Security Testing Fundamentals

SecAppDev 2013

Leuven, Belgium
4-8 March 2013

Copyright© 2013 KRvW Associates, LLC

 Confessions of a pen tester
Typical scenario looks like this
– Customer calls and asks for a test
– 2-3 weeks prior to product going “live”
– Security test required by auditors
– Want to ensure “hackers can’t get in”
– How secure are we?

What problems do you see here?

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 The problem
Too many organizations have either:
– Neglected security testing entirely
– Assumed (incorrectly) their QA testing will catch security
issues
– Adopted a late-cycle penetration test process as their sole
security test

When you ask the wrong questions, you won’t get

the answers you need!

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 Security testing is different
Security focus should primarily be on non-
functional aspects of the software
– Not just focused on what the software can or should do
– Active deception of software intent
– Need to test every aspect of app

QA team often has a tough time “thinking like an

attacker”

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 Uninformed “black box” testing
Advantages
– Unencumbered by prejudices of how things “should”
behave
– Accurately emulates what an outsider might find
– Can be inexpensive and quick
Disadvantages
– Coverage is abysmal (10-20% LOC not abnormal)
– No notion of risk prioritization

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 Informed testing
Advantages
– Effort can be allocated by risk priority
– Can ensure high coverage through careful test design
– Emulate an insider attack
Disadvantages
– Functional “blinders” might miss things

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 Case study: format strings
You are the engineering team leader of an
embedded sw open source project
The chaos computer club just posted a paper
detailing a newly discovered format string
vulnerability ‘sploit
Your boss sends you a memo and asks, “are we
ok?”
Your src includes: if (mystate==FOO) {
printf(userstr);}

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 Testing methods
Common practices include
– Fuzzing
– Penetration testing
– Dynamic validation
– Risk-based testing

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 Fuzzing
Basic principle
– Hit software with random/
garbage
– Look for unanticipated
failure states
– Observe and record
Any good?
– MS estimates 20-25% of
bugs found this way
– Watch for adequate coverage
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 Fuzzing techniques
Smart fuzzing and dumb fuzzing
– “Dumb” refers to using random, unchosen data
– “Smart” implies using chosen garbage
– Example - fuzzing a graphic renderer
l Dumb approach is to throw it randomness
l Smart approach is to study its expected file formats and to
construct garbage that “looks” like what it expects, but isn’t quite
right

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 What to fuzz
Fuzz targets
– File fuzzing
– Network fuzzing
– Other I/O interfaces

Constructing “dumb” scenarios for each is easy, so

let’s look at some smart approaches

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 File fuzzing
Smart scenarios
– Really study the expected file format(s)
– Look for things like parameters in data
– Construct nonsensical input data parameters
l Negative or huge bitrate values for audio/video
l Graphic dimensions

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 Network fuzzing
Smart scenarios
– Really study the software-level network interfaces
l Coverage here must include state
– Look for things like flags, ignoring state
– Construct nonsensical input data parameters
l “Insane”packet sizes
l Data overflows and underflows

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 Interface fuzzing
Smart scenarios for all other “surfaces”
– Really study the data interfaces
l APIs, registry, environment, user inputs, etc.
– Construct nonsensical input data parameters
l Overflows and underflows
l Device names when file names are expected

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 Automation is your friend...
…and your foe
– Lots of fuzz products are
appearing
– How can one size possibly
fit all?
– Best fuzzing tools are in fact
frameworks
Examples
OWASP’s JBroFuzz,
PEACH, SPI Fuzzer

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 Finding value in pen testing
Enough with what’s wrong
– Consider informed testing
– Quick form of attack resistance analysis
– Risk-based prioritization
– Nightmare scenarios from architectural risk analysis
– Abuse case stories
– Start with vendor tools, but then roll your sleeves up and
do it yourself
l Scripting tools can help tremendously

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 Pen testing strategies
Inside => out approach is
most likely to yield
meaningful results
– It doesn’t hurt to also do an
outside => in test
– One very small part of
overall testing
– Adversarial approach
– Surprises happen

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 Basic pen testing methods
Target scan
– Take inventory of target space
Vulnerability scan
– What potential preliminary weaknesses are present?
Vulnerability exploit
– Attempt entry
Host-based discovery
– What interesting “stuff” is on each breached system?
Recursive branching
– Repeat until finished
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 Pen test results
Results need to be actions for dev team
– Traditional pen test teams report to IT
– Need to adapt to different audience
– Map findings to modules and code

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 Automation is really your friend
Pen test tool market is (arguably) one of the
strongest in the security business
– Choices abound in commercial and open source
– Many are quite mature
– Almost a commodity market
Examples include
– Nmap, nessus, Metasploit, ISS, Core Impact, Retina

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 Dynamic validation
Time to verify all those security requirements and
functional specs
– QA will have easiest time building test cases with these
– Fault injection often used
– Helps if requirements verbiage is actionable

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 Automation, what’s that?
Dearth of available tools
– Some process monitors are available and helpful
– Test cases are easiest to define

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 Risk-based testing
Time to animate those “nightmare scenarios” you
uncovered in the architectural risk analysis
– Start with abuse cases, weakness scenarios
– Describe and script them
– Try them one step at a time

Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to

the end; then stop. − Lewis Carroll

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 Automation, what’s that?
Dearth of available tools
– It’s rare that these scenarios lend themselves to general
purpose automation
– Test cases are really tough to define

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 Additional considerations
There’s plenty other things to think about
– Threat modeling
– Results tracking
– Five stages of grief
– Knowledge sharing
– Improvement and optimization

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 Threat analysis can help
Who would attack us?
What are their goals?
What resources do they have?
How will they apply technology?
How much time do they have?

Answers can help in understanding feasibility of

attacks

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 Results tracking
Lots of good reasons to
track results
– Use again during regression
testing
– Ensure closure
– Knowledge transfer of
lessons learned
– Justify time spent

Tools can help

Test Director
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 Five stages of grief
Security testers are often the bearers of bad news
– Learn from the Kübler-Ross model
l Denial,anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance
l Watch out for denial and anger!

– Understand and anticipate

– Diplomacy and tact will optimize likelihood of
acceptance

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 Knowledge sharing
Show the dev team how
their code broke
– Best way to learn
– Public humiliation is a
powerful motivator

If a picture tells a
thousand words, a live
demonstration shows a
thousand pictures
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 Improvement and optimization
Immediate goal is to find defects in today’s
software, but preventing future defects is also a
worthy goal
– Formalize lessons learned process
– Consider papers, blog entries, etc., to share new findings
(once fixed) with others
– Learn from medical community model

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 Getting started
Some general tips and guidelines
– Interface inventory
– Let risk be your navigator
– Get the right tools for the job
– Scripting skills can be very valuable

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 Interface inventory
Start by enumerating every interface, API, input,
output, etc.
– This should be done per module as well as per application
– List everything
– Some call this the “attack surface”
– This list should become a target list as you plan your tests
– Flow/architecture charts are useful

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 Risk navigation
The target list is probably too big to do a thorough
job
– Prioritize focus in descending risk order
– Follow the most sensitive data first
– Those flow charts will set you free

See now why rigorous testing should be informed?

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 Test scenario sources −1
Develop test scenarios throughout SDLC
– Start at requirements, such as
l US regs: GLBA, SOX, HIPPA
l ISO 17799 / BS 7799

l PCI

l OWASP’s WASS

– Warning, they’re often fuzzy (no pun…)

l SOX says, “Various internal controls must be in place to curtail
fraud and abuse.”

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 Test scenario sources −2
Also look elsewhere in SDLC for test cases
– Abuse cases
l Many cases translate directly to test cases
– Architectural risk analysis
l Seek the doomsday scenarios
– Code
l Compliance with coding standards

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 Deployment testing
Rigorous testing of environment
– Network services
– File access controls
– Secure build configurations
– Event logging
– Patch management
– Test for all of this
l Not your job? Who is doing it? The pen testers?

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 References
Some useful additional reading
– “Adapting Penetration Testing for Software Development
Purposes”, Ken van Wyk, http://BuildSecurityIn.us-
cert.gov
– “The Security Development Lifecycle”, Michael Howard
and Steve Lipner
– Fuzz testing tools and techniques http://
www.hacksafe.com.au/blog/2006/08/21/fuzz-testing-
tools-and-techniques/

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 Kenneth R. van Wyk
KRvW Associates, LLC

[email protected]
http://www.KRvW.com

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