According to Salmond, interpretation or construction is the process by which the courts seek

to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which
1
it is expressed.” Statute law is law which is written and that is set in place by a
legislature.Interpretation of statute is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words
used in a statute. This process must be distinguished from the construction of a legal text, which
is the process by which the court resolves uncertainties or ambiguities in a text.2 As explained
by Cooley: “Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former is the art of
finding out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author intended to
convey. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting the subjects
that lie beyond the direct expression of the text.3This distinction has been widely criticized.
Characteristically, interpretation resolves ambiguity and construction creates subsidiary rules
that resolve vagueness. Why? Interpretation resolves ambiguity, because it is usually the case
that there is a linguistic fact of the matter about the semantic meaning of a text that is
ambiguous. For example, the phrase "domestic violence" is used in Article I of the United
States Constitution: does it mean "spouse abuse" or "riot, rebellion, or insurrection"? In
context, it is clear that the linguistic meaning of "domestic violence" was the latter and not the
former. Construction resolves vagueness, because interpretation cannot do that work. When
a word or phrase has a linguistic meaning that is vague, then interpretation has done all the
work it is capable of doing. At that point, what we need is a construction that allows us to draw
a line (making the vague provision more specific) or that gives us a decision procedure
(allowing case-by-case resolution of the vagueness)4. Thus, the two processes go hand in hand.
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by SALMOND, “by interpretation or
construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the
legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.” What
constitutes the “intention of Parliament” is not easy to define. In the words of Lord Watson in
the English case of Salomom v Salomon & Co Ltd5.
“`intention of parliament` is a common but very slippery phrase which, popularly understood,
may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as
to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to
enact it. In a court of law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done
can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express
words or by reasonable and necessary implication.”
In other words, the intention to be given to parliament is to be determined from the objective
words used rather than from any subjective intention, which were not expressed. As one learned
writer,R M Dworkii, put it, the question of legislative intention is not about the historical or
hypothetical views of the legislators but rather concernsthe meaning of words used in a
particular context6.The correct is one that best harmonises the words with the object of the
statute7.As stated by Iyer J. “to be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul. The
judicial key of construction is the composite perception of the deha and the dehi of the
provision8.”
Elaborate rules of interpretation were evolved even at a very early stage of Hindu civilization
and culture. The rules given by ‘Jaimini’, the author of Mimamsat Sutras, originally meant for
srutis were employed for the interpretation of Smritis also9.
In the process of interpretation, several aids are used. They may be statutory or non-statutory.
Statutory aids may be illustrated by the General Clauses Act, 1897 and by specific definitions
contained in individuals Acts whereas non-statutory aids are illustrated by common law rules
of interpretation (including certain presumptions relating to interpretation) and also by case-
laws relating to the interpretation of statutes.When the language of the statute is clear, there is
no need for the rules of interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than one meaning may be
derived from the same word or sentence. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the statute to
find out the real intention of the statute.There are three rules used when using statute law. These
rules which will be discussed and analysed below, are supplemented by the provisions of the
Interpretations Act, 2009 in Ghana, as well as the definition sections of the statutes, which
define certain words and phrases used in the statutes. From the 1992 Constitution of ghana,
Article 130 deals with the court’s interpretative jurisdiction as distinct from its enforcement
jurisdiction. Under article 130(1), the Supreme Court is vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of the Constitution; and
also as to whether Parliament or any other authority or person empowered to enact any
legislation has exceeded its powers.1 Under article 130(2), whenever an issue relating to any
of the matters referred to in article 130(1) arises in any proceedings of a lower court, the
proceedings should be stayed; and the question of law raised in the proceedings should be
referred to the Supreme Court whose interpretative decision shall be binding on the lower
court.2 The exercise of the original and exclusive jurisdiction under article 130, is reinforced
by the provision in article 2. Under article 2(1), a person may seek a declaration in the Supreme
Court to the effect that: (a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority
of that or any other enactment; or (b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with or
is in contravention of a provision of [the] Constitution.3 It should be stressed that the
Constitution itself does not give any principles or guidance which may be applied by the
Supreme Court in exercising its interpretative role under articles 2(1) and 130(1).4 It appears
that the apparent assumption of the framers of the 1992 Constitution is that the Supreme Court
would itself fashion out the requisite approach and principles and rules of constitutional
interpretation.a The three main rules of interpretation and construction of general statutes are
the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule. It must be noted that these rules are not
binding precedents on the court , but rather, seve as aids, giude posts, ground rules, e.t.c. to the
art and science of Interpretation.

THE LITERAL RULE

This rule is the basis of all court decisions in relation to statutes. Here judges rely on the exact
wording of the statute for the case. This rule is to the effect that the intention of parliament
must be found in the plain, ordinary or grammatical meaning of the words used in a statute
regardless of whether the result is sensible or not10. The meaning of what is meant by giving a
word its ordinary meaning was explained by Brobbey JSC in Republic V Fast Track High
Court; Ex Parte CHRAJ(Anane, interested party) as follows:
“It is not the meaning that a person will find by research into technical books or arcane
sources. That will be far beyond the comprehension of the ordinary man. The ordinary meaning
will be the meaning which any ordinary man on the street will understand by that word or the
sense which he/ she wil attribute to that wordwhich is the sense in which it will be used by that
ordinary man. In the normal run of affairs, the ordinary man will approach the for the meaning,
if he has any doubt about the meaning of a word.”
Lord Diplock in the Duport Steel v Sirs case (1980) defined the rule:
“Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not then for the
judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to it’s plain meaning
because they consider the consequences for doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or
immoral.”
This definition says that a judge should not deviate from the literal meaning of the words even
if the outcome is unjust. If they do they are creating their own version of how the case should
turn out and the will of parliament is contradicted.In this regard, the maxim judicis est jus
dicere sed non dare ( it is the function of the judge to apply the law, and not make it) applies.
As put by Kludze JSC in Republic v Fast Track High Court, Accra;Ex parte Daniel11:
“Even in the area of statutory interpretation, we cannot amend a piece of legislation
because we dislike its terms or because we suppose the lawmaker was mistaken or unwise. Our
responsibility is greater when we interpret the Constitution. We cannot and must not substitute
our wisdom for the collective wisdom of the framers of the Constitution.”
The Court will rely on standard dictionaries to help it in finding literal meaning of a word12.The
literal rule of interpretation is paramount, and all other rules, principles or presumptions are
subordinate to it.
An example of the use of the literal rule can be seen in Tuffour v Attorney General.13
The Supreme Court in that case had to decide the meaning of th phrase “shall be deemed” in
article 127(8) of the 1979 Constituion in relation to the appointment of Justice Apaloo as Chief
Justice. In contruing the phrase,the court opted for the natural meaning of the wordsnin the
phrase and held that it meant, a thing that is said to be something else with its attendant
consequences when in fact it is not. Prior to this conclusion, the Court referred to the use of the
phrase in other contexts of the contitution. Such as Section1(1) of the transitional provisions to
the 1979 constitution the word “deemed” had been used to mean that although the first
president had not been appointed under the constitution, he should for all purposes exercise all
the functions of the President as if he had been so appointed. The same phrase was alos used
in relation to the election of memebers of Parliament. They were considered to have been
elected under the Constitution even though they had not been so elected.Consequently, the
Court held that the phrase “shall be deemed” should have the same meaning as those attributed
to the phrase in sections 1(1) and 2(1) in relations to the election of the president and members
of Parliament. Thus, article 127(8) of the 11979 Constitution should mean thaat a justice of the
superior court of judicature holding office immediately before the coming into effect of the
1979 constitution should continue in office as if he had been so appointed. It was after this that
Justice Apaloo, being the head of the Superoir court of judicaature before the coming into effect
of the constitution, became Chief Justice by virtue of article 127(8) of the 1979 constituion and
there was no needd for him to have been vetted for the purpose of approvinf him as Chief
Justice.

Another example can be seen from the South African case of Ebrahim v Minister of Interior14.
Section 15 of South Africa’s Citizenship Act,1949 provided that a South African national
would lose his nationality if he acquired a foreign nationality”whilst outside the Union”. The
appellant, a south African seaman, applied for British citizenship in order to secure better
employent. He falsely claimed to be ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom when in fact he
was living in Durban.British nationality was formally conferred upon him when he was on his
ship, which was within South African Territorial waters. The appellate division held that he
did not lose his South African citizenshipbecause foreing nationaltity was acquired when he
was in south Africa( the country’s territorial waters being part of the country). The Court said
that if the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous,then effect shhould be given to their
odinary, literal and grammatical meaning.

A third example of the literal rule is in the decision of the Supreme Court decision in Republic
v Yebbi & Avalifo. 40 This case came before the Supreme Court, on a reference from the
Greater Accra Regional Tribunal, on a case stated under article 130 (2) of the 1992
Constitution. The tribunal sought an interpretation of article of 143 (1) of the 1992 Constitution
which provides: “ A Regional Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to try such offences against the
State and the public interest as Parliament may, by law, prescribe.” The Supreme Court made
the pertinent observation that the question referred to it, did not relate to an ordinary Act of
Parliament. Having made that observation, the court held that, unless there were compelling
reasons for interpreting the word “and” in article 143 (1) as being only conjunctive, it would be
more desirable to interpret it liberally to encompass both its conjunctive and disjunctive
meanings. The court therefore concluded that regional tribunals had jurisdiction under article
143 (1) to try such offences against both the State and the public interest or against the State or
against the public interest; and that the “ and” as used in the article should be read as “and/or.”
b

A technical statute is one passed with reference to a particular trade, business or profession. In
such statutes, words which are conversant to members of such trade, business, or profession
must be construed in such a way that it is understood by them even though such meaning may
differ from the common usage of the words. An example of the application of interpretation
such statutes is the English case of Fisher v Bell(1960). Under the offensive weapons act of
1959, it is an offence to offer certain offensive weapons for sale. Bristol shopkeeper, James
Bell displayed a flick knife in his shop window. When brought to trial it was concluded that
Bell could not be convicted given the literal meaning of the statute. The law of contract states
that having an item in a window is not an intention of sale but is an invitation to treat. Given
the literal meaning of this statute, Bell could not be convicted. The court chose the former
meaning of an invitation to treat, that is, an invitation to the public to make offers for the goods
displayed.
The R V Harris case (1836), where the defendant bit the nose off the victim. The statute stated
the offence was ‘to stab or wound’. Under The Literal Rule, biting is not stabbing, cutting or
wounding (implying the use of an instrument). The defendant was proven not guilty.
A third example is the Partridge v Crittenden (1968) case used a legal loophole.
The defendant placed an advertisement offering two bramble finches for sale (s.6 of protection
of birds act (1954) makes it and offence to sell these birds). The advert was treated as an
invitation to treat, not an offer for sale and the defendant was acquitted.

Where the statute is not dealing with a particular science or art it will prima facie be presumed
to use the words in their popular sense as they are understood in common language15. This is
known as the plain meaning approach. It was criticised in Asare V Attorney General16 where
Date-Bah JSC said:
“What interpretation is to be given the words should depend upon the court’s perception
of the purpose of the provision and the context of the words, rather than on their dictionary
meaning. The `plain meaning` approach to judicial interpretation is not neccessarily the most
apposite. In my view, words hardly ever have a meaning in vacuo. They take meaning in
association with the other words in whose context they are used. Therefore, the interpretation
of words almost invariably means doing more than finding their mere dictionary (or `literal` or
`plain`) meaning.”
The plaintiff brought an action seeking (1) a declaration that upon a true and proper
interpretation of article 60(11) of the 1992 constitution, the purpoted swearing in of the Speaker
of Parliament as President of Ghana on or about Monday, 24th February 2002, is inconsistent
with ,or in contravention of the said provision of the Constitution and therefore is
unconstitutional, null and of no effect: and (2) a perpetual injunction to restrain the Speaker of
Parliament and any other person succeeding to the Office of the Speaker of Parliament from
performing the functions of the President of the Republic of Ghana except in the event of the
President and Vice President being unable to perform the functions of the president.17 In
interpreting the phrase” unable to perform the function of the President” in Article 60(11), the
Court held that a purposive interpretation was to be given in Article 60(11) of the 1992
Constitution and that where both the President and Vice- President were absent from Ghana,
the were regarded as “unable to perform the functions of the President” and thus the Speaker
was obliged to perform those functions. The Court basically said that the Constitution ensures
that whoever exercises the functions of the President is to be physicallly present in the country.

Another example is seen in the R v Maginnis case (1987), the defendant was charged with
possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply under the misuse of drugs act 1971 (s.5).
The defendant claimed that the drugs belonged to a friend who was picking them up later. The
judge stated that handing the drugs back was supply. The case was upheld on appeal. In his
speech at the appeal, Lord Keith proposed that: “The word ‘supply’ in its ordinary natural
meaning, conveys the idea of furnishing or providing to another something which is wanted or
required in order to meet the wants or requirements of that other.”
Lord Goff dissented saying:
“I do not feel able to say that either the delivery of goods by a depositor to a depositee, or the
redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can sensibly be described as an act of
supplying goods to another.”

Main advantages of The Literal Rule:

1) No scope for the judges own opinions or prejudices to interfere.
2) Respects parliamentary supremacy and upholds separation of power.
3) Encourages drafting precision, promotes certainty and reduces litigation.

There are disadvantages to The Literal Rule. An example is in the R v Maginnis case.This case
shows the main problem with The Literal Rule – that there can be disagreement over the literal
meaning of statutes.
The Literal Rule can create loopholes in law, as shown in the Fisher v Bell (1960) case
and the R v Harris (1960). Similarly, the Partridge v Crittenden (1968) case used a legal
loophole.
The Literal Rule can also lead to injustice. One example of this is the. In the London
and North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) case a rail worker was killed whilst oiling a
track; no ‘stopping man’ had been provided. Under statute, compensation is provided on death
of workers ‘replacing or relaying’ track. The statute did not cover oiling and so compensation
wasn’t given. This can undermine public confidence in the law.

THE GOLDEN RULE

As discussed previously, the literal rule is to the effect that the intention of parliament must be
found in the plain, ordinary or grammatical meaning of the words used in a statute. However,
language as it is, is rarely as free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than
one sense.
The rule was defined by Lord Wensleydale in the Grey v Pearson case (1857) as: “The
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some
absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity
and inconsistency, but no farther.”
The golden rule allows for a departure from the literal rule when the application of the statutory
words in their ordinary sense would be repugnant, or will lead to some absurdity so glaring that
it could neverhave been contemplated by the legislature.So, The Golden Rule is a modification
of The Literal Rule to be used to avoid an absurd outcome.
The golden rule was used in the case of Ababio v The Republic18, the court was to interpret
paragragh 5A of the Chieftaincy(Amendment)(No3) Decree, 1967(NLCD203). The Court in
interpreting” any person” in the above paragragh held that the phrase cannot bear its ordinary
literal meaning as person in general because such meaning would create an absurd situation
where any person, not necessarily a chief, could be prosecuted under the decree if he failed, for
example, to honour an invitationto attend a meeting of a traditional council. The Court
interpreted the phrase to mean persons who have been demoted as paramount chiefs and whose
stools had been specifiedin the schedule to a Decree. This aid was to aid the cure of the
mischief, that is, the displacement of customary allegiance to traditional paramount chiefs
which earlier legislation had given rise to, which the amendment Decree was enacted to deal
with.
Also, in the english case of Re Sigsworth, the golden rule was used to deny a murderer from
inheriting on the intestacy of his victim, although he was as her son, her "sole issue" on the
literal interpretation of section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925.
The "narrow" approach and the "wider" approach are the two possible approaches used in the
application of the golden rule.
The narrow approach basically provides that where the language used in a statute is ambiguous,
the Court can construe it so as to avoid any absurdity as a result. A case where the narrow
approach was used is in the case of General Cold Industry Ltd v Standard Bank Ghana Ltd, the
plaintiff company was registered under the Companis Code, 1963 as " General Cold Industry
Ltd." A bank account of a company called "General Cold Co Ltd" was frozen by the state
under the schedule to the Assets and Bank Accounts Decree, 1972, as amended by the Assets
and Bank Account (Schedule)(Amendment)(No15)Instrument,1979. In addition to this, shares
of the same company "General Cold Co Ltd" were confiscated and transferred to the State
under Transfer of Shares and Other Proprietary Interests Decree1979. The Court had to decide
whether the plaintiff Company, "General Cold Industry Ltd" was the same as " General Cold
Co Ltd", the subject of the frozen account and the confiscation of shares. It was argued that on
the proper construction of the enactments,there seemed to have been a mistake on the part of
the draftsman who seemed to have ommited the word "industry" thereby not correctly
identifying the plaintiff company as the company the enactment referred to. The Court was
therefore urged delte the word "company" and substitutte the word "industry" in order to avoid
the absurdity of the two enctments freezing and confiscating the assets of a non-existent
company. The Court rejected this argument holding that the enactments could not be contrued
to affect the plaintiff company as it was no where mentioned in them. In the courts view, even
if there was an omission, this could not be corrected by the Courts. The remedy lie, not with
the court bur with the legislature which was at liberty to amend the enactment to reflect its
intention. As matters stood, the Courts duty was to ascertain the intention of the legislaturefrom
the words of the statute and on that basis the words did apply to the plaintiff company.
The Golden Rule in the narrow approach was also applied in the Adler v George case (1964).
Under section 3 of the official secrets act (1920) it was an offence to obstruct HM Forces in
the vicinity of a prohibited area. Adler was arrested for obstructing forces whilst in a prohibited
area. Under The Literal Rule, Adler was not in the VICINITY of the area – he was IN the area
– and so was not infringing the terms of the act. The Golden Rule was applied to extend the
meaning of ‘vicinity’ and avoid the possible absurd outcome.
The "wider" approach, allows a departure from the clear, unambiguous language of a statute,
if to do otherwise would lead to a glaring absurdity obviuosly never contemplated by the
legislature. This approach is represented by the dictum of lord Denning L J( as he then was) in
the English case of Francis Jackson Developments Ltd v Hall. He said:
"If the literal interpretation of a statute leads to a result which Parliament can never
have intended, the Courts must reject the interpretation and seek for some other interpretation,
which does give effect to the intention of Parliament."
The wider approach was used in was used in the R v Allen case (1872). In this the defendant
was charged with bigamy (s.57 of offences against the person act 1861) which, under statutes
states: ‘whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the former
husband or wife is guilty of an offence’.
Under The Literal Rule, bigamy would be impossible because civil courts do not recognise
second marriages, so The Golden Rule was applied to determine that the word ‘marry’ should
be seen as ‘to go through ceremony’ and the conviction was upheld.The word "marry" permits
of alternative meanings. It may be construed to mean" contracts a valid marriage" or " goes
through a ceremony of marriage." Since the former meaning would produce an absurd result,
the Court adopted the latter meaning.
The main advantage of The Golden Rule is that drafting errors in statutes can be corrected
immediately. This is seen in the R v Allen (1872) case where the loopholes were closed, the
decision was in line with parliament’s intentions and it gave a more just outcome.
A major disadvantage of The Golden Rule is that judges can technically change the law by
changing the meaning of words in statutes. They can, potentially infringing the separation of
powers between legal and legislature.
The Golden Rule won’t help if there is no absurdity in the statute. For example the London and
North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) case, where the widow couldn’t get compensation
because the wording of the statute didn’t allow for this circumstance.

THE MISCHIEF RULE

Mischief Rule otherwise known as the rule in Heydon's case or the "purposive rule of
interpretation" enables the court to adopt an interpretation which is likely to give effect to the
purpose or reform, which the statute is intended to achieve.This rule gives judges the most
discretion of all. The 4 principles to follow were expressed in Heydon’s case (1584) which
concerned a conflict over legal action against Heydon for trespassing on certain land:
 What was the common law before the making of the Act?
 What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
 What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth or rather to remedy the defects?
 The true reason of the remedy.

The office of the Judges is to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance
the remedy and to supress subtle inventions and evasionsfor continuance of mischief.
The four principles in mischief rule was reformulated by Lord Diplock in the English case of
Jones v Wrotham Park Settled States. He stated them as follows:
 It must be possible to determine from the consideration from the Act as a whole
precisely the mischief that it was the purpose of th Act to remedy.
  It must be apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had inardvertently overlooked,
and so omitted to deal with the mischief, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if
the purpose of the Act was to be achieved.
 It must be possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would
have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had the omission been
drawn to their attention.

The rule after it was formulated by Lord Diplock was then reformulated by Bennion again as
follows:
" A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose
by-
 following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance
with the legislative purposes( in this code called purposive- and -literal construction) or
 applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the
legilative purpose( in this code called purposive- and- strained construction).

The Mischief rule goes beyond the literal rule and the golden rule. It is usually used to resolve
ambiguities in cases where the literal rule cannot be applied. In a Ghanain context, it has gained
prominence in the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.
For instance, Kludze JSC in Asare v Attorney- General expressed the purposive constructive
rule as follows:
" I agree that we must adopt a purposive construction of the constitutional provisions.
That means that we do not construe the words in the anstract but within the context in which
they are used. Language is a tool for expressing the wishes of the speaker, author or writer.
Therefore, regardless of the theoretical classification of the methodology of construction, the
fundamental rule is for the Court to construe every enactment with the purpose of effectuating
the true intent of the law-maker, in this case the intent of the framers of the 1992 Constitution
of Ghana. All other cannons of construction have the ultimate purpose of achieving this goal.
I do not think the mere recourse to dictionaries of the English language which will resolve the
issues which confront us or render any easier task we are called upon to perform."
The rule is intended to rectify ‘MISCHIEF’ in the statute and interpret the statute justly. The
mischief Rule uses common law to determine how the statute is interpreted.
In Smith v Hughes (1960), the defendants were charged under the street offences act (1959)
with soliciting in a public place. The prostitutes were soliciting from windows, technically not
a public place. The Mischief Rule was applied to interpret that the prostitutes were doing what
the statute was trying to abolish so they were convicted.
The Golden Rule was used to handle a dispute in the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) v DHSS
(1981) case. Here the RCN challenged the involvement of nurses in abortions. Under the
offences against the person (1861) it is an offence for anyone to carry out an abortion. However,
the abortion act (1967) claims an absolute defence for medically registered practitioners to
carry out abortions.
Hormonal abortions are commonly administered by nurses. The Mischief Rule was used to
interpret that the statute of 1861 was trying to combat backstreet abortions and therefore nurses
fall within the 1967 abortion act.
The main advantage of The Mischief Rule is that it closes loopholes in the law and allows laws
to develop. The main disadvantage is that it creates a crime after the event has taken place,
which can be seen in the Smith v Hughes (1960) case. It allows judges to apply their opinions
and prejudices – an infringement on the separation of powers.
When comparing the three rules there are differences and similarities. The Literal Rule is the
basis of all cases. By providing no scope for the judges input, it upholds the separation of
powers and respects parliamentary supremacy. However, its inflexibility can also create
injustices.
The Golden Rule tries to compliment the Literal Rule by allowing judges to change the
meaning of statutes in order to give justice. However, this infringes the separation of powers.
The Mischief Rule gives the most discretion to judges and is suited to specific, often ambiguous
cases. The rule allows statutes to be refined and developed. However, the increased role of the
judge means that his views and prejudices can influence the final decision.
It must be noted that the mischief rule is not a carte blanche for rewriting legislation and should
never be used as a ruse, a cloak or a guise to do so.
Judges can interpret more than one meaning for the same word and that the meaning of the
word can change depending on the context which it may be stated in. Statutory interpretation
is important so that they are unable to make their own judgement in cases.

If they stumble upon any problem they cannot change the law therefore they cannot interrupt
the flow of justice. In allows Parliament to be the law making body and court will then apply
the law.

Statutory interpretation plays an essential role in the process of access to justice and cannot be
overlooked. It is easy to see that when judges use statutory interpretation it may be considered
a skill of language rather than a law. The uses of traditional rules of interpretation are applied
basis on the ambiguity of the legislation and tend to somewhat cancel of each other.

Using rules of languages and, internal and external material helps interpret the law and also
how the system such work. Statutory interpretation is important to the access to justice because
it helps the judiciary system implement the law in an efficiency and effective way and helps
the Parliament to make the law.