paradigm, for its adherents, assumes the mantle, as it \ /ere, of near,

if not absolute, truth.

2 GRAMSCI, HEGEMONY
AND INTERNATIONAL
Notes RELATIONS: AN ESSAY IN
1 This chapteris a revised version of Gill (1991a).I am grateful to Robert Cox METHOD
for highlighting the importance of Gramsci's conception of myth, and to
Frank Pearce for clarifying questions relať ingto Marxist structuralism. ROBERT W. COX
2 Note from Robert Cox to the author, 29 September1990.
3 I am grateful to Robert Cox for emphasising this point.
4 Here we might distinguish between logical contradiction, of the type
which characterisesformal logic and mathemať ics(e'g' as discrrssed in Some time ago I began reading Gramsci's Prison Notebooks.In these
Hegel,s Scienceof Logic)and historical contradicť ions,which occur partly as fragments, written in a fascist prison between 1929 and 1935, the
a result of human collecť ivitiesacquiring self-consciousnessand a capacity former leader of the Italian Communist Party was concerned with the
to conceptualiseand understand and act upon historicalforces.Of course, problem of understanding capitalist societies in the 1920s and 1930s,
there is thus no single or straightforward way to define or elaborate the
and particularly with the meaning of fascism and the possibilities of
nature of historical contradictions. To do so necessarily implies the
building an alternative form of state and society based on the working
construction of ontological abstractions and categories. In the preface to
this collection I made an initial sketch of the contemporary historical class. What he had to say centred upon the state, upon the relation-
dialectic of integration-disintegrať ionworld order, that is the historical ship of civil society to the state, and upon the relationship of politics,
ť ransformationin world order which was being brought about by the ethics and ideology to production. Not surprisingly, Gramsci did not
contradictions between the globalising thrust of internationally mobile have very much to say directly about international relations. Never-
capital and the more territorially bounded nature of political authority and theless, I found that Gramsci's thinking was helpful in understanding
legitimacyin the late twentiethcentury. the meaning of international organisation with which I was then
5 For an elaborationof thesepoints, see C. Murphy and R. Tooze,'Introduc- principally concerned. Particularly valuable was his concept of
tion' and 'Getting Beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy'
hegemony, but valuable also were several related concepts which he
(Murphy and Tooze, 199'|.I-32).
had worked out for himself or developed from others. This essay sets
forth my understanding of what Gramsci meant by hegemony and
these related concepts, and suggests how I think they may be
adapted, retaining his essential meaning, to the understanding of
problems of world order. It does not purport to be a critical study of
Gramsci's political theory but merely a derivation from it of some
ideas useful for a revision of current international relations theory.1

GRAMSCI AND HEGEMONY

Gramsci's concepts were all derived from history - both from

his own reflections upo., thor" periods of history which he thought
helped to throw an explanatory light upon the present, and from his
personal experience of political and social struggle. These included
the workers' councils movement of the early 7920s, his participation
in the Third International and his opposition to fascism. Gramsci's
ideas have always to be related to his own historical context. More
than that, he was constantly adjusting his concepts to specific

48 49
 ROBERT W. COX W: GRAMSCI/ HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

historical circumstances.The conceptscannot usefully be considered perhaps some other gÍ oups potentially supportive of revolutionary
in abstraction from their applications, for when they are so abstracted change.o
different usages of the same concept appear to contain contradictions Gramsci's originality lies in his giving a twist to this first strand: he
or ambiguities.2A concePt, in Gramsci's thought, is loose and elastic began to apply it to the bourgeoisie, to the apparatus or mechanisms
and attains precision only when brought into contact with a particular of hegemony of the dominant class.TThis made it possible for him to
situation which it helps to explain - a contact which also develops distinguish casesin which the bourgeoisiehad attained a hegemonic
the meaning of the concept. This is the strength of Gramsci's position of leadership over other classes from those in which it had
historicism and therein lies its explanatoryPower. The term'histori- not. In northern Europe, in the countries where capitalism had first
cism' is however, frequently misunderstood and criticised by those become established, bourgeois hegemony was most complete. It
who seek a more abstract, systematic, universalistic and non-histori- necessarilyinvolved concessionsto subordinate classes in return for
cal form of knowledge.3 acquiescencein bourgeois leadership, concessionswhich could lead
Gramsci geared his thought consistently to the practical purpose of ultimately to forms of social democracy which preserve capitalism
while making it more acceptable to workers and the petty bourgeois.
political action. In his prison writings, he always referred to Marxism
Because their hegemony was firmly entrenched in civil society, the
as 'the philosophy of praxis'.a Partly at least, one may surmise, it
bourgeoisie often did not need to run the state themselves. Landed
must have been to underline the practical revolutionary purpose of
aristocrats in England, |unkers in Prussia, or a renegade pretender to
philosophy. Partly too, it would have been to indicate his intention
the mantle of Napoleon I in France, could do it for them so long as
to contribute to a lively developing current of thought, given impetus
these rulers recognised the hegemonic structures of civil society as
by Marx but not forever circumscribed by Marx's work. Nothing
the basic limits of their political action.
could be further from his mind than a Marxism which consists in an
This perception of hegemony led Gramsci to enlarge his definition
exegesis of the sacred texts for the purpose of refining a timeless set of the state. When the administrative, executive and coercive appa-
of categoriesand concepts. ratus of government was in effect constrained by the hegemony of
the leading class of a whole social formation, it became meaningless
ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF HEGEMONY to limit the definition of the state to those elements of governrnent.
To be meaningful, the notion of the state would also have to include
There are two main strands leading to the Gramscian idea of the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. Gramsci
hegemony. The first ran from the debates within the Third Inter- thought of these in concrete historical terms - the church, the
national concerning the strategy of the Bolshevik Revolution and the educational system, the press, all the institutions which helped to
creation of a Soviet socialist state; the second from the writings of create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations con-
Machiavelli. In tracing the first strand, some commentators have sistent with the hegemonic social order. For example, Gramsci
sought to contrast Gramsci's thought with Lenin's by aligning Gram- argued that the Masonic lodges in Italy were a bond amongst the
sci with the idea of a hegemony of the proletariat and Lenin with a Sovernment officials who entered into the state machinery after the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Other commentators have underlined unification of ltaly, and therefore must be considered as part of the
their basic agreement.s What is important is that Lenin referred to state for the purpose of assessing its broader political structure. The
the Russian proletariat as both a dominant and a directing class; hegemony of a dominant class thus bridged the conventional cat-
dominance implying dictatorship and direction implying leadership egories of state and civil society, categories which retained a certain
with the consent of allied classes (notably the peasantry)' Gramsci, analytical usefulness but ceased to correspond to separable entities
in effect, took over an idea that was current in the circles of the Third in reality.
International: the workers exercised hegemony over the allied classes -As noted above, the second strand leading to the Gramscian idea
and dictatorship over enemy classes. Yet this idea was applied by the of hegemony came all the way from Maihiavelli and helps to
Third International only to the working class and expressed the role broaden even further the potential scope of application o] the
of the working class in leading an alliance of workers, peasants and concept. Gramsci had pondered what Machiavelli had written,

51
 ROBERT W, COX
'wi GRAMSCI/ HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

a new
especially in The Prince, concerning the problem of founding applying coercion against recalcitrant elements and building consent
fifteenth century, was concerned with anong others. (This analysis was partly apposite to the period of the
státe. tr,tacrriavelli,in the
finding the leadership and the supporting social basis for a united New Economic Policy before coercion began to be applied on a larger
and
Italy; é ramsci, in thl twentieth century, with the leadership s6aleagainst the rural population.)
supportive basis for an alternative to fascism' Where Machiavelli In Western Europe, by contrast, civil society, under bourgeois
tooked to the individual Prince, Gramsci looked to the Modern hegemony, was much more fully developed and took manifold
Prince: the revolutionary party engaged in a continuing and devel- forms. A war of movement might conceivably, in conditions of
over
oping dialogue with iti own base of support' Gramsci took exceptional upheaval, enable a revolutionary vanguard to seize
image of power as a centaur: half man, half control of the state apparatus; but because of the resiliency of civil
rroďuacrriávelli the
of consent and coercion'8 To the society such an exploit would in the long run be doomed to failure.
beast, a necessary combination
extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront' Gramsci described the state in Western Europe (by which we should
in
hegemony prevails. Coercion iJalways latent but is only applied read state in the limited sense of administrative, governmental and
ma"rginat,deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to e1su19 conformity coeÍ civeapparatus and not the enlarged concept of the state men-
'an outer
of behaviour in most people most of the time' The Machiavellian tioned above) as ditch, behind which there stands a
as one
connection frees the concept of power (and of hegemony powerful system of fortresses and earthworks'.
formofpower)fromatietohistoricallyspecificsocialclasses In Russia,the Statewas everything,civil societywas primordialand
and
u.,a girru, it a wider applicability to relations of dominance gelatinous;in the West, therewas a proper relationbetweenState
relations
suboáination, includi''g, u' shall be suggested below, and civil society,and when the Statetrembleda sturdy structureof
not, however, sever pov/er relations from civil societywas at oncerevealed.(Gramsci,1971,:238)
of world order. It does
case of world order relations by
their social basis (i.e., in the Accordingly, Gramsci argued that the war of movement could not be
states narrowly conceived) but
making them into relations among effective against the hegemonic state-societies of Western Europe.
social
directs attention towards deepening an aI /areness of this The alternative strategy is the war of position which slowly builds up
basis. the strength of the social foundations of a new state. In Western
Europe, the struggle had to be won in civil society before an assault
VYAR OF MOVEMENT AND WAR OF POSITION on the state could achieve success. Premature attack on the state by
a war of movement would only reveal the weakness of the opposition
In thinking through the first strand of his concept of and lead to a reimposition of bourgeois dominance as the institutions
hegemony, Gramsč i reflected upon the.experience of the Bolshevik of civil society reasserted control.
drawn
Revolution and sought to determine what lessons might be The strategic implications of this analysis are clear but fraught with
in Western Europe.9 He came to the -
from it for the task oŤrevolution difficulties. To build up the basis of an alternative state and society
Western Europe differed greatly
conclusion that the circumstances in upon the leadership of the working class means creating alternative
from those in Russia. To illustrate the differences in circumstances, urstitutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing
had
and the consequent differences in strategies required' - he sgcietV and building bridges between workers and other subordinate
and wars of
recourse to the military analogy of wars of movement classes. It means actively building a counter-hegemony within an
Europe
position. The basic difierence between Russia and Western established hegemony while resisting the pressures and temptations
the
was in the relative strengths of state and civil society. In Russia, to. relapse into pursuit of incremental gains for subaltern groups
administrative and co"riirre apparatus of the state was formidable Ffii" the framework of bourgeois hegemony. This is ttre line
butprovedtobevulnerable,whilecivilsocietywasundeveloped.A war of position as a lon-g-rangeievoluiionary strategy and
letwgen
social democracy as a policy of making gains within the esta6iished
relativelysmallworkingclassledbyadisciplinedavant.gardewas
-overwhelm
able to the state in a war of movement and met no order.
party-
effective resistance from the rest of civil society. The vanguard
through a combination of
could set about founding a new state
53
 ROBERT W. COX rwl GRÁMscI/ HEGEMoNY AND INTERNATIoNAL RELATIoNs

PASSIVE REVOLUTION its outcome. In the aftermath of the First World War, worker and
peasant occupations of factories and land demonstrated a strength
Not all Western Europeansocietieswere bourgeois hegemon- which was considerable enough to threaten yet insufficient to dis-
ies. Gramsci distinguished betweentwo kinds of society. One kind lodge the existing state. There took place then what Gramsci called a
had undergone a thorough social revolution and worked out fully its 'displacement of the basis of the state'11towards
the petty bourgeoi-
consequences in new modes oÍ production and social relations. sie, the only class of nation-wide extent, which became the anchor of
England and France were casesthat had gone further than most Í ascistPower. Fascism continued the passive revolution, sustaining
others in this respect.The other krrd were societieswhich had so to the position of the old owner classes yet unable to attract the support
speak imported or had thrust upon them aspects of a new order of worker or peasant subaltern groups.
created abroad, without the old orderhaving been displaced. These Apart from caesarism, the second major feature of passive revolu-
last were caught up in a dialectic of revolution-restoration which tion in ltaly Gramsci called trasformismo.It was exemplified in Italian
tended to becomeblocked as neitherthe new forces nor the old could politics by Giovanni Giolitti who sought to bring about the widest
triumph. In these societies, the new industrial bourgeoisie failed to possible coalition of interests and who dominated the political scene
achieve hegemony. The resulting stalemate with the traditionallv in the years preceding fascism. For example, he aimed to bring
dominant social classes created the conditions that Gramsci called northern industrial workers into a common front with industrialists
'passive revolution', the introduction of changes which did not through a protectionist policy. Trasformismoworked to co-opt poten-
involve any arousal of popular forces.10 tial leaders of subaltern social groups. By extension trasformismocan
One typical accompaniment to passive revolution in Gramsci's serve as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially
analysis is caesarism:a strong manintervenesto resolve the stalemate dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant
between equal and opposed socialforces.Gramsci allowed that there coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based
were both progressive and reactionaryforms of caesarism:progress- organised opposition to establishedsocial and political power. Fasc-
ive when strong rule presides overa more orderly development of a ism continued trasformismo.Gramsci interprets the fascist state cor-
new state, reactionarywhen it stabilisesexisting Power. Napoleon I poratism as an unsuccessful attempt to introduce some of the more
M/asa case of progessive caesarisn,but Napoleon III, the exemplar advanced industrial practices of American capitalism under the aegis
of reactionary caesarism, v/as more representative of the kind likely of the old Italian management.
to arise in the course of passive rer,olution.Gramsci's analysis here is -The
concept of passive revolution is a counterpart to the concept
virtually identical with that of Max inThe EighteenthBrumaireaf Louis of hegemony in that it describes the condition oi a non-hegemonic
Bonaparte:the French bourgeoisit, unable to rule directly through society - one in which no dominant class has been able to establish a
their own political parties, were contentto develop capitalism under hegemony in Gramsci's sense of the term. Today this notion oÍ
a political regime which had its social basis in the peasantry, an passive revolution, together with its components, caesarism and
inarticulate and unorganised classwhose virtual representative Bona- trasformismo,is particularly apposite to industrialising Third World
parte could claim to be. counť ries.
In late nineteenth-century ltaly, the northern industrial bourgeoi-
sie, the class with the most to gain from the unification of Italy, was HISTORIC BLOC (BLOCCO STORICO)
unable to dominate the peninsula.Thebasis for the new statebecame
an alliance between the industrialbourgeoisí eof the north and the Gramsci attributed the source of his notion of the historic
landowners of the south - an allrlancewhich also provided benefits bloc (blocco storico)to Georges Sorel, though Sorel never used
the
for petty bourgeois clients (especiallyfrom the south) who staffed the a,:..*-o.any other in precisely the sense Gramsci gave to it.12
Sorel
new state bureaucracy and political parties and became the interme- did, however, interpré trevolutionary action in terms of social
myths
diaries between the various population groups and the state' The :1o-ugh which people engaged in action perceived a confrontation of
lack of any sustained and widespread popular participation in the totalities - in which they saw a new ordei chailengrng
an established
,passive revolution, character oÍ order. In the course of a cataclysmic event, the old
unification movement explained the order would be
55
 ROBERT W. COX cR4l4s!!r ryEGEMONy AND TNTERNATTONAL RELATTONS
.coÍ nmon
overthrou/n as a whole and the new be freed to unfold.l3 While culture. A new bloc is formed when a subordinate class
Gramsci did not share the subjectivism of this vision, he did share (e.g., the workers) establishes its hegemony over other subordinate
the view that state and society together constituted a solid structure gÍ oups (e.g., small farmers, marginals). This process requires inten-
and that revolution implied the development within it of another sive dialogue between leaders and followers within the would-be
structure strong enough to replace the first. Echoing Marx, he hegemonic class. Gramsci may have concurred in the Leninist idea of
thought this could come about only when the first had exhausted its 6n avant-garde parť y which takes upon itself the responsibility for
full potential. Whether dominant or emergent, such a structure is leadí ng an immafure working class, but only as an aspect of a war of
what Gramsci called an historic bloc. Í novement. Because a war of position strategy was required in the
For Sorel, social myth, a powerful form of collective subjectivity, western countries, as he saw it, the role of the party should be to
would obstruct reformist tendencies. These might otherwise attract lead, intensify and develop dialogue within the working class and
workers away from revolutionary syndicalism into incrementalist between the working class and other subordinate classes which could
trade unionism or reformist party politics. The myth was a weaPon be brought into alliance with it. The 'mass line' as a mobilisation
in struggle as well as a tool for analysis. For Gramsci, the historic technique developed by the Chinese Communist party is consistent
bloc similarly had a revolutionary orientation through its stress on with Gramsci's thinking in this respect.
the unity and coherence of socio-political orders. It was an intellectual Intellectuals play a key role in the building of an historic bloc.
defence against co-optation by trasformismo. lntellectuals are not a distinct and relatively classless social stratum.
The historic bloc is a dialectical concept in the sense that its Gramsci saw them as organically connected with a social class. They
interacting elements create a larger unity. Gramsci expressed these perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental
interacting elements sometimes as the subjective and the obiective, images, technologies and organisations which bind together the
sometimes as superstructure and structure. members of a class and of an historic bloc into u commo.t identity.
Bourgeois intellectuals did this for a whole society in which the
Structuresand superstrucfures from an 'historicbloc'. Thatis to say
bourgeoisie was hegemonic. The organic intellectuaÉ of the working
the complexcontradictoryand discordantensemble of thesuperstruc-
tures is the reflection oÍ the ensernbleof the social relations of class would perform a similar role in the creation of a new historic
production.(Gramsci,1971,: 366) ,t.,d". working class hegemony within that society. To do this
!lo.
they would have to evolve clearly distinctive culture, organisation
The juxtaposition and reciprocal relationships of the political, ethical and technique and do so in constant interaction with the members of
and ideological spheres of activity with the economic sphere avoids fhe -gmergent block. Everyone, for Gramsci, is in some part an
reductionism. It avoids reducing everything either to economics intellectual, although only some perform full-time the social function
(economism) or to ideas (idealism). In Gramsci's historical material- of an intellectual. In this task, the party was, in his conception, a
'collective
ism (which he was careful to distinguish from what he called intellectual,
'historical economism' or a narrowly economic interpretation of In the movement towards hegemony and the creation of an historic
history), ideas and material conditions are always bound together, bloc, Gramsci distinguished three levlb of consciousness: thb
econ-
mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other. omico-corporative, which is aware of the specific interests
of a
Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances' particular group; the solidarity or class consciousness,
which extends
Material circumstances include both the social relations and the to a whole social class but remains at a purely economic
level; and
physical means of production. Superstructures of ideology and the hegemonic, which brings the interesis
of the leading class into
poiiticat organisation shape the development of both aspects oÍ Í urmony with those of subordinate classes
and incorpoiates these
production and are shaped by them. other interests into an ideology expressed
in universal iu.-, (Gram-
An historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class' sci, 1971:180-95).The movement
towards hegemony, -ofG.amsci suys,
Where the hegemonic class is the dominant class in a country or ls a 'passage from the structure
to the ,phe." *r"
superstructures', by which he
social formation, the state (in Gramsci's enlarged concept) maintains means purri.rg from the "o-piu*specific
cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a urterests of a group or class to the
buitaing-or institutions and
 ROBERT W. COX
rw GRAMSCI, HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

elaboration of ideologies. If they reflect a hegemony' these -insti- v/ould now call dependency. What happened in ltaly he knew was
tutions and ideologieš will be universal in form' i.e., they will
not markedly influenced by external powers. At the purely foreign policy
aPpear as those ofá partic':lar class, and will give som; satisfaction level, great powers have relative freedom to determine their foreign
or policies in response to domestic interests;smaller pov/ers have less
to trre subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership
vital interests of the hegemonic class' autonomy (Gramsci, 1977: 264). The economic life of subordinate
nations is penetrated by and intertwined with that of powerful
nations. This is further complicated by the existence within countries
HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS oÍ structurally diverse regions which have distinctive patterns of
relationship to external forces (Gramsci, 7971,:182).
WecannowmakethetransitionfromwhatGramscisaid At an even deeper level, those states which are powerful are
these
about hegemony and related concepts to the implications of precisely those which have undergone a profound social and econ-
it is useful to
conceptslor iniernational relations. First, however, omic revolution and have most fully worked out the consequences of
look át what little Gramsci himself had to say about international
this revolution in the form of state and of social relations. The French
relations. Let us begin with this passage: Revolution was the case Gramsci reflected upon, but we can think of
Do internationalrelationsprecedeor follow (logically)fundamental the development of US and Soviet por /er in the same M/ay. These
social relations?There can be no doubt that they follow. Any were all nation-based developments which spilled over national
organic innovation in the social structure,through its technical- boundaries to become internationally expansive phenomena. Other
military expressions,modifies organically absglte ,and relative countries have received the impact of these developments in a more
relationsintheinternationalfieldtoo'(Gramsci,l97l:176) passive vÝ'ay/an instance of what Gramsci described at the national
level as a passive revolution. This effectcomes when the impetus to
By ,organic, Gramsci meant that which is structural,,conjunctural,'
long-term or
change does not arise out of 'a vast local economic development . . .
,"tuti.,ěty permanent, as opposed to the short-term or
but is instead the reflection of international developments which
He was suyi"g that basic changes in international power relations or
transmit their ideological currents to the periphery' (Gramsci, 1971:
world order, *t i.tr are observed as changes in the military-strategic 116).
and geo-political balance, can be traced to fundamental changes in The group which is the bearer of the new ideas, in such circum-
social relations. stances, is not an indigenous social group which is actively engaged
Gramscididnotinanywayby-passthestateordiminishits in building a new economic base with a ne\ / structure of social
importance. The state remained for him the basic entity in inter- relations. It is an intellectual stratum which picks up ideas originating
- the
national relations and the place where social conflicts take place from a prior foreign economic and social revolution. Consequently,
place also, therefore, where hegemonies of social classes can be built'
of the thought of this group takes an idealistic shape ungrounáed in a
in these hegemonies of social ..í u,,",, the particular characteristics domestic economic development; and its conception of ihe state takes
nations combine in unique and original ways. The working class'
the form of 'a rational ibsolute' (Gramsci, 1971.:777). Gramsci
which might be considered to be international in an abstract sense/ criticisedthe thought of BenedettoCroce, the dominant figure of the
nationalisé sitself in the process of building its hegemony. The Italian intellectual-establishment of his own time, for exprž ssing this
in
emergence of new worker-led blocs at the national level would, kina of distortion.
this line of reasoning, precede any basic restructuring of international
or
relations. However, the state, which remains the primary tocus
of international relations, is the
social struggle and the basic entity HEGEMONY AND WORLD ORDER
en1arged siáte which includes its own social basis. This view sets Is the
for Gramscian
aside a narrov/ or superficial view of the state which reduces it, ! _ concept of hegemony applicable at the
hternational or world level? Before attempting to suggest how this
instance, to the foreign policy bureaucracy or the state's military
rnight be done, it is well to rule out some usages
of tÍ u t".. which
capabilities.
.From flte common in international relations studies. Very
often'hegemony'
his Italian perspective, Gramsci had a keen sense of \^/hat\ďe
 ROBERT W. COX
GRAMSCI/ HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
is used to mean the dominance of one country over others, thereby saged by the Trilateral Commission; increased fragmentation of
ť ying the usage to a relationship strictly among states. Sometimes world economy around big-power-centred econňmic spheres;
'hegemony' is used as a euphemism for imperialism. When Chinese
'hegemonism' they seem the possible assertion of a Third-world-based counter-heg'emony
political leaders accuse the Soviet Union of . the concerted demand for the New International Economic
to have in mind some combination of these two. These meanings r as a torerunner.
ďffer so much from the Gramscian sense of the term that it is better, on the basis of this tentative notation, it would appear that,
'dominance' to
for purposes of clarity in this paper, to use the term storically, to become hegemonic, a state would have to iound and
replace them. t a world order which was universal in conception, i.e., not an
In applying the concept of hegemony to world order, it becomes in which one state directly exploits others but an order which
important to determine when a period of hegemony begins and other states (or at least those within reach of the hegemony)
when it ends. A period in which a world hegemony has been find compatible with their interests' Such an orde"r *o.'í á
established can be called hegemonic and one in which dominance of r be conceived in inter-state terms alone, for this would likelv
a non-hegemonic kind prevails, non-hegemonic. To illustrate, let us to the fore oppositions of state interests. It would most likelv
consider the past century and a half as falling into four distinguish- prominence to opportunities for the forces of civil societv to
able periods, roughly, 1845-1875,1875-1945,1945-1965and 1965 to Lteon the world scale (or on the scale of the sphere within '"Í 'i.n
the present.la y prevails). The hegemonic concept of world order is
The first period (1845-75) was hegemonic: there was a world not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also
economy with Britain as its centre. Economic doctrines consistent a globally-conceived civil society, i.e., a mode of production of
with British supremacy but universal in form - comparative advan- extent which brings about links among social ilasses of the
tage, free trade and the gold standard _ spread graduďly ouť ward ies encompassedby it.
from Britain. Coercive strength underr,rrrotethis order. Britain held orically, hegemonies of this kind are founded by powerful
the balance of power in Europe, thereby preventing any challenge to which have undergone a thorough social and economic revo_
hegemony from a land-based PoweÍ . Britain ruled supreme at sea . The revolution not only modifies the internal economic and
and had the capacity to enforce obedience by peripheral countries to ical structures of the state in question but also unleashes energies
the rules of the market. h expand beyond the state's boundaries. A world hegemonj, is
In the second period (1875-1945),all these features were reversed. in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internai(national)
Other countries challenged British supremacy. The balance of ,power y established by a dominant social class. The economic and
in Europe became destabilised, leading to two world wars. Free trade institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this
was superseded by protectionism; the Gold Standard was ultimately ď hegemony become patterns for emdátion abroad. Such an
abandonedi and the world economy fragmented into economic blocs' ive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a
This was a non-hegemonic period. : revolution. These countries have not undergone the same
In the third period, following the Second World War (1945-65), 'ough social revolution, nor have their economieš developed in
the United States founded a new hegemonic world order similar in but they try to incorporate elements from thď hege-
basic structure to that dominated by Britain in mid nineteenth century :"-" Y1y,
ic model without disturbing old power structures. l4/hile periitr-
but with institutions and doctrines adjusted to a more complex world countries may adopt some economic and cultural aspectJ of ihe
economy and to national societies more sensitive to the political rmonic core, they are less well able to adopt its political models.

i
repercussions of economic crises. as fascism became the form of passive revolution in the Italy of
Sometime from the later 1960s through the early 1970s it became inter-war period, so various forms of military-bureaucratic r"gi-"
evident that this US-based world order was no longer working well' ervise passive revolution in today,s peripheries. In the wč rld-
During the uncertain times which followed, three possibilities of monic model, hegemony is more intense and consistent at the
strucfural transformation of world order opened up: a reconstruction and more laden with contradictions at the periphery.
of hegemony with a broadening of political management on the lines Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an
order
6'J.
 ROBERT W. COX AMSCI/ HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RBLATIONS

among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant which establishes the hegemony. At the very least they must
mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into that state's support. The dominant state takes care to secure the
other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of :ence of other states according to a hierarchy of powers
international social relationships which connect the social classes of the inter-state strucfure of hegemony. Some second-rank
the different countries. World hegemony is describable as a social are consulted first and their support is secured. The consent
structure, an economic structure, and a political strucfure; and it least some of the more peripheral countries is solicited. Formal
cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World may be weighted in favour of the dominant powers as
hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions lnternational Monetary Fund and World Bank, or it may be on
and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for ne-vote basis as in most other maior international
states and for those forces of civil society that act across national . There is an inÍ ormal structure of influence reflecting the
boundaries - rules which support the dominant mode of production levels of real politicď and economic power which underlies
formal procedures for decisions.
institutions perform an ideological role as well. They
THE MECHANISMS OF HEGEMONY: INTERNATIONAL
define poliry guidelines for states and to legitimate certain
ORGANISATIONS tions and practices at the national level. They reflect orienta-
One mechanism through which the universal norms of a favourable to the dominant social and economic forces. The
world hegemony are expressed is the international organisation. lD, in recommending monetarism, endorsed a dominant consen-
Indeed, international organisation functions as the Process through of policy thinking in the core countries and strengthened those
which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. were determined to combat inflation this way against others
Among the features of international organisation which express its were moÍ e concerned about unemployment. The ILo, by
hegemonic role are the following: (1) they embody the rules which ting tripartism, legitimates the social relations evolved in the
faďitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are countries as the desirable model for emulation.
themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they talent from peripheral countries is co-opted into international
ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt in the manner oÍ trasformisltto.Inďviduals from periph.
the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter- countries, though they may come to international institutions
hegemonic ideas. the idea of working from within to change the system, are
International institutions embody rules which facilitate the expan- to work within the structures of passive revolution. At
sion of the dominant economic and social forces but which at the they will help transfer elements of 'modernisation' to the
same tirne permit adjustments to be made by subordinated interests ies but only as these are consistent with the interests oÍ
with a minimum of pain. The rules governing world monetary and local powers. Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows
trade relations are particularly significant. They are framed primarily sooner or later the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to
to promote economic expansion. At the same time they allow for uPon. Only where representation in international institutions is
exceptions and derogations to take care of problem situations. They based upon an articulate social and political challenge to
can be revised in the light of changed circumstances. The Bretton y - upon a nascent historic bloc and counter-hegemony -
Woods institutions pto,rided more safeguards for domestic social participation pose a real threat. The co-optation of outstanding
conceÍ ns like unemployment than did the Gold Standard, on con- from the peripheries renders this less likely.
dition that national policies were consistent with the goal of a liberal ismo also absorbs potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and
world economy. The current system of floating exchange rates also these ideas consistent with hegemonic doctrine. The notion of
gives scope foi national actions while maintaining the principle of a for example, began as a challenge to the world economy
!rio, to harmonise national policies in the interests of a vocating endogenously determined autonomous development.
"o-*itment
liberal world economy. P term has now been transformed to mean support by the agencies
International institutions and rules are generally initiated by the the world economy for do-it-yourself welfare programmeJ in the
 ROBERT \,V. COX GRAMSCI HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

peripheral countries. These programmes aim to enable the rural to deprived social groups and generate high unemployment open the
popul4tions to achieve self-sufficiency, to stem the rural exodus to PTosp'".' of a.broad alliance of the disadvantaged agáinst the sectors
the cities, and to achieve thereby a greater degree of social and of capital and labour which find commo'. g'o.'.'ď in international
political stability amongst populations which the world economy is grody;tio1.and the monopoly-liberal world order. The policy basis
incapable of integrating. Self-reliance in its transformed meaning Í or this alliance would most likely be post-Keynesian u,.á .'"o-
becomes complementary to and supportive of hegemonic goals for mercantilist. In peripheral countries, some states are vulnerable to
the world economy. revolutionary action, as events from Iran to Central America suggest.
Thus, one tactic for bringing about change in the structure of world Political preparation of the population in sufficient depth ma not,
order can be ruled out as a total illusion. There is very little likelihood ho'ever, be able to keep pace with revolutionary opportunity and
of a war of movement at the international level through which this diminishes the prospect for a new historic utoi. en effecuve
radicals would seize control of the superstructure of international political organisation (Gramsci's Modern prince) would be required
institutions. Daniel Patrick Moynihan notwithstanding, Third World in order to rally the new working classes generated by international
radicals do not control international institutions. Even if they did, production and build a bridge to peasants and urban marginars.
they could achieve nothing by it. These superstructures are inad- Without this, we can only envisage a Process where local páhtical
equately connected with any popular political base. They are conn- elites, even some which are the product of abortively revolutio.,ary
ected with the national hegemonic classes in the core countries and, upheavels, would entrench their power within a rnonopoly-liberal
through the intermediacy of these classes, have a broader base in world order. A reconstructed monopoly{iberal hegemony would be
these countries. In the peripheries, they connect only with the quite capable of practising trasformismoby adjusting to -u.ty varieties
passive revolution. of national institutions and practices, including nutio.,alisation of
industries. The rhetoric of nationalism and sociálism could then be
THE PROSPECTS FOR COUNTER-HEGEMONY brought into line with the restoration of passive revolution under
new guise in the periphery.
World orders - to return to Gramsci's statement cited earlier In short, the task of changing world order begins with the rong,
in this essay - are grounded in social relations. A significant structural Iaborious efÍ ort to build new historic blocš within national
change in world order is, accordingly, likely to be traceable to some boundaries.
fundamental change in social relations and in the national political
orders which correspond to national structures of social relations. In
Gramsci's thinking, this would come about with the emergence of a Notes
new historic bloc. l This essaywas originallypubtishedin Milrennium,(19g3) (2):J,62-7s.
We must shift the problem of changing world order back from 12 r
refer in citation to GramJci G97L),heraftercited as serectioni.
The full
international institutions to national societies. Gramsci's analysis of criticaleditionis Gramsci(lgTS),hereaftercitedas
euaderni.
Italy is even more valid when applied to the world order: only a war 2 This seems to be the problem underlying Anderson (1976_77)
which
of position can, in the long run, bring about structural changes, and - Puť Portsto find inconsistencies in Gramsci,sconcepts.
a war of position involves building up the socio-political base for 3 on this point seeThompson(rg7g),which contrasts
a historicistposition
analogousto Gramsci,swith the abstractphilosophical
change tfuough the creation of new historic blocs. The national structuráfismof
Althusser. see 'Marxism is not Historicism', in Althusser
context remains the only place where an historic bloc can be founded, (197e\.
and Balibar
although world-economy and world-political conditions materially 4 It is said that this u/asto avoid conÍ iscation
influence the prospects for such an enterprise. of his notes by the prison
if this is true,must havebeenparticularlyslow_witted.
The prolonged crisis in the world economy (the beginning of which ::.:oj,*lo,
" l".l-Y|":!1Tann (1975) placesGramscisquare|y in theLeninistť radition.
can be traced to the late 1960sand early 1970s)is propitious for some rortelli
(7972) and Macciocci (1923)both contrast Gramsci
and Lenin.
developments which could lead to a counter-hegemonicchallenge' Buci-Glucksmann's work seems to me
to be more fuly thought through.
In the core countries, those policies which cut into transfer Payments See also Mouffe (1979)and Showstack-Sassoon(19g2).

65
 ROBERT W. COX

with Gramsci's assessmentof the situation in Italy

6 This notion fitted \.4/ell
in the early 1920s;the working class was by itself too weak to carry the
3 ALIENATION, CAPITALISM
full burden of revolution and could only bring about the founding of a AND THE INTER-STATE
new state by an alliance with the peasantry and some petty bourgeois
elements.In fact, Gramsci considered the workers' council movement as SYSTEM: TOWARDS A
a school for leadership of such a coalition and his efforts prior to his
imprisonmentwere directedtoward building this coalition. MARXIAN/GRAMSCIAN
7 See Buci-Glucksmann(L975:63\
8 Machiavelli (1977:49-50);Gramsci (1971:169-90).
CRITIQUE
'Western Europe' refers here to the Britain, France, Germany
9 The term MARK RUPERT
and Italy of the 1920sand 1930s.
'passive revolution' from the Neapolitan
10 Gramsci borrowed the term
historian Vincenzo Cuocco (1770-1823)who was active in the early stages
of the Risorgimento.In Cuocco's interpretationNapoleon's armies had
brought passive revolution to Italy. This chapter presents an interpretation of the radicalised historical
11 Buci-Glucksmann(1975 1.2I). ontology characteristic of Marx and Gramsci, and argues that it is
12 Gramsci, Quaderni(1975:2,632). possible to understand both the system of sovereign states and the
'Napoleonic battle' in the letter to
13 See Sorel's discussionof myth and the capitalist world economy in non-reductionist ways if the theory of
Daniel Halevy (in Sorel, 1961). IR/IPE is reconstructed on the basis of a Marxian/Gramscian social
14 The dating is tentať iveand would have to be refined by enquiry into the ontology. Building upon such a foundation, I will suggest an inter-
structuralfeaturesproper to each period as well as into factors deemed
pretation of the political relations which underlie the capitalist organ-
to constitutethe breaking points between one period and another. These
are offered here as mere notations for a revision of historical scholarship isation of production, as well as the inter-state system, and which
to raise some questionsabout hegemony and its attendantstructuresand allow us to understand the historical construction of these relations
mechanisms. without a priori reducing one to the other. Viewed from such a
Imperialism, which has taken different forms in these periods, is a perspective, relations among sovereign states can be critically under-
closely related question. In the Í irst, Pax Britannica,although some stood as relations of alienation, historically constructed among politi-
territorieswere directly administered, control of colonies seems to have cal communities (states/societies) which are themselves constructed
been incidentalrather than necessaryto economic expansion.Argentina, on the basis of relations of alienation (i.e., the corresponding separa-
a formally independent country, had essentiallythe same relationship to
tions of the producer from the means of production, of political from
the British economy as Canada, a former colony. This, as George
'liberal imperialism'. In the economic relations, etc.).
Lichtheim noted, may be called the phase of
'new imperialism' brought more emphasis Marx and Gramsci may be said to have shared a common polití cal
second period, the so-called
on direct political controls. It also saw the growth of capital exports and commitment which permeated their practices of social inquiry and
of the finance capital identified by Lenin as the very essenceof imperial- which constitutes, for me, their primary legacy. Both werďengaged
ism. In the third period, which might be called that of the neo-liberalor in a practice oÍ critique which aime,d at uniovering and *át.i"g
monopolyJiberal imperialism, the internationalising of production explicit a social ontology - a process of social self-creation - which
emerged as the pre-eminent form, supported also by new forms of underlies and makes possible the capitalist mode of production, but
finance capital (multinational banks and consortia). There seems little
which is systematically distorted ánd hidden from view by the
point in trying to define some unchanging essenseof imperialism but it
characteristic institutional forms and social practices of capitalism. In
would be more useful to describe the structural characteristicsof the
imperialisms which correspond to successivehegemonic and non-hege- the process of constructing this critique oi capitalist social reality,
monic world orders. For a further discussion of this as regards Pnx ontology itself is radicalized; no longer viewed a priori, i.e., as
prior
BritannicaanďPax Americana,see Cox (1983). to and constitutive of the reality -hi.n we can
know, it becomes
instead an ongoing social product, historically
concrete and contest-
able.t This contrasts, therefore with the dominant
discourse in North
American studies of IPE/IR, neo-realism.2

66 67