1

The Computational Mind

Dr Joe Dewhurst ​- ​[email protected]
Sommersemester 2019 ​(Veranstaltungsnummer:​ ​10139​)

This course provides an introduction to the philosophical theory that the mind should be explained
computationally, and the associated scientific hypothesis that the brain is best understood as a
computer. It will also cover some more general issues in the philosophy of computation, which can
help us to understand what it means to say that the mind or brain are computational. Topics covered
include the history of computational cognitive science and the computational theory of mind, different
ways in which the claim that the mind/brain is a computer can be understood, philosophical and
scientific objections to the computational theory of mind, and some recent debates about the nature of
physical computation.

Topic Overview and Reading List

For each week I have assigned either one or two essential readings, which are ​underlined​. You should
aim to read these papers before the lecture. I have also included several further readings that will get
you started if you are especially interested in a topic, or are planning to write an essay on it, but these
are not essential for the lecture. Some of the papers are quite technical, but don’t worry if you struggle
with them, we will cover all of the important points in the lecture.

If you would like to get a general overview of philosophical issues in computational theories of mind,
I would suggest taking a look at one of the books listed in the further readings for week 1 (the books
by Crane and Clark are perhaps more ‘philosophical’, whereas Piccinini’s book is concerned with
theories of physical computation, and the Sprevak & Colombo volume is more engaged with
empirical cognitive science). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is in general a very reliable
resource, so I would recommend checking it for any topic you are interested in. I am also very happy
to suggest additional readings if there is a particular area you are interested in!

If you have any trouble accessing a paper or book from the list below, please just let me know and I
will provide you with a copy.

1. Introduction and overview​ ​(24.04.19)

The idea that the mind is a computer is now commonplace, but what does it really mean, and
can we test it scientifically? In this first lecture we will discuss our general intuitions about
this proposal, taking as our starting point Turing’s classic ‘test’ for artificial intelligence.
Over the rest of the course we will consider different ways of understanding the claim that the
mind (or brain) is a computer, and different empirical approaches to investigating this claim.

○ Turing, A. 1950. “Computing machinery and intelligence.” ​Mind​, 49: 433-60.

○ Crane, T. 1995/2015. ​The Mechanical Mind.​ Routledge.

○ Clark, A. 2000/2014. ​Mindware. ​Oxford: OUP.
○ Piccinini, G. 2015. ​Physical Computation.​ Oxford: OUP.
○ Sprevak, M. & Colombo, M. (eds.) 2019. ​The Routledge Handbook of the
Computational Mind​. Routledge.
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2. NO CLASS ​(01.05.19)

3. Computation before computationalism​ ​(08.05.19)

The idea that the mind might be a computer has a rich scientific and philosophical prehistory,
but only became explicitly formulated in the middle of the 20th century, by a number of
figures associated with the cybernetics movement. Of particular importance were Turing’s
formalisation of the idea of computation as a purely mechanical process, and McCulloch &
Pitt’s proposal that neural activity could be treated as a kind of ‘logical calculus’.

○ Turing, A. 1936. “On computable numbers, with an application to the

Entscheidungsproblem.”​ Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society​, 42/1:
230-65.
○ McCulloch, W. & Pitts, W. 1948. “A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in
nervous activity.” ​The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics​, 5/4: 115-33.

○ Abraham, T. H. 2019. “Cybernetics.” In Sprevak & Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge

Handbook of the Computational Mind. ​Routledge.
○ Dupuy, J.P. 1994/2001. ​On the Origins of Cognitive Science​. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
○ Isaac, A. 2019. “Computational thought from Descartes to Lovelace.” In Sprevak &
Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. ​Routledge.
○ Petzold, C. 2008. ​The Annotated Turing​. Wiley.
○ Piccinini, G. 2004. “The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain.” ​Synthese​,
141/2: 175-215.
○ von Neumann, J. 1958. ​The Computer and the Brain.​ New Haven: Yale University
Press.

4. Classical computationalism and computational functionalism​ ​(15.05.19)

The original computational theory of mind was developed in philosophical work by Hilary
Putnam and his student Jerry Fodor, inspired by (or perhaps inspiring) the cognitive
scientific research programme now known as ‘classical computationalism’. This theory,
sometimes called computational functionalism, claimed that to have a mind is to be a
mechanical system with the correct kind of functional organisation, understood in terms of a
computer implementing a program.

○ Simon, H. & Newell, A. 1970. “Human Problem Solving.” ​American Psychologist,​

26/2: 145-59.
○ Piccinini, G. 2010. “The Mind as Neural Software?” ​Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research,​ 81/2: 269-311.

○ Aizawa, K. 2019. “Turing-equivalent computation at the ‘conception’ of cognitive

science.” In Sprevak & Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the
Computational Mind. R​ outledge.
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○ Bechtel. W. & Shagrir, O. 2015 “The non-redundant contributions of Marr’s three

levels of analysis for explaining information processing mechanisms.” ​Topics in
Cognitive Science​, 7/2: 312-22.
○ Fodor, J. 1975. ​The Language of Thought. C ​ ambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
○ Marr, D. 1982/2010. ​Vision​. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
○ Miłkowski, M. 2018. “From computer metaphor to computational modeling: the
evolution of computationalism.” ​Minds and Machines,​ 28: 515-41.
○ Putnam, H. 1960. “Minds and Machines.” In Hook (ed.), ​Dimensions of Mind.​ New
York: University of New York Press.
○ Putnam, H. 1967a. “The Mental Life of Some Machines.” in Castañeda (ed.),
Intentionality, Minds and Perception​, Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
○ Putnam, H. 1967b. “Psychological Predicates” In Captain & Merrill (eds.), ​Art, Mind
and Religion​. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
○ Rescorla, M. 2009. “Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought.” ​The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science​, 60/2: 377-407.
○ Samuels, R. “Classical computational models.” In Sprevak & Colombo (eds.), ​The
Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. ​Routledge.
○ Shagrir, O. 2005. “The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism.” In
Ben-Menahem (ed.), ​Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus).​
Cambridge: CUP.
○ Shagrir, O. 2010. “Marr on computational-level theories.” ​Philosophy of Science,​ 77:
477-500.

5. Connectionism and neural networks ​(22.05.19)

The connectionist research programme (re-)emerged in the 1980s as a critical response to the
classical approach, having lain dormant since the 1960s. It took inspiration from biological
models of neural processing, and argued that cognition should be understood in terms of the
activity of low level, ‘sub-symbolic’ units (i.e., neural networks). This approach was criticised
by traditionalists (include Fodor) for being unable to capture basic aspects of natural
language, such as systematicity and compositionality, although it has also gone on to inspire
the deep neural network approach that dominates contemporary artificial intelligence
research.

○ Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z. 1988. “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical

analysis.” ​Cognition​,​ ​28/1-2: 3-71.

○ Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. 1991. ​Connectionism and the mind: An introduction

to parallel processing in networks. ​Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
○ Buckner, C. & Garson, J. 2019. “Connectionism and post-connectionist models.” In
Sprevak & Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind.
Routledge.
○ Chalmers, D. 1993. “Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn
Were Wrong.” ​Philosophical Psychology,​ 6/3: 305-19.
○ Clark, A. 1993. ​Associative Engines.​ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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○ Copeland, J. & Proudfoot, D. 1996. “On Alan Turing’s Anticipation of

Connectionism.” ​Synthese​, 108: 361-77.
○ Hinton, G.E. 1992. “How Neural Networks Learn from Experience.” ​Scientific
American​, 267/3: 144-51.
○ Rumelhart, D. & McClelland, J., ​et al.​ 1986. ​Parallel Distributed Processing, vol. I​.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
○ Stinson, C. 2019. “Explanation and connectionist models.” In Sprevak & Colombo
(eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. ​Routledge.

6. Embodied cognition and morphological computation ​(29.05.19)

From around the early 1990s there have been a number of ‘alternative’ approaches to
computational theories of cognition, often emphasising the role of physical embodiment in the
problem-solving capacities of natural cognitive systems (i.e. humans and other animals).
While some of the proponents of this approach have been opposed to the computational
theory of mind, here has also been a related interest in the computational capacities inherent
to physical systems, so-called ‘morphological computation’.

○ Brooks, R. 1991. “Intelligence without representation.” ​Artificial Intelligence​, 47/1-3:

139-59.
○ Milkowski, M. 2018. “Morphological Computation: Nothing but Physical
Computation.” ​Entropy​, 20/12: 942.

○ Braitenburg, V. 1984. ​Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology.​ Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press.
○ Brooks, R. 1986. “A Robust Layered Control System for a Mobile Robot.” ​IEEE
Journal on Robotics and Automation​, 2/1: 14-23.
○ Brooks, R. 1999. ​Cambrian Intelligence​. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
○ Holland, O. 2003. “The First Biologically Inspired Robots.” ​Robotica​, 21: 351-63.
○ Müller, V.C. & Hoffman, M. 2017. “What Is Morphological Computation? On How
the Body Contributes to Cognition and Control.” ​Artificial Life,​ 23: 1-24.
○ Paul, C. 2004. “Morphology and Computation.” In Schaal ​et al ​(eds.)​, From Animals
to Animats​ ​8​. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
○ Pfeifer, R. & Gómez, G. “Morphological Computation – Connecting Brain, Body,
and Environment.” In Sendhoff ​et al.​ (eds.), ​Creating Brain-Like Intelligence​.
Springer.
○ Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch., E. 1991/2017. ​The Embodied Mind​. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
○ Walter, W.G. 1950. “An Electromechanical Animal.” ​Dialectica,​ ​ 4​ /3: 2016-13.
○ Webb, B. 1995. “Using Robots to Model Animals: A Cricket Test.” ​Robotics and
Autonomous Systems​, 16/2-4:117-34

7. Mapping accounts and pancomputationalism​ ​(05.06.19)

In order to decide whether a physical system such as the brain is a computer, and to
determine what it computes, we first need to establish some more general criteria for
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computational implementation. The most basic approach to this question is to establish a

‘mapping’ between an abstract computer and the physical system that is said to implement it,
but it turns out that this can have some unintuitive (and perhaps undesirable) consequences,
such as being forced to say that every physical system computes.

○ Putnam, H. 1988. “Appendix.” In ​Representation and Reality​. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.
○ Chalmers, D. J. 1996. “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?”
Synthese​, 108/3: 309-33.

○ Anderson, N. & Piccinini, G. Manuscript. “Pancomputationalism and the

Computational Description of Physical Systems.” Available at
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12812/
○ Chalmers, D.J. 2011. “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.”
Journal of Cognitive Science​, 12: 323-57.
○ Chrisley, R.L. 1995. “Why everything doesn’t realize every computation.”​ Minds and
Machines​, 4: 310-33.
○ Copeland, B.J. 1996. “What is computation?” ​Synthese,​ 108/3: 335-59.
○ Scheutz, M. 2012 “What it is not to implement a computation: A critical analysis of
Chalmers’ notion of implementation.” ​Journal of Cognitive Science​, 13: 75-106.
○ Schiller, H.I. 2018. “The Swapping Constraint.” ​Minds and Machines,​ 28/3: 605-22.
○ Schweizer, P. 2019. “Computation in Physical Systems: a Normative Mapping
Account.” In Berkich & d'Alfonso (eds.), ​On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific
Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence​. Springer.
○ Sprevak, M. 2012. “Three challenges to Chalmers on computational implementation.”
Journal of Cognitive Science​, 13/2: 107-43.
○ Sprevak, M. 2019. “Triviality arguments about implementation.” In Sprevak &
Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. R ​ outledge.
○ Millhouse, T. 2019. “A Simplicity Criterion for Physical Computation.” ​The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science​, 70/1: 153-78.
○ Piccinini, G. 2007. “Computational modelling vs. Computational explanation.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy,​ ​ 8​ 5/1: 93-115.

8. Semantic accounts and mental representation​ ​(12.06.19)

A common addition to the mapping accounts discussed in the previous week is to require that
every computational system is also a semantic system, i.e. a system whose states and
processes are in some sense meaningful. This could potentially limit the number of physical
systems that qualify as computational, and also has the added benefit of accommodating some
common intuitions about the representational capacities of mental states and processes.
However, it is somewhat unclear what it means for a physical system to be inherently
semantic, or whether this could provide the basis for an objective theory of physical
computation.

○ Sprevak, M. 2010. “Computation, individuation, and the received view on

representation.” ​Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A,​ 41/3: 260-70.
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○ Egan, F. 2014. “How to think about mental content.” ​Philosophical Studies,​ 170:
115-35.

○ Fodor, J. 1981. “The Mind-Body Problem.” ​Scientific American​, 244: 114-25.

○ Fodor, J. 1987. ​Psychosemantics. ​Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
○ O’Brien, G. 2011. “Defending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive
science.” ​Journal of Cognitive Science, ​12: 381-99.
○ Piccinini, G. 2008. “Computation Without Representation.” ​Philosophical Studies,​
137/2: 205-41.
○ Rescorla, M. 2012. “How to integrate representation into computational modelling,
and why we should.”​ Journal of Cognitive Science,​ 13: 1-38.
○ Rescorla, M. 2014. “The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation.” ​Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research,​ 88/1: 173-208.
○ Schweizer, P. 2017. “Cognitive Computation sans Representation.” In Powers (ed.),
Philosophy and Computing.​ Springer.
○ Shagrir, O. 2001. “Content, Computation and Externalism.” ​Mind​, 110/438: 369-400.
○ Shagrir, O. 2018. “In defense of the semantic view of computation.” ​Synthese,​ online
first: ​https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01921-z

9. Mechanistic accounts and computational individuation​ ​(19.06.19)

The ‘received view’ that computation must involve representation has recently come under
attack from a family of mechanistic accounts, which argue that computational states and
processes can be individuated without reference to their semantic content (or lack thereof).
These accounts form part of a broader trend towards mechanistic explanation in philosophy
of biology and cognitive science, and thus are vulnerable to some of the same criticisms, such
as being unable to capture important aspects of actual scientific explanations.

○ Piccinini, G. 2007. “Computing Mechanisms.”​ Philosophy of Science​, 74: 501-26.

○ Chirimuuta, M. 2014. “Minimal models and canonical neural computations.”
Synthese​,​ ​191/2: 127-53.

○ Coelho Mollo, D. 2018. “Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation.”

Synthese​, 195/8: 3477-97.
○ Dewhurst, J. 2018. “Individuation Without Representation.” ​The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science​, 69/1: 103-16.
○ Glennan, S. 2002 “Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation.” ​Philosophy of Science​, 64:
342-53.
○ Haimovici, S. 2013. “A Problem for the Mechanistic Account of Computation.”
Journal of Cognitive Science​, 14: 151-81
○ Kaplan, D. 2011. “Explanation and Description in Computational Neuroscience.”
Synthese​, 183: 339-73.
○ Lee, J. 2018. “Mechanisms, Wide Functions, and Content: Towards a Computational
Pluralism.” ​The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science​, online first:
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy061
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○ Machamer, P., Darden, L. & Craver, C. 2000. “Thinking about Mechanisms.”

Philosophy of Science​ 67: 1-25.
○ Milkowski, M. 2011. “Beyond formal structure: A mechanistic perspective on
computation and implementation.” ​Journal of Cognitive Science,​ 12: 359-79.
○ Miłkowski, M. 2013. ​Explaining the Computational Mind​. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.

10. Neural computation and the digital/analog distinction ​(26.06.19)

If the brain is a computer, what kind of computations does it perform? McCulloch & Pitt’s
original proposal was that the firing activity of a neuron could be treated as a kind of digital
logic gate, but it may be that there are other, non-digital properties of the brain that are
computationally relevant. More generally it is still unclear what the functionally relevant
properties or components of the brain might be, and thus in what sense it might compute.

○ Piccinini, G. & Bahar, S. 2013. “Neural Computation and the Computational Theory
of Cognition.” ​Cognitive Science,​ 37/3: 453-88.
○ Cao, R. 2014. “Signaling in the Brain: In Search of Functional Units.” ​Philosophy of
Science,​ 81/5: 891-901.

○ Beebe, C. 2016. “Model-Based Computation.” In Amos & Conondon (eds.),

Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation​. Springer.
○ Cao, R. 2019. “Computational explanations and neural coding.” In Sprevak &
Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind​. Routledge.
○ Chirimuuta, M. 2018. “Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and
Non-causal.” ​The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,​ 69/3: 849-80.
○ Irvine, L. 2019. “Simulation in computational neuroscience.” In Sprevak & Colombo
(eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind.​ Routledge.
○ Maley, C. 2011. “Analog and digital, continuous and discrete.” ​Philosophical Studies,​
155/1: 117-31.
○ Maley, C. 2018. “Towards Analog Neural Computation.” ​Minds and Machines​, 28/1:
77-91.
○ Maley, C. 2018. “Continuous Neural Spikes and Information Theory.” ​Review of
Philosophy and Psycholo​ gy,​ online first: h​ ttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0412-5
○ Marr, D. & Poggio, T. 1976. “From understanding computation to understanding
neural circuitry.” ​AI Memo 357​. Cambridge, MA: MIT Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory.
○ Zednik, C. 2019. ​“Computational cognitive neuroscience.” In Sprevak & Colombo
(eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind.​ Routledge.

11. Anti-computationalism and dynamical systems theory ​(03.07.19)

Despite the apparent computational consensus in contemporary in contemporary cognitive
neuroscience, the claim that the brain or mind is a computer is still quite controversial, both
philosophically and scientifically. Some of this has to do with disagreements about what it
means to compute, or what it would entail if we accepted that the mind was a computer. Even
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if one accepts the consensus view, it is still worth considering these criticisms and
counter-arguments, as they can help us to clarify our claims and commitments.

○ Van Gelder, T. 1995. “What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?” ​The Journal
of Philosophy,​ 92/7: 345-81.
○ Faries, F. & Chemero, A. 2018. “Dynamic information processing.” In Sprevak &
Colombo (eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind​. Routledge.

○ Beer, R. 1995. “A Dynamical Systems Perspective on Agent-Environment

Interaction.” ​Artificial Intelligence,​ 72:173-215.
○ Beer, R. 2000. “Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive Science.” ​Trends in Cognitive
Sciences​, 4: 91-9.
○ Chemero, A. 2000. “Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance.” ​Philosophy
of Science, 6​ 7/4: 625-47.
○ Chemero, A. & Silberstein, M. 2008. “After the philosophy of mind: Replacing
scholasticism with science.” ​Philosophy of Science​, 75/1: 1-27.
○ Eliasmith, C. 2010. “How we ought to describe computation in the brain.” ​Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science​, 41: 313-20.
○ Kaplan, D. & Craver, C. 2011 “The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and
Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.” ​Philosophy of
Science, ​78/4: 601-27.
○ Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch., E. 1991/2017. ​The Embodied Mind​. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
○ Villalobos, M. & Dewhurst, J. 2017. “Why post-cognitivism does not (necessarily)
entail anti-computationalism.” ​Adaptive Behavior,​
https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712317710496
○ Zednik, C. 2011. “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.” ​Philosophy of Science,
78/2: 238-63.

12. Wide computationalism and the extended mind​ ​(10.07.19)

If the mind is a computer, and computers are medium-independent, then why think that the
mind must be confined to the brain? This kind of argument, while it might sound far-fetched,
is something that we must seriously consider if we want to take seriously the computational
functionalist theory of mind. If you find the conclusions of this argument unpalatable, you
might think that it constitutes a ​reductio​ argument against the computational theory of mind,
or at least requires a response of some kind.

○ Wilson, R.W. 1994. “Wide Computationalism.” ​Mind​, 103/411: 351-72.

○ Clark, C. & Chalmers, D.J. 1998. “The extended mind.” ​Analysis,​ 58: 7-19.

○ Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 2001. “The bounds of cognition.” ​Philosophical

Psychology,​ 14/1: 43-64.
○ Hurley, S. 2010. “The Varieties of Externalism.” In Menary (ed.), ​The Extended
Mind​. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
○ Hutchins, E. 1995. ​Cognition in the Wild.​ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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○ Sprevak, M. 2009. “Extended Cognition and Functionalism.” ​Journal of Philosophy,​

106/9: 503-27.
○ Menary, R. (ed.). ​The Extended Mind​. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
○ Miłkowski, M. ​et al​. 2018. “From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent
Revolution.” ​Frontiers in Psychology,​ ​https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02393
○ Wells, A.J. 1998. “Turing’s analysis of computation and theories of cognitive
architecture.” ​Cognition​, 22/3: 269-94.
○ Wheeler, M. 2010. “In Defense of Extended Functionalism.” In Menary (ed.), ​The
Extended Mind.​ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

13. NO CLASS​ ​(17.07.19)

14. Predictive coding, free energy, and the Bayesian brain​ ​(24.07.19)
The recent literature in philosophy of mind and cognition has been dominated by discussion
of the ‘Bayesian brain’, i.e. the proposal that the brain (and perhaps the mind) should be
understood as implementing a form of Bayesian inference. This proposal has its roots in the
connectionist approach we discussed previously, and was first developed as a model of visual
processing, but has since been generalised to apply to the whole of the brain, and perhaps
beyond.

○ Clark, A. 2013. “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of
cognitive science.” ​Behavioral and Brain Sciences​, 36/3: 181-204.

○ Bogacz, R. 2017. “A tutorial on the free-energy framework for modelling perception

and learning.” ​Journal of Mathematical Psychology,​ 76/B: 198-211.
○ Buckley, C., Kim, C.S., McGregor, S., & Seth, A. 2017. “The free energy principle
for action and perception: A mathematical review.” ​Journal of Mathematical
Psychology,​ 81: 55-79.
○ Clark, A. 2015. ​Surfing Uncertainty.​ Oxford: OUP.
○ Colombo, M., Elkin, L., & Hartmann, S. 2018. “Being Realist about Bayes, and the
Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.” ​The British Journal for Philosophy of
Science,​ online first: ​https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy059
○ Hohwy, J. 2013. ​The Predictive Mind.​ Oxford: OUP.
○ Howhy, J. 2019. “Prediction error minimization in the brain.” In Sprevak & Colombo
(eds.), ​The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind.​ Routledge.
○ Metzinger, T. & Wiese, W. 2017. ​Philosophy and Predictive Processing. ​MIND
Group: ​https://predictive-mind.net/
○ Rao, R.P.N. & Ballard, D.H. 1999. “Predictive coding in the visual cortex.” ​Nature
Neuroscience​, 2/1: 79-87.
○ Spratling, M.W. 2017. “A review of predictive coding algorithms.” ​Brain and
Cognition​, 112: 92-7.
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Assessment
The course will be assessed by ​a single essay submitted at the end of the semester, which should
be at least 15-20 pages long, in 12pt font with 1.5 line spacing (approximately 5000-6000 words).
The deadline for submitting an essay is September 23rd, and the registration period this semester is
from July 1st-12th. If you are thinking of writing an essay for this course and have any questions,
please come and talk to me before the registration period.

You are free to choose the topic of your essay, although you should discuss the title with me prior to
starting work on it. I have included some suggested titles for each week below, but you are also
welcome to come up with something different (just make sure to discuss it with me first!)

1. Can a computer think?

2. What was the cybernetic conception of computation, and how can it help us today?
3. Can classical computationalism solve the mind-body problem?
4. How, if at all, can connectionism account for the systematicity of thought?
5. Is morphological computation really a distinctive kind of computation?
6. Could a modified mapping account avoid pancomputationalism?
7. Does the semantic account provide an objective way of determining which systems compute?
8. Can the mechanistic account provide a satisfactory individuation of computational states?
9. Is neural computation digital or analog?
10. Are dynamical explanations necessarily non-computational?
11. Does the possibility of extended cognition threaten computational functionalism?
12. What does it mean to say that the brain might be approximating Bayesian inference?

My marking criteria are as follows:

Very good:​ (1.0), (1.3)

● A convincing argument that explicitly addresses the question and goes beyond the course
material.
● A transparent and well-designed structure that clearly supports the argument.
● Detailed and original critical analysis, considering and responding to possible objections.
● Strong familiarity with the literature, and evidence of independent research.

Good: ​(1.7), (2.0), (2.3)

● A convincing argument that explicitly addresses the question.
● A transparent structure, but not especially elegant or helpful to the reader.
● Strong critical analysis, with some evidence of originality and considering possible
objections.
● Familiarity with the literature, although lacking in depth or comprehensiveness.

Satisfactory: ​(2.7), (3.0), (3.3)

● A moderately convincing argument, but not always clear or relevant to the question.
● Some structure, but unclear or occasionally hard to follow.
● Critical analysis is mostly relevant, but lacking in originality or clarity.
● Some knowledge of the literature.
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Pass:​ (3.7), (4.0)

● An identifiable argument, but not at all convincing or relevant.
● Some structure, but still basically unsatisfactory or unclear.
● Some analysis present, but frequently unclear or irrelevant.
● Some knowledge of the literature, but lacking in crucial respects.

Fail:​ (5.0)
● No clear argument, or unrelated to the question.
● Very little structure, such that it is hard to follow the essay.
● Poor or irrelevant analysis throughout.
● Little or no knowledge of the literature.