ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 314 SCRA 641

In most cases filed to challenge the constitutional validity of any statute or order, the issue as to whether the
petitioners are the proper parties has been questioned. In JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRAGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO,

* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA). 642

642

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review

MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, In his capacity as provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity
as Provincial treasurer, G.R. NO. 133064, dated SEPTEMBER 16, 1999, the Mayor of the City of Santiago, the President
of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City and three residents of Santiago City filed a petition for Writ of Revision
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8028, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an independent
component city to a component city, the locus standi of the petitioners was questioned. The Court in said case held
that “it is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who sustained a direct injury
as a result of the endorsement.”

Annotations have been made on similar issues in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) such as
Constitutionality of Statute or Action Must be Raised by Proper Party (Taxpayer’s Suit) in 15 SCRA 497-501, Judicial
Deference to Political Questions in 21 SCRA 822-837, The Plebiscite Cases—Political or Justiciable Issues in 49 SCRA
180-193, Judicial Review of the Effectivity of a New Constitution and the Political Doctrine in 50 SCRA 393-413, and
Political or Justiciable Question in 59 SCRA 652-673. The issues raised in said cases are justiciability, standing,
mootness, ripeness and political questions. This annotation will dwell on the rule of locus standi of the petitioners in
filing cases questioning the constitutional validity of statutes or executive orders.

§ 1. Locus Standi

Defined Locus standi generally means a place to stand. It refers to the standing of a person to file a case. (Ballantine
Law Dic643 VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 643 Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review Dictionary, p.771).
It is a place to stand; a standing in law or a suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 [1976]).

§ 2. Early U.S. Doctrines on Judicial Review

The principle of judicial review which originated in the United States restricted the filing of cases by individuals to
challenge the constitutional validity of a statute. Early U.S. court decisions formulated the conditions needed to
adjudicate a case especially with respect to the challenge of the validity of a statute. Decisions generally limited access
by litigants to shield judges from cases that threaten their independence and institutional effectiveness. They also try
to avoid trying cases that involve politically sensitive issues.

Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the boundaries for judicial action were quite fixed: “It is most true that this Court
will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.” (Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 [1821]). What the Court should or should not accept is largely a matter of judicial discretion.
Reflecting on his work at the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis confided: “The most important thing we do is not doing.
(Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 17 [1957]). The deliberate withholding of
judicial power often reflects the fact that courts lack ballot-box legitimacy. Although couched in technical jargon,
jurisdictional requirements raise fundamental questions of democratic theory. (cited in Fisher, American
Constitutional Law, p. 96 [1990]).

Judges invoked some rules to preserve public support and to avoid conflicts with other branches of the government,
and provide flexibility of action for judiciary. The doctrines used to pursue those goals include justiciability, standing,
mootness, ripeness, political questions, and prudential considerations, all of which help protect an unelected and
unrepresentative judiciary. Although efforts are made to distinguish these doctrines, inevitably they overlap. As noted
by the Supreme Court: “The standing question thus bears close affinity to Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial
Review questions of ripeness—whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention—
and of mootness—whether the occasion for judicial intervention persists.” (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10
[1975]). (Fisher, Ibid.)

§ 3. The Issue of Adverseness

To resolve a legal claim, courts need to know that parties have been adversely affected. Abstract or hypothetical
questions, removed from a concrete factual setting, prevent courts from reaching an informed judgment. The words
“cases” and “controversies” limit the federal courts “to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 95 [1968])

American courts occasionally consider a case even when both parties agree on the issue. In United States vs. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department agreed with the plaintiff that a provision in a congressional statute was
unconstitutional. To protect its interests, Congress passed legislation to create a special counsel. Functioning officially
as amicus curiae, the counsel in effect served as counsel for the United States to assure adverseness. (328 U.S. 303,
304 [1946]). In other cases the courts have appointed a special counsel to satisfy the requirement for a genuinely
adversary proceeding. (Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1,4 [1955]). (Fisher, Op. Cit., p. 97)

In affirming the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court, the Supreme Court also refused to regard the case as a “friendly,
non-adversary, proceeding” between Chadha and the INS. As the Court noted, it would be “a curious result if, in the
administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney General of the United
States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.” From the moment of Congress’ formal intervention
as amicus, adverseness was “beyond doubt.” Even prior to intervention

Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review there was adequate Art. III adverseness.” (INS vs. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 [1983])

§ 4. Standing to Sue

To satisfy the requirement of a case or controversy, parties bringing an action must have standing to sue.
“Generalizations about standing to sue,” Justice Douglas said with customary bluntness, “are largely worthless as
such.” (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 [1970]). After the Supreme Court announced that the
requirements of standing are met if a taxpayer has the “requisite personal stake in the outcome” of his suit, Justice
Harlan chided the Court: “This does not, of course, resolve the standing problem; it merely restates it.” (Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 121[1968]) (dissenting opinion).

To demonstrate standing, parties must show injury to a legally protected interest, an injury that is rather than abstract
or hypothetical. (O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 [1974]). Injuries may be economic or non-economic. (Data
Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 154 [1970]). They may be actual or threatened. Injuries may afflict organizations
as well as persons. (Havens v. Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n. 19 [1982]; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
511[1978]). A “threatened” injury can be close cousin to the hypothetical. Five members of the Supreme Court in 1973
held that allegations of injury were sufficient to establish standing. Proof of actual injury was not necessary. On the
other hand, actual injury may be inadequate to establish standing if the Court wishes to defer to the states. (City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 [1983]). (Cited in Fisher, op. cit., p. 100).

§ 5. Individual’s Standing

A Judge-Made Rule Individuals, functioning in the role of private attorneys general, may have standing as
“representatives of the public interest.” (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F. 2d 608, 615-616 [1965]). This
principle sometimes permits one Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review

party to assert the rights of third parties (jus tertii). Federal courts are reluctant to resolve a controversy on the basis
of the rights of third persons who are not parties to the litigation. There are two reasons. First, the courts should not
adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish them, or
will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not . . . . Second, the third parties
themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and
therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before
them. (Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-114 [1976]).

Although standing is basically a judge-made rule, courts recognize that Congress can, by statute, confer standing upon
an individual or a group, and courts may defer to Congress on such matters. However, such statutory phrases as
phrases as “any person aggrieved” or “adversely affected” allow the courts broad discretion in interpreting what
Congress means by standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the courts to grant standing. Furthermore,
Congress cannot compel the courts to grant standing for a suit that, in the opinion of judges, lacks the necessary
ingredients of a case or controversy. Congressional efforts to confer standing are limited by the judiciary’s exclusive
responsibility to determine Article III requirements.

§ 6. Taxpayer’s Suit

The U.S. Supreme Court at first denied in 1923, the right of taxpayers to challenge the validity of a statute.
(Frothingham vs. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 [1923]). The Court reasoned that the taxpayer’s interest “as comparatively
minute and indeterminable.” There must be a direct injury to evoke standing. The decision was based on a court policy
as it will mean more cases for the court to tackle. The decision was criticized as such a doctrine would put the
government in the position of conceding that a taxpayer lacked standing “even if Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for
Judicial Review Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for the construction of
churches for particular sects.”

The Court decided to liberalize the rule on standing but at the cost of creating substantial doctrinal confusion. It
claimed that standing focuses on the party, not the “issue” “when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and
not whether the issue is justiciable.” It was feared that by lowering the barrier for standing, the Supreme Court not
only encouraged more lawsuits but invited collisions with other branches of government. In a later case, Justice Powell
warned that a relaxed standing policy would expand judicial power: “It seems to be inescapable that allowing
unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a
shift away from a democratic form of government.” (United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 [1974]) (concurring
opinion). (Fisher, op. cit., pp. 102-103) § 7. Locus Standi of a Group

In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court also denied standing to an environmental group that wanted to prevent construction
of a ski resort in a national park. The Court was deeply split with four Justices arrayed against three. (Sierra Club v.
Morton, 404 U.S. 727 [1972]). In that same year, it refused to decide whether the Army’s surveillance of domestic
activities constituted a chilling effect on First Amendment liberties. A majority of five Justices, with four dissenting,
held that there was insufficient evidence of a direct injury to present a case for resolution in the courts.

PHILIPPINE COURT DECISIONS

a. General Rule on Judicial Review

Since 1937, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), reiterated in Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990) and Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA
392 (1980), the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]).

b. Early Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court

Also Restricted the Rule on Locus Standi In 1945, the Philippine Supreme Court in Custodio vs. President of Senate, 42
O.G. 1243 (1945) held that a person who questions the validity of a statute or law must show that he has sustained,
or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule was reiterated in
Manila Race Horse Training Association vs. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951). In People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), the
Court ruled that there must be a showing that the petitioner’s interests are or about to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of the ordinance in question. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by
the operation of a statute or ordinance, he has no standing. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967), the Court held that the invocation of petitioner as motel operators of
their alleged right to being free from reasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously.

c. The Relaxed Rule on Locus Standi

In Rodriguez contra El Tesoro de Filipinas, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), the Court ruled that if a taxpayer cannot attack the
validity of the executive order in question or a law requiring 649 VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 649

Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review the expenditure of public money, no one under our laws could
question the validity of such laws or executive orders. In Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993), petitioners having failed
to show that they were the owners of the artwork, it was held that they were not to proper parties to enjoin the PCGG
from proceeding with the auction sale of old masters’ paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and
the Metropolitan Museum alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et
al., 9 SCRA 230 (1963), the petitioner, as a rice planter with a riceland of substantial proportion and as taxpayer
affected by the purchase of the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, is entitled to a chance
to sell to the Government the rice it seeks to buy abroad and has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial
assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.

d. Taxpayers’ Suit

A party’s standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside
in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84
Phil. 368 [1949]; Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 Phil. 603 [1953]), the Court said that because “the transcendental importance
to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, it brushes aside technicalities of
procedure. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]). “Objections to taxpayers’ suits for lack of sufficient
personality standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or
not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of 650 650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial
Review these petitions.” (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]). Taxpayer-Plaintiff must sufficiently
show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party interest.
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common
to all members of the public. (Bugnay Construction and Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 243 [1989]). However,
in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the Court ruled that petitioners do not possess the legal capacity to
institute the action for the annulment of the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) because they are without a “present
substantial interest as distinguished from mere expectancy, or future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.” The phrase “substantial present interest” means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action
as will entitle him, under substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has legal title to defend
and the defendant will be protected in payment to or recovery from him. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear
legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 571 [1993]). In
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994), the Court held that the petitioner KMU has the
standing to sue. Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and
damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear
legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars
and/or orders. KMU mem651 VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 651 Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
bers, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of
arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who compromise the riding public.
Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not
possessed of the standing to sue, the Court is ready to brush aside the barren procedural infirmity and recognize the
legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality
is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and
waived the requirement of proper party. (KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).

e. Locus Standi of Associations or Groups

When associations or groups of individuals are composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their
vital interests, they are allowed to file suit. The petitioner, the Philippine Constitution Association, is a non-profit, civic
organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the
Constitution. As taxpayers, petitioner may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]). A similar ruling
was made in Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Assn. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).

f. Locus Standi of Public Officials as Petitioners

The Governor of the Province of Rizal, representing the most populated political subdivisions, whose taxpayers bear a
substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the Philippines justify the action. (Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]). In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and a Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review taxpayer, filed
a case to question the validity of some Executive Orders. In Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1962), the Court ruled that
any public official claiming to be adversely affected by a statute enacted under the police power of the state to
promote morality in public service and thereby limited in scope to officialdom may rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof. Since the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in
public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process or liberty as long
as such requirement is observed. To the extent then that the questioned section of the statute compels public officials
to do a certain act, there is an infringement on their liberty.

However, under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.

g. The People of the Philippines as Petitioner

The People of the Philippines represented by the Solicitor General can be a proper party to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute (The Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The People of the Philippines
have a substantial interest in contesting the constitutional validity of a law. “Of a greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the moral wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.”
(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66).

h. Locus Standi of Members of Congress

The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990).
In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify
the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The Court then ruled that a member of the Senate, and of the
House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review standing
question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. (Id. at p. 519).
Where there is a constitutional question to resolve, a senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite
preconditions to bring a suit. (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 [1972]).

However, in Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 (1995), the Court held that the absence of a claim
that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the
Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998), the standing of petitioner Senator Blas Ople was questioned. The Court said
that petitioner Ople, a distinguished member of our Senate, is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public
funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 [1998]).

i. Free Access to Courts

A means of providing guarantee to the constitutional provision of free access to courts (Art. II, sec. 11, Philippine
Constitution), any person is allowed to question the validity of a law under the principle of taxpayers’ suit.

However, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action, and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337
[1998]).

Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case
does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).

The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit
in their name as representatives of affected companies. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]). ——o0o——

[Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review, 314 SCRA 641(1999)