23
● Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent Judge Alagar in this case having tolerated
unknowingly his employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors no matter how small, with party
litigants in a case pending before his sala.
● Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted with impartiality and propriety in
dealing with the complainants in Criminal Case No. 4252, we find fault on his part in failing to supervise
the conduct and behavior of his court employee for the latter’s improper use of his vehicle, to the
detriment of the court’s image.

PERTIERRA V. LERMA A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1799, [SEPTEMBER 12, 2003], 457 PHIL 796-804

Doctrine: Under Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, we find this admonition: "It is not necessary to the
proper performance of judicial duty that judges live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the
reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse,
and that they should not discontinue their interest in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge
should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as
may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an
element in determining his judicial course."

Facts:
● Complainant Maria Cristina Olondriz-Pertierra filed two complaints against respondent Judge Alberto L.
Lerma, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, for (1) gross
ignorance of the law, and (2) conduct unbecoming a judge, bias, partiality, impropriety, and lack of
integrity to continue as a member of the judiciary. Complainant's administrative action for gross
ignorance of the law was considered by the Court premature, and was dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
● On the second complaint, complainant alleged that on June 19, 2002, she arrived at 12:30 p.m. in the
courtroom of Branch 256 for her hearing scheduled at 1:00 p.m. and chanced upon respondent judge
talking and having lunch with Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr., counsel for her estranged husband, Arturo
B. Pertierra. Respondent judge was shocked to see her, and despite not having finished his lunch,
respondent judge stood up to head for his chambers.
● Atty. Verano, Jr., for his part, left the courtroom with his face down. The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that the respondent judge be found guilty of the light offense of fraternizing
with lawyers and penalized with a fine of P1,000 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Issue: W/N the propriety of the respondent judge's act of associating socially with a counsel who has a pending
case before his court is deemed proper.

Held:
● The Supreme Court reprimanded respondent judge. According to the Court, while there is no showing
that the respondent judge acted with malice or bad faith, his action constitutes an instance of
"fraternizing with lawyers and litigants," which is conduct unbecoming a judge. For respondent judge to
eat lunch with counsel is not wrong per se.

24
 ● The Canons, however, provides that as much as possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid
any suspicion that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element in "determining his
judicial course." Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case
pending before him, respondent judge should have thought twice about joining counsel for lunch,
especially in the courtroom.

FLORES V. GARCIA

Doctrine:
The Code of Judicial Ethics dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. Being the subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.

Facts:
● The case at bar consolidates two administrative cases filed by Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia and Utility
Worker Celfred P. Flores. The first case, Administrative Matter No. MTJ-03-1499, is a verified
Letter-Complaint by Flores against Judge Garcia for oppression, grave misconduct, and violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Judicial Ethics. The second case, Administrative Matter
No. P-03-1752, is a counter-charge for falsification filed by Judge Garcia against Flores.
● Flores complained of two incidents in the first case. The first incident took place in the afternoon of 22
July 2002 in front of the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental. Flores alleged that Judge Garcia boxed and hit him on the face and threatened to shoot
him. The second incident took place on 24 July 2002 inside the courtroom of Judge Garcia.
Respondent judge allegedly pointed a finger at Flores, ordered him to get out of the courtroom and hit
him at the back part of his head as he was about to leave the courtroom in the presence of court
personnel and litigants. Flores also alleged that Judge Garcia shouted saying that he could have shot
him had he brought his revolver with him that day.
● In his Comment, Judge Garcia denied having boxed Flores. He alleged that he merely lifted his fist
against Flores to express his anger over the latter's alleged immoral advances on his then already
senile 78-year old wife. He averred that Flores filed the Letter-Complaint in order to cover up the latter's
lewd designs on his wife and to preempt his filing of a falsification case. Judge Garcia also presented a
Joint Affidavit executed by five members of his staff stating that the allegation of Flores that Judge
Garcia boxed him was false and exaggerated. Finally, Judge Garcia argued that Flores should have
attached a medical certificate to prove that he was indeed injured or hurt by him.
● On the counter-charge for falsification, Judge Garcia alleged that Flores falsified his Affidavit in his
Letter-Complaint when he alleged that Judge Garcia boxed him. Judge Garcia also accused Flores of
falsifying the Affidavit of Abunda who later on executed an Affidavit of Retraction. Abunda allegedly
signed the Affidavit without knowing that there was a statement to the effect that Judge Garcia boxed
Flores.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Garcia is guilty for misconduct

Held:
● Yes. Judge Garcia had acted in wanton disregard of the exacting standards of conduct attached to his
position as a magistrate. Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a
25
 number of restrictions thereon which he must pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in
the administration of justice. His personal behavior, not only upon the bench but also in everyday life,
should be above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. The Code of Judicial Ethics
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.
● Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. Thus, when Judge Garcia acted without exercising civility,
self-restraint, prudence and sobriety even — if at all — he was indeed provoked, he did so in violation
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, viz.:

CANON 4- PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

An act that violates the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes gross misconduct which is considered a serious
charge under Section 8 (3) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
SEC. 8. Serious charges. — Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.

RE: QUITAIN, JBC NO. 013, [AUGUST 22, 2007], 557 PHIL 478-495

Doctrine: Failure of the Judge to disclose in his Personal data sheet that an Administrative case was filed
against him. Such is an act of dishonesty which renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting
as a judge. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.

FACTS:
● Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
10, Davao City. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential
information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as
then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which
he was dismissed from the service.
26
 ● In Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the JBC Judge Quitain declared that there were 5 criminal
cases filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, all were dismissed. No Administrative Case was
disclosed by Quitain in his PDS. The Deputy of Court Administrator (DCA) required Judge Quitain to
explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.
● Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during
his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the
NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case simultaneously filed
against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an official copy of
A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
● Respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad
Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service,
he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation
from NAPOLCOM; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief
that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation
amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised
therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the
service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be
appointed.
● The court contends that Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from
the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial
and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative
Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service.

ISSUE : Whether or Not there was a misrepresentation committed by Judge Quitain.

Held:
● On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making
it appear that he had a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the
government service is a blot on his record, which has gone and has spread even more because of his
concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into consideration
when the Council acted on his application. His act of dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary,
much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for
misconduct and dishonesty.
● Thus, the OCA recommended that:
(1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as an administrative matter; and
(2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
● The court finds respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity.
● Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of
dismissal.
● However, Judge Quitain submitted his resignation letter. Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which
was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case.
27
 ● The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges
against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.
● Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. Judge has been held guilty of
Misconduct and would merit dismissal from service had he not resigned.

MIRANDA VS MANGROBANG, SR. A.M. NO. RTJ-01-1665 422 PHIL 327-334 NOVEMBER 29, 2001

DOCTRINE: A JUDGE SHALL NOT USE THE JUDICIAL OFFICE FOR THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF
OTHERS AND FOR HIS FINANCIAL DEALINGS. — Respondent Judge intended to bring the influence of his
judicial office to bear on the business negotiations. He thus compromised the integrity and moral authority of
his office, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Indeed, a judge's private life
cannot be dissociated from his public life and it is thus important that his behavior both on and off the bench be
free from any appearance of impropriety. Respondent likewise violated Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides: A judge shall refrain from financial or business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's partiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments
and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving ground for disqualification. Under the
circumstances of this case and in accordance with Rule 140, §11-C, reprimand is the proper penalty.

FACTS:
● This is a complaint against Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 22,
Cavite City, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary.
● Complainant Rosauro Miranda was the founder and chairman of the board of the Macamir Realty and
Development Corporation (Macamir Realty). Macamir Realty entered into a construction contract with
O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corporation (O.B. Jovenir Construction). Complainant
Rosauro Miranda charged that respondent Judge engaged in business and in the private practice of
law and used his office as a judge to further his business interests. More specifically, respondent
allegedly committed the following:
1. By being a Director, Vice President for Administration, and legal counsel of the corporation O.B.
Jovenir Construction, with address at Purok 5, Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, and impressing on those
dealing with said corporation that he has the necessary connections and clout with governmental
agencies and judicial offices;
2. By reportedly interceding with other judges for cases of O.B. Jovenir Construction [notably Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, both of the RTC of Las Piñas City]; and
3. By reportedly inducing a Cavite RTC Judge [Judge Lucenito N. Tagle, Presiding Judge of Branch 20
of the Cavite Regional Trial Court] to intercede at the Court of Appeals on behalf of O.B. Jovenir
Construction in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 43957 entitled "Macamir Realty vs Caoibes, Jr. and O.B. Jovenir
Construction”
● In support of his first allegation, complainant submitted copies of minutes of meetings between O.B.
Jovenir Construction and Macamir Realty, showing that Judge Mangrobang attended the meetings and
actively participated in the discussions. It appears in the meeting of August 17, 1996 that respondent
28
 "brought the matter of transferring to the contractor the title of the 12 units assigned to them as
performance bond." On September 27, 1996, he "[gave the assurance] that by January even if there
are delays [in the construction project], construction will normalize." And, on October 25, 1996, he said
he "will also ask the help of his associates in order to solve the problem on [an] adverse claim."
Complainant did not submit evidence supporting the second and third allegations.
● In his answer, respondent denied that he was an officer of O.B. Jovenir Construction. He claimed it was
his son, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., who was a director of the corporation, as evidenced by the articles of
incorporation and by-laws of the corporation.
● He said that not being an officer nor legal counsel of the corporation, he never received any fee,
allowance, or remuneration from O.B. Jovenir Construction. He likewise denied having intervened in
cases involving his son's corporation. Respondent admitted, however, that he sat in one or two
meetings with representatives of Macamir Realty upon the request of his son "as an observer but never
as a representative of O.B. Jovenir."
● Complainant filed a Reply to Answer and Comment to Verified Complaint, and submitted a photocopy
of a document entitled "Company's Top Brass," showing respondent to be the Vice-President for
Administration of O.B. Jovenir Construction. However, in his Rejoinder to Reply, respondent said he
was unaware of the document and submitted the affidavit of his son, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attesting
to the fact that the latter, and not his father, was a stockholder, vice-president, and treasurer of O.B.
Jovenir.
● In its report, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that: 1. the instant case be
RE-DOCKETED as an Administrative Matter; 2. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr. be FINED in the
amount of P5,000.00 for violating Canon 2, Rule 2.03 and Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and that he be DIRECTED to sever all ties he has with O.B. Jovenir Construction so that he
can devote all his time to government service and the administration of justice; and 3. the other charges
be DISMISSED for being unsubstantiated.
● The case was referred to Associate Justice Quirino Abad Santos of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report, and recommendation. He set the case for hearing, but complainant moved for the
inhibition of Justice Abad Santos on the ground that the latter and respondent were college fraternity
brothers. Justice Abad Santos inhibited himself. Accordingly, this Court designated Associate Justice
Ruben T. Reyes, also of the CA, to investigate the case.
● Complainant submitted the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings earlier submitted. On the
other hand, respondent filed a manifestation in this Court, asking that he be allowed to present
testimonial and documentary evidence.
● The request was denied by Justice Reyes on the ground that the manifestation, which was filed with
this Court, was received in the CA only on September 21, 2001 and Justice Reyes had only until
October 2, 2001 to submit his report and recommendation.
● Based on the affidavits and pleadings earlier submitted by the parties, the Investigating Justice
submitted his report recommending that respondent judge be sternly warned against such indiscretion
and that a repetition of a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Mangrobang should be reprimanded and warned for violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct?

HELD:
● The recommendation of the Investigating Justice is well taken.
● From the Articles of Incorporation of O.B. Jovenir Construction, it indeed appears that respondent is not
an officer of that corporation. However, the minutes of the meetings held between Macamir Realty and
29
 O.B. Jovenir Construction tell a different story. These minutes show that respondent was indeed
present in the meetings to which they relate and that he took active part in the discussions relating to
the contractual negotiations between the two companies.
● For example, during the meeting of August 17, 1996, respondent brought up the matter of transferring
to O.B. Jovenir Construction the title to 12 units on the 6th floor of the building being constructed.
According to respondent, O.B. Jovenir Construction needed them as collaterals to secure a loan
needed to purchase construction materials.
● During the meeting of September 27, 1996, he assured the representatives of Macamir Realty that by
January 1997, despite the delays, construction would "normalize." Finally, during the meeting of
October 25, 1996, respondent said he would ask the help of his associates to solve the problem on an
adverse claim.
● Although he claimed that he was in those meetings merely as an observer, respondent never disputed
the authenticity of the minutes of meetings. It is clear that in taking part in the discussions, respondent
intended to bring the influence of his judicial office to bear on the negotiations. He thus compromised
the integrity and moral authority of his office, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides:
● A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
● Indeed, a judge's private life cannot be dissociated from his public life and it is thus important that his
behavior both on and off the bench be free from any appearance of impropriety.
● Respondent likewise violated Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides:
● A judge shall refrain from financial or business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's
partiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with
lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other
financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving ground for disqualification.
● But the charge that respondent influenced Judge Caoibes, Jr. to deny the motion to dismiss filed by
complainant in aa Civil Case against O.B. Jovenir Construction and to cite complainant in contempt and
Judge Maceda in the delay of the approval of his bond has not been substantiated. Also
unsubstantiated is the allegation that he had asked Judge Lucenito Tagle to intercede in behalf of O.B.
Jovenir Construction with members of the CA in connection with C.A.-G.R. SP No. 43957. These
charges should, therefore, be dismissed.
● As already noted, the Investigating Judge recommends that respondent be sternly warned not to
commit the same impropriety; otherwise, he would be dealt with more severely. A warning, however, no
matter how stern, is not a penalty. Under the circumstances of this case and in accordance with Rule
140, §11-C, reprimand is the proper penalty.
● Thus, in Marces, Sr. v. Arcangel, a judge was reprimanded for having attended barangay conciliation
proceedings at the request of one of the parties and introducing himself as the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, in an obvious attempt to lend the prestige of his office to a party in a case. It was
held that it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or controversy. For as Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
● The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
● WHEREFORE, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary, respondent Judge Cesar A.
Mangrobang, Sr. is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
30
 in the future will be dealt with more severely. The other charges against him for interceding with and
influencing other judges to further his private interests are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

SPOUSES DARACAN VS. NATIVIDAD

DOCTRINE: To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in
the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

FACTS:
● An administrative complaint was filed by complainants against respondent judge for gross ignorance of
the law, oppression, gross partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust order for having issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against properties of complainants-spouses relative to a guardianship case
pending before the respondent judge although they were not parties in the guardianship case.
● Respondent judge explained that he was prompted to issue the assailed writ of preliminary attachment
because complainants-spouses failed to appear despite due notice to oppose the issuance of said writ
in the light of a sworn assertion of the guardian that complainants were indebted to her wards, who
were already senile, to the tune of P5 million.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Natividad be declared guilty of gross ignorance of law and knowingly rendering
unjust order or judgement.

HELD:
● NO. DISMISSED. The Supreme Court agreed with the recommendation of the Court of Appeals
Justice, to whom the case was referred for investigation, to dismiss the complaint against the
respondent Judge.
● For administrative liability to attach, it must be established that respondent was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. Complainants have not adduced proof to show that bad faith
attended the issuance of the assailed order.
● The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is
the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, incompetency, etc. the general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials
apply.
● In short, the Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. For the
foregoing considerations, the allegations of oppression and gross partiality must likewise fall in the
absence of factual support to substantiate the charges.

NELSON RODRIGUEZ and RICARDO CAMACHO, complainants, vs. JUDGE RODOLFO S. GATDULA,
respondent.

Doctrine:
An administrative complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the
same has not yet been resolved with finality. For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the
31
challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent
judge is administratively liable.

Facts:
● Mariveles Pawnshop Corp. represented by one Candido, filed with the MTC a complaint for forcible
entry against Camacho and Hernandez.
● Defendants moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case
since the case involves an intra-corporate dispute.
● Respondent judge, however, denied the motion, and later ruled in favor of Natividad.
● Thereafter, respondent allowed the execution of his decision as defendants failed to post a
supersedeas bond.
● Defendants filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC and filed this administrative complaint against
respondent judge for ignorance of the law.

Issue: WON the administrative case against respondent judge was properly filed.

Held:
● No. It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressed, that an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent
developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed
against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position doubly unbearable.
● To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where
the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative
sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.
● In the present case, the complainants filed this administrative case against respondent judge while their
appeal and petition for certiorari challenging his decision and order were still pending with the RTC.
Following our settled pronouncements cited above, the instant complaint is impermissible.

Seares v. Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160 (Resolution), [November 22, 2000], 399 PHIL 7-15

FACTS:
● On November 13, 1996, Dr. Maria Cristina B. Seares in a sworn letter complaint charged Judge Rosita
B. Salazar of MTC, Bangued, Abra with ignorance of the law for failure to decide criminal cases for
violation of B.P. No. 22. Dr. Seares is the private complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 5760 to 5763, for
Violation of B.P. 22. Complainant alleges that these cases were submitted for decision on February 14,
1996. Since then no decision has yet been rendered.
● Furthermore, respondent disregarded the directive of Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L.
Suarez in a note dated August 8, 1996 that the criminal cases be decided soonest considering the
lapse of the 90-day period within which to resolve the same. Another sworn letter complaint dated
January 20, 1997 was filed by complainant questioning the propriety of the action taken by respondent
when she set the hearing of the aforecited cases in December 30, 1996 and ordered the accused to
present evidence despite the fact that this had long been submitted for decision.
32
 ● Complainant submits that when respondent ordered the resetting for further hearing of said cases, she
displayed a blatant disregard of the law and the order of higher judicial authority. On August 4, 1997,
this Court referred this case to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. On March 27,
1998, the OCA submitted a memorandum in compliance with the order.
● In the memorandum, the OCA found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
dereliction of duty and recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P1,000.00 with a
stern warning that future similar infraction on her part will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has violated the rule that cases must be decided or resolved within
three (3) months from the date of submission pursuant to Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution; and,
whether or not the respondent has presented any sufficient explanation for the non-compliance considering
that in certain meritorious cases a longer period to decide had been allowed.

HELD:
● Under Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence, and Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's
business promptly and to decide the case within the period fixed by law. The 90-day period to decide or
resolve the case submitted for decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a mandatory requirement.
Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the erring judge to administrative sanction as this Court
may deem appropriate. It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those involving difficult questions of
law or complex issue 2 or when the judge is burdened by heavy caseloads, 3 that a longer period to
decide may be allowed but only upon proper application made with the Supreme Court by the
concerned judge.
● First, there is no question, and the respondent judge admits, that at the time the complaint was filed
there was yet no decision rendered on the cases. At the time complaint was filed, which was on
November 13, 1996, the mandatory 90-day period to decide or resolve the case had already lapsed,
the cases having been submitted for decision since February 14, 1996.
● Second, the respondent judge offered no satisfactory and acceptable explanation for her failure to
comply with the 90-day period to decide or resolve the cases. Neither did she file an application for an
additional time. Respondent judge claims that it was only when complainant asked Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) in addition to the balance of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and was
refused, that she continued with this case.
● As correctly observed by the OCA, the pendency of an amicable settlement is not a valid excuse
because it is a settled rule that a criminal case once filed in court cannot be amicably settled. Under the
Civil Code, there may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense; but such
compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
● The non-compliance of the 90-day period in itself renders the respondent judge subject to
administrative liability. It is the duty of a judge to take note of the cases submitted for his (her) decision
and see to it that the same are decided within the 90-day period fixed by law, and failure to decide a
case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency. 6 The 90-day period is intended to
prevent delay in the administration of justice 7 and non-compliance thereof constitutes a serious
violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases. Delay of justice is
injustice. 8 It erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its standard and
brings it into disrepute. 9

CASE: TUZON V. CLORIBEL-PURUGGANAN

33
Doctrine: "Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If either
party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties.
However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.

Facts:
● In this case, there is an administrative complaint against Judge Cloribel-Purugganan for violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
● Tuzon filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the Order of the Judge denying the motion of
Tuzon to allow cross examination for his witness. The CA issued a resolution directing the private
respondent in the case to comment and show cause why the injunctive relief should not be granted.
The Judge filed the comment for herself and the respondent. The CA ultimately denied the petition for
lack of merit.
● Tuzon then filed the administrative complaint for the deploring act of filing a comment in a civil case as
an illegal private practice of law and antedating her decision. The Judge admitted the comment she
made and stated that she only did so because the counsel of private respondent was sick and unable
to make the comment. She denied the antedating.
● Deputy Court Administrator Recommendation: That a fine be imposed against the Judge for the
comment.

Issue: Whether or not the Judge should be fined for the comment she made for private respondent

Held:
● The Court ruled in the affirmative by suspending her from the practice of law for 3 months and a penalty
of 10,000 was meted by the Court.
● In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent judge filed a comment on behalf of the respondent
Raymundo E. Catral in the case on review with the Court of Appeals. Respondent judge signed the
pleading herself and submitted it to the court notwithstanding that it was her decision that was the
subject of the petition in the said court.
● In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in the Revised Rules of Court which
provides: "Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If
either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included therein as
nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear or participate in
the proceedings therein.
● Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with the court on behalf of one of the parties,
engaged in the private practice of law. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court
or participation in court proceedings but includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of
litigation.

RICHARDS VS ASOY

Facts:
● Richards retained Atty. Patricio Asoy as counsel in a case before the RTC Pasay against Danilo
Felindario for damagas allegedly due to faulty worksmanship and non-compliance with the
specifications in the construction of Richards House in BF, Paranaque. Among the terms and
34
 conditions in their contract for legal services was the payment by Complainant to Respondent of an
acceptance fee of Fifteen Thousand Pesos payable upon the signing of the agreement, and a fee of
P300.00 for each Court appearance.
● The acceptance fee was fully paid by Complainant on April 30, 1982, the initial payment having been
made on April 26, 1982. The civil case was dismissed by the RTC without prejudice for lack of interest
on the part of the plaintiff as shown by the absence of their counsel despite due notice. On Aug. 1983
the case was reinstated after reconsideration sought by the respondent but the RTC again dismissed
the case for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute despite due notice to the respondent.
● Respondent stated several reasons saying that the complainant migrated to Australia without furnishing
him for the payment of the expert witness which he cannot shoulder and his daughter having cerebral
palsy and that he had no intention to delay the cause of the complainant for money of malice.
● Prior to the formal complaint, Richards filed a letter complaint before the chief justice denouncing the
respondent’s actuations. Respondent was required to comment on the resolution to show cause why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with, but refused to do so despite several service of notice. Since,
unquestionably, respondent had gone into hiding and was evading service of
pleadings/orders/processes of the Court, the Court suspended him from practice of law. When flushed
out, respondent submitted himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court denying any violation of his
oath.

Issue: WON Atty. Asoy should be disbarred from the practice of law.

Held:
● Respondent is guilty of grave professional misconduct. He received from Complainant, his client,
compensation to handle his case in the Trial Court, but the same was dismissed for lack of interest and
failure to prosecute. He had abandoned his client in violation of his contract ignoring the most
elementary principles of professional ethics.
● That Respondent had ignored the processes of this Court and it was only after he was suspended from
the practice of law that he surfaced, is highly indicative of his disregard of an attorney's duties to the
Court. All the facts and circumstances taken into consideration, Respondent has proven himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
● "Consistent with the policy to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession, insure
the observance of legal ethics, protect the interests of clients and help keep their faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Supreme Court is constrained to disbar a member of the bar who violates his
lawyer's oath for failure to properly attend to a client's case not only once, but on two occasions, with
results highly prejudicial to the interest of the latter."

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:
● Gozun was in open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His
family's house was erected on the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow
blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his
parents.
● The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot||
● Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga: in favor of Municipality
35
 ● Vice Mayor Batu filed with MTC a petition for declaratory relief: these request are in connection with our
plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the
designated place thereof is presently being squatted by Gozun
● Judge Liangco: resolution: "With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the
municipality of San Luis may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis,
Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any
right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours)."
● Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for
declaratory relief
● complainant Gozun's wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the
respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, "Ing Apung Guinu yu
y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi" ("Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him").
● OCA: recommended dismissal from office of Judge Liangco
● SC: affirmed OCA’s dismissal; ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in
addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a
judge of a first-level court. The Court also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the
demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless. It described
respondent's acts as biased and "maleficent" and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of
dismissal from the service
● OCA: Filed a complaint for disbarment against Judge Liangco; charged him with gross misconduct for
acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of
well-established rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal
profession.
● Judge Liangco: when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion "honestly and in good
faith"; and that his actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. He further
pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the
practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.
● IBP: Recommends disbarment: She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of
well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first
of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary,
respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four
(54) cases for violation of PD No. 1602 — a violation of SC Circular No. 7. Also, pending with the
Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of
the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the NBI in an entrapment operation.

ISSUE: WON Judge Liangco should be disbarred

HELD: WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:
1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary
2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility

GROSS MISCONDUCT
● Concept of gross misconduct - any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties
36
 or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose
● The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated
Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution — all
on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Also, evidence shows that
Judge Liangco maintained close relationship with Vice Mayor.
● As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to
conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the
judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the judiciary. Integrity and
impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of
judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the
decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.

INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

● We are appalled by respondent's ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court
processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly
shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.
● there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to
thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a "legal opinion,"
but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory
processes such as notice — especially to Gozun — and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable.
Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of
judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in
the context of contested proceedings.
● In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process
● As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot
render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question.
● Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the public's confidence in the
competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility
that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should
know.

TOPIC 20 CRIMINAL OFFENSES THAT MAY BE COMMITTED BY JUDGES/JUSTICES/LAWYERS

Chapter Two
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
Section One. — Dereliction of duty
37
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. — Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be
punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or
decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have
acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly
unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.chanrobles
virtual law library

Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the proper
administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to
1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any
malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.chanrobles virtual law library

The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor

(procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information
from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the
consent of his first client.chanrobles virtual law library

38
TOPIC 21 CRITICISMS AGAINST THE COURTS/JUDGES/JUSTICES

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 11

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.

39
RE: BAGABUYO

Fact:
● Criminal Case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser, who denied the Demurrer to the
Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient
to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the
defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then
Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the
ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail.
● Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of Senior
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate,” by
allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Judge Tan and Order favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of
Bail Bond.
● Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. respondent appealed
from the Orders to the CA. Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the
publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
● Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the
indirect contempt order to the CA. Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented
himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge
Tan and the trial court’s disposition in the proceedings of criminal Case.

Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath?

Held:
● Yes, Respondent violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect
to bail out, which appeared in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent’s statements in the article,
which were made while Criminal. Case was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13,
which states that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
● In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his
grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and
its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was
studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
● Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[his] clients.

LACUROM V. JACOBA

Doctrine:

40
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote
high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.

Facts:
● The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a
civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos (Barrientos) . The Municipal Trial
Court rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
● The Regional Trial Court reversed the judgement rendered by the Municipal Trial Court.
● Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideretaion, with request for inhibition, pertinent portions
of which read:

II. PREPARATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and
legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
acted as if it were the Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and
TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to a
Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base
this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
● The Regional Trial Court Judge ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held liable in contempt of court for the “very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating”
contents on the motion.
● Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize “for whatever mistake [they] may have committed
in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and out of bounds.
● On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her
with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.
● Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last
day na, baka mahuli." She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith"
on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading turned
out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
suspension from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not the use of sardonic, strident, and hard-stricking adjectives is in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility

Held:
● Velasco-Jacoba insists that she signed the motion only because of her husband’s request but she did
not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each other’s pleadings is a
long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "so implicit is their
trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, she already lost count of the
number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other." By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission,
therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7.
41
 ● This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to
disciplinary action.
● No doubt, the language contained in the motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to
defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity,
legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect."
● In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language
but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest means, thus:

Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges
to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.

Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

● Wherefore, the court were faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves
with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. The
court found respondents to have fallen short of the mark. Atty Ellis Jacoba was suspended for two
years while Olivia Velasco-Jacoba suspended for two months.

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS VS CITY OF URDANETA

Facts:
● This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts filed by respondent Waldo C. Del
Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad
doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners(APP)
represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation
(APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.
● Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for
the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center
and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95
million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the
commerce of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains
devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts,
from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they
were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
● In their Answer, 3 APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor
Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer, 4 joined in the defense and asserted that the
42
 contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the
complaint states no cause of action.
● After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an
Omnibus Motion 7 with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer; (2) drop UrdanetaCity as
defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City's complaint; and (4) conduct a new
pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
● Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm
and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the CityProsecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the
city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo's complaint, and directed
the defendants to answer the city's complaint.
● Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the
RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of written explanation why
service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.

Issue: W/N Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration

Held:
● Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping of the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. 14 Thus, the Court of Appeals is
allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the petition.
● However, it must be pointed out that in several cases, this Court had considered as substantial
compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the
authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case. The Court notes that the attachments
in the motion for reconsideration show that the Board of Directors of APPCDC authorized Cesar Goco
to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals. Ronilo Goco doing business under the name APP,
also appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition. When the petition was
before the Court of Appeals, Cesar Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification
except that the proof of his authority was not submitted together with the petition.
● Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed
RTC orders and we may also consider the same as substantial compliance. Petitioners also included in
the motion for reconsideration their explanation that copies of the petition were personally served on
the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance. The affidavit of
service supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the
appellate court to deny reinstatement of the petition.

SPOUSES TIONGCO V. AGUILAR, G.R. NO. 115932 (RESOLUTION), [JANUARY 25, 1995], 310 PHIL
652-664

Doctrines: CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

43
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.

FACTS:
● In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for
the petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
● It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with
administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his
unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case before it
concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave
abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge
as a "liar," "thief," perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the
intemperate words enumerated in the resolution.
● Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate
words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called
the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and
"cross-eyed.”
● Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following reasons: first,
he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read the petition; second,
except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious," and "blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the
other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure
amounts to an admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon
which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh
words and phrases to his petition.
● We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all
read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for
this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put them
to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render
justice, thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of
"encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1935]).

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tiongo violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:
● In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the
respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose
glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision in favor of Atty. Tiongco and
his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant
petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent
judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and, eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing
mistrust in the administration of justice.

44
 ● It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the
courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such
right. The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
● Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration
of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re:
Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive, language (Yangson v. Salandanan,
68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in
pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja v. Macandog, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the
resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association v. Quisumbing, G.R. No.
76180, and Ceniza v. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled
for remarks (Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
● Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious
insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous
characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger,
if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who
"seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice
whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does
not accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]).
● When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other
intemperate words in his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September
1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him]
into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES —
AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution — Preamble, 66th word)," nothing more can extenuate his liability
for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of his other duties
entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
● WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

COMPLAINT OF MR. AURELIO INDENCIA ARRIENDA

FACTS:
● In particular, the complainant charged the respondent justices for "willfully, maliciously and arbitrarily"
rendering allegedly unjust decisions in (RTC) Civil Case No. Q-53060, CA-G.R. CV No. 48737 and
G.R. No. 137904 which were filed by complainant and his family against the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and Crispina de la Cruz. He also charged them with "willfully, maliciously and
arbitrarily" suppressing evidence and resorting "to a modus operandi or the so-called '1-2-3' to swindle
or defraud" him and his family "by simply issuing 'minute' resolutions based on technicalities without
having passed upon the unresolved issues and those other issues that were resolved contrary to laws,
rules on evidence, etc."

45
 ● The complainant accused the respondent justices of acting on the basis of "personal considerations"
when they decided the case against him and his family. He alleged that they acted like the lawyers of
GSIS and de la Cruz. He described the adverse decisions as acts of betrayal of public trust.[8]
● The complainant branded the respondent justices as "Crooks in Robes" and "Swindlers in Robes" who
"gypped" him and his family of their right to due process. He also labeled them as "corrupt justices….
who were only sowing 'judicial terrorism.'"
● Because of his offensive and disrespectful statements, the complainant was ordered to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for attempting to foist falsehood on the Court and
committing grave abuse of court processes.
● On January 26, 2005, complainant filed his answer. The complainant denied foisting falsehood on and
showing disrespect to the Court. He asserted that he "merely exercised his right to due process of law,
of speech, of expression to air his grievances and that of his family and to expose to the Court for
redress the injustices inflicted upon them."[16] He maintained that he filed his complaint "to expose the
1-2-3 swindling committed by respondent justices." He then sought an investigation where he could be
heard by himself and counsel, and face the justices.
● The words employed by the complainant against the justices were not only obnoxious and insulting;
they were downright slanderous. Such gutter language can only come from one who is deeply and
self-righteously intolerant not only of our system of laws but also of the opinion of others.

Ruling
● The complainant has been repeatedly directed to abide thereby. His deliberate violation of the orders of
the Court are unjustified and inexcusable. The refusal of the complainant to concede defeat, manifested
by [his] unceasing attempts to prolong the final disposition of [this] case, obstructs the administration of
justice and, therefore, constitutes contempt of court.
● The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant against the respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in
Robe," "Swindlers in Robe," "corrupt justices who were only sowing 'judicial terrorism'" as well as his
vilification of the Chief Justice whom he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe," go beyond the bounds of
acceptable behavior.
● WHEREFORE, the complaint of Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Supreme Court Justices Reynato S.
Puno, Santiago M. Kapunan (Ret.), Bernardo P. Pardo (Ret.) and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., CA Justices Bennie Adefuin-De la Cruz (Ret.) and Perlita
Tria-Tirona, is hereby DISMISSED with finality. Furthermore, he is found guilty of contempt of court and
a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) is hereby imposed on him, payable within ten days from
receipt of this resolution under pain of imprisonment. He is hereby warned that any repetition hereof
shall be dealt with more severely.

TITLE: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs. UEM-MARA PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD and PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, respondents.

DOCTRINE: While the Court recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and justices in the performance of
their functions, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety.

FACTS:

46
● Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleged that he is a taxpayer and resident of Cavite. He claimed that
he instituted this suit in the RTC in his behalf and in behalf of the other users of the Coastal Road which
is the principal road connecting Metro Manila and Cavite
● Private respondent UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) is a corporation duly organized and
validly existing under Philippine laws. It was incorporated by two Malaysian entities, namely, United
Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) and Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA).
● Public respondents are the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), created under PD 1112 8 and the Public
Estates Authority (PEA), a government owned and controlled corporation organized pursuant to PD
1084
● UMPC entered into a Toll Operation Agreement (TOA) with the Republic of the Philippines, through the
TRB and PEA, for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the R-1 Expressway. UMPC
was exclusively responsible for the design, construction and financing aspect of the expressways,
while the PEA was exclusively responsible for the operation and maintenance thereof
● PEA was to operate the R-1 Expressway (also known as the Coastal Road) as a toll facility and collect
toll fees from its users. Part of these fees would be used to compensate UMPC for its investment and
participation in the project. Toll collection commenced on May 24, 1998
● May 22, 1998, petitioner led a petition for prohibition, injunction and declaration of nullity of the TOA,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction in
the RTC praying that respondents be ordered to cease and desist from collecting the announced toll
fees for the use of the MCTEP on the following grounds: (1) that the toll fees as fi xed in the TOA were
grossly exorbitant, unconscionable and violative of the allowable reasonable rate of return on
investment and (2) that there was absence of notice and public hearing in the fi xing of the rate of toll
fees in contravention of public interest.
● Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC, Makati City, Branch 133, issued an ex
parte TRO effective for 72 hours enjoining respondents from charging and collecting the toll fees.
● The case was raffl ed to Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of Branch 150 who subsequently inhibited himself
from hearing the case. The case was re-raffled to Judge Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr. of Branch 147
● Judge Guadiz, Jr. issued an order extending the TRO to 20 days. On June 9, 1998, he issued an order
setting aside his May 27, 1998 order and set the case for summary hearing pursuant to Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court.
● On June 23, 1998, Judge Guadiz, Jr. issued an order granting petitioner's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which writ was issued on June 24, 1998 after petitioner posted a surety bond in
the amount of P100,000.
● Petitioner also insists that they be cited in contempt for showing disrespect and resorting to offensive
language against RTC Judge Guadiz, Jr. when they stated: Despite the obvious legality of the project,
petitioner, either by sheer arrogance or a malicious refusal to acknowledge the truth — that the
[MCTEP] and the imposition of toll fees for the use of the Coastal Road are legal and above board —
initiated what is no more than a nuisance suit and secured from an insufficiently-informed judge an
illegal writ of preliminary injunction which public respondent, the Honorable [CA], subsequently
reversed. aAH
● On June 26, 1998, UMPC led a petition for certiorari with application for TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction in the CA. The CA nullifi ed and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the RTC. It ruled that the writ was issued in contravention of PD 1818 and petitioner failed to prove
that it satis ed the requisites for its issuance. It denied reconsideration in a resolution dated September
23, 1998.

47
ISSUE:
1. WON UMPC and Councel should be cited for contempt for misrepresenting to the Court in their
memorandum
2. WON they should cited in contempt for showing disrespect and resorting to offensive language against RTC
Judge Guadiz, Jr.

HELD:
1. No, we do not think that UMPC and its counsels should be sanctioned for contempt.
● Counsels can be held in contempt of court for making false statements in the pleadings they file tending
to mislead the Court and to degrade the administration of justice. We cannot see any deliberate
falsehood or misrepresentation in the aforequoted statements of Attys. Poblador and Bretaña. On the
contrary, they truthfully indicated that UEM and MARA were the former stockholders of UMPC. This is
the clear import of the phrase "then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM." This also implied
that they had been replaced as such. Besides, the ownership structure of UMPC as a party in this case
was never material to the issue for resolution which is the issuance of a writ of injunction for the
collection of toll fees. Hence, the Court was not deceived in any way.
2. No, we cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is disrespectful, abusive or
slanderous.
● Attys. Poblador and Bretaña, in their defense, countered that there was nothing insulting or disparaging
in describing someone as "insufficiently informed." This was not intemperate language amounting to
vilification. They are correct. In criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it is done in good faith:
● While the Court recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and justices in the performance of their
functions, "it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges (or justices) thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts."
● We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is disrespectful, abusive or
slanderous. Besides, [it] is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is
inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of
justice. Judges however are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
● Therefore, we deny petitioner's motion to cite in contempt for lack of merit.

POBRE VS DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO

Facts:
● Antero J. Pobre invites the Court's attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago's speech delivered on the Senate floor:
. . I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots . .
.

48
 ● To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt
of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator. Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted
statements.
● She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
● She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial and Bar
Council [JBC]", which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an
advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

Held:
● No. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11
of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof".
● Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala
fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The
disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct
such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
● For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment
or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word
on the matter. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
● To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon
8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01. –– A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11. –– A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. cTDIaC

49
 ● Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is
duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the people's faith in the integrity of the courts. As Senator Santiago alleged,
she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC.
● This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. To be
sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and
offensive personalities. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago's outburst was directly traceable to
what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice.
● But while the JBC functions under the Court's supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the
Chief Justice who sits as the JBC's ex-officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates
for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator
Santiago's wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
● The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins
a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution". But as to Senator Santiago's unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate
Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. 20
The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber.
● It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. Finally,
the lady senator questions Pobre's motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings
must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot
overstress that the senator's use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of
the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.

COJUANGCO JR. VS ATTY. PALMA ADM. CASE NO. 2474

Doctrine: "The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards
of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe
a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards
are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else
incur the risk of suspension or removal."

Facts:
● To practice law is a privilege one. It is only for those who can pass the bar and pass the standards sets-
out which are indispensible. One of the requirements to admit the bar is to have a satisfactory
testimonial of good character. Such good moral character must be maintained throughout his life as a
lawyer.
● In this case the complainant is a client of Angara Concepcion Regala &Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA),
who assigned the case to Atty. Palma, the respondent. The former hired the latter as his personal
counsel for his business. The same becomes very close to the family, dine and goes with them abroad.
He even tutored, complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa).

50
 ● On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of the complainant
despite the facts that the former is already married and with three (3) children. Complainant sends his
two sons to persuade Lisa to go home with them, which she did. In the celebration of respondent’s
marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor.
● On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage and which was granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint
on the ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
● Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he contends that
complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his
lawyer’s oath.

Issue: Whether or not respondent's acts constitutes gross immoral conduct so as to warrant his disbarment
from the legal profession.

Ruling:
● Yes, the Court ruled respondent's action constitutes gross immoral conduct. A gross immoral conduct,
the Court said, is a conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Thus, measured
against this definition, respondent’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful
wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he
misrepresented himself as a “bachelor” so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
● In particular, adds the Court, "he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality." Moreover, the circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence.
● It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete trust in him
that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be
complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter. Like the
proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking.
● Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in
order to marry the latter’s daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s knowledge.
● The Court stressed again the principle that law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life.
● This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any
time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.
● Respondent cannot rely on complainant's admission that he is a good lawyer, because professional
competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is
always an indispensable requirement.
● In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his
offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

51
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, RESPONDENT A.C. NO.
8920, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011

Facts:
● Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Battung. He claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on
the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his
motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top
of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then
cite me!”Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent
then left.
● While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I
will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” Judge Baculi ocited him for direct contempt
of court for the second time.
● After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I willfile gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!” He kept on shouting, “I am not afraid of you!” and challenged the
judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.
● Judge Baculi later found out that after the respondent left the courtroom, Atty. Battung continued
shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Issue: Did Atty. Battung violate Cannons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling:
● IBP Commissioner found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial
officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
● The respondent’s argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due
consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he
created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. De la Rama recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
● The Supreme Court held that litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and
avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and
the court that he represents.
● A lawyer who insults a judge inside acourtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge
Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and
in his ability to decide cases.
● Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided
under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the
courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
● Atty. Battung was ordered suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

52
ROMULO SJ TOLENTINO, STATE PROSECUTOR AND ACTING PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF
CAMARINES SUR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ALFREDO A. CABRAL, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 30, SAN JOSE, CAMARINES SUR, RESPONDENT .

FACTS:
● Respondent judge approved the motion for bail of the accused in Crim. Case No. T- 1417 for rape
despite the testimony of the Psychiatrist who examined the 15-year old victim who manifested
psychotic signs after the rape and the offer of compromise made by the accused. The order granting
bail contained grammatical and clerical errors. On the day the ex-parte motion for the hospitalization of
accused was filed, respondent granted the same based on "humanitarian reason."
● On the hearing date, respondent granted the motion in favor of accused because according to him the
life of accused was at stake. These became the bases of the administrative charges filed by
complainant, acting provincial prosecutor, against respondent.
● Complainant further alleged gross negligence on the part of respondent for the loss of several pages of
the records of the case and his failure to determine the cause of the loss. Respondent filed counter
charges against complainant.
● He alleged that complainant made misrepresentations when he claimed that a court aide tampered the
order granting bail where in fact said court aide merely entered the necessary corrections on the order
and his declaration that counter-affidavits of accused and his witnesses were attached to his motion to
resolve pending motions when no such documents were attached.
● Records disclosed that complainant even threatened respondent with an administrative charge if
respondent deny his motions. When his order granting bail was annulled in People vs. Cabral for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, respondent moved for the dismissal of the
administrative case filed against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge shall be held administratively liable

HELD:
● Positive.
● Administrative actions cannot he made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. The Supreme Court does not, as a matter of course,
dismiss administrative cases against members of the Bench on account of withdrawal of charges.
● The omission of vital evidence against the accused in the grant of bail and the misapplication of legal
doctrines constitute gross ignorance of the law. The issuance of said order amounted to knowingly
rendering a manifestly unjust order.
● The order granting the ex-parte motion for the hospitalization of the accused was a grave abuse of
discretion.
● Failure of the judge to adopt a system of record management and failure to exert effort to determine
cause of loss of documents constitute gross negligence and inefficiency.
● Lawyers have an obligation to the court as well as to the opposing party to make only truthful
statements in the pleadings, and intemperate words tending to influence the court in administering
justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading.
● Respondent Judge was found guilty of the charges, while complainant was reprimanded.
● WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alfredo A. Cabral of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San Jose
Camarines Sur, is hereby found liable for grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross
negligence and inefficiency, rendering unjust judgment and for violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and, accordingly, is SUSPENDED from office for SIX (6) MONTHS without pay. On the other
53
 hand, complainant Romulo SJ Tolentino is REPRIMANDED for breach of Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and
10.02 as well as Canon 11, Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Both complainant
and respondent judge are WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will be
severely dealt with by this Court.

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO,

Respondent.

DOCTRINE: A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or
oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentlemen to another.10

FACTS:
● In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from
each other. They have two children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed
a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the
complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
● In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning
Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that
she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the
help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
● Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding
policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and
settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court’s
resolution/order.3 In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with
respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This
agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI
Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
● In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the
hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant
rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.
● On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a
verified petition4for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children
on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the
authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 20025 from the Court of
Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to
respondent had been issued.
● At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

54
 ● Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney’s oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’ Resolution in and outside a court of
law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to
enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

HELD: YES.
● In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of
Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that
he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in
his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898,7 which
he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have
participated in its fabrication.
● Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it
must never be at the expense of the truth.
● Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.9 The lawyer’s
arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should
be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.10 By calling
complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly
measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
● Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
● Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the
period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which
we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.

BILDNER V. ILUSORIO G.R. NO. 157384, [JUNE 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 369-391

Doctrine: Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Facts:
The disbarment case against respondent Atty. Singson stemmed from his alleged attempt, as counsel of
Ramon in Civil Case No. 4537-R, to exert influence on presiding Regional Trial Court Judge Antonio Reyes to
55
rule in Ramon's favor. To complainant-petitioners, the bid to influence, which allegedly came in the form of a
bribe offer, may be deduced from the following exchanges during the May 31, 2000 hearing on Ramon's
motion for Judge Reyes to inhibit himself from hearing Civil Case No. 4537-R:
COURT:

Do you have something to add to your motion?

ATTY. JOSE:
The purpose of this representation basically, your honor state the facts are already established as a basis for
tendency or a perception correctly or incorrectly that there is already a possibility of partiality.

COURT:
Who is your partner?

ATTY. JOSE:
The counsel for the plaintiff is Law Office of Singson and Associates and I am the associate of said Law Office,
your honor.

COURT:
And you are aware that Atty. Manuel R. Singson is your boss?

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. JOSE:
Yes, your honor?

COURT:
Has he been telling you the truth in this case?

ATTY. JOSE:
Well, your honor my appearance here for the purpose of having this motion duly heard. EAcIST

COURT:
That is why I'm asking you the question, has he been telling you the truth regarding this case?

ATTY. JOSE:
Well, your honor in fact the actual counsel here is Atty. Gepty and I have been…

COURT:
Are you aware of the fact that Atty. Singson has been calling my residence in Baguio City for about 20 to 50
times already?

ATTY. JOSE:
I have no knowledge already.

COURT:

56
Are you aware that he has offered Atty. Oscar Sevilla his classmate at Ateneo Law School P500,000.00 to give
it to me for the purpose of ruling in favor of your client[?]

ATTY. JOSE:
I have no knowledge your honor.

COURT:
Ask him that tell him to face the mirror and ask him if he is telling the truth alright? I will summon the records of
PLDT. The audacity of telling me to inhibit myself here. It has been him who has been trying to influence me.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Tell him to look at his face in the mirror, tell me if he is honest or not. 15

And to support their disbarment charge against Atty. Singson on the grounds of attempted bribery and serious
misconduct, complainant-petitioners submitted an affidavit executed on December 23, 2004 by Judge Reyes in
which he pertinently alleged:

2) That one of the cases I tried, heard and decided was Civil Case No. 4537-R entitled "Ramon K. Ilusorio v.
Baguio Country Club" for the "Declaration of Nullity of Limitations and/or Injunction . . .";

3) That the very minute that the case was assigned by raffle to the undersigned, Atty. Manuel Singson counsel
of plaintiff Ramon K. Ilusorio in the aforementioned case, started working on his channels to the undersigned to
secure a favorable decision for his client;

4) That Atty. Singson's foremost link to the undersigned was Atty. Oscar Sevilla, my family friend and who
incidentally was a classmate of Atty. Singson;

5) That Atty. Sevilla, being a close family friend, immediately intimated to undersigned that Atty. Singson
wanted a favorable decision and that there was a not so vague an offer of a bribe from him (Atty. Singson);

6) That I rejected every bit of illegal insinuations and told Atty. Sevilla to assure Atty. Singson that I am duty
bound to decide every case on the merits no matter who the litigants are;

7) That even before the start of the hearing of the case, Atty. Singson himself relentlessly worked on
undersigned by visiting him about three times in his office. And not being satisfied with those visits, he (Atty.
Singson) made more than a dozen calls to undersigned's Manila and Baguio residences, and worked on Atty.
Sevilla . . . by calling the latter's cell phone even when we were playing golf in Manila. These phone calls were
even admitted by Atty. Singson in a Manifestation he filed in court citing several ridiculous, unbelievable and
untruthful reasons for his phone calls;

8) That when Ramon K. Ilusorio's plea for injunctive relief was submitted for resolution, Atty. Singson became
more unrelenting in throwing his professional ethics out of the window and breached his lawyer's oath by
personally calling many more times, some of which were even made late evenings, just trying to convince
undersigned to grant the injunctive relief his client Ramon K. Ilusorio desperately needed in the case;

57
9) That because of his inability to influence undersigned x x x, Atty. Singson filed a motion to inhibit alleging
that facts have been established of undersigned's partiality for his client's adversary, the defendant Baguio
Country Club;

10) That at the hearing on the motion to inhibit . . . I declared in open court and in public the dishonest and
unprofessional conduct of Atty. Singson in trying to influence a judge to favor his client, no matter how
unmeritorious his prayer for injunction was. In open court, undersigned scored Atty. Singson's audacity of
asking an inhibition when it has always been him and him alone who wanted and tried to influence the
undersigned.

11) That on January 12, 2000, undersigned issued an Order in Civil Case No. 4537-R . . . denying Atty.
Singson's client's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction . . .; ASCTac

12) That the undersigned's ruling against Atty. Singson's client in the case was elevated to the [CA] in G.R. No.
59353 where . . . Atty. Singson never raised the issue of undersigned's denial to inhibit;

13) That still unsatisfied with the [CA's] adverse ruling against his client, Atty. Singson went on to the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 148985 questioning the [CA's] affirmation of undersigned's decision. The Supreme Court . . .
dismissed the appeal of Ramon K. Ilusorio and sustained undersigned's decision. 16 (Emphasis ours.)

Complainant-petitioners also submitted Atty. Oscar Sevilla's affidavit to support the attempted bribery charge
against Atty. Singson. In its pertinent part, Atty. Sevilla's affidavit reads:
That sometime in late October of 1999 . . ., I received a call from Atty. Singson . . . and in the course of our
conversation, I learned that Ramon K. Ilusorio is his client who has a civil case raffled to Judge Reyes;

That during said conversation, I mentioned to Atty. Singson that Judge Reyes is a family friend and . . . is a
man of integrity;

That in the months that followed, Atty. Singson made a call or two to my cellphone requesting if I could mention
to Judge Reyes that he (Atty. Singson) is my classmate at the Ateneo and also a good friend;

That I remember having mentioned this to Judge Reyes who told me that he always decides on the merits of
all cases . . . and to tell Atty. Singson that he need not worry if he had a meritorious case. 17

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioners prayed that respondents be adjudged guilty of criminal
contempt of court and punished in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The censure of
respondents was also sought for using extrajudicial ways of influencing pending cases in court. Lastly,
petitioners asked for the disbarment or discipline of Atty. Singson for attempted bribery and gross misconduct.
By separate resolutions, the Court directed respondents to submit their comment on the contempt aspect of
the petition and Atty. Singson to submit his comment on petitioners' motion to consider the same petition as a
formal complaint for disbarment or other disciplinary action.

Issue: W/N Atty. Singson should be administratively disciplined or disbarred from the practice of law for
alleged gross misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge Antonio Reyes.

Held:

58
The court held that we must stress the difficulty of proving bribery. The transaction is always done in secret
and often only between the two parties concerned. Indeed, there is no concrete evidence in the records
regarding the commission by Atty. Singson of attempted bribery. Even Atty. Sevilla did not mention any related
matter in his affidavit. Nevertheless, Judge Reyes' disclosures in his affidavit and in open court deserve some
weight. The possibility of an attempted bribery is not far from reality considering Atty. Singson's persistent
phone calls, one of which he made while Judge Reyes was with Atty. Sevilla. Judge Reyes' declaration may
have been an "emotional outburst" as described by Atty. Singson, but the spontaneity of an outburst only gives
it more weight.

While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be supported by evidence other than Judge Reyes'
statements, there is nevertheless enough proof to hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical behavior of attempting
to influence a judge, itself a transgression of considerable gravity. However, heeding the injunction against
decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction would suffice to accomplish the desired end, a suspension for
one year from the practice of law appears appropriate.

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA

Doctrine:
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue
in the practice of law. In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile, we imposed on the
respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty.
Sorreda from the Bar a fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to
the profession. It is imperative to instill in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he
has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds.

Facts:
● Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his frustrations of the outcome
of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the very first case he filed with the Court entitled Ramon
Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Office of
the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:
● Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally
execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It
is the action not of men of reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and
tyrants from whom "might is right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor's
throat a ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.
● Reacting to the above, the Court required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly
disciplined "for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile, offensive,
intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it"
● In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to the Court
arguing for the propriety of his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and
Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law.

59
 ● Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty. Sorreda disparaging the
Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory language, to wit:

"SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH THE COUNTRY'S JUSTICE
SYSTEM"

"WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE?

“I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations as the Honorable Court
has displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship or authoritarian regime."

● Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again
went on a rampage in his letter.
● Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably meritorious cases
that have ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court of justice for that matter. I cannot
doubt that were it not for the Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents that ensued from it, at
least some of these ten cases would have met with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are
their merits to any reasonable and impartial mind.
● Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days as greater than
60 days, and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the supposedly most illustrious legal
minds of the land, would miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the actions of an agency that directly
contravened numerous laws and rules all at once? How could democracy's vaunted "last bulwark"
suffer a widow and her children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and
illegal demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the court pause for even three minutes to put itself
in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept locked up for three years now on a manifestly false and
fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its "discretion" not to entertain his appeal at all? Where
did the Court get such brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that the
docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact were? What manner of men
are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt, and the bar to become like "Frodo" in
the fight against society's evils in your public speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing
the same evils when hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the 'What-are-we-in-power-for' mentality?

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his letters
addressed to the court.

Held:
● Yes. The Court held that unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court
or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose.
On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of
the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court,
Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in
the fair administration of justice. No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the
country’s highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.

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 ● Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice,
to which his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
● The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in
the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that
must at no time be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice.
● Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrate. We have constantly
reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts
his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile, we imposed on the
respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar.
● Here, as in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a fitting sanction until he
proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is imperative to instill
in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to which
he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds.
● Thus, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar.

LORENZO SHIPPING CORP. V. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. NO. 155849, [AUGUST 31, 2011], 672 PHIL 1-20

Doctrine: The Court has long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that
matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and
through legitimate channels.

Facts:
● The petitioners filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt of court for including
allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called Sea Transport Update concerning the Court’s
resolutions dated June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002 issued in G.R. No. 152914 entitled Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines, et al. v. Administrator Oscar Sevilla, Maritime Industry
Authority, et al.
● Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising respondent Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate
adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared
deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153). For clarity, MARINA
issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping
Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994.
● DMAP challenged the constitutionality of EO 213 and commenced in CA a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order
; these actions were subsequently dismissed and such decision was upheld by the Court on appeal.
● DMAP then held a general membership meeting where it reproduced the Sea Transport update
wherein it was averred among others that The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court
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 was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented and Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months. Lorenzo Shipping Corp, et al,
alleges that such publication constitutes indirect contempt.
● Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the respondents,
insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for
patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous, malicious,
tasteless, and baseless innuendo"9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be
influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling
issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months."10
● They averred that the respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy
the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!"

Issue: Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of
court?

Held:
● NO. The Court has long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that
matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms
and through legitimate channels.
● We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has long
adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562
(1970): xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption. xxx Courts and
judges are not sacrosanct.
● They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
● The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done
in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of
the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of
court.
● Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so
near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt,
which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.

SESBRENO VS GARCIA A.M. NO. RTJ-88-272 FEBRUARY 6, 1990

DOCTRINE: Respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is admonished to abstain from intemperate and abrasive
language in his orders. He is further urged to be decisive and resourceful in implementing the processes and
orders of his court. He should dispose of his cases with equal dispatch, whether the parties be menials or
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millionaires, so that the aggrieved party will have no reason to complain that justice is only for the rich and
influential and that the poor must await the rich man’s pleasure.

FACTS:
● This administrative complaint against respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is the culmination of the
complainant’s frustrations with Branch 20 of the RTC of Cebu where in 1985 or five years ago, he filed
a criminal case for estafa against millionaire Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Hermilo Rodis of the notorious
Philfinance caper. Silverio has not been arraigned allegedly because his heart condition will not permit
him to fly to Cebu to be arraigned, although he has flown in and out of the country and is still out of the
country.
● For some cause not shown in the record, even before the defendant was arraigned, Criminal Case
reached the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision directing the Presiding Judge of Branch 20
(then Judge Exaltacion A. Navarro) to set the arraignment and trial of Silverio, Sr. "as soon as
possible". Instead of complying, Judge Navarro dismissed the case. Complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order and numerous other pleadings. However, Judge Navarro retired
without acting on his motion for reconsideration.
● Respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia was appointed to the position vacated by Judge Navarro. Garcia
also refused to act on the motion for reconsideration and other pleadings praying for the immediate
arraignment and trial of Silverio. Finally on August 15, 1988, Judge Garcia issued an order for the
arrest of Silverio and set his arraignment on October 18, 1988.
● The accused filed a motion for postponement which the complainant opposed. Nevertheless, Judge
Garcia granted Silverio’s motion, and made it appear in his order that there had been no objection by
the complainant. The latter filed two manifestations and memoranda objecting to the judge’s statement
in the order. Respondent Judge issued an order chastising Attorney Sesbreño for the insolent,
disrespectful, and contemptuous language of his pleadings and for imputing that he granted Silverio’s
motion for postponement without his knowledge and consent.
● Sesbreño charged respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia with the following misfeasances: 1. Neglect of
duty — for delay in acting on the complainant’s pleadings praying for the arrest and arraignment of
Silverio; 2. Dishonesty or serious misconduct — if the respondent Judge misrepresented in his
Certificates of Service for the months of May or June, 1988 that there were no motions pending
resolution in his sala, so he could collect his salary for that period; 3. Oppression — for warning the
complainant in his Order that the complainant would be declared in contempt of court if he repeats the
allegedly offensive language he used in his two Manifestations/Memoranda, without giving complainant
an opportunity to explain that the language in his pleadings was not insolent, disrespectful, nor
contemptuous; AND 4. Acts of impropriety or intemperance — for accusing the complainant, without
factual basis, of making a veiled threat that he would file administrative charges against Judge Garcia
should the latter decide Criminal Case in favor of Silverio.
● In his comment on the verified complaint, respondent Judge explained that when he assumed the
position of Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988, his predecessor had previously issued an
Order on March 30, 1988, deferring action on all motions and pleadings in the case "pending on
whatever action the Court of Appeals may take on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the private
Respondent." On June 20, 1988, he called complainant’s attention to that order of Judge Navarro. He
explained that the delay in resolving complainant’s motions could not be helped because "the entire
records of the above-entitled case is still with the Court of Appeals in Manila".
● In his order dated June 27, 1988, respondent Judge remarked that the complainant’s Urgent Motion
dated June 26, 1988 was "highly litigious," meaning hostile and provocative.

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 ● Upon receipt of the records from the CA, Judge Garcia issued a warrant for the arrest of Silverio and
his co-defendant. Silverio posted bail. The case was set for arraignment on October 18, 1988. Instead
of appearing in court on the scheduled date, Silverio, through his counsel, Atty. Reyes, asked for
postponement on account of his heart condition.
● The order of the Court dated October 18, 1988 reads as follows: "On the suggestion of Atty. Edwin
Reyes, counsel for the accused Ricardo Silverio, to reset the arraignment and pre-trial to December 7,
1988 at 8:30 in the morning, considering that the accused Silverio is also appearing in Branch 9 of this
Court on said date and without objection on the part of Atty. Raul Sesbreño, the court is constrained to
defer the arraignment of the accused on said date and time. On suggestion also of Atty. Sesbreño, Atty.
Reyes is hereby directed to handcarry the subpoena for his client and also the bondsmen to appear
before this Court on December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the morning."

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Judge Garcia violated the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct?

HELD:
● Postponements are left to the sound discretion of the court. The fact that the postponement exceeded
one month from October 18, 1988 was not such a grave abuse of discretion as to call for disciplinary
action against respondent Judge, it appearing that there was a good reason for resetting the
arraignment of the accused on December 7, 1988 because he (Silverio) would be appearing in another
sala on that date. He would have to make only one trip to Cebu for the two cases. The postponement of
less than two months was a reasonable period.
● Complainant’s allegation that respondent Judge neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch
complainant’s pleadings, urging the immediate arrest and arraignment of Silverio, Sr. is not supported
by the records of the case. Indeed, more than four (4) long years have elapsed since Criminal Case No.
CU-10568 was filed in 1985, but that delay may not be laid at respondent Judge’s doorstep for he
assumed office as Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988 only.
● However, respondent Judge erroneously believed that the records of the case were still in the Court of
Appeals. The fact is that the records were returned by the Court of Appeals to the lower court on
January 9, 1987 yet.
● On August 15, 1988, or two months after Judge Garcia took over from Judge Navarro, he issued a
warrant for the arrest of Silverio. He clearly acted with reasonable promptitude, but since the accused
has not been arraigned up to this time, there is reason for Attorney Sesbreño’s complaint that the court
has not acted with determination and resourcefulness to foil the dilatory maneuvers of the accused and
his lawyers.
● The charge of dishonesty or serious misconduct against Judge Garcia is not worth considering as it is
hypothetical, i.e., if respondent Judge stated in his certificates of service for the months of May and/or
June, 1988 that no motions were pending resolution in his sala. Complainant did not even attempt to
present a shred of evidence to prove this charge.
● Complainant’s charges of oppression and acts of impropriety or intemperance refer to respondent
Judge’s Order of November 29, 1988 which reads in part as follows: "A cursory reading of the
above-mentioned facts will ineluctably show that the court had traversed on the middle ground of the
road in order to satisfy both parties. As to why Atty. Raul Sesbreño filed two (2)
manifestations/memoranda using insolent, disrespectful and contemptuous language impressing the
court that the latter opted in favor of the postponement of this case, without his knowledge and consent
and that he was just compelled to accept because the Court, in effect, handled the postponement in
arbitrary manner is beyond the comprehension of the Court.

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 ● "Parenthetically, the offended party made mentioned to place on records his reaction to postpone the
arraignment, which was not reflected in the transcript of the stenographic notes, especially his veiled
threat, which is covertly contumacious when he said in the two (2) manifestations/memoranda that the
same are filed for: (1) for record purposes; and (2) for reference use in the future in the appropriate
opportuned time. The Court is not naive to understand that should this case be adversed to him, he
would use this incident as a means to vindicate or retaliate against the Presiding Judge. It is already a
matter of public knowledge that movant counsel is in the habit of filing cases against any government
official before whom the investigation or hearing are conducted whenever the orders or decisions are
adverse to him.
● "Let it be known that neither pressure nor threat/influence of any material considerations whatsoever
can dissuade the court from properly exercising and dispensing the administration of justice.
● "To think that one has the absolute monopoly of legal knowledge and virtue is downright officious and a
pretension of the highest magnitude. They say, in heaven one can not find a saint who was never
humble here on earth. x x x
● "Without further digging into the intricacies and insolent words, which are self-evident and
self-explanatory, the Court hereby warns him not to repeat using words of the same import and
meaning, otherwise the Court will be constrained to cite him for contempt of court in order to protect
and enforce its dignity and honor as well as the majesty of the law."
● We have read the two manifestations/memoranda (Annexes C & D) of Attorney Sesbreño, and find
nothing therein which can be described as "insolent, disrespectful and contemptuous" or "covertly
contumacious" or resembling a "veiled threat" against respondent Judge to warrant a warning that he
may be cited for contempt of court if he should repeat words of the same import.
● More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judges not to be onion-skinned when
confronted by dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish for contempt is not a bludgeon to
be used for the purpose of exacting silent submission to their rulings and orders however questionable
or unjust they may be. It should be used only to protect and vindicate the dignity and authority of the
court. Courts should exercise their power to punish for contempt on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment.
● WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is admonished to abstain from intemperate and
abrasive language in his orders. He is further urged to be decisive and resourceful in implementing the
processes and orders of his court. He should dispose of his cases with equal dispatch, whether the
parties be menials or millionaires, so that the aggrieved party will have no reason to complain that
justice is only for the rich and influential and that the poor must await the rich man’s pleasure.

YANGSON V. SALANDANAN

DOCTRINE:
Use of offensive statements in pleadings is direct contempt. the statement in a motion for reconsideration that
the Supreme Court's resolution is "a gross and serious departure" from established precedents, "without
reason or justification, either factual or legal" is offensive and disrespectful and its use is an act of direct
contempt or contempt in facie curiae, which could be summarily punished without hearing.

FACTS:
● In his motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Supreme Court directing the Solicitor General
to investigate the complaint for disbarment against respondent, the latter stated that the Court's
resolution was "a gross and serious departure" from established precedents, "without reason or
65
 justification, either factual or legal." Although such offensive observation appears to be an act of direct
contempt in facie curiae, and could be summarily punished without hearing, the Court afforded
respondent a chance to be heard.
● He apologized and indicated that it was not his intention to show disrespect, but that he was "carried
away by his anxiety or emotion in his effort to call the attention of the court" to what he believed was the
more appropriate and applicable ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salandanan be punished for contempt

HELD:
● YES. Use of offensive statements in pleadings is direct contempt. The Court has scrupulously refrained
from prejudging the merits of respondent Salandanan's defenses in this case so as not to prejudice
him. On the other hand, the complainant's side of the case cannot be overlooked.
● Since the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive
principle and on the corrective rather than retaliatory idea of punishment, and where a lawyer, after
having been required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for using offensive
and disrespectful statement in his motion for reconsideration, apologized for said offensive statement,
and indicated that it was not his intention to show disrespect to the court, but that he was "carried away
by his anxiety or emotion in his effort or desire to call the attention of the Court to" what he believed
was the more applicable ruling.
● The court resolved to admonish counsel to exercise greater care and circumspection in the preparation
of his pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language.

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