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Seminar report

On

Biometric Authentication Technology

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of degree
Of Computer Science

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

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Preface
I have made this report file on the topic Biometric Authentication Technology; I have
tried my best to elucidate all the relevant detail to the topic to be included in the report.
While in the beginning I have tried to give a general view about this topic.

My efforts and wholehearted co-corporation of each and everyone has ended on a

successful note. I express my sincere gratitude to …………..who assisting me
throughout the preparation of this topic. I thank him for providing me the reinforcement,
confidence and most importantly the track for the topic whenever I needed it.

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INTRODUCTION

Humans recognize each other according to their various characteristics for ages.
We recognize others by their face when we meet them and by their voice as we speak to
them. Identity verification (authentication) in computer systems has been traditionally
based on something that one has (key, magnetic or chip card) or one knows (PIN,
password). Things like keys or cards, however, tend to get stolen or lost and passwords
are often forgotten or disclosed.
To achieve more reliable verification or identification we should use something
that really characterizes the given person. Biometrics offer automated methods of identity
verification or identification on the principle of measurable physiological or behavioural
characteristics such as a fingerprint or a voice sample. The characteristics are measurable
and unique. These characteristics should not be duplicable, but it is unfortunately often
possible to create a copy that is accepted by the biometric system as a true sample. This is
a typical situation where the level of security provided is given as the amount of money
the impostor needs to gain an unauthorized access.
In this computer-driven era, identity theft and the loss or disclosure of data and
related intellectual property are growing problems. We each have multiple accounts and
use multiple passwords on an ever-increasing number of computers and Web sites.
Maintaining and managing access while protecting both the user's identity and the
computer's data and systems has become increasingly difficult. Central to all security is
the concept of authentication - verifying that the user is who he claims to be.
We can authenticate an identity in three ways: by something the user knows (such
as a password or personal identification number), something the user has (a security token
or smart card) or something the user is (a physical characteristic, such as a
fingerprint,called a biometric).
Passwords are cheap, but most implementations offer little real security.
Managing multiple passwords for different systems is a nightmare, requiring users to
maintain lists of passwords and systems that are inevitably written down because they
can't remember them. The short answer, talked about for decades but rarely achieved in
practice, is the idea of single sign-on.Using security tokens or smart cards requires more
expense, more infrastructure support and specialized hardware. Still, these used to be a lot

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cheaper than biometric devices and, when used with a PIN or password, offer acceptable
levels of security, if not always convenience.
Biometric authentication has been widely regarded as the most foolproof - or at
least the hardest to forge or spoof. Since the early 1980s, systems of identification and
authentication based on physical characteristics have been available to enterprise IT.
These biometric systems were slow, intrusive and expensive, but because they were
mainly used forguarding mainframe access or restricting physical entry to relatively few
users, they proved workable in some high-security situations. Twenty years later,
computers are much faster and cheaper than ever. This, plus new, inexpensive hardware,
has renewed interest in biometrics.
Who are you? Do you belong here? What rights do you have? And how do I know
you're who you say you are? Those are the essential questions that any effective security
system must answer before a user can access a computer system, network or other
protected resource. We think this is what a password system does, but passwords are only
one part of an effective security system. That security system requires three separate
elements - identification, authentication and authorization - that together make up what's
called access control.When you log into a computer or network, the first thing you're
asked for is a user name or account name. But a user name offers little protection to the
system. Therefore, the system also usually prompts you for a password, a form of
authentication.

1.1 Authentication
The question, "How do I know you're who you say you are?," is in many ways, the
most important one. Unless it's answered satisfactorily, identification is incomplete and
no authorization can or should take place. But how does a system verify that a user is who
he says he is? Simply entering your password doesn't prove it's you. Someone else could
know your password. The answer lies in a strong authentication process. Basically, the
following three factors can be used to authenticate an individual:
1. Something the user knows. This is a reusable password, passphrase, personal
identification number or a fact likely to be known only to the user, such as his
mother's maiden name.

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2. Something the user has. This could be a key, a magnetic-stripe card, a smart card
or a specialized authentication device (called a token) that generates a one-time
password or a specific response to a challenge presented by the server.
3. Something the user is. This depends on some inherent physical trait or
characteristic. Often called biometrics, examples of this form of authentication
include: fingerprints, retinal (eye) patterns, hand geometry, voice recognition,
facialrecognition, typing pattern recognition and signature dynamics (speed and
pressure, not just the outline).

These authentication factors are listed here from weakest to strongest as determined
by how difficult they are to forge or fake. By themselves, each of these methods offers
some security. However, each has its own problems or weaknesses.
Anyone can enter a password and, historically, reusable passwords have been
vulnerable to guessing, brute force and dictionary-based attacks.The second means of
authentication - something the user has - requires the user to possess an often difficult-to-
replicate device. However this stronger protection also costs more (typically tens of
dollars per device), and it requires contingency procedures in case a device is left at
home, lost or stolen. The third type of authentication - something the user is - is the most
difficult to defeat, but it has other problems. Biometric identification methods are subject
to two types of errors: false positives and false negatives. The first erroneously
authenticates an individual who shouldn't be authenticated; the second denies an
individual who should be authenticated. Error are not desirable, and it's important to
know and verify error rates when considering such a system. [1]
Another problem is that permanent physical changes or temporary ailments or
accidents can alter or render unreadable the measured characteristic. If you cut part of
your fingertip, you've changed what the fingerprint reader sees. Put on a Band-Aid, and
the reader can't see the fingerprint at all.
Finally, if the method is compromised, there's no way to give an individual a new
identifying characteristic. You can issue a new password or security token, but you can't
change his fingerprints or eye pattern.

1.2 Two-Factor Authentication

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For greatly increased security, the approach preferred by experts is to use two of the
three methods in combination - a process called two-factor authentication. For example,
to use a security token that generates a one-time password, you may need to enter a
personal identification number into the token itself. Similarly, a card-key can be used in
combination with a biometric system.

This is essentially what happens when you check in at an airport ticket counter. You
hand over your ticket, which identifies you. Then you show a photo ID of some kind.
This is something you have with you, and it's biometric (something you are) in that the
clerk has to determine that the photo on the card matches you.
Once a user has been identified and authenticated, what remains is to grant him
access to whatever specific system resources have been approved. This authorization is
usually accomplished by looking up that user's entry in an access control list that
delineates specific rights and permissions. These can be based, among other things, on an
individual's identity or job function, membership in a workgroup or other classification or
time of day or day of week.

Authentication via Security Token

Security Token like Secure ID, a hardware authentication device, or security token,
provides greatly increased protection against spoofing or brute-force attacks. The time-
synchronized SecurID card from RSA Security Inc. in Bedford, Mass., has an LCD
screen that shows a string of numbers that changes every minute. The user types in his
user name at log in, then the number shown on the card. The host system knows what that

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number is supposed to be for that user at that particular time. Some tokens don't show a
number continuously but require the user to enter a PIN on the card itself before the
number is displayed, thus providing two-factor authentication.

Challenge-Response Systems with a token-based Challenge-Response system, the

system displays a number (the challenge) when you log in. The user types this number
into his token, which encrypts that to produce a second number (the response). The user
enters the response into the computer. The host performs the same operation on the
challenge, then compares its result to the user's response. If they match, the user is
authenticated.

1.3 What is Biometric?

The term biometrics is derived from the Greek words Bio & Metric. The term
Biometrics relates to the measurement (metric) of characteristics of a living (Bio) thing in
order to identify a person. Biometrics uses various physiological or behavioural
characteristics. Common physiological biometric measurements include fingerprints,
hand geometry, retina, iris, facial images etc. While common behavioural biometric
measurements include signatures, voice recordings, keystroke rhythms etc. With an
increasing importance of security, there is a need to guaranty that only authenticated users
have access to the system. In recent years, biometrics authentication has seen
considerable improvements in reliability and accuracy, with some of the traits offering
good performance. However, even the best biometric traits till date are facing numerous
problems some of them are inherent to the technology itself. Biometric authentication
systems generally suffer from enrolment problems due to non-universal biometric traits,
insufficient accuracy caused by noisy data acquisition in certain environments. Biometric
measurements are inherently varied because of the existence of back-ground noise, signal
distortion, biometric feature changes and environmental variations. Identification based
on a single bio-metric trait may not be sufficiently robust and it has a limited ability to
overcome spoofing.

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One way to overcome these problems is the use of multi-biometrics. A multi

biometric system uses multiple sensors for data acquisition. This allows capturing
multiple samples of a single biometric trait and/or samples of multiple biometric traits.
This approach is enables to provide significant improvement over unimodal biometric
system in terms of higher accuracy.

Biometric System Components and Process

Four major components are usually present in a biometric system:
A mechanism to scan and capture a digital representation of a living person’s
biometriccharacteristic.
Software to process the raw data into a format (called a template) that can be used
forstoringand matching.
Matching software to compare a previously stored biometric template with a
templatefrom a livesample.
An interface with the application system to communicate the match result.

Two different stages are involved in the biometric system process – enrollment and
matching.

Enrollment. As shown in Figure 1, the biometric sample of the individual is captured

during theenrollment process (e.g., using a sensor for fingerprint, microphone for speaker
recognition, camera forface recognition, camera for iris recognition). The unique features
are then extracted from thebiometricsample (e.g., image) to create the user’s biometric
template. This biometric template is stored in adatabase or on a machine-readable ID card
for later use during a matching process.

Figure 1. Example Enrollment Process

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Matching.Figure 2 illustrates the biometric matching process. The biometric sample is

again captured. The unique features are extracted from the biometric sample to create the
user’s “live” biometrictemplate.This new template is then compared with the template(s)
previously stored and a numeric matching(similarity) score(s) is generated based on a
determination of the common elements between the twotemplates. System designers
determine the threshold value for this verification score based upon thesecurity and
convenience requirements of the system.

Figure 2. Example Matching Process

Biometrically enabled security systems use biometrics for two basic purposes:
identification andverification.

Identification(one-to-many or 1: N comparison) determines if the individual exists

within an enrolled population by comparing the live sample template to all stored
templates in the system. Identification can confirm that the individual is not enrolled with
another identity or is not on a predetermined list ofprohibited persons. The biometric for
the individual being considered for enrollment should be comparedagainst all stored

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biometrics. For some credentialing applications, a biometric identification process isused

at the time of enrollment to confirm that the individual is not already enrolled.

Verification(one-to-one or 1:1 comparison) determines whether the live biometric

template matcheswith a specific enrolled template record. This requires that there be a
“claim” of identity by the personseeking verification so that the specific enrolled template
record can be accessed. An example would bepresentation of a smart card credential and
matching the live sample biometric template with the enrolled template stored in the
smart card memory. Another example would be entry of a user name or ID numberwhich
would point to an enrolled template record in a database.

1.4 A System Model

Although these devices rely on widely different technologies, much can be said
about them in general. Figure 1.1 shows a generic biometric authentication system
divided into five subsystems: data collection, transmission, signal processing, decision
and data storage. We will consider these subsystems one at a time.

1.4.1 Data Collection

Biometric systems begin with the measurement of a behavioural/physiological
characteristic. Key to all systems is the underlying assumption that the measured
biometric characteristic is both distinctive between individuals and repeatable over time
for the same individual. The problems in measuring and controlling these variations begin
in the data collection subsystem.

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The user’s characteristic must be presented to a sensor. The presentationof any

biometric characteristic to the sensor introduces a behavioural (and,consequently,
psychological) component to every biometric method. This behavioural component may
vary widely between users, between applications,and between the test laboratory and the
operational environment.The output of the sensor, which is the input data upon which the
system isbuilt, is the convolution of: (1) the biometric measure; (2) the way the measureis
presented; and (3) the technical characteristics of the sensor. Boththe repeatability and the
distinctiveness of the measurement are negativelyimpacted by changes in any of these
factors. If a system is to be open, thepresentation and sensor characteristics must be
standardized to ensurethat biometric characteristics collected with one system will match
thosecollected on the same individual by another system. If a systemis to be usedin an
overt, non-cooperative application, the user must not be able to wilfully change the
biometric or its presentation sufficiently to avoid beingmatched to previous records.

1.4.2 Transmission
Some, but not all, biometric systems collect data at one location but store and/or
process it at another. Such systems require data transmission. If a great amount of data is

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involved, compression may be required before transmission or storage to conserve

bandwidth and storage space. Figure shows compression and transmission occurring
before the signal processing and image storage. In such cases, the transmitted or stored
compressed data must be expanded before further use. The process of compression and
expansion generally causes quality loss in the restored signal, with loss increasing with
increasing compression ratio. The compression technique used will depend upon the
biometric signal. An interesting area of research is in finding, for a given biometric
technique, compression methods with minimum impact on the signal-processing
subsystem.
If a system is to be open, compression and transmission protocols must be
standardized so that every user of the data can reconstruct the original signal. Standards
currently exist for the compression of fingerprints (Wavelet Scalar Quantization), facial
images (JPEG), and voice data (Code Excited Linear Prediction). [5]

1.4.3 Signal Processing

Having acquired and possibly transmitted a biometric characteristic, we must
prepare it for matching with other like measures. Figure divides the signal-processing
subsystem into four tasks: segmentation, feature extraction, quality control, and pattern
matching.
Segmentation is the process of finding the biometric pattern within the transmitted
signal. For example, a facial recognition system must first find the boundaries of the face
or faces in the transmitted image. A speaker verification system must find the speech
activity within a signal that may contain periods of non-speech sounds. Once the raw
biometric pattern of interest has been found and extracted from larger signal, the pattern
is sent to the feature extraction process.
Feature extraction is fascinating. The raw biometric pattern, even after
segmentation from the larger signal, contains non-repeatable distortions caused by the
presentation, sensor and transmission processes of the system. These non-controllable
distortions and any non-distinctive or redundant elements must be removed from the
biometric pattern, while at the same time preserving those qualities that are both
distinctive and repeatable. These qualities expressed in mathematical form are called
“features”. In a text-independent speaker recognition system, for instance, we may want
to find the features, such as the mathematical frequency relationships in the vowels that

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depend only upon the speaker and not upon the words being spoken, the health status of
the speaker, or the speed, volume and pitch of the speech. There are as many wonderfully
creative mathematical approaches to feature extraction as there are scientists and
engineers in the biometrics industry. You can understand why such algorithms are always
considered proprietary. Consequently, in an open system, the “open” stops here.In
general, feature extraction is a form of non-reversible compression, meaning that the
original biometric image cannot be reconstructed from the extracted features. In some
systems, transmission occurs after feature extraction to reduce the requirement for
bandwidth.
After feature extraction, or maybe even before, we will want to check to see if the
signal received from the data collection subsystem is of good quality. If the features
“don’t make sense” or are insufficient in some way, we can conclude quickly that the
received signal was defective and request a new sample from the data collection
subsystem while the user is still at the sensor. The development of this “quality control”
process has greatly improved the performance of biometric systems in the last few short
years. On the other hand, some people seem never to be able to present an acceptable
signal to the system. If a negative decision by the quality control module cannot be
overridden, a “failure to enroll” error results.
The feature “sample”, now of very small size compared to the original signal, will
be sent to the pattern matching process for comparison with one or more previously
identified and stored feature templates or models. We use the term “template” to indicate
stored features. The features in the template are of the same type as those of a sample. For
instance, if the sample features are a “vector” in the mathematical sense, then the stored
template will also be a “vector”. The term “model” is used to indicate the construction of
a more complex mathematical representation capable of generating features characteristic
of a particular user. Models and features will be of different mathematical types and
structures. Models are used in some speaker and facial recognition systems. Templates
are used in fingerprint, iris, and hand geometry recognition systems.
The term “enrollment” refers to the placing of a template or model into the
database for the very first time. Once in the database and associated with an identity by
external information (provided by the enrollee orothers), the enrollment biometric data is
referred to as the template ormodel for the individual to which it refers.The purpose of the
patternmatching process is to compare a presented featuresample to the stored data,and to

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send to the decision subsystemaquantitativemeasure of the comparison. An exception is

enrollment in systemsallowing multiple enrollments. In this application, the pattern
matching processcan be skipped. In the cooperative case where the user has claimed
anidentity or where there is but a single record in the current database (whichmight be a
magnetic stripe card), the pattern matching process might onlymake a comparison against
a single stored template. In all other cases, such aslarge-scale identification, the pattern
matching process compares the presentsample to multiple templates or models from the
database one at a time, asinstructed by the decision subsystem, sending on a quantitative
“distance”measure for each comparison. In place of a “distance”measure, some
systemsuse “similarity”measures, such as maximum likelihood values.
The signal processing subsystem is designed with the goal of yieldingsmall
distances between enrolled models/templates and later samples fromthe same individual
and large distances between enrolled models/templatesand samples of different
individuals. Even for models and samplesfrom the same individual, however, distances
will rarely, if ever, be zero, asthere will always be some non-repeatable biometric-,
presentation-,sensor- or transmission-related variation remaining after processing. [5]

1.4.4 Storage
The remaining subsystem to be considered is that of storage. There will beone or
more forms of storage used, depending upon the biometric system.Templates or models
from enrolled users will be stored in a database forcomparison by the pattern matcher to
incoming feature samples. For systemsonly performing “one-to-one”matching, the
database may be distributedon smart cards, optically read cards or magnetic stripe cards
carriedby each enrolled user. Depending upon system policy, no central databaseneed
exist, although in this application a centralized database can be usedto detect counterfeit
cards or to reissue lost cards without re-collecting thebiometric pattern.
The database will be centralized if the system performs one-to-Nmatching with N
greater than one, as in the case of identification or “PIN-lessverification” systems. As N
gets very large, system speed requirementsdictate that the database be partitioned into
smaller subsets such that anyfeature sample need only be matched to the templates or
models stored inone partition, or indexed by using an appropriate data structure

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whichallows the templates to be visited in an advantageous order during theretrieval.

These strategies have the effect of increasing system speedand decreasing false matches,
at the expense of increasing the false non-matchrate owing to partitioning
errors.Thismeans that system error ratesdo not remain constant with increasing database
size and identification systems do not scale linearly. Consequently, database
partitioning/indexing strategies represent a complex policy decision.
If it may be necessary to reconstruct the biometric patterns from storeddata, raw
(although possibly compressed) data storage will be required.The biometric pattern is
generally not reconstructable from the storedtemplates or models, although some methods
do allow a coarse reconstructionof patterns from templates. Further, the templates
themselves arecreated using the proprietary feature extraction algorithms of the
systemvendor. The storage of raw data allows changes in the system or systemvendor to
be made without the need to re-collect data from all enrolledusers.

1.4.5 Decision
The decision subsystem implements system policy by directing the
databasesearch, determines “matches” or “non-matches” based on the distanceor
similarity measures received from the pattern matcher, and ultimatelymakes an
“accept/reject” decision based on the system policy. Such a decisionpolicy could be to
reject the identity claim (either positive or negative)of any user whose pattern could not
be acquired. For an acquired pattern,the policy might declare a match for any distance
lower than a fixedthreshold and “accept” a user identity claim on the basis of this
singlematch, or the policy could be to declare amatch for any distance lower thana user-
dependent, time-variant, or environmentally linked threshold andrequire matches from
multiple measures for an “accept” decision. Thepolicy could be to give all users,good
guys and bad guys alike, three tries toreturn a low distance measure and be “accepted” as
matching a claimedtemplate. Or, in the absence of a claimed template, the system policy
couldbe to direct the search of all,or only a portion,of the database and return asingle
match or multiple “candidate” matches. The decision policyemployed is a management
decision that is specific to the operational andsecurity requirements of the system. In
general, lowering the number offalse non-matches can be traded against raising the
number of falsematches. The optimal system policy in this regard depends both upon
thestatistical characteristics of the comparison distances coming from thepattern matcher,

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the relative penalties for false match and false non-matchwithin the system,and the a
priori (guessed in advance) probabilities that auser is, in fact, an impostor. In any case, in
the testing of biometric devices,it is necessary to decouple the performance of the signal
processingsubsystem from the policies implemented by the decision subsystem.

1.5 Biometrics and Privacy

1. Unlike more common forms of identification, biometric measures contain no
personalinformation and are more difficult to forge or steal.
2. Biometric measures can be used in place of a name or Social Security number to secure
anonymous transactions.
3. Some biometric measures (face images, voice signals and “latent” fingerprints left on
surfaces) can be taken without a person’s knowledge, but cannot be linked to an identity
without a pre-existing invertible database.
4. A Social Security or credit card number, and sometimes even a legal name, can identify
a person in a large population. This capability has not been demonstrated using any single
biometric measure.
5. Like telephone and credit card information, biometric databases can be searched
outside of their intended purpose by court order.
6. Unlike credit card, telephone or Social Security numbers, biometric characteristics
change from one measurement to the next.
7. Searching for personal data based on biometric measures is not as reliable or efficient
as using better identifiers, like legal name or Social Security number.
8. Biometric measures are not always secret, but are sometimes publicly observable and
cannot be revoked if compromised.

1.6 Factors of Evaluation

1.6.1 False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Match Rate (MAR): The probability that
thesystem incorrectly declares a successful match between the input pattern and a
nonmatchingpattern in the database. It measures the percent of invalid matches.
Thesesystems are critical since they are commonly used to forbid certain actions
bydisallowed people.

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1.6.2 False Reject Rate (FRR) or False Non-Match Rate (FNMR): The probability
thatthe system incorrectly declares failure of match between the input pattern and the
matchingtemplate in the database. It measures the percent of valid inputs being rejected.

1.6.3 Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC): In general, the matching

algorithmperforms a decision using some parameters (e.g. a threshold). In biometric
systems the FARand FRR can typically be traded off against each other by changing
those parameters. The
ROC plot is obtained by graphing the values of FAR and FRR, changing the variables
implicitly. A common variation is the Detection Error Tradeoff (DET), which is
obtainedusing normal deviate scales on both axes. This more linear graph illuminates the
differencesfor higher performances (rarer errors).

1.6.4 Equal Error Rate (EER): The rates at which both accept and reject errors are
equal.
ROC or DET plotting is used because how FAR and FRR can be changed, is shown
clearly.
When quick comparison of two systems is required, the ERR is commonly used.
Obtainedfrom the ROC plot by taking the point where FAR and FRR have the same
value. The lowerthe EER, the more accurate the system is considered to be.

1.6.5 Failure to Enroll Rate (FTE or FER): The percentage of data input is
consideredinvalid and fails to input into the system. Failure to enroll happens when the
data obtained bythe sensor are considered invalid or of poor quality.
1.6.6 Failure to Capture Rate (FTC): Within automatic systems, the probability that
thesystem fails to detect a biometric characteristic when presented correctly is
generallytreatedas FTC.

1.6.7 Template Capacity: It is defined as the maximum number of sets of data which
canbeinput in to the system.

1.7 Biometric Applications

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Biometric applications can be categorized in horizontal categories as well as

verticalmarkets.Biometrics are most frequently used in the following horizontal
categories:
a) Citizen Identification:
Identify/authentify citizens interacting with government agencies
b) PC / Network Access:
Secure access to PCs, networks and other computer resources
c) Physical Access / Time and Attendance:
Secure access to a given area at a given time
d) Surveillance and Screening:
Identify/authentify individuals present in a given location
e) Retail / ATM / Point of Sale:
Provide identification/authentication for in-person transactions for goods/services
f) E-Commerce / Telephony:
Provide identification/authentication for remote transactions for goods/services
g) Criminal Identification:
Identify/verify individuals in law enforcement applications.

In each of those applications, biometric systems can be used to either replace or

complementexisting authentication methods.
 Government Sector
 Travel and Transportation
 Financial Sector
 Health Care
 Law Enforcement
Among the technologies, finger scan is the undisputed leader with more than 50% market
share. [4]

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Chapter – 2

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BIOMETRIC TECHNIQUES

There are lots of biometric techniques available nowadays. A few of them are in
the stage of the research only (e.g. the odour analysis), but a significant number of
technologies is already mature and commercially available (at least ten different types of
biometrics are commercially available nowadays: fingerprint, finger geometry, hand
geometry, palm print, iris pattern, retina pattern, facial recognition, voice comparison,
signature dynamics and typing rhythm).

2.1 Fingerprint technologies

Fingerprint identification is perhaps the oldest of all the biometric techniques.
Fingerprints were used already in the Old China as a means of positively identifying a
person as an author of the document. Their use in law enforcement since the last century
is well known and actually let to an association fingerprint = crime. This caused some
worries about the user acceptance of fingerprint-based systems. The situation improves as
these systems spread around and become more common.Systems that can automatically
check details of a person’s fingerprint have been in use since the 1960s by law
enforcement agencies.The U.S. Government commissioned a study by Sandia Labs to
compare various biometric technologies used for identification in early seventies. This
study concluded that the fingerprint technologies had the greatest potential to produce the
best identification accuracy. The study is quit outdated now, but it turned the research and
development focus on the fingerprint technology since its release.

Fingerprint readers
Before we can proceed any further we need to obtain the digitalized fingerprint.
The traditional method uses the ink to get the fingerprint onto a piece of paper. This piece
of paper is then scanned using a traditional scanner. This method is used only rarely today
when an old paper-based database is being digitalised, a fingerprint found on a scene of a
crime is being processed or in law enforcement AFIS systems. Otherwise modern live
fingerprint readers are used. They do not require the ink anymore. These live fingerprint
readers are most commonly based on optical, thermal, silicon or ultrasonic principles.

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Optical fingerprint readers are the most common at present. They are based on reflection
changes at the spots where the finger papilar lines touch the reader’s surface.[3]

All the optical fingerprintreaders

comprise of thesource of light, the
lightsensor and a special
reflectionsurface that changes the
reflection according tothe
pressure.Some of the readers arefitted
out with the processingand memory
chips as well.

The size of the optical fingerprint readers typically is around 10x10x5 cms. It is
difficult to minimize them much more as the reader has to comprise the source of light,
reflection surface and the light sensor.
The optical fingerprint readers work usually reliably, but sometimes have
problems with dust if heavily used and not cleaned. The dust may cause latent
fingerprints, which may be accepted by the reader as a real fingerprint. Optical fingerprint
readers cannot be fooled by a simple picture of a fingerprint, but any 3D fingerprint
model makes a significant problem, all the reader checks is the pressure. A few readers
are therefore equipped with additional detectors of finger liveness.
Optical readers are relatively cheap and are manufactured by a great number of
manufacturers. The field of optical technologies attracts many newlyestablished firms
(e.g., American BiometricCompany, Digital Persona) as well as a few big and well-
known companies (such as HP, Philips or Sony). Optical fingerprintreaders are also often
embedded in keyboards, mice or monitors.Silicon technologies are older than the optical
technologies.They are based on the capacitance of the finger. The dc-capacitive
fingerprint sensors consist of rectangular arrays of capacitors on a silicon chip. One plate
of the capacitor is the finger, the otherplate is a tiny area of metallization (a pixel) on the

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chip’s surface.One places his/her finger against the surface of the chip (actuallyagainst an
insulated coating on the chip’s surface). The ridges ofthe fingerprint are close to the
nearby pixels and have high capacitanceto them. The valleys are more distant from the
pixels nearestthem and therefore have lower capacitance.
Such an array of capacitors can be placed onto a chip as small as 15 x 15x 5 mm
and thus is ideal for miniaturization. A PCMCIA card (the triple height of a credit card)
with a silicon fingerprint reader is already available. Integration of a fingerprint reader on
a credit card-sized smartcard was not achieved yet, but it is expected in the near future.
Silicon fingerprint readers are popular also in mobile phones and laptop computers due to
the small size.

Fig: Fingerprint Reader Fig: Typical features in a fingerprint

Re
The fingerprintbitmap obtainedfrom the siliconreader is affected bythe finger
moistureas the moisture significantlyinfluencesthe capacitance. Thisoften means that
toowet or dry fingers donot produce bitmapswith a sufficient quality and so people with
unusually wet or dryfingers have problems with these silicon fingerprint readers.Both
optical and silicon fingerprint readers are fast enough tocapture and display the
fingerprint in real time. The typical resolutionis around 500 DPI.
Ultrasonic fingerprintreaders are the newest andleast common. They use
ultrasoundto monitor the fingersurface.The user places the fingeron a piece of glass and
theultrasonic sensor moves andreads whole the fingerprint.This process takes one or
twoseconds. Ultrasound is notdisturbed by the dirt on thefingers so the quality of the
bitmap obtained is usually fair.

Fingerprint processing
Fingerprints are not compared and usually also not stored as bitmaps. Fingerprint
matching techniques can be placed into two categories: minutiae-based and correlation

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based. Minutiae-based techniques find the minutiae points first and then map their
relativeplacement on the finger. Minutiae are individual unique characteristics within the
fingerprint pattern such as ridge endings, bifurcations,divergences, dots or islands (see the
picture on the followingpage). In the recent years automated fingerprint comparisons
havebeen most often based on minutiae.
The problem with minutiae is that it is difficult to extract theminutiae points
accurately when the fingerprint is of low quality.This method also does not take into
account the global pattern of ridges and furrows. The correlation-based method is able to
overcomesome of the difficulties of the minutiae-based approach.However, it has some of
its own shortcomings. Correlation-basedtechniques require the precise location of a
registration point andare affected by image translation and rotation.
The readability of a fingerprint depends on a variety of work and environmental
factors. These include age, gender, occupation and race. A young, female, Asian mine-
worker is seen as the most difficult subject. A surprisingly high proportion of the
population have missing fingers, with the left forefinger having the highest percentage at
0.62%. There are about 30 minutiae within a typical fingerprint image obtained by a live
fingerprint reader. The number and spatial distribution of minutiae varies according to the
quality of the fingerprint image, finger pressure, moisture and placement. In the decision
process, the biometric system tries to find a minutiae transformation between the current
distribution and the stored template. The matching decision is then based on the
possibility and complexity of the necessary transformation. The decision usually takes
from 5 milliseconds to 2 seconds.
The speed ofthe decision sometimesdepends onthe security leveland the
negativeanswer very oftentakes longertime than the positive one (sometimes even 10
times more).There is no direct dependency between the speed and accuracy ofthe
matching algorithm according to our experience. We have seenfast and accurate as well
as slow and less accurate matching algorithms.
The minutiae matching
is aprocess where two
sets ofminutiae are
compared
todecidewhether
theyrepresentthe same
finger or not.

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The minutiae found in the fingerprint image are also used to store the fingerprint for
future comparisons. The minutiae are encoded and often also compressed. The size of
such a master template usually is between 24 bytes and one kilobyte. Fingerprints contain
a large amount of data. Because of the high level of data present in the image, it
ispossible to eliminate falsematches and reduce the number of possiblematches to a
smallfraction. This means that the fingerprint technology can be usedfor identification
even within large databases. Fingerprint identificationtechnology has undergone an
extensive research and developmentsince the seventies. The initial reason for the effort
wasthe response to the FBI requirement for an identification searchsystem. Such systems
are called Automated Fingerprint IdentificationSystems (AFIS) and are used to identify
individuals in large databases (typically to find the offender of a crime according to
afingerprint found at the crime scene or to identify a person whose identity is unknown).
AFIS systems are operated by professionalswho manually intervene the minutiae
extraction and matching processand thus their results are really excellent. In today’s
criminaljustice applications, the AFIS systems achieve over 98% identificationrate while
the FAR is below 1%.The typical access control systems, on the other side, are
completelyautomated. Their accuracy is slightly worse. The qualityof the fingerprint
image obtained by an automated fingerprint readerfrom an unexperienced (non-
professional) user is usually lower. Fingerprint readers often do not show any fingerprint
preview and so the users do not know if the positioning and pressure of the finger is
correct. The automatic minutiae extraction in a lower quality image is not perfect yet.
Thus the overall accuracy of such a system is lower.[1][3]
Some newer systems are based not only on minutiae extraction,they use the length
and position of the papilar lines as well. Afew system take into account even pores
(theirspatial distribution), but the problem with pores is that they are too dependent on
thefingerprint image quality and finger pressure.Most of the biometric fingerprint systems
use the fingerprintreader to provide for the fingerprint bitmap image only, whole
theprocessing and matching is done by a software that runs on a computer(the software is
often available for Microsoft Windows operating systems only). There are currently only
very few fingerprintdevices that do all the processing by the hardware.Themanufacturers
of the fingerprint readers used to deliverthe fingerprint processing software with the
hardware. Today, themarket specializes. Even if it is still possible to buy a
fingerprintreader with a software package (this is the popular way especially for the low-

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end devices for home or office use) there are manymanufacturers that produce fingerprint
hardware only (e.g. fingerprintsilicon chips by Thomson) or software companies that
offerdevice-independent fingerprint processing software (e.g. Neuro-dynamics).Device-
independent software is not bound to imagesobtained by one single input devices, but
their accuracy is very lowif various input devices are mixed.[7]

2.2 Iris
The iris is the coloured ring of textured tissue that surrounds the pupil of the eye.
Even twins have different iris patterns and everyone’s left and right iris is different, too.
Research shows that the matching accuracy of iris identification is greater than of the
DNA testing.[7]

The iris pattern is taken by a special gray-scale camera in the distance of 10–40
cm from the camera (earlier models of iris scanners required closer eye positioning). The
camera is hidden behind a mirror, the user looks into the mirror so that he/she can see
his/her own eye, then also the camera can “see” the eye. Once the eye is stable (not
moving too fast) and the camera has focused properly, the image of the eye is captured
(there exist also simpler versions without auto-focus and with a capture button).

The PC iris uses a hand-held personal iris imager that functions as a computer
peripheral.The user holds the imager in his hand, looks into the camera lens from a

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distance of 10 cm and presses a button to initiate the identification process. The Iris
Access is more advanced. It is auto-focus and has a sensor that checks whether an
individual hasstepped in front of the camera. It is also able to guide the person audily into
the correctposition.
The iris scanner does not need any special lighting conditions or any special kind of light
(unlike the infrared light needed for the retina scanning). If the background is too dark
any traditional lighting can be used. Some iris scanners also include a source of light that
is automatically turned on when necessary. The iris scanning technology is not intrusive
and thus is deemed acceptable by most users. The iris pattern remains stable over a
person’s life, being only affected by several diseases. Once the gray-scale image of the
eye is obtained then the software tries to locate the iris within the image. If an iris is
found then the software creates a net of curves covering the iris. Based on the darkness of
the points along the lines the software creates the iriscode, which characterizes the iris.
When computing the iriscode two influences have to be taken into account. First, the
overall darkness of the image is influenced by the lighting conditions so the darkness
threshold used to decide whether a given point is dark or bright cannot be static, it must
be dynamically computed according to the overall picture darkness. And second, the size
of the iris dynamically changes as the size of the pupil changes. Before computing the
iriscode, a proper transformation must be done.
In the decision process the matching software given 2 iriscodes computes the
Hamming distance based on the number of different bits. The Hamming distance is a
score(within the range 0 – 1, where 0 means the same iriscodes), which is then compared
with the security threshold to make the final decision. Computing the Hamming distance
of two iriscodes is very fast (it is in fact only counting the number of bits in the exclusive
OR of the two iriscodes). Modern computers are able to compare over 4 000 000 iriscodes
in one second. The iriscode is computed very fast and takes 256 bytes. The probability
that 2 different irises could produce the same iriscode is estimated as low as 1: 10 78. The
probability of two persons with the same iris is very low (1:10 52).
An iris scan produces a high data volume which implies a high discrimination
(identification) rate. Indeed the iris systems are suitable for identification because they are
very fast and accurate. Our experience confirms all that. The iris recognition was the
fastest identification out of all the biometric systems we could work with. We have never
encountered a false acceptance (the database was rate not very large, however) and the

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false rejection rate was reasonably low. The manufacturer quotes the equal error rate of
0.00008%, but so low false rejection rate is not achievable with normal (nonprofessional)
users. It is said that artificial duplication of the iris is virtually impossible because of the
unique properties. The iris is closely connected to the human brain and it is said to be one
of the first parts of the body to decay after death. It should be therefore very difficult to
create an artificial iris or to use a dead iris to fraudulently bypass the biometric system if
the detection of the iris liveness is working properly. We were testing an iris scanning
system that did not have any countermeasures implemented. We fooled such a system
with a very simple attack. The manufacturer provided us with a newer version of the
system after several months. We did not succeed with our simple attacks then, but we
wish to note that we did not have enough time to test more advanced versions of our
attack.

2.3 Retina
Retina scan isbased on the bloodvessel pattern in theretina of the eye.Retina scan
technologyis older than theiris scan technologythat also uses a partof the eye. The
firstretinal scanning systemswere launchedby EyeDentify in1985. The main drawback of
the retina scan is its intrusiveness. The method of obtaining a retina scan is personally
invasive. A laserlight must be directed through the cornea of the eye. Also the operationof
the retina scanner is not easy. A skilled operator is requiredand the person being scanned
has to follow his/her directions.A retina scan produces at least the same volume of data as
afingerprint image. Thus its discrimination rate is sufficient not only for verification, but
also for identification. In the practice, however, the retina scanning is used mostly for
verification. The size of theeye signature template is 96 bytes.The retinal scanning
systems are said to be very accurate. Forexample the EyeDentify’s retinal scanning
system has reputedlynever falsely verified an unauthorized user so far. The false
rejectionrate, on the other side, is relatively high as it is not always easyto capture a
perfect image of the retina.
Retina is not directly visibleand so a coherent
infraredlight source is necessary toilluminate the retina.
Theinfrared energy is absorbedfaster by blood vessels in
theretina than by the surroundingtissue. The image of
the retina blood vessel pattern is then analysedfor
characteristic points within the pattern. The retinascan is
more susceptible to some diseases than the iris scan,but
such diseases are relatively rare. [6]

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Retinal scanningis used only rarelytoday because it isnot user friendly andstill
remains veryexpensive. Retinascan is suitable forapplications wherethe high security
isrequired and the user’sacceptance is nota major aspect. Retinascan systems areused in
many U.S.prisons to verify theprisoners before theyare released.The check of the eye
liveness is usually not of a significant concern as themethod of obtaining the retina blood
vessel pattern is rather complicated and requiresan operator.[2]

2.4 Hand geometry

Hand geometry is based on the fact that nearly every person’s hand is shaped
differently and that the shape of a person’s hand does not change after certain age. Hand
geometry systems produce estimates of certain measurements of the hand such as the
length and the width of fingers. Various methods are used to measure the hand. These
methods aremost commonly based either on mechanical or optical principle. The latter
ones are much more common today. Optical hand geometry scanners capture the image of
the hand and using the image edge detection algorithm compute the hand’s
characteristics. There are basically 2 sub-categories of optical scanners. Devices from the
first category create a black-and-white bitmap image of the hand’s shape. This is easily
done using a source of light and a black-and-white camera. The bitmap image is then
processed by the computer software. Only 2D characteristics of the hand can be used in
this case. Hand geometry systems from the other category are more sophisticated. They

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use special guide markings to position the hand better and have two (both vertical and
horizontal) sensors for the hand shape measurements. So, sensors from this category
handle data from all the three dimensions.

Fig: Hand Geometry Scanner

This is a hand geometry scanner HandKey II
manufactured by the Recognition systems, Inc. Special
guides use electrical conductivity to ensure that the
fingers really touch the pins. Correct position of the
fingers is indicated by a led diode on the front panel.

Hand geometry scanners are easy to use. Where the hand must be placed
accurately, guide markings have been incorporated and the units are mounted so that they
are at a comfortable height for majority of the population. The noise factors such as dirt
and grease do not pose a serious problem, as only the silhouette of the hand shape is
important. The only problem with hand geometry scanners is in the countries where the
public do not like to place their hand down flat on a surface where someone else’s hand
has been placed.A few hand geometry scanners produce only the video signal with the
hand shape. Image digitalization and processing is then done in the computer. On the
other side there exist very sophisticated and automated scanners that do everything by
themselves including the enrollment, data storage, verification and even simple
networking with a master device and multiple slave scanners. The size of a typical hand
geometry scanner is considerably big (30 x 30 x 50 cm). This is usually not a problem as
the hand geometry scanners are typically used for physical access control (e.g. at a door),
where the size is not a crucial parameter. Hand geometry does not produce a large data set
(as compared to other biometric systems). Therefore, given a large number of records,
hand geometry may not be able to distinguish sufficiently one individual from another.
The size of the hand template is often as small as 9 bytes. Such systems are not suitable
for identification at all. The verification results show that hand geometry systems are
suitable for lower level security application. The hand geometry systems are used for
example at the Disney Theme Parks in the US or were used at the 1996 Olympic Games
in Atlanta.The manufacturers advertise the crossover accuracy about0.1%. These numbers
are difficult to obtain in reality. FAR of 3% and FRR of 10% at the middle security
threshold are more realistic.The verification takes about one second. The speed is not a
crucial point because the hand geometry systems can be used for verification only.

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2.5 Signature dynamics

The signature dynamics recognition is based on the dynamicsof making the
signature, rather than a direct comparison of the signatureitself afterwards. The dynamics
is measured as a means ofthe pressure, direction, acceleration and the length of the
strokes, number of strokes and their duration. The most obvious and importantadvantage
of this is that a fraudster cannot glean any informationon how to write the signature by
simply looking at one thathas been previously written.
Pioneers of the signature verification first developed a reliablestatistical method in
1970s. This involved the extraction of ten ormore writing characteristics such as the
number of times the penwas lifted, the total writing time and the timing of turning
points.The matching process was then performed using fairly standardstatistical
correlation methods. Newer sequential techniques treatthe signature as a number of
separate events, with each event consistingof the period between the pen striking the
writing surfaceand lifting off again. This approach is much more flexible. If themajority
of the signature is accurate and only one event is missingor added then this event can be
easily ignored.
There are various kinds ofdevices used to capture the signaturedynamics. These
are eithertraditional tablets or specialpurpose devices. Tablets capture 2D coordinates and
the pressure.Special pens are able to capture movements in all 3 dimensions.
Tablets have two significant disadvantages. First, the resulting digitalisedsignature
looks different from the usual user signature. And second, while signing the user does not
see what he/she has written so far. He/she has to look at the computer monitor to see the
signature.This is a considerable drawback for many (unexperienced)users. Some special
pens work like normal pens, they have inkcartridge inside and can be used to write with
them on paper. [6]

Fig: (a) E-pad (b) SmartPen

These are special purpose devices used to capture the signature dynamics. Both are
wireless. The E-pad devices shows the signature on the digital display while the
Smartpen has got its own ink cartridge and can be used to write onto any paper.
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A person does not make a signature consistently the same way,so the data
obtainedfrom a signature from a person has to allowfor quite some variability. Most of
the signature dynamics systemsverify the dynamics only, they do not pay any attention to
the resultingsignature. A few systems claim to verify both (i.e. the signaturedynamics as
well as the resulting signature look itself). Ourexperience shows that if the system does
not verify the resulting signature, then the signature that is accepted as a true match
maylook significantly different from the master template. The speedof writing is often the
most important factor in the decision process,so it is possible to successfully forge a
signature even if theresulting signature looks so different that any person would
notice.We have tried simple attempts to sign as other users as wellas simulation of attacks
where the attacker has seen a user signingonce or several times. Our results show that
individuals’ ability to fake signature dynamics substantially improves after they see
theway the true signers sign.
The size of data obtained during the signing process is around20 KB. The size of
the master template, which is computed from 3to 10 signatures, varies from around 90
bytes up to a few kilobytes. Even if the size of the master template is relatively high the
signaturerecognition has problems with match discrimination and thusis suitable for
verification only.The accuracy of the signature dynamics biometric systems is not high,
the crossover rate published by manufacturers is around2%, but according to our own
experience the accuracy is muchworse.The leading companies in the signature systems
are Cyber-Sign, PenOp and Quintet.

2.6 Facial recognition

Facial recognition is the most natural means of biometric identification. The
method of distinguishing one individual from another is an ability of virtually every
human. Until recently the facialrecognition has never been treated as a science.
Any camera (with a sufficient resolution) can be used to obtainthe image of the
face. Any scanned picture can be used aswell. Generally speaking the better the image
source (i.e. cameraor scanner) the more accurate results we get. The facial recognition
systems usually use only the gray- scale information. Colours (if available) are used as a
help in locating the face in the image only.The lighting conditions required are mainly

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dependent on the quality of the camera used. In poor light condition, individual
featuresmay not be easily discernible. There exist even infrared camerasthat can be used
with facial recognition systems.
Most of facial recognition systems require the user to stand aspecific distance
away from the camera and look straight at thecamera. This ensures that the captured
image of the face is withina specific size tolerance and keeps the features (e.g., the eyes)
in assimilar position each time as possible.
The first task ofthe processing softwareis to locate theface (or faces) withinthe
image. Then thefacial characteristicsare extracted. Facialrecognition technology has
recently developed into two areas: facial metrics and eigenfaces.Facial metrics
technology relies on the measurement of the specificfacial features (the systems usually
look for the positioning ofthe eyes, nose and mouth and the distances between these
features).Another method for facial recognition has been developed inthe past three years.
The method is based on categorizing facesaccording to the degree of fit with a fixed set of
150 master eigenfaces.This technique is in fact similar to the police method of creating a
portrait, but the image processing is automated and basedon a real picture here. Every
face is assigned a degree of fit to each of the 150 master eigenfaces, only the 40 template
eigenfaces with the highest degree of fit are necessary to reconstruct the face with the
accuracy of 99%.
The image processingand facialsimilarity decisionprocess is done bythe computer
softwareat the moment,this processing requiresquite a lotof computing powerand so it is
noteasy to assemble astand-alone devicefor face recognition. There are some efforts (by
companies like Siemens) to create a special-purpose chip with embedded facerecognition
instruction set.
The accuracy of the face recognition systems improves withtime, but it has not
been very satisfying so far. According to ourexperience there is still a potential for
improving the algorithms forface location. The current software often does not find the
face atall or finds “a face” at an incorrect place. This significantly makesthe results worse.
Better results can be achieved if the operatoris able to tell the system exactly where the
eyes are positioned.The systems also have problems to distinguish very similar per- sons
like twins and any significant change in hair or beard style requiresre-enrollment. Glasses
can also cause additional difficulties.The quoted accuracy of facial recognition systems
varies significantly,many systems quote the crossover accuracy of less than onepercent.

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The numbers from real systems are not so pleasant, thecrossover accuracy is much higher
and indicates that these systemsare not suitable for identification. If security is the main
concernthen even the verification accuracy may not be sufficiently good.Facial
recognition systems are offered by a great number ofsuppliers nowadays, to name a few
of them: Miros, Neurodynamicsor Visionics.[7]
The face recognition system does not require any contact with the person and can
be fooled with a picture if no countermeasuresare active. The liveness detection is based
most commonly on facialmimics. The user is asked to blink or smile. If the image
changes properly then the person is considered “live”. A few systemscan simultaneously
process images from two cameras, fromtwo different viewpoints. The use of two cameras
can also avoidfooling the system with a simple picture. [5]

Extraction of face Extraction of face

Input face features
image
image

Positive

Database
Negative

2.7 Speaker verification

The principle of speaker verification is to analyse the voice ofthe user in order to
store a voiceprint that is later used for identification/verification. Speaker verification and
speech recognition aretwo different tasks. The aim of speech recognition is to find what
has been told while the aim of the speaker verification is who toldthat. Both these
technologies are at the edge between research andindustrial development. Texas
Instruments reported their work inspeech verification for access control already in the
early 1970’s.There are many commercial systems available today, but their accuracystill
can be improved.

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Speaker verification focuses on the vocal characteristics thatproduce speech and

not on the sound or the pronunciation of thespeech itself. The vocal characteristics depend
on the dimensionsof the vocal tract, mouth, nasal cavities and the other speech
processingmechanisms of the human body.
The greatest advantage of speaker verification systems is thatthey do not require
any special and expensive hardware. A microphoneis a standard accessory of any
multimedia computer, speaker verification can also be used remotely via phone line. A
highsampling rate is not required, but the background (or network)noise causes a
significant problem that decreases the accuracy. Thespeaker verification is not intrusive
for users and is easy to use.
The system typically asks the user to pronounce a phrase duringthe enrollment,
the voice is then processed and stored in a template(voiceprint). Later the system asks for
the same phrase and compares the voiceprints. Such a system is vulnerable to
replayattacks; if an attacker records the user’s phrase and replays it laterthen he/she can
easily gain the user’s privilege. More sophisticatedsystems use a kind of challenge-
response protocol. During the enrolment the system records the pronunciation of multiple
phrases (e.g. numbers). In the authentication phase the system randomly chooses a
challenge and asks the user to pronounce it. In this casethe system not only compares the
voiceprints, but also deploys thespeech recognition algorithms and checks whether the
proper challengehas really been said. There exist (very few) systems that arereally text
independent and can cope with the full vocabulary.
Speaker verification is quite secure from the professional mimics since the system
make a comparison of the word stored in adifferent way than humans compare
voices.Currently there are three major international projects in thefield of voice
technology: PICASSO, CASCADE and Cost 250.There is a great number of
commercially available voice systems as well. Keyware, VeriTel and International
Electronics are a fewof the leading companies.Speaker verification is a biometric
technique based on behavioural characteristic and as such can be negatively affected by
the current physical condition and the emotional state. The accuracyof the speaker
verification can also be affected by the background and network noise in the input signal.
This increases the false rejectionrate. During the tests of a speaker verification system
inthe Sandia Labs the false acceptance rate after a single attempt was 0.9% and the false

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rejection rate after three attempts was 4.3%. Atrial at UBS’s Ubilab achieved the equal
error rate of 0.16% after aone attempt.

2.8 Other biometric techniques

2.8.1 Palmprint
Palmprint verification is a slightly different implementation ofthe fingerprint
technology. Palmprint scanning uses optical readersthat are very similar to those used for
fingerprint scanning, theirsize is, however, much bigger and this is a limiting factor for
theuse in workstations or mobile devices.
2.8.2 Hand vein
Hand vein geometry is based on the fact that the vein patternis distinctive for
various individuals. The veins under the skin absorbinfrared light and thus have a darker
pattern on the image ofthe hand taken by an infrared camera. The hand vein geometry
isstill in the stage of research and development. One such system ismanufactured by
British Technology Group. The device is calledVeincheck and uses a template with the
size of 50 bytes.

2.8.3 DNA
DNA sampling is rather intrusive at present and requires a formof tissue, blood or
other bodily sample. This method of capture stillhas to be refined. So far the DNA
analysis has not been sufficientlyautomatic to rank the DNA analysis as a biometric
technology.The analysis of human DNA is now possible within 10 minutes. Assoon as
the technology advances so that DNA can be matched automaticallyin real time, it may
become more significant. At present DNA is very entrenched in crimedetection and so
will remain inthe law enforcement area for the time being.

2.8.4 Thermal imaging

This technology is similar to the hand vein geometry. It alsouses an infrared
source of light and camera to produce an image ofthe vein pattern in the face or in the
wrist.

2.8.5 Ear shape

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Identifying individuals by the ear shape is used in law enforcementapplications

where ear markings are found at crime scenes.Whether this technology will progress to
access control applicationsis yet to be seen. An ear shape verifier (Optophone) is
producedby a French company ART Techniques. It is a telephonetypehandset within
which is a lighting unit and cameras whichcapture two images of the ear.

2.8.6 Body odour

The body odour biometrics is based on the fact that virtually eachhuman smell is
unique. The smell is captured by sensors that arecapable to obtain the odour from non-
intrusive parts of the body suchas the back of the hand. Methods of capturing a person’s
smell arebeing explored by Mastiff Electronic Systems. Each human smellis made up of
chemicals known as volatiles. They are extracted bythe system and converted into a
template.The use of body odour sensors brings up the privacy issue asthe body odour
carries a significal amount of sensitive personalinformation. It is possible to diagnose
some diseases or activitiesin the last hours (like sex, for example) by analysing the body
odour.

2.8.7 Keystroke dynamics

Keystroke dynamics is a method of verifying the identity ofan individual by their
typing rhythm which can cope with trainedtypists as well as the amateur two-finger typist.
Systems can verifythe user at the log-on stage or they can continually monitor the typist.
These systems should be cheap to install as all that is neededis a software package.

2.8.8 Fingernail bed

The US Company AIMS is developing a system which scansthe dermal structure
under the fingernail. This tongue and groovestructure is made up of nearly parallel rows
of vascular rich skin.Between these parallel dermal structures are narrow channels, andit
is the distance between these which is measured by the AIMSsystem.

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Chapter – 3

PRACTICAL ISSUES

3.1 The Core Biometric Technology

There are at least ten biometric techniques commercially availableand new
techniques are in the stage of research and development.Whatconditions must be fulfilled
for a biological measurement to become a biometric? Any human physiological or
behavioural characteristics can become a biometric provided the followingproperties are
fulfilled.

*Universality: This means that every person should have thecharacteristics. It is really
difficult to get 100% coverage. There are mute people, people without fingers or with
injuredeyes. All these cases must be handled.

*Uniqueness: This means that no two persons should be the same in terms of the
biometric characteristics. Fingerprintshave a high discrimination rate and the probability
of twopersons with the same iris is estimated as low as 1:1052.Identical twins, on the other
side, cannot be easily distinguishedby face recognition and DNA-analysis systems.

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*Permanence: This means that the characteristics should beinvariant with time. While
the iris usually remains stableover decades, a person’s face changes significantly with
time.The signature and its dynamics may change as well and thefinger is a frequent
subject to injuries.

*Collectability: This means that the characteristics must bemeasured quantitatively and
obtaining the characteristicsshould be easy. Face recognition systems are not intrusiveand
obtaining of a face image is easy. In the contrast theDNA analysis requires a blood or
other bodily sample. Theretina scan is rather intrusive as well.

*Performance: This refers to the achievable identification/verification accuracy and the

resources and working orenvironmental conditions needed to achieve an
acceptableaccuracy. The crossover accuracy of iris-based systems isunder 1% and the
system is able to compare over 4 X 106iriscodes in one second. The crossover accuracy of
somesignature dynamics systems is as high as 25% and theverification decision takes
over one second.

*Acceptability: This indicates to what extend people are willing to accept the biometric
system. Face recognition systemsare personally not intrusive, but there are countries
wheretaking pictures of persons is not viable. The retina scannerrequires an infrared laser
beam directed through the corneaof the eye. This is rather invasive and only few users
accept this technology.

*Circumvention: This refers to how difficult it is to fool the system by fraudulent

techniques. An automated access controlsystem that can be easily fooled with a
fingerprint modelor a picture of a user’s face does not provide much security.[7]

3.2 The layer model

Although the use of each biometric technology has its own specificissues, the
basic operation of any biometric system is verysimilar. The system typically follows the
same set of steps. The separation of actions can lead to identifying critical issues and
toimproving security of the overall process of biometric authentication.The whole process
starts with the enrollment:

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First measurement (acquisition)

This is the first contact of the user with the biometric system.The user’s biometric
sample is obtained using an input device. Thequality of the first biometric sample is
crucial for further authenticationsof the user, so the quality of this biometric sample must
beparticularly checked and if the quality is not sufficient, the acquisitionof the biometric
sample must be repeated. It may happen thateven multiple acquisitions do not generate
biometric samples with sufficient quality. Such a user cannot be registered with the
system.
There are also mute people, people without fingers or with injuredeyes. Both these
categories create a ”failed to enroll“ group ofusers. Users very often do not have any
previous experiences with the kind of the biometric system they are being registered with,
sotheir behaviour at the time of the first contact with the technologyis not natural. This
negatively influences the quality of the firstmeasurement and that is why the first
measurement is guided by aprofessional who explains the use of the biometric reader.
Creation of master characteristics
The biometric measurements are processed after the acquisition.The number of
biometric samples necessary for further processingis based on the nature of the used
biometric technology.Sometimes a single sample is sufficient, but often multiple (usually
3 or 5) biometric samples are required. The biometric characteristics are most commonly
neither compared nor stored in theraw format (say as a bitmap). The raw measurements
contain a lotof noise or irrelevant information, which need not be stored. Sothe
measurements are processed and only the important featuresare extracted and used. This
significantly reduces the size of thedata. The process of feature extraction is not lossless
and so the extracted features cannot be used to reconstruct the biometric
samplecompletely.

Storage of master characteristics

After processing the first biometric sample and extracting thefeatures, we have to
store (and maintain) the newly obtained mastertemplate. Choosing a proper
discriminating characteristic forthe categorization of records in large databases can
improve identification (search) tasks later on. There are basically 4 possibilitieswhere to

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store the template: in a card, in the central database ona server, on a workstation or
directly in an authentication terminal.
The storage in an authentication terminal cannot be used for large-scale systems,
in such a case only the first two possibilities are applicable. If privacy issues need to be
considered then the storageon a card has an advantage, because in this case no
biometricdata must be stored (and potentially misused) in a central database.The storage
on a card requires a kind of a digital signature of themaster template and of the
association of the user with the mastertemplate. Biometric samples as well as the
extracted features are very sensitive data and so the master template should be
storedalways encrypted no matter what storage is used.As soon as the user is enrolled,
he/she can use the system forsuccessful authentications or identifications. This process is
typicallyfully automated and takes the following steps:

Acquisition(s)
The current biometric measurements must be obtained for thesystem to be able to
make the comparison with the master template.These subsequent acquisitions of the
user’s biometric measurementsare done at various places where the authentication ofthe
user is required. This might be user’s computer in the office, anATM machine or a sensor
in front of a door. For the best performancethe kind of the input device used at the
enrollment and forthe subsequent acquisitions should be the same. Other conditionsof use
should also be as similar as possible with the conditions atthe enrollment. These includes
the background (face recognition), the background noise (voice verification) or the
moisture (fingerprint).While the enrollment is usually guided by trained personnel,the
subsequent biometric measurements are most commonly fullyautomatic and unattended.
This brings up a few special issues. Firstly, the user needs to know how to use the device
to provide the sample in the best quality. This is often not easy because the devicedoes
not show any preview of the sample obtained, so for examplein the case of a fingerprint
reader, the user does not know whetherthe positioning of the finger on the reader and the
pressure is correct.Secondly, as the reader is left unattended, it is up to the readerto check
that the measurements obtained really belong to a livepersons (the liveness property). For
example, a fingerprint readershould tell if the fingerprint it gets is from a live finger, not
from amask that is put on top of a finger. Similarly, an iris scanner shouldmake sure that
the iris image it is getting is from a real eye not apicture of an eye. In many biometric

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techniques (e.g. fingerprinting)the further processing trusts the biometric hardware to

checkthe liveness of the person and provide genuine biometric measurementsonly. Some
other systems (like the face recognition) checkthe user’s liveness in software (the proper
change of a characteristicwith time). No matter whether hardware or software is used,
ensuring that the biometric measurements are genuine is crucialfor the system to be
secure. Without the assumption of the genuinedata obtained at the input we cannot get a
secure system. It isnot possible to formally prove that a reader provides only
genuinemeasurements and this affects also the possibility of a formal proof of the security
of whole the biometric system. The liveness test ofa person is not an easy task. New
countermeasures are always to befollowed by newer attacks. We do not even know how
efficient thecurrent countermeasures are against the attacks to come. Biometricreaders are
not yet the main target ofsophisticated criminals.But then we can expect a wave of
professional attacks. We haveseen a few biometric readers where the estimated cost of an
attackis as low as a few hundred dollars. The security of such a system isreally poor.[3]

Creation of new characteristics

The biometric measurements obtained in the previous step areprocessed and new
characteristics are created. The process of featureextraction is basically the same as in the
case of the enrollment.Only a single biometric sample is usually available. Thismight
mean that the number or quality of the features extracted islower than at the time of
enrollment.

Comparison
The currently computed characteristics are then compared withthe characteristics
obtained during enrollment. This process is verydependent on the nature of the biometric
technology used. Sometimesthe desired security threshold is a parameter of the
matchingprocess, sometimes the biometric system returns a score within a range. If the
system performs verification then the newly obtained characteristics are compared only
with one master template(or with a small number of master templates, e.g. a set of
mastertemplates for a few different fingers). For an identification request the new
characteristics are matched against a large number of mastertemplates (either against all
the records in the database or if thedatabase is clustered then against the relevant part of
the database)

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Decision
The final step in the verification process is the yes/no decisionbased on the
threshold. This security threshold is either a parameterof the matching process or the
resulting score is compared withthe threshold value to make the final decision. In the case
of identification the user whose master template exceeds the thresholdis returned as the
result. If multiple master templates exceed thethreshold then either all these users are
returned as the result or thetemplate with the highest score is chosen. Although the error
rates quoted by manufactures (typically ERR < 1%) might indicate that biometric systems
are very accurate, the reality is rather different.
The accuracy of biometric systems used by non-professional usersis much lower.
Especially the false rejection rate is in reality veryhigh (very often over 10%). This
prevents the legitimate users togain their access rights and stands for a significant
problem of thebiometric systems.

3.3 Biometrics and cryptography

Is cryptography necessary for the secure use of biometric systems?
The answer is quite clear: Yes.
There are basically two kinds of biometric systems:

* Automated identification systems operated by professionals.The purpose of such

systems is to identify an individual inquestion or to find an offender of a crime according
to trailsleft on the crime scene. The operators of these systems donot have any reason to
cheat the system, so the only task forthe cryptography is to secure the sensitive biometric
data.

* Access control systems. These systems are used by ordinaryusers to gain a privilege or
an access right. Securing such asystem is much more complicated task.Let us consider
further the general-use systems of the latter type,as this report is devoted solely to the use
of biometrics for the authentication.

Biometrics are not secrets

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Some systems incorrectly assume that biometric measurementsare secret and grant
access when matching biometric measurementsare presented. Such systems cannot cope
with the situationswhen the biometric measurements are disclosed, because thebiometrics
cannot be changed (unless the user is willing to havean organ transplant). Moreover, the
user will not learn that his/herbiometric is disclosed. People leave fingerprints on
everythingthey touch, and the iris can be observed anywhere they look.Biometrics
definitely are sensitive data and therefore should beproperly protected, but they cannot be
considered secret. So the security of the system cannot be based on knowledge of
thebiometric characteristics. When using secret keys or passwords for authentication, a
common method to defeat replay attacksis to use a challenge-response protocol, in which
the passwordis never transmitted. Instead, the server sends a challenge thatcan only be
answered correctly if the client knows the correctpassword. Unfortunately, this method
does not apply to biometricdata. The difference between a password and a fingerprint is
that the password is supposed to be secret, while the fingerprint is not.[1]
Hence, replaying attacks are inherent with biometric authenticationschemes.The
only way how to make a system secure is to make sure that the characteristics presented
came from a real person and wereobtained at the time of verification.

The liveness problem

So-called liveness problem is a closely related issue. One has tomake sure that the
authentication device is verifying a live person.The liveness test is dependent on the kind
of biometric technologyused and it is a task left up to the core biometric technology.
Some biometric techniques (e.g. face recognition or voice verification)may use
experiences with the challenge-response protocolsused in cryptography. The user is then
asked to pronounce a randomly chosen phrase or make a certain movement. The
biometricsystem has to trust the input device it provides only genuine measurements.We
cannot make a secure system if we do not trust the biometric input device. If a malicious
party can easily tamper witha fingerprint scanner, the whole system is not secure no
matter howsecure the other parts of the system are. In terms of the hardwareof the device,
until now, only smartcard-based devices can providecertain level of tamper-resistance.
(Note: Smartcards are hardlyever tamper-proof, rather tamper-resistant.) The
trustworthiness ofa device is also a relative concept that depends on how the deviceis
used. For example, a removable optical finger scanner put in apublic place may be treated

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asuntrustworthy, while the same removableoptical finger scanner may be treated as

trustworthy in aplace where there is a constant human supervision.[1]

Authentication software
The biometric system must be convinced that the presented
biometricmeasurements come from a trusted input device and were captured at a certain
time. If the authentication is done on-device,the device itself should be trustworthy. If the
authentication is doneoff-device, then the operating environment of the software and
thecommunication link between the software and the device, have tobe secure. For
example, in a client-server application, if the clientworkstation is not trusted, then there is
no point authenticating a user using that workstation. If one chooses to run the
authenticationsoftware at the server side, then the communication link betweenthe server
and the device itself (not just the clientworkstation) hasto be secured. Otherwise, a
malicious party or even the workstationitself may intercept the communication and replay
recordedbiometric data. One way to defeat replaying attacks is to put a separate secret key
in the device and use challenge/response protocolwith this key. Obviously, the device has
to be trustworthy.The best solution probably is to use a TLS-like protocol withmandatory
authentication of both parties. In any case it is necessaryto transmit the whole biometric
measurements over the connection.
Either the reader sends the biometric measurements to theworkstation (or server or
whatever grants the access right) to make the match or the workstation provides the
master template to thereader that makes the matching. Hashing in the usual sense
andsending only the hash over the link does not help here, because thebiometric
measurements never are the same. To make it work we either would have to ensure that
the biometric measurements arealways the same (but see the warning below) or change
the hashfunction not to depend on all the input.One has to consider that 100% similarity
of two samples fromdifferent biometric measurements implies a good forgery. This istrue
with almost 100% probability.

Improving security with biometrics

Can biometrics help cryptography to increase the security?Here the answer is not
so clear.Cryptography has been relatively successfully used without biometrics over
decades. But it still can benefit from the use of biometrics. To put it simple, cryptography

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is based on keys. Secure storage of keys is a crucial non-trivial task. Key management
often is the weakest point of many systems. Secret and private keys mustbe kept secret,
and here the biometric technologies might help.Indeed, one of the most promising
applications of biometricsis the secret key protection. If a user’s local workstation is
trusted,then the problem of the authentication software is minor, but the inputdevice must
be trustworthy. The security concerns are the sameno matter whether the secret (or
private) keys are stored on a smart-card or on the hard disk of the workstation. If a user’s
workstation is not trusted, the private keys have to be stored in a separate secureplace,
usually a smartcard. Smartcard based solutions where the secret key is unlocked only
after a successful biometric verificationincrease the overall security, as the biometric data
does not need to leave the card. For smartcards the fingerprint techniqueswith a silicon
fingerprint reader are most commonly used today.It is necessary to distinguish securing a
key with biometrics andgenerating a key from biometrics. The latter does not work. It
mustbe pointed out that biometric data cannot be used as capability tokensin the same
way as secret keys or passwords. In secret key or password based access control schemes,
a key/password itself can be used as a capability. Knowing a secret key or a password
canmean that the user has the right to use certain application. However,this does not apply
to biometric data. As we already know biometricsare not secrets. One viable way is to use
digital certificates. Digital certificates can be used as capabilities or digital identitiesthat
allow users to access remote applications, while biometrics isused to secure the
access/usage of the private keys associated withthe digital certificates.[4]

Chapter – 4

CONCLUSION

Even if the accuracy of the biometric techniques is not perfectyet, there are many
maturebiometric systems available now. Properdesign and implementation of the
biometric system can indeedincrease the overall security, especially the smartcard based
solutionsseem to be very promising. Making a secure biometric systemsis, however, not
as easy as it might appear. The word biometricsis very often used as a synonym for the

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perfect security. This isa misleading view. There are numerous conditions that must be
takenin account when designing a secure biometric system. First, itis necessary to realize
that biometrics are not secrets. This implies that biometric measurements cannot be used
as capability tokensand it is not secure to generate any cryptographic keys from
them.Second, it is necessary to trust the input device and make the communicationlink
secure. Third, the input device needs to check theliveness of the person being measured
and the device itself should be verified for example by a challenge-response protocol.

REFERENCES
 Google.com
 Wikipedia.org
 Studymafia.org
 Pptplanet.com

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