PSDSA v. de Jesus - Quasi-Legislative Power: June 3, 2018
PSDSA v. de Jesus - Quasi-Legislative Power: June 3, 2018
Petitioner: The Public Schools District Supervisors Association (PSDSA), with its officers and
members
Respondents: Hon. Edilberto C. De Jesus, Department Secretary, DepEd, and The Department
Of Budget And Management
SUMMARY:
RA 9155
enacted to change the governance of DepEd due to the evolutio of learning process
Enacted to improve the managemebt of DepEd
retained the position of the petitioners as district supervisors with limited responsibilities:
1. providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
2. curricula supervision; and
3. performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.
PSDSA
originally has the admin supervision over the elem and public high schools over their
jurisdiction (with respect to both affairs/admin of the schools and curriculum)
contend that the IRR implemented by DepEd expanded and modified the provisions of RA
9155, particularly:
1. limiting the admin supervision of the district supervisors (petitioners); and
2. the donations, gifts (sec 6.2(11) of IRR) was a modification of RA 9155 as such report
must be reported to them as district supervisors and not only to division superintendent
(rulling is the last part of the digest)
FACTS
Ever since DepEd was founded, its management had been so centralized in the Manila
office. Schools in the national, regional, and division levels merely followed and
implemented the orders and memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the
evolution of the learning process and the onset of information technology, there was a need
for a radical change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the
management of the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was the abolition
of the office of the district supervisor.
Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on Education, authored
Senate Bill No. 2191, the thrust of which was to change the existing management style and
focus on the schools where the teaching-learning process occurs. The bill was intended to
highlight shared governance in the different levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish
authority, accountability, and responsibility for achieving higher learning outcomes.
RA 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) became a law in accordance with
Sec. 27(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have a
director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and support,
planning, administrative and fiscal services.
The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district
is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion.
However, the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor were limited.
The schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or
supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts.
Under Sec. 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to “promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations within 90 days after the approval of the Act, provided
that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within 2 years” after
such approval.
Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, PSDSA
sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) National
Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the following
administrative issues:
PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation with the
district supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs be considered
in formulating the rules and regulations to be urged by the DepEd. However, the Secretary
failed to reply.
DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus thereafter issued DECS Office Order No. 1 which
constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9155.
PSDSA led a petition for prohibition and mandamus with SC.
Contentions of the PETITIONERS (PSDSA):
IRR of RA 9155 expanded and modified provisions which are diametrically opposed
to the letter and spirit of the subject law. They argue that the said law should be read in
harmony with the existing educational laws.
The act of the DepEd in removing the petitioners’ administrative supervision over
elementary schools and its principals within his/her district and converting his/her
administrative function to that of performing staff for the division is a gross violation of
RA 9155;
Ultimately, petitioners allege that by the implementation of the IRR they are stripped of
their administrative functions.
7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited responsibilities, and
that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by any
of those responsibilities. The Education Secretary is the disciplining authority in the
DepEd, with the regional directors acting as the disciplining authority in their respective
regions.
As to petitioners’ gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among those school
heads who should report when “[a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants x x x”
the OSG avers that this reportorial function is “directory” and merely for “convenience.”
RULING:
Administrative bodies are allowed to implement policies.
It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.
It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of
subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling
in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and
purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or
actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of
laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not
only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and
the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those
needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized
capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
Disposition: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid, except Section 6.2(11), Rule
VI thereof which provides that “donations or grants shall be reported only to the division
superintendents.” Such donations or grants must also be reported to the appropriate school district
supervisors, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9155. Petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES:
Whether the IRR for RA 9155 is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power of DepEd. – PARTLY
YES (except Sec. 2(11), Rule VI regarding the reporting of donation)
Senate deliberations showed the intent to divest from the district supervisor any administrative
supervision
As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the district supervisors
were divested of any administrative supervision over elementary and public high schools.
Senator Aquino-Oreta’s comment:
“Mr. President, may I just explain. There are two school supervisors. One is for the academic
function and the other is for the administrative function. As such, if these two supervisors will
dictate to the principals, then our thrust in reducing the level of bureaucracy might not bemet. Also,
the thrust of this governance bill really is to flesh out the importance of the school as the heart of
education here. In that heart, we have the teacher, the student, and the school head.
What we are trying to do here is to bring to the forefront the school itself. In fact, right now, there
is a move in the DECS to do away with the school supervisor in charge of administrative and leave
that function to the principal. If the principal, the school head will be dictated upon by these two
school supervisors, we might not be able to achieve what we want to do here putting to the forefront
the school itself. Meaning, putting to the forefront the school head, the teacher, and the student.”
x x x
“But precisely, Mr. President, we are not doing that, we are not taking them out. What we are
saying is for the school supervisor to focus on the curriculum because in the administration of the
affairs of the school, we are saying that the principal knows best how to administer or how to run
the school better. And so, we are saying here that school supervisors will be there contrary to the
view of that ADB study. We will maintain them, but the focus of the school supervisors will be on
the curriculum of the schools.”
Statutory Construction
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.
Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district supervisor. Congress
would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict
or limit its meaning and confine its terms only to those expressly enumerated. Courts may
not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include situations not
provided nor intended by Congress.
The submission of the OSG, that the schools district
supervisors have the administrative supervision over school heads, is more in accord with
the law, to wit:
Section 7 of RA 9155, on School District Level, pertinently provides that “a school district shall
have a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion,” and that the schools
district supervisor shall be responsible for: (1) “(p)roviding professional and instructional advice
and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the
district [or] cluster thereof”; (2) “(c)urricula supervision”; and, (3) “(p)erforming such other
functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities.”
A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District Supervisor has limited responsibilities, and
that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by
responsibility nos. 1 and 2. Neither is that power covered by the directive that the District
Supervisor shall have an office staff for program promotion. The only logical conclusion,
therefore, that can be derived from the aforesaid enumeration of responsibilities is that the
District Supervisor may only exercise administrative supervision over ESPs when such
function is assigned by proper authorities. And, since the DepEd Secretary specifically
declared through the IRR of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall not exercise
administrative supervision over the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized, petitioners cannot
complain against the said declaration. On this score, it is settled that the intent of the statute
is the law.
Needless to say, Section 7, on Division Level, further provides that the School Division
Superintendent shall have authority, accountability and responsibility for, among others,
“(s)upervising the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary and integrated
schools, and learning centers.” To claim, therefore, that the District Supervisor has
administrative supervision over the ESPs would also violate the above-quoted provision.”
Sections 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V of the IRR are valid.
The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155.
Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place,
and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the
division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads.
A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision
of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand,
supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools and learning centers.
The Court likewise declares that the last paragraph of Section 4.3 of the IRR, stating that
the regional director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching
personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions
under R.A. No. 4670 (“Magna Carta for Public School Teachers”) does not contravene
R.A. No. 9155. Indeed, the IRR merely reiterates the DECS Rules of Procedure, DECS
Order No. 33. nd pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code.
(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants in accordance with existing laws and policy
of the Department for the purpose of upgrading teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies,
improving and expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and equipment.
Such donations or grants must be reported to the division superintendents.
We agree with petitioners’ contention that, under the law, donations and grants must be
reported to the appropriate district supervisors and not only to the division superintendents.
The use in the law of the word “must” is an expression of the mandatory nature of the
reporting of donations and grants to district supervisors. The reason for the provision is
that such grants and donations which are intended to upgrade teachings/learning
facilitators’ competencies, improve and expand school facilities, and provide instructional
materials and equipment will assist the school district supervisors in the performance of
their duties and responsibilities under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, and submit
appropriate recommendations to the proper administrative officers.