OPOSA VS.

FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

Facts: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et
at., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented
by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) cancel all existing Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLA) in the country; (2) cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs. The petitioner alleged that they
have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitle to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
the petitioners claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
(1) plaintiffs have no cause of action against him; (2) the issues raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of government.

Issue: (1) Whether or not petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class
suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests.
(2) Whether or not the issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question.

Held: (1) Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations to come. The SC ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergeneration responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony
of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology.

(2) Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative

branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved
is the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed
in legislation. It must, nonetheless, emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power of the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grace abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR 54 SCRA 83 (1973)

Facts: A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents
P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in
the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent
Honorable Guillermo Villasor, issued an order declaring the said decision final
and executor, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to
execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued.
On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of
the AFP on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations
of the AFP.
Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor
for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
(2) Whether or not the notice of garnishment is valid.

Held: (1) The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares, “The State may not be
sued without its consent”. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it
from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification is the practical
consideration that the demands and inconveniences of litigation will divert time
and resources of the State from the more pressing matters demanding its
attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability
is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private
parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of
its multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
 (2) What was done by respondent Judge is not conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic
concept of the non-suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.

DA VS. NLRC 227 SCRA 693 (1993)

Facts: The case is regarding money claims filed by employees of a security
agency against the DA as filed and requested by National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
DA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to
their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages,
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the
security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and
severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State is applicable on

this case.

Held: No. The rule of non-suability of the State is not absolute and it does not
say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The state may at
times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is
found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits
to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.”
Express consent – may be made through a general law or a special law.
Implied consent – is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation,
the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
In this case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract;
nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act propriety in character. But, be
that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims.
PNB VS. CIR 81 SCRA 314 (1978)
Facts: A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel Manansala had
previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed
is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert
Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary
to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment may be public in
character. In thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there
was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines
amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
The PNB move to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the lack of
merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the
notice of garnishment dated May 6, 1970. The petitioner filed a MfR, but it was
denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.

Issue: Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment
can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of
discretion. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character
may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they
were exempt from garnishment.
As stated in National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. CIR, a GOCC has
a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It
may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any
other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters
into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business
thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro
hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject
to the rules of law governing private corporations.

TECSON VS. COMELEC 424 SCRA 277 (2004)

Facts: Respondent Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy on December 31 2003 for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate
of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be “Fernando Jr.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, his date
of birth to be August 20 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ
and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born
citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national. COMELEC
dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Issue: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes, FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

The term natural-born citizens, is defined to include “those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” Based on the evidence presented which
the Supreme Court consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of
Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years in Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate,
the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at
least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death
was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of
petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe, father of private respondent
Fernando Poe Jr., was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August
20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as
citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,
Fernando Poe Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless
of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

REPUBLIC VS. LI CHING CHUNG 694 SCRA 249 (2013)

Facts:

Issue: When decision is executory pursuant to Sec. 15, RA 530.

Held: The RTC declared petitioner Li Ching Chung a.k.a Bernabe Luna Li a.k.a
Stephen Lee Keng as a Filipino citizen by naturalization and admitted as such.
However, pursuant to Section 1 of R.A. 530, such decision shall not
become executory until after two (2) years from its promulgation and after the
Court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the
applicant has: (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself continuously
to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; (4) or committed any act prejudicial
to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
As soon as this decision shall have become executory, as provided under
Section 1 of RA 530, the Clerk of Court of this Branch is hereby directed to issue
to the Petitioner a Naturalization Certificate, after the Petitioner shall have
subscribed to an Oath, in accordance with Section 12 of C.A. 472, as amended.
The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila is, likewise directed to
register the Naturalization Certificate in the proper Civil Registry.
REPUBLIC VS. DELA ROSA 232 SCRA 785 (1994)
Facts: On Septermber 20, 1991, Juan Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization
captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of the Philippines.
Respondent Judge Rosalio Dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on
March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said
date of hearing.
On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo filed a Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of
Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it on March, where
he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The
motion was granted and the hearing was moved on February.
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Juan Frivaldo, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic
of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen. After receiving a copy of the Decision
on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with
the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Juan Fivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as
Filipino.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Fivaldo is declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
province of Sorsogon. The petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two
credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of Juan Fivaldo as
required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Fivaldo also failed to
attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of
the said law.
The proceedings of the trail court was marred by the following
irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date
of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and
the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the publication
of the petition (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the
finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
observing the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days
from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that
period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision.
Section 1 of RA No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its
promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the
country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced
policies.
Even discounting the provisions of RA no. 530, the courts cannot
implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.

BENGZON III VS. HRET 357 SCRA 545 (2001)

Facts: The citizenship of respondent Teodoro Cruz is at issue in this case, in
view of the constitutional requirement that “No person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
On Novermber 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
CA No. 64, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country.”
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. Subsequently, Antonio Bengson III filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become
a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an

American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held: Yes. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under CA No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by RA No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove
that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. CA No. 63 enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by CA No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a
mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by CA No. 63. Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by

those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services
in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to
an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation

simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where
the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.

This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he

rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship