Economic Developments and Outlook Budget 2018
Economic Developments and Outlook Budget 2018
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C
onflicts are defined as situations in which two or more parties perceive
that their goals and/or interests are in direct contradiction with one
another and decide to act on the basis of this perception. This definition
suggests two conditions for eruption of the conflict: identification of the contra-
diction and the decision to act on this basis. Accordingly, it is not enough that each
of the parties will identify the contradiction in goals and/or interests: In order for
a conflict to erupt, it is necessary that at least one party will decide to act upon
this contradiction and bring it into the light, at least in a verbal expression. This
means that conflicts may erupt also when in the first stage only one side perceives
that its goals and/or interests are in direct contradiction with the goals or interests
of another party and decides to act on the basis of this perception. Such a move
causes the other side to note the contradiction and act as well, leading to the surge
of the conflict.
Conflicts are inseparable and significant part of human life on every level of
interaction; there are interpersonal conflicts, intragroup, intergroup, interorgani-
zational, intrasocietal, and interethnic as well as international conflicts and even
intercivilization conflicts—to note the most salient ones as we move from the micro
to mega conflicts (Galtung, 2004). They take place constantly and continuously
because it is unavoidable that human beings will not have disagreements over
goals, interests, values, and/or beliefs. It is just simply natural that people, as indi-
viduals and groups, who differ in aspects such as belief systems that include aspira-
tions, values, goals, needs, as well as in ways of socialization, cultural environments,
or political and economic systems will have conflicts over almost every tangible or
nontangible element of desire.
In this vein it is necessary to say that not all the conflicts have negative meaning
and are negative in their nature. Conflicts are also necessary for enabling progress
and innovation as human beings come with new ideas or inventions that contradict
old stagnated dogmas, values, habits, or practices. Conflicts also erupt to abolish
various types of immorality that human beings practice such as discrimination,
injustice, inequality, exploitation, occupation, and even ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide. Often only through conflicts groups can achieve what they deserve according
to international laws or moral codes of the international community. This is so
because very rarely groups willingly provide to other groups with what these groups
* I would like to express gratitude to Shai Fuxman, Nimrod Goren, Dana Guy, Dennis Kahn, Shiri
Landman, Rafi Nets-Zehngut, Amiram Raviv, Nimord Rosler, Ofer Shinar, and Doron Tsur, who
reviewed the earlier draft of the chapter and provided valuable comments.
ought to have according to these laws and codes. Many of the attempts to correct
injustice are then met with strong resistance and rejection which lead to serious
conflicts. Moreover, there is need to note that conflicts differ in their symmetrical–
asymmetrical dimension on various parameters. The two distinguished parameters
refer to the military–economic–political might that the sides in conflict have and to
the level and extent of violation of moral codes that the sides in conflict practice.
On both parameters there might be differences between the rival sides. In general,
it can be said that those are not the conflicts themselves which necessarily reflect
the ugly side of the humane species, but some of their causes and some of the ways
they are managed.
society members are aware that this preoccupation is shared by other members
who also identify with the collective (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe,
2004). With this awareness, society members do not have to experience the conflict
directly in order to feel that they are part of it. As members of a society they are
exposed to the events of the conflict via various channels of communication and
societal institutions and thus become vicarious participants of all aspects of the
conflict through the process of identification with their society.
The care and concern for the well being of the society or even direct participa-
tion does not mean that all society members must agree with the way the conflict is
managed. Some of them may not even support the goals of the conflict. They may
disagree on various issues related to conflict and carry out debates and activities
that reflect these disagreements. These disagreements may even lead to deep schism
reflecting intrasocietal conflicts that may evolve at any phase of the macro inter
societal conflict.
Socio-psychological Perspective
The analysis of the macro level intergroup conflicts involves many different per-
spectives such as, for example, historical, political, sociological, economic, or cul-
tural ones. Each of these perspectives offers different concepts, theoretical
frameworks, models or even ways of collecting data that provide unique outlooks
and emphases. Thus, the historical perspective focuses on the historiography of the
outbreak of the conflict and its continuation, attempting to describe the course of
the events in most accurate way; or the political perspective tries to elucidate the
role of political systems and dynamics in conflicts.
However, it seems to me that first of all there is a need to recognize that those
are human beings who initiate conflicts, take part in them, manage them, some-
times peacefully resolve them and even may reconcile. Human beings perceive,
evaluate, infer and act. These human psychological behaviors* are integral parts of
conflicts’ interactions as human beings are the only actors on the conflict stage. As
noted, those are human beings who decide to disseminate the idea about the neces-
sity of conflicts, to mobilize societies’ members to participate in them, to socialize
their children to continue them, to carry them violently, or to reject their peaceful
resolution (see Chapter 1).
Mobilization is a necessary condition for carrying out a successful macro level
intergroup conflict. Mobilization is an act of deliberate recruitment of society
members to be involved in the causes of the conflict. It can be seen as a kind of
persuasion process with the goal of convincing group members to support the
conflict and participate in it actively. The necessary basic precondition for mobili-
zation is that individuals who are society members will greatly identify with their
group, in general, and specifically with the posed conflict’s goals of their society
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001; see also Chapter 5). Moreover, mobilization means
not only that individuals identify with the group and accept the goals related to
* The term behavior is used in the most general psychological way to refer to perception, cognition,
experiencing affect and emotions and acting.
conflicts, but also approve the direction of the actions that the group takes and are
ready to carry some kind of action themselves on behalf of the group which often
involves killing the rival and at the same time, readiness to be killed (Klandermans,
1988). This process is carried through messages that include beliefs which are
relevant, concrete, appeal to the social identity, negate the present situation as
unacceptable, note important cherished values are threatening and arouse strong
emotions. It is clear that harsh and violent conflicts cannot evolve and gain
strength without the participation of at least some of the group members in
conflict, which is manifested by their total devotion and readiness to sacrifice
their lives (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).
In view of the premises stated above, the study of conflicts cannot take place
without the contribution of the field social psychology. More explicitly, social
psychology provides the core knowledge that is necessary to form the founda-
tions for the understanding of the conflicts’ dynamics and their peace making.
Socio-psychological perspective does not try to describe what the “real” course
of the conflict was, but rather to analyze what people think and feel in this situ-
ation, as this is extremely important for the understanding of why they act in the
particular way. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey (1962) rightly noted years ago
that “man acts upon his ideas, his irrational acts no less than his rational acts are
guided by what he thinks, what he believes, what he anticipates. However bizarre
the behavior of men, tribes, or nations may appear to an outsider, to the men, to
the tribes, to the nations their behavior makes sense in terms of their own world
views” (p. 17).
This means that people behave in a conflict according to their psychological
repertoire which includes not only those beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and intentions
of behaviors acquired in the course of the conflict, but also according to the ones
that were acquired over a long period of time in different contexts, before the con-
flict erupted. Various past experiences and acquired knowledge also have determi-
native influence on the manner in which a collective acts in a conflict situation.
Thus the socio-psychological approach tries to reveal these thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors that are underlying the evolvement and maintenance of the conflict as
well as later its eventual resolution and reconciliation. Thus, also a possibility of
peace building must also be initiated in human minds first. This idea should then
be propagated and adopted by the same human beings who were engaged in initi-
ating and maintaining the conflict.
viewed as one of the salient indications of intergroup conflict and violence (Cantril,
1941; Harding, Kutner, Proshansky, & Chein, 1954; Newcomb, 1950). However,
this state changed with time. Presently, the study of prejudice is omitting deeper
analysis of conflicts and their resolution (Stephan, 1985).
In the mid-twentieth century, when the modern social psychology evolved, the
study of conflicts was part of the main stream. Kurt Lewin believed that conflicts
are inseparable part of human behavior and social psychologists can illuminate
various aspects of this phenomenon. The edited volume Resolving Social Conflicts
(Lewin, 1948) presented and analyzed different types of conflicts ranging from
intrapersonal to intergroup using socio-psychological conceptual framework. Based
on Lewin’s theory, Deutsch, one of the pioneers of modern social psychology,
began to develop a theory of cooperation and competition, which has served as a
basic conception for the study of a conflict (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b). During this
period, the knowledge about conflicts began to crystallize and the classical text-
book Theory and Problems of Social Psychology by Krech and Crutchfield (1948)
already devoted two chapters to conflicts: one regarding industrial conflict and the
other about international tension.
The classical studies by Sherif and his colleagues about conflict and coopera-
tion are undoubtedly the most compelling examples of seminal contributions to the
understanding of how conflicts evolve and how they can be resolved (Sherif, 1966;
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). The so-called “Robber Cave experi-
ments” provided experimental real life opportunity to observe first the formation
of two groups, then the emergence of a conflict between them and its various
implications and finally ways of resolving this conflict peacefully via setting a series
of super-ordinate goals. Approximately at the same time the paradigm of simulat-
ing conflicts as games was imported from game theory to social psychology allow-
ing for the use of experimental method in the investigation of various hypotheses
in intergroup conflicts and their resolution (Deutsch, 1958; Kelley et al., 1970;
Rapoport, 1960). This paradigm enabled precise measures of outcomes, easy
manipulation of various situations and strict control of variables (Pruitt & Kimmel,
1977). The most popular paradigm was the prisoners dilemma, but with time other
paradigms were invented including trucking game by Deutsch and Krauss (1960)
that allowed to study mixed motive conflicts.
The very early work by Klineberg (1950) was signaling the growing preoccupa-
tion with international conflicts by social psychologists . In the 1960s, a clear trend
in this direction emerged in social psychology. The edited book by Kelman (1965),
as well as books written by Stagner (1967) and White (1970), offered a social
psychological perspective to the analysis of large scale intersocietal conflicts, high-
lighting issues such as intergroup perceptions, violence, leadership, or negotiation.
The seminal contribution of Tajfel (1979, 1982) on social identity also has direct
implication for intergroup conflicts, suggesting not only a crucial mechanism for
group formation and functioning, but also a determinative element that leads to
intergroup differentiation as well as to conflicts.
From the present perspective, it is possible to say that although the theme of
studying conflict never achieved a longstanding primary place as did the studies
of prejudice or conformity, it succeeded to establish itself as a legitimate part of
the social psychology. A number of textbooks included this topic in their agenda
(Myers, 1993; Raven & Rubin, 1976; Saks & Krupat, 1988) and a number of lead-
ing social psychologists such as Morton Deutsch, Herbert Kelman, late Jeffrey
Rubin, late Ralph White, or Dean Pruitt to name only a few, devoted their entire
career to studying this topic. For years social psychologists have played the major
role in developing and establishing peace psychology and political psychology
which have been preoccupied with the study of conflicts and peace making. In
1990 division 48 within the American Psychological Association (APA) namely
the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence was established. Few
years later the society began to publish a journal Peace and Conflict: Journal of
Peace Psychology.
Today there is a growing interest in the social psychology of a conflict and many
of the younger generation of social psychologists concentrate on various aspects of
this area. Throughout the recent years, books, chapters, and journal articles, have
been published and many papers have been presented in social psychology confer-
ences on various aspects of conflicts and peace making (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2008).
Also several “small meetings” of the European Social Psychology Association were
organized about the social psychology of conflicts and their resolution and several
issues of Journal of Social Issues and Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
were devoted to this theme as well. A few years ago a second edition of the hand-
book about conflict resolution (Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2006) was published
by social psychologists and recently a few important collections have appeared
providing impetus to the psychological study of conflict and peace building (de
Rivera, 2009; Fitzduff & Stout, 2006).
The present book is taking a social psychological perspective to the analysis of
conflicts. It mainly focuses on the socio-psychological foundations and dynamics of
harsh and destructive intergroup conflicts (but not only), illuminating their erup-
tion, management, resolution, and peace making.
Destructive Conflicts
There are different types of societal conflicts, which may be classified in various
ways. One of the more meaningful classification focuses on their severity and
longevity. In fact this dimension represents the level of destructiveness of the
conflicts. Different terms were used to describe the two opposing poles of this
dimension on which it is possible to locate the various intergroup conflicts—though
they may dynamically move on this dimension with time. The concepts of tractable
and intractable conflicts* will be used. Thus, on the one pole of this dimension are
found tractable conflicts which are over goals of low importance and last for a short
period of time, during which the parties in dispute view them as solvable and are
interested to resolve them quickly through negotiation. In addition, the involved
societies avoid violence, do not mobilize society members to support their cause,
and recognize and take into account mutual interests, goals and needs, and view
* The term intractable became popular in recent years among social scientists (Coleman, 2000, 2003;
Lewicki, Gray, & Elliot, 2003 and http://www.crinfo.org).
their conflict as being of mixed motive nature. Some of the conflicts between allied
states such as France and Germany or Britain and United States are examples of
this type of conflicts.
On the other pole are found intractable conflicts. These conflicts are over
perceived important goals; they involve great animosity and vicious cycles of vio-
lence; are prolonged because neither side can win and therefore are perceived as
unsolvable and self-perpetuating; at the same time both sides are not interested in
compromising and resolving them in a peaceful way; in contrast, each side mobi-
lizes society members to participate in them and is focusing only on own needs and
goals (see also different characterizations of intractable conflicts, Azar, 1990;
Burton, 1987; Deutsch, 1985; Huth & Russett, 1993; Kriesberg, Northrup, &
Thorson, 1989; Mitchell, 1981; Mor & Maoz, 1999). The interethnic conflicts
between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, between Chechens and
Russians in Chechnya, between Tamils and Singhalese in Sri Lanka, between
Turks and Kurds in Turkey, between Moslems and Hindus in India’s Kashmir and
in the Middle East, between Jews and Palestinians provide or provided in different
periods prototypical examples of intractable conflicts. This type of long-lasting,
severe and violent conflicts have serious implications for the societies involved,
their individual members as well as for the whole world community. Therefore,
understanding the foundations and dynamics of intractable conflicts is of special
challenge for social scientists, including social psychologists. Many chapters of this
book focus especially on this type of conflicts.
The present characterization of conflict’s intractability is based on Kriesberg’s
characteristics (Kriesberg, 1993, 1998). He suggested the following four necessary
characterizing features:
emerge. Violence also erupts often in conflicts in which one party is not recognized
as a legitimate side to contentions, when there is a great disparity of power and
when one side believes that it can ignore the demands of the other side and then
the other side feels the need to demonstrate its determination; when there are no
institutionalized ways to deal with the grievances, and/or when a party believes
that using violence is the best way to achieve its goals.
In most of the cases the beginning of violence by one side immediately evokes
violent response from the other side to the conflict. From this point onwards the
acts of violence become a part of the conflict and the meaning of initiation and
retribution for specific acts is lost. Once the violence erupts it immediately changes
the nature of the conflict because it involves harm to society members. Physical
violence includes all forms of harm inflicted on human beings beginning with
destruction, injuring through torturing, raping, murdering, and can at times leads
up to mass killing, ethnic cleansing and even genocide. Physical harm is usually
accompanied by symbolic violence such as humiliation or discrimination. The
harm is often not only inflicted on military forces but also on civilians (Chapter 8).
The harm violates codes of moral behavior, involves group members, gives rise to
a sense of collective victimhood, arouses strong emotional reactions, leads to dele-
gitimization of the rival and eventually escalates the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2003). Also,
particularly important in the context of interethnic conflict is the fact that although
individuals perform violent acts, the violence is initiated and carried out within the
social system. That is, the societal–political system provides the rationales and the
justifications for the violence, mobilizes group members to carry it out, trains indi-
viduals to perform violent acts and then glorifies the violent acts and those who
perform them.
As noted before, parties involved in intractable conflict cannot win and do not
perceive a possibility of resolving it peacefully, instead they continue the confron-
tation for many decades until intractability is eventually overturned, that is, either
one side wins eventually, or both sides finally decide to resolve it peacefully. In any
event in interethnic conflicts it is very difficult to win it militarily and therefore
they continue through decades and centuries until sometimes both sides turn to
peaceful resolution (Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste, & Senehi, 2009; Worchel,
1999). Even when one side conquers the territory and even when establishes a
cooperative regime to own wishes, the conflict may erupt again until the basic
needs and goals of the conquered group are satisfied (see, e.g., the conflicts in
Chechnya, Rwanda, Middle East, or Sri Lanka). In a few cases interethnic conflicts
ended with ethnic cleansing or even a genocide (e.g., the case of Aborigines in
Australia). Of crucial importance for the continuation of intractable conflict and
lack of its peaceful resolution are the shared beliefs of the rival societies’ members
suggesting—that they have the human and material resources to continue the con-
flict, that their goals are sacred and therefore cannot be compromised, that the
other side cannot be trusted and/or that time is on their side which means to them
that they can improve their situation with time, and may even win the conflict.
When even one of these beliefs is hegemonic it greatly inhibits an achievement of
peaceful settlement of the conflict.
Conceptual Framework
My own academic work over the last 25 years focuses entirely on the study of con-
flicts, their resolution, and also in general on peace building. Specifically, I focused
on the development of conceptual framework that elaborates the process and the
contents of the repertoire that maintains prototypic intractable conflicts. On the
basis of this conceptual framework I later developed a conception for analyzing
peace building and reconciliation. This line of thoughts served as a scheme for the
planning and organization of the present edited book. It provided the rational for
the holistic, coherent and systematic structure of the chapters and therefore will be
described in details.
* This idea is based on conceptual and empirical literature which suggests that successful coping with
threatening and stressful conditions requires construction of a meaningful world view (Antonovsky,
1987; Frankl, 1963; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Taylor, 1983).
† Societal beliefs are cognitions shared by society members on topics and issues that are of special
concern for their society and contribute to their sense of uniqueness (Bar-Tal, 2000).
It justifies the outbreak of the conflict and the course of its development.
It presents own society in a positive light (Baumeister & Gastings, 1997).
It describes the rival society in delegitimizing ways (Bar-Tal, 1990; Oren &
Bar-Tal, 2007).
It portrays own society as the victim of the opponent (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-
Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Mack, 1990; Volkan, 1997).
All these themes appear in the description of the history of the conflict.
It follows that opposing groups in a conflict will often entertain contradictory
and selective historical collective memories of the same events. By selectively
including, or excluding, certain historical events and processes from the collective
memory and by characterizing positively the in-group and very negatively the out-
group, a group views itself and its historical experiences in unique and exclusive
ways (Baumeister & Gastings, 1997; Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). Collective memory
provides a black and white picture, which enables parsimonious, fast, unequivocal,
and simple understanding of the “history” of the conflict.
Societal beliefs about the justness of own goals, which outline the goals in
conflict, indicate their crucial importance and provide their justifications
and rationales.
Societal beliefs about security refer to the importance of personal safety and
national survival, and outline the conditions for their achievement.
Societal beliefs of positive collective self-image concern the ethnocentric
tendency to attribute positive traits, values and behavior to own society.
Societal beliefs of own victimization concern collective self-presentation as a
victim.
Societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent concern beliefs which deny
the adversary’s humanity.
Societal beliefs of patriotism generate attachment to the country and society,
by propagating loyalty, love, care, and sacrifice.
Societal beliefs of unity refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts
and disagreements during intractable conflict in order to unite the forces
in the face of the external threat.
Societal beliefs of peace refer to peace in general and amorphic terms as the
ultimate desire of the society.
Ethos of conflict together with the collective memory constitutes the ideological
epistemic basis of the conflict and complements each other with similar contents.
But while the collective memory provides the narrative of the history of the conflict,
ethos of conflict enlightens the present and future orientation of the society. In
addition to the epistemic–cognitive basis which is constructed with societal beliefs,
the socio-psychological infrastructure includes collective emotional orientation.
* The proposed eight themes of the ethos were found in the public opinions of the Israeli Jewish soci-
ety between 1967 and 2000 and served as their organizing scheme (Oren, 2005). They were also
found to be central motifs in the Israeli school textbooks (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 1998b). Finally, recently
they were extensively analyzed as providing foundations for the culture of conflict in the Israeli
society (Bar-Tal, 2007b).
† Collective emotional orientation refers to the characterizing tendency of a society to express a par-
ticular emotion. That it, the emotion and the beliefs that evoke a particular emotion are widely
shared by society members and appear frequently in the society’s public discourse, cultural prod-
ucts, and educational materials (Bar-Tal, 2001).
Societies may begin the conflict with consensual agreement which later may
dissipate and lead to schism in the society and also conflicts may begin with a dis-
agreement but later with the appearance of a real threat society members may rally
under the patriotic umbrella of unity.
a barrier for resolving it; in fact it is part of the vicious cycle of the intractable
conflict. Considering that this process occurs simultaneously to the two parties in
the conflict (what is called a mirror image), it is obvious how the vicious cycle of
violence operates (Sandole, 1999). As the conflict evolves, each of the opponents
develops the described culture of conflict with the repertoire, which initially ful-
fills important functional roles, on both the individual and collective levels. With
time, however, this repertoire comes to serve as the major motivating, justifying,
and rationalizing factor of the conflict. Any negative actions taken by each side
toward the rival then serve as information validating the existing negative socio-
psychological repertoire and in turn magnify the motivation and readiness to
engage in conflict. With the tuning toward the evilness of the rival, the behaviors
of each side confirm the held negative socio-psychological repertoire and justify
harming the opponent. Both societies practice moral disengagement, moral enti-
tlement, and self-focusing, blocking any empathy, accountability, and responsibility
toward the suffering of the rival and the performed perpetration by own group. In
this situation it is extremely difficult to change the minds of the involved society
members to resolve the conflict peacefully.*
Observation of the serious, harsh, and violent conflicts indicates that it is much
easier to mobilize society members to participate in them than to persuade them
to embark on the road of peace making. Society members can be mobilized with
much enthusiasm to support even violent conflicts, in which many human lives are
lost, within days; but it takes years to persuade them to stop the bloodshed and
suffering in order to settle the conflict via negotiation that requires compromises.
There are several reasons for this asymmetry. At least few of the reasons that
are somewhat related are as follows:
1. Evolutionary psychology tells that human beings are more tuned to threats
than to peaceful signs (Bigelow, 1969; Ross, 1991; van der Dennen &
Falger, 1990). The instinct for survival in times of threat is strong and very
basic (Duntley, 2005). People do not take risks and therefore cope with
perceived threats with speed and determination in order to avert possible
harm (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). This
tendency reflects adaptive behavior since negative information, especially
related to threats, may require immediate functional reactions to the
new situation (Fox, 1992; Gil-White, 2001), including aggression (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1979).
2. High fear, which dominates society members engaged in intractable con-
flict, usually overcomes hope because is processed unconsciously and
* It should be noted that intergroup conflicts of a macro scale are not necessarily symmetrical on
various dimensions. Of special importance for the understanding asymmetrical conflicts is the
level of military-economic power. Such an asymmetry has a great influence on the way the conflict
is managed. These asymmetries have to be taken into consideration in the analysis of conflicts.
Nevertheless the present conception and many of the chapters focus on the psychological forces
that operate independently of the asymmetry, though it is well recognized that the asymmetry has
an effect also on socio-psychological processes and dynamics (Aggestam, 2002; Rouhana, 2004;
Rouhana & Fiske, 1995).
evokes simple feelings, while hope needed for peace is always based on
conscious piecemeal cognitive activity (Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Petersen,
2002). In addition, whereas fear is activated automatically, without effort
and cognitive control, hope always relies on thinking and requires various
intellectual skills (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). On the behavioral level,
fear may lead to defensive and/or aggressive behaviors, often already used
in the past as it is based on memorized patterns of reactions (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt & Sutterlin, 1990), while hope requires conceiving new behav-
iors to achieve the desired, positively valued goal and attempts to realize
it (Snyder, 2000). In this human programming people are guided by high
fear which inhibits a rise and development of hope that is one of the con-
ditions for driving society members toward peace making.
3. Negative information about potential harm has more weight than positive
information about peace opportunities. This proposition is based on con-
siderable evidence in psychology to the effect that negative events and
information tend to be more closely attended and are better remembered,
and that they strongly impact evaluation, judgment, and action tendencies
(see reviews by Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Christianson, 1992; Lau,
1982; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; and studies by Ito, Larsen, Smith, &
Cacioppo, 1998; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990). This negativity bias is an
inherent characteristic of the negative motivational system, which operates
automatically at the evaluative-categorization stage. It is also structured to
respond more intensely than the positive motivational system to compara-
ble levels of motivational activation (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).
4. Finally, social psychological theory of terror management (Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991)
proposes that innate anxiety of annihilation, combined with the human
knowledge of inevitable death, creates an ever-present potential for terror.
One of terror management theory’s central propositions, strongly sup-
ported by research (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), is that
conditions in which mortality is made salient, which characterize many
negative threatening contexts, arouse the potential for terror and the
immediate need to protect against it. In other words conditions of height-
ened mortality salience lead to a desire to bolster beliefs in the need to
defend and select behaviors that uphold those beliefs, as well as a readi-
ness to reject and even annihilate outsiders who are viewed as threatening
the society.
Once collectives rally to engage in conflict and then continue it for a long period
of time, additional reasons may explain the dogmatic adherence of the society
members to repertoire that maintains conflict and is resistant to alternative infor-
mation. Some of those several reasons explaining this tendency are as follows:
f undamental for defining their identities, world views and ideologies, and
thus they become protected against any trade-offs or compromise (Baron
& Spranca, 1997; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). Giving up on these values implies
for them moral bankruptcy, and even the thought about their compromise
stimulates a strong psychological response in the form of moral outrage
(Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).
Protected (or sacred) values may be abstract (e.g., human rights,
justice, etc.), or may be symbolized in a tangible asset, such as a holy site
(Skitka, 2002). In other cases, they are associated with a specific policy
that is perceived as reflecting the protected value (e.g., building Jewish
settlements in the West Bank). Since protected values are nonnegotiable
by definition, if the core issues of an intergroup dispute are perceived by
the parties as protected values, the conflict will be stubborn and difficult
to solve (Landman, in press).
2. Intractable conflicts lead to the evolvement of culture of conflict that
penetrates to every societal institution and channel of communication
(Bar-Tal, 2010; Ross, 1998). It appears, for example, in public discourse,
cultural products, educational material and channels of mass communica-
tion. It is very difficult to change cultures in general and especially culture
of conflict as it is well entrenched and supported by the conditions of con-
flict. Dominance of this culture serves as an inhibiting environment that
discourages evolvement of alterative ideas that advance peace making.
3. Many of the intractable conflicts are viewed as being related to collective
identity (Kelman, 1999a). According to Rothman (1997), these conflicts
are “deeply rooted in the underlying human needs and values that together
constitute people’s social identities,” (p. 6). In times of intractable conflict
the generic features of collective identity become conducive to the man-
agement of the societal mission (David & Bar-Tal, 2009). Also, societal
beliefs of ethos of conflict and collective memory offer contents par excel-
lence that imbue social identity with meaning, which maintains the con-
flict (Barthel, 1996; Cairns, Lewis, Mumcu, & Waddell, 1998; Gillis,
1994; Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004). The challenges of introducing new
beliefs that support peace making provide threat to the well established
foundations of the collective identity. Any change of these contents is slow
and requires an establishment of secure new foundations for the new
emerging identity.
4. The intractable conflicts are supported by ideological conflict supporting
beliefs that are frozen because of structural and motivational factors and
serve as socio-psychological barriers to peace making (Bar-Tal, Halperin,
& Oren, in press; Cash, 1996). Rigidity structures imply that they are
resistant to change, being organized in a coherent manner with little com-
plexity and great differentiation from alternative beliefs (Tetlock, 1989;
Rokeach, 1960). The motivational force that contributes to the freezing is
a specific closure need (Kruglanski, 1989, 2004), which motivates society
members to view the held conflict supporting beliefs as being truthful and
valid because they fulfill for them various needs. It is thus extremely
In spite of the delineated list of obstacles, conflicts do not only outbreak and are
managed, but also some are resolved (see Chapter 10). Groups sometimes find
ways to resolve the contradiction between their goals and other group goals
(Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste, & Senehi, 2009).
All this does not mean that all the conflicts are similar. On contrary, they are
different, involving parties with different level of responsibility, of justified conten-
tions, or of used violence. But almost all of them require peace making process in
order to end them.* The next section elaborates this process.
* There is the hidden assumption in this chapter and other chapters that it is desirable to solve inter-
group conflicts peacefully. In general this assumption is well accepted but I do recognize that this
assumption may not apply to very few conflicts that require a complete victory in accordance to
moral standards. One such clear example is the violent conflict of the World War II because the evil-
ness of the Nazi regime required a full victory to stop it.
(Zartman, 2007). Within the process of peace making, conflict resolution refers to
the negotiation process that takes place between decision-makers to reach its
formal settlement.
In order to pave the route to the settlement of the conflict and later to the last-
ing peace, a new repertoire must be formed and disseminated among society mem-
bers. This repertoire should include ideas about the need to resolve the conflict
peacefully, about personalization and legitimization of the rival, changing goals
that fueled the conflict, cessation of violence, initiating compromises, optional
solutions for conflict resolution that could be accepted by both sides, building trust
and constructing beliefs that the agreement can be implemented, developing goals
about new peaceful relation with the rival, and eventually recognition in the need
to reconcile and construction of new climate which promotes the above presented
new ideas about peace making and building (Bar-Tal, 2009). These ideas have to be
adopted by society members who must be mobilized for the peace process, if it
would be successful. Thus in principle there is need to move the society from what
is known, well entrenched in the minds of society members and well practiced for
many years to new ideas that portray unknown, uncertain and unpredictable future
that is dependent on the delegitimized rival. The above described change there-
fore constitutes long, complex, and nonlinear process, which does not necessarily
end with the new peace supporting repertoire or with peaceful conflict settlement
(see Chapter 13).
Peace Making
According to the classic conception offered by Lewin (1947) every process of
c ognitive change, in individuals and groups, requires unfreezing. Hence a pre
condition for the acceptance and internalization of any alternative content about
the conflict or peace building depends on the ability to destabilize the rigid struc-
ture of the socio-psychological repertoire about the conflict that dominates the
involved societies.
This endeavor is especially challenging because in many of the conflict situa-
tions, this process begins with a minority who needs also to have courage in order
to present the alternative ideas to society members. This minority is often viewed
by the great majority of the society members at best as naive and detached from
reality, but more often as traitors, who harm the patriotic cause and hinder the
group cause. Nevertheless the emergence of this minority is not only important for
the own society but also for the rival group as well. It may ignite a similar process
in the other group or reinforce it. With time, this small minority may gain support
and its persistence may serve as a basis for a movement and a change of the context
that eventually will open the possibilities to launch an effective campaign for
resolving the conflict peacefully.
Peace making requires support of formal leaders for its realization and indeed
some of the leaders may join the process of peace making in its early phase trying
to initiate conflict resolution. In most of the cases, peace making involves, on one
hand, bottom-up processes in which groups, grass roots, and civil society members
support the ideas of peace building and act to disseminate them also among leaders.
On the other hand, it also needs top-down processes in which emerging leaders
join efforts and begin to persuade the society members in the necessity of peaceful
settlement of the conflict and begin to carry it out.
Peace making process must get also a support from the elites and institutions
of the society and eventually must be shared by at least a substantial portion of
society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Knox & Quirk, 2000; Weiner, 1998). Of special
importance is the role of mass media and other societal channels of communica-
tion and institutions that can first buttress the formation of peace orientation, and
next transmit and disseminate the new system of beliefs among the society mem-
bers. The presentation of new beliefs which provide the goals, plans, information,
images, considerations, arguments, and justifications for peace building subscribes
to the principles of persuasion. These new beliefs should form a new prism for
understanding the reality and processing new information. In any event these new
alternative ideas must be spread, be legitimized and eventually institutionalized in
the society if peace making process is to succeed (Bar-Tal, Landman, Magal, &
Rosler, 2009 conception).
Unfreezing process may be facilitated in many of the cases with changes in the
context which signal to society members a need to reevaluate the held repertoire that
fueled the continuation of the conflict. A few of the possible changes to be noted are:
First, the context may change as a result of accumulation of conflict experience like
fatigue, vast human and property losses, continuous stalemate and lack of effective
governance. Second, it may change as a result of major events like the outbreak of a
war, dramatic peace gesture or extreme violent events. Third, this may happen as a
consequence of conciliatory and trust-building actions by the rival, which lead to
perceived change regarding the opponents’ character, intentions, and goals. Fourth,
change may take place because of internal events or processes unrelated to conflict
(recession, hunger, appearance of a new enemy) that indirectly create the motivation
to reassess the centrality and importance of the conflict. Fifth, a third powerful party
may change the context by an intervention. This intervention can take various forms
such as mediation, providing incentives, persuasion, bombing, sending troops or
even economic boycott. Sixth, coming to power of new leaders, who are less commit-
ted to the ideology of conflict and thus can develop new approaches to the conflict
and create a new context. In addition, arriving of a new generation which has a dif-
ferent look at the conflict and its implications may create a new context. Finally, a
need to reevaluate the situation may be the result of more global geopolitical
processes and events that are not directly related to the conflict (collapse of a super-
power and international climate), but may eventually affect the parties.
Obviously, embarking on the road of peace depends in fact mostly on the societ-
ies involved in the severe and harsh conflict. A number of contributions tried to
elucidate the conditions of ripeness that may facilitate peacemaking process and
reaching conflict settlement. For example, Zartman (2000)—proposed if the (two)
parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b)
perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for
resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin)” (pp. 228–229). On the
basis of the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it was also proposed that
societies may begin negotiations for peaceful settlement of the conflict when society
members realize that the loses resulting form the continuation of the conflict exceed
significantly the losses that a society may incur as a consequence of the compro-
mises and outcomes of peaceful settlement of the conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin,
2009). It seems that the great majority of society members are usually mobilized to
support the peace process on the basis of self-utilitarian considerations. Only a very
small minority approach and weigh the situation from moral perspective.
Eventually, conflicts may de-escalate and move toward their peaceful resolution
when society members are demobilized from supporting the goals of the conflict
and are mobilized for its peaceful resolution (Gidron, Katz, & Hasenfeld, 2002). But
without determination and persistence of peace forces which actively act, peace
cannot be achieved because it is not enough just to want peace. Almost everyone on
this earth cherishes the value of peace and wants to live under its wings. But this is
not so simple—peace making requires parting from far-fetching and ideal dreams,
descending to concrete steps of pragmatism and transforming the psychological
repertoire that served for many years as a compass for continuing the conflict. Even
goals that are underlined by justice and moral values have to be eventually compro-
mised with practical considerations if peace making process is to succeed.
This process is complex. The psychological roots of conflict are not easily elimi-
nated. The collective memories of the conflict and ethos of conflict are well orga-
nized in the memory system are automatically activated when threats, real or
symbolic, are perceived. Thus, the orientation for peace needs not only to inhibit
the automatic activation of thoughts associated with conflict, but also to replace
them with new beliefs and behaviors. These new beliefs must be attended, compre-
hended, accepted and practiced, before they can serve as an alternative to the
automatically activated repertoire of conflict.
This challenge meets many obstacles because although during the peace
making process the conflict may stop being intractable, it still continues to exist
and still may have violent expressions such as terror attacks on civilians, military
encounters, aggressive rhetoric, or agitation. Hostile and aggressive acts do not
stop at once, but usually continue for years, even after achieving formal agreement
to settle it. When signs of conflict still occur, this is a challenging task because not
only the conflict repertoire becomes accessible, but also these signs are used by
spoilers of the peace making process who wait for these types of events and know
how to inflame the animosity, fear and hatred. In such a situation the reaction of
leaders and the media to the threatening cues is crucial. When they frame the
events in support of the conflict orientation, then peace process has very low
chances to evolve. But, when in contrast, the leaders and media on both sides
explicitly condemn the acts and their perpetrators, when they minimize their
importance, reassure the public, and repeat their commitment to peace goals, then
the chances are high that the peace making process will survive and gain momen-
tum and reach the stage of conflict settlement.
Conflict Settlement
Ending the conflict resolution process with settlement is a turning point in the
relation between the rival parties engaged in intractable conflict. This point in
most of the cases is reached after a long process of persuading society members to
support it and mostly when the leaders decide to take the determinative decision
to settle the conflict peacefully. It refers to a political process through which the
parties in conflict eliminate the perceived incompatibility between their goals and
interests, and establish a new situation of perceived compatibility (Burton, 1990;
Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, 1990; Kriesberg, 1992). It usually ends with an agreement,
negotiated by the representatives of the two opposing groups, which outlines the
details of the settlement that allows viewing the goals as not being contradictory
(see Chapter 11). Conflict resolution can be seen also as a psychological process,
since it requires that the negotiators will change their beliefs regarding own
goals, and/or other group’s goals and/or the extent of contradiction between
these two sets of goals, and/or the conditions of the political environment, and/
or the situation of the own group and/or the situation of the adversary group
(Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989; Bercovitch, 1995; Burton, 1987, 1990; Fisher,
1990, 1997; Kelman, 1997; Kriesberg, 1992; Ross, 1993; Worchel, 1999).
An agreement of conflict settlement is a very important phase in the course of
the confrontational relations between the rivals. It formally indicates an end of the
conflict and specifies the terms of its settlement, which are based on uncertain and
ambiguous future benefits. In most of the cases they require to put aside dreams
and aspiration in order to accept the possible and practical present.
But it has to be clear that in order for the agreement to resolve the conflict will
contribute determinately to the peace building process and change the conflictive
relations there are a number of conditions:
It has to satisfactorily address the issues that stood at the core of the
conflict.
It has to satisfy the basic needs and goals of both parties.
It has to address the justice within practical limitations.
It has to provide observed changes in the conditions that benefit the
ex-rivals.
It has to create a basis for the emergence of the new psychological repertoire
that supports the peace making.
It has to signal a strategic decision that changes the nature of the relations
between the rival parties.
It has to provide foundations for new policies and new courses of actions
which strengthen the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and move the
involved societies on the road of peace building.
Nevertheless, peaceful settlement of the conflict does not have a unitary mean-
ing, as peace can take many different forms, ones is achieved. It can range from
cold peace that indicates lack of violent acts and minimal relations up to warm
peace that is geared toward major transformation of building completely new
peaceful relations (see the difference between negative and positive peace by
Galtung, 1969). In any event reaching a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of an
intractable conflict with the support of the rival societies is probably one of the
most impressive and significant achievements that human beings attain.
Reconciliation
Students of reconciliation in the present decade agree that it concerns the forma-
tion or restoration of genuine peaceful relationships between societies that have
been involved in intractable conflict, after its formal resolution is achieved (Nadler,
Malloy, & Fisher, 2008). Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict
resolution to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions by
the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the
relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves (De Soto, 1999;
Kelman, 1999b; Lederach, 1997; Nadler, 2002; Rouhana, 2004; Shonholtz, 1998;
Wilmer, 1998).
There is not doubt that the first condition for reconciliation is legitimization,
personalization, humanization, and equalization of the rival (Bar-Tal & Teichman,
2005). This recognition allows viewing the rival as a legitimate partner to peace
and as human entity that deserves equal humane treatment. In addition reconcili-
ation requires viewing the conflict as solvable and recognizing that both sides have
legitimate contentions, goals, and needs and there is need to satisfy them in order
to solve the conflict and then establish peaceful relations. These basic changes
open the road for the process of reconciliation to progress.
On the general level, a number of definitional specifications have been proposed
by different writers. Thus, for example, Marrow (1999) pointed out that reconcili-
ation “is reestablishment of friendship that can inspire sufficient trust across the
traditional split” (p. 132). In emphasizing trust, he asserts that the basic thrust of
reconciliation is to be sensitive to other’s needs, the principal question being not
what they have to do, but what we have to do to promote the reconciliation process.
Lederach (1997) focused mainly on intrasocietal reconciliation and posits four
elements of it which can also be extended to intersocietal conflicts, namely:
This view is similar to Long and Brecke (2003) model which suggests that rec-
onciliation is based on truth telling about the harm done by both parties, forgive-
ness which requires new view of both parties, giving up retribution and full justice
and building new positive relationship. Kriesberg (2004) added the following to
the list:
a. Solution of the conflict, which satisfies the fundamental needs of the par-
ties and fulfils their national aspiration.
b. Mutual acceptance and respect of the other group’s life and welfare.
c. Development of sense of security and dignity for each group.
d. Establishment of patterns of cooperative interactions in different spheres.
e. Institutionalization of conflict resolution mechanisms (Bar-Siman-Tov,
2004).
two rival groups that emphasize the importance of new just, equal, cooperative,
and friendly relationships.
Societal beliefs about the history of the conflict. Reconciliation requires also a
change of collective memories that were dominating the engaged societies during
the conflict. There is need to revise these narratives that fueled the conflict into
outlook on the past that is synchronized with that of the former rival. Within this
theme, past injustices, immoral acts, or violent atrocities have to be addressed.
Societal beliefs about peace. Reconciliation requires forming new societal
beliefs that describe the multidimensional nature of peace, specify the conditions
and mechanisms for its achievement, realistically outline the benefits and costs of
achieving it, connote the meaning of living in peace, and especially emphasize the
conditions for its maintenance.
Reconciliation also requires construction of general positive affects and spe-
cific emotions about the peaceful relations with the past opponent. Positive affects
should accompany the described beliefs and indicate good feelings that the parties
have toward each other and toward the new relations. With regard to emotions,
reconciliation requires a change in the collective emotional orientations of high
level fear, anger, and hatred, which often dominate societies in intractable conflict.
Instead, there is need to develop at least emotional orientation of hope to establish
peaceful relations with the past rival, which reflects the desire for positive goals of
maintaining peaceful and cooperative relations with the other party. This emo-
tional orientation indicates positive outlook for the future, expectations of positive
events, without violence and hostilities.
The described changes in groups engaged in intractable conflict, in the frame-
work of reconciliation, is a very complicated, painful, threatening and full of resis-
tance and obstacles process. In order for such a process to succeed, there must be
a societal climate of openness and motivation to search and absorb new informa-
tion, which provides alternative perspective to the conflict. It has to be noted that
the process of reconciliation in which ethos of peace evolves is a political, social,
cultural, and educational process which involves all the societal institutions and
channels of communication (Gawerc, 2006). But, it is not a formal process that can
be fully controlled. It depends on a number of major factors.
First of all, it depends on successful conflict resolution, which terminates the
conflict formally and is expressed in signed agreement by both sides. This is a deter-
minative factor; without it, reconciliation cannot advance. Second, it depends on
the course of events and acts of the past rivals which reflect the desire to change the
conflictive relations into peaceful relations. Third, should be noted external sup-
portive conditions such as the peaceful international climate, pressure from influen-
tial allies, or rise of a new external common goal (e.g., threat), which may be
determinative in the acceleration of the reconciliation process. Fourth, the progress
of reconciliation depends on the strength of the opposition to the peace process
within the involved societies. Strong opposition of political parties and/or nonparlia-
mentary organizations, which have the support of the elite and/or the masses, may
impede the reconciliation process. Fifth, of great importance are the acts and deter-
mination of those parts in the engaged societies who support the reconciliation
process. Sixth, the success of reconciliation depends on the mobilization of the
e ducational, societal, and cultural institutions for support of the reconciliation pro-
cess. Finally, the success of the reconciliation process depends also on the activities
of various organizations which promote the reconciliation among the in-group
members and initiate joint acts with the former adversary group.
It is assumed that the coming years, in the new millennium, we will witness a
major effort to study and practice reconciliation. This endeavor is necessary
because conflict resolution, especially in the cases of intractable conflicts, is only a
part of the reconciliation process. Without reconciliation, seeds of the conflict feed
the society members and conflict may outbreak again, as it happened in the past
e.g., in Bosnia or Rwanda). Reconciliation assures in more fundamental way that
the past rivals form peaceful relations and view themselves and each other in a way
that is functional to the completely new relations (as it happened in the French–
German case).
present situation that is sometimes labeled as an age of terror. Many of the conflicts
in the present times involve terrorism and the chapter attempts to unveil the rea-
sons for its evolvement. Chapter 9 describes the socio-psychological barriers that
hinder and inhibit peace making. Rest of the chapters concerns processes related
to peace building. Chapter 10 presents the process of conflict resolution and focuses
on various variables that facilitate or inhibit this process. Chapter 11 elaborates on
the processes of intergroup negotiation and mediation, since they constitute an
essential part of the peace making process. Chapter 12 questions the traditional
approach to the study of reconciliation and points out that in cases of asymmetry a
new perspective is needed. Finally, Chapter 13 specifies the various socio-psycho-
logical approaches and ways to building and maintaining peace including peace
culture.
These chapters present an opportunity to get acquainted with the central issues
that stand at the core of the discussion in the social psychology of conflict. They
may not be exhaustive, but uncover, even if partially, the state of accumulated
knowledge in this area. There is no doubt that they do not come to conclude, but
to instigate interest in one of the major topics that has a direct relevance to the well
being of the human species.
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