Chapter one

1.1 Introduction

Advances in the life sciences during the last decades have profoundly changed the social fabric of
our world. Rapid technological advancement, a display of mastery over nature, has left little time
for reflection and making sense of how our relationship with nature and the world has changed,
and will continue to change. Such changes have been occurring in an atmosphere of promises or
revolutionary medical advances that have not been fulfilled (Brown & Michael, 2003), but the
hope of scientists that technology will improve our lives has sustained enough momentum for
new fields to arise. In this time and age where scientists seem to increase their grip over life, with
cutting-edge technologies like gene editing that promises surgical precision over the
manipulation of life, it is more important than ever to understand in depth how scientists think
about life, and by extension, about their duties and roles in society. For this task, I examine in
depth the goals, narratives, imaginaries and visions of possible futures that the emerging field of
xenobiology may bring into being. Xenobiology, for the unfamiliar, has been defined succinctly
as1:

“Xenobiology (XB) is a subfield of synthetic biology, the study of synthesizing and manipulating
biological devices and systems. Xenobiology derives from the Greek word xenos, which means
"stranger, guest". Xenobiology describes a form of biology that is not (yet) familiar to science and is not
found in nature. In practice it describes novel biological systems and biochemistries that differ from
the canonical DNA-RNA-20 amino acid system (see central dogma of molecular biology). For
example, instead of DNA or RNA, XB explores nucleic acid analogues, termed Xeno Nucleic
Acid (XNA) as information carriers. It also focuses on an expanded genetic code and the
incorporation of non-proteinogenic amino acids into proteins.” (Emphasis added).

The question about what every organism on Earth shares in common has entertained the
imagination of scientists for decades. From the discovery of DNA as the molecule of inheritance
and its double helical structure in the mid twentieth century, scientists have experimented with
alternative molecules to DNA that also support genetic information storage and transfer. The
most significant finding of xenobiology and the study of life outside the boundaries of biology
has been that DNA and RNA are not the only molecular systems capable of storing genetic
information (Eschenmoser, 1999). The imagination that the genetic code or the chemistry of the
genetic system could be different is as old as early efforts in molecular biology following the
discovery of DNA as the molecule of heredity. It is until recently that the ideas behind
xenobiology of a departure from life, or ‘life as we do not know it’, can be materialized. Edward

1
Definition found in the Wikipedia website for ‘Xenobiology’. Retrieved from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenobiology [last visited 26 September 2018].

1
L. Tatum, winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, stated in his Nobel Prize
Lecture on December 11, 19582:

“With a more complete understanding of the functioning and regulation of gene activity in
development and differentiation, these processes may be more efficiently controlled and regulated,
not only to avoid structural or metabolic errors in the developing organism, but also to produce
better organisms.

Perhaps within the lifetime of some of us here, the code of life processes tied up in the molecular structure
of proteins and nucleic acids will be broken. This may permit the improvement of all living organisms by
processes which we might call biological engineering.

This might proceed in stages from the in vitro biosynthesis of better and more efficient enzymes,
to the biosynthesis of the corresponding nucleic acid molecules, and to the introduction of these
molecules into the genome of organisms...” (Emphasis added)

Tatum’s words do not necessarily signal the research agenda of xenobiology but do indicate a
fascination with the ‘code of life’ and a willingness to manipulate as much as biology allows it.
In this thesis I explore efforts from scientists to redefine what we understand as life and the
boundaries between the natural and the artificial. As scientists conduct efforts to rethink life, they
also rethink discourses about how to fit new organisms (or possibilities) into society, mobilizing
a set of promises, narratives and discourses of legitimation. I refer to narratives as a combination
of constructs that people use to understand social phenomena and guide their actions. Their
enterprise of bringing a ‘second nature’ is also displayed as a responsible move, as they aim to
portray their approaches to biology as the safest technological path available. In a commentary
about the draft opinion on risks of synthetic biology conducted by the European Commission
(EC) Scientific Committees, Breitling and colleagues (2015: 107) write that the European Union
recommended, for improving the ‘safety locks’ of genetically modified organisms, the
“development of additional approaches, including genetic firewalls based on noncanonical
genetic material.” Such approaches can only be accomplished with xenobiology, positioning as a
field that can provide control as a form of isolation, hence safety.

In addition to studying the birth of a discipline (Bensaude Vincent, 2013; Powell et al., 2007),
in this thesis I focus on the discourses and imaginaries that sit behind efforts to redefine the
genetic systems of living organisms (i.e. Benner & Sismour, 2005; Marlière, 2009). I follow
efforts in this regard under the umbrella term (Rip & Voß, 2013) 3 of xenobiology, a ‘life sciences’
discipline that aims to explore the non-conventional biological world, through the development

2
From https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1958/tatum-lecture.html [Last visited
June 21, 2018]
3
The authors write: “there is not only a struggle for recognition (and funding) of new fields within science, but
also a struggle for legitimacy and resources in direct interaction with policy communities and a variety of social
groups who are looking for opportunities to endorse and fund interesting research programmes.” (Rip and
Vob, 2013: 43)

2
of alternative genetic systems4; given that all living organisms share the same genetic molecule of
life, DNA, xenobiology consists of an exploration of how life could have been different.
Organisms on Earth may not share the same cellular properties, neither the same genetic codes,
but one thing is certain: all existent forms of life share the same common ancestor(s) (c.f. Woese,
1998). The success of synthetic biologists (or xenobiologists) in expanding the genetic basis of life
changes our conception of the living. Such a profound transformation of how we approach life,
which continues previous efforts in genetics and genetic engineering over decades, involves
reconfiguring social order in ways yet to be imagined. I ask what is at stake with this new field,
asking not only about how it transforms the way we think about life, but what political and
ethical aspects need to be accommodated if these new ways of thinking are to be adopted by
society. In doing so, xenobiology offers a mirror of how scientists think about the public, and
what type of values, prioritizing risk and safety, are legitimate. Conversations about new
technologies tend to be framed in terms of whether new objects present hazards, and whether
these hazards can be managed. Such inclination to evaluating and predicting risk, leaves a blind
sport for questions of whether technology supports the good life, what kind of society we want to
build with the help of technology, and who has a say in such paths that are being opened.

Particularly telling is the relationship between xenobiology and biological containment

(biocontainment). Biocontainment, broadly speaking, denotes strategies to confine pathogenic
and genetically modified organisms to the laboratory. Xenobiology employs two forms of
biocontainment, the first is auxotrophy, a nutritional requirement for organisms that cannot
manufacture a nutrient by themselves. Simply put, an organism cannot survive if it does not ‘eat’
a nutrient that it does not produce. In the case of xenobiology, such nutrients are artificial and
cannot be found in nature. This has been used in molecular biology as a traditional tool, on the
basis of mutants that cannot synthesize certain amino-acids. The second strategy corresponds to
making it impossible the transfer of genetic information between organisms of different species.
This has been a major concern about the environmental impact of genetically modified
organisms, for example the transfer of antibiotic resistance genes to species in the wild.

A good way to illustrate auxotrophy is the ‘lysine contingency’ fiction employed in Michael
Crichton’s novel Jurassic Park (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990). In the film, after the
dinosaurs have escaped their cages, the staff of the park have an emergency discussion on how to
handle the situation5. Looking for solutions, the game warden Robert Muldoon asked, ‘what
about the lysine contingency? we could put that into effect.’ Then the visiting paleobotanist Dr.
Ellie Sattler asks what it is. Subsequently, CEO and creator of the park John Hammond says: ‘it

4
Note that scientific efforts in these areas are not restricted to xenobiology, neither are exclusive of the last
decade. See chapter one for background on xenobiology.
5
From https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107290/quotes [last visited July 5, 2018].

3
is absolutely out of the question.’ Further, chief engineer Ray Arnold (played by Samuel L.
Jackson), states:

“the lysine contingency is pretended to prevent the spread of the animals in case they ever get off
the island. Dr. Wu inserted a gene that creates a single faulty enzyme in protein metabolism; the
animals can’t manufacture the amino-acid lysine. Unless they are completely supplied with lysine
by us, they slip into a comma and die.”

Unfortunately, the lysine contingency biocontainment mechanisms did not spare the visitors
of the park them from facing terror by dinosaurs wreaking havoc in the island. Safety is also the
results of human agency and institutions and technologies are unruly (Wynne, 1988); as such,
the containment mechanisms in Jurassic Park failed to imagine uncertainties that the system
could present, and failed to response to such external hazards.

For the task ahead I employ theoretical tools and methods from the discipline Science and
Technology Studies (STS, or ‘science, technology and society’), a field known for its social
constructivist approach (i.e. Hackett et al., 2008); STS is concerned with how scientific
knowledge and technological systems are constructed (Sismondo, 2008), and conceives science
as a social activity shaped by history, institutions, beliefs, and values.. The emerging field of
xenobiology involves construction in many levels, for instance in terms of bringing novel forms of
beings to the world, with meanings that are yet to be understood, their fitting into the existing
realm of living beings, and their portrayal as safe organisms. The type of inquiry in STS is
devoted to finding alternative explanations, fighting reductionism and destabilizing or
challenging dominant stories, as well the visions of possible futures that technologies help realize
(Jasanoff, 1996). This thesis takes an STS perspective that recognizes not only the social aspect
of science but its political connotations.

In this chapter I provide an overview of the field I engaged with in this thesis, ‘xenobiology’,
along with the context of one of the main promises that researchers claim, that of biosafety. I
indicate why STS provides a set of theoretical tools and empirical studies that are useful to study
xenobiology from a social and political angle. Proponents of xenobiology aim to redefine the
genetic basis of life, and in doing so, they also drag along previous controversies over genetically
modified organisms. They face the future of the field based on a negotiation of the limits of
modifying the natural, based on assumptions on what the public may want or allow. Examining
these dynamics further lies at the heart of this thesis.

In the next section, I introduce the emerging field of xenobiology by referring to the First
Xenobiology Conference held in 2014, an event designed to congregate the leading minds behind a
set of common questions and goals around manipulating the genetic basis of life. In this

4
conference, questions of ethics and responsibility were intertwined with the origin of the field, as
the two are inseparable.

Subsequently, I address the main research questions that have guided the development of this
thesis and its relation to STS and governance of technology. Next, I explain efforts of
incorporating safety features as the characteristics or properties of a product, along with the
consequences that this brings for governance and allocations of responsibility. Then I illustrate
that xenobiologists have sought to provide solutions to the problem of safety and risks of genetic
engineering as developing biocontainment, and the importance of studying this connection
between technology and safety. Last, I provide an outline of the chapters of this thesis.

1.2 Xenobiology and the first xenobiology conference

A good starting point for introducing the emerging discipline of xenobiology is the First
Xenobiology Conference6 (referred to as XB1 hereafter), held in Genoa, Italy, during May 6th-8th
2014. The conference was organized by Phillipe Marlière, a French biotech entrepreneur who
has advocated the field with enthusiasm and vigour, called it a foundational conference. His
importance for the field of xenobiology is remarkable. He and Markus Schmidt, among others,
have worked to provide a vision of what is achievable in xenobiology (e.g. Herdewijn &
Marlière, 2009; Marlière, 2009; Schmidt, 2010). The conference gathered a few dozen
researchers from different regions of the world, and from diverse scientific disciplines, from
synthetic biology to organic chemistry. Foundational conferences usually serve to define what set
of questions in common, and how to advance the field forward.

The ‘synopsis’ section of the conference website provides an overview of its focus,

“Xenobiology (XB) is the endeavor to overcome the constraints imposed by evolution on natural
living organisms. It is an emerging field in the context of synthetic biology, encompassing the
design, generation and evolution of alternative forms of life. The foundational conference XB1 aims
to gather scientists, engineers, designers, policy makers and other stakeholders to chart the paths
toward an entirely novel biodiversity.
A major goal of the XB1 conference participants will be to assess how alternative life should be
designed to reserve human health and the environment. With this in mind, sessions of XB1 will be
devoted to plan experimental tasks for diversifying nucleic acid propagation, reprogramming
proteins, expanding metabolism and assembling ecosystems de novo. The prospect of further
diversifying the Earth’s biosphere challenges current worldviews and raises new ethical and philosophical
issues while stimulating industrial innovation and artistic creativity.

6
A relevant source was the website http://xb1genoa.com/ [Last visited March 2017], which is no longer
available online.

5
 The venue for the XB1 conference was chosen in the hope that Genoa’s illustrious citizen
Christopher Columbus will inspire the exploration of yet unknown continents of life.”7 (Emphasis
added).

This introduction from the conference website summarizes the agenda of xenobiology, its
transformative potential, and its inclination to challenge established understandings of life. From
its foundational moment, the field was stamped with a label of navigation, as I will address in
chapter four. One of the organizers of the conference was Biofaction8, a non-profit organization
that communicates and engages with public debates about synthetic biology, founded by Markus
Schmidt, who has built a career in risk assessment. Biofaction prepared a short videoclip about
XB19 that captures xenobiologists’ simultaneous ambitions of redefining life and positioning
researchers as responsible. The videoclip opens with Phillipe Marlière saying ‘there was a
momentum among different scientists all over the world, and we felt that it was time to organize
a xenobiology conference.’ Glorious baroque classical music followed, setting the scene for the
replica of a beautiful galleon stationed in the port of Genoa; after various close-ups to the ship,
Marlière continues:

“Biologists now are like navigators in the Renaissance, because we don’t know enough, but we
can move away from the natural world, and try to reach virtual continents of life, so to speak, so
Christopher Columbus, appears as the icon for organizing this first xenobiology conference. And
where was Columbus born? He was born in Genoa. That’s where we are.”

It is no coincidence that Genoa was chosen as the venue for XB1. It fits well within the
narratives and metaphors that Marlière uses, as I explain in chapter five; as he has claimed, for
him biology involves a departure from the natural, the familiar, to sail into uncharted territory
that can bring multiple rewards, including safety. The BioFaction video also features Markus
Schmidt, a major spokesperson in the field, specialized in risk assessment, and founder of
Biofaction. In the video, he explains what xenobiology is about, of exploring the unknown:

“we wanted to bring together some of the most important scientists working in the area of
xenobiology, so this is kind of an inaugural conference... Xenobiology, the xeno stands for
something foreign, something that is unknown, and biology is the science of life. To hear that
there is to create and design and make in the laboratory forms of life that are not known from
nature. So it's life as we don’t know it.” (Emphasis added).

Later in the video, Phil Holliger, Program Leader at the Medical Research Council (MRC)
Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, and pioneer in xenobiology, comments on the
foundations of xenobiology, by saying,

“One of the key things that xenobiology will tell us about is if the chemistry of life is in some way
special, functionally privileged, superior to other chemistries that we might think of. Or if really, if

7
See footnote Error! Bookmark not defined..
8
Biofaction website, http://www.biofaction.com/ [Accessed 12 March 2017]
9
See Vimeo, video titled ‘The XB1 Conference’, uploaded July 1, 2014 by BioFaction’s account.
https://vimeo.com/99627227 [Accessed 12 March 2017]

6
 life sort of arose in an opportunistic way, making use of the building blocks that were available,
and building on that. So I think that is a truly fundamental question in biology to understand
that.” (Emphasis added).

The fundamental questions in biology that xenobiologists aim to address are tied to questions
of scientific responsibility, in the sense of effectively managing the hazards that the technology
may bring– constituting a tension and a relationship that I address in this thesis. For the short
length of the video (7:35 minutes), the authors included opinions on matters of risk and
implications for society of xenobiology; it is intuitive that such an emerging field raises eyebrows
about its ethical implications, but having scientists being such upfront about their handling of
responsibilities and consequences is telling. The scholar in ‘responsible research and innovation’
(RRI) René von Schomberg who participated in the conference, comments in the video that an
emerging technology needs additional personnel involved in overseeing the producers of the
technology, because scientists or engineers would not do risk assessment. Markus Schmidt also
commented on responsibility in xenobiology. He sees his role in the organization of the
conference “as to ensure that right from the beginning, the societal and ethical issues are taken
into account when developing this field, so that the field is developing in a responsible and
conscious manner.” From the very beginning xenobiologists aim to incorporate responsible
practices. What forms such practices may acquire or claim is part of what I unfold in this thesis,
as well as for what ends. Near the end of the video, von Schomberg commented on the
importance of involving key stakeholders in discussion about trajectories of technology (cf. Von
Schomberg, 2013):

“governments have a role as a regulator but very much more in emerging fields, as a facilitator for
discussions and networks with stakeholders, to create environments where the stakeholders take
up responsibility for their roles in innovation processes.”

The video finishes with Marlière indicating an open path for xenobiology, whose future will
be shaped by those who are brave enough to steer it: “I think it is far too early to fix the thinking,
the directions, the navigation. We should just let people spontaneously go where their taste and
intelligence tell them to go.” Is there a role for responsibility in a field that will be defined by the
will of brave scientists? Leaving aside the excitement for science that xenobiology offers, I
wonder whether and how xenobiologists conceive limits. Should the field be allowed to flourish
as it may, or is there a role for social scientists and laypeople to influence its direction? In order
to address these questions, we need some clarity about what scientists understand as
xenobiology. In fact, xenobiology not only conveys a set of foundational questions, but
aspirations of how science is disseminated in society and the power of scientists to impose one
trajectory over others.

Philippe Marlière is a good reference to explain the ambitions of xenobiology, because he and
other pioneers like Markus Schmidt and Piet Herdewijn gave the field its name and have

7
promoted it actively10. Commenting in an interview for Anna Musso, a French science
journalist11, on the seminal paper of Romesberg lab in 2014 (see chapter two)12, Marlière defines
xenobiology not only in terms of what it is, but its aspirations. Hence the nascent field of
xenobiology is not only a set of epistemic assumptions but is wrapped up with value judgements
and aspirations.

“In Europe, the field in question is organized under the name of xenobiology. Xenobiology does
not have an applied goal itself, it consists in conceiving, assembling and evolving living
organisms, for the moment, of bacteria, so that they differ in their chemical organization from all
the species of terrestrial ecosystems. So also that this artificial biodiversity is totally captive of the
environments where it is cultivated and incapable of contaminating, genetically polluting natural
habitats. From the point of view of environmental protection, this is a path that can lead us to the
ultimate protection.”

Moreover, Philippe Marlière has articulated a succinct definition: “Xenobiology is the study
of foreign organisms, life as we do not know it” (emphasis added); but this study involves the
creation of unknown forms of life, not the study of existing ones13. This is Marlière’s vision of the
field, a vision that not all researchers in xenobiology share. At this point, many are working in
projects that have common questions and aspiration but from different disciplinary silos. When
we refer to xenobiology, we must be cautious about its ambiguous character, and the different
meanings that different scientists ascribe to the field. Few researchers would identify themselves
as xenobiologists. As such, xenobiology is not a consolidated discipline: it does not have a
journal, a dedicated society, or a course of study (i.e. a doctoral programme). Most scientists
active in the field would not label themselves as xenobiologists, because their disciplinary
affiliations lie elsewhere, for example as synthetic biologists, metabolic engineers, biochemists,
organic chemists, molecular biologists, and so on. It takes plenty of work, including forging
alliances and mobilizing resources, for heterogeneous scientists to group under a single label.
However, the realization of two conferences dedicated to xenobiology14, and the usage of the
term in scientific articles, lends support that there are ideas mobilized around a core set of
assumptions and aspirations centred around xenobiology. Although I have heard comments that
xenobiology is a terrible label for a discipline for its association with ‘xeno’, the xeno in
xenobiology refers to the non-terrestrial nature of the exploration, of developing life forms that
are constituted by artificial genetic systems.

10
See Herdewijn & Marlière, 2009; Marlière, 2009; Schmidt, 2010.
11
Interview by Anna Musso. La création d’organismes artificiels protégerait l’homme et la nature. May 23,
2014 See: http://www.humanite.fr/philippe-marliere-la-creation-dorganismes-artificiels-protegerait-lhomme-
et-la-nature-533716 [Accessed 07-Mar-2017; translated via Google Translate website (revised for accuracy)]
12
The article reported the creation of a semi-synthetic organism, a bacterium that uses the four canonical DNA
bases (A, T, C and G), but that also holds in its genetic code a pair of two synthetic bases called X and Y.
Read more at: https://phys.org/news/2017-01-scientists-stable-semisynthetic.html#jCp
13
This resonates with an episode of the TV show Star Trek, in which the crew of the Enterprise space ship is
exploring a planet in search of live, and the ship’s surgeon Dr McCoy says: "it’s life, Jim, but not as we know it".
See Gee, 1999.
14
Such as the XB1 conference in Genoa in 2014, and the second xenobiology conference, held in Berlin, 2016.

8
 An important term to introduce is ‘XNA’, for ‘X’ nucleic acid, or any type of nucleic acid
different from DNA or RNA. Herdewijn & Marlière (2009: 792) refer to XNA as ‘additional
types of nucleic acids (XNA for ‘xeno-nucleic acids’), whose chemical backbone motif would
differ from deoxyribose and ribose, and whose polymerization would not interfere with DNA
and RNA biosynthesis.’ Vitor Pinheiro & Phil Holliger (2012: 245), citing Herdewijn & Marlière
(2009), refer to XNA as any ‘synthetic genetic polymer with a focus on those that have shown
potential for either chemical and/or enzymatic replication’. Notably, Steven Benner, one of the
first experimenters with alternative genetic systems (see chapter two for detailed background on
technical aspects of xenobiology), does not employ the term ‘XNA’, but ‘artificial DNA-like
molecules’ (Benner, 2004: 625). Nevertheless, xenobiology is not restricted to the study of XNA
nucleic acids in biological systems. Researchers have studied chemical variations of DNA, which
maintain the core skeleton of phosphate and the sugar deoxyribose, but with different nitrogen
bases; it also comprises the expansion of the genetic code (i.e. from three to four nucleotides, or
the reconfiguration of the genetic code, so that codons code for different amino-acids or for
amino-acids not found in nature. Seen in this way, the xenobiology conferences may serve a role
in unifying diverse approaches in biotechnology and biosciences under a key core of goals and
research questions, a unity which may lead to a more efficient attraction of resources and
prestige.
<< Insert figure that shows different XNAs? >>
The field of xenobiology –also referred to as orthogonal biology– is relatively new, although its
foundations trace back to the birth of molecular biology in the 1950s. It is one of several
disciplines that employ synthetic biology approaches (ERASynBio, 2014)15. For the Engineering
Biology Research Consortium (EBRC), synthetic biology “aims to make biology easier to
engineer. Synthetic biology is the convergence of advances in chemistry, biology, computer
science, and engineering that enables us to go from idea to product faster, cheaper, and with
greater precision than ever before.”16 It is starting to gain attention in policy circles (e.g. Carter et
al., 2014; Pauwels et al., 2012)17, for example, as ‘radically new approaches’ in synthetic biology
(European Parliament, 2012: 211), and usually associated with safety in genetic engineering
(German National Academy of Sciences, 2010).

15
These approaches include Metabolic engineering, Minimal genomes, Regulatory circuits, Protocells,
Bionanoscience and Orthogonal biological systems (what I refer to in this thesis as xenobiology). See also
Acevedo-Rocha (2016) for a classification of the different subfields in synthetic biology.
16
From https://www.ebrc.org/what-is-synbio [Last visited September 22, 2018]. Note that EBRC was formerly
called Synberc, a center established in 2006 to coordinate efforts between universities and private enterprises
with the goal of making biology easier to engineer.
17
The absence of discussion of xenobiology or orthogonal biology is telling in landmark reports such as Balmer
& Martin, 2008; BBSRC & EPSRC, 2011; Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2010; Royal
Academy of Engineering, 2009.

9
 Further, a note on the geography of xenobiology. As it currently stands, efforts in
xenobiology are not restricted to particular regions, neither different regions emphasize certain
aspects of xenobiology18. Milestones in the field have been accomplished in places as varied as
Japan, California, the US, Israel, and Europe. If seen from a scientific point of view, it is difficult
to pin epistemological differences between different regions, although that might need to be
further studied. However, in terms of discourses of biosafety in synthetic biology, some
differences can be made in the US with respect to Europe19, which would be expected given their
different political cultures and civic epistemologies (Jasanoff, 2005).
Xenobiology is an interesting field to study from an STS approach, because as researchers
seek answers to fundamental questions, such as whether life could have arisen with a different
genetic chemistry, they also seek applications in various arenas, like biomedicine and the
environmental science (i.e. bioremediation, terraforming). This tension between what scientists
find interesting to investigate, and what potential applications receive support for research, is at
the centre of the narratives, discourses and imaginaries that drive xenobiology. In chapter two I
provide a more detailed account of the possibilities and applications of xenobiology.

1.3 Research questions

This thesis aims to gain a better understanding of scientific practice in xenobiology, questioning
its value choices, implicit assumptions, visions, narratives and epistemological judgments,
through engagement with synthetic biologists. My aim is to provide insights on how emerging
technologies can be governed responsibly, to draw lessons for steering the development of
technologies towards a more inclusive regime of knowledge production. I place emphasis on
how the problems and promises of xenobiology are constructed, such as the engineering of
organisms with built-in biological containment features, and the sociotechnical imaginaries
(Jasanoff, 2015; Jasanoff & Kim, 2009) that support them. Sociotechnical imaginaries drive
technological trajectories, represent visions of how technology should be developed –for good or
bad– and importantly, guide how states support visions of ‘where–to–get–to’ (although the
concept is not restricted to state–level actors). Sociotechnical imaginaries are in the words of
Jasanoff (2015: PAGE), “collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed
visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social
order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science in technology” (Emphasis
added).

18
See Meyer & Molyneux-Hodgson (2016) for ‘placing’ in synthetic biology, after a comparison of the
development of synthetic biology in France and the UK.
19
This theme of geographical differences with respect to discourses of safety merits further investigation. In
my fieldwork, I was only able to interview two interviewees from the US, which could provide a narrow picture
of their views on xenobiology and biosafety.

10
 I analysed an emerging technoscience (xenobiology) using a combination of qualitative
research methods. The data I analyse and present in this thesis comes from a series of thirty-four
semi-structured interviews conducted over one year; this was complemented with participant
observation in a synthetic biology laboratory (located in the UK) for one year, where I also led
discussions with researchers about crucial topics of science and society related to xenobiology. In
addition, I analysed policy and scientific literature about advances in the field and reflections
about biosafety and biocontainment. I also attended academic events (i.e. conferences,
workshops, seminars) about synthetic biology and xenobiology.

In this thesis I analyse the narratives, imaginaries and visions that construct the relationship
between xenobiology as a field that expands the boundaries of life and biosafety, in the form of
biocontainment. Such relationship offers a prime view of how scientists conceive their
responsibility to society and frame of problems to be solved via technology. My aim is to show
that xenobiology and biocontainment are supported by an expectation of achieving control over
biological systems and that such control will ensure public acceptance. In doing so, I provide
elements to think about responsibility in emerging biotechnologies like xenobiology as giving up
control and embracing uncertainty and displacing the level of analysis from the organism to the
ecosystems level. Following real-world experimentation (Gross, 2010; Krohn & Weyer, 1994),
which considers scientific practice as an experiment in which we are all inevitably involved, I call
for a more open discussion of the purposes of innovation and how technologies are political in
the sense of restricting participation. If biocontainment serves to lock down certain assumptions
and goals of biotechnology, like developing biosafe organisms or improving intellectual property
control, I argue that by questioning such connection with xenobiology, we can develop
opportunities to rethink the governance of biotechnology, to think less about risk and more about
values and the public good.

Overall, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on the governance of emerging
technologies, and particular con responsibility in science. The analysis I present can contribute to
the understanding of what motivates scientists and how they conceive responsibility, as well as
the cultural resources (i.e. narratives, visions and sociotechnical imaginaries) they recruit to
legitimize their research. Such cultural resources and ways of relating to society tend to be
crosscutting to emerging technologies, not only relevant to the life sciences. Second, this thesis
contributes to highlight the importance of imagination in scientific practice and risk management,
as an important subject of enquiry. And last, I put forward a provocation to think about
uncertainty and experimentation in the real world in different ways, giving up control and
adopting frameworks for governance that are both adaptive and inclusive.

11
 Xenobiologists not only have the power to redefine the boundaries of life, but to extend
humanity´s control over death and life and redefine (biological) time and space. A first theme to
address in this regard is that of thinking of xenobiology as a point of reference to question a
culture (or paradigm) that is pro-innovation20, in which innovation and its risks are lauded,
believed to bring economic growth and solutions to pressing issues, without questioning their
consequences, or how they may erode existing norms, a characteristic of the moderns (Latour,
1993: 41). Second, conversations about xenobiology raise questions about the purpose of the
field (Guston, 2013) –at the heart of responsible research and innovation frameworks (c.f.
Stilgoe, Owen, & Macnaghten, 2013). Macnaghten & Chilvers (2014: 543) write, “when it comes
to upstream processes, stated public concerns suggest a need for more deliberate consideration of
political economic dimensions, the underlying motivations of science and scientists, and the
potential for new science to disrupt natural orders.” Asking what motivates scientists to
undertake research in xenobiology opens opportunities to extend the range of actors involved in
the development of the field, since it destabilizes the status quo that technology must be
developed for its own sake, in favour of a more democratic governance.

Third, looking at visions of the future is a mirror of controversies of the past. To study
xenobiology we need to consider the social and historical context in which the field is embedded.
This connects with what Michel Callon calls ‘overflows’ (Callon, 1998), the negative
externalities of science and technology, not necessarily restricted to accidents. Overflows are
inevitable, cannot be contained with existing political and economic institutions, which
motivates rethinking existing boundaries in society, particularly between experts and laypeople.
Overflows tend to lead to controversies associated with outputs of technology, like genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), nuclear waste, mobile
phones, the treatment of household waste, asbestos, tobacco, or gene therapy, that scientists and
politicians try to avoid (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009). Nevertheless, Callon and
colleagues invite to think differently about overflows, welcoming controversies as opportunities
to explore uncertainties and ‘zones of ignorance’; they welcome the involvement of actors who
would be excluded from participating and framing the stakes.

Controversy over genetically modified crops in Europe in the late 1990s, manifested through
the regulatory procedures delayed or restricted commercial use of genetically modified crops, as
well as public protest and outrage. For Kearnes and colleagues (2006: 301), genetic engineering
of crops technologies

“reflected a broader set of tensions: global drives towards new forms of proprietary knowledge;
shifting patterns of ownership and control in the food chain; issues of corporate responsibility and

20
For example, see Sveiby, Gripenberg, & Segercrantz, 2012.

12
 corporate closeness to governments; intensifying relationships of science and scientists to the worlds
of power and commerce; unease about hubristic approaches to limits in human understanding;
conflicting interpretations of what might be meant by sustainable development.”

Moreover, they made visible that policy frameworks for governance of technology were not fit
for purpose, because they conceal socio-political agendas, which resulted in a legitimacy crisis in
science, as well as public distrust of regulatory institutions and science (Levidow & Marris, 2001;
cf. Jasanoff, 2005). As Kearnes and colleagues (2006: 302) note, ‘contemporary scientific
research is informed by tacit visions and imaginaries of the social role of technology’ and ask for
such visions to be opened up for deliberation and scrutiny in the case of nanotechnology.
Xenobiology presents another opportunity that should not be missed, to widen the range of
actors involved in the discussion about values and imaginaries that technologies embody. This is
in line with Ben Hurlbut’s thinking on biocontainment, who writes: “if the technologies of the
moment truly offer the power to remake life, then they might also provide occasion to revisit and
rewrite our programs of governance, and so too the habits of mind and modes of imagination
that underwrite them.” (Hurlbut 2017: 92).

This thesis examines how researchers in xenobiology reimagine life, the type of imaginaries
that support such moves, and the corresponding ramifications into social and political arenas.
For Sheila Jasanoff (2003), a participatory turn that gives the public a role in decision-making
about technology is not sufficient. The culture of governance and mechanisms for governance
need to be redeployed. In her words (p. 240), “there is a need for ‘technologies of humility’ to
complement the predictive approaches: to make apparent the possibility of unforeseen
consequences; to make explicit the normative that lurks within the technical; and to
acknowledge from the start the need for plural viewpoints and collective learning.” In this
regard, Jasanoff draws attention to how problems are framed, active participation of individuals
in risk analysis, distribution of implications of innovation, and (most importantly for the
argument of this dissertation) learning and collective reflection from past experiences. STS
researchers may find opportunities to design and carry out experimental forms of participation,
as co-producers of knowledge and social order (Stilgoe & Guston, 2017).

The last theme to address, before specifying the research questions of this dissertation,
concerns the politics of design in xenobiology. Langdon Winner has made us sensitive to the fact
that technological artefacts have politics and embed forms of power, as they rule specific
relationships between people and modes of action (Winner, 1986). He also proposed the
principle that ‘technologies be built with a high degree of flexibility and mutability’ (Winner,
1977: 326). I propose that much of the design principles involved in xenobiology not only
involve forms of authority, but also embody ways of imagining responsibility and the public.
Artefacts also incorporate values which must be scrutinized in depth. Other concerns for enquiry

13
include unforeseen consequences including controllability and reversibility, as well as impacts on
perceived naturalness, fairness and equity (Macnaghten & Chilvers, 2014). In this sense, I aim to
address Langdon Winner's (1993) critique that the narratives of STS are limited to suggesting
that ‘technologies are socially constructed’ (p. 373), to ‘call into question the basic commitments
and projects of modern technological society.’ (p. 375).

In considering the potential of xenobiology –and most technologies– to reshape the world and
reconfigure society, this thesis is not oriented toward assessing ethical, political and social issues
of cutting-edge biotechnology. Following a co-productionist approach (Jasanoff, 2004), I
interrogate the emergence and stabilization of new objects in the life sciences and their political
implications, in this case the intertwining of xenobiology and biocontainment. The first line of
enquiry that constitutes this dissertation relates to imagination and imaginaries, of which I place
emphasis on sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009). Leading questions include what
imaginaries lead the emergence of xenobiology? What are the values, narratives and imaginaries
of xenobiology? How are imaginaries related to scientific practices and expectations (Gjefsen &
Fisher, 2014)? What alternative imaginaries are possible? By these questions I also mean what
types of assumptions and ideas about life, as well as social order, are invoked by practitioners of
xenobiology. This has opened enquiry in terms of how life can be reimagined (chapter five), or
how scientists think about the limits of life (Helmreich, 2008, 2011), which is tied to how they
imagine the public, and the consequences of their research. Interrogating imaginaries leads to
matters of governance and policy, as Macnaghten, Kearnes, & Wynne (2005) write, reflecting on
the role of social scientists in nanotechnology:

How do imaginaries shape trajectories of scientific research, and help define “doable” and
worthwhile scientific problems? What role do they play in the allocation of funding? How do they
mobilize public and private interest and opposition? And how can social science help open up
such imaginaries to wider public scrutiny and debate, for the benefit of science as well as society?
(bid., p. 279).

The profound transformations of genetic systems and our understanding of life that
researchers in xenobiology may displace commonly held meanings of life, that may result
disruptive for many individuals, but at the same time may bring benefits and advantages. In this
sense, I ask how the narratives and rhetoric of xenobiology seek to legitimize the search for
limits? How do researchers aim to recruit support from other actors (i.e. government funding) to
advance their research agendas? This brings us to examine ‘responsibility’ in xenobiology, do
researchers mobilize strategies to associate their field with a responsible discipline? Is the
association between xenobiology and biocontainment (or safety by design) a form of
responsibility?

14
 A third stream of questions has to do with governance, in particular the framing of problems
to be solved with xenobiology, aspects that are worth of deliberation, as well as who has the
authority and power to define these aspects. This brings my attention to biocontainment and
safety by design, as a form of governance by containment (Hurlbut 2017), with its implications
for the democratization of science.

The analysis presented in this thesis owes to the views and thoughts that researchers shared
with me, as well as my participation in conferences, workshops, and laboratory meetings. As
such, I am bound to present a limited side of the story of xenobiology, however trying to be
faithful to the trailblazers who aim to turn ideas about new biology a reality. Hence, this
dissertation encompasses an effort of interpreting the worldview of scientists and hopes to pave
the ground for meaningful collaborations and engagements with researchers in xenobiology.

1.3 Safety by design, biocontainment and xenobiology

In this thesis I explore the motivations and justifications for research in the emerging field of
xenobiology, aiming to understand how a research agenda that may pass as purely ‘scientific’,
carries along a set of social, political and ethical issues, and assumptions. In multiple
conversations with scientists and lay people about my research in the field, a commonly asked
question was –xenobiology sounds fascinating, but what can it accomplish? Why is research in
the field being conducted?–. The early stage of the field implies that it is not moving in a
direction that is clear or deterministic, which makes it necessary to recur to metaphors and
promises to sustain its growth and validation. Studies in the sociology of expectations (see
chapter three) highlight the future-oriented nature of innovations, and the need for visions and
promises to coordinate different actor communities, as well as mobilizing resources (Borup et al.,
2006). Expectations and visions play a performative role, however the futures they project may
not be realized (Brown & Michael, 2003). Visions and imaginaries that guide the trajectories of
technology have power to determine preferred futures over others (Jasanoff, 2015). This prompts
caution when thinking about the possibilities (or promises) offered by xenobiology, inviting also
to engage with their present and past practices, to gain a more complete picture of their
transformative potential.

Xenobiology offers potential for developing novel pharmaceuticals and modes of delivery of
drugs, as well as insights into how life evolved. Other applications include the development of
novel (nano)materials, and platforms to evolve microorganisms efficiently (through directed
evolution). Among multiple promises, I focus on the possibility of developing safe GMOs
(Schmidt, 2010), by means of containment (or safety by design). Both concern and interest over
the development of ‘safe’ GMOs has been persistent in both policy and scientific circles, which

15
has not been fully resolved after decades of advances in genetic engineering and legislation on
the subject, being dependent on civic epistemologies and political cultures (Jasanoff, 2005;
Wright, 1994). Release of synthetic organisms, that is, their use outside the laboratory or isolated
facilities (i.e. a factory)21, has been identified as a major social challenge in synthetic biology
(Balmer & Martin, 2008: 15). This is partly due to the conviction that the safety or hazards
imposed by genetic engineering can be solved with technology, as a problem of design, rather
than one that also incorporates institutions and norms for governance. For instance, the US
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (2010: 68)22 values the possibility of
safety by design, and writes,

“internal mechanisms to reliably contain function and reduce or eliminate these risks are being
developed. “Biological isolation,” which is also termed “biosafety engineering,” aims to build in
molecular “brakes” or “seatbelts” that restrain growth or replication of partially or fully synthetic
organisms. Synthetic organisms can be engineered to be contained physically or temporally.
Additional data are needed to assess how well biologically engineered safeguards, such as “kill
switches” that activate after a defined number of generations, will work.”

In chapter six I explain that this bears similarities with the outcomes of the Asilomar
conference in 1975 and the imaginary of governance it has maintained over decades (Hurlbut,
2015), that both synthetic biologists and xenobiologists mobilize (i.e. Wright et al., 2013). Marris
& Jefferson (2013) identify four considerations when addressing the importance of safety by
design measures in synthetic biology. First, they claim that ‘built-in biocontainment’ cannot fully
prevent horizontal gene transfer. Synthetic biologists recognize that ‘no such mechanisms could
ever be infallible’ (ibid, p. 22), because organisms can evolve and ‘escape’ the mechanisms
designed to prevent their spread or horizontal gene transfer. Living systems are inherently
‘messy’, unpredictable, resistant to simple forms of control or understanding. In fact, novel
approaches like synthetic biology and systems biology aim to better understand the complexities
of living systems and tame them (Calvert & Fujimura, 2011). Second, even though containment
mechanisms may work to contain designed microorganisms, the DNA of these organisms may
be present in the environment and get incorporated by other non-engineered wild species (this
would not happen in xenobiology). Third, the authors note that containment mechanisms do not
address external factors present in the environment, which may affect the possibility of
horizontal gene transfer23. Fourth, the discourse on biosafety positions horizontal gene transfer

21
Release has been defined as the lack of containment, by the Deliberate Release Directive (2001/18/EC) of
the European Parliament , as “any intentional introduction into the environment of a GMO or a combination of
GMOs for which no specific containment measures are used to limit their contact with, and to provide a high
level of safety for, the general population and the environment”. See also Lee, 2008; Levidow & Tait, 1992.
22
Commission appointed by President Barack Obama in November 2009, to study bioethical issues arising
from advances in the life sciences.
23
To clarify this point, the authors cite the European Decision 2002/623/EC: “the reproductive properties of
the GMO itself, including the modified sequences, the conditions of release, and particular environmental

16
as a hazard effect in itself, but what concerns regulators and experts in risk assessment is the
consequences or adverse effects that can derive of horizontal gene transfer. This resonates with
how the problem (of safety) is framed, which determines the type of solutions that can be
established.

Pioneer xenobiologist Steven Benner has proposed a different view of safety in synthetic
biology, which favours approaches from xenobiology, in a Venn diagram (Figure 1). He points
out that the Mycobacteria with a chemically synthesized genome created by Craig Venter
(Gibson et al., 2010) occupies a space of risk, because it is self-sustaining, can evolve, and is
made of the same biochemistry as humans. Benner’s ‘xenobiology’ aims to expand the letters of
the genetic code, still based on DNA, unlike more recent approaches. As such, his achievements
are placed in ‘non-standard terran biochemistry’, but still self-sustaining. Xenobiologists would
argue that because their XNA-related materials are not found in nature, xeno-organisms would
not be self-sustaining, providing an additional layer of safety. In chapter five I address in detail
the imaginary of control over nature that justifies the rationale that in xenobiology, the unnatural
is safer than the natural. Creating the narrative that real hazards are brought by DNA–based
organisms, and XNA-based organisms constitute a ‘safe space for experimentation’, puts forward
a set of questions about responsibility and the nature of limits that xenobiology aims to
challenge.

Figure 1. Potential for danger from synthetic life according to Steven Benner (Benner, 2010: 3).

considerations such as climate (for example wind), agricultural practices, the availability of hosts for parasites”
(their emphasis).

17
 Xenobiology looks like a Janus head, with one head facing fundamental questions of the origin
of life, as well as what we understand to be the core elements of biology, and on the other hand,
applications of interest for the bioeconomy, like biomedicines, or even nanomaterials (i.e.
Pinheiro & Holliger, 2014; Taylor et al., 2016). A third avenue for the possibilities of
xenobiology is the release of microorganisms in the environment, which would enable a plethora
of applications. Traditionally, the use of genetically modified microorganisms has been restricted
to laboratories or physically contained settings, such as bioreactors in factories. A few
regulations, like the “contained use” or “deliberate release” in EU/UK regulations (i.e. EU
Directive 2001/18/EC on Deliberate Release into the Environment of GMOs and EU Directive
2009/41/EC on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms), impose restrictions
on the use of genetically modified microorganisms in open environments, anywhere beyond the
walls of a laboratory (c.f. Hamlyn, 2018; Lee, 2008). The possibility of releasing genetically
modified micro-organisms in the environment should not be taken lightly. As Marris & Jefferson
(2013: 10) explain, the challenges this has encountered in the past:

“25 years on, hardly any commercial products consisting of a GMMO [Genetically modified
microorganism] that requires deliberate release into the environment to perform its intended
function have entered the EU or US market, very few experimental releases are currently being
conducted, and firms seem reluctant to invest in this area.”

An example of the use of GMOs in the field is the Arsenic Biosensor24 developed by researchers
from the University of Cambridge, a project that was born in iGEM. The biosensor consists of a
recipient that contains bacteria capable of changing colour if the concentration of arsenic in a
sample is higher than an established threshold, therefore allowing the detection of arsenic
contamination in water for drinking purposes; this was meant to be used in rural villages in
Nepal. However, the project encountered regulatory obstacles that to this day have not made it
possible to be implemented in the communities where it was addressed for25. Another avenue has
been proposed as the development of microorganisms that can remediate (degrade, or digest)
hazardous environmental chemicals (Pieper & Reineke, 2000), including plastics, or oil spills;
among the chemicals that can be degraded is the herbicide atrazine (Sinha et al., 2010).

The projected possibilities of employing GMOs in open environments open the question of
engineering not only organisms but microbial communities (Scott et al., 2017), which necessarily
invokes the imagination of large scale ecosystem engineering, or what scientists call
‘terraforming’; and why not, the possibility of modifying the atmosphere and living conditions in

24
See http://arsenicbiosensor.org/ [last visited October 13th, 2017]
25
Sundaram, L. (2017, May). Beyond Product or Process: The Role of Context in Regulating Genetically-
Modified Organisms. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Governance of Emerging
Technologies: Law, Policy and Ethics, Phoenix.

18
other planets26. This would be of course a possibility not restricted to xenobiology but
biotechnology as a whole. Interviewees explained that at this point synthetic biology may be far
from fulfilling this possibility. What is at stake, according to de Lorenzo and colleagues (2016:
623), is that “[c]ontemporary SynBio allows for the first time in the Earth’s history not only [to]
invent biological activities which have not been available before in nature, but also their deliberate
spreading through much larger, even global-scale ecosystems.” (Emphasis original). The
deliberate spread of microorganisms in the environment is meant to cross an imagined barrier,
made solid by means of regulation, between the laboratory and society. The applications I
mentioned above that require the release of microorganisms into the environment are not
necessarily related with the goals of xenobiology, like expanding the genetic code, or producing
proteins with non-natural amino-acids. This is a connection that researchers in xenobiology
make. What is remarkable is the perceived possibility for xenobiology of allowing
microorganisms to step out of the lab into the ‘real world’, while by doing so, this serves to
justify research in the field.

Ben Hurlbut (2017) refers to ‘governance-by-containment’ not only as a form of design, but a
vision and framework of governance, regardless of the technical feasibility of containment
mechanisms in genetically modified organisms. An important development of this governance
framework is the ‘revolution-risk asymmetry’, the assumption that the social benefits of
biotechnology are unlimited, and taken for granted, whereas the risks that derive from it must be
demonstrated and can be manageable with engineering principles. This works insofar
containment is invoked, because if risks are controllable, then there is no justification to deny the
benefits of new technologies. In Hurlbut’s words, the ‘corollary to the promise that risk can be
contained is the promise of an endless frontier of technological progress.’ (ibid, p. 86).

Xenobiology is framed as capable of producing ‘safe organisms’, which cannot proliferate if

not given xenobiotics (or synthetic nutrients) and cannot transmit their genetic material to other
organisms. In this regard, a synthetic biologist whose research has been crucial for xenobiology,
Farren Isaacs (corresponding author of Rovner et al., 2015), commented for a news note by
science writer Elie Dolgin (2015: 423) in Nature, that “[e]stablishing safety and security from the
get-go will really enable broad and open use of engineered organisms”.

The limits that xenobiology redraws are also limits of society and nature. As Pasteur was
successful in bringing the real world into the laboratory and back to society (Latour, 1988), now
xenobiologists aim to take their modified organisms out of the lab and having them carry out
applications that are currently not possible, or difficult to obtain permit for. Xenobiology thus

26
See Dy, A. 2017. Synthetic biology to help colonize Mars. Blog ‘Plos SynBio Community’.
http://blogs.plos.org/synbio/2017/03/01/synthetic-biology-to-help-colonize-mars/ [last visited October 13th,
2017].

19
aims to redefine the boundaries of the biological world, and the boundaries of society in the
laboratory. The problem is that such renegotiations of boundaries are packaged as a technical
question, drawing out most of the attention on ethical and political issues in the field. The
insightful analysis of Hurlbut (2017) suggests that imagining risks as problems of containment,
restricts participation of the public and the range of moral and political questions that can be
asked. The focus on biocontainment distracts and impairs deliberation on how to govern
emerging technologies. This is evident, for example, in a commentary by synthetic biologist
Christina Smolke of Stanford University, for a perspective in Nature in which five synthetic
biologists were asked their views on the challenges, future, and ethical questions associated with
the ‘design of new biological systems’:

“The ethical and regulatory concerns depend on the potential uses and applications. For example,
if the organism is to be used outside of a contained environment (such as an enclosed bioreactor),
then potential effects on the environment and existing ecosystems should be addressed, as well as
related issues such as evolution, adaptation, containment and removal.” (Emphasis added). (Church et
al., 2014: 293).

Nevertheless, research in xenobiology cannot continue without appealing to moral reasons or

benefits that justify research in the field or supply a purpose. This view is shared by interviewee
1A, a civil society member, who expressed,

“the thing that’s being said in synthetic biology is that you can learn about nature by trying to
make it or recreate it. And it’s probably true. If I was somebody who was studying biology at the
molecular level, I would probably want to do that too, as a way of understanding these
mechanisms. So I wouldn't have a problem with that if it’s kept within a lab and it’s about trying to
understand the underlying physics and biochemistry of life” [emphasis added].

This quote summarizes the tension that gave rise to this dissertation. Why do genetically
modified microorganisms need to be contained? 1A continued by saying,

I think that’s very good. What I’m concerned about is when it goes back to this question of what
is the political economy that sits around that, it’s when it’s application focused, when it’s like –
we’re doing this so we can come up with an application– which we may then bring into the real
world.” (Emphasis added).

The issue that 1A considers is not about modifying life in ways that may result uncomfortable
for some, but the associated imagined implications that would bring the release or introduction
of xenobiological organisms into the ‘real world’. This denotes a barrier between the laboratory
and society that scientists may cross, raising issues of political economy. In this thesis, I take
issue with this line of thinking. Establishing a divide between the lab and society is no longer
tenable in the context of emerging technologies and inhibits the type of learning and collective
experimentation that is required for areas such as xenobiology, in which risks cannot be defined
(and uncertainty must be embraced), and greater public involvement should be present. What is
most important about the quote from 1A, is that research can be ‘kept within a lab’, as if it was
not part of the world already. As if what happens in the laboratory somehow does not constitute

20
the reality that all of us are part of. If we are to take seriously the idea behind xenobiology, of
pushing the limits of what life can be, we should not be concerned whether this is encapsulated
in a lab, in society, or in the environment. In other words, these categories cannot be separated.

1.6 Final remarks and outline

STS commentators have turned their attention during the last decade to synthetic biology,
because it has offered a new subject of study where new institutions, aspirations, and
implications coalesce. Synthetic biology offers an opportunity to address governance issues from
an early beginning, providing an interesting opportunity for social scientists to steer the trajectory
the of a field. Similarly to nanotechnology, synthetic biology offers an opportunity to earn public
trust and acceptance from early stages, by integrating social and ethical aspects with research in
the laboratory (Fisher & Mahajan, 2006). Despite synthetic biology having its own set of
epistemological assumptions, among them making biology easier to engineer, the boundaries
between xenobiology and synthetic biology are not at all discrete. Many researchers in
xenobiology identify as synthetic biologists. This may be explained by the associated prestige and
institutional achievements that synthetic biology has obtained, like doctoral training
programmes, university departments, and dedicated funding. Xenobiology taps into previous
controversies over biosafety –which concerns the large-scale damage to ecosystems and human
health– but not so much over biosecurity –concern over biological agents that could be
intentionally misused– (cf. Garfinkle & Knowles, 2014), in particular the release of genetically
modified organisms to open environments and their exchange of genetic material with wild
species. As a major concern in policy circles is the acceptability of synthetic biology (Calvert &
Marris, 2018, forthcoming), in this thesis I show that biosafety concerns are recruited by
promoters of xenobiology to legitimize the field, used as an opportunity to expand biotechnology
to open environments.

The structure of this dissertation is the following. In chapter two I provide an overview of
scientific achievements in xenobiology, signalling the most important developments in the field,
which traces its roots to the dawn of molecular biology. Subsequently, this chapter expands on
the ‘possibilities’, or potential applications of xenobiology, which are important as they are the
manifestation of the visions, assumptions and imaginaries of the field. This is important as I
point out the tensions of xenobiology between being a fundamental and an applied science
(understanding that these categories are not discrete and overlap). In this regard, an important
avenue of research in the field concerns understanding the ‘origin of life’ and determining
whether ‘life’ could be sustained on a different genetic chemistry than DNA. The development of

21
pharmaceuticals and medical applications is also an active area of research in xenobiology, as
well as most of the life sciences, which is rather focused on providing biomedical solutions. It is
in this landscape that biocontainment and the ‘release’ of genetically modified microorganisms
to the environment should be considered.

Chapter three offers an overview of some theoretical insights from Science and Technology
Studies that inform the analysis presented in this dissertation. In particular, I refer to the idiom of
co-production (Jasanoff 2004) to understand the commitments of xenobiology as a scientific
discipline and as embedding understandings of the relationship between science and the public.
This is further supported by a discussion of the literature on imaginaries, including
sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim 2009), technobiological imaginaries (Fujimura,
2011), technoscientific imaginaries (Marcus, 1995), and sociotechnical vanguards (Hilgartner,
2015). These concepts will be useful for the goal of examining what narratives, imaginaries and
visions lead the development of xenobiology. A third stream of literature concerns the sociology
of risk, along with ‘collective experimentation’ (Latour, 2004) and ‘real-world experimentation’
(Krohn & Weyer, 1994), as the starting point that society itself is an ongoing experiment, and
scientific research inherently involves all citizens, is useful to think about issues of control and
uncertainty that are at stake in xenobiology and biocontainment. The rest of the chapter
addresses other important areas of governance of technology and STS, including sociology of
expectations, and public understanding of science.

Chapter four explains the methods I used to approach the social study of xenobiology as a
field in the making. The research for this thesis was qualitative, based around thirty interviews
with synthetic biologists –which comprised doctoral students, postdoctoral researchers, and
professors–, and a handful of decisionmakers and regulators. This was supported by a twelve-
month participant observation in a xenobiology laboratory, where in addition to conducting
fieldwork, I organized five discussions with members of the lab, about social and political aspects
of xenobiology. Overall, this research is supported by secondary sources, such as articles
published in scientific journals, news reports, recordings of presentations of scientists, and
interviews to scientists which have been made publicly available.

Chapter five considers xenobiology as a way of thinking about life, as being unlimited. I
examine the rhetoric that the unnatural is the safer option, and scientists aim to challenge the
limits of what is biologically possible. In this section I elaborate on what I call te sociotechnical
imaginary of ‘life unbound’, the premise that life does not necessarily has to be based on DNA,
neither tied to an evolutionary history, but depends on what is biologically possible. Some
researchers like Philippe Marlière frame such exploration with narratives and metaphors of
navigation of exploration, meant to create a niche that only xenobiology can occupy, which is

22
also a safe space, to fulfil a promise of safety by design in biotechnology. Nevertheless, concern
over limits raises a number of questions about responsibility, as a researcher expressed, ‘where
do we draw the line?’.

Chapter six looks at biocontainment as a form of governance by design, which as a legacy of

the Asilomar conference, encapsulates a form of imagining risks that can be managed via
technical solutions found in the laboratory. This embodies an imagination of risks, and
addressing incorporates (or negates) democratic principles as it narrows down the scope for
deliberation, and provides an illusion of control. In this section I introduce what I call the
sociotechnical ‘imaginary of life controllable emergence’, which assumes that controlling
biological systems can ensure control over public acceptance.

Chapter seven… how scientists imagine the publics and given their understanding of the public
fearful and the need to avoid controversy, they aim to associated xenobiology with
responsibility. Responsibility in this context is related to control of organisms, rather than the
expansion of actors in deliberating what is at stake.

Chapter eight… addresses that xenobiology’s approach to life is reductive, here I explore
different forms of understanding the relationship between xeno-organisms and their
environment, leading to thinking about experimentation in a more flexible and broad aspect.

Chapter nine… discussion and conclusion of the findings and arguments of the thesis.

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