Central Intelligence Agency

\Vashington. D.C. 20505

8 November 2016
i\fr. Alan Weberman
Independent Research Associate
345 East 94ih Street
Apartment 28 C
New York, NY 10128

Reference: F-2016-02381

Dear Mr. Weberman:

On 15 August 2016, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your
Freedom ofinformation Act request for CIA documents on Dag Hammarskjold, 29 July 1905 -
18 September 1961.

We conducted a search of our previously released database concerning the subject of your
request. Accordingly, we located and are enclosing 127 documents, consisting of 880 pages,
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Sincerely,

Pf J,ul jt~~~
Michael Lavergne
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures
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1. SitUa.tion in the A. Hammarskjold's dea't h - will 'f urther·

Congo ~omplicate the ach1evement of a unified
Congo, but ,for the· moment has brought·
events altr)ost to a standstill. ··· Tshomb~(b ) (3)
professes he . is still willing to t~lkr
but plans to return sa6p _to Elizabeth~
vi],.le ; The . . T~nisi~n Mahm.ou<d Khiari,
a. s .e n'i.qr-:uN ·.of.f.icia:,1 1 has .:been
ordered ~o N:dolti ·t o coi:rtinu.e negotia-
t :i ons, but the. '™' · claims tt will .not
change its policy.
B. The military situation appears
to haye worsened somewhat. The Irish
in Jadotvilie have surrendered, and
we have sever.a l · unconfirmed press
reports that the base at Kamina has
been overrun. Fighting has also broken
out at several points in northern
Katanga. In Elizabethville, UN forces
hold a number of strong fp9ints, but
·a re merely ·def ending them.
C. The UN's military predicament
stems from several· factors. Neither
the UN officials in charge nor the
nations contributing troops want a
military solution, and have since
the first day of hostilities held
back local commanders. Th~ combat
performance of · Swedish and Irish
troops ha$ apparently been dis-
appointing· 1 (b)(1)

For The President Only ~

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D.' The us Embassy in Leopoldville ..

reports its concern · tliat ·a truce in
Katanga on Tshomb~'s terms will
seriously ·weaken Adoula .
E. The USSR has so ·far reported
Hammarskjold's death without comment,
but Satellit e propaganda is -beginning
to call for immediate institution
of the ''troika" s ystem for his
replacement . Yesterday's Security
Council sessio n devoted itself to
eulogies and deferred consideration
of a successor . I (b)(1)
I . (b )( 1)

j. 2. Algerian rebel leaders Walmsley concludes :

meet Ambassador Walmsley A . The Algerians were· "impressed
and heartened" by US willingness
to talk.
B. The new government wishes to (b)(3)
demonst r ate its acc e ptabi lity t o
the West.
c. While firm on Saharan sovereignty,
they a r e flexible on transitional
arrangements .
Walmsley also notes the Algerians'·
de~ire to pin down the meining of
D.e Gaulle's "mystical language" on
the Sahara. This intent is clear
in the statement they issued last
Fr iday calling for resumpt ion of
talks. I I
(b)(1)

For The President Only ~cret .

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.NOTES .,

J
(b)(1)
(b )(3)

1 (b)(3)
There was another minor incident in the Berlin air corridors
I
yesterday afternoon, when a Spviet fighter dived in front .of
a US Air Force transport. .

IThe press reports that Communist g~~riflas

in South Vietnam
attached and ·burned a provincial capital 60 miles north ol
!Saigon Monday, apparently· the largest action they have ye·t

~
ndertaken. We have no official confirmation. " ·

rumah is back in Accra, and the situation there ·appears to

ave quieted down for the moment.
~!
I
,____lthe Yugoslavs (bJ(1 r
have toTff tne Soviet-s-l:hey are not~p-r_e_p_a_r~e~a~-to sign a German v·
peace treaty which is already prepared and about which no
discussion ~s possible. L_ Jthere is no point (b )( 1)
in attending a "peace conference" unless the treaty is really
c_~~~_Jto be negotiated there.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

For The President Only~

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5. <Ti'HER CONGO DEVELOPMEXTS :

A, THE PR<}\'IS•IOKAL CEASE-FIRE HAS EXPIRED, LEAVING THE SITUATION Di

KATANGA PRE"d~RIOUs, (b)(1)

'--------------,-------(b)(3)
B. THE US AIR ATTACBE REPORTS HE CAN FUID :KO EVIDENCE THAT HADARSKJOLD

PLANE WAS SABOTAGED OR SHOT Dc::OWlc.::=N,,_.---~

(b )(3)

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C05~73645 i

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-1,1p material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, ·because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
IntelJie-ence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person ; as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

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20 June 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Cuba: . MIG jet fighter being assembled .at Cuban. air base;
Soviet freighter may be:unloading 15 to 18 more. (Page t)

2. USSR-Indonesia: Indoner a mav ·be taking deliver y on first

two TU-16s from USSR. _ _Page t)

3. Bo~ivia: Stevenson r~ports crucial need .for asser.t ion of

government authority; armed forces say they will take over
if Paz goverilll)ent falls . (Page t) ·

4 . . Brazil: Quadros tells embass_ies . in ~exico and Ecuador

to push plan for offering· LatinrAmerican "good office~"
for US-Cuban rapprochement. L j(Page tt)

5. Congo: Kas~vubu - and Gizenga r~gimes reportedly agre~ to

convene parliament at Leopoldyille next week. ·(Page tt)

6. Tunisia - Communist China: . Tunisian inform.ation secre-

tary en route to Peiping may negotiate exchange of diplo-
mats. (Page tt)

7. UAR~Africa~ · Cairo increasing. financial aid to African states

it considers su.sceptib~e to its influence. (Page tt t)

8. UAR-USSR: Cairo-Moscow pl ona,ganda disoute wani, ; Nasir

orders suspension of attacks. _ _ (Page ttt)

9. Dominican· Republic: US consul attempting to dissuade

anti-Trujillo elements from ·taking measures to provoke
US intervention~ (P~ge i·v) '·
 CE.NTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 June 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*Cuba-.USSR: JA reportfrom a highly reliable source inl. . .-_-~--~

cates that on 15 .Tune a MIG jet aircraft was being assembled
at the San Antonio de los Banos air base ih Cuba. 'T his is the
ffrst confirmed report of the presence of such aircraft in Cuba,
but there is no indication of the total number delivered· to date,
nor of whether it is a MIG-15 or MIG-17. The Soviet merchant
v~ssel Leninsky K~msomol, which ·~rived in cUba on or about
16 June ma have delivered from 15 to 18 more MIGs •

.USSR~Indonesia: The Indonesian Embassy in Moscow, ac:-

cording to ·~ intercepted message. of 12 June, has informed. the
Burmese Embassy that the USSR will ·deliver two TU-16 jet
medium bombers to lndonesi~ in the near future . . This would
be the first transfer of such aircraft out of the Soviet Union.
IQ.donesia has requested permission for th~ two.bombers, ac-
companied by two Soviet AN-12 transports, to stop over in Burma
between 22 and 25 June en route to Djakarta. The TU-l.6 s are to
be flown from· the USSR to Rangoon via Peiping by ·soviet pilots,
and from Rangoon to Djakarta by Indonesian pilots with Soviet co-
pilots. · Under the Soviet-.I ndonesian arms agreement of. last Jan-
uary, the USSR is to provide a total of 20 TU:-16s during 1961 and
( 962: six of which will be eguipped with air-to-surface missiles.

Bolivia:. Ambassador Stevenson, in commenting on his talks

with President Paz and Vice President Lechin, r.e ports that the
Bolivian position as a whole is "desperately bad," and that the
..basic problem is the need for assertion ·of government authority o
The army sent word to. Stevenson that it was fully behind Paz,
and rather than tolerate Lechin, .will take over with ·a military

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IRElANO

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. junta if Paz f~ls . Any such attempt would be .l.i kely to meet -.
resistance from armed elements of .the police .and of the work-
ers' and peasants'- militias. j (Backup, Page· 1)
J

*'B razil-Cuba: The Quadros administration ·in Brazil is

going ahead with ·plans to offer its goqd offices, together with
·t hose of Mexico and Ecuador, in.an "attempt to bring about a
·rapprochement between· Cuba and the United States," according
to a 16 June intercepted Foreign Ministry message to the
Brazilian embassies. in Mexico City and Quito. The message
emphasized .that Brazil felt the offer, as proposed by special ./""6
Cuban emissary Carlos Olivares during private .conversations
with the Mexican, Brazilian, and Ecuadorean presidents in· late
May, wouJd have to be "extremely discreet" and should. be aimed
sole.l y at bringing the United States and Cuba together for bilat-.
eral conversations. The message added that Brazil did not op-
pose the participation.of Urugu~y and Chile in.the "good offices" (b )( 1)
effort--as proposed by Ecuadorean Pre~ ident Velasco--and said (b)(3)
it would like to see Argentina addecLj
Ithet ~~~-----r-
, ~~~~

· Congo: Representatives of _the ·Kasavubu and Gizenga .regime (b)(3)

report~dly have agreed to a meeting of the Congolese parliament
at Lovanium Univ~rsity outside Leopoldville on 27 or 28 June.
The UN apparently. will set lip a neutralized zone with a six- mile .
radius from which all unauthorized persons would be.barred. Leo
poldville officials recently indicated to officers of the American ..
Embassy that negotiations with Katanga were-also going well, al-
though Foreign Minister Bomboko was adamant that Tshom l!""·~"----"-1
would not be. released before the reconvenin.g of parliament. (b )(3)
I I
(Backup, Page 2) (Map) · . ~-----1~--

. Tunisia_.- _Communist China: [secretary of State for' Informa-

tion Mohamed Masmoudi, who leaves on 20 June for .Peiping, will.---- -
. be. the first Tunisian official to visit Communist China, and m,a,.y
have .been.given the mission of negotiati ng an exchange of diplo-
matic missions. Pres.i dent Bourguiba indicated as early as July, ~---~
~958 , tha~ he was contemplating an exchange of diplomatic] · ·

20 June 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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(representatives. Last fall he said he wou~d thenceforth op-

pose _the m.orator.i um on the Chinese UN representation issue
in the UN General Assembly; Tunisia to date. has ~bstained]
J ~Backup,
Page 4)

UAR-Africa: Cairo, which has long prov~ded moderate

amounts of ·financial assistcµlce to African nationali~t move-
ments, has recently begun to offer relatively substantial aid
programs to certain African countries apparently selected on
the basis of their presumed susceptibility to UAR influence. A
-c redit to Mali of $18, 720,000. to buy Egyptian equipment and .
services for a variety of economic and social development proj-
ects was e~ended during Malian President Keita's visit to Cairo
last week. A similar amount was made available to Guinea's
Sekou Toure whe~ . he. was in the UAR in May. Both countries ..
are associated with the UAR in the "Casabl~ca group" of rad~
ical African states. Earli~r the ·UAR granted an·$11,200?000
credit for · development projects in the Somali Repub~ic. Cairo
has also provided some militC\}'Y a,id to both the Somali Republic
and Mali1
I .___.,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

uAR- ussR: The three-week~ old propaganda dispute between

Cairo and Moscow is tapering off. On 14 June, according. to an
intercepted message from Cairo to Damascus, Nasir .notified
.Sarraj, "The. attack on ~he Soviet propagcµlda machine is to s~t_o_.._-i
since the~r broadcasts have not attacked us for three days ."

Only a few scattered items critical qf the USSR have ·ap-

peared in the .Arab press or r adio since 14 ~une . Moscow ap-
. pears equally ready to end the propaganda exchange. A 17 June
Pravda article entitled "Who benefits from .this? " blamed UAR
press media·for creating .t he dispute, but stressed .the USSR's de-
sire for maintaining good relations between the two countries. At
the same time, the article made lt clear that Uie USSR would con- (b)(3)
tinue to defend Arab Communists . and to protest the actions_ot_tru s
countries hich " ersecute" the

20 June. 61 DAILY BRIEF iii

-1or SEGRE~
W47A:WA?W~

J£2!~;!~~..121..~;J..~~!;~~~2N~£gz1~~,..s..~~..~,.~~/,
 . .
Dominican Republic: Anti-Trujillo e~ements evidently now
be~ieve. their. cause is almost hopeless and are .considering:ex-
.tr~me measures in an effort to provoke US armed .interve~tion .
The US Consulate ·in Ciudad ·Trujillo ·reported on . i 7 June·that it
. believes it has; at least temporarily, dissuaded .two prominent
. dissidents from such . a plan .to sabotage loca,l ·American invest..
ments and create the appea,rance that Americ~ citizens are in r. 1
danger. · · · ·. v~

The consul noted on 18 June _th~t _since.the departure of the

special OAS subcommittee on 15 June the government has made
no further moves to give the impression of democratic inte.11tions.
No additional Trujillo· associates have. been downgraded or ·sent
out of the country, and the MiUtary..Intelligence Service is again
in .evidence althou ·its behavior has been· more .co'rrect than
usual

20 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iv

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Tfl~ Bo.livian ~ituation

President Paz. told Ambassador Stevenson. that since the ..

1952 revolution. the governing Nationalist Revoiutionary Move-
men~ had tried. to push ·social deve.lopmel_'lt cµid welfµe fast.e r
than.the country's economic· development would permjt. W~th
.Jhe help· of foreign . advisers, as well as µie United Nations,
the government of Bolivia.- is now completing a long-term pian
to .increase annu~ per capita . income to $180 within .six or seven·
years; Paz states that present per capita income is $90 annually,
but other recent estiniates have been lower.

Paz said th~t his arrests of Communist.labor leaders had

created a strong reaction and that the CommuniE?ts proved to
have wider connections than the government had supposed. He
said the s.ituation was further confused by divisions within the
government and th~t Lechin refused overt support. Lechin Jater
. told Ambassador Stevenson Jhat his equivocal position is helpful
. to the .gove.rnme11t aild .claimed everyone knew he was. supporting
the government since he was pa:rt of it. He impressed Ambassa-
dor Stevenson as thoroughl~ untrustworthy and opportunistic.

·Lechin, who heads the national labor federation, might be

· willing·to oppose .the Communist arrests .i f .he· .thought.he ·would
strengthen his position with labor. Thus far he has refrained
from overt opposition, . however, and he evid.ently did not ~upport
the demonstrations on 15 June calling for release of the Commu-
.nist labor leaders. A reliable observer estimates that the demon-
strations .involved only 450 students, some 500 workers who took
. part only briefly, and street gangs who did ..the most damage. The
demonstration. was led by ·youths who frequent Communist party
.headquarters .

The Boliyian Army numbers about 11,000 and the air force
950. The. national police nuQiber about 5,000 . . The American Em-
bassy µi La Paz noted in March· 1960 ~at the police and the army
together are outnumbered and out- gunned by the civUian militia.
Membership in the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement,. which .
polled 70 percent of the vote in 1960, implies an .o bligation to drill
. with local militia un.i ts. I I (b)(3)

(b )( 1)
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C ) ·1u~b~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----'

_Situation in the Congo

Cyrille Adoula, the moderate interior minister in ·P remier

Ileo's cabi,net, seems .the· likeliest candidate for the prime min-
istership when. parliament reconvenes. Adoula has Wide support,
particularly among Gizenga's more moderate lieutenants, and
the American.Embassy believes the stanleyvHle leader·.would ac-
cept a vice premiership under Adoula. Ileo appears to have lit.:, ·
tle support from any faction._a nd in.fact has been re:moved from
the team which is negotiating with· Gizenga's repr.e sentative.
. .
The embassy believes thaf Gizenga 's position. has weakened
.in the last two months: .If feels that coming. to a parliamentary ·
, . session is the lesser: of two evils for him, since m·the long run
his position in stanleyvi.lle would not be tenable without massive
outside aid. I IThe onlY: aid effort~ now pend- . (b)(3)
.ing- -the medical supplies being brought in by an IL-18 from
Ghana and a $2,000,000 .barter arrangezpent with Yugoslavia--
will not be adequate to meet his needs. L (b)(3)
~~~~~~~~~~~~

In Katanga, American and UN officials believe. that the re -

cent expulsion of Be.lgian extremist advisers .to the Elisabethville
. regime improves the chances for .Katanga's reintegration with the
·. rest of the country. Agreement reportedly has been reached be-
tween Katanga and the UN for the replacement of senior Belgian ·
officers in Elisabethville's forces with UN officers. [Belgian. For -
eign Minister Spaak stated recently that he hoped that 50 Congo-
lese officers would be sufficiently trained by 1 July to enable
Belgium to begin withdrawing. its lower ranking gendarmerie of-
ficers. Spaak reiterated his view that the implementation of the
UN resolution could be made easier-if tripartite grm,1ps made up (b)(3)
of Belgian and Congolese officials could work out arrangements
on the spot in'.the. Congo_.. However, Sahbani, Hammarskjold's
representative in Brussels, told US officials that he did not think
·he could persuade the secretary general to· "buy the idea," at lea st
until after the departure of some 23 Belgians already nominated
by Spaak for ,withdrawal and of at least .some Belgian mercenaries.]

[ Spaak does not share Hammarskjold's recently expressed

view that UN forces in. the Congo probably could be reduced from
20,000 to 5,000 by the e~d _ of the. year. ~aak: believes the situatiori)

TOP SECREr_j (b)(3)

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~--_.,I [will remain so unstable for ·a.1 least a . year that any substantial
UN withdrawal would be dangerous. Hammarskjold; ,. in stating (b)(3)
his views tO. British officials in eaz:ly June, had also sa:id ·he
hoped to reduce the annua_l cost of UN. op.er·a tiohs in the Congo
.from . $120,000,000 to . $20,000,000. British-officials are in ·
.. favor of the goal but believe Hammarskjold's .timetable .is over-
J
optimistic . . .. · ·
Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko. told an American qf-
ficial on. 18 June. that Leopoldville authorities had positive proof
that Indian Charg~ Rahman had been involved in subversive ac-
tivities against the Congolese Government. [usually reliable ·
sources have reported that Rahman, apparently·without sanction ·(b)(3)
from New Delhi; has been ~dvising· Lumumbist elements in Leo-
poldville and has act~d as a. channel for funds from Gizenga to
his supporters in the capital. · According. to an untested source,
he also was implicated.in a plot involv4tg a· youth group and army
elements . . The leader of the. yout_h. group was arrested last week
and may have furnished the basis for Bomboko's chargesJ Bom-
boko plans to send a letter to Nehru, asking that Rahman'b~ re-
moved quietly in the interest qf Congolese..:Indian relations.
· Should the charges be widely publicized, the recent improvement
in New Delhi's attitude. toward .the Congolese Government would ,
. progably be nullified. . _ I_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,~b)(3) !
(b)(1) '
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- ~_) .

, Tunisian Secretary of State to Visit Peiping .

-, I . .
~smoudi's vis~t, originally schedQled for late February,
was planned at a time when President Bourguiba, having beeij
excluded~y King Mohamed V from the Casablanca conference
. of chiefs of state, was groping to resist both international iso-
latioµ, and th~ label of having "sold out fo the ~est." At that
time BoqrguiOa was persuaded by Iraq to send his foreign. sec-
retary to._t.h e A'r.~ foreign µiinisters'.. m:e eting iQ· Baghdad. .

The Peiping vfsit was indefinitely postponed when

Masmoudi, who · earll'er had established a degree of rapport
- - - - -- ith-De Gaulle, wa~ c~mi~sioned to prepare the way for the (b)(3)
e ·Gaulle - Bourgu1ba 'i rleetmg on 27 February. Now that
ourguiba has completed ftis visits to Canada, the US, and
ritain, the Masmoudi trip has been rescheduled, possibly in
n attempt to allay· criticism that little more than lip service
·s given the offici~l policy of n~-alignment. An exchange of
issions with Peiping would facis·tate Chinese liaison with the
lgerian rebe.l s. ·

Masmoudi reportedly will be acco . panied by the Tunisian

~mbassador to Moscow and Prague, the\dir.e ctor of youth and
sports, and the director of the Neo-Destour party's Arabic-lan-
guage daily newspaper and the official ne.w's, agency. Although
.this is the first official Tunisian visit .to Pei'(;>.ing, Tunisian
labor, youth and women's groups have excban°'g!ed relatively fre-
quent visits with. sbnilar groµps in Communist hina ever since
Tunisia .acquired independence in 1956.:
- -

Even though Bourguiba had long ago indicated h wou.l d in

due course exchange. diplomatic missions with the Si~- Soviet
bloc, Soviet, Polish, and Czech missions were not estkblished
in Tunis until 1960, and an. ambassador--Bourguiba's abl-e
proteg~, Ahmed Mestiri., the former secretary of state fo).'\.f i-
nance and commerce--was dispatched to Moscow and Pr~gu~-.
Tunisian relations with.the. Soviet Union have apparently been\
disappointing
.
to Bourguiba and lesser Tunisian officials. An \ \

\
CONFIEJEN'TIA
. [,z..._

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' off
........
er of technical assistance. in. the construction of three small
dams in northern. Tunisia. seems not to have gone beyond the
discU8ston stage. On the other hand, a .first contract under a
Polish $a~OO , OOO credit arrangment was concluded earlier this
month for IBe~onstrl;lction . of a metal-products factory at Sousse
and the em_ploylnent ; of. 34 Polisn technicians. Other Czech and
Bulgarian technic~s are employed under contract by Tunisian
governmental departm'ents, and relatively active cultural affairs
programs have receiv.e'd ailii.xed reception in Tunisia.

AlthoughTunisi~' comm~ith
s the bloc has increased
substantially in the past several years';'such trade amounts to
. less .than 3 p~rcent of its total foreign tra~]lich .is still pre-
dominantly with Europe, particularly France. j j (b)(3)
~~~~---..::
......._
~~~---'

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

CONFtDEf\!TlAL
-
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. '

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense .
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Setretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, rhe Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force .
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Securi'ty Age ncy
The Di rector
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

TONFfl=>£NTf AL
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~ . 0 T T U ?a
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~ 5 August 1961 (b)~:
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Copy No. C Ji)71
h (bl)~~

CENTRA

~ ~
~~ ~~
0. ~
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~ ~
~ ~
~~ .
"'TOP SECRET_
~~
~/////////////////flpp[o{ec[to}F§'e~a_;e;2§1§1![71§(c§5~7~6~6'l///////////////~
, C05'973686 ~pproved
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of ~epartments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
c :ellie·ence rn this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the bentfit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~~T
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 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0597368

~
5 August 1961

CENTRA!:i INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

l. West Berlin: l ,306 refugees. registered on 3 August.

( Page t)

2. East Germany:· Contingency plans being put into effect

against possible West German refusal to renew inter-
zonal trade agreement. (Page t)

3. Tunisia. ( Page tt)

4. Congo: Adoula emphasizes his intention to reintegrate

Katanga into Congo. (Pag~ ttt)

6. Communist China:. Changes in commune system reportedly

made. in response .to agricu~tural difficu~ties. (Page tv) ·

7. Bolivia: Paz government takes control of Santa Cruz from

local leader. (Page tv) ·

8. USSR : New Communist Party rules. (Page v)

C05973686 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C05973686
0 .. 0

(b)(3)
TOTAL ANNUAL REFUGEE FLOW INTO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY
, - - , Re(ugee:s enterf"9 Weit Berlin (mott r-1 Refvge1:1 ontoring Wo1f Germony diredly
L ~ of whom loter go on 10 Wo1t Ge""o•y) L-:.J GCfOP fast-West German v>nol bonier.

60 1961

WEST BERLIN REFUGEE TOTALS

COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BY WEEKS
10000

9000

8000

7000

EASTER .
I
,,._/
I~ '
sooo
~
jwHITSUNTJOI
I /
//'- v
4000

3000

I
- ~. ..ii VR
1961

"-
.....__
, \:...-v
A

1000

0
II. .A....

~- - ~/
...1960

3. 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 II 18 25 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20 27 4
J ANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH Al'RIL MAY
' JUNE
11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29
JULY AUGUST

DAILY TOTALS SINCE l5JULY 1961

2000
llH

1500 J\ ~ ...
~4
~ 221 -r;.:, 12u 1~01
1000
uo ~ .2l
I
..
12SS
J\ JI\
~
12U
0
1#
10 11.
'
Ill ~ ....
i"oo.rri U1 "'
500

0
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 71 28 29 30 JI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
JULY AUGUST

(b)(3)

5 Aug 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE .BULLETIN Graphics Page

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5. August 1961

DAILY BRIEF ·

. · B~rlin R_e fugees: 1,306 l"efugees, including 116 "border

crpssers," .resi~ents of East .Be:rlin·o:r the. S.o viet Zone who
work .in West Berlin, registered in West Berlin on 3 August.
According to West Ber~in · Senat officials, the East German
poiice have jnstituted "exceedjngly severe" controls at sec-
tor ~d . zonal checkpoints, and observers .in West Be~lin
have seen large nu..mb~rs of people turned :back to the Zone.
Senat officials report that .i n.five confirmed .cases border
crossers have ii;iterceded through .relat.i ves .with.their West
D b)
· Berlin employers .fo;r ·written-proof of· dismissal in order to
regain identity cards s~ized .by the. East German police. There
are unconfirmed press reports that the percen.tage of youths
fleeing to the West normal! 25 ercent of the refu ee total
is unusually hi · h.
'--------'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--I

The whereabouts of East German party boss· Ulbricht

since 1 August is unknown. Despite denials by regime spokes-
m~n in Moscow and East Berlin on 4 August, Ulbricht may be
in the USSR to discuss measures for dealing .with the refugee
flow and the effects of .the bloc's Berlin and Germ olicies
on the domestic E st Germ · ·situ ti on.

as ermany: e a

o )(.
that the West Germans ·may, ~brogate the lnterzonal Trade
Agreement, in retaliation for East G.e rman pressure against
West Ber lin. · con~
tingency economic plans are being put into effect under which
some planned long-term investment projects r equiring imports_] (b)(3)

i
 ~~~~-C-05-97-3-68_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

· [!rom West Germany are to.be delayed until other sources of

' - -- - -- - t . supply are found. The regime is attempting ·to replace West
German imports with goods .from pther ·West :F;uropean and
NATO countr~es, particularly the. UK, France, and Switzer ~
land. Presumably, projects well under way and those of high
priority are excepted f ram these planiJ .
liast. Germany at present is continuing to import heavHy
from West Germany and probably will attempt to accelerate
deliver of items needed to com 1 te rio ·
(b)(1
(b)(3)
Tunisia: Tunisia's director o{ national security has ex~
pressed the belief. to the VS ·ambassador that B.o urguiba has
suffered a serious domestic' political setback-as a consequence
of the Bizerte affair, the :effects of' which will be ·felt more over
the longer term than immediately. The secqrity director said
on 2 August that ~ven though .the nation ~d rallied to meet the
crisis, pqpular confidence .i n Bourguiba .has _b een shaken to such
an extent that a political opposition could arise later which might
lean ·on Egyptian, Algerian, or Soviet support.
. E!rench.Ambassador to the UN Bei;-ard told Ambassador
Stevenson on 3 August that a. meeting between the French con-
sul general, assisted by military advisers, and the Tunisian
gove'r nor of Bize:rte would satisfy the French requirement for
_ _ _ ____... a bilateral meeting with th~ · Tunisians. Berard saj.d Paris would
give assurances in such·a meeting tnat French troops woqld be
pulled back to the base, and .would tnen ask Tunisia to guarantee
normal communications at the base. Berard added th~t some
French reinforcements could make an "early and conspicuous
departure" and that France would be willing to begin substant.i ve
' - -- - -discussions on the future of the l)ase in less than.two weeks if
----1

complete calm returned to the area. Although .the Afro-Asian

bloc apparently has enough sjgnatures to force ·a special session
of the General Assembly, such·a session probably would not be
· held until at least 8 August, giving both sides some additional
time to arran e a bilateral meetin . _ __ _ _ _ _ __ .r--(b)(
~==--=----=-=--=--=--==---~~~~~~~-"1.__
. (b1)
)(3

(b)(3)

5 Aug 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

-,·or SBGRF:[
Wh'H;';'///////N/,IM/,1;'/N//N/// /h//;'N.H///;'/////////;',"///N/N,..;'/N;'/ /.H/////H,..//H.1.:

w.et!1?!~. ~N'l5!~
. . . !1ZJ!~;J!~
. . .!. ~!....2I
. 3,2, . £g§,. S. .9-.~,~l
. .~~~, . ,
 Congo: Adoula's initial statements··following his assump~
-tiori·_of ·the premiership have emphasized .his intention to restore
Katanga as an integral part of the Congo. Adoula's implied
threat of military action against Tshombe has been supported
by .UN officials, who have reaffirmed .that moves by the central
· government to reintegrate· Katanga with .the Congo would .not be
opposed by the UN.
The American Consulate in Elisabethville reports that
Adou~a's statement of his intentions concerning Katanga has
made a strong impression Ori T~hombe and his ministers, and
. thaf Tshombe appears to be searching desQerately for me~s
r QJ.lr:serve stability in ~atanga. j
discipline among Katanga army umts
outsi=e the city has deteriorated to a point where soldiers obey
orders only on a selective basis. The consuJate observes that
II "

K~tanga army units tnay be content to continue. under present

conditions so long as they are paid. Nonetheless, the Katanga
army no longer appears to ·represent a formidable military
threat to efforts by the UN and the central government to re-
unifhthe Congo. .
c I~
(b )~-~
I
~
~elgian Foreign ~inister Spaak ·has expressed to Ambas- (b);
sador MacArthur his concern over a recent mes~age from
Hammarskjold indicating that, in view of Tshombe's unwilli11g-
ness to cooperate for Congo unity, the UN planned immediate
III
action .to disarm the Katanga. army. Spaak stated that he be-
lieved such precipitous action might cause the· Katanga govern-
I11
ment to react violently, and doubted whether the UN·w s ca able ~
of kee in the situation under control. ( b)(3)~
( b)(~2J
(b)(1
(b)(3)
)l
I
I
I
~

5 Aug 61 DAILY BRIEF. iii

-,fOP !ECREtj
Vl»"#//////////#///Q////#////////#////.//hd///////////h~W//h=w/A=W/~
=,,,.=(//#h=,,,,.===========-
y~E.~~Y~,~,l~,,~ZJ~~~~~,~g,!,~L2Zi~,9u~~l,~~,w,,,
 ommun1st Ch.ina: Recent reports of changes in the com~
mune system in Communist China reflect Peiping's continu~ng

D
problems with farm management and peasant morale. Refugees
from South China report. that ·production groups within the com-
munes are being reorganized into smaller un~ts , .that some
farmland is being assigned .to .ind.i viduals and groups of work-
ers for cultivation, and that communal messhalls are being
closed down. Local officials acknowledge that the changes
are in response to peasant discontent and successive hf d har~
vests. \~--------------------~J
Bolivia: The Paz government decreed the eastern province
of Santa .Cruz a military zone on 2 August, and army units have
taken control of Santa Cruz city from the local chief of the gov=
ernment parfy, Luis Sand9val. Sandoval is a leftist who for the
·past year has exercised .control. over the· area in almost com-
plete independence of the central government. Paz seems to
have used as a pretext for his present move the arrival in Santa
Cruz of a Constellation aircraft allegedly loaded with contra-
band- -another example of the smuggling .with which Sandoval
has long been linked. Some 1,000 to 2 ,000 local militiamen, loyal
to Sandoval, have reportedly retreated into mountainous r__e__s~-____,
near Santa Cruz, and mav ·attemot to recaotu~e c.ity.

5 Aug 61 DAILY BRIEF iv

 *USSR: The Soviet Communist Party statutes--the rules
governing party organization and activities--have been rewritten
to bring them into harmony with the :r;-ecently published party
program. The new rules, although ·basically similar. to those
currently in force, incorporate the language of the new program
and the comparatively minor substantive changes in party pro-
cedures it calls for, but without elaboration. The s.tatutes,
which along with the program await formal approval by the 22nd
party congress iil October, were published in tl)e Soviet press
today, instead of on 20 August aS originally scheduled. Need
for more extensive discussion prior to the lower level-party
c·onferences which will precede the national congress probably
figured in the dee ision to advance the publication date. . . ;'-t
. =h~e_ _ _ _~
lower level conferences will begin later this month. I
I ~.--

L---------------~

4 Aug 61 DAILY BRIEF v

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0 ~ u

Recent Change.s in China's Commune a

the &>uth China province of
'-------,-~~~~-----.,.~~---::--:--:-'
(b)(1)
Kwangtung, peasants are obtaining gr.e ater control over the
cultivation phase of farm work. The "new system," report-
edly announced in the. late sp.r ing and early summer in .various
communes in Kwangtung, entails the ai;isignment of collective
land in one- and two-acre plots to individuals or groups of
farmers who are to be completely responsible for tending the
crops on this land. Boweve.r, commune authorities continue
: to specify which crops are planted on what land, set the yield
expected from each plot, and dispose of the crops after each
harvest. .Peasants will in effect continue to work for the col-
lective but will be free--within the .limits of crop assignments
and expected output--to work the land as they deem fit. These
changes, if wideEipre~d, would i.n dicate Peiping's inability to
apply collective methods effectively at the field level. ·
Many messhalls have ·also b~en closed down, apparently
because of their continued unpopularity With commune mem-
bers and because of food shortages. Reports of messhall
closures are so far conf~ed to Kwangtung, but a re.c ent article
in the Peiping Ta Kung P3.o, w~ich for the first time since 1958
failed to state that foodgrain is being. distributed through the
messhall ·system, suggests these cl9sures may be more wide-
spread. The public mes$hall is the major remaining social
change introduced with tpe original commune system.
Pe~sants are reportedly being given more time to work
their private plots, and ·this of all the measures to boost peas-
ant incentives appears to ~ve been the most successful. The
9
· pe~sants z.e al for collective work has. clfi!a;rly flagged, but re-
m~ins high. where individual; plots are concerned. These pri'-
. vate plots appear to have contributed to an increase in the
supply of non~stapl~ foodstl,lffs. This has eased the food shoi;-t-
age, but a corresponding fmprovement in peasant morale is
not yet discernible.
To justify these private plots and the free markets where
such produce is traded, Peiping has been forced into awka.rd
..

~
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0 SttRu_ _ (_)

rationalizations. It has argued in the press that private plots

are "not a remnant of capitalist ownership," but rather are
. "entirely socialist in nature." The rationale here is that pri-
vate production is purely subsidiary in nature and· in no way
detrimental to the economy. Free markets have been char-
acterized as a "small freedom within the big collective" and
designated "an integral part of the socialist system of com-
merce. " I I (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

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C~ l)

Violence Threatens in ~as~ern BQlivian Dep~rtltlent

.. Of Santa Cruz
The sweeping revo.l ution of .1952 wa.S less popular. in re-
mote .Santa Cruz .t han in any other Bolivian department, and
violent clashes b~tw:een right-wing groups and the govern-
ment party--·t he Nationalist Revolutlc;mary Movement (MNR)--
have occurr~d peri~ically. This· is the. first occasion, how~ ·
ever, when .the national government has taken action against
the MNR militia in Santa Cruz . It is also the first instance
·s .ince .1952 of a clea:rly drawn conflict betWeen.the .armed
forces and the MNR ·militia. ·

Paz, who was inaugurated.a .year ago, has. previously dis ...
played impatience with the erosion of presidential authority
which .o ccurred wider his predecessor. During February and ·
March of this year Paz arrested and exiled a significant num-
ber of right-wing. critics as well as s~vera~ leftist extremists.
~n June he arrested 35 important CommW)ists. · Twice this
year he has decreed a 90-day state-of-siege.

Sandoval has no official status in Santa Cruz beyond .t hat

of MNR leader, but his control of the local party appara:tus
·h as been such that he has hired and fired department·officials
"with. cynical regularity :'I (b)(1)
Santa Cruz Departmeµt reportedly sent no tax rev- (b)( 1)
~e_n_u_
e-.t.---
o-.th
,..,e capital in 1960, .i n part because customs revenue
was used to reward ..the m~litia for service to Sandoval. He
has also been linked with. the production and e~port of cocaine
on a large scale.

The army contingent regularly stationed in .the area num-

bers about 400 and consists of agricultural service. troops .
These have been supplemented by· other troops,: and both the air
·force commander and the armed .forces commander are in
Santa Cruz. I I (b)(3)

(b)(1)

CONFIBENTI A,,
-
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0 CONF IDE~'ITIA I _ U
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Speciol Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for Notional Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administrarion
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boord
The Deportment of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy. Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Deportment of Defense
· The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretory of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations}
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Novy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander / Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Di rector, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director·of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Deportment of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Jnformation Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

CONFIDEiVTIA l
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I ;..."i_- -- I

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- - ..-
•- --- - :f.1. -
~-- - -

-.~- ~-::

. . ·.~~ : . :i 1-!-r. .1 I ~
. . . .·J ·. .
 .
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~ ~Sc..
FeRET
- ._,
The Situation in the Congo
"
fihe initiative in the eastern Congo remains with the
~--------,. Lumumblst forces and their trlbai allies, who reportedly (b)(3)
are becoming more aggressive as a result of recent suc-
cesses. Baluba tribesmen have cut the rail link between
Elisabethvllle and Kamina air base and, together wlth troops
from .Kivu Province, continue too ose relnforcemen · e
L-----------' UN rrlson at Manono · (b )( 1)
e in e area. do.e s not .Plan
o a e strong action against the dissidents unless o~--""--~
do so by headquarters in Leopoldville. '-----------~ (b )( 1)
CJ the Baluba forc~s will .succeed ln setting up an "inde-
pendent" .~tate in northern Katanga.'"]
ITshomW's government in Elisabethvllle reportedly now
has imported more than 100 Belgian paracommandos. Although
Tshomb6 apparently distrusts his native troops, ·Belgian offi-
cers with .the .Katanga·forces discount the possibility of dissen-
sion among Africans in th~ armed forces. The native .civilians
in many of the province's important mining cities reportedly
present a threat ·to order;· they apparently. have some weapons
at their disposal-;] ·

rUN Secretary General Hammarskjold has J Ireit-

erated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative
(b )( 1)

in Leopoldvllle, and has ·rejected .Ka:savubu's formal demand of

14 Ianuary that Dayal be recalled. HamJllarSkjold took issue
with charges made against Dayal by .Kasavubu, but said he ·would
·refer the matter to the Security. Council for final action:j
(b )( 1)
Dayal has been withholding informatlon and slanting reports
ln such a way as to favor Lumumba supporters. However,
Hammarskjold angrily told American officlals on 14 January
that he was "very determined" to keep Dayal in the Congo,
despite a campaign of "Russian-type" innuendo which n,e implied
was coming from Western sources. Neverth_eless Hammarskjold
may yet· have to appoint a .new representative if the UN followsj

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~ ~
~

(b)(3)
Ube precedent of acceding to such requests from ·recognized chiefs
._of state in the country where UN troops are servlng21[ (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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· agriculture, notably those concerning the "new·lands," .t he

corn.;,.fol!"'fodderprogram, and. the substitution of incen.:.
tives .tn place of coercion and Communi,st enthusiasm as !
motivatiqn_f_OJ.:J:he·Soviet f~ been verv fJ cibly
restated.j _
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· •congo: There are indications. that the Moroccan Govern-

m~nt 1s .mo~.ing to dissociate itself. from Ute UN Congo opera-
tion .. rh~ 3,000-man ~oroccan unlt in J:he country· reportedly I
has bewuP'dered not to fight against. th'\l forces suppor.t ing Lu- ~ _...i; i
mumbatJ.nd the Moroccan· crown prince recently stated µiat 1 ~ :J..J I
.!
h~ had unde_ rtaken to begin the withdrawal of h~s forces by 5 ~ ,,.; !
February. Hammarskjold has· told US offi~ials that, with ·Kasa- {j> 1 ~
Vubu:havlng ll)ade pubµc:hts request for the removal of Dayal, 1 ,a; .:L.Y.v
chief UN representative Jn.the Congo, h~ c·a nnot now appo.l nt a ~ / P 3
.new-representative. Hammarskjold implied, however, that
Dayal's contract would not be renewed when it la ses two months
hence;' I
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*Iran: The Shah, faced by chronic financial difficulties I'
and ·persi$tent nationalist opposition, is .trying to stre~gthen
his position with a new round of rigged parliamentary elec~
.tions, now about 20-:ipercent completed, '.I'he elections started
in .rural areas about a week ago and are scheduled for· Tehran
-about !he first of February. _The Shah .apparently has hoped
that the elections, besides fu1filling constl.tutional requirements,
wou1d produce a favorable impression on.the United-States, on
which.he continues to rely for financ.ial help. Although the Shah
wiil. obtain a reasonably docile parliament, the electoral me.th-
ods and the disorders which may still result from _them, particu-
. larly in Tehran, will maintain .the breach.between the Shah and
,the people, and th0 posslb.il.).ty of a coup against him continues.
. .In an effort to moderate Soviet propaganda the Shah ·plans
tq send a "good-will" mission to Moscow in March. Khru- .
shchey. accepted .the· mission in princ.iple on 8 January.· Iran-
ian-Foreign Ministry officials feel, however, that the USSR will
. continue to press for a prior. agreement on some .points which
could be announced·in Moscow on .the occasion of the visit. The
· USSR's aim is a.political accommodation which would at least
: begin to weaken Iran's ties with the West, but .the Shah insists
he will agree to nothing which would. compromise Iran's ob.Uga-
L_to_th_e_Centi:a.L.TJ:eabr.D=n.W-M.ion_and_tb.e_UnJ.ted_sG±e"

.21 Jan . 61 DAILY BRIEF iii

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OCI NO. 026s/ 61
I 18 January 1981

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE Of CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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cunRENt' INTBLLIGFNCE WJ:EKLY SUMMARY

18 January 1961

Moscow, Pe1pLna, and B&nol The bloc llMlY al50 feel thA.t
have now all accep~~d a proposal endorsement of the proposal will
made by Prince Sihanouk for a encourage what it cloims is in-
14-natioo conference on Laos . creasing evidence of disagree-
The meetinr would ~rosun~bly be ment among tbe We5tern allies
held ia Cambodfo and would in._ concernin lie toward ·
elude re pre eentat iv ea .tro111 Burl!UI, Laoe.
Thailand , and South Vietnam, (b )( 1)
along ~ith the 1954 Geueva par-
ticipant& and member countries (b )(3)
of the ICC tor Laos . Thia maneu-·
ver, which capitalizes on gro•-
ing Asian concern ovor tho
course o~ events in l.4oe , seems
intended to retain the bloc's
initiative on the diplOlf)lltiC
f"l•ont and prov ido a 111011.ns to
obstruct nny·suggested solutions
to the Laotian crisis on West-
ern terms.

CONGO
In Katanga Province, the put down , but the questionable
initiative re~ins with Gizenga reliability of the troops has
forces and tboir tribal allies . further Jeopardized Mobutu's
Stanleyville troops and dissi- ability to m.ti<tt tho milltar)'
dent Saluba tribesmen appa~ent­ challenge from Stanleyville .
ly control the UN-policed
" neutral zone" ln the northern Lumumba ' s transfer from
port of the province, vitb the Leopoldville army c~mp ta
the UN unable to take any Elisa.botbville probably was
c ountermeasu.res . designed to increase the ee-
curity control over t~e e~­
premlo1· . It may also be
In Elieabetbville, Katan- connected with the forthcoming
ga'e capital, President Tahombe'S round-table conference of Congo-
dlstr~s t of hie Afrlcan ~roops lese leaders , now scheduled tor
appa1·ently .Ls growing, aad tho February in Ellsabothvllle.
ontive civiliane in many of the
province's important mining ilelations between the UN
c ities repo r tedly are increas- and the Ka5avubu government
tng1 restive . Tshom~'s re- cont t nue to worsen . On 14 Jan-
l.mo uary JCasavuhu de1n11ndod that
Raje5bwar Dayal, l:IA-arskjold's (b )( 1)
......,c--,-,------:-::-.,.,--..,...,.aiay recru t ng a personal representative. ~aa~
~ropean foreign legion to the Con o.
s erv~ as a reserve security (b )( 1)
forco.
In the Leopoldville are~,
a brief anti - ~obutu mutiny in
tho ar~y appeare to have been On l(J anuary

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CllRR!nlT INTILLIGE!fCB WE"l!'.KLY SUNM.\RY

18 January 1981

however , Ha.nunarskjold
publicly roitorated
hi~ confidence In Dayal
and ref'u sed to recall
him .

Before bu re-
cc1 vod Kas~vubu's de-
mand, Harnmarsk.jol<I
had told Aaerican ot-
f icials that. be was
"very determined" to
keep Dayal 1n the Con-
go, despite a campaign
of "Russian-type" in-
nuendo which be im-
plied was. coming frora
westora souroos. Sub-
se~ucntly he added
tbat public pr~aure
would prevent bis
yieldini to Kaeavubu's
request. He informed
Kasavubu th~t tho (b)(3)
problc111 'll•oul<I be turned
over to the SecurltY
Counc.11 .~1----------~ (b)(3)

CUBAN rum RA ITIA~ OliV!i:LOPMJlNTS

Havana is makina a new ef- government had been describing
fort to eliminate . the potential a:11 1.mminent for m.o re than two
threat posGd by anti-Cll&tro weeks. f1dol Castro and Presi-
guerrillas 1n the ~ountains of dent Oorticos explained, in the
central Cuba . There are some forme r's ·words, that " any c;r:lmi-
ind1cations that Fidel Castro nal surprised In the act ot com-
himself is directing the anti- mitting a crime can be stopped
guorr1 lla opO"ra.tione. ·rhe b6forc he CODU11it& it, " thus im-
new dr1vo is evidently moti- plying that Cuba's prop~rcd~css
vated by recognition that as had stopped the invasion.
long ae tbere remains ~ rallying
point inside Cuba, the re3ist- Yt wae announced at the
anco could ~nowball into a major rall) tho. t tho "na t1 ona l •Ob 11 i.-
etlort, as Castro's own expe~i­ za t 1011" ""'OIAld be coot:ln\lod
ence proved . through 20 January, a11d the hope
'll'&S expressed that tJ1e new ad-
· There ·11as a smaller turn- ministration in the United States
out than usual at tbe 14 January would "nake rect1tico.t1ons" to-
rally in Havana , called to obt~in ,...~d Cuba . Ho~ever , Castro
the " peoples• ratiflca.tlOQ" ot went on, "the headache i~ not.
government preparations to reslst ours.... If there is no r-ecti-
tho "imperia.l.i a.t inva11ion" the .fication, that is alao very good.

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: *Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold.has been alarmed

by reports at the Frem~h ambassadors in :LeopoJdville and
Brazzaville a.re encouraging Mobutu. and Le.opoldville's Foreign
Minister Bomboko to under~e ·a military coup again~t the Ileo
gc;>vernment, possibly this week if President Kasavubu's cooper~~
· ti~n . can. be secured. · Hammarskjold also has reports of the ar- ~
rival of a .n ew· group of "French mercenaries" in Katanga, and ·
. s~ys the UN representative there has demanded .they be expelled.
The secretary general sees these alleg~ French· ac~ivities as
·undermining hopes.for a .moderate Congo settlement a,nd as play-
ing into Soviet. hands J .
In Brussels, US Am.b assador MacArthur reports .t hat For-
eign Minister Spaak·has objected.to the proposed immedi~te
withdrawal of Belglan military ~rom Katanga Provil'\ce on the
.growid that it would provoke· Tshombe and cre~te a "defin~tive
·rupture"- between ElisabethvUle and Leopoldvil~e . . Spaa,k main- ·
.t~s that the Belgian cadres are the backbone of order and
· S~bility in Katanga and that thejr sudden with4rawal wou~d lea,d
to chaos made worse by ·the possibility of conflict with UN forces
deployed to replace .them . . Spaak admitted that the powerful
Belgian mining interests in Katanga might be "pl~ying a differ ...
ent ganie" there. from that of the government, but ~nsisted .that
he IJeeded ·f irm evidence o~ this in order to proceed against. them.

D [Spaak '.also opposed w~at: he ..called the "B.~itish .thesis" that the]

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lcongo parliament should convene _in the near turt=u=-

re=----=e'-'-v-=e=n:. -lf
. .:=-· ------~
it meant a overnment dominated.b Gizen a. "

5 July 61 DAILY BRIEF iv

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. . ·THE PRESIDENT'S.
.·-lNTELLIGENCE CHE'CKLIST
< • •

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5 JULY 1961
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(b )( 1)

3. Hammarskjold alarmed
over' planned ·cong~ c __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~IMobutu a'nd (b)(1)
coup. I I Bomboko,with French encouragement, are
J
considering a mili ta~y .coup aga'inst
the Ileo governmen·t. ·The a ttempt"would
allegedly t.ake place in the next '\ve&l(b)(1)
if Kasavubu's support can.be·assured.
The Secretary General believes that ·-
such a c·oup would piay into ·soviet
hands by enhancing" Gizenga "s support .
among the-.·neutralist A.frical?-":. s~a t~s· · (b)(1) ·
and would destro hopes for ·a moderate
Con o solution. I •
. ,.. (b)(1)
(b )(3)
.J

.· ... :-· .

4. Chinese.Communists.put. An intimation of Peiping's desire for

o'ut' feeler on private. a series' of 'informal, private ·conver-
talks with US. sations·with us officials came at ·a
· recent meeting· between US and C~i·nes'e
Ambassadors in Warsaw. The Chinese,' (b~(3)
.taking an unusually affable tack,
urged an extension of such· contacts,
but took. pains to· hold the· Peiping
line 9n Laos, Taiwan and th_e UN, In
recent months, Peiping. has made ·sim-
ilar approaches through other cha n·nels,
always insis.ting, however-, that Wash-
ington must take the :LJ._rst s·tep toward
improved relations . [ (b )( 1)

For The President Only.~

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. Belgium - Ruanda-Urundi: @elgian Foreign Minister

recently raised with UN Secretary General Hammarskjold the
Spaab
D problem of maintaining order in the Ruanda- Urundi territory
during the forthco~ing August e.lections, when hostility betwe~ · ·

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tr~bal factions may erupt into widespread vioJence. The elec~

.tiohs are expected .to set the s~ag~ f of the independence of
separate Ruanda and Urundi states, probabiy by mid-1962.
Pointing ou~ the inadequacy of the military forces stationed
in the two territories..::o-1,200 Belgi~ : troops· in addition to a
partially .t rained native gendarnier.ie of so~e 1,300 men-..:
Spaak proposed .that either Belgium augment its troops th~re
or .t he UN bring .in additional f orce·s·. The.f or·eign minister
a,.dm~tted that the .first proposal would pr.e·s ent "certain polit~
.ical drawbacks," given .the present internatio~al situation, ~d
he:,would.wish to have recourse to it only with the consent of
UN officia~ I I
(Bacl:tup, Page a)\ Map)

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(b )(3)

The Situation in the Congo

While public demands by the Gizenga ."g roup have centered

around .a vice premle~ fo~ Gizenga and a suitable pi:_Qpor-
tion of cabinet posts> I _ _ - _ -- -- 1 (b )( 1)
D Glzenga is becoming.·more confident of his parllam~ntary (b)(3)
strength and that he ·Will ress vi orousl for control of an new (b)(3)
central overnment.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

D
(b)(3)

CThe American Consulate ln Elisabethvill~ believes that

Tshomb6, .intoxicated by tn~ependence day oratory and by the
flatt~ry of Katanga's European community, has reached anot~r
.peak of- intransigence. The consulate observes that Tshom~ has
pressed his independent course for over a year against almost
universal opposition outside Katanga, ·a nd that he i s unli~~ly to
abandon at tJtis .juncture· instruments:..-such as his foreign advis-
ers- -wlllch .he :regards as having helped safeguard Katanga' s sep- 1•
aratism .and economic prosperitz:J I (b)(3)
I . ~. - .-. - -. - (b)(3)
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SE04&f COPY NO. 77

I
OCI NO. 02a9/e1

20 July 19Cl

CURRENT
INTELLfGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

ll.{)CU?llEn-T HD. - - ' - - - - -

l1l tHi'.llZ ct ~!.A.n, 0
D u~~t..o

~:o·~~;-:~~: n s(i) t1qo

A~Tlh Hl 1~.J

D..l1!l !& T~ fVL___ _ ___J

(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTEUIGEl'ICE

(b)(3)

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CURRENT I.NTELLIGDCE DULY 80DARY

+

CONGO

Abo~t 160 ot the a1e mem- and tension between UN and

bers of the Congoleee legis- ltatcmga troops in nortberp
lature have arrived at Lovanium Katl\n1a is increasing. The
University outside of Leopold- &nericnn consul in Bli1;1abeth-
ville. the site ·agredd on for ville believes tbat 'l'shamb~
the reconvening of parliamont · is curr.ently at a peak of
by leaders ot the Leopoldville intransigence and is unlikely to
and Btimleyville factions. Elt- cbange his ottitude. · Moreover,
teaslve negotiations are taking the Katanga president's olose
place as the two reg.1111ea--Bl1ea- assoc1Qtos, especially Vice
bethv1 lle is so far no~ repre· President Kibwe a.nd Interior
sented-..,.aneuver for position, Minister Dllu.nongo, seem even more
UN officials are hopeful that etro.ngly o»posod tbon he ts to
tbe seeslon CBn get upder way tho idea of reintegratioD with
1n tb@ next f~w daye . the reat ot tbe country .

Moderates in Leopoldville According to a Ulf official,

appear to be makiDg an effo~t IUbwe lus repudiated the recent
to dovelop Q cabinet slate under ~eatfirm&tion of the military
Interior Minister Adoula . The accord betnen TtlhOlll~ and lltobutu
Leopoldville faction r@mQins and bas warned T&b.ombe} not to
weakened by tbO mutual 6US- attend parliament on poril of
pic10DS o'f 1 ts .l eadera, howevel' , aesassin.ation by rightist Buro-
and appears unsuro , of lts ~bil­ peap elemeuts 14 Blisabotbville .
ity to dominato pnrliament. There are also indications of
Premt.er Ileo, reali.zing tb.at uorea t, stem11d.ng from grievances
hls c~ances 9f reta.i.ning b!s cono~rntng pay .,-id promotions,
position ozi.oe parl;lament con.... 111 th.in the KtLta~ga arm_y .
venes aTe virtually nil, is
coot1Qu1~g hie tactics to d~lay
-itie sessioi:i . Lea.den 1n th:t> Leopoldville
r .egi!llle regard TebocnW '"r:seven
deputies arid .eight sonators as
Tsbamb6 atill iasimtg ~hat ·an import.ant and po-rbaps essen-
be will permit bis delegQtes to tial 1actor in the ir power
attend the session only if there struggle with Gizeng~ , and non-
is a prior "swmn.lt mee~iag" of attendance by tbeso repressent&-
Co~go l e ae leaders . Since &ttend- tivoa will 1.ncrens·e Leopold.. ; . 1 ••
aQce at parliament by representa- v11le's mJ.ag1•1ngs concerning
tives from Blisabethville wo~ld the s esl!llon.
reduce Gi~onga's chances, it 1~
questionable that G12enr& would
agree to such a meeting . More tb.a n 60 po.rltomen-
tariD.iJa arrivod in Leopoldville
from Stanleyvillo aboard UN air-
~e bomblt ia under conaid- craft on 17 July. "l'he aroup was
orablo pressure from tbe VM to beaded by ChrlstoP,he Gbea1e,
abandon his separatist position, G1~enga • s extr""'~et t interior min-
ister : GU:enga 1"G211ai.ned 1n stan• ·
l eyville &8 ~result of aa illness .

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CURR&NT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 9Ull!MARY

. s~oke$men associated with tanga and waQ ur11ns private in-

tbe Btanleyv1lle regime have ter.eats to e~e~t econoM1c pres-
i~plied th.at Gizenga will see~ sure on Tshomb~. According to
the Congo premiership when Speak ; Hammarskjold did not press
" parliament opens. The spokes- · the question o~ immediate with-
men allege , bowever, tbat G1- drawal ot all. Belgian military
zenga will accept whatever ofticer·e other than to indicate
verdict reaglts tro~- the forth- thiat the eoonflr it was accom-
coming see.111ion. One represea.t- pltsbed 1n an orderly fashion
ative 1nd1oated tbat tbere was witb appropriate replacemonts
strong anti-1'Jlsavgbu sentiment tbe better.
la the Stanleyvtlle group, sug~
gesting that the Presidont's
position may become A mnJor Spaak has been reluctaD.t
issue in Leopoldville . to withdraw all Belgian elements
wt th out. assurance.a that order
will be maintained, for violence
In view of tbe continuing to bolgl.an civilians would ad-
struggle bet~eeD tbe J.eopoldville versely affect tbe tenure of t~e
and Stanle1~ille grou»s, pro~­ Lefevro-Spaok government. In
peots 1or tho 011rly 1oniaUon of reply to heavy a1:tack;a from rlrb'-
an effecUvo coalition gove:rn- i5t elements in the Belgian Cham-
ment appear slight. Btcb side ber of Dciputies .roprdins tbo
eeems cautiously optl.mistlc ~OQ­ expulsion of Thyaaens--Tsbomb6's
cernin« its _prospe~te tor con- leadinr Belgla.a adviser-....spaak
t.rolling piarl1ament, and neit~er stated that much of tbe ~resent
ls likely to aocept with rood difficulty ln the Congo arose
grace tba position of a minor- fro1D tbe fact Unit uoir.e Belgians
1ty group lo n coalltton . Gi- at bome and io tbe Coogo have in-
.zenga 1 s tollowere, bowe11er, tervened in intern11l Congolese
may feel tbat tPeir greater offairs. Spaak believes that tbe
cohesiveness •ill permit them Union ~iniere , the large 8elgiaD
evontually to control any 1ov- combine 1n ltatanga, bas not been
orDlllen t, and that even a eoall- effoct1ve1y using its influence
tion offers greater pr0111ise with TShomb6 to get h1.lft to co-
than .,going it alone" in r.e:m.ote operate with tbe modoratos God
Orlentale Province. · send delegates to parllamont .
Altboogh Spaak has written Tsbomb~
saying t~at be cannot conti.J>ue
Foreign Minister Spaak in- . to rely on Belgian pol1t1ca1 and
formed UM Secretary General m1l1tary support and ~rglog hlm to
eomm11rskjol<J on l~ .i... i1 tbs t be o.ccept o unified federal Congo,
fu Uy agreed ~ itb the UN policy Spaak feels that the B~lgian Gov-
on the witbdrawol O·f political ernmen·t ' a influence with s~
and m1litory advisers troP Ka- s been eot1 roduced \
(b)(3)

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~<ET ··· COPY NO. 78
OCI NO. ozeo1e1
11 27 July 1981

·cuRRE.NT
INTELLIGENCE
.WEEKLY
.I
SUMMARY

C E N T R A L l N T E L L I.G E N C E AG E N C Y
OFFICE OF CU'RRENT INTELLIGENCE
llOa!NDIT •a. ~
llG ctM&:GI Lil Cl.ASS. 0
0 illaUIUlll! D
ClA:lc•. SB.OfVOll) TDI fi ii@ .,..,
ln::f n;;7;:.'0 WITil b..!0
AflH• UR to.i

11an1 ~~•s:fdL (b)(3)

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 25 1uly 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*Tunlsla-Fran~e: lj'unls.ian offlclais consider that Haul~

skjold's presence ln the country will forestall a Sovlet move to
reconvene the Security Council. Hammarskjold .ls expected. to
recommend some contlnulng UN presence ln. Tunisia to observe
the implementation of the Sec~ity Council's cease:-fire resolu-
tion of 22 July:;,] . ·
No meeting has yet occurred between the Tunisian governor
and the French .base commander who have been asked by their
governments to arrange Uie details of the cease-fire and the status
oft~ city of Bizerte. ·lfunisian Defense Minister Ladgham on
24 July described the current situation as still "dangerous" and
said the French were using the cease-fire to improve their po-
sition. Bourguiba has reiterated that a cease-fire and return
to the status quo ante will by no means satisfy him and that ~
France mu.s t agree to the principle of evacuation of Bizerte and ;·
begin negotiations on such evacuation in the near futur4iJ
Rumors that new French reinforcements had arrived were
r
partially confirmed [it was "likely"
some troops arrived with a warship whose matn mission was to
repatr.iate to France some 300 families of French soldiers. Simul-
taneously, the arrival early 24 July of the first unit of Tunisian
troops recalled from the Congo should substantially boost Tunisian
morale. ·
Although J3ourguiba will welcome the symbolic gesture of the
Arab League in offering to supply "volunteers" to assist the Tunis-
ian Government, he probably will be hesitant to have any appreciable
number of Arab soldiers actually reach Tunisia. [}.adgham told the
· American ambassador on 24 July that aid offers of men and mili-
tary advisers were being received from many countries and that
his government has decided to "acce t in rinci le at least. d t
manageable levela~·~rj__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-"'-~~~~

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CURRENT INTJ!.LLIGENCE WEEKLY SUWJARY

Bi.zorte .fears of reprisal.a by tbo siz-

able French colony in Bizorte
Pres1d~nt Bourgu1ba ap- and by Tunisian action in <le~
paront:1y wil). ei;iek an.other meet- t-ainin.g and expelling Froncb ·
ing 0£ the UN SscUrity Counci1 citizens and seizing French
to ehe.-rge that France has :f.ai led properties throughout Tunisia.
to comp1y with the counci1 1 s
22 July resolution urging aa Bourguiba on 25. July re-
immediate cease-~ire at Bizerte ne.,;i;ed his de.mends tbr. t Trance
and th-e wi thdrawa1 o'f ;fo:r:"c'e.si to evacuate. the base and reit-
positions held before hostil- erated his appeal ~or foreign
ities. began o~ 19 July, Before volunteers~ Citing ~ rieed .for
the tenuous truce was e.f-t&eted guurr1lla £ight~r§, t~chn1Cia~s,
on Sunday, Pr-en.ch -tore-es h.a:.d and ~r.rnr; to aUgx:ieut his crippl~cl
s~cured all access ~outea to arm~. The r~turn of the 3,100
t:ho1r base ~-omple}t, A -tormal. Tunis~an troops ~ro~ tnc CongQ
ceas~-~ir~ has yet to b& lil:r~ will boost morale, but Bo~r­
.ranged bec&oae the -Preach ha.Se guiba .~eels a need ~or so~ething
commAnder and the Tunisian pro- more than p1edges of solidar.ity
vincial governor) wno have been and is s~eking at loast a tok~n
charged with ·se9url~g an agree- international forCG.
ment, have n-ot agreed on a ei te
for. tne meeting. France is re- Tho~e is Still no evidence
ported to have suggested a "that T\Jnis:1.a is aol.iciting Sino-
"neutral epot" -O\.ltstde Btzerte Sov~et bloc assistance~ despite
t-or the mee.t~og. the tnct tha~ Tunisian ofticials
--inc1ud1ng Amhassador Habib
Bou.rguiba ma.y have in~ Bourg~iba,. Jr ., 1 in Washington--
·tendo-d ·to .fore-stn.11 a B!milar have hinted that Tunisia ml~ht
move by the USSR when he stated turn to th:e Soviet:' IJnJ.on.I
on 25 July- that he wantG-d 9-n- (b)(1)
o-ther meet.ing of the Securi. t.y
Council. An l\.merican UN o~fi­ (b)(3)
cial nad a hint on 24 JUly from
Georgy Arkadyev. highest rank-
i n& Soviet Ila tional in' the Tbe Bizerte cris~s and
Secretariat, that the USSR Bo\•rg01ba"'"s :fe-eling that the
might cal\ tor another council West b~trnyed hiD At this junc-
meeting, Tilts of:ficial estima-i.es ture ~ra ~X11GCt~d to be reflect-
thut if the French do not coMPly 9-d ln a modif.ieation of hi9
_promptly wi'th 'the counct.l reso- polic-y of pro--We:stern nonal.ign-
lution 1 thoro will bo ~ further ment1 'and aDti-Western tenden-
W.B-eting on 28 July ''an-d a specin.1. c1ee which Bourguiba has here-
Gen~ral A~se~bly seseiofi ne)Ct tofoT.e held iii cb-eck are lik.ely
wcek. 1
' to emerge, Although he has
sought to remain ale>of fr-om
Harnmnrskjold, who arr~ved Middle Ea.s't"e-rn e~tanglemcnts
in Tunis on-24 July at Bour- and llas quar-reled bi ttorly with
gu1ba's invitation, is reported Nasi.r, h.-O 1-S no.,,, co!:llnitted to
hopc~ul tnat he can persuade rasumo full !M:!mhership in the
both th9 Tun~s1~ns and tho Arab League and to re-establish
French ~o conform to thg rseo- diploma~ic relations.'~ith the
~-U
tionJ in which case .~r1t would UAR. Renewal of these tiesi
not be too di~ficult £or the hovever, 15 not likely to elim-
parties to reach a negotioting inA.te wholiy the suspic1on Wi~h
_posture,'' N.egotiations, hcrl!'ever, vbjcb A.r;-a.b leaders generally re-
would b-e complicated both by .gard,.:Bourgu:lb-a and his e.sp1.ra.tions

z-7 July 6J. Paffe- 3 or 23-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

·28 July 1961

DAILY BRIEF
. . .
*Tunisia: ri:Iammarskjold is convinced, and probably .will
·. ~I __ _ _ _ ,

so .inform the'-secur.ity Council on 28 July, ·that the continued

presence of French.forces in Bize:rte, against the will of
Tunisia, must be· considered a threat to int~rnational peace.
and security ·within the meaning qf the UN Charter. He is al-
most certain to· recommend that France·accept the principle
of evacuation·as desired by Tunisia.and·the negotiation--"free
from any pressure from either: side"--of a reasonable sched-
iile of evai:u9-tion:]
D

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\.__ ...

(b)(3)

ua ion

(b )( 1)
, /.___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______.\have consolidated their po- (b )( 3)
sitions in. the area and that French. paratroops had that morn-
ing completely sealed o~ the native quarter of the city. He
observed that no one was allowed in-:or out of the old city, and
that the paratroops had commandeered shops, bars, and other
e.s tablishments all around the perimeter for quarters and had .
set up emplacements at all strategic spots along the perimeter.
French officials in Paris, while admitting the encirclement of
the native quarter in reprisal for the capture .of some para-
troopers and civilians ~ho had "wandered" into Tunisian hands,
claim that five exit points were established and that the area
. is controlled to .prevent unauthorized traffic and to "pen up but
not stifle"_the area until ~e captive·s are returne~:]

/
- \and strung ~rbed
wire· at strategic points adjacent
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)
to the naval air base, and that the Tunisian Army has set up a
. defensive line in the hills surrounding BizertEIJ

(!he governor of Bizerte claims that 400-500· French rein-

forcements had arriv~d in Bizerte on 31 July,and Tunisian
morale, ~aised by Ham~arskjold's visit, is a~ain ebbinO
ft.French Foreign Ministry official reiterated on 2 August
that De Gaulle would not accept or be guided by any third-party
mediat~on, especially from the UN. This official declared that
the. Bizerte matter could not be settled in New York and that the
. best advice to give. Tunisian. Defe~se Minister l.adgham, who ·
was then in Washington, or other Tun~sians, "including Bourguiba,"
was t o start co~idential negotiatioi:t!J
~anwhile the French representative at the UN, apparently
on iristructions from Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, out-
lined in a 2 August conversation with American representatives
France's position on talks with the Tunisians. He said it was
the "absolute French prerequisite" that the first phase of talks
take place at Bizerte directly between :rumsians and French, ~

4 Aug 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE .BULLETIN Page 1

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11;,

I
Congo: Adoula 's initial statements«following his assump~
ttOri'_ ofthe premiership have emphasized his intention to restore II
II
Katanga as an integral part of the Congo. Adoula's impl.led
threat of military action against Tshc;>mbe has been supported
by .UN officials, who have. reaffirmed.that moves by the central
government to reintegrate·Katanga with .the Congo would.not be
opposed by the UN. ·
The American Consulate in Elisabethville reports that
Adoula 's stat~ment o~ his intentions concerning Katanga has
I
Im•
made a strong impre.s slon on T~hombe and his ministers, and ·
that' Tshombe appears to be searching desperately for means
to .reserve stablli in Katanga. ~ [ -----------~
discipline among Katanga army units
L____.---.-~-n.---=-o.----.--.--.:'
ou s1 e e city as deteriorated to a point where soldiers obey
-
I
(b )( 1 )
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

D I
orders only on a selective basis. The consuJate observes that
Katanga army units may be content to continue ~der present
conditions so long as they are paid. Nonetheless , the Katanga
army no longer appears to ·represent a formidable military , )(3)

II
threat to efforts by the. UN and the central government to re-
unifhthe Congo. . ·
l_!\elgian Foreign Minister Spaak ·has expressed to Ambas- ~( b )(3)
sador MacArthur his concern over a recent message from
Hammarskjold indicating that, in view of Tshombe's unwill~g­
ness to cooperate for Congo unity, .t he UN planned immediate. II
action.to disarm the Katanga. army. Spaak stated that he be-
lieved such precipitous action might. cause·the·g:atanga govern- II
ment to react violently, and doubted whether the UN·was ca able
_ __ _ __,, of .keeping the situation under control.
..--......----------~"--- - I
(b )( 1)
( b t(_~)
(b )( 1)
( b )(3)

· 5 Aug.61 DAILY BRIEF. iii II

~
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10 Augwit me · · ' · .::;;'< _;:

CURRENT ·-~.;-.' . .
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INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

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A ye.u..r ngo, ~00-~.- t.hov1rht Co_ago-lose- dlli'.1.ng tb.¢- J):('c-ind'6!..

i"t Bfnt an exce11-e:n-t opp-ol.'"tun1:ty- pond&oc~ Eb'uod Tti.bl~ C-0n1erence
to {q:flus-nca t+ho ConEW-'-B- polt,t ... ·tn Sruats-el."!- c~r.ly tba t .year.
ic~l and CCQno-mi.c develQpoilQnt~­
a.nd 'tO adv.nae& Soviet go.ale :1(}~ ~t~cipal rcaponsib111ty
A1'r1¢~ ~e a wh.01~--by ~Btabl~h­ ap-pareotly Wl'.liJ i;is9:.lg-.nee1 to tb.e
ing a tir~ adviaory posit:µ,~ Belg-inn ~mun.1st par·ty (Pea) ~-
rlt-h-111 t~Gt ce-Dtra1 govoTnment and, wi tblll "the. par-t;y, ·to (:0fi-
at 1..eop:oldvi1le. Por ·a t11t1e 1 tral COllltl'!i tt-oe P1Grriber Albert:
·tho trSS'R'a -o-1>JO"ctive o:r uot:fy~ Deaonia.cit, Tr.1.pa t:-0 &ct Gc-r-
ing the .coTintry Undier Patric€ ID~ny, Prague, Q_nQ Y.o-s-cow "lff!t-1'"~
Lum:in"b~ co.11'!c.1dcd .-i ih i.be a.i,m o-trered tQ th_q dial.agates~ e..ttd
0-f. .ind.9pendont- A:fr-1<l'-IH:i .stt.:tee. a.otne:-in(:,luding -01.%ef1$11.-vi~ 1 t.--ed
8ov1€t le~dQra~ ho~ev-cr, un~er­ the. 'blo-c du.ring and i~c-di.atel·\'
~a~1n~ting tne e:rtcqt o1 Atro- --.!!._t.t:e-r t.h_e_c.o.n.f_~e-___... (b)(1)
Asian support fqr the Un~ted
Niitt.1ons 1 Ove:rp1aye-d thoir haM 1
and .:bl-oc a1.il:B ;ln ./\.fr!CtL
S"tlttered u aGvere set-~cis:.

A1though its opportuniti19;0

to 1..o:fluooce. the si-tua.tion bave Th'3" Be-0.1J..Omtt: .Ro"ad Ta.bLe
dimi.11iahed ~ Uc l)S~R do.ea n.¢t ~n 1at~ April ,,_nd early May o-f ·
cona.ide:t' t.he Congo n lo:;it -Cll.U-BE-. 1960 s:avo the Pea un-d bloc rep-
An .e.ight73hn Sov.1et d:iploma t1-e -l-"-01;enta t-\v-ee J._o. lh:-~B-Bt1l..t:! :turtiler
lilia~.ion arr1. ved un~aoounce<I in occaai.-(")o for contacts -with t-b-e
thQ Gizetlge. :iiJtNnViold of' stun- Cori.gol.ese. {·.
leyv.11Ic- Q~r-1.y laat trlQn.tb~ p.reo-
sumably aot~c~p:itiD~ tbe recon- Af"ter tJie J)elg1an Govern-
voning o:f t..h.11 Congoleae p::irl·iQ.- ment cndGd its admi~~tr~tion
aent.• fyo i:e.rnbera of" the- ·So-v.iet r;,1 the Con(;_-0 on 30 ·.:mne lS-6-0 •
PON;JiiUL M1..01BtT.y told an Amer- Khrusht:!MV :;iont a personal me!'i-
ican o-fj'j_cial on 27 July tbnt .s.&ge rocogn~zi:rLg the rogt~~
the tra!lR oxpQcte.a the forma- Wid rQq~e5ting diplon+i.ti~ r{l18-
"tio-:n 0£ c. Co-.ngoleJ:1:c- t_{OVernz.ent: "t.ions. 'nl.e SQ-vio-t tte.lega. us
roprq.geotln_g Al), :ract1ons in .a:tt".e-111i:1ng Uie- tna.epe-n.de.nee-
PAr.l.iame-1:1~. lJosco'll' hrt:;: l>ollVfi ~erQmonie:s re'.ltil1hed norQ than
to l.ay tho. gr-0ull.CJ"a'Qrk for cul- a week .i11 Leopol.dv111e. aoo .at:.
"t.i vo.-t in:rr
Co.ng:olc.u:Q ex-cre:Li.st;.9 tn-eir depn.rturs an agr-&ement
Md tOO.Se <i-l.IO"JOODta B)ltli.tlll. tho-tic to exch~IlS'e ambaasador~ wAs
to Lhe Colll1Wn1st. bloC. l"lnnou.oce-d ..
'Th.o· mu-tiny. lllhicb !lrokc;i- ·
out a week a:tt.or .ind0J)encte.nce---
Soviet: act:lona 1:n 'th-e among- CongQl-o:so "t:r0-0_pB aear
mo-nthB OO;fo.re the Cori.g-o re- Leopql~vi.l.le. who denan-dcd in-
ceived 1.ndet_v-ond.en-a.e ·g.nve no cro-116~ pey a.n.d the- :r~val ot
evid~nce that the Kre-.ii~n lead- BelgLILI:l. o££i~cra--1n~t1ally ltilt
-ors anti_e:i.pat<;1d the 1a~.r d-Q-- not. politica_lly :f..ll:9pired or
velopme:r.rts- there. Pl;'.;l-or to primar-ily ant~-Euro{XIBn in
19S~ the bloc rn~intalned ltm- ch.Elr&o-to.-~ Jt re-ceived im-
1 t-e-d COD.'t.nC tlil -wi tb Congo lG30 pcti;m, bowe-ve.r t ~ri;tlll intl'1.m-
poli-r.:1,ca.l_ t1gu.res WoiJ,eb 'tbe r;in.tory -anti-Bol gian speeches
Cz..e-ch Co_ll:9U1&-tc. :i:g, J.i.eopol<1v-1llc. boy L.um-u.nbo...,. wbo bad eome out
'I'h-.:;i Comroun.W t5 beg.a1'6 9.}'B1:tim- ahei'.l.d Qf. bis r~v.nla .in el-ec..-
ri tie: ,o,,.),. <ti va,ti.on -0-f lGnd1.n~ ~ioJ1b: n fqw weeh~ -0~rli~r ~nd

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tl.el!ldcd A ~aa 1!:lonnl coa;l.1 t:!on" 81.oo Ta~dC:61
~0-Yei"ilme:Dt r"$Drf!Seati~B i&
dUteuilot facUona and ~d·es. Belgtum•a atr11~~ o~ re-
·lli~-. abe9.9Bioo to tb-e ao.ldi«l'.rCI' • ia.f'"ceinerrie t.o thir;i C.01110 to
·f.11Ql'llali6ilr ·l .41d· to the IU'JI)'" t .t ta:la.oi- &B8'14t it.1$ tr'OoP& 'lllbO ~
pl.ille .an.cl :riot.1rtl' throu,gbQ:ut m~lned ~here b1 ~~·~ 986 lm-
'l&tdt O~ the l)I'OV~"-~ 8.lld meilintml1 cle11.011Jl'laed by lill.r1J:Sllc:hev·
)N"ffljllted o : rqq111fft .f'.Nlm h1rll i ·n a speci.:LI. p;reee ~oo:ft!lrC111Co at
and :P.re9t~flut K:aJ011,vv:b11 1·0.r tm tho .l4-e:llili ae an atteftJ)t ·to eap-
NEl.iBtillnco 111 controlllna the
qutbreaJI: •
.Ptt.&a U!o Co111<>' a atta~~umt. 01
lrn!e,pe'DClen.c:e. Thle w•e fol.Lo.ad
..
~
by 41 Soviet. Oov~. r;il!l$nt statement.
lofl.uo~C:-iDR .P11c"tor.e &CCIU:!li1J8 th~ l'e~tera. po1il'CY.rt;I ot
!IOllll:.il'lir t;a "1.Jq."14111te" the new
'l'ha t"ai>lcliy detor.1ar111t.i.11g ~t•i~ th~OIJfh dt~ct m11it&~y
pollttcal and ecof>Omic •it_..__ aetto.111.
tion vb.1 Ctl follow~;u,1 86"& Sov~t
l.e111cr.e~& a.a. O'l>'.POrt:wii ty Tha USS~ .i ml'tially ~gp:por-i.­
io -eet.ab- r:.
lillb a .e~rcag blo~ ~$encc cd t!N actio.n tQ ~qal vitll t -h e
deep i.o Due.rs Afr-J.c11; and at the ai t.uat.1..0l!I i.o an effort to pire-
..... ti.me to tu.rltl.~ th'D use~· 8 vont 'lln£le..tinr11\ •es tern ioto:r~
po~ aa cb111111>'1on ot .1 u1t.ieol.ootaL- · 'Htn:tl9111, tore~ 'the wi.UICfJ".a:n.l of
~~~. b&~etl!!U;:t-oY of uc:rsrly 1114e- .Belelo.n troops a:n.d ci.vlliao ad-
~~o't J\friC11.a. lii'ta."t.es~ .tu:id de- v:lr;11JnJ • a.lld e:t.rongtbtl'D tll.e ·Oen•
feruter o~ At'rtcaD and Ae~an na- ~rol fovw.mui:nt. Premtci- lf\l-
tiol!.~Uem. ID Aftltioo 1 i.t lllWlba a e:stl.'l!mo aottcolbnial
o:f:tered t1'9 posl!libillty o~ open• na.tiarui.Usm S~ljX>ri.od 't.l)e t>loc Te
in.g to Co1mnn1~st pei:ii!!tr.11 Uon a·Ja;iy ob,Jec't.i:V'e 0>t re110v.u a: Sut\cpclllll
~ 1u;ljg,ceat to tb• ~t.111 de~
,pen<lent to~1t~~ tes ~f ~r1tl8b
Ee.•t Atrtca, tb• 11\)i>tl.'lgu~m·
tll1lu~nces ~ram A1r~ca.

'fu i111depcil.4o11't i\fric&n

.
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colonies, alld. Wifbin the statelll ta?Ore:d ml' laC.rv~ntto.111

1're11Clli CO!linmntty, the new Cen.- as a memas ot eas.1.11is ·ten.11J.op,
'tJ\41 Atr1c.an. RcJl'll;b ltc. and Congo r~torlDir tba au~hQrit.Y ·Of' thc-
l?.eJ)IJbl ic Cl'r'-z:zo.villc) , Leofoldw1~1.lii reat1De 1 and ~Vo1G­
:las ez:t.e11Biac of tM col-d \Yu
The eollapsi!! Dt the Pa.rib tn:to At:rJ,C;!a . G'haaa .a.ad' Guinea,
''1Ja1111tt•• :llf!ettl!l8 two acnt'.bai .111re.n.c1y atd.i.Qg 1..1.1~wt1be. i .t:o11n- · ,..·.
I
earlier ha-d eoded Mo!s>cow ':e p:rc- ciial l;y H 11art rd tri.n eff0rt
•~EJIU.t attl~~e of ~ooc~l1a~1oa to promote el.alma to, Afrd,e11n
toll"ll;ird too lh:l!lt. --~d soviet 1°"c:l&rSh.1p • ~o pa.r't.1Cl.ilA.l'ly .
l•&de:l'l!!I had a4o~ted qn 1ncreas- tiqel' to coooerate vi·th tbe VJ9.
t~l)' belllgeNtai p01lt.urc;i . •or-e- Jn. addition, t.IM)' sav an oppo:i:--
over, t.be C'oo~o G1tullltloa £0~­ til~ity to ~hbmnec tttelr role
Jio'ft'ed i:.o tbe nkt! 0£ th.9 C:Ct.b- witJda. tbo ln:teroa.U.9 aa1 ·Ol'-
fcir-ence· at. Commu"tst leadc%'4 san.U:at.i.oa., to 1nsu1ate tbe
at Buo~a~ ln lato J~ri.e. at COago f;ro111 o.lrifel.coac for.1KA I·:· '
.'lih'l,1:1) Ute Chi.eCliae or.al;y nc:- .i.nter'lea.tioa., ~ncl-~l>Y •ci'td:.clf i·
c.ueed X~usllc.bev ot softness as 11.c:cU.awr IW!t:1'1!co 1-be ~Jl8o­ ( .
tow a lid the •est. A. 11"c:1:r1c lne P"im.ior. and tbe mi--w eet
poi.i;rt at 18'!Slle ..-.11. ~tie degrgg- • preeeden~ to~ (~re si~ua-
an.d 0~11eter ot 11uppo:rt thi6 1!1onil ~l.:eewbere ta. At;rS;.co..
bloc: ebould p ve a1a1:foimlle:t
JtOff'DDDte 12' the IJll411U'4&vclqpod· A~ tbe BecUTl'ty eounet1
:11.reaa . seaaiaa. eonv.eae~ tlO diGc'l:lil9 1.be i.
:\ '
s t tQatl<Hfl, the Sovle~ 4e1eaat~
liloviat le.ader.!I applllNDt.ly 6ei:Jandod A ree.ol~tton ~Nf•na­
.1·e -u th~."'- develoPl!lltlli& in. tibt;: in;g Dltl.1?1111Z •.e ".nr!Dl94 aa.itres-
Coa10 coa.ld b9 f~lly explolte4 .e10ll ,., acc-lq .1:111.e V3 · of eoi-
T.i tboait ~n.dl.le rt.olh 111114 Ml:llSCQW 111.bor~~lo~. ~11.d cm111ne ·for t:be
'lllOUbted an o"Xwast ve c:-Ji•.tao v1tll:ar6w~1 ot 9el~i11.o .force&.
of qff.1c1111l. 8t11:bll~"Dts, dtplt,1-
ma~io act1v~t,, &od p~oPRJtaAda Ia the early d11y• o.t t .be
.11.~ plU''t· of its e.trcag 11nti-:tl:EI crleis. Sovh·' t leaders sio1U;gbt
UDll·, ~ eree.te the hl~e1~A that

10 Alli!: 61 ~$1.Se 3 <If 1::1

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C0622 4745 ~oved for Re:se: 2016/07/05 C06224745
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CUBB.£:NT UITRLLIGkNCE 11XBICLY StJt.WARY
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the US.SR 1111gbt intervene..
r~ply t9 Lu1111.1mba'q and ~~vu­
111 er.ate one for "a.poedy" with- ' . { .."'. ..~. .
:,
.· ..
··~·
bu 'a req'le.e t oo 14 July to
d.rawa:l spouso1·ed by Tunisia
and Ceylcm .
.'-t~ ~: .~1·~·~·1: .... ••• •, •..... t .

"watch de·v elo,pmente closely"

since the Congo Aight "!ind it ·.-.. ': ,I.
necessary" to ask for Soviet Bloc Intervent10Q
~elp, lltbrusbcbe~ prom.i.sed
"rosoluto RQV..Sure!J" and t:be • • ,,· ''"!
...
"required ·h elp" if furtl\or " .i m- 1fh11e Sov~et diploma.ts ·;: . , ·.. ·,, ~ ..
pe~ialist aggression" made emcb were tatuc~ ~he lead in urging : ... :. ·~~ ... --: ! . •
action uooe~eary . Responding UH a$sistance to thu COn~lcee ' < · ' ,, •••• s
to Lumumba'e reitQrated tbrc~t Qov·e rnment , llk>scow was obta..in.-
a tew days later to request 1ng max111\\lm propaaan~a adv~n­ ..' ..:
Sovi~t troopS, F1rGt Peputy tago by circUJ11venting the UH
Foreign Mi.nieter .K uzncit6ov told tac111tie$ ~d delivering ai~ ·' :
.......
th$ scicor.1 ty Council that the d1a-ectl)' to tbo Congolese. Tbe ..
ussa would "CU\filtrer all requel!iltB" first Soviet planoloe.d of :fOOCI :: ..
of paaples struegling . for lib- supplies arrived in Leo.PQldville
eration. These carefully oon- on 2(1 JuJ.y; :troro thea uatll 11t1d- . .,.,.
comn11tt~l pledges, by appea.ring ' ·;:
Septembe1•, 'lrbon bloc pe-rson.o.ol ·~ j!···
reepoDBive to tho COngo G<>vern- wero expelled from the ·C ongo, r4" .,.
~ent 'o conc~rn, were ~lso in- the Soviet bloc provided ~u­ "-
1' •. ..... .
te11ded to bolster LWJ\ut11ba's mu.ioba '~ e~trem~ st tactio~ w1th
tom.1.oua bold over the govern- 17 a:J..rcr~ft (;ioolud1ns ~ poi--
mental macbinory. aonnl plane for ,t.wrumba.), 1·0 0
t rucks , and \Jnknown quantities
0°1: tfln.A.l), A.J"lllS t IJIOlle Yr fOO<I, and .. ,

Meanwhile, the USSR bernn

• ; I ..,

madicinea, The 'b loc ~•t 350

rallying .neut:raliat c;upport to 400 tecbn1cian11 llJld several : ....:. ' ..
tor its campaign to brand tho 't11g11-1evel pol11:i~al a.Ad e<:o-
Weatora. co~ntrtos aggressors. nomi c adviaGrs, and SOvict IL-1&> ... . •. . r.~.' ~ . ~:,-; '".
Pirst Deputy Prend.02" 111koya.n ferried Ghanaian ILild Guinean . " . ..
a4Q Foreign Minister Gromyko troops to the COngo in guppor1:
ox-pounded Soviet vie•~ on the of Ltu:rumba •
Congo situation to d1plom~t~
a:t a reception on 13 July and "•• .;.· ' .
callod on tho Afro-Asian coun- Tbo ~~d nnd . s~pport of bloc
tries to . join .tbe OS:JJI in ' de- and l"Adical Af)'iCCUl t!lt11.te.s enco,;; ·-
nouncing ·the West's intorvcn- aged LumUJ11ba. to take a ho.rd 1i.aa
tion. w.ltb )119 oppo11ents 11.~d to de:fy tbe ....
~ ''";i.: /'·.
UN . i11 order .. to. acb.ievo bi& eoal or
· unifying the Congo un.dar hie per-
Bowevar, SOviot le~ere sonal. rule • Re l)oasted o:t bloc
were caref·u l to avoid becominJ eu.pport ~nd of tho soviet tJ'OOP6
isola~ed trorn tbe •tro-ABian Wh.icb would be seat 'if hCI re- ,•
posi tion . Jn t~bo secur.J. ty Coll,l)- quested the111 .
ci.1, Jtu~notsov withdrew his
reGolution c~llill8 for evacua- ~~:·"h~.:.~:
tion o:f 'B elgian forca.&; within Soviet leaders apparently .. "· .
thr~ dAy~ and acceptod a lllOd-
'~. " .:
became concerned over the eI-
agseJl'nt"ed Congo1e1;e elCpeotat:ions
:: ·_.;· -..:.~< 1;...., ......-: .
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10 A\18 61 SPECIAL AR'TICl.118 P~~ !t o1 1.3 :·~ .~
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C0622A745 L"1Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06224745
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of bloc s~pport . A party or force agai~st op_poattion eloment~

soviet rep:a-~&entatives heAd&d --par ticulai-ly seceas ~onist
by i'orei~ ~lnist:ry oftlolal KiitangQ Province--to unity the
Foatn--lat:~r a.ppoi.ntod Bov·i ot countrf under Leopoldville. They
ohara6 d'o.ffaires--arrlved in feared that polltleQl fr14irmentAtlon
Leopoldville in lnto July into autonomous provLnc i al covern-
abOllrd a Sovl,~t food plane to ments. would eocourage continued
coo~dioste future movos •~tb econom.la 4o-peo4Q.noe on Brussels
the wmum'b a g0vernme.n t and BJ1d tbat national a11ogiaQco
cbannol fir.at-band io.forne.t.ion woul d be $ ubor.~nated to tr~ bal ' '·'\

to Moscow. ano seottona1 loyalt~ os.

During l.UIJlumbB' 9 visit: to Sec ~ otary G<Jnera.l Uammo.r-

New Tork at tho end Of J u ly , slfJold, ~owever. ruled that
tbe 1.JSSR sougbt to mod.orate the tm re:llolutionr.. did n.ot Author-
Coogolea.G demant1s. no Soviet ize CJll troops to \IBe force on
Govorn:ment state.i>Onts issued l>Obalf of ~~o centr•l govero-
between S1 Ju.ly atld 5 August me~t. ~is failure to movo
reAffirmed the OSS!l'e readl.- agatnst Tehomtl& •s Bel.sian-bac'ked
oeB9 to ' ' to.to resoluto :mea:!lurqs regime in Xoitanga d:rew $tron&
to rebuff 'the aggresGors ," but A:tr o..Asillll and bloc orl tlcis:11 .
they .oaro:tully avoided com~ · · Mosoo• aaouo.ed 88.Jlllllarelejold ll~ d
roitttns Mosaow to UA.llatera l ~oder Secretary Bunche of con-
Action , nivance ·with the W~stern powers
to pOTpe tuate colon~al control
An ·o((i~al st11to.ent on UQdOr CO~Or Of the UH.
20 August ca11tained tbo ttrs t
reference to "volunteelt's, •• a Wbon Mo~utu o~orth:rew Lil-
flood 01 which ooal.4. come from 111._ll'lba on 14 Septll'llber and 9ul>-
among "1oyal f:tiondsH 111 A!riaa s~.quently expell&d till bloc
and other continents lt addi- reprcnJenta.t ives , Sovie t tactics
tional NATO units were sent to entered a now ph~so . Tbe USSR
the COA80· Th• Congo three launch4'1d ILD all-out <!&mpalgn ..·.
day$ later ~ejected soviet mil~ to wtoeck tho U.N'lil Congo opera- ''
itB.ry b.elp, however, .e.tati.ng tion _ Moscow ~ for tbe llrst
that · it did not oeed ~oreign t i me, broke ~ltb tho ~fro-AsJ.aru.i
volunteore. SOviot propa.gand11 by ve'totng 10. -t'h e Sc>curity Co'li.11- -"
began to claln thQt Moscow ' s oll a codorate resolut i on 8pon-
action ~ad preve ntod t~e US sored by Tuni~~a and CoylOG de-
from intervening in .the s itua- s i gned to conf~ Hamm~slejold ' s
tion . stnnd agAiost unllat~nl m~lltary
.support to tbe Congo . Geoeret.1
Attitude TOWIU'd tbe U1ll Asa~~bly approval o1 the reso-
lution on l~ Septc;miber provGke:d
Sovlot lea.de1·• trom: thoo tbe f~rat Soviet prop&lfllnda
outset rotarded tho UN opera- criticism of tho Afro-Asiaq
tion in tho Congo n& no ~oro poaltion , In his sboe-pound-
than a te111porary expedient for ing ~ddre-5'0 be(·Gre t.he Gen.era.l
olla~atin~ DelgllUI intluence Aesem~ly a. yeek later , Kbru-
and c:reau.ng conditJons tavoi-- ob6hev reafrirmed tho USSR ' &
able to advancing bloc alms l~ •uJIPOrt for Lulllu:ml:la and made,
A:f r.Jo4. The Afrio8JI · sto.t es ex- h18 ·v tl'Oi'ka " . proposal tor ·
pected that th~ UN would a.et in replacing the UN eoel'8taJ>y
support of Lumlll!lba a11.d u 1Je gen•ra1.
. . . ;, . . . i

~£ SJ

1.0 Aug 61 Par:e 4 · of 13

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-CONFl9D4TIAL _
CVRIUiltr IJ1l'BLl.10BMC& lf.BBO.Y ~y

So~iot 1Di'1uonce V~cs vlthctteT tho UAR u11.1t .frQm tb.Q

OJ; cocnm11n(I. 1uul urged Ohm.11a ;ind
TIKI bl.l)C' a dt.l"Clc:t :1.rill'Ol.ve- Moroc~o to do tb.e ~NW.
mcnt . in tbc Congo vJ.J"tUa.l;ly ,.'
«iHecf wit~ tb.& ol«oure of tne Moscow •J>.par.!lptly regarded
~v1et: and Czec.h Qmbassi.eig ~t 1'All r;11.1pport · :.for Gizellij?a ;i.e
Leopol<h1.il.t.e· oc 1,:7 tioepten'oor, strecgtbani AS t:he ~a.1U .o.n o~
iarul tbe· U'SU fl.011;gAt to c1-•AD6 l the ~xtremists ,taJJd t.bUPJ i.acil·
aes1e.itance to pTO-IAliZtknlba 1tat.1oe J.osi.wi:bo. •s e\reotu1
1orce1<1 tbrocqrb Qu1a~~. a~n~. r~etor3.t:lon . It sr.1111gbt: to co-
!lnd the UAR • UN OOiiltro l of ard~CL to b1aa a14 ettorta wi t.h
~he aaJor ~irt1el~ pre~ento~ tbe U~a. BD4 11111.da o.~allAble to
Zl.111 sullditAntial 1m1ou1rt ol 11,i~ Gizeil.gn 1 s
m.i.as10111 ig ca1ro a
fr Olli rea¢ld m tbe rebells substnnt1~1 ~l.lll of moDey · ~d a (b )( 1)
qulll).U ty of v e . Bloc
6.DSl. l l
et~te.s Joi.f:Jocl. tho UAll.; Qb.ana,
and Guinea in urg.i DI' B:u*'neeic
off !ci3.1G to ~"'11.1t UAk over-
le the Ult, noecov ~li~hta on rout~ to ftt:lil.D1eyville.
re. ueo t .o ~ 1 ts obu0> of the Wi.th. 1Dsa.rt:OW11'$ J'e:fw;al to ~u~
CO?IS'Q operatioD e:irperu1ee arid 1;1tia pa.r1111salon. t.l.Oe aJWI. l'·ad'-
dcml)Jl4ed that D~~e~Jold li2.li>- icai African support tor t~e
ut t p.l'opa!';a.la for w:i thdrav.l,.u~ 1:11'<>-'. Luarulllba grCl:lp lf'nB re-.trtotcd
UN 111111.~~ for~q~ . tc tlqii,an,da -.for .IAl:n.umb::i. ·~ rctleasu
and rei.Cu(ftn.t eme:at and frn th&
·'fbo USBR r~pon4e4 to dhar.m1ll!J ot J»:but\1 and 'l'elumJ)Q
LumWtlba '!9 ure8t 111. early .Do- :forcos.
ceab6r v;t.th a govorn.t0e~t state-
ment ~cat~ng~y a~taClkins Jfn.n- The $oviat leadt>.&'s aa,.. :in
IDG:l'!lkj 01d and iJJe U» Coalllllllld tu:n11.nl;iit.•s delith~a.D11011Dced 1.c
11.mt laf1ng ·tne bb.lll11 e.nttrely mld·P·obru~y-a~ e~oenent . op~
on w.b.at lt allega,d as us in- pi>rto,r:iity' to ~IU'ry..forvnrd tha.1.r
tortere-o~q. The statement c8DJ)o.1gD against eotontaliS1D . and
a.eraU. vaic;ad di!!ploaaure w;l..th nga.i,o ldeqtl~y the ussa w1~
those ~frica~ oi.Pd Ast~ ~tate~ an.t i-West..,rn ele1119·11f:Ei -J.n Atric.ir.
-.iliiah ttbave .cot preserved tlle. ~d Aaia- They hoped lt wou.td
requ;isite unity'' on tho Co.ric;o- lo~ to ~·be 'D'11;hd.ravm.l o-1 th-o
iS!lu~ . remalninB Afro-lts1~ contingents
in the Cougo , aad block an~ e~f~c­
80.... iet leaders 'C:OOlt A caU- t _l V'Q We.a.te-.rn-baek<ld UM ~ctton to
ti.<IUB· att i t1.:1d& t .ovard tbe 1'~ de11.l wltb the !dtuRt:1on.
go"erfllU;lnt 1>1"001.ailw<l in &tu-
.leyvU.le by .Lumuai~ 1 s pr<>- lL<l!i>c;:Clll nlso ae~d on the
OOmm.aoia·t deputy Aatoi.uG CJ:2enga lssue ci.s a protext for MIMl111. ,D1!1
1~ mid-J>ecenl;ior, ~resumably to $ovt&·t · {l.°ttack11 oa ~arekj'old
l!llllntui n Hex-J,.1>11"1 t~ Yi th re- 11.nd fClJ:' prea1dn1r ltbrusb.cllev•s
(:lkrd to evei.ts iJ? Leop0lcl:v:il lc • plan tQ .reorganize ti)o- UM in tllle
Grmi.}'ko .Eita.tQd publ:i.c ly tJui.t }lope .o f glll'nori:n~ l\t:r<>-IJ.s i.aa
thq VBS!l roc;>0en1zcd Gizeeg~ RS auppo:11t. In lErU~ c;?.re lo late
n:et1ft6 pro1111er, wt ll05eour cltd P.cl!run.r y tQ JJebru a11:d otber bttll<ds
ne1t estend tormal recojtnitio~ of goveramont in Asla, Atr1CA~
t.o .1:1.11!1 rostme·. Atter ~ delay Bul;"'Ope ,• 11;n<2 IAl.t.in ~.r1'ca ,, Kbru-
ot tell clays , Khrull:ohi:tv re1>l1ed sll•cbe" aoll(:ht to e.atab.l1ah the
·to nn Rppea1 for lllAte.ri.al a~­ p~int that ~bo.'s doatb Jue-
si~tQnce trom G1zeDg~ bJ retc- t1tle4 the Soviet ~Qposal and
erA.t ln:s genor.a.l promises of' .Kosa01r '.a atta.c::lt :la.~
tall on
SQviet BupjK)l'"i O.n.d· BYl".P~tby . HB.mlllU'Bkjold. Re pro])0.9&d that
a l l "tor-ei.gn tr-oops" be wltb-
T.hci ·OAB. hovvver, tlu:.-w clrRWD trom tbe co.1;1s:o ud ~­
its enti.To suppo.-t to (>i.zonga. plaQed with a comn~sslon oi
"- •l<1.ipl~tic" miss1.o n . 'il'i'S ,es- Af..-ican ~ta~ea .
tabli~h~d ror q~~ .1Jl Cil.iro, !lnd
tJAa oft1cl!!rCJ io St,1U1leyv1.llc It& a .ge111t1.1re of. ::ree·tra.i.11&
provided 111.11.ftar-y advice And toli'~ the now adii!in1.St '.r ti.tioD
t~ctmical .asrsiist:1111ce·: IQ111sir~

"lXJNFtBEN!IAL
10 A~ 6.1 SPBClAL .ARTICL8S

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111\ Wasbl:iarton_, l!!hr ..abohev d1 d Ille .9liCc~B 1111 ln-tlue.not.cg

not di.ractly :!.mpl~ca.tq tb9 v~ ~ro-Astan opl111oft .
i.c l.rWl\Dl!bll ' es diemtb, but he
obl~q~•lY ll'&l'ned against any
uDI liatera.l .i:otor~ot;t..on 1 n the [c I:lfo llel>l'!llau-7, i:o lle>11-
COil.ltO . lci; the n<loption bf t.be: Uli Cieo- ...
era.l ~embl.J' of ~ l"lod&r ato
resolution 9,POD5Clred by tl!l.e UAR,
Shortly tb9reatt.Gr, COll- lJ.beria; o:nd Ceylon ypbi;.ld1:ng:
lllWli"t Cb:i D~ ian·d "t.lu;t b toe sat.- 1111111114lf'akJold•$1 authority ln tile
e lli'tea fonui.lly r11aopb:od Congo, a top Sov.1,~t ofUaiia.J,.
G~zenia'e ~e~:lile and ~11d 'o repo.rt;a1;!'l.f ch111.r11.ct11r 1zed thi;t
ox.;~go '111JbMl88dOTB , VAii '8 African pol.i.Gy 11;9 "eq1d v-
oc·al" and. SJa1 d Bas ii' •:D r-aa l aim
v = i to 180111.to tJ1e '•aocd..11.U&t
Pr-eeent Soviet · Att1t~do ·· onmp" fl'0!6 .A.f:riC.fl.. -

lllODit.ollf' Iii lJ~~te:r dellUQO 1111,. The ta1-l1:1:re Of r-oofle-cl. So-

UOtll of UllllllJIU'Slrjold r~f l.octed
tb9 truetratlo.11 t:b• Soviet
lander-Ji! 11-ad felt sl'Jtee lilmwabo.
v.i ot e-r i'orts to provide· Jlo1Cll ·t-o
GUenp imll to ltlstal.l hUi a.s
~Wilba'e leeitima.t~ suc~eesa~
...
Wlll8 -o -v ertbrovn an<J bloc. n1s- clqseod out t;hi.s .Pba5a 01 •oscO'll'' a
6lone $~llea from the o.;.ogo .
In attncki11s tbQ ~ oraani¥a-
i1~n, h~1teYe:r • tho V.SSll 1.ost
\ t:!~!:O_'.j ,.,,...,. "'-] (b)(1)
n1ppQt''t. MOn,g t:tie l.IJrlca.a a.nd
Aslam c;ountrl,qe, . llb.Ue the
Asta.a-Africa» •~iatoa dt6ae:reed
vi:ttl 00111e of Ji4min6rmkja-ld • 6
pollc ici5, tho:r were M~n.1.slou~
tll Ui)b1Hdt.11g- t 'laq i39U t'1t10ll81
su.tbo-r1t1 of. tlut -'l«:~otar)' 8911-
ernl, .nd t-hey 00111aidl!T11d th., ~av~rtbela.~, with pol~ticat
UtUted Katioc!ll tho 0111y alt&1"• -to:rces a.nd str-uot-ur•-61 st111 1a
native 1:0 1n•Olvem11nt i.n ICaat- .flux, tile COcgo rcr.ualam " potea- .....
Waat pqiJGr str~!Z'Qles . t.lally tnt~-="'"""--~ f.:..
: ,•
"t.1 vu {of;__J (b)(1)
Soviet bope1' ln tho Ooi:iao
.c;irq tv.r.tbel' lruat.rmt.ad by ~n i, .
a.pp~ront c.on£i1ct of 1:.ntaro~t :r
betwc1111 JIQ.:a;cotl' =!lll4f. C&1ro . As
early .., .Ja.mi.llr:)r tll••,.. -l'e
·BllUiS that tM Sovi,ot . 1Jn1Qll '
vg,g ~<1!111~1 ~oneerned over So-

r'"'f!.:"',,·~..::x:~r ..
th.a IJAEI ' 8 .1:i:if lueDO& with iGi- · viet oliitr7 o.fflen],
Aabags;;~or 'Pb.omp-
iwn Ill!. mld-M111y tbat tho S(~le-til (b )( 1)
tuta beeo r-.,atra~a&d wt~~ rlll'Spe<it ... ..
to the Cong~, lliiJ~ ·t.ha~ i ( ihe
I ·
~itu$tlon &Uloti.ld d~tar torAto,
tb.e-)' "''0~ ld" aet hifaJ"y t ·o roe full;y ,."

~ V~il
Stlould tho cuuen.t uJU1t.ab'le rel~

l_
~~ ~ reel tha~
~ioonetl:~J18 lll1IODIJ
tio~ ~reall dow.o,
be eKpect"'4 to
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?tae.tr wae 51111y:lia$ ·•U.p aor"1•1cu1" All at~ellJ)t
to lGLluenoe ~ub34-
to Af'rican aatlOAa:U.am 1111110 quont ali~ente ,.anctJ:Beo.n:nJ..t:a
reet-:1:.Dg -~n the '' liwrctlll" ot (b) (3)
ronner po~1~10~. LL~~~-~-~~~~~,---.

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I . OCI NO. 029s;e1

17 August !GG!

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
·WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLlot~;;.,,, '''" 5
JB Ul.ulCI IU CU;it.. 0
0 Cli:C:LitS!il:flED fa\
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l1N 8eC1J;'IO t11ry 04JOl;tol''ll.1 mtmM lnactequat~ly r-ep~o~entea .l~ the

~F.r.k.1<>ld is proe;,Qedi.ng vitb. ilU~ Sectrot"-r.iat .
pl.,l)ns tQ reor-jfnqize tl'!~ ·uN·
·~e<el'et.n:ri:a t to .a-ecoar.aiod.a te l!iome
of t.h.19 dem~nds a·f Atr~-Asian , ~Jl'lllAl"BkJold. eve.n b~!ore
_partlcu&a1•l )' Mi-1'..c-.a:n, aemb-.el'.$ Kh~~~bchev'$ attack, b~d estab-
lor ~ la~~er sbare ot poli~y­ lished two cor..i.i.ttees to help
Making poi;1t:1on~ . Q~ 6 Au~~s~ h1m ·.t,q s'tudyj,.og these d¢1m.nds •
.h'O ·told U3 Q:f.';fic:1all.9 tba't .bl1&1 ~:b· 1'1.n.dinae. al.oq 1'1tb Baiµ..
propotJ11d: :re!l:lf'$1il111zcstton ILa.$ m~rs:kj old.... OWi\ P1"'0POs.a.la. wil'l
be~n w~il .2"Gcet~¢~ by tho Atro- probably becQmo the ~ocqe ot hQt
A!l>hus. Re b¢l\i&vea that 1:Jl.l$ de~t9 at tfac 16th Gt:!'.Qfill"al .Aa-
.f11ctol'. toget:t~er W'.it.ll t.he ~\lG­
·CeO~·
~~d bi~
of thQ U~· ConfJ<) 0operl)tlon
$ym~8t~y tor thq
kRO'lrn
iv. •~i•• ••••• 19 ""•!&"""' / (b )(1)
(b)(3)
Tu~i$i11ns t~ the Blz9'1'te di~­
;puto, wU.l. coo.ctc>T' .' loi:liet
clJ'1l"g-e$ tJla. t. ho 1B .111 Cl "l11pe-~
rlalist stoq-re, •• and .make :I. t
diff1cult to~ tho U~SR to MUB-
ter sappo~t ic. 11:s oppos1t1~n
t.o t:h~ :Se.or~t:Rr i.a t,

The quc;ii;;t.1on of tl~e $ccre- The- ei;gh.t-Mimbe't' CQmro11:tet:i

tm..ry g.en~xAl's ~~ tbo.rity and o~ of Expe.rta on tJa.e Acti v.1 t1et1
the Jle~60llD~l ~rut £ooct10~~ of ~nd Ol'lgiu11ZBit.i.oll1 oJ. the Scilcra-
the ·UN Se~Nta.rtat vas brought• ten-lat--m.ppobtcd by Harrmarskjold
into th~ for~grourbd 1n ·the ~ail in the· Blll!l!lAn' of' 1900 0.11 'tho
o1 1.9~0 bf IKllu:·uelU'.lb.Ov ~ s bit tar 1"'9Coflllli~nd.., tio:ll of. the ·1:4:t'h Geo-
a t:t~c'ka on RUl!i'lan.ltt-Jold. 'ih'EI ~ral Assembly egasioq--issued
Soviet pre.tuie~ de.llW~ded tha.t ~ta report on
14 J~n9 1961, The
the ~OCl"e'l:lfll:y· ge:n~al ta office report. is 11e.l'~pe: 111().l"e 11~;rtable
be r~pl.aced bv a three-Ill.in "'aol- f'ar t:b.e nu111bcr <>f tU181;e-.nts t t
ltu::t:1 v~ ex.e~Uit .1 v& bo.;{y'' composed! cont;ains the fq~ 1 ts J:'18~0'J:iQle.D•
of :r-opre.scJiU.t.tv" o:f t.bc 'tles-t:, da:t '-«m6.
thq Colllm\!lnia.t bloc, a11d th~ ~0'1.1~
·tr8.l n•
tioM . J\l tbott_l?JI th~
"t;l;'oika" proposal failed to ~-t A majority ot t.ho commi ttr:-o
JPr.lcb a"p_por't, msu~ UK mmben; . ~eaJlll.e.ng~i:I tbe.t ~ count.ry•s
pa:rti\<:ularl,;v tbe A;fJ:o,..!\ailol.ns, population as V'Qll as its .f.10111..D.-
we:r~ .1.D $ym_p.athy wi'th lr.Qsoo'lfi .fit <Ji.al eon ti"ib"!tlone· w tbS< Wil b~
Ciu1pa1,g1:1 to· Si!'~ bloe n~t1ori•l.e ~DS1CleJl'C.(\i.n di.~t;ribllt1..lll8' "tJ:iG
into ~01 _pol icy-making po~itions b~lk of
t.he prot~sstonal. posts
1.D the se-creta~'-"' t o.n th111 prelli- u1 UlG ·a eeretar1at. Blitch :me111-
:iGe tb~t eqnih.b le ~O.fU'&)>fllc 'b cr state wou14 be ~sa ig~ a
d~~t~butioq shoul~ ~& th~ para- mGj.mw ot tw~ &ta:t'.f ·fl(!$i t loDS
mo"\'m.t oontrider4tion .1.o the hi.r- Hi ol"de:r to l"E!:fle-ct '9'1 thin t.bc
1nc of trN eivtl e~vtu1ts. The Secreta~tat the IUll!lbe~abip O'f
.Afro-./ls1 aa RO.·t1.okl$ aleo bll ve the UN 1118 a whole . Ip ~dd1t1on 1
loojt ct;JIJJplatn.ed that 'th-ey ·irere ~n& staff ~er wouid be

COl~ftDENllAL
'SI Rlf"
17 Aue 6:l SPECIAL 4W11CLES

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CllRRXNT INTELLIGENCE l"IREKLY SUID!ARY

:.

recruited from every m~mOer o£:f.icials. Tbe m~jority geve

state to~ oacb 10,000,000 of its no support to tbe Soviet mem-
population up to 150,000,000, ber 1 e insi-atence on a three-rne..n
.n.nd one :further staf.f _p091t.ioD executive. However, thr~~ m0m-
would be allotte-d :for eaoh.
30,000,000 abovo 150 1 -000,000.
be.rs--lndiat Ghan.a, and the UAR.-·-
proposed that three deputy secre-
'·
T.be rc:main.t.ng po.<Jt.B ·i!:lUbjeot to taries general b~ appointed ~o
geoBr~phic distrfbJtion would shur~ policy~~1ni r~sponsihll-
then be allotted accord1ng to 1t1001 a suggestion pr&vioualy
the members' percentage ebnro rejectQd by .Bammar-.s.kjold. Woet-
of tlle UN budget--the forrnuln ern officials believe tbe tbroo
.now in use. deputies--~epr~aenting the three
pow~r blocs dei1ned by KhruaUchev
as East, West, and neutral--vou1d
The majori~y
of the com- a'low do~ .and even paralyzo t.he
m1~tee that the
recogni~~d Secretariet~s Ability to act
policy-making rosponsibilities quickl.y in t1D1~6 of crisis.
requtred a more ~lexiblo ratio
for the h1gh&r _profession.al
posts:, such as under secretar-
ies nnd head.B of political de-
partments. They proposed a
similarly constructod ~armula An advi.eo_ry _p:n.n-el consist-
on a bns1s 0£ reg1ons rfither ing of three 1-0rmer prosidonts
than ot individual member states. o.t "the ~neral As-senibly~-Pearson·
Seven geograph1ca1 regions ~ere of Canada, PrLnce W~n of Tha1-
devi~~d: Africa, Asia and the land, Rnd Bela~oQ0 of Peru--waa
Far Fast, Eastern Europe, West- aske~ by HammarSkjold in Novem-
0rn liur-0pe, Latin Americn, the ber "1959 to adv1ee him on cor-
Middle Ba.st. n11d No-rth .l\.tnorica.. recting- c0rtai~ "ll'eaknesse-s" 1n
th.e organ1~:ation. The panel's
main recoromendnti.on called 1or
The co:n:isitt~e members split OGt.ablish~ng ~rom thrao to five
on the ·D)oro :fundamental issues undor secretar~es general to deal
involving the role o:f. the sccr~­ with spccia1 politif;a.1 affairs.
t~ry eenerR\.~nd his top They u•ould n.ss±s.t the se-c:retary.

WfGtOMAl OrsTii'fSIJTfON Of 'j((R_ETARIAl o-ma-ALS AT UMITtD NATION~ flEAO.OU-A~TUtS

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J: 5 Gftt F
1/ Aug 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 2 ot 5
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CCfRREm' l~ELLIGEHCS WllBIU.Y BtW.l!ARY

general 011 oolitical mie:11U.onra, "udlllio1.strat1vo" J-uoct.lons. J\s-

such a~ those ~am~r~ltjold bas s~stant socretari~ would serve
undertakeA to SOuth Africa 1~ only oa·e teria o.f three to five
1960, Laos in 19G!I, a11d Peiping years, Wh1lo under $8Cl'Gtariea
in 19S5. Bach o! the !lve would would serve up to two terJ11s.
nlao havo ~e<tiponeibility for ~ Aaeietl\nt secretaries would be
gcoirra,phic r.egton. selec:ted on a broad t<agio.n a l
bO.IJ19.
Hnltina~s1'.,iold's Plaq$
~~rskjold rec011111onds
The &ecretary general has tour under eecret01ries in the
develope<t some plam~ of biS own Office ot tho S·ucreiai-y GOneral
for reorgani~iDg the upper eoho- --a cbof de cab~not, one tor ad-
lons ot tho Secretariat . Ho .re- miD19tratiye affDirs, a le141
;J octod t.be commi tteo •s reco.111Men- counselor, and a airoctor of
dations co~oerning geographic pe&+sonnel. T!le remaint11g t1vc
cU.st:ribut.lon as 'be1~ too in.flex- would be in chnrge ot trwitee-
J.blo and not allowlag sutlic1ent sh..lp af;fnirs, econom.1c aod so-
latitude for a secrefa~y ioneral cial affairs, te~hn1CQ1 assistane~
to hi~o the most OOllP~tcnt per- conference 11nd general. setrvices,
30ll.D&l regai·dlese of origin . and public in.to·rtnation .
Be agreed tha.'t 111oro p.o sts A.lth011i1Jh h:ama1u·s!rjold prob-
auat be fouud for A~rican and ably will not make 1111\ny changes
~ovlet bloc personnel, but 1.1ntil af·ter tho General AsS()•-
aia1n noted tha~ it ~ diffi- bly <USC\•S98& bis and tho COID-
cult t.o get e.xpcrionced 'People ~1ttee• g proposal•, he l!As re-
from "~"" 11tembcl'-(;t11.tee where cently trnnstcrred 4ndrew Cordier
such por~on:s are needed to bclp of the United States, who vas
.govern their O'lllft oowit.ries. The bis oxeeutive nsslstalit, to tbe
secret~ry genoral's dittiaul- PoSt of ·u nder secretary tor Gen-
tie.s lft filling the Ba~t Euro- eral Assembly a f fairs . Cordier•s
poan quota ate• to eome degree other <lutiea have been Uken
frOID the conduct of bloo pcr- o~or by C. V. ~rasimbun ot
SOlll\ol . Indin as Choi de c.abinet .
5o~iot nationals h1~od by Anotber i-ccent ap,potntmoat
tho VN often de)oy their arr1vnl L6 ~hat
of Robert K. Gardi.ner
11t headquartel'S for more t .ttan oi Ghan~ a& dirfXltOr of ~be
t~o weetts nftor reaching Now D1vi~1on ol Public Administra-
York by reporting :t1·rs~ to tbe tion. He wUl be the M.ibMt
Soviet UN mission. Rmployees t'&l\kiDS Africa11 a.t UN beadq\•ar-
from the SOY1ot bloc do not stay tors. Gardiner is currently
1b thoir Jobs 1or mot'e tban tbree- serving In the Congo :as oac ol
years, and tb•y o~ten resi~n rr~wn~rstjold'a poJ~tical aidee .
without notice while oo home
leave. There have Mlso been la hi~ efio~te to find more
cases iu Wllich Soviet natloual& b!gh p0sitions .fOt" A:fro-Asinos, .'
have ueod UN aesignn~nts ns bo~ever, H~llllW.\rS~jold mU3t t~~e
cove~ for esplon~ro. Many Sov1ot 1Lito aecount tbe Jno~lo of bis
bloc appl.t.cants cannot meet Pl"C~eDt staf! . Western ~uro­
in1n11num language or educat-i on pea11 and U-~ offici..als of tbe
requirements for higher UN .jobs, ~rqturi3t--wbo provide its
·but; they l".efuse to accept posi- bnckbouc--1uo I lcUs- (b )( 1)
·tione at the lower profefi!eiOlll.\l e.it1!3fied a11d taar pr!lcipitate
levels. action to roducG their uuDber (b)(3)
regardless of their leastb of
Uammarek.jold proposes that se.rvi.c e an<l contribt,tion to tbe
two cate.gor1()8 of' equal rcuik be organization . L0111ored ~or.ale
establ.1ebed tor seo1ot" UN ot:f1- in the See~gtQriat at n ti~e
ctale: five as~lotQnt secretar- vben it faces turtbe1' at1:~ckS
ies· general with "politlcal" , Could affeet geogral UH opera-
respon•ibilities, and niue un-
dor secretaries with primarily bly. c
t lone at tho leth Ge~eral AS9Clll-
\ (b)(3)

17 Aug 61 ~PBClAL AJn'ICl.ES

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~ COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0095;61
11 31 August 1961

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY _/

SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE Of CURRENT

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CVRR.BNI' IIfrBLLIQIRCJ UEKLY StlDAltY

CQ:RGO

UN t ·r-oope ovor thee pas.j.f'J of TsS-om btt 'e a.nn y wa-e •10on.tro11.&tl"
'IMOk detai.ned for re~triation by tho UK, "nd O'Bl:len ob:S~rved,
approximntely 500 Buropoans, "Jt11tanga J.s in .s.e ceasion •1th.out
moet or them Bel,ian$ servica tho •e.an.s of matnte.i~QB it . "
tn t~e X~tangan armed foraea ,
Tho evacuatlOll
1ff part o.f
of
merco~ar1e9
ste,p p&d-up uir
11 T•hamb& replied on 29 Au-
Clil1Dpaign to force 'Tl!lh<llmb~ to auat that b,o bad 'toured .mU1tary
drop hie ~la:ims of Ka.tancran camp.s la tbo past 24 hours and
indeponde»c~ and to entor into th~t "the a.ray vi:ll not 11aut1ny . "
negotiatioA& with Prem!~r Adoula A lllaJor d1sclpl1nary brOaltdown,
a:Uued a.t reinteoat.b g Kat.al'lga however, might well 1ead to th4
wJ, th U1,e Cong'(> . ool-la)k!Je of bta g-overmnent,
:ive-.111 prlo:r t·o the OW roundup
there were poriodi¢ refle<itions
The UB 1110Ve began on 26 of p00r dl8Cip1iae and aorale iq
August wi~h the a1rli~t1ng of arey caJDps ·o ear a:uaa!)etbville.
a 'oattaU.o n o:t lnd.ian troops Tho BelS:i.Bll consul general ~a.8
tT-om noi-thern Kate.ag~ to !'11e.a - ~tnted that, ae early as 28 Au-
l>othv111e. Tho •lrlift ihlllledi- gust. theJ"'O were soveral "1nci-
ately trig.gEn"ed rumors that tho· deJJta,. between .\fric.a n soldier~
UK, in. support Of Ado~la~ WOU-ld and whites. '·
attempt to dJ.sci.rm Katanga • s
10,000-..an Dl1DY aod 3,-000...0dd
pol.ice . On 26 AUSU.St 1 UH re,Pt'o- Belgi4.D Fol'·e1gn Miu1ater
senta ti ve O'Brie.n del1v~red a Spoak ha& sent Sec:re~cu-y .Qeneral
virtual u.l·ti.matum to Tebomb6, li81111114.l'&kjold an •;energetto" pro--
warn~.._ that if be did not go test over tho VN aeaaure• asainst
t;o 'Laopoldv.llle tho ''situation Bel.!iila.n offi.cei-s- in Ka:toi.nsa. ln:J.-
'l'Ol)·ta woi:-.soa 1 •1 '4\-Dd entpbasi~iog tlally ho 'bad indiontod tbat his
th.at the 'UN WAl!I pr·e pared t.o sovernment would cotltlnue to co-
MJsist Adoul~ in milit.a ry actiob ope-ro.te w:t'tb the W and would
a1:1a.il1:llt JCatanp. Tshomb6 re- remove Belalan off icere from
plied that b& would not .oogoti-· KatQ.Dga , p:oovideCI s uca ma:leuree
Qte with LeopoldvUle under did not load ei:thvr ·t o A pan..iek·y
•
pre~_G'Qre exod~a of the Europe~ population
or to· a arotiny of the Katan.gait
Uiled forGeS . However , t:.be dras-
In a ewitt predAwn maneu- tic act.ion of tbe OJI lll taking
ve.r on 28 Aupst, lndiu troops 'Belslan of'ficers into custody
seized key poi.ots in B\1se.betb- prompted the protest •ove . Bpaak
ville and boga.n the roundu.P of felll'B ~hat l~ae-soalc bumiltAtioo
Boig1Qos . Although Tehom.b& of Be~glan nationals wou14 lb()
o.nnounced that h.o aac.epted t't:u~ exploitea to the fqlleet by his
UH action and urged the popu- rlgbt-wing critic& at b009e . .·...:
lac0 to ~omaiQ calm, the U.N
placed I~terior Minister ltwlongo
under aotent1oa 1 appar$~tly as In tho Co~go prope~, atte~­
a preoal.l tiontll' y 11oasu;re ,. On 29 tJon h~s cente~ed
on the uncer-
August the UM ann~~d th~t ta~n rolationship botween Adoula
most of tho 800 vbtte ott1cere and Gtzgngn and o~ maneuvering.a

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conco~~~qg Conso1&&9 att9nd~nce WM inll:pac:.ted. by 'UN OfflCJAlG .

at 't be eelgt-ll<'e <J.0Df&I'4)\'lCC Of. 11'.tum o US consul attwapto.d to
unoommi tt:ed nat1c;ins. AJ.tho"Bh contfa.(lt the plahe•a ~er1aan
Gizenga is believed 1:0 favo,. .Pilot, lie ·U11.B threa1:eBed at;
COD601Q&e participation in tbe the &lrport by Gt.zengist sol-
oonforenc-e. his m.-ain preocoupa- diers, who apparently blanod
U ,Q ll appeara to be with eecuriog ·b lm for the Uii' 11 dotetttloa ot
agree1te11 t to 'V'U" lOWll concl't.- ~ ·tbe e.trcraft~ 'l'be consul WB&
tioos he laid down for his 81i9- placed under OM protection. sod
.PO.rt of th.e o:ow government.. tn subfJeq,un.,tly rut"Urned to lieO.POld-
tbo ueantim~, be has refused v 1 Uo afto~ bo1og "el(pr;tlled"
to go to Leopo l.Ov1Uo to t a.lro fr<Jl!l Sta.nleyville on Qizenga'&
up bis vice preaiers~~p . orders.

.A tlfi:h 1Ur Jordan ob.art.fi!ir Jordanian Kl.'Dg Husayn has

fll"lbt. t~
Sta.n.loyvtlle arrivf,!ld lQdtcated cancer~ over tbe 8tao-
on 26 .A11guat • .-eported.ly carry- ' le:yvJllo flisht and baa oitdo~ed
i11g f9oa, clothin~. ~qd a::Wt tho gro~.Ung 0( all A:lr J'Mdan
~8e.Qg·e.rs , V.q.l"tke previous aircraft pencl1.r:lg ~out~ Of
occasions, bOTever. the car~o a cou.rt of 1.Dqu1ry1 (b)(3)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE auLLETIN

16 September 1961

DAILY BRIEF D
*Congo: Attacks on UN forces in Katanga 'continued through
15 September. The US Consulate in Ellsabethvllle reported. yester-
day evening, however, that UN officials there, while seriously con-
cerned about the Irish company still under heavy attack at J'adotvllle,
believed that the situations in Ellsabethvllle and Kamlna were "in
hand" and that the Katangan fighting would "slacken~ " UN authori-
ties planned to ~rlift two companies of Swedish troops from Leo-
poldville to Kamina yesterday, and early additional UN reinforce- J l'l)
ments were also expected in Ells abethville. ·. /fJ1
. Hammarskjold, in conversation with. US Ambassador Gullion
in Leopoldville yesterday, was optimlstlc regarding the possibility
of a .c ease-fire in Katanga, and said that Katangan Vice President
Klbwe had promised to· help arrange ·a meeting between Tshomb6
and UN representative O'Brien. Hammarskjold said there was no
question of the UN giving up positions it now holds or of renouncing
its mission; he added that if a cease-fire could not be ·negotiated,
the UN military would take the "initiative," a step he said it had
avoided doing thus far in order to minimize bloodshed and destruc-
tion. In Ellsabethville, O'Brien hoped to. have a meeting with
Tshomb6 yesterday evening; as of 0500 EDT this morning it was
not known whether this meeting took place. Although both Tshomb~
and O'Brien are believed to be anxious for a cease-fire, neither has
· appeared wllllng to abandon his political objectives.
The UN has recently attempted to build up the authority of Kibwe,
who had announced on Elisabethvllle radio on 14 September that he
had assumed control of the Katangan forces ''because Tshomhll is
unable to carry out his functions. " Cease-fire appeals by Kibwe and
O'Brien went ignored, however, and Tshombt! yesterday continued
hls efforts to whip up popular support over "Radio Free Kata.nga. "
~tangan armed forces reportedly have been reinforced by tribal
· )warriors from the bush.
' According to the American Consulate in Ellsabethville, UN
officials there have largely blamed local Europeans, especially

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Belgians, for the failure of their plan to secure Katanga·for

.. 1.::
·.· Premier Adoula. The consulate described Tshomb~'s white
allies as increasingly effective as snipe~ troop command-
ers, and drivers of armored vehicles. ~cal Europeans--
apparently led by the Belgian consul general--are regarded
by the consulate as even more .emotlonal than UN officials. The
consulate has characterized the Belgians as threatening any-
one not supporting them, ·and reports the consulate has been under
heavy pressure to join other Western :mlsslt!;iis\ in. ~f denun'ailatton
of UN "atrocltt~~
Hammarskjo .has canceled a press conference which was
t<;> have been held shortly after his arriVal 1n Leopoldville on
13 September. His statements to foreign diplomats, in New
York and Leopofavllle, have cited varlous bases for the UN ac-
tlon ln Katanga. The British ambassador in Leopoldville, ln
a 14 September meeting wt,th Hammarskjold., advised him that
lf the UN was not able to justify lts actions, Brttaln would re-
consider its financial support of the UN operatlQA:]
The US Embassy in Leopoldville has received unconfirmed
reports that a military revolt has broken out at Inongo, where a
Congo Army battalion is stationed. The embassy adds that iso-
lated tribal clashes occurred in Leopoldville on the night of 13-
14 September, and that politically conscious youth groups had
become more active.
Foreign reaction to the events in Katanga has been strong-
est in Western Europe, where criticism of tJ!e UN has been in-
tense both in offlcfal and unofficial circles. ~ a conversation
with Ambassador MacArthur, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak--
in a "cold and bitter mood"--denounced Hammarskjold on 14
September as a "liar" who "could not be trusted.·" Spaak sald {:..:]
that if the Congolese Government closes Brussels' Congo mis- ..;(b)(3)
f~: ~~
sion, Belgium will terminate all economldnd technical aid to ....
;·t:.-1
,
. '. the Con a.w_alLi.ts_te..cbnician
~ ·~ -·~~ (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

16 Sept 61 DAILY BRIEF u

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Situation ln the Congo / ./
(During Hammarskjold's stay in Leopoldville, ·he told Am-
bassador Gullion that he believed the Adoula government would
be the "greatest winner" from the UN Katanga operation. He
asserted that Adoula had been under great pressure from the
Glzenga faction to bring Tshomb~ to heel. The secretary gen-
eral said he believed that if this could be accomplished, Adoula,
whom he characterized as the most purposeful, energetic, and
capable African he knew with the possible exception of Nigerian
Premier Balewa, would be master of the situation. Otherwise,
according to one of Hammarskjold's aides, there was a danger
that General Lundula ln Stanleyvllle would take action against
Katanga on his own account.]
(The UN officials expr.e ssed con~ern over the appointment
of Eglde Boclieley-Davidson as the chief Leopoldville represent-
ative ln Katanga. · However, they said he was presently under
the control of the UN and they hoped he would remain so •
Bocheley-Davldson has thus far been confined to Ellsabethville
airport by the fightlng tn Katanga. !
r-.· ·- ·
i A more accurate evaluation of the sltuatlon may be that
provided by Arthur Doucy, a Belgian socialist called by the
American Embassy ln Brussels "one of the most knowledge-
able Westerners" on Congo affairs. Doucy, who ls a friend
and adviser of Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko and has
known Adoula for ten years, told American offlclals that he
fears the UN is unwittingly abetting a Gizenga takeover. He
asserted that anti-Commwiist elements in the government, such
as Bomboko and Suret~ chief Nendaka, were being isolated throQgh
the appointment of Gizenglst assistants, and that the dispatch of
Bocheley-Davidson to Elisabethville was part of a Gizengist plan
to take over K~tanga after the UN had neutral~zed Tshomb~ and
his associate~,
...-
{According to Doucy's informants, the radical neutralists at
the Belgrade conference worked to impress Adoula with the
necessity of retaining Glzenga's support; as a result, Doucy feels
that Adoula, who he says ls not a partlcul.ai-ly strong personality,
would prefer to make concessions to Gizenga rather than put up
a determined fight against Gizenga's efforts to gain control. Doucy
stated that he fears the GizenE?a bloc mav take over from Adoula
within three or fo.ur months:-LJ (b)(3)

(b )( 1)
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 September 1961

DAILY BRIEF.

j
. *Congo: Hammarskjold's· death further reduces the
prospects for an agreement in the near future to reintegrate
Katanga into the Congo. Tshomb~ is quoted as having told
a news conference In Northern Rhodesia yesterday that he
was returning to Katanga to lead a "flght to the end" against
UN troops. Tshomb~ said he was willing to discuss a peace-
ful solution with UN representatives and "will talk with any-
body of good faith, 11 but not with O'Brien, the chief UN repre-
sentative In Katanga. A UN spokesman in Leopoldville said
that a high UN official would be detailed to contact Tshomb~,
but also stated that Hammarskjold's death will not mean any
change in· UN policy In Katanga.
Attacks on UN positions continued through yesterday,
and reports Indicate the fighting has now spread to several
localities In northern Katanga. The Irish unit which had been
beselged at Jadotvllle has surrendered, and several uncon-
firmed press stories indicate that the UN base at Kamina may
have fallen to Katangan forces. I I

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-CONFI9&l\JTIA L

Situati.on in the Congo

Indian Brigadier I. J. Rikhye, who was Hammarskjold's

mil~tary adviser and with Undersecretary Ralph Bunche
seems to have assumed.direction of the Congo operation, on
18 September gave American officia~ his analysis of the
diffic~ltles encowitered by the UN forces in Katanga. Ac 0

cording to Rikhye, the original UN plan had had the limited

objective of closing down the Elisabethville radio station.
This action triggered the return to their units of many of
the ~uropean mercenaries who were in the process of repa-
triation, and fighting spread unexpectedly. Furthermore,
the Katangan sold~ers often were better a.rmed than the UN ·
troops, and the limited UN airlift capabil.l ty has been unable
to provide either support artillery or transport in adequate
quantity. Rikhye stated that the Swedish and Irish troops
were trained mainly in oolice function~~ ~
.in combat. IL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ ___J_~ (b)(3)

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COPY NO.
OCI NO. 029s1e1
21 &.ptember 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ·

OFFICE Of CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
rmUHIT H . /0
H 011.1110£ Ill CL&SS. 0 .
0 ~'~'~ ii'lllJ Ci
GLUt, C:ll~Dlll TD1 n I \.2,1 I"°'0
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r+'1 •nn '-' -·

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEll.KLY .S1™hlARY

SUCCESSOR TO TlfB UN SKCRETARY GENERAL

The UM faces a loog per1.od · Burm.a, the UAR, Sudan, Morocco,

of tu.r:moil over constitutional and I;raq. Under this plan tbe
problems nrising from tbe search Gee.er.al Assembly would desigoa,t.e
for n no~ secretai-y gonoral ei~her tlte president of tho
who will be acceptnble to Qotb current s.esa.ion--1.Co.o.gi s1im 0£
t~e USSR and the West.
Soviet Tun1sia~or outgoing presid0nt
delegat~B continue to 1us1at Boland of Ireland as interim
on -tha.ir 1•troika" concept, but secretary general. Th~ pro-
Afro-A,eian pressure may· lead cedure was designed to avoid,
"to eventual appointment 0£ a for the prea~nt, e~pacted
single successor. Seiect1oa Soviet Vfit<Xis in the Security
o·t so aµthoritative a figure n.s Council .'of any nominee .!or
~a$ Hamnarskjol~, however, is t.ho ·ip'.og.1:t•ion· ·o.t· .S:19cretary
unJ.ike ly·. general..

HRm.lllar~kj old' s death ticoqgh..t Boland told tbe US dqleg~­ ·.

to a hefl-d 'th_c :fight between 'Bil.ei tion oo 18 S~ptembGr his canvass
and West ovGr the l960 Sovio-t Of UN members showed that the
pr.oposnl ~or replacing tho soc~ procedure ll'ould not be easy· to·i
retary general with a triumvirate put acroea. He report~d that
r~p~~senting the WQst, the Soviet o_ppoa:t,~ion oa:me from ''W(lll-
bl.o.c, alld t:he no-ut:i:-ala, The ttr.ot-- intentionedn -O&legat1ons which
k8.·• idea was not 'llt'ell received believe ~nat ong roan could not
Oy the A:fro-Asian members, many handle both jobs~ ·Other op1:i-o-
. of whom recognized that such a si tion crun.Q £rom countries
reo-rga._niztttion would pa.ra.lyze ~hich are promotiig ~pecific
tbe SGcretari~t. ~ow~vart it candidates ~or the post and
is PoS-91ble that, in ordeir to from tho Savi.st Qlo.c, which is
~void a Soviet vQto, UN memQers sticking to ~ts trotku proposal.
~ight agree 't:O somo version of
the troika in tho lo... ar echelons Prior to Hammarskjold's
of the Office of the Secretary d~ath, most UN members were
General. agreed that the next secretaxy
g~neral would. come ~XOQI Asia
'rh-e n.ppointment of a. n-eui, or A:fricn. Mong.1. S l:i.11, u.•:t-hrol t
secretary genA:ral is suhjG~t of Burma, o..nd C~ V. Xarnsimhan
to the concurrence of th~ five and Krishna Menon of ladJa
perman~nt memb-e.rs o1 tho council have boen mentioned as possi-
plus (l'ndorseooen't: by n majorlty bilities.
of the 99-membe~ Genornl As-
SOJnbly. The assemDly can, how- .In the m~nntime, the ad-
ever-, decide that ·the choice a.£ rn1n1strative duties a:! tho
a new secret.o.ry genBral is an .;Sacro,tary G9nera.l ts Of:fice have
"important question" requiring been assumed by Narasimhan,
fi two-th~rds majority vote. recently appo-inted.chef de cab-
ioot i.o that office; An.drov
As n s~opgap mea~ure, the Cordier of the United State.a,
con.ccpt of having the pres~d~nt under secret~ry for General
of the Genera1 Assembly.tern~ Asaernbl.y a:ffaire; and another
po:rarily h'.andle the duties at Americ.nn, RAl.ph Buncb.e} uod-er
th.e secretary gGneral was np- secretary .far Q.0.....\.1.:t•.i_cal a..!fairs.
(b)(3)
pa:rently ~ell .received by sev-
ern.l 1JN me.mbe•rs, including .
I I

.CONFIDENTIAL
2.i ·~pt 61 lfEE!(LY REVIEW ~ge 1 of 22
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~ COPY NO. 60
OCI NO. 029e/s1:
11 28 September 1981=

CURRENT
INTELUGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTEUIGENCE
DOCIUllllT ••• - - - ' " '_.._I- - - - -
IG C'HILllGI 11 CU.U. 0 r..
0 llfllLU1tf'llD •
CUSlo UUlillUI TGI TS I { ~ (q\CI
HU ll'tiYJ<l!f l&Alil
AllTHI 118 11>4

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYYARY

28 Seyte~ber 1961
TR E 11' E E 1C 1 If B R I B F

EAST-W~~LATIONS . . . • . . • • , , • , . . , . . . Page l

The Soviet Uolon's line on Germany and the Berlin

pr-Qblem ·· continues to combine an o.tt1:tude of reason a ble -
ness on detmile and procedures witb an uoyleldlog stand
on certain basic issues . Khrushchev , in his talk with
Belgian Foreign Min1$ter Spaak on 19 September , appeared
more conciliatory and flexible than at any time since the
Vienna meet.Ing with President Kennedy . Gromyko has not
yet reflected tbls line in bis tallce with Secretary Rusk
or w1tb Lord Home , and Moscow bas made further moves in
the m1litQry sphere to tmpress the West with bloc ~lli­
tary strength and co11tbat readiness . Exercises of the
Warsaw Pact forcea have been anGounced for October and
Nove~bor. At the UN, the Soviets bave continued to ad-
vocate the trot ka, but the.re are ·increasing signs tba t
the bloc will event ually compromise on on arrangement
for ao interim appointment to fill out Hallllll8rskjold•s
term, plus appoiDtment ot thi:e_~T cretaries to
act as advisers. I _ (b)(3)

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CONFIDENTIAL
BRIEFS

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' _., _.
ftJJNFIBENTIAL_
..-;- COPY NOX' ~ c .-f
OCI NO. osoo1e1
I 5 Ocoober 1981

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE - AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRl:NT INTelllGENCE J~
llO~llDJfl' ~.L ---------~~--"'
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1:J Dblli.t!fl'U) -
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T.he l..Ctb tiN Coenernl &9- poeail'>ly be such th.a:t the ~iooup
settibly is. in it:s tb.U:~ we¢k ot io the end wo:uld. vote ~ 111.. bloe·
gaoeral. dcblli.tl! . fl!oet; activity, _and QPJ;IQ$~ ~~t~on~l:ist a.tna.
~~ver, la t:akiDcfr placi; in ~:1-
vate .negot iatione a51.0~g ,l Jll a.em- The .'.30cret:arz GertC!l'Al.$hlp
bers 0111 such koy :1~$uea 8:8 the
:admis1d.o :n o.f r.iongolia and :Uauri- 'rhe ~oviet 4elegatioa 'bo.&
t~u. a.tld the ~ppointmeo.t oi ao.
turther m.oditied .itis: ~it.ion
111ter:tm BlElcretary ~:i;i.orn.l. on ~ Hstmn.ai+~kl<>-l~·a auc.ceasor
'-o· ~-.. ··~:f:fort to. neet the A.fro-
Aaians 1 ob-jactione lil.m1 to gal:o
, their aU'PPOrt i'c»' "9<>!D0 form of
Tho SOcrJ:titY Cenmcn oo 2 · the t,...01.lea p:ri11:a:1pie. ThB bloc
O<:tobe:tr o.:g~lA ctete:r.re d cons·idor.a- : .is O&A~,..e:ait 1.y· p;ress.i~ a prO»OISal
't:i.ott. ot 1111.u:r.tta.n.ia ~ s and Mo:ngo- : t.or 'the Security 00iunc11 t-Q ~
11a!s m.elllb61~~.hip ~p9:J.i.:!,ll.tio:111e .. · a prcvb,.oual "Chief ot the .e .ec-
All 11 coun.<ii.l. member.a a<:quiei:.ce-4 retariatH plus three depgti.e~-·
l:n the def·e rral, -rCIJ?<!:r'ted.l)i' to one each .fl'QIR tl).-e- weet. tbe So-
allO'lr tim.e tor- :t!urt.be:r. negot.1 a.- v.ii:it bloe·; and. t.iw neutro.:1
t:iO.M 'IJ.Ull :N.11.tiomalist China ()n s1:a'tee. 'l'hie fcmr-man. <Urect·o-
its opposition to 'MOugol:!a ·~ en- rate would be r.cQ:'"1N'-d: to act in ·
try into ·tJti: ·v111. 'Iile USSR. still tho !!ip:tt-;1.t of "coocord0 and. to
1

i11:$1Sti!ill :it wi.11 veto !11;u.1rit:a.n.:l~ts ' ~e"e until April 1963. when
ap.P11c.a.1tion. if' M.oi.1$-.)liP. is re..- Ralllll1arskjoldi's te:r.rQ would bavs
J ect.od. :Milu,4'i:ta:tt1.a' s arpplica- ~1.r~d.
tion 1S . :U r et. on the as0111cm. J;)U.t
the USBR .bas cire\IDVOiited this. In .h:.i:.is c:;Kpl~at.ion ot 'th is
tactical dJ.lc:mnia. by tbrea:ten'"" plan to AJllbas:sador St.eva1J.;Bon.
t:ias to vet:o )!~l.ll"itani& 's aclm!U!;.- ¢hl.e:f So-v i:et. deleptrai ~1.'"ltl va.s
e:ion unle10a Moosolia ha& Cll:rea.dJ .ambieuous on tl\.e 41.-.,ie1;1tion of
bCCD &¢(:epted. Wh~the~ tbe soviet terminolQS1
1.nvolved a V<'tto pQ'll'Qr i 'Q~ the·
'l'be 8eeur.it y OOt'i.:lj)C.i l ·win deputies. On l October 1 howe"Pe:r.
probably rr..eot 11.Knin soon on the: tho SOV,iet tiel&ptlon _publi&Md
problem, n,_g.d., a, H~t:.lomal.iet veto i;;. f:O>:llial ata:te.:ment out lining
Oil »on.go11a tbeo. could ·a.<.:ee lel"a.te the propose.ls and d.e:ilY:1tm that
the as619mbly ®b~t<l' .on Clltoese J.IO$OQll.I envisaged a "Veto :powc-r
'Q~ repre$;Jonta.tioo ~o(t ~~t; a1so by Bnf of thrai d~t :tel!;I •
l.ea.d. ~a e11!1.r1y SOV.iet efforts to
.have 'the asselilb~ reject Ta.~J)Cj 'ISl The 1&>Viet oologntiQP hll:B
credentia1s--a vote requ~~itig on- been 6<)ok1~S su~port ~ro~ Afr(>-
ly a s :i111J.i1lC maJorl. ty • 1'Jle west Ai'll.1n_,a; ~or th:la :la.test plan.,
w~nt!il to b111,v-e the issue debated 'l'be USSR l'eporteclly U.S· aaeed
8.B .a n '' important q,uest:l.On" l"e- to the ~DPOiAttn.e~t ot Bur&a'~
QlliirilllJ: ;a. twc-thir&a ·\lm:e , U 'l'ftitil" ll9 lliterim. ~rGt~..__-..
gertel!'o.J. With :i'!u.11
Al though .spokeaaen for "the· (b )( 1)
f:.v.ie;tve Frencb African :stato!i :ln (b)(3)
the Bi+dit.a\1'1 lle El:J:'OU:P continne "
t.Q· ~:rt ·that. t -h ey wi.1 1 C:pp0$0
11aipei .a;i; a bloc 1f fitl\Ur 1 tad a
Ui de<n1.e<l UN tnehlti&.r.ahip because
of d ~~t1o.oa.1:1s~ veto of Mon~Q-
1.ta1' ·th.ere are indic11 t :io.l l!i that
th.0 gr<Np 1$ UO't M Ub:1.f1.ed OD. , The V5all 1 B %$111 purp0se
tJ.U,19 1.61il~ ~ ~qme epokeamen . ~109 to be to a void a deC'f:eicm
cl,lrlm. .Pore lgn Wn.ist;ry of.f1C;1c:i.l~ l'l.bi<:h 'li'Ould 1"0cOnfii:111! the eKist-
of Otm9r~J'li, °?O'g'Q, o.~d .even · t:Sng '5J.tµa:t:ion and represent !.
Se~ga.l,.. IH'l'I\& re<ientl;, e.xpreased def&.at .for the Sov1.'1·t contention
Qppo~:Uion. t;.Q ChiJJ.QlliJQ Co~P.;1$t tha '.t tlw o~~ti-~ b!'attch of tllc
mtt11ibore»htp in the· v:n:. However, ~-.liJ!.<1ul.d be reo.ri;anizod. / /
:r~et).tment: Qf T.o.i,.p e 1 cou:lct
,n. Ii (b)(3).
~ Oct 6].
·~ -.·
....- ;-:"::~ .
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ppointment of an Inte-rlm UN Secretary General

[The 52-year- old U Thant has been Burma's permanent

repz:esentative at the United Nations since 1957. A close
friend of Prime Minister U Nu, Thant has been regarded as
one of Burma's more able public servants. He is in accord
with Burma's neutralist objectives, but within this pattern is
broadly pro~ Western in outlook and, according to the Amer-
ican Embassy in Rangoon, a strong anti~ Communist. He
vigorously defends the right of newly emerging nations to oc~
cupy a neutral position ~tween East and West, and has been
a persistent advocate of Communist China's admission to the
UN. U Thant is a B\(ave, well-groomed man, equally pleas-
ant to those whom he likes and those he dislikes. He speaks
excellent Eng~ish.J
fitammarskjold hi~self considered U Thant a capable nego~
tiator. In January, when he was searching for a successor to
Dayal as chlef UN mediator in .t he Congo, Hammarskjold said
he would appoint U Thant if the Burmese Government would
release him._] ·

(!n June 1960, as part of his proposed reorganization of

the UN Secretariat, Hammarskjold suggested.that five assist-
ant secretaries general with "political" responsibilities be:
appointed on a broad regional basis. One assistant would always
be a US national and one a Soviet. The remaining three should
be "nationals from countries outside any power .blocs." Although
this phraseology seems to endorse ..the concept of three power
blocs, Hammarskjold on 20 July assured the US qelegation that
it did not establish any new cr•teria for the selection of. Secre~
tariat personnel. beyond· competence and geographic distribution,
as specified in the UN Charter. Moreover, Hammarskjold in-
tended to retain the right to appoint these asslstant.il
\nuring the past week UN members, particularly those of
the Arro-Asian bloc, have been· promoting this plari for five un-
der secretaries with a single secretary general. Their· efforts- -
plus the strong opposition of the West to the troika at the secre-
tary general level--may have influenced the V~SR to accede to
U Thant's appointment with five advisers_] (b)(3)
I
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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~ COPY NO. 7··1 .

I OCI NO.
9 November 1961!
oso5/61 :

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
'i

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRIENT IN.TELLIGENCI!

L-------~ ..

=1
(b )(3)

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. ·. ·"
THI! DH SEClll!TARIAT WfDSB U THANT

U Thant's appo1ntment ae t1ons. and bad appointed personal

interim UN secretary 1en0ral by repr~s-entnttvesWho served to
coneeueue ia the Security Co1mdl bolster Jordan in its <11.spute
and .the unaniJ110us endorsement Wl th the UAR ,
of tbe General Assembly give
him cons14erable latitude' to
act .as tbe •ole· oxocutive of Thant is .m ore likely to
the UN Secretariat . Thant , oDe insist on specific mandates and
of the first candidates sug- to seek ·1110r e active participation
gested to succeQd Dag llaminar- o1 representatives of OR me~ber­
Skj old, bad made it clear that etates 1n the conduct of UN
the BLlrlllese GovernmeAt would operations ia crisis situations.
qot pel'Jllit him to accept 1:t The implied COJDllll'tment to con-
there \fGT& QD)' fOJ:IQ Of "veto eult with the under s~retaries
or compulsory consultations 111·1 11 also Und to 4,1epr1ve bim of
•ltb advisers" involved. He tbe opportunities Hammarskjold
bas since pledged hiQelf "to aometimes '1$ed to ~onf~nt tbe
preserve the 1:mpartial1t~ and ·USSR 1111 th a fat t accompli.
effectiveness of the Secretariat.
Generally recognized as one
Thant will act ae secretary of bis country's ableet public
seneral until April 1963--tbe servaztts, the 52-ye·a r-old Burman ·'..
date on which .Dam11arskjold's gained the :respect of all polit-
second term would have expired . ical factions as Prime Minister
He has retained Ralph Bunche U Nu's ch1e-f ad'Vtser tn both
of the United States and Georgy domestic and fore~~n a1fai.rs .
Arkadyev of the USSR as under At the UN, wh~re be has been
sec~etartea, •nd NaTa$i~D of Burma'u perma~ent representative
lnd.ia as chef de cabinQt. Be since 1937, Thant is highly
sa1d tbat be would also iDvite regarded for his quiet and effi-
a "llllited number" o:f pel"aons cient promotion of Burmes~
to act as " pri.ncipal. advis.ers object.tvee. A Buddhist ()f gl"eat
on 1~port.an.t •• . tunctions en- personal integrity, Thant is
trusted to t.be s ecr G1:ary genersl.:' ~lJ\lo " hard wo.r ker ,

Thant will probably lean Thant is

in accord
over backvard in bis efforts w1tb Burma •aoeu'tral1et
to ·be completely 1.mpartial . objec.tives, but within this
He is unlikely to e~blbit the pattern he is broadly pro-
strong executive leadership 'Westorn ln outlook· and,
.tre4uently exeroi&ed by BaJlllllar- aecording to the American .·
l'ikjold, who so11119times went bo- ltmbassy 1n Rangoon , a stro11g : ..
yond a strict interpretation of anti-Com111unl11t. Be vigorously
tbe Ulf Charter . lo additioD to defends the right of newly
tho active role he played in emerging nations to occupy
tbe Congo. Hammarskjold had a neutral position betwe.n
set. up..-•lt.hoat a epec;:i:fic .man- Bast and ·west, and bas been
date from the UN and despite a pei-sie.tent advocate of ,• . ~.
strong Soviet obJections--a Communist Ch~na'a admission -
UM opera t too in Laos wb·i ch to the UN. l (b)(3)
included d1p1oniatic ~s well QB
well a.a economic advisory func- -..
-·

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. *Con~o: [iiam~arskjo~d has sent a letter to Kasavu,bu im~

P.lying: that. he will ~k:the Security Council to take the UN out
of the Congo if M.o~tu uses force -in an·attempt to take Orien-
,--~,tale Province~- sUll nom.l nally controll~d by Ari.toine Gizenga's
L "government:.~·· Hammarskjold told US officials, however, that
'-----~he does ·not expect clvll war .ill the Stanleyvllle. area, since he
, .M VJ
believes neither Glzenga nor Mobutu is strong ·enough to force
a- mi~itary showdown. , Hammarskjold plans to be in the Congo
on. 3 and 4 January:!· Khr\,lshchev, after a delay of ten days, re-
sponded to Glzenga's ·appeal for support by reiterating. Sov.i et
·promises of support and. sympathy but avoiding any specific com-
mitment of assist~ce . CSudan continues to refuse transit to UAR
.-----~----. planes bound for Sta.nieyville, but President Abboud admits that
f~ghts over remote areas of ~e countr could robabl be made b)(3)
._____ _ __,,__·.U-A>it, . h, ,._ou.·. t,._,S__udanese~oJVle_. b)(3)

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Hammarskj~'S Views.on~ - (b)(3)

Ci.JN Secretary .Gen~ral Hammarskjqld has senta letter ·to
President Kaaavubu:imp~ying that he will ask ·~he Secur_ity Coun-
c.11 to take th.e UN 9ut of the Congo if Mobutu uses force. in'. an
attempt to take Orientale Province-- still. nominaily · co~trqlled
.by the "government'' of Antoine G~enga. On 25 December
LumUlJlba supporters entered adjacent Kivu ·Province and.ar-
rested the -governor and.several Qther provincial officials.
Mobutu:.m.a y be expected to take· some kind o( retaliatory ac-
~oo~ .
Cliammarskjold toid US officials that he does. not expect civil .
war in the Stanleyville area, since he be_lieves that ne.lther Gizenga
nor Mobutu is strong enough._ to force a military showdown. The US
ambassador in LeopoldviJ.le~ however, believes ·that barring i;;ub-
stantial airborne. assistance from the. bloc or·the UAR, economlc
co.l lapse :will. come. to Orientale· Province in two to four. weeks, and
that there may then be attacks on Europeans and their shops. He
po~nts outthat·eince.t he Europeans are widely scattered throughout .
: the proyince, ·it will be very· difficuJt for the UN force. to protect
them. The Sudan .continues to refuse transit to UAR planes bound
for Stanleyville, but President Abboud.has admitted that planes.cou,ld
· overfly remote . areas -of.. the country without .Sudanese knowledge':]

(Hammarskjold, who plans to visit the Congo on 3 and 4 Jan-

uary·, hopes soon to get the Guine~ troops out of the country, as
he considers them Communists for all practical purposes. He does
not think that either. Ute UAR or lncija will withdraw its forces, and
he hopes to be at?~e to k.e ep the Moroccan.troops in the Congo. The
army. personne~ who retur~ed to Morocco on 25 December were mem-
bers of a special training mission and not part of the Moroccan UN
f orce_1 : ·
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, after a delay of teh days, respond-
ed to an appeal for support from Gizenga by reiterating promises of
Soviet support. and .symp~thy ·but avoiding any specific. commitments
. for assist~ce -to the S.t aaj.eyvllle group. Moscow may be awaiting the
outcome of the Rabat meeting of African-leaders, to beg.i n· on 3 Jan-
uary, befor~ .takin a definite stand toward Gizen a and his rum
. ernment. (b )( 1)
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 CommWllS~ China. - Japan: A Chinese CommWlist· labor
·delegation, 1 which includes two members of tile. Chinese Com-
mWli.s t party central committee, is expected to visit Japan.this
week. It is the first group of Chinese officials to visit Japan in
. . over two y~ars. It ·will almost certainly use its stay to offer .
supplem.e ntary gu,t~ce ,to japanese·leftlsts and Communists
on renewed efforts to undercut the security treaty. Observers
ln Japan speculate that the Ikeda government may. use the visit
to sound out .the Cninese on the question of re~umption of trade.
I

II. ASIA~ AF~CA

.* CCgo: The status of Kat~ga Province .and of Belglap bases

in.the · ongo has become a major source of .friction betwe·e.n UN
and Belgian officials in the Congo. On 25 July, Brussels pro-
tested ·a press .l~terview by· the UN commander, General van Horn, · .
in.'Ylhich Von ·Horn ·"orde~ed"· the evacuation of Belgian .armed
.f orces from Katanga. . Subsequen~ly, Von Horn. authorized a mild-
er statement in which .he nevertheless indicated:.! hat UN .forces
would shortly move to occupy Katanga.
-~ru:ssels continues -il)declsive concerning. the "independent"
I
I
Katanga government of Mo.l ee Tshombe, . and thus far- has stopped
·short ·of formal recognition. UN . Sec.re~~ry General :ijammars~jold
. will proba}?ly seek a B~.lgian withdraw~ from Katanga.dul'.lng his
present visit to the Congo, but a decisiQn by Brussels to recognize
. the Tshombe government could presage. moves b Bel ian forces
to·bar.Jhe e~tcy of UN fo_rces into Katanga.
(Page.3) · · ·

. Southern Rhodesia:- African nationalist rioting at Bulawayo

D
s . con~mue esp te strenuous efforts by 2,000 police an~ troops.
e Africans, aroused by developments .i n. the Congo, are protest-
g the arrest last week. of several nationalist leaders. The. white-
tt.l er. government apparently COI)tinu~s to· l:niscajculate.thejntensi-
fy Qf African aspirations. The government may: be pursuil)g a to~gh J·

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·UN Pressing for Total Belgian Evacuation

.
o.f Congo
. .
Statements purportedly made by General von Horn, com"'.'
. mander of the UN forces Jn the Congo, "ordering" thf:'·Belgtans
to ~vac1.1ate.. Kat~ga·· reflect increased fr~ction between trN and ··
Belgi~· offiCials in..the Congo. Desplte .Bl-µssels' protest, Von
Horn on.26 Jwy·authorized ·a.n amplifying statement that "iQde-
pendent" Katanga appeared ~o be "a.part of the Congo problem as
far as the UN is conc~rned." Hi.a statement suggests that UN
forces will shortly move .to ..occiipy Katanga,· wher~ order riow·.
is beJng main~alned by Belgian.troops invited in by Premier ·
Tshombe. · · . · . . .. . · · .

;premier Lumumba, in New York, has quoted See;retary Gen-

eral Hammarskjold·as assuring him that "there is no.., question of
an independent Katanga." British Foreign 'Minister Lioyd, however·,
stated on 25 July that it would be a "very. grave mistake" for UN
troops to attempt to resolve the breach between the Congo and·
Katanga governments. Lloyd's statement notwithsta.Ilding, · Belgium
will probably be hard pressed .to justify its continued .presence in.
Katanga wiless it takes the lead and recognizes the Tshoml;>e gov-
ernment.

Meai:i.while, both Pr~mler Lumumba and Congolese. spoke~­

mel) .in I,.eopoldvi.lle.have expressed.reservations ·concerning.. the
$2. billion. Congo..deyelopment ag·r eement app~rently re~~ed .with
American financier Edgar.Detwi,ler. . Lumumba characterized .the . (b)(3)
~egotiatior.id as explor_atory, while Col)gole.s e offici'al~s~in
~ s~
is~t,,..
e~...-..__--.
no_c..ontrac was bind,ing until ratified .by the c~binet. (b )(3)
'--------~

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

P.aki.stan-USSR: Pakistan's announcement that it welcomes

a Soviet proi:i'osaI to discuss details of oil exploration as.sistance}
is symptomatic of Pakistan's desire.to enhance its aid from a-
oad by.introducing competition between.the US and the bloc.

d _

·
e Soviet P.roposal,_ originally made in 1958, was .renewed in
sponse to a Pakistani initiative·last MafJ President Ayub
_JIJ obably does not intend to jeopardize Pakistan's alliance with
the US, but he presumably hopes to ar0 use apprehension. tha~t-----~
P~ki~tdn-'-i.A_mmdn1r. .J.owJ.1.rd__a_rnore3ndenendent~nolicv_.
~-------

LATE ITEMS
*Republic of the Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold is
·expected to arrive in the Congo on 11 August and to .proceed on
I b. (3)

Friday to Elisabethville where Katanga Premier Tshombe has l

stated he is prepared to begin .negotiations for entry of UN t r o o p s L _

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:

into ~nga,

L Pespite his ef-

tor ts to reconsff u. e e orce u lque, Lumumba prob-
ably has no more than a few hundred troops loyal to him-
sell, however, and no Congolese aircraft with which to
airlift them to Katanga.
In Leopoldville, there have been anti-Lumumba dis-
turbances for the second consecutive day. Possibly in re-
actlon to rumors of a c·oup attempt, Congolese police on
10 Augu~t raided the office of the Abako party, which on
8 August passed a motion of no confidence against Lumumba.
Several Abako adherents were reportedly wounded when
firing broke out, but reports that Lumumba himself was in-
jured in street demonstrations have been denied by an aide.
The premier has warned that large numbers of Europeans
would shortly be arrested for ''plotting against the Congo, "
a threat which may lead to a new exodus by Belgians, in-
cluding those in Katanga.
Brussels continues critical of the US for supporting the
UN resolution calling for the "immediate" withdrawal of
Belgian troops from Katanga and for activity allegedly pre-
judicial to Belgian interests ... <Although Foreign Minister
Wigny has indicate d that all Belgian troops c ould· be evacuated
from ·the. Congo by 21 August, Brussels still may hope to a-
void a commitment concerning a date for the evacuation of.
its Congo bases!_.,·1?ublic criticis m of Prime Ministe r ·Eyskens'
r = =•nt haii snarkeil """' rnm~r<Ll>• ~ " " ....~• . . _ '

~o-s-:-rne are a contr-oTRRrny-1'.n r e ous con

parachute battalion and othe r small units allied with it
i~~1
- -- ----<
·s . Li.s__a.0.0.arentlv rPs t r i,.to d to th o llionf.1° ..
(b )( 1)
\ U )\ I J

L - - , , , - -- The .provls ion al exec utive com mlttej

--,---;,------;;-;-;-----;-;----7
I
(bl(.1)
announced tn Vientiane by the revolutionary high command ;i
~~
contains ~iverse e lements unified ma~nly by their dislike or ~

11 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii L -----1

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- ; (b)(3)
~ Tur St:€REI...___ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,
LATE ITEMS
,,. :

*Republic of the Congo: Congolese police loyal to Premier

Lumumba contlnue to patrol the African quarter of Leopoldville
- following anti-Lumumba demonstrations. on 9 and 10 August.

·-:.D
Lumumba, whose political position appears to have been weakened
.·. .. ·.. .... by the recentJ}o-confidence vote agalnst hls administration by the ·
••·

;-. ';
•.;1,
'l Apako party, f!..eportedly is planning a cabinet shake-up-in order ;.(b )(3)
.. to ·displace his moderate ministers with leftist~ The Abako--the
. .. :·:.r
best -organized party in the Leopoldville area, where Lumumba
• ,' r
: '•
:'.• .:.:;· has little popular support--ls opposed to the premier's concept
of a b.ighly centralized government.
~Secretary General Hammarskjold, _meanwhile, has told
Katanga Premier Tshom~ he will arrive in Elisabethville today, . -
accompanied by mllitary and civilian advisers and two Swedish :(b) (3)
companies of about 125 armed men each. He will not take a
representative of the Lumumba government with him. In an
apparent effort tq curb lnfl~mmatory statements by Prime Minister
Nkrumah of Ghana, Hammarskjolddiscussed the situation with him
:.
:-!·!:
.~ during a "refueling stop" in Accra en route to LeopolqvilliJ
Uiammarskjold hopes to call in the first large complement of
· troops--Irish, Moroccan, and more Swedii;oh--for Katanga on

CJ
(b)(3)
14 Augµ.st. He plans to return to Leopoldville on 15 August to .
1begin negotiations wlth the Congolese and the Belgians on the .
dlsposltlon of Belgian bases:]
...... The Belgians, in their ·pique at the UN, have characterized
., the maintenance of troops ln their trust territory of Ruanda-
~· : !~ Urundl as logistically dependent on retaining their Kamina base
.~ 'r
••
in Katanga;·they have hinted that they might be obliged to abandon
the Ruanda:.._u rundi trusteeship. Premier Eyskens announced on
:..y · 11 Augu~t that he would request a vote of confidence on Belgium's

:,:.·o.
..... : -~:i. . Congo policies next week.
, ·:·:. Soviet officials are continuing their attempts to stimulate
-_ ::{i among 4!rican countries dissatisfaction wlth UN efforts in the .-
Congo. IP.uring his 10 August talks· with Hammarskjold, however, .. (b)(3)
!°:/ :·
:.:,-_.,
t Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov agreed that the USSR
would make all of its technlclans for the Con 1 u -
;: ·:. the UN'":l (b)(3)
. .. L...-------~------------~---r
(b )( 1 )
-·· ··:
.. :-
. ..
:
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t2. Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iv

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.-- - - - -- ---------...,
°"TOP SECRe.rj (~)_(3)
·'(:'<1;f?1n~. . . .llllmmmu I H!Ul~i[!II!R!K J IBM ~ ~ I'. I ! ~l!ID ~ma !EdU!I 11'1'.T il1~illll!Ii!U!!l!!J&~·*~1

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1(3)
~ongo: ~ew moves planned by .Lumumba to bolster his In-·
ter.n position.have an authorita_i:ian .character. These report-
dly will .include .the suspension of judicial procedures in favqr
I
l(l~-.i~(
~-- 3
)
f ..trial by military tribunal and passage of a .law requi.r~g. that
es for newspapers and periodicals .b e renewed every two
s'J A major internal. crisis for Lumumba appears to have
averted by postponement of the Abako party's convention
cheduled for 13 August, at which· the Abako had been· expected I
I
to declare the low.er.Congo region independent of the Lumumba
government. Lumumba also may avoid ail early. showdown con-
cerni.?J.g the political. status of ~atanga in the expe~ta,tion that a 6 K...J
scheduled meeting· of independent African states in Leopoldville
from 25 .to 30 A~st will take a strong stand in favor of uni-
fled Congo. · . .
a ·
1-rm
{!UN .Secretary General Hammarskjold pn. 15 August summoned
a new·'meeting· ot the Security Council following Lumumba's charge
that. the Congo had "lost conf.i dence" in Hammarskjold. In ·an ef- I b~ 3 )
(l
fort to, retain the propaganda initiative, Lumumba also called for . ~
the ·dispatch of a .14-nation UN ·commission.t6 oversee the with-
drawal of Belgian ~roops . J
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~ ~
'rhe Situation in th~ Congo

Postpone'm ent by the Abako·.party of° a convention originally

scheduled for.13.:.16 August appears to have averted a major inter-
nal crisis for Co~golese l:>remier t.umun:i.ba: The Abako on 7 Au-
. gust. had passed a .resolution of no cQnfidence in .the Lumumba
governmer.it;•and th-e convention reportedly was to have been the
· occaslC!_n .for the Abako to declare the lo\ver Congo region. independ-
ent of the.central ·government. Although .the reason for the post-
ponement is unclear,. it maY-h~ve ..resu,lted .from pressure by Lu~
. mumba -on A.bako le~er and Congo ·President Joseph Kasavubu .

. with Kasavubu:'seemlngly unwllling:to oppose Lumumba, the

. focal point for antl-Lumumba activity." may·once ~ain. become the
Cqngo Senate, whose moderate·president, Joseph Ileo, has become
. lricreasingly critical of the premier. ·The Senate; which has been in.
a(ljournment ~ince . 22 July, ls sched~e<I° to reconyene on ~6 August.
. .
ti'he.i,ti~uni.ba. government co~tinues to implement measures
.lgned to suppress internal opposition. · · Theae include the su·s -
nslon of judicial procedures Jn favor of 'trial, b~ ·military .t~ibu..;

A
./ ·
als ~d passage of, a.law requiring that licenses for newspapers
d periodicals b~ renewed eveey two months. Congolese officials
· earlier. had closed down. the facilities of the Belgia,n and French
.n ews ·agenc.les ln LeopoldvilJe.J . . .
(b)(3)

Lumumba may avoid. an. eariy. showdown concerning the pollt-

~cal status of l(atanga in anticipation .that a scheduled. mee~ing of
independent African states in LeopQldviUe from .25 to 30 August
will· take·a strong _stand .i n f~vor of a u~ed Co~go. ·
~ S~cret~y General H.ammar~kjold on 15 August summ~ned ·.
.a,new Security CoU;Iicil meeting--exp·ected.to b~ held Wednesday or
Thur~day--followlng Lmnumba's charges earlier in the day that the
----~· Congo had ·" lost ~onfidence" in Hammarskjold. In an.effort to retain
the prop~anda initiative, · Luniumba also called .for the dispatch of a (bH3)
14-nation·UN commission--Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco, EUil-
opia, the UAR, ~daJJ.; Ceylo~, · I,.ilberia, Mali, . Bur:r;na, · India, Af-
anistan. and. Lebanon- ~to:....ri_'\ffiIS..e.eJh.e- wt thdr_awa.L.oLB.eJ.eian_t,momLL~
(b)(1)
(b)(3l.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA
. India-Pakistan: Conclusion of ·the long- delayed treaty
dividing the waters of the Indus ruver basin now is probable
as a result of agreement on the most important disputed ·
points~ Altnough negotiation of remaining· details could· c~use
further delays, Nehru ls .scneduled to go to Pakistan to ~ign 9 k_
the tr.e aty about 20 September. While reiterating his willing~
ness to discuss other matters wlth.Ayub, Nehru recently indi~
cated he ls still riot ready to take up the Kashmir dispute and
is not' interested in joint defense proposals. The Nehru-Ayub
meeting c.ould, hmVever, lead to general exploratory talks at
a lower level to continue the improvement in relations desired
by both ieaders. I
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~: Prime Minister· Ikeda· has announced that the Diet

is liKelyTo be dis1;1olved in November·and elections held shortly
thereafter. In addition to his desire to satisfy the general feel:. tJ k..
ing t.nat he should seek an early public mandate, Ikeda probably
ls encouraged by impressive.conservative ~c.tories in three suc-
cessive gubernatorial elections and by failure of the .S ocialist
a
parties to develop popular issue for -exploitatlc:m. Public opin~
ion polls also revea.l.Jm.usuallv strong eunriort for the new uovern-
L
ment . . __
· Pa~tu ese Africa: Plans for strong reinforcement of Por-
tuguese secur orces in Mozambique ·and Angola have been
. reported to the US consul general ID.· Lourenco Marques by a re- 6) k(
· liable· source. A civil.defense orgaiilzatton hae been established
in Mozambique, and armed tro<;>ps· and police ·are .much in evi-
dence. These m_easures reflect increasing Portugu'ese distrust ·
<?f the native populatlon . ~d. a 2rowln2 fear of subverslon.lmm
neighboring territories. IL--~~-------___ _____
•Congo: ,As Secretary General Hammarskjold prepares for t<
·-the· emergency session of the Security Council, he ls seeking sup- 0
·port for his 'interpre~ation of the UN's role in Congo, a position
already ·atta~lted by .t he Soviet Union. According to pre~e i'epo~s

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~ ~~~~~~~~
from the UN, Sovi~t Deputy Foreigll Minister·Kuznetsov has
strongly ·objected to the. secretary general's stand that the
9 August. resolution bars UN intervention in.internal Congolese
disputes. . · ·
Lumumba, in Leopoldville, continues to take repressive
measures against both UN.personnel and Belgian interests. On
~ 7 August he .threatened to confiscate all Belgian assets in the
Congo if :Efrussels did no~ 'quickly return Co olese. funds de os-
lted in ~elglum several_monUi__!_ago.

III. THE WEST

e Castro
re me s sen ng . a_rge amoun s o money o various other Latin
American colintrles to carry on Cuba's campaign against the OAS
and perh~ps to bribe delegates to the OAS foreign ministers' meet-
ing now urider way in Costa Rica·~ This money may. be part of the
$8,000,000 ln too- and 50-dollar bills which Cuba .is known.to have

~8 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF 111

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. .

The Congo Situation

Secretary General Hammarskjold, und~r severe attack
from both Congo· Premier Lumumba and the USSR, is taking
the chaqtic Congo situation ·back to the Security Council in or~
der t<,> 9btain council support for
his· position. He ma.Intains
that the UN forces are not authorized to intervene in internal
Congolese disputes despite the demands :of Lwnumba that the
UN crush -the rebellious·.Katanga government.
The session may ·be o~ crucial importance because Lu~
muniba, ·backed by ,the. Soviet Union, -"is increasingly critical
of HammarskjoJd and.has .t hreatened-to demand the withdrawal
of all European elements of Uie UN . force~ - an action which Ham~
marskjold has said he would reject in favor. of urging the with-
dr'a wal of ~e entire emergency for~e . . Either· course would
remove present restraints from Lumumba and prov:ide a wide
opportunity for exploitation.by ·opportunistic Afric.a n govern-
ments as well as Com·m unist bloc, countries.. ·
+ • • • •

. In LeopoJdville, Lumumba continues to take repressive meas~

urea· against. Belgians and to harass UN personnel. Subsequent to
the widespread police checks of persona~ docun,ientation on 16 .Au-
gust in Leopoldville, . Congolese troops Qil ._1 7· August set up ma-
ch,i.ne. guns at the airport and.interfered with plane landings. The
premier. threatened .to seize all B~lgian assets in.the Congo if
within. two weeks B:f\l.BBels has not returned Congolese funds, in-
cluding gold, whiC,h were sent to Belgium several months ago.
~ .
1....lle al.s o reportec;Uy has given :the UN one week to take "satis~
factory" action.in regard to Katanga or he will send Congolese
troops into.that province.· It is estimated that Lumumba has
ntrie
-infantry and six gendarmerie. battalions scattered throughout the
: J. : " jive provinces, exclusive of :J{atanga, five of which are in Leom
poldvill~ .P rovince. Gendarmerie battalions have rio support weap-
ons or transport, ~hll~ al• battalions are short of supplies, trans~
port~ and·trained officers.-
. ~ . .
Tsh()mbe, on the other·hand1ls believed to control about 2,000
~rQOpS of the ·former Force Publlque oi:g~zed into four battalions:]

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Ghe troops up to and includiJ).g the rank. of captain are CongQlese.
Some senior oUlcers are still Belgians. Tshombe has also re-
cruited some 2,000 young warriors with no previous milltary ex~
perience. His force is reported to be very we.11 armed, with com-
, plete modern battalion.weapons and· plenty of transport. In addi-
tion, 250 automatic rUles and ;mimunltion h_:;ge been issued to.tribal
chiefs to help defe~d· Katang3:.../ (b)(1) -
(b)(3) -

~ ..

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ..
19 Augu~t 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

""

II. ASIA-AFRICA .

*Republic ~ the Co~go: {izN forces in the Congo ha~e re-

portedly be eh authorized,.to shoot in th~ir own defense follow-
µig new anti-Western and anti-white incidents· whiCh were
. apparently instigated by ]4umumba. ·On 18 August, a Canadian
officer Qf.the UN force was injured and other Canadians sub-
jected..to indignities by Force Publlque. soldiers at the ~opold- .., . ,.
ville airport. US Ambassador Timberlake--who' was barred · ~
- - - --';b y Congolese. soldiers from Lumumba's residence on 18 August--
rns th8.t the Force Publique could be. incited to action against
e UN troops, or to new depredations ~ga.iiist whites in general.
~cretary General ~?imars~jold, meanwhile, has stated
hat he will invite any nation in the Security Council which dis-
g.r ees with his recent actions in the Congo to present its views,
ossibly in the form of a resolution. He appears confident ~at
critical ·resolution will obtain only the votes of the .two Commu-
·st· nations. The British, meanwhile, are exploring means of
- -- - .averting a showdown between Lumumba ..and HamIJ1arskjold, be-
lieving that UN operation·s could not continue· in..-:th=e--=f=
ac
=e~oi=-=
a _ _ _ _ __ _____r,..,...._,
.. determined Con olese demand for withdrawal.
(b)( 1)
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disagrees with his recent actions in the Congo t~ present its ·
views, possibly ~n the form of a resolution. He appears con-
fident .that a critical resolution will obtain only the votes of the
t~o Communist members) · ·. .
. .
· (qoncerning. a possible UN withdrawal from the Congo,
Hammarskjold professed to regard such a demand by Lumum-
l)a as unlikely. He expressed the conviction that .w mumba is
being· adv,ised by Communists i~ Le.opoldville, ·but stated.that .
he could see no alternative: to Lumumba at this timeJ ·
t1he British Foreign Qfflce ls exploring means of averting
~ showdo'Wn between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, believing
that the UN op.e rations could not continue in the face of a d~ter­
mined Congolese dema~d for withdrawal. · The pr_e llminary_
British views ai.-e that the best way of supporting the UN effort
would be by tackling the· constitutional dispute bet~een Lumum-
ba. and Tshomb~ , perhaps by having the UN SecW'.itY Council
appoint a c s_to_seek..to resolve,_·--~
the issue. (b )_(3)
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

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alternative to his .control would be a pro-Castro regime, he is

· believed capable of ·a ttempting to align his regime with Castro
or even with the Soviet bloc. Moscow is likely· to be very cau-
. tious in respol)ding to such overtures, especi~ly in view of the
unanimity of Latin American opini t the Dominican
I.tepublic as expressed in the OAS .

. LATE ITEMS

*Republic of the .Congo: Katangan President Tshomb~

has seized upon Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the
UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the
independence of Katanga. Tshom~ probably regards the
Security Council consensus as strengthening his hand with
:r espect to Lu:mumba; hls statement that he has "consulted" tt > <:.
wlth antl-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congolese con.; , . . : . .: .·
.federatlon suggests that he still favors confederation.as the
most -_acceptable resolution of "the Katanga crisis.
According to press reports from Ellsabethvllle, the
566-man Mall UN contingent .in northern ·Katanga have become
involved .ln fighting apparently stemmlng from activities l;>y pro-
Lumumba, antl-Tshomb~ trlbesmen. Should tribal violence .
spread, the position of the Tshom"M government would be
badly undermined.
Meanwhlle, Czechoslovakia reportedly will take favorable
action ·on an anticipated Cone:olese reauest for several .hundred
secondary schoolteachers.•. I

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~ ._.

. The Situation in the Congo ·

Katanga President Tshomµ~ has taken advantage of Lu-

muinba's retreat f.rom his attacks on the UN fo express "con-
fidence" in. the UN and to reiterate the independence of Ka-
·tanga. Tshomb~ probabiy regards .the Security Council con.:.
census in favor of Hammarskjold as strengthening his hand
with respect to ~umumba : his ·statement that he has "consulted"
with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congo confedera-
tion suggests that he. still favors this· means of resolving the
.Katanga crisis. ··

I; . Albert Deconinck, . .
J (b )( 1)
thelgian Communist party leader . ·responsible for Congo · .
affairs, now is ·planning to arrive in Leopoldville oli 29 or 30
August. He. will be accompanied by Jean Terive, the princi-
pal Belgian Communist adviser to the Congolese. Botll men
have had extensive contacts with .the principal Congolese. lead-
ers, especially Lumumba. They may hope. to play a leading
role in .advis~g the Congolese, as well as to establish a party
apparatus in the Congo.J

(The Be~gian pa~ty has systematically followed up its ini-

tial contacts with. Congolese leaders. After malqng numerous
contacts among Congolese d,elegates to the round-table con-
ference in Brussels last January, and at the economic confer-
ence last April, the party concentrated on infiltrating Congo-
lese political parties and encouraging close· Congolese coopera-
tion with the Soviet bloc. Trips ·to Moscow and Prague. were
granted numerous Congolese for "study purposes~
. .
In Leopoldville,· Lumumba continues concerned over pos-
sible unrest. Congolese officials reportedly suspe.c t collusion
.bet~een Tshomb6 and elements in the former French Congo.
·New rumors of support for Tshomb~ from President Youlou
in Brazzaville appear to have been stimulated by the. forced
landing in Luluabourg of a Belgian air liner en route. from

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Brazzaville to Elisabethville with a group of anti-Lumumba

Congolese.

· Elsewhere there are press reports that General von Horn,

who commands UN.fprces ;in the. C<:mgo, may be r~placed by
Finnish General A. · E. Ma.1tola. Von Horn has been under se-
vere criticism by :Premier Luniumba arid by some Western ob-
servers; his removal, following the replacement of UN repre-
sentative atmche, ·would indicate that Ha.inmarskjold ·plans a
major reorganization of the :UN groop µi the Congo. General
Martola was active in organizing the UN Emergency Force (b)(3)
during the &lez crisis. I
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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 France'-Mali: France plans to· recognize Senegal_ as an in-
dep n en coun ry on 11 September and thereafter to propose
its admlsslon to the UN, even though Paris anUclpates that such~---~
formal acknowledgment of the breakup of the Mall Federation
will create dlfflcultles both in Africa and in the UN. As far as
Soudan ls concerned, France believes its recognition of Mali
cov.ers that country and plans no ·special action. The Soudan·ese
members of the Mali Government, who have proclaimed Bamako
the capital of the federation as·well as of Soudan, appear deter-
mined to implement their threat to break off relations wlth any
nation recognizing Senegal's indep.endence and have already moved
to terminate some French activities in Soud?-n. In addition, spe-
cial representatives have been sent to New York to push the
Soudanese position at the UN, and another Mali envo was sched-
uled to de2art for Moscow on 9 September.
~------------~

LATE ITEM

~: .UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, in.a blunt speech

to thel.JFrSecurlty Council in which he stated· that Ka.savubu had the
constitutional right to fire Lumumba, affirmed his- intention to keep . i\. 0
UN forces in the .Congo and stated in effect that the UN must'govern the
,. ls
y.) Congo until such time as a legal and. responsible gover.nmerit estab-
·.r\/>· 1, .f•" lished. Meanwhlle, the Tunisian UN delegate ls trying to r:ound up .
1
'· support, particularly from ·African states, for a resolution--drafted
by Hammarskjold--which would authorize the secretary general to
take any necessary action to restore law and order in the Congo.
Action on the resolution is expected when the Security Council re-
convenes in the afternoon of 10 September. .
In Leopoldville Premier I,umumba has strengthened his control
following his unexpected succe.ss in winning both Chamber and Senate

C''".. 1.1 , I
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durther difficulties for the United Nations are likely to arise

with President Tshom~ of Katanga. On 9 September he defied
UN control of three airfields, including that at Ells~bethvllle, to
send several small planes to the northern part of Katanga where
an invasion b ro-Lumumba forces from Klvu was re orted ln
pro ress.

_J

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~: The UN command in the Congo appears to be involved

in an~ut effort to establish the authority of Congolese Pres-
l<ient Kasavubu and·set the stage for an early attempt to remove
Lumumba from power. Working through .Col. Mobutu, =the chief
of staff and most important figure in the Congolese Army, the UN
appiµ-enUy ~rranged the surrender of arms on 10 September by .IJtt-c
the bulk of the S,000 Congolese trOQps stationed ln the Leopol4-
ville area~ In addition, the ·uN provided the troops with thefr flrst
pay ln two months and announced an order--attrlbuted to the Con-
a
golese Army--- calllng for general cease-fire throughout the
Congo. Plans were revealed for the dispatch of a speclal UN
team to supervise along the borders of s~paratlst Katanga Prov-
ince the truce which the UN com:inand clearly hopes w.111 result
:from· the. cease-fire order. The cease-fire order has been cau-
tlously welcomed by Katanga President Tshomb~ and hls allies ln
Kasal Prov.lnce, but has ln effect been denounced by Lumumba who
stated on 10 September that Congo Army operations would contlnue
in Katanga and Ka.a~.

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Meanwhile, Kasavubu has transmitted to Hammarskjold an

inltl~ llst' of .a new cabinet, headed by moderate leader J"oseph
. lleo, to replace Lumumba's cabinet, which Kasavubu insists was
legally dismissed last week. Efforts apparently are being made ·
by Kasavubu supporters to line up support for the new"group, pre-
sumably with a view to reversing at a new parliamentary session
the endorsem~nt won last week by Lumumba in both houses. Di-
rect action looking to the arrest of Lumumba. ls also apparently
under· consideration.
· At the UN, the Security Cou i scheduled t resume meet-
on the Congo this afternoon.
_J c___~~~~~--'

IU. THE WEST

Dominican Republic: ·Reacting to the recent OAS decision
to impose sanctions on the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo
government has called a huge Castro-type rally for ·24 Septem-
ber to demonst~ate its popular support. The government-con- .
trolled radio has also begun warning US bu$inessmen to defend. ck...
Trujillo from US attacks if they wish to cmtlnue qoing business
in his count.r y. American officials in Cludad Trujillo see the fu-
ture of US interests there as "incr.easingly bleak" as long as
Trujillo retains control. Domlnlcan Foreign Minister Herrera
Baez ls visiting Western Europe in an attempt to counter antici-
pated trade and sJ:llimlng bovco_tts by Western Hemim>here coun-
tries. [ =1
El Salvador: The stability of President Lemus' middle-of-
the-road regime '1s under serious strain, although developments
of the past few days have lowered tensions somewhat. Whlle the
state of siege.declared on 5 September continues, ~mus' con-
. clliatory moves have apparently succeeded in red,uctng the strong
public resentment caused by the government's~ lndlscrlmtnate use
of force against the Comtnunlst-enc.o uraged student demonstra-
tion on 2 September. Communist.and pro-Castro elements will
probably be quick to encourage new demonstrations as opportunity
offers, but stude~ers seem·fauhe_m:e..s.enL tn...he_t.akin!?....a]
conciliatory line. . )(3)

J
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The Congo Situation

The UN co~mand: in the Congo appears to have embarked
on ~ all-out effort to establish· the authority of Congolese Pres-
. ident Kasavubu and set the stage for an early attempt by Premier
Lumumba 's Con·g olese opponents to remove hun from power defin-
itively. This effort apparently has the support of Col. Mobutu, the
chief of staff and most important figure in the Congolese Army- ~
control of which will probabiy prove decisive in determining the
outcome of the.Kasavubu- Lumumba power struggle. Mobutu, wh9
rece~tly _ c laimed that three quart~rs of the army was loyal to hfin,
reportedly ~rr~ed the surrender of arms by the .built of·the· S,000
Congolese troops stationed in the Leopoldville area. This action
took place. at a UN-controlled army s:amp on 10 September. In ad-
dition to ·i ts virtually ~ertain insplratio.n of .this development, which
would seem seriously to undermin~ Lumumba'e position, the UN has
provided the troops with the first pay many of them have received in
two months.

These moves by the·UN command coincided with its announce-

m~nt of an order-.:attrlbuted to the Congolese Army--caUllng for a
general cease-fire throughout the Congo and of plans to supervise the ·
executiop of th~ · order along. the borders of separatist Katanga Prov-
ince. The cease-fire order has been welcomed "in principle" by
Katanga President Tshombe~ whose regime Lumumba 'h as vowed to
crush, and by Tshombe~s ally, Albert KalonJl, the. leader of the
hard~pressed anti.:Lumumba movement in neighboring Kasai Prov-
ln~e. Lumumba, on the other. hand, dented the validity of the ·cease-
fire order and announced that his troops were continuing to operate
"wlth great success" tn Katanga and Kasai. Press reports from
Elieabethville, however, indicate that last week's incursions into
Katanga froµi Kivu Province by Congolese Army .elements have not
yet be~n followed by any invasion in for~e .
Meanwhil~, ~asavubu and his supporters. have ·pushed ahead
with the formation of a new cabinet composed of moderate, fed-
erallst-minded elements to replace Lumumba's lefUst regime, de-
spite the latter's continued ~laims to.be the only legal government
of the Congo. . Headed by Senate President lleo, ·the cabinet list trans-
mitted by' Kasa\rubu to Secretary General Hammarskjold over the
week end names Kalonji as interior minister and Justin Bomboko as

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foreign minister--the post Bomboko held until recently 1n the

Lumumba government. The.re ls evidence that Lummnba's op-
ponents are making strenuous efforts to dev~lop wider supp~rt,
apparently wlth a ~ew to · reverslr~g at ·ari early date the. votes ·of
confid~nce. won. last ~eek by LumUinba, after·demagogic ·appeals,
in both houses of the Congolese parliament. KasaV1,lbu'e gr.oup
may also attempt to arrest Lumumba in the near future, espe-
clal:ly .if it becomes convince,d it can rely on substaritlal support
from .Co~gQlese troops as well as the neutrality of UN forces 1n
.. the Leopoldville.area. The· group probably drew encouragement
from the ~irm stand· taken on 11. September· by Ghanaian.troops iii
·the face·of an attempt by Lumumba to regain by force control
over the UNm~rded Leopoldville radio station. ·
. . .
Bomboko departed for New York on 11. September to speak
at the UN in behalf of the proposed Ileo government, ;ind 1t is pos-
sib.l e that represe~tatives ..ot Lu~umba's regime may also arrive 1n
time for the Security Council's next meeting on the Congo crisis,
now schedule<ffo.-·the.a#ernoon of 12 September.

Moscow's immediate negative reaction to Hammarskjold's

blunt speech of 9 . S~ptember suggests that the USSR. may veto any
resoh~tlon . aimed at strengthening the secretary gen~ral's harid 1n
the Congo. · Som'e UN members reportedly are considering the ad-
visabillty of calling an ·emergeJ?.CY ses.s ion of the General Assembly--
possible on. 24-hour not1ce- in ordeJ" to keep the UN tn· the Congo ~
0

Hamm:a rskjold's 'p restige ls still suf~lcient, ·p articularly among the

smaller· ount - ale sunnort from the_as-
~embly . (b)(3)
(b)(1)"
(b)(3r

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Caraou ro<.tio e.1ta ... cr~U.o ll'!tlon (tr.ll>)--ha~ p~­
U.Oll OD b~ a ifa.-
12 sei)'tembe.l" se:ntod ·a unit~. c1v1,iu.o. front
Uoad guard: of.Uc&r vb.o npor"t- ap:tnst tbQ r"lolrr1:aa tb:re:n·t o:t
eilly . hoped ~.o .11!.S'Pll"O co-eon• & .O()fl dtc:ta.i.o.n;b.a.p DY veae.-
& p.l.rA.to.ra to fu ltill a nvo- :!m,eh.' & t;raditional. ty poll tic al
lut.lona.ry plan or1:a1oal:lf .sot 411"1ei;I fon::ei1.
!~r 10 &l9U11.b 9J". .
·i;&tt le un:Hy ~s been jlOS•
Area.y a ~s Tac;t,ga.;i.tiaa na.t .ai"b le, baweYe:r... e lt:be·r wit'hla
11,6.vo l>oo.u roga.rdod by anti-· or rimtlhlt ·the. par-t1e,a oa t.h e
govqJl"IUu.lat a-la.,el!l~l\'S 1LS crea:tiag CUbll.fl iss:ua. Be1:1tecwr-t lie.a
a woa.l poi.Qt i~ the unit~d 1ndi.ea:t1Qd that he does ·not wo.nt
J·roni o1 Vc;n."~a·l.~ 'iJ three
•- the rostp& tJOD '01 tho JJTO-
.:J or pant.e.e vh*-ch l;l:i\v-e asu.cte u.p ~ba;o Areal'•• wbo ie prOV!insmt
tbe go\•e-1'1l1'1itt.ot oolllltlo:o &!nee ln- t.h13' WO, to be t'.b.e IC$U3& tor
Pre~d.dent "D !fta.oc-ourt 'S toau«Ura- bre~t;l;ng th.er coa.Ut1oo. e.Jt4n.*
tioo lo feb.tu~y 11MiD. Those ·couri: bel;.tevciG tho.t cno.ny tlrtD ·
le ·tt-of-e.e·at~~ ~:l"tlos--Botan-­ :embens ue dli.i.U.ws tan.eel w1th
cou:rt ~s De:tsioc:rauc
A~t.ion (Ai>) the.it' l\1lrt1 and could &v&ntu-
i?J."OU..P~ "(:p 0G'1Ge~tie
Ctu'lfl:1a.tl [ al'Jv be convtacea ·t.6 lSJ\V, 1t~
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"tlto Coneo s Uv.a Uwi M,G been renob ~ agl'<ee~&ttt~ DaXlng the
c:ompoundod by- t•o coupe at- Ut.9t'iln Q. tteo,11.eet:•• Of C"O Ol.f0l880
tempted 1\-~q:i.st ~ter ~1nd:m. et'udooui and tc.c·lln1~ia.ns woold .
p,:.o9 i,d~r>~ :tta!il~vqt;i~ •a e.ff'or.'t to ·r on "tll• Oonao. tn cooponrt 1oa
d~~~~ the premittr CU1d: ca.PJ>Oin't !if·1 th. tho UN. 'fiQ- p.r opoacd to
uodera,t~ J~el)h ·u eo!. the prest- e;top tb~ Crmgq•s cli'U'-t towp,rd
de:nt 0£ the senate. in b .i !:i sto.n.a. C®:nmn~;ro by ~l®lng th& SQvtet
Gld DOl! recei 90 ' DOPulll:r OT ..u .. iuid ·Citee.Ji em'b ;ul&ieo is..i:ld c~au­
:l t:arr :ru.poo:rt, an<J Ilo~ . c.b~c .lat&!: j pba ing 111!1 i tai-y ~rde­
tM .sa:.f~t'Y ot .(lr3zz1n•:Ule tn iu· a~d tho pre;;i.1 .Ses, and ·rorci.De
.Pros·id.qo-C. Youlou ~ 5 Con.go Ete.JJ9l)• tli-e d1:pl<mat.a to leave w1tb1D
lie !si.stcad ut th~ poli ticlll. 48 hours ..·
etrlU~l!i.C! in Lcopol ifvUle , bi
ta.ci.,, bQt~ y~~vu.bu and l .l eo In t.M ·o.bsonco oi. d.t soNo:r.a
h.a-ve mi'lr'ed so alowly i:tu.t or etl"4't18 ~ai;tio.ns o~ tht!i Pfll"t.
Aa?ef'j,c~il F.mba:S ll'J off1c16:IS de- ot .t el.ldiog COS\golcu;;o poUtic::b"lls,
9e'i''lbe ~h¢ tr Jlil.c;'e ao enn..1.l-U.ke, 2.t appea..r ed that· th-0 c;01,9p ~igbt
•nl!. report t!hnt Kaeavubu. ~acts bet SUCCO~::lllE[. .Howc:ivcr, by mi.d -
more 1.ilw a vept.able e~ery ct0rn1.-'.S' ot l~ ~e_pto:ritJer • !o:rc;l6G
day ,~• lofal to 1>.l!1:1:1~ba t!'fflned. to hAve
"'·p.taed the i.a.1..'ti-·t£.ve. ~Ul!I...
Oo 14 Sovtoro'bcn:·:.. Colon.o.l b'a.· cld-11 .tibat lfobu.tu h11.d been
Jrowtu~ DC!Y'l 7 •PP01R"t~d ritiJJJ A.r~ted "'~ ~~a~ebUV d.~oied,
¢oama.ni;to.r la chtef, &nnouQC.04 bove•e·i i, 'the e1.t~·t1011 r~a.lDS
th~~ t -llo ~"'Y
wae ta.k"J.ng cl:i;l.rge ext::ren:.>&lf :flu.id, with the sycap:s. ..
~1ld would enfof'Ce, .o. truce u;oUl th!e.s ot th& bulk ot tb& eoa.1io-
3\ .Oec:e111Mr, t.bus &nAbll.Dg tb.e le.s11 ArflY 1.l.llCl9&:1'.

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ru1s ar1sen fl"Oil Hvaa.l of tho .,tiotJo f~.\'!8
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Af.r lca:n s tR t~ Whlo.h aympa·tbl:z:e by tho U3SlL Tb.Iii c.o-u~cll sea--
wit~ UtmunibA-•& pr.octaiaea et.;. slot! on 1.2 Scptembo.r ft.S ad-
for·ts to ner:ac.rvc 1"J\r> unitJ o.t jo~rned beciua.se Al.l ~ti;ppl~t9d
~be CO~~O ~Dd to comb~~ f.o~Gl~O mo~l"OQ would bave eidcd Lu'
--nota;bly Be l.lfi&D and Prenah"'- Qlwab~ ; ~o~ · ~a'-ul>u; th~ !Se!s-
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liL!>t few da:7~ ~ ba.&'f'4'r, as the <>JrD1tloA to !.a.&av\lb11 aod w ...
W :rel.a.x.ed l:ts eon.trol of the .-.~J>4, .
LeopoldvtUo rAdio sta.tton a.nd
a.lrtlela, Gt.tea. and ~daa """'e F.or sev!Il'al. da.·1 e ·t tlere hai:s
acioptod D. 11Jore o,onoUi.lltor)' pol.- be-ea A \oseenlni of blood$~a~
lc:!f tovud ·t .bo 5ocrata-r)• aea ~ 1ii ebo h.1111..i llrQa, al though i .t
or"l · 18 no•t clear wbo:tho;r tl!.19 ' bas
rosuhod ·fro111 the geaa.:ra t ¢.eaae-
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l\u boec; b,andlcap_ped i11 bb of- 10 Sopte.a.ber hmd bQ~n o~dered
fart~ i .a u.~ ~c-urtt.)l Couhe .U .by t.be ~(l·l?Ole.!UI At'a.y . 't'b1~
to ~et backlDg tQr ~ t~uab 001- easiog ot tho 81~uattoo was prob-
t.cv l .fl tbe Congo 'by 'tb.c wa.vqr- R~ly 1~ pa.rt 2 rqsnt~t of tbe
lag at A.rro-A.s.laA govor~•nts, U.N•e P'l"OBlbUiton egidJUjt otber

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alr 1U.81ttrJ $-a the Coo(to, TlU.e tbe pol1ctoa ot tbe countries
~t'l."·i.cU.oo ha.d arountSo(t ·ttlc.> wbic;;b ba.~o atwa,y.s; ~pOoQGQ th$
tcm Sovi~t IL-148 ~bic~ h~d b~n potU. ti on~ of. -oo l.Ooi.aU-:m . ,..
used lo 'tra:nsport ~011:c 200 ·Lu ... All&1'4i1?'.l tig que8Ho11~ etbot\rd
m!m.btl troo~ to t.ho 1Cau1 bat... t:b& Bal"t1.l<a., U1e 5o'Y'l e1: prea.ler
t.lef.rotrt ~ 1Uth the relnx~t io.n 4enc>ubc·~4 lt4'1r.mt.r&tr.Jold. ~s .toeist-
Qt tho Wf r-estrtctlcm.&, ~1a1.lm coco tba..~ &:&:U aid to tho CoC!gQ
will J'r6bllbly 1t1vo now l\i.tctntion Oovc.rnlilcint. ht: cho.onclad thra.ugb
t:o tho lt-asa! •J.QQc~ioni~t :Prob- tb.e Uli as a :r-ur.ti.er ef""fort. to
.t a.a in lln: otto~t to o.Utln tw uptto.l<f co l.onilil i.s t 1.at91"ests ,
~~a mraa prepar.a.tory· to an ttl t- D.D~ lndicllt~ that ho ~P..Y pr·Cl.68
O\tt: hta.o{tn CU!pU~ . the Co.n~ lsm-ue nt tho f -ortb-
c0111og ml 09Del"al A.ssetiblY .11.eet-
\l'o:tl(Alii\lt the f!OlaU.-octilc iog.
:o.e·t loft 111t. 't-110 JM?'.i ata, aloag the
K&U..Qp-·~vu 1rontler lns·t ·•eo~ .. JG tlte .u n.1a SO'i'tet <Jo\'ei'a-
t.~ct 'JD,-t.:ui~a bor4~1· ~daH men.t sta.t:em~nt on ttlo f1Ub-Ject, ·
qulet (l"Ot!l. ·u
September, \lthen. isaued .on .e Sept-her,. :i.b e asse
r&por~s retiu;ihcd. rueaootbv1 llo ~OC'll~Od "EIM~l".S.'1014 Of h ..iting
tl:.:i.t soo couaot.se uoo_p• loylll t ·o show t:he "mirdduiia ">-t ~.m.Pta..r­
to LW..\ IJJl'>ll VOT• ~ttemptto~ to t-1altty'' a.rilJ of •topenly 11orking
lDVlldO bh1n~ ft"ON ltSvu .• At -f<;Jl' t;tl• b'J'lld .t t or " the c.o.lodt u~
tbe- same -t:l.IW, Prqeldoiit 1'a'hombl~. is ts~ -th6reby e:a..promlr:J;t.ng tnca
KaU.n p J'"Ogime W&Bi C.OtlfrOlitEtd UN. '' "°&OW detiArid~d tha.t tlll'
-qh·b an atPJ>al"CO~ly_ ·soriou.. u,p .... 1o.rcos oc.cupyt.Qg Coruio l.G-89 Ur-
r 191ng l>Y Ba l,"1~ll tribe:S:ne.n at.· fleld9 a.ad rauiio sta.t.ic;tns bo
KaM110 . dl.!ilAt .fl:&OO> ca,nd -cal.led on the
go•e·rim:eot~ 't ih9;9 U'fX)pe are ln
Tsbom~6 Qel~omed lleo•s tb a CO~o to aa.rr¥ out tho "eood_
dosignBtion aa pre~1er ·~~ hae eoi-~:oc·~ Oec1&1o.a.s... -o i tho so ..
oeAt two :regr.es en C.R:ti vq.IJ i Q Cll.%':i t1• ~rictl, bypaas1ci.~ tlltt
neet 'flU.b Uoo 1$ 4,o'lc:glltes ii= IDl C<Kmiia..nd 1 f 11CC~3-8N'f.
B:rP.~~1'-d. l.lo to diSGUl!t8 a. .Ce<l-
GJl'a:to-d CoQS::». At ·t be 609 Uitl!)) . Tbtl USSR~ f1 r.el)·ly 011 10 Sop•
Tshomb6 c-ont.:l"lwee t-o mQk-.c> i;t;11tc- tembor . tc,> • l)Qt.9 ·f ron lllltwiar-
neots t~~o~1~B ~omplete :iade- &l'Jo l ·d ~,gud.ln_g dh-oc·t Soviet
oeod.eoco toT Kntcnp. 'Th18 a.ri- ll.1d 'tO th" C'ottG'O 1ndic~to~ Nos-
p:uielfl.'tl;y to 111.rge.1 1 • ba1·g~1n.us cowt9 inteaUora t ;o ce>ntl.nua itA
. taotio, but also d.estgru:i·d to ua.i 111:to~ai a,\IPP<>I' t fo r .Ltutilinhll •
appe-al t.o lc>c~ l •.clvocAte-.s ot· 11 Tbe- SOvic-t. not• ~tR"~ t-b.at ·Ille
SiJFaJ"~"C-9 l(a t~l'l-8!'1 · : . . ~CU:ri"t)' Cou.nci l TO$/O 1,u"tions · .
''do ao-i ua cn.ttnot re!it:r .icrt ..
. C?~le't- Bloc ltovo.9 tbQ right .of the Con.~olege Go.v-
-er.nmoot to ro-quoe·t a.110 l"Ooehe
'f1\o ~u:Diat bloc 1& be- Aas1sta.oee d1.E"eo1:-l.y ,tl'OG_I 899'-
eo.ttln(t llJOr-e itt•ol:ved ta the ei>nraci:it:~ 91 'l·tllGl' eouotrtes 1u1d
OonBO S'1taAt1oD. !Chru4h-Che-v ·, as&ert6d thut So~1ot ~1~ 1ft the
J.q tbo ·•troa~9t Soviet a.ttRC~ i~t·11 ·O l oh'll a.ir'Cl'·a .t't a.lld raoto:r
OD Ha;a.~~rSkJO l O to d.Atq, ChllJ'god vob.1-=.la:i; w~ "!f\tllt a~t!s-i.11tcot ••
e>n. 1~ SoptGDba.r t:b1u. · the UN ee.c- fN'Ufa tbe:se rc(lolu·i'J.-one . ·Moaco1,1
ratar y teu~ral ts "'C.Oll~10\l.~ly 9X_p:r~98&d 8.U.rpriae- tbA:t t.h1> ~QO­
wor~1na ln ~he 1ntorcDtsi of tho rcta.l"y .go.~vrgl w~e ~tt~ptimg to
i11pt)l'i11.1.,s:~n" l .n tbe ·C oa10 a.n4 ¢0.l)tJto.l ·tlid Co:ng.o,e irel&tiotis
t.b.11.t hie ~·tlou .''ctontaU -v1tll ·~tttl ouv.u• Bt.bt'i':t, spa<: Uie:a.Us-
tha USSR. . .

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t~rn vU.b t-h& J'l!l-J1"'diatio11 ot t ;h.e VaQOAktlot ~ Olm. a.ad 11'\oUtJJ.
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ou11. TltoU' .soU-ettl•d ••twvolu- toast .at tbt.a uae--. "tt\ci-J -'-"""
-u .oaary (loamt tteo 1r proe'J,attJied pl:edged g u.pgon to nAlf sa \rD..Qg
CJVlll" Rridio Sava.iitia.khet on 10 aad seat o~a:ruis to Utan.fl
S«il pt~unbe)' that l t had teui_po..ra:r- Pru.bllng t--o h phi,~ tb~t.r ac-
Uy f!Ot -11A;!ct~ l'ttD c:on•Utu--Ciol'.I., ·u ons ·t o 't.he llloiu.re:-h.
"'OW!lted-"' -tbe 8qu•1um~ go.v el;'Jl-
.tient ; a.eel ae-cre&d ID&l"t 1-D. l law 1'hc ~~Clt.lbo-t. group c!A.im
t,Eiro~fi,liOLl.'t taos .
All ml.U.tu:.,- tbO loyal:tJ ot ~U fOUT 'l'J11.l~
~oNJM n~rs . t.?-1'~11 eel'va.llt&, .a.nd l'OIJ10D- comnabdocs outo.i de qi
· ;people vere :r.eq,u er;te-d t--o rec- V:tont.ta.110_, .as wo11 as tea of
o;nize the . au~h6rlty oJ -oom-
miti.ee Cbairtta:n .Boim OWn &ltd ~o
the c:mmtry 'c; U P-rovt neul
~rbOJ."a , but their ~u•t•~no4
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d~rei;n.:rd V.tentta.'OC ' G 07~o-re. laela.Dc~ &n.d l.l.ntey Df jlll:lr~e
i$ «>?e~ 'to qu.*1;tioD. Th& -first
Po\t.Q. Oun
ls t bQ oO-Jear- tiUitary region cocnqand·o·r, wi-th
o~d ~~e-di~ary l"l.ller. ot $O~th­ h~Octuar-w:rs ·J n ~ag ~~~g.
er.D 1.lloe. •ho reoou.nced hla bQi.r. tt1ftl1'5 Qd Jl,1 tnaelf · tw·toe· Cl.lid
c:1:a 1118 1» 1946 in favor ot. e oow seen& te~htiwlf to bo
ual.Ued ,~Q-$ undor t~o _K11)g ~t supporu~ t~ .sou~~ s:ovon-
LiiaoJ Ptiab11ug • . Descr.ib&d o.s 11eat . th.~ l oya.lty of lonr
a.:n oa:i'iby. Pl"ac·n q-a 1 IMO or ac- aohelcm miU~ry i.m itis- -u O\fGll
~j,oa. ~"'n ~ 1.8 ~.Ucvc4 to 110.1 '0 di:f.ficult to .1ur,::al!ls.-;. DOUD
Jtnve c 'h Afe:d iJl reoe:at :ye"_r.q OuR' aiid Pltowt •.Ul .r.eq_ulr-6
ovor thQ lack 01 scoJ)O oJtered outside. f:i.~r:ieiA-1 -an4 iou·u .-uc.
for Ais cnorg1c6 by iUa 81.DO- s.u _pport i f t~&7 ~ t ·et- ca n 1
o.ur& lJO.Si.t-ton a.Ii.a iaJtpec:t.Qr ~.n,.. out tbou -plans.
4>.ral o~ the Xi.ru:.<lcm. Baun Ou'-
wa.c ao aot-1.-J'apamr.so l'Q8.1sta.n.ce 1.bD4 ID:r, SOQ.vv.ma. has
l!i?ader i.a •or1d h r n .. •Qd. ii! f eactcd 'o· che 8au:n Oum • P'l\ou~l
1~~4 ho lod comaabao troops a -l,loE!p Yitll 111ode:riu..ia11, ~P·
llgll1Jl.St tb.c Sn-VAd..1DB Vle-t Mlnh. J>al"eDUy .vtt.U hoptnir 1or a
D9 vma premier iD l9d9•$Q. -~ -COQJ'Olliee . 1'1! MO doclU"ed Q
f~11on aU111.11ent wUh ·the h:Jt at~_te ot
oeargon.c-y tlrt'vu1d1out '
•nd t~ i.JIJ)051~1on 01 -autbott~ -the aDWJtZ'ft bl.It ba6 aot -Y-•-t
tnri~ft g°"er.D11.e~t~ bl'IU\dad Phoue»t. and SQuip. ~"' RB

PART .I 01' UWl!Dl4l'E' lr«TBBBST ~o. e or 10

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(b)(3)·
ECRET : _ _ _ _ ___,

The _Congo Situation (Information .as of 0300 EDT)

Colonel Mobutu has moved to consolidate control in the Leo-

poldville area. 9n 16 September, troops loyal to him prevented ·
a mee~ing--called by President Kasavubu--of the Congolese Nation-
al Assembly. _Mobutu troops also raided Lumumba's r esidence
and arrested about twenty of the pre~ier's staff, although Lumumba
himself remained unmolested. Censorship reportedly has been im-
posed at the. Leopoldville telegraph office. This .activity ls in line
with Mobutu's announced policy of "neutralizing" c·ontentious political
forces. ·

· Mobutu also repeated his demand that CommunlS.t bloc diplomats

. leave the Congo by.noon· on 17 September. · According to press sources,
on 16 September personnel of the' Soviet and Czech embassies begari
preparations to depart Leopoldville. A TASS newsman was quoted
by a .western jo.u r:ilallst as saying, ''We are ill leaving tomorrow. "
.I -- (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

/
I
L_
. The-latest attempt by the central government to invade Katanga
apparently has failed, and at least part of the Congolese invading
force has retired across the border into Klvu province. The Tshomb~
government continues to be troubled, however, by serious disorders
among Baluba tribesmen in northern Katanga.· Ti;ihomb~'s troops
reportedly have killed fifte en persons ln suppressing disturbances at
Manono in the north central par t of the province, and another 20.
tribesmen have been killed at Luena, about 60 mile s southeast of
Kamlna. ·

At the Security Council meeting on 16· September, Tunisia and

Ceylon introduced a modera~ resolution. designed to confirm the

( b)(3) ~

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present ·UNJ20Sltlon Without spectflcally co.nc;lemnlng the USSR's

actlvttles. \Ilda resoll:ltlon was vetoed by the USSR, supported
by Poland wlth ·France abstaining. The US then called for a"
emergency s·e aston of the General Assembly which· was· summoned,
oyer a negative Soviet vote, ·for 2000 EDT 17 September . ...se~.re.tary ·.
General Hammarskjold ls.confident that the African states w.111
support hlm ln the Assembly, arid he believes he ·c an force the USSR
into the unpopul# position of defending unllateral military su art
of the Con o ln. defiance of the UN. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

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1I I I I I I ~I Ill •
.. ·-- --
• I • I .. • • - •
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WR/AYA'/~/RiWA'/R/A'Y//AW#/#H'/~R/R.t.w.eaw.ve,,./////.V.11»'/.Wa«V/~.W~

·=ZJF SECRET...[

The regime ls making a special effort· to min-

- - - - --'-r-...-:m
=-rz=-e=-:::i.'-
o=m estic apprehension. During Gursel's absence,
Deputy Pre~ier Fahri. Ozdilek, former chlef of the Army
General Staff, .is the acting chief of state, closely sup•
_ _ _ ___ ported by General Madanoglu, apparently the· dominant
member of the Committee of National IInt ruLLj
I L--~
, ~~~

· · ·Congo: (Tension between UN officials and the ~obutu

r --'--- -----, regime niayTncrease following Hammarskjold's criticism
of the Congo leader at the·Security Council session on 7
December, when he stated that technical and financial aid .
outside the UN framework were r~sponsible for the rehabil~
L-- ------ ltation of".the Congolese Arn;iy and Mobutu's strengthened
position.lln the Congo, the UN Command has ·reacted strongly
·against Mobutu's order to control the transport of UN mil~ .
itary supplies which came soon after announcement of the
·impending withdrawal of Ceylonese, UAR, and Yugoslav
· ·for·c es. The Yugoslav action wtil deprive the UN Command
of some of its n~cessary aviation maintenance men; the UAR
withdrawal:. will strip the hard~pressed UN forces of 500
troops. .
Colonel Mobutu has taken measures to attempt to seal
oft the ~umumba partisans in Orientale Province, and ·Pres-
ident Kasavubu has proclaimed a state of emergency in that
[province, probablv in nrenaratian for . ~i~tarv lnti(~:~o~.

III. THE WEST.

Chile:- US~~: Tbe conseryatlve Alessandrl government

· ha~ expressed concern to the US Embassy in Santiago over
. Soviet tra(le overtures, particularly off~rs to supply petro 0

leum at well below world prices and to purchase substantial

quantities of copper. The offers, presumably made by Soviet
· representatives now-in Chlle, are presented as straight com-
·mercial tra~sactions and not barter. Leftist politicians a;re
i
9 Dec 60 · . DAILY BRIEF iii \
I-
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~
oc1· NO. 00011&o
111
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

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CENTf.h"L
OFRCE Of' CUl'lENT INlEWGENC!

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i•

CVBRllH IKTELL.I(lJ.}(CB WlmltLY SUMMABV

29 Docember 1960

.A "bala.nce of wea.fQia$c;1·.1 Altb.otJ#fJ his hold on K1vu

b~tv.·een Gi~e:aga•s a.n-d Mobutu 'e 18 .P n>bab.l y _preca.r1ous, t·be eaaa
tot>ees ,. lb wb1cb MOb1,1\'.\l hesitat- W1 tb wbtc.b Oh;en;p acb.1e"·e d . the.
ed to move ailitA~ i ly •1a1ns~ fin.-t of b.1..8 goals , w1tb littlo
t.be '#ell but iaccee:slble reg1.12e GutrddQ belp, Ca.ti be ur,;oatcd
at Btaelc:7v.tllo, cmd.ed. o".ll· 25" to boq8t tbe ~1881deat:s • -pr-ea ....
Dceeml1~r vhon G1z.a1a•9 aold.lors tiae bo~ •Hll tn a.ad out4 i~C.J
entered ltiV\1 Provine.a. A force "tbo Con~o.
of at;»o\rt eo •~n se1Md p.rovt.n-
Ci.al ).QQ.dor• a.n.d a m.111 tary Cl.Om• The s1tuaUoo 1.n K:hu will
$rad,~r r"a.rcied as leant~ tD~W'CI - 1ncr~aso pr~aur~ oo Nobu~q to
tmdertoko a1.li tary
oporatloo9 agal4St
tho di~•ldente, aot-
wi,.tbeU.ndi.ng UN oi>.po-
niuon. e&D1arsk,101d
bu sent a letter to
Ka-6l\V~Q i~pl7icg ·that
be wlll aek tbe Socurity
Co.uacll t .o tilko t .he UN
out of tho- Congo it
li!Cbutu wJas :f-Dl'~9 in
aa at tatpt to .ulte
Or·. iantalo Pro'ltDC:ft.
bi!l&v·u bu--i n ~n -~P­
pa.raat at·t 91npt to avoid
au ogatrv.ctioa1st role
ralQtivv to tbe UH-·
~ indi.c&UJl]
(b )( 1)
I I that 6~
ie willb~ to reoeho
tbo 1ons·~a1Uayed w
concilia:i-100 ~ids­
sto~t pret~ra.bi1 ~t
tbe .. ume of iJIL!llJW&r-
skj ol.d 'B \' il!l,i t to L6'o-
~ol GVJ l le oa ~-4 uao- (b)(3)
uitr¥.
Bobutu. 41.t bougb oo more tba.ft lle&DWtllle, G.1.1;in®, GJn~na,
a f.ew- l:luad~d t:~oopa were us6d .Dli • · &Gd. the UAR h~v~ a~ceDte<l
by tbc dle.eidents, by 27 DecC!'.11- ~n 1.Av1tat1o~ from Kina Uohatted
bo.r 11~ch of' the f"rC1V lftc.e appcmr-ed V of Moroeao to n9ot .1o Oi.sa-
rqpon.etve ~o tb.e Oiiz.ooga.. r'OS'lllle. blaa.aa on 3 Jan~ to discuss
c~n pl:'Obl oma. In add.l t.ioa to
By bls iDUta-tho Gizenga jt.f'Ov idj.ag a •O\Ut<l_1Qf boa rd ~O:r
saineel ~o.nt.rol O"f a food-pro- aat.i-WQR_te.ro pt:OhOUD.eemonta ~ tbo
d~cing area ·ea._p&·blo of Ul~vt•t- m~t-igs ~5 e.x pected to procnote
1DIJ tb.e serious 1.'6od •ibc:trtniie 4hc~s1on ol pos.sibl.o jotnt a.c-
1.a Staate7vlll~ . U11:n• to atd the 8t1Lol0,y1t.U .lo
d.1BS.1Ce.4tS.

~
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- -.. ; - ... .._,. __ . _,,.. .
CURB.BNT l'tfT£.U.1GSNCB t/.E.BlLY SD~llY

~ . Dece~l~H' l9GO

Sovie>t ta~oign Miniot:ir ia.nc& trom ~i~ensu by roitorat-

Gro~>to Oh 23 December eatd tbon~ in~ aeneral pro11·L aee ot Sov1.et
ttio 11-ssa rec~olites G1zienga a8 euppo'f't. aod s11npatUJ1 'bui avo1d-
tho "o.ct.t ng p.ter:iier of t.be le- init llaf spao:l'lic conmJ.tments.
sHi~to sovucmc:ot oJ tbc Qon- ~oeco., ~AJ be a~'.t\-ltiag the ou~­
so, " b"Qt tho <USSll bllo ao tar qOlllc· o~ thQ Cn.sllb1tl.a(la. mc:etiag
refrAio~d fro.II oxtoQdjng oid ot A1riol1XI lcadors before taBio~
aiu;t e,;pU,c~t ;-ccogni~ion. to a de~ini~e at.&Ad tOWArd the rump
h1e StanlQV.l llo rciJaO. Oeo- gov".nunon t . ·
ll}'ko. ropqrt:lug on davolOPRqnt.a
ltl t.be c~11go, told 't.llo $\.lp.l'qo In IA)Opoldvillo. tho ap-
SoYiet tllai ••cuttbr.oat11 in t.bo 111'0.\l.~bot. 31 Deem'be·I", or.tgimlll,)'
pay ot. tore1B:Dere'• b~d &dJwrnG.cl eet by llobtr.tu ae the ~el.'11.tcu~l
the pa.rlianeft't e.1eetec:t ·t>y the cfat.e. 'tor b.U 1nteT'11D sovoromcu't.
COagolese peQr.Ue a.ncs ha<I 1.llr- has B't1r.r.ed new d.1ssena1oa over
prts.one.d ·t:rte lawful preniier, the absence or c1vt1 gove.l'nlft&nt.
l;mmba. He asaertea th.At. tb.1e , io the CGago. Mobutu appears to
'bov.•cvcn·~
could riot be 'l"eearded :ta."or. the retenUO'il of hie cocn-
aa ia. vlct:0r, . for the 11:Coloa..t.a.l~ m1sa~oner.s wiaar ~ pr~er re-
ists" boC11W110 it had diapelled apons.1 ve to· 'hislaa1f; Kasavubu ~
tbe o~ivo i1lubida that th~ aq tbe o'Ul.6~ baad, !avo~a the
ur.iU volunua.:d ll' l"OUQQPlCJb tbcir ~0;ntol'Qtton o( 1he lloo cabinotJ
rule ta 't.b9 ci;>.loni~:u,1. 1'.bG f~i.l­ w1:th wbicsb h.o dt:11pla.ood L'\ml'Wlb11 .
u:~e · or the VH in Cho Cougo ~.h·V-il"" (b )( 1)
t1on. be ~~ld. tl'a.keB c.lOlttr tbo
·~11rese1ria need" tor ~h1uwtos (b)(3)
·cbe &tructut"a ot that body.
Xh.rush~he<v, aftor a delay
ot t~n· da7s, ~~spoftded 04 2~
bQoC111b~r to ao appe•l for assist-

Following ~ progr~•$ in ro1;1awtag tho tt'ade ~c·t. fo

the caruer tau:s, aaet - •eet Us s·O'eeeb to tbe .sopr-erte soviet
Gonna11 .a egot1.a t1ons on reacti'la- om 23 .Deecmber ~ Fore1p l11n1ster
·t .ion o-1 'Ul,e i:a.terzoilAl tracte Oriocn)'ko wa:r -iied that. l.ailure to
oarce.acut were 6t1.1 1 1.a. the bard rea~h 6.n agreement ~'O~ld be
bA.rsat.nl~ir phase u of 20 Decom- 14
.ft'a\J6ht •i th UtlCXJ'CCt o<l IUld
ba1". 'l'tic !aat Go~n rdprese.ata- qi.i.itQ ~orOWJ conscqucmcall, ••
~1 vo on 22 Doco~~or . $uddcnl,y ~c­ 11lght ellei t an Eaat Germa.n
vereed. hi'1 ' c:cm:c.i.U.o;tory 11hitudo, •;:roto.Uat.o ry 'bl~.'' aq.d CQ\lld
compla1ne¢ 'bout ~1..a.ke " to tbe even J.ead to !'• dll.tlgorous c:ori-
westel"o p..-an, .ad. ukcid toi- ;i pl tcat~on in relat19ft& betseen
poetpone11e.it.t ot tbe n·e got.1at1one the tour pcwers:." Tbts tbreat
uo~tl 29 DecEHlll>er. -Wblcb coa:tt"A&'te wUb the iren:-
e.ral tott& ol Gr-om:rko"s eoeecb
Tfte USSR tor ·tbe !1.rs~ - a t 1.ndlcate· that. Ulhd.Cht
tlee 18 htgb-leve1 puh-
giw~llg appeU.~ to Uosccw for .speet.U-0
110. su9port to Bast Gernaot's .support to strengthen his hand
c~to'l'td to pressuro eocui ·into in the· tiallts .

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 ' *-Mali:-~~all arms':.and ammwtlti~n.___ _ _-,-_ ______ _J
I
(,£j( 1)
· CJhavebeen ..transshipped .by _truck.from Guinea to Mali at
·regular· intervals last month. The arms, ,which probably are ·
fr9m stocks_given Guinea in 1959 by Czechoslovakia, are be- -~ (c:::..
(11)
· ll_e ved intended for distribution to internal security forces and
_____I . for stockpiling. Acquisition o~ 'bloc arms in .t his way, report-
(1(3)
. edly arrapged during Uie early December meeting between top
Malian and Guinean .leaders, reflects the growing influence of
·the·nro-Gllinea extremist faction-in ~fall's single-party reglme.t
I J ... ~ (b (3)
ll

*iongo: Mobutu's unsuccessful attempt to move his troops

Jnto ivu Proy;ince on 1.January may influence him to def er any
f~her such efforts. for the present. On 30 December,. similar
moves had been' reported about to be undertaken from points in
. Equateur Province i~to neighboring Orientale Prov w now.
~controlled bv Lumumba's dePutY G'zen a. Re orts .!)jc::-

indicate a .general breakdown of the governmen

.....____ur-o~pean ·settlers
terrorized by undisciplined troops. These
troops were conv-inced. by ~ltators from Stanleyville that .t he
Congo will return .to colonial status if Lumumba is not released.
Meanwhile, Hammarskjold's sharp rebuke of Belgium on. 2 Jan-
"Uary' for allowing Mobu~uis Klvu-bound troops to land in.the UN
trust territory of Ruanda-Urundl will probably encourage Lu-
. mumba 's supporters abroad to press for addltional curbs on the
Mobutu regime.
Reports that clearance-has .been requested for ·s evenIL-14
aircraft to .l and at Khartoum .en route to Stanleyville suggest a I
3 Jan 61 · . DAILY BRIEF v

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possible earty attempt by Soviet bloc or other pro-Lumumba

elements ·to buttress Gizenga's regime. Sudan's foreign min-
ister repeated on 31 .D ecember, however, earlier Sudanese -r---~-'--------
a s s u rances that no such clearances would be ranted.

--~ eria-France:[Rtghtist opponents of De Gaulle in

--- Alger a reporte y. ave definite .plans for street demonstra-
tion~· beginning4 January. Moslem viol~nce continues nightly
in Oran, with Moslems reported ready to mount CQWlterdem-.
1(3)
D onstrations if the ri.g htists go into the streeD Possibly reflect-
lng.government fear of widespread abstentions in the ·ref eren-
dum, De Gaulle appealed in.his New Year's Eve message for
(JJ ft::::.

. "vast approval" of his policy and implied he would resign if

.. there were a large number of negr ive votes or abstentions. ·
•
(b (3)

IV. THE WEST

*East Ger~any - ·west Germany;CVest Berlin Mayor Brandt

has indicated that in· the recently concluded interzonal trade
talks, the East Germans accededto all of Bonn's demands and
agreed not to implement. the restrictions on West German travel
I
to East Berlin which last September had-led .Bonn to cancel the ~)( 1 )1
trade pact. West Germany has not yet informed its allies of the
detailed formulation of the new agreement
(1(
'-----=--~
1
ermany accepted we . er woriling than it o._r_i_g_
i n_a_ll_y_d_e_s_i_,r.ed
. . ,rr.e=:'"n,------J
"' )
several points in qrder·to reach agreement. The East Ge rmans 3
(b)( ) ·
were success~ul In insisting that .their concessions w~~ld remain
in effect onlv if the strictest secj ecy were maintaine~ I
I _(Page 4) · (b 3)

.* EI. Salvador: The provisional gover~ment appears moving to <Pr:-

reduce US · eco~omic and military assistance. The defense minister
.. told a group of US officials on.28 December that his government

· 3 Jan .61 DAILY BRIEF vi

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Oct NO. ·C>2<i$1s1
t FGb.fl.laJ"Y U Hil

·CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

, '

'
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CENTRAL

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CunaENT JNTELLTG~~ W.lif!lr.LY S0r4NA.RY

2 F~bl'ua·r)' 196.l

. ~xeept the UDltod statas, euba, seeds throughout tl\ls pr-0111n.;c•·

the
DOlniDiC~D Ropublic, ana 1\ttd T1er-c '1W41'ting' hC!'lp i.I.). thoir
~l'~ Pre>DO$iruf jo-int con:c.Ui- ~Jan~ to.,; the US. 1'ber&fore,
nt:ion of "the us-~!'-n prob ... ~astro went on, ''We oow b.;nre
10Q•1 bv tho LaUn Aoorican& to cl CP.n out Q U O\lr o:t ficos ! n
act tog ·outside t.b.e framev.'Ork o.f this pr9vinee."
tile Org~abaUon of ~~¢1'.lcan
3tates or· the Uu1ted "Nat1~ns. ·C~atro pl.edged that mill ..
Cb1ribo,ga•s 1n1tlnt1vo ~B ~­ tayy ·o_peratlon.a "l.n 'the n.ounti\i"4G
rou..eing little su;p port, 1.n part: and tho purgos tu p.rov1u.c 1al
bec~usc. the tnc~oqt ~""1- offie~e woUJ.d cunvc;r-t Ln~ V:U.'l ar;
dorea.o Covernmeot lAcks J)r-es ... .:l.nto ••the most revoluti.oo:r.ry
tigc i11 tho hQ111h1pho:ro . prov1n<!le ot Cubn. ;, Trto d;lyo bo-
to.r o ·°'\.atni •a &peooh, tbo loade1·
la. a s.Poocll on 28 Ja-n"Ua.ry of the. '" Second Fi"Oot of the E~­
i n Llls VU las P.roviace, Ctistro c.a11br:n.y," mop <ivitorro:z Me!loyo,
fo~ th& £1rs~ time publ~ly a.Del ~ ·n~bq.r or other Cuban l!l.rtll)'
ac:knowl4>ciged tho oztent ot 'the oftleers arr1ved in Rey We~ t by
<l-Ow1t.&rre'\lolutio·11:lr1 threa f . open boat oec~ing asylvm.
tbere. He clRimod that ant1~
Ctls1.r4> (;\ten1il.as 1 wh1cll -he · Cho Guov~r~. o~~hitcct of
n1cl ni;imborod. CJVo:r 500, i .n tJte at~ t:iet economy
the r ,e gi.ne 's
Eacellbr"l' Moun ta.l as are ••·ferul~d. n.nd th~ oft~c~al cbioLly re-
io to tho poiot whore tboy can- spon.siblo tor ne~t:1a ting l!let
not e:scape, Wb.en. tbese ·renc-e.s ye~r t -s econoaic ngrecaien t.a wi. th
(b )( 1)
~e ~t.rong eno-~. 'bo.t·taUon'$ thG bloc, mn.y soon ra.~_.._,..___...__-----,
of Gilltia woll and epocially 'fo~l c.ab111e·t ·poet.
ua1.o ed W111 advaoce o.a thelli ... (b )( 1)
Castro blamec.1 tbo couoter~
.i>-evolutiobary .:tctlvit:f ln .L il.$ G expected short y (b )( 1)
VU.la~ OJ:> '.th~ "ba,dn ~evoluUoll.­ ·o res.1go as )>l"esi.d'err t of the
o.r1ea ot the ns.eeona P.r<>nt. O.f N°RU()nal Banlt t-o ta~o tbe ncrw
the ~caebrtty. •• an iridog~odont o&t. ot minister or 1ndu~ ri
gi-oUJ> a.11 iec1 wt th Cast.ro foree.a (b)(1)
dur!.ng tbe :J..&tter part of the (b)(3)
o.nt~-~t1et~ ~~vol~ti~n an4
tJie1' ln tegr11 t-ed ·1 .nto &etN '$
~rmy • He ma i~ tb oso ''&\lbve.T-
st ves have pla:nted 41.v erslon·i .s:t

QONGO
. 'Ibo o:tforts o:t President t ,b.o Congo and a.re .b.1nderea. by l'.l.
l!As~v~bu and Colonel HObu~u to Bhottll,gti of m111 U:ry oupplio".
co"otcr. the n.Qtivhie·s ot tile
pro ...commtl.bist 01~.ena.n. .reigitne JQa.n Dol :tlro~go, t=asa vc1bu 1 s
in Sta.n.l.oyv·iHe to.co &. €;rowing in forca:t.ton min 1st.er· a.cd Ute
·trend t;O\Jar-d f .r aguieoU.'t'.l.011 of le~der ot £'q\1l1.t.eur Provlneo~

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CUJUt.£'.NT 1M't.BLLIGENC£ WBEK.L.Y SUDAllY
2 f'Qbl"\Ul..cy l,~8).

i~ nbrtbw.eat.e ro Ooago, ho.B b~n expected to hJ!le place .nt n

aeeo~tat~n~ ~1th (fl'qQps in later d~te ~B .6llsabotl\v1Jlo~
~1,4bborJ-ne n;ipublico O'l tho but in vi.ow of tbo ~cnr.fcrcncc ' 6
vrcncb Comn.uaity tor ·1t.111tary unreprese.attt1.ve imture and th.a
assista.aoe II.Ml son"Y=-~.t.:llJ.~....___ _ _1 oootlnllecl d.isa11Ueement belt$O.l.1
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• t.Tt::l.11."Y with 'n:ihcmb6 !llld Kn.lcu:~jl,
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protoct Bqu.atc:iur Provi.ftoe 1u1.d uoe 'to :r-otu•o to allow dd ill~
appro11ah.ed th& Aa.t)rlou ainba.s- t01'1Q.l t.o ltll>Ve across its 'tO¥r1-
sa.do1' on 28 Ja4\lal"Y tor US turf. 'lAS'S sDDOlllicea on 30 .Ja.au..
&r>nG tor ihi~ puztpC>ac. Such ~l"')'· that thD lf$SR bad a:skcd
~ctivi.tle• .ill~acrate the UD ~ Sudanese Pre~ld~a.t Abboud ~o
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unt·ty . a.reas 01 tl.te couao .
tilt- prepcrde>r:r .,011 t1<t.n.l .Sudancieie of'fich.lu fear
coa1e.rea.ee at Leo-poldvl1l·e ot th:a t 11nlet1e t"ber.e .ls e-ffect;.~ve
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parti.cipo.tioa of G!zens-'8 ed- ~~tuat~on ~1 datortornte tu
bereute.--..chOse lts <>'1!1.Cers and the p6int mere the Sudan wo·uld
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. , -- ........... ·---- ......--....
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(b)(3y.'.
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(Map}

Congo Situation: The _generally favorable response in the

·uN to Hammarskjold's s~ggestion that-the Congo crisis be
solved by neutralizing rival Congolese military factions has
led to similar. but more comprehensive proposals by several
UN members. Typical of these is a Nigerian plan which- - in
addition to neutralizing the Congolese Army and the fighting
forces of the several ':' breakaway states"--would make the
UN responsible for law and order, permit the release of all
political prisooors, including Lumumba, and provide for the
establishment of a new, broad-based government. This gov-
ernment would then draft a new federal-type constitution -~ . ~.
.... : -
.. :-

6 Feb 61 .DAI~Y BRIEF ii

..
: ..~·.(

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... :··

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: ..~ "'
., ,_.·;;!~!:.' ~~

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permitting a considerable degree of provincial autonomy and

call for general elections under UN sponsorship. Reaction
- .~ ·:· : by the Soviet representative at the UN to the neutralization
.. ·~~: .,. ... proposal of Hammarskjold has been reserved. The Congo-
;~¥.~
- ~ '.'. :.~ lese spokesmen at the UN, when apprised of specific neu-
. ,1· ·~ '

:::.f'.;:~ tralization proposals, strongly objected. Although Gizenga

-~. 'i '? ;.:
. :: .
... _; ~-- :;.
and Tshombe have not released statements on their reac-
tions, a maximum amount of pressrre woul~blv be ~~~I
r: .
nppdpd to gprnrp th p t compliance . ~----------------'
: ; . ... -
._ ..
.~

• I :• I.

The military situation in the Congo continues to pose

difficulties for the UN .forces , which ~ave recently been weak-
ened by troop withdrawals. On 4 February, a UN Nigerian
unit was ambushed by a pro.-Lumumba force near Kindu in
Ki vu Province. Although an uneasy truce was called after
an all-day exchange of fire between the two wiits, both sides
have continued to maintain their battle positions. An improve-
ment in the security of. the outlying areas cannot be e:>q>ected
until more troops under UN control arrive in the Congo.
Mal.3.ya and Liberia have expressed a willingness to supply
additional military aid to the UN force, and ~e Renuhlic of
~ scheduled to provide a "token" unit. [ _
L__J(Backup, Page 7) (Map) ~.---~

South Korea: The recent reshuffle of the cabinet, which ..

·· '(
brought five new ministers and four vice ministers into the
government, is an attempt of the Chang Myon administration
to rally more parliamentary support. Popular expectations
were high following the ouster of Syngman Rhee last April,
but the·Chang Myon government, beset with factionalism and
corruption and handicapped by a demoralized poJice estab-
lishment, has not shown the dynamic leadership needed to
·gain p()pular support. Popular demands for reprisals against
those associated with the Rhee regime has.led to ex post facto
legislation. Action under these ~ws could exclude from public
;Life large numbers of the limited supply o(trained personnel.
. With a,n assist from a heavy propaganda barrage from the
North, tlie belief is spreading, particularly among younger
:· ,1...
_..: ' .. ; .

6 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii

:::::~ -~ .
·· ·: ;-:·.=:'.t·:·, · : z.:. ~~ .: r~ :~:?~:~:~ ~:~; -~;-~;;, ~ ;~~~\~: ~r:::1:~~~·-rr~~?1;··~f.~J:'.~~~~t~?~.~:~~·'.Z!~:·~:i~f.Gf(.·;~~~;~:=_~:;.~:~:t;{1 r.~:,:~~}~:I1~·~·;ff?~~~f~!\~}~~~l~;,~~:·~i-~?.~·~~~1t:ft~~~~11~t~~r-~~~f:::~~:\ti~~~:~ =r.~~ :_-~~~_::. ; -

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~-----'

Situation in the Congo

The American interest in promoting a new approach

.to the Congo is meeting with general approval from many
UN delegates. Latin American and Scandanavian represent-
atives consulted have expressed general agreement, a UK
delegate has recommended to London that the approach be·
supported, and the UAR representative has characterized
it as a "step in the right direction."

The French position is unclear. A French spokesman

in Washington suggested on 3 February· that Paris probably
would cooperate, but at the meeting in Paris last week of. the
foreign ministers of the Community of Six, the French for-
eign minister was quoted by his Belgian counterpart that
the "UN effort had fail~" and that France was considering
. extending ''bilateral military· and other assi~tance on an ade-
quate scale to Kasavubu and his supporters."

Most representatives of the neutralist Afro-Asian.bloc

in the UN have stressed the need for Lumumba's release at
an early stage and indicated that they would tolerate Bel~
gium 's continued presence in the Congo only under strict UN
control.

The situation in Katanga continues to be confused. A

Kasavubu adviser told the US Embassy on 1 February that
negotiations ·b etween representatives of the Leopoldville and
Katanga governments to form a common military front a-
gainst the Gizenga regime had collapsed. Tshombe, after
rejecting Kasavubu's final offer, announced his refusal to
send a .delegation to the round-tatte talks scheduled for 15
February.' The adviser added that since further approaches
to Tshombe would prove useless , the Leopoldville govern~
ment probably would eventually renew its attempt to elim~
inate Tshom~ by armed attack.
Tshombe, however, may believe that hi s regime will
benefit more from Belgian- - and possibly French--support
than by becoming involved with the distant Leopoldville

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of the C o .n go

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·... ·-

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forces . Hammarskjold implied to Ambassador Stevenson
on 2 February· that Belgian supply efforts to Katanga were
of greater m itude than those to Stanle llle the UAR
and~ (b)(1) ~
(b)(3) -

~ .____
I _ _ ____.I
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6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8

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supervises party affairs . in the USSR's largest republic. Com-

pared. with some other·Soviet republics, the RSFSR had a
satisfactory agricultural year in 1960 and there has been no
indication of executive failures on Aristov's part. His demo-
tion app.e ars to be the outcome of a competition for authority
·among Khrushchev's lieutenants. His removal from the
RSFSR post, in which he has been replaced by a newcomer
to the central command, appears likely both. to strengthen
the grip of Frol Kozlov, as Khrushchev'B principal party aide (b)(3)
on the RSFSR party organ.~ation and to enpance the oosition
·of Dmitry Polyansky, the .RSFSR premier. L
I I ~~~~--
(b)(3)

(b )( 1)
( b )(~)

C~mgo: Britain, France, and Belgium have now expressed

.reservations concerning a:ammarskjold's recent proposals that
the Congolese.Army be neutralized. The British believe that
the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu
and that his position would be undermined if the troops in the
Leopoldville _a rea were disarmed. French and Belgian rep-
resentatives have also stated th.a t the proposal would be
. ..:{.. ~

·.:-. ·:....
;.;

• .:
· 7 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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detrimental to ~savubu's legal position, and mi ht result

·1n the earl restoration to ower of Lumumba. (b)(3)

Burma: General Ne Win appears to have staved off a

potential challenge tO his control of the Burmese A.r my. On
3 Februar·y , he reportedly accepted the resignation of Brig-
adier Maung Maun·g, as well as the resignations of .several
other senior officers, and ordered five of Burma's .13 bri-
gade commanders to attach~ posts abroad. .These actions
would eliminate those who have argued most strongly for a:
resumption of mllltary government and against Prime Min-
ister Nu's olfo of ra rochement wlth Pei i .
(b )(3)

Iran: The Shah is· reported to be discouraged by elec-

tion dillfculties, problems ln Iranian-Soviet relations, and
uncertainty over future American policy toward Iran. The
fear of resurgent nationalists~ led him to impose almost
complete control over the current parliamentary elections.
This in turn has brought an increase ln antlregtme activity
o~ nationalist groups. While the Shah has given. earlier as-
surances to the Ui:iited States that he would not make any
slgnific~t polltlcal concessions to the ·ussR, he has in-
structed his prime. minister not to be "totally antagonistic"
toward the USSR but to flnd out what the Soviet Ilni.on.Jrn_uL
· be willing to do for Iran. I (b)(3)

(b )( 1)
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7 Feb 61 · DAILY BRIEF Hi

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Congo Situation

A British Foreign Office official has indicated that Brit-

ain has some reservations concerning the recent United
States initiative in the Congo. The American Embassy in
London believes that the British will ask for a further re-
view of the proposals before they are willing to support them.
Representatives of the French· and Belgian governments have
also r.aised questions concerning the plan.
The British believe that the military situation in the
Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would
be compr.omised by a neutralization of ·the Congolese forces , .
as the United States plan suggests. Moreover, they question
whether Kasavubu will accept the plan and doubt that many
UN members would be willing to make the necessary sacri-
fices to carry it out if it is accepted. They reportedly favor
a more gradual approach to the problem, waiting to bring
forward the proposals at least until the end of February, when
· the UN's conciliation commission is scheduled to publish its
report . . The commission, which is now completing its inves-
tigations in the C~:mgo, is expected to :r:nake a report generally
favorable to Kasavubu and the moderates.

Nehru, in a conversation with .t he US ambassador in New

Delhi, welcomed the new plan and expressed complete agree-
ment with many of its elements. He reiterated, however, his
belief that political prisoners , including Lumumba, should be
released earlier than new proposals envisage.

Meanwhile, .Mobutu appears to be planning a military op-.

eration against Gizenga's force~. He stated recently that he
. had reports of disaffection among Gizenga 's troops in eastern
·Kivu ·Province and that he was ready to move into the area in ·
the near future . . Prepa.rations for the move apparently are be-
ing made with the assistance of Mobutu's Belgian military ad- (b)(3)
visers. However, any operation will be hampered by lr=i=s:.ti.=.=·-=c=-=s=-----~
ties db the wireliability of Mobutu's troops.
(b)(3)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 February 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Congo: Hammarskjold stated on 10 February that if

Lumumba is dead- "·which appears increasingly likely--the
UN must temporarily take over in the Congo. He has in ·
mind the placement of airports and ·all other transport fa-
cilities under UN control, the establishment of a protective
· guard for all Congolese political personalities, and more
drastic steps to.protect Belgians from reprisals by Lumum ·~
ba's supporters. Hammarskjold said he would justify this
action to the Security Council as a necessary emergency
measure and ask the Council for a new mandate to cover
the situation.
The uncertainty regarding Lumumba has apparently in~
terrupted at least some of the efforts which had been under
way at the UN to formulate a new Security C · o t "on (b)(1) -
~med at promoting a Congolese settlement.
_____ __ _ _:_·_ __Jp'-n_lO_F~ebruary. that a meeting
,_
__ y ith representatives o~~e~ n=
e ~--_.J
tralist African states was unable to decide what to do in view
of the news about Lumumba. The Security Council meeting .
scheduled for 13 February seems certain to focus mainly on
the question of Lumurnba's disappearance, with the USSR call- (b)(3)
ing for immediate UN action to establish the facts and for the
immediate release of Lumumba if still alive.
(b )( 1)
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(b )(3)
The Congo Situation

Although proof is still lacking, the conviction is growing

among observers in the Congo that Lumumba and his two fel-
low prisoners are already dead and that the story of their es-
cape is a fabrication developed by Tshombe's Katanga regime
in anticipation of a UN move to force the release· of all polit-
ical prisoners. . Leopoldville's newly designated Premier Ilea
reportedly confirmed Lumumba's death on 11 February, while
a former Congolese official is said to be claiming to have wit-
nessed the execution of the three prisoners following their
transfer.· to Katanga in mid-January. A high-level Belgian of-
ficer serving with the Katanga forces is also reported to have
stated that Lumumba is dead and that he knew the identity of .
the person who executed him. The Katanga government is of-
ficiallv still pressing a search for Lumumba, but
I poKatan a official a ears
really concerned over the alleged escape. (b )( 1)
a growing belief that Lumumba will never'-'jb:::e:-f&.o~un
~r. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___J

Tshombe's regime has cast further suspicion upon itself

by indicating it would refuse to cooperate with the mission of
inquiry sent to Elisabethville by the UN Command. Tshombe
told newsmen on 12 February that the "escape" is "a strictly
internal affair and the UN has nothing to do with it."

.___ _.I Soviet UN delegate Zorm expre-s-s-eu ms sirepm.."Isnruv-t.-.xr-----'

reports of Lumumba's escape and said the situation in the Congo
would become "uncontrollable" if he had indeed been killed. In
the Security Council meeting on 13 February Zarin may exploit
any discussion of Lumumba's f~te as further proof of Moscow's
charge that Hammarskjold has proved himself uritrustworthy and
· 's m date for the
na:
(b )( 1)
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l Om5~7-- .PJ!£~Fl,~1.~ase' 2ii~67To5COss4fo5
01' SECRK
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 February 1961

DAILY. BRIEF

. C.c;mgo: The harsh tone .and far-reaching -demands of the

Sov:iet GOvernment's statement of.14 February reflect Mos-
cow's determination .to exploit Lumumba'e death to discredit
and .terminate the UN: operation in the Congo. By making de-
man$ which are probably unacceptab_ l e to the majority of UN
members, the Soviet leaders are seeking to ·discredit Hamm
skJold,-· exploit widespread .c oncern over. the effects of Lumum-.,___ _ _ _
-ba's death, and strengthen the.Soviet bargaining position in fu-
ture talks on a Co~go settlement. Moscow's statement- probably
foreshadows increased pressure on .t he Sudan to permit transit
of Soviet a~d to Stan~eyville, and raises the ssibllit of formal
Soviet recognition. of Gizenga's r~glme ~---;-~--.-----:-;.-------~~.-------_J
*Reprisals ainst whites for Lumumba's death may still
_take place,

. -- Mammarskjold haS sent order s to UN headquarters in Leo-

poldvll.l e ,to stop all operations by·the. var.ious Congolese mill-:
~---~ .tary forces . Execution of these orders will primarily ~affect
.'4obutu's operations in Eq _ ro lnce and Tshombe's offen-
.o r

. I.iaos: ~he Soviet Union seems anxious to appear r ospon- (b)(3)

sive to recent US statements that developments in Laos have
a direct bearing on_~o..rlei=Amerlcan relations. Two ~e~or So I
vlet journalists told! that the (b )( 1)
USSR did not want an international crisis at tliis time over Lao

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(b)(3)

. .
Soviet Government Declaration on the Congo
. The Soviet leaders obviously view Lumumba's death as
providing an excellent opportwilty .to carry forward their
campaign against colonialism .and again identify the USSR
with ·extremfst, anti-Western .forces in Africa and Asia.

. The Soviet Government's statement. of 14 February

revived the harsh tone of Khrushchev's indictment of coloni-
at
alism ' and the United Nations' role in th'.e Congo the Gen-
eral ·Assembly last.fall. The de.mands made in this state-
ment .w ere lncluded in the draft resolution circulated py the
Soviets yesterday for presentation at the UN Security Coun-
cil today. The statement and resolution suggest that the
SoVtet leaders may hope that Lumumba's death will lead to
the collapse .of the UN operation through the withdrawai of
the remaining Afl!o-Aslan contlngents..:-most immediately
those of Morocco, Ghana, and Indonesia. .Moscow would
exploit to the hilt the dispatch of Western troops as an at-
tempt to reimpose colonial rule in the Congo. The Soviet
·leaders probably believe direct Western intervention would
make .it extremely difficult or impossible for the _W est to.
marshal the· support of moderate Afro-Asian powers for a
·~ew approach .f or a Congo settlement.

The Soviet statement's call on all .~ 'freedom-loving

states" to·respond to the appeal for aid issued by tne "leglt-
lmate government of the Congo" headed by acting premier
Glzenga and the avowal of Sovlet support fQr the ·s tanleyville
i. regime appear to foreshadow formal recognition of thls ·re-
glme. Such.' a step woµld be calculated to bring pressure on (b)(3)
Afro-.Asian governments to follow suit a:qd also to prepare
.l egal justification for ~ore vigorous bloc efforts too~"'-'--'""'-------.
channel fore · e
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

In addition to this attempt to discredit and terminate the

UN oper:atlon and block any effective Western-backed UN
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(b)(3)
~ L - - - -- -- - - - - -- - - '

action to deal with the crisis, the. Soviet leaders are seizing
_. upon Lumumba's death as a . pretext for reviVing their charges
against Hammarskjold. Since Khrushchev's sharp attacks on
the secretary general's conduct of the UN operation, it has ·
been apparent that Hammarskjold ·has been selected to serve
as the. s·c apegoat for Soviet setbacks in the Congo. last ·fall.
Moscow9s latest demand for his dismissal and its declared
refusal to recognize his authority as·secretary general prob-
ably do not foreshadow-a Soviet-led bloc withdrawal from the
UN. This latest statement only makes more explicit the p.o si-
tion Khrushchev took last fall in his pronouncements before
. the Genera.l Assembly. He warned at that time that .Hammar- .
skjold's failure to resign 'WOUld lead the USSR to draw the
"nece.s sary conclusions" and threatened to withhold Soviet co-
operation with any of his decisiona. At one point, Khrushchev
hinted that if Soviet demands for revamping. the UN executive ·
machi.D.ery were not accepted, the bloc might withdraw and
form a: separate international organization. However, be
. stopp,e d short of making.any specific threats or commitments
on .this point.

. As long as he believes he h~s the support of the smaller

UN ·members, Hammarskjold is unlikely to resign. However,
. ~e VSSR's refusal to recognize his au.thority will make the
conduct of UN operations more difficult.

· l & jold has already order ed the UN force to occupy alrlields

\Hammar-
(b)(1)

· and 9ther communication cente;rs and to set up military con- .

· trol points in ·areas of Congolese military action. Th.e tiN Com-
. ·.mal)d ~eported:,ly· has been. ordered to stop all forces engaged
·in offensive action but to use force only if force is used against
it. However, the smaU siz~ of .the UN units, . coupled with ·the
equivocal nature Of the directives themselves, will render ef-
(b)(~)
fective UN control difficult. Neutralist ,nations reportedly be-
lieve that the Security Council should pass an. emergency.res-
olution . urging that all possible measures be taken to avoid
civil.'vr.lr ?Jld. calling·for the cessation of Belgian and other ,
foreign interference. · Repre·sentatives of Nigeria, a leader of
moderate Afro-Asian opinion, ·have state4 that if Hammarskjold
moves rapidly to take over temporary control of the Cong~

(b)(3)
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(b)(3)

(Nigeria will increase its military .c ommitment .to the UN

force. Otherwise, they said, the Nigerian units will be with- (b)(3)
drawn"]

As .long as the USSR remains. in the UN, it will have to

conduct rout~e business with the Secretariat, the staff of
which is predominantly." loyal to Ha.mmar~kjold. The US~R
vetoed the reappointment of Hammarskjold's predecessor,
Trygve Lie, .in October 1950, .link~g him to the UN action
in Korea~ The General .Assembly later that year extended
Lie's .a ppointment for three years. The Soviet bloc responded
by officiaUy ignoring Lie as secretary ·general for the ensuing
0 ' e finallv for ced him to r oaian in 1 (LJ:ij"--'-.-~
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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COPY NQ 1180
II! . OCI NQ o-3M/ tl

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CE.NTRA.l !I NTEl l lGENC E A, ·G fNCY

·OFF.cf Of ·CURJ'D« !NlEl~E

(b )(3)

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~Uc~ \lO a nalae 11Hcb i:s ~abl• co Ha~J~ld &ta~!ns
~O\lld tile· rea~b C7f di.t'eet 'lba t 'tM UN ba4 taUect to ub..te.-e
$ode~ B\lP.POt't, 1:\:tl 1)'ri~~' a!_~ l ri ~"~ 4;?.c>na~. /'

a~4 ui.t l,fDl"~ liiJaeGui. tliPi

•t,t't t~eo to solve tbe _pro'bler:i.
C'oru111nto1 Ctd.M hill' good tb& :iau.~Ao •o~~d ti• loroed io
LWllWl.ba •a diea1b Gl'J tho- o~c·1uiioo -vitbd:n• .l.tD troop:s trwi \be
tor He .nost ot.r1ch:c1t 0
p.rop6ic~ut41a tJli C~21d.
~igQ ·of th.a yc.u ., ho'ld.ir.aa
1.8.J:'gC J'Dl U.e~ 1 D C~ 1.ll.C$C ci tieo
t~ OllJll'OU t:odtgPA.tion O.'VOJ' tbo tho deol.!ston. to Ge~ <tbo
Cl"la•B
~..,_nsiroQ& allOj'GdlJ ~ba.:rpl.f '\fO'l'dod cab:l.o 11a,5 appaita
•osAn••r•4 b.1 us ~~~ atls~a• OD't lV made ILD • l"Cl~ul.t ol pub.Uc
brp&d•ll1n. & •uiJ " th'el r •ts•in" ~~c~.lo~ .l e 't.b$ SU4ao to .14-
Bamat!i.kjOld. CbiD&tRl P:l ed!J.-.8 d9~tb .
.«ii.tWba' & O~ 14 anc.t Hi
of .. u.taost" 'H11port--p;reeuDP.~ly feb~, 8.a al.l. belt' ••U-q~gan­
0111.y DDnl a.Rd t ·iaa.Mia1.....b ....,.e iz:~d p;ro.,.lAJm!l.'Jl·ba. street. ~ht11.on­
bCMl~ eoU11icd witb ~s•iom~ iStr.a.t.J.ona took place ta tilrea
of eon1.1donea in t.ho ability a:f toi;,ius .i.D tbo SuAbl.a. Tho gcworD-
tao CGagolo~o ~o •lD ovontu.t ocnt ft.!! CDil~l'D•C11 ~wcr the poa..
vtc~rf ~RO slv• ~~o 1A,p~oast~11 ~ib111iJ 't.b.&~ ~ in~carual BU•
tbat PeJpi1t8 lnteDCl& t"!' le't otb- d1L'llit&0 e1pJ>as;h·ion gro~ Wbid1
• t:j; ~Ul'f OD 'th.e flS'M • 'l'b• ~ ~cJlnU)l' be911. Pl"•N~ toP
~~~- ~SlA~ ~&~Gl~~~ haVO ~1· .D. l'(t'tU'l"D 'l;Q ca;v1.~111.n JOVG~AGDt.
eo bean loii.d 1.11 "tbol.'r coll.daaD.ll-' •cnlld QO tllo O:>ng9 pr9blet1. tor
u .on. ot' UtJllf&ba• 1111 "ell.Nor. ,• . 1 ti; own. 1nu•.posaA.. Tb• CA..b'.), • ,
'Vlatcb r~c~lvcwt wtdo publ 1.~tir .
·s .a tnc Sa4.an:~ pr~•a, protia.1>11
Ofl 19 i'e ~'°CllLJ'J', Pe t.p.iog _ doo.- sun pral;JIB.._ ~1;11' chsng•
H 'j )l"0'88Qd ~dlJl~H ~ 4UJta.bUen 'lb i:u !OflOf'Mll>nt • e policy ot
dl:Pl.oaaC'lc nl.tto~e \'U l1 Ot- &ilppo:rc :t or. t.1~ W, b11t ia ratb-
lS/908*, A .JO ;l;tit COl!IDIH\l4tl• Of ec ~t) • it&a;i to c-.t~t to public
20 I'• 1»"1.10.0 annouaceics ·acxee111)1)1: op lo ton..
.tor. ao eacib&qe ot .M tllaaea.dore.
Pet,Pine 1:15 lil:ely to a.<?cired.lt .
1110 e,.lltxlcisador ill a .a otbor ":frJ.ea.n I~ Accrn the torolgn ain-
co~~ ~~Y to Sta.atoyo•l l•. Je\<~,.8 c>'.f O~ll:ll , ~\Q(P , ._U,
ICOl'~¢¢0·, ~Od U.• V.ll laJl\I• relll-
'lt.h04 ·u.e,: ·8 'WOrt for ca ...
. ~ 1 tboqp th• 511ca.~ae CIO'Y - seg"* • nd c~Jl~ for tbe 11111edi ~
~.-...~n t llas
co~ u~~" to r.e.let at$ •lt'b4r&1'11.l of an foreign

23 hb 61

A pproved for Release: 201 6/07/ 05 C06541059

C06 ~ 41059
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Approved for Release: 2016/ 07/05 C06541059
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-

Uploanto -f'!'.ota -tbe Con~o. 1'h.6J a U ;U•t:Y preseun tr.o:e a b.road-

re-tnd.OJ'SQ;cl Ghafla hoaicieot 11 ba..!Jed .l.aofoldYillo cave'1'11•
~ai·s l)l&-1!. to.r roeoasutu:t• •utot . Gi.unc;a • o :po•i ti.on •PJIGr-
ins tbe ON fore& lllto u Afl"teu eatl.:y is 'fOAkoo.l oge 'bl# uoopa,
corumnd llnd re-caaaeD.ded a. Jta l t . .PLJ'tlC.ul,.a~ly ~Q tbe StaQ.toyyUh
t() Cl.Qblll?Uou ot 'C'oago'lese Draa, &re subject to it~cle coa•
f.~r<:es . 'IMY-•• !ff P~9PQ~Dd t~ t trol trcia above; tuccts 1ar P•7•
~U .(<tNf.S:D ai;:;U\'·itioA bo con- lQir thom reportedly vil 1 ran
t~d .,, ~· Wf a~d i~ t° A out 'by ·t.ha and of Ji!ar<h; 11..D.d bla
n.eucr&l oomiisslo" hHai·wt~ 1;~outaaai1t in KiY~ 'Pr9v1o~•,
t.wwaba • " ·de-• t!b • Acl~t. Jta;11tlAauz-a, fiip~t .11 18
ro11-i.att.ng Sttiale~v.tU•'•· efforte
~o 6'\lb.Jtct a.lb to ~l.oeer- coacro.l.
'ibe prel.i.'lJ i.n •rr t'epo., t: ->:f Jlow..-~-.:_. CUMnga 'has 11-ttle to
the ~ Co11o.U1Ail.ol) COt:iP199lcn"- .bo_,. ,f ·p,r 1ii a "'•1>.P~.h•a~n1 • w·t tb
an 1.1•11t111ber b~ on •h.l.c.11 IDQJl~. kelTid.u. t.~d be 9robftbl1 wo11.U
of' the Ae i.e.o ar>d" A1rlc;ao Mtiions be n1<l-u<::ta11t to &~ceut • polit-
~ho haYe bnd ~~Jll!J iQ tbe Cona:-o iaal c$0l.u Uon .iapo&ed l1)' the ~
arc- iocprosC!otcll--was. odo piab• unb:!i!!l a:si!nu.•ad ot o.41'.11111.caot
.l lc on 19 :PbbJ<Ullq. It .rcccni• io~l:uollCle ia the IAtoPoidvtilo
cotW.a c:llo oato.bllGblMtnt or a S:O'VO'.f't,a'ltUli • .
broad.lJ baeod Co.Q80'.!<1AO savor...-.
'19tU , ;ti~ HDOV~l. Of t;C:.O llftll'1
f .rom po-U .Uae 8.11.4 UIJ r•orp11o- ta.rse-eC.fll$ rep~lsa-18 tor
izatioJi u:nde-r a. naU011al d~te·a.:se the de:a:ClJ ot W.1.mba Hd Me
coullc 11 ,. tbe roi.ease a ·i: po'.U .t.- a.lrlct S1lptj1Grtore-two o:t tboa ta
ii:.al ·pripoi:urra, and par1·~111" latt.n;a '&Jld COVDll lll AlbGJ't
~SI a.p-1ron.1 or uua n.o11 g~v­ ICA.lo1'j1•~ "'Soutb _ b.(1~1,. etat.o-
•.ttliJ.e~t . S lO~e- 1 t:e NC~h_,$~ '-'•V~· ao :ra~ QOt -~t•11••4.
uou. ~ae tb• Jl.4H> 1o•ero11e""1: lli>iK!vorl' 0011e at.ro<lltioo, aw~r..
•s • sft.l'~'lQI pol.n.\ for- .........._ OUtlJ OD tlio ,p art of l.tDIU.Ge1•
tllbliellJ.111 t. o• U011a.1 reaii••, pl uioo COQf;.ol.oo-~ -croopo, 'fie-"'
t.be report iG like b co bo co·R>- ~lttod to Xl:vu Pro•laoo.
~eBia-1 to la.D&vub1&·J bo•"Yer, ~~;~:itcrrod .i.l!ieicJ.qnt~ t111vc ~
rec-on.t ropor~ ~TMl .i<la~e tbat. ~IU."Y~d cbro~t cbe co.,..o CM1t-
Tlllbl.d.bia D.i:lO bi.G a.aaoe!.Atoo IUo sl4.~ OJ ar9as ~on-t"°l.l"d t>y tta.
1.c ~ !SlO<lc3 ~o acco.p t 0.01 re-cori.- ~CJ..W [email protected] '
ctU.ai l.ctl pi'O$>Oie&ls. a.1 tbo~i.
on 22 Febru~rT lie 41d ~onou~ae
bis •a:Aealflbt "i'th. w · Ofi'l.C.Uhl8 ln J'Ao.poldv"iUo, .Proaior-
to ctop troop .11twe.unt:a in 'Ka• ""8 ~fJlUL~G l,t~ .l"l!t'iJartodl:v ha.a
taop. P'roT.iaoo ~ •nl&.rgtd bt9 PJ'OJ>O&Od govarn.-
M :11t·, tollo•l"8' dJse1;1ee'loe:e •Ull
tomier s115lport.e.rs o.f 4ttl~• ·
Tit• reacl:'lon of 1ba '6:&:Z4HIB& Tb.ct addit'ioDG a .1 iepdly will bt"'
~est.e co cbe eOllAJ.esioo•~ rec- ~ludo aa•oral Lwuill!ttmt•, but
oo~e~tiofto ~r~~bl7 ~ill dcl~ad . ' Da-1\)' or tbe .Q,ppotoCo•l!l ba.•.o 11ot
oo th~ diea1doo't4• eotioat~ O't beiOB pe~~O~dlly ~~n~uit90. 'l'bO
tbetr abi~i~y to roGimt coa- \ ·t•t: oc>l'ltll.hit!J dal@• of tad1v·1d-
tto1&C1l econonic, poli-cioctl, and ·ua.ltt poen ~l)' ....,a&"d•d -...

'WEBKLY iLP lBW. P11.&o a or u

Approved for Release: 2016/07/ 05 C06541059

 C065 41059
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541059
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ll:.Oft1'ate .,.bft'e of tb• 1Jw1wa.ba Tbo oco~oa1c Glt~~tio~ •a

tact.ion·: bO'liev~ .. ilian'f ~:t Utcm tA0$)0ld'1.l llc Ja dot:-lor-allmg
&N c,~rooot11 ..or.ld:nc- ·t i>r c:i1• ~•Pl4lr, ~Ol"d•ht to • r•co~tly
cenua u S'Uolo.,.-U.le. Co.<i...-o. &J'-'1101n.t .el! mr ec<>nOliic a.d'Yiser.
and New Yo-..11:. Oiu1 of the 111.!Jt. acts of· ltobutu • a
~alloge of . c~sloDei-s before
;t t d·lr::1~cd4>d on. 9 f'o.b l"UAry •••
·to ~~doa th• tu~toP.HJ Pl'D•
4Jl'SD -vht.c.h bad ba.oa .dovolopcd (b )( 1)
"'Hll VN Ui- ~3'ta.1\co . AIJ a rc~lt ,
·Ut.e 8'Q~r~n.t 4 .' 9Uc.H- t or Ja~­
tiA.r:)'· ~OlJG to •J..S , 000, 000. 9top-
B.•l> a.ld 18 b9ina .f~J'Dl:sh.od. by
\'M· C•l'lltll-J tMldlf or. tit• <»n_go ~
'JbO a.PlllJ i ll.O 'l'f;!Hr, ~ 1$.: po.J.ley ~ .J >lac•
'---,.,.,.--.--c---:-r-=-
4= t-=-
a..-09
~·=·~~--. r 111•1 loya.L- .l.!Ul (l<t!"G !llCl'IUIY 111 c1.-.c;.ulaUoa., (b )( 1)
t'J,4':6, .l'~Jlartodl.7 1s a.1110 o.~ wt Ut • r9sttlt1~ \Q f'I.U.1~1
~t tho t'Ot;O&t 4a0Ct1UO!I bJ tb·e ~p.lnl . ·tbe- o~ <'ltlJC.1.~l bo-
Sow tb ~.eu IJO~G:r"ntMllnt D'f .a:ovon Uevets. ·t M OQ.\y- a~l~t·lol\ 1$ a
COPB1)l9'.f4".. ..,,Q i;AIDCI .f.l'OD i;ctlt• $100,000.000 a.id nofP"M! Wt4l•r
cttt.l t 'r lbsl fjf'oii~ 1t'M.c:b a:N . tlN contJ:'ol .
:rep.retsttoHd 111 'L'b@ • '.rtl)' , Ut»\J
22 t'ebruary- deaOi.llJG6'Jeti:c Qf uy
u~ dlsa:nilllb•bt ot Oa<nn.Ol•s& rot'- J?cono•t.c e.mad1 tioit:5 ia otb-
ce:s pr..ooa.bl:_y ls a. retij)(i:i!f& to ~ pu~o o t t .lut Cozi;:o u-e alee;
tb.c.se prt:55Ure11. su-~"fo~iDS tum t.h.e po-
U t.lUl CSUU-tqrr-u.to:n.
Con 8 o A OS o1.Udal Wb<> 1."0"-
eent l; vielt &d St.oley-
• i l.le eltp!ta ts t.ll~ e ooe-
cmy the.Fe to c.olla~e.
J.a •1• ·or c.i~bt we-elm ;
Jtatani;n, the · rlc-llest
Aro• i~ tbo couctry,
ta a1ao ruaDic~ n
~q41q~~fY ~o(•~~t .

BofOJtci b6 ae;r-eed
to Uaiito.cl coo~oraU.oa
il'J.tb n
cwtbor1tJO:a.
tl.g•
'blhtmtu> *'"4l&ctod
OT'O•inU7 \0 0• S~"rl ty
Cau~e1l •8 31 ht.ruu-1
.ri5!Jolutioa. . Chai-f11111J
~tat the r esolutlom

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Tl.S A ,..dcte·1ar&t.iOD.,. of
wa.r b_y the- IJJl •~aat
ltata.np llctd ihe WM\e
i!ell?U~ CO~go ,
.f.l'.1l"tWr {b)(3)
,~ ~_....... , • • •l
~~ .aitnoua~e~ tiObl-tbe
~-
·- --: lizlltW11 of -t.he Pl"O"l~'e

23 hb 81 W.IH.t.Y aEVlP

Approved for Release: 2016/07105 C06541059

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541059
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p.opalQUoB to "Oo.t4"ud t-beir Uvet; a ~oapor•ry bA)t ~~ ~ie •tt~~a

6Cl!i Sll'O.PO.r1)' IM~~ bf tbo ·to · coottr¥ue ottoooho o»era.-
OnUed .N ati9'fts .• rt ~ iR~id tba"t Uoas llgiiiast il;;luba tdbtl
tho· UJC ~uld -be ree{?()n.&U>lo .f'o:r .ESU.lJiVQ~tcJ's of Glmeqg.a in north.. ·
o~y bloodoh~ ~s~ltlne trq~ tha ~rn bia.ctp Vl"o\ttaco ~ 14•"t
re colu.t lo~. iioe~ 11. 01!! lit89tlae pat.rol. oo-
~i.iiHe;u11s n rocio11011!.ss:a.n.cc
-u!llt Of b.ta~~ U'OOp$ a.bout
'lhio biU.a.1 a.•enet lo~ 11.ppar· 50 •ilee eo~th 01 ~&aoao,
e11tiy ,,aa ia!79ired by ~C!-1.ioc ca,oua l of tll& Ha-lQba "Ltllllaba
~lDtcg .totor-er:s':e wb:li;b CO'ln(IOlod
.--''L.ft._.........UL:l.n.t:Jo\J\.t.~Ack_on___jJlf.'_L.QrCC.IL._-'
atatit /' e.ad ,,_s
·t ol4 bf a 801-
stan olUc:or \ G:Mllag Ute u.ott
tlill.t h6 WOl,lliJ C:~J>"l\J.fO .l !a:f\01>0
as pa.rt 01 o tt~n•nl ni.np (b )( 1)
offeD&lv• , A~r .olJ~e~~vo Ui
l .lkel1 t~ be t(l.1:~1lUcgl.~
1'8boab~ ·t,o rop~~ ~o o ~vQ tntriJl!I~ bey Cht Bahi1'ae, who,
11e 1.9 ":f'tghdciv; !or 1Ll8 job !MlO
bU Ufo'' 1n tbo t~UIO of "O)f dt-
h&•e.
into
o&.Se
alre~a,, Q••
1uc11.N1.1 oue
a.re& ~lO!lf c~t rat)
~~
t.•t'.-laa.ttos. to ·p1.11rl:sh b.in lor 11110 between J'a.dotv U.le •~
1.M ct~o. ~b 01 lml1111ba .• O.ll1Dll 111'.hlch wius ~ently wo~
back by riirha~.
(b )( 1)
r ja COM1dorab
a1H1be-r of Af·.l! i<:aoe -A4Jo4gad loya.1
;oJ 'lb.111 c11.i °tllrJ it~tlao to-
t.n.e &dQfil 't!J1. th tbo eGQ.b.l ialmtt irt (b )(1)
to "bhoabe b;a,,-e beiD a:re.ed 1n · Of a '! C~18t COngole:me
order ~o tbv•rt ~ po&siblo at- p),J'l1~ ·~ ~.Cl.Q~I). Thg DQV(t
~~opi l>J lJU fOl"<'~O t1J d l.~.litCI lltO V'.(l.if prob•bl,y It& .. ~ a.t ·tbi»
htn"PJW . Europeaois q;ay b•"• i-oitiaU•e ot J.ut;erto·r 111"1sto:r.
bet~ eiaUo.rly auued . Yima ot tbe .Balu~ 11 1Aa.l11-f:)a
lilto te . "' .laGO!l =-c11:i.d90-, • lo"-
JDS a.nt.i ..tomnn1.is~ Balu.ba le.a'ISe.r
·~tea res-iao b nO'W· a1- ift Lcopoldvillo, deoied oo
la08t -cc:wipla~oly 1.:lo1atD>d inter..- 20 l'ctbru&rJ' Uaa.t a 01 .fhl.O-b
.0Uo1\ally f.ollov1.ng its i.nvol•e.. "youth 11.0Y0111tot" had bee.n
.tl}CJl.t .lCJ ~ aeo. th 01 1~a1umba; :ror•G'd .
bhoalt& ~UJIU$9 lO :rarwr;o co
coop~ro.te •lUI ~ba I.loo ·p ver:n•
·m&nt io ~ta.,1.ue l;t'1 tu.lD~ Tbe CO~au~U;t la.bcl ~uJd
tbtt a.inloterlo.l 9or.tfoll0:11 lott seen \.o b~va COIL5lO~ra.bto app~1
vnc1lnt to.r a ~~a,p \'ep:r~~n:.u­ -to ors•.n.l:.t-. ho~& ot .Lue1111iba ' •
th·c . ~:unort.erb. t.l thO&Dlb ti.ta
appeal ls 1111~11 10 · bo lee-
r;anod ·tg a-oa.e ext.en~ e,y tile
'l'elboab&' 5 ai1reenrnt •Hll- 011.rty •a tri'izU CllfiJH)C UOB& j
t.t.o Dlf •PpA.INH\tly "pu·t at le.Mt I ' (b)(3 )

Pa:1e 5- ot 24

A pproved for Release: 201 6/07/ 05 C06541059

C06S41060 Approved for Release : 2016/ 07/05 C06541060
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~~ COPY NO. 7i

II . ·OCI NO. O~t/tU

S March 1941

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
. .

WEEKLY ·
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTE.llfG .ENC.f AG :E·NCY

Office Of <:wsu:NT ~n~ai

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 20 16/07/05 C06541 060

C06 ~ 41060 - (b)(1)
A pproved for Release: 2016/07/ OS C06541060
(b )(3)
C0 65 41 06 0
Approved for Release: 2016/ 07/05 C0654 1060
~~ IRrJltLlGRNO.S WllKLl &UID&Alll'

'l'lre 1f'ICAr!l1«t by G1gqqp Off:lcct :a of t.ba. illVt&.ding -fol"Co

·fo-rcCG t:oto t.be Luluaboun. ~i"ea did n.g t .ba.V'e: oontrol ot t.bei:r
o~t ~~.l Province,. li:bic}) cDused men, and iho force· ovi·d .errU.y
a.uch sj).Pi"'ohension .in Leopol~ dl-epc-raeel· ..tithel" th:Aq eubrt1 t to ·
~i l,lQ, b~ fado<l out tbU vc:ok . a. dt.c~t airrcc:a.~11t 1!'h~cm
U.N ao.urc.es clal.ln t.bllt Lu..l\llibourg 1tG lead~ra had n~ottatea with
ts • ''UN <:-it.ft:ti f)~e.i"theloss 'ttlo looal t1tf ~C>at'-initcn't . n·1-
CoqoJ,ese tr-oops o1 lro,but\i., ac-; .r;en1ritst· O'flie~..-s 1nve>hed. iD
col'd.iatJ to p.rese l'~Orts, l:l11V& thEmo n~(JOUAt. 1on9 a.nd the ccm-
engaged 11J riots with ~9 loca.1 -.acter ot 1ibe pro-ltobutu garri-
populGce ·wftieh h•vb ~esul~ed in son uk&d 'for ti&ild recebod tJ!J
11().ro t.tum 40 fa1.alit.1ea. TDe pr~tectlcm, although tbe~~ are
tn0 bAS c;onf1t'lt.Qd ttiat -A.nO-tb&.J' i ndieattons th~t the ~9opol~­
Gize.oga for-co cS't1T.IUlt-1;d a·t two •ille govermtent i.Utends . ~o tAke
batt.o.;tions iu ctW11llf from Jkc:il.a. dieclpl.tnal"f QC.tloc ~inst ua
io ~a~tral Cone<> t~nt Caquil.- o~t'J;col:'S". Tb1s cootu;sion 1'D
batvi Ue1 c11pl~l of Bqwa.t·e ur Lul-v.AbOUre tllust:r&.tos the ct~­
b,c.vi.aee, 9bic'b ttio UN :f'Qp01"t.e ·p endonce Qf cc.aa ol.9aa mil 1t11:ry
virtually 1¢fU&l"dcd by ~copold­ opcra.t.1onlP oc tbo vhiDB ot in-
v i11.l!t toi-c:e:s . ~rskjold 'tol.d. dlvidual. uni·te :
Amb!lesrutor Btovon~~n on 28 ·F&~­
l'lllll'y lie d1<1 ' o.ot th1okre~e.&tt Th~ G1£enaa for~ in
1Dil i~ry operatioas 1n ~be Copgo Luluabou,rg, a~c.ord'iilg i.o cyewit-
l.illd C!!AQged 'tb<J balao~ Olf pQWet-" ncsse&. d.1.d n~t ba9e -ovan tb9
asa.oai: tho va.:ctous !actiOne. ;iOS't moa:ger logi Q:tJ.ea.1. 1a-i,ippori
--aocJ otb.cr 8~gl~yv11lo C.Olw:tll.9
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pa,pa'l protened , obJectins to
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to~ctt .. bac be ratun;od t:o maot with
i..un41.1u to . d1•c~ ~ c~...-
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l4 f'ilQr.uN")' ·oa t;b• e"Q~p,. •t Ui lf:t'\tt t(I lllltl!li'CJ. Jiil"®• . ,
tbe Ad>diUOO. l)f \& f."t!turl(Od. 4~tcaad bopo to be-.1:0 o1.t. u tndlu de•·
thht ltiUUIU'Sjltlold bo Npl~od
bj t. ~toe-a&D d&¢UtJ.•t ,C-rp.o ,d•l@l I (b)(1)
npr~~.otug tih!t lfe.:tt,, t<be Q'Ja>P ~o acn.d caba.t. tN~ <o
mil.ht bloc, &nd· tbO Dlflitr&l.,. ~~DIB)" bl>.t<t,; UI~ C.t4t:i.Ai•
1Gtt.. 1Uuacl1ff dULt'Pil. 1 ·u. lliat1d:o:r.- ..-n~I' ~· _.Jl',FWl!li!t~h
la Bui;tar•k,.f~\d Y:h.o kl tl•ii ~ i'h h1ll: ..ng bi wras of .. br:lp.de--
a.a.b,... rr.u.d 1l«I t ued , "til r; aa- labelil.LL.OOD Oab~---~
o.ot. iot"S!•:t~ a Wl !9CCiretftl:r &~Oro
crru b:r&U!Kim:I 91 B ·t1i1~ e.b~i-­
Ialr.e ante: - (b )( 1)
ll~ltle &!4r-d4!>':· 1• (b)(3)
'fb.iJ &Y"bt. ~I' SYOi.4ftf4
er, cu:n<;=t a-t.t.oc.~ on. ~'"' 011:U:c:d
St:•toD>. but" he 'ftr'D04 c:o'f'liA.111
u~n•a.o ''•ttt:iMMn
t~•t ' "bi.s .stj,Q3t" p9Uo1· ;h
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it. ,.. '°'1'\P>
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(l)t op'll!rat.~~ b1 • ~Ur:if,it111 qi
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"°-.•• . . .
~ Ob.una1 GoiDeia,. •~.1.,
lioroc;~, ~- t'ba \fAn--·~U~ \~
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poo~ l'OeG:ll:St:t tlitllla· th• O:M :l'Oft:G
,i:nt6 a.ft ..\-tTl.C:11n tal:tit~..., ~Guul;!J•CI
tor 'tM Ou~ u~r:i AVY l.'41fl>U t.i;t
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0icihed.Y!led w ·:r.eQJOov.tt.M r;su '1 _
lla:rc~ . A ., , P~l:Jtl'l'oer7 ~oai:u.m.tciu~
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•eHiQI' lo. J\aora n \ l4'd fo:r r~
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fall'Coa and t'.b.eb ebot'«Uo.:u:1on
to ao .Af~l~•&i ~~n;d .

2 ...... 81

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541061
 ·CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
•.v .... . •

~:~~~:~ 8 March 1961

,f~J'
·.:····:·· ·
E-:·T-:
•. i:.·:. .)!-.·

_o_A_1L_
v _s_R_
1e_
F ~~~~~-~
:.:·~.(·r,,;

,:.f_~t~~
I .
Congo:/ (b )( 1)
.:· ,··
': ::·~:
(b)Q).
"f"' "': ····
! ·-:··-:·;
'ir.:~:i;;~
1••• :·:. ·:~:
u-.·~:.:.
Lout Gizenga's participation, the only significant result of \with-
the
;~~~
.
.~::;-:-;..~
•· ·:. confere.nce probably will be a slight strengthening of the tle s
between Leopoldville and Ellsabethville . ~ID Leopoldvllle , ~
!:· ~.~:,_,,
:...; :~'.:,~·.-~: .~:·,'.~
S.~:~· -c~~

American and UN officials believe that there ls little time re- ht~l
malning before inflation gets completely out of control, with ,i'.-, . ;.;:i-
·jJl~ the c·o nsequent possl'1tlitv of disorde rs in truLbl~cen~
"·~!,,.. civlltan pop~lation. L For .=. ~ '(b)(1 )
;~~.i·J eign Minister Bomboko and the UN commander, Genera.I McKeown,
;;;\~i[]~. met on 5 March and agreed on a number of measures ·to reduce t":Lkb)(3 )
.·: :; tensions between Congolese and UN troops, partic'ularly in Ma- ..
'>;,;,
~

tadi. Hammarskjold admitted ~,::C~ )( 1)

.;~~~~'. i--1 that Rajeshwar Dayal, h._i_s_r_e_p_r_e_se_n_t_a_U_v_e_i_n_th
_ e_t;_'o_n_g_o__.
,
"::~:~) ~able to communicate with any Congolese leaders and ln-
\~'<i:J dtcated that Dayal would not return to the Congo after his trip
· .. to New York: for "consultations" which is scheduled to take lace
\~:~;{ tn a .few days.=.:) . J 0u ~:(b)(3)
~~~i~: (Backup, Page ~ ~~I ~ ·i:.:
*Laos: (Information available as. of 0400 EST) Vientlane's 1 IP ~ i :. I .' .
forces ln the Phou Khoun road junction area withdrew ·in µie face. .
of aggressive probing actions initiated by Kong ·Le - Pathet Lao ~ ;.;.:p
·forces on 6 and 7 March. Indications are that the enemy forces
had not planned a major attack, but were quick to capitalize on
the government's hasty withdrawal ·a nd may have gained at least ,.,., ........
temporary control of the Phou Khoun road junction. General
Phoumi ts making urgent plans to regain the lost ground, but the :; ·;

.......

i
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Situation in the Congo

[Hammarskjold stated that Makki Abbas of Sudan would

immediately be installed as the UN's acting representative in
the Congo and that Dayal would 'leave "this week!' Continuing
tension in Matadi apparently has postponed Dayal's departure.
~----~ He continues to hold himself aloof from the Congolese; ·..re~•::· ,.,~
cently he failed. to turn up at a meeting with Foreign Minister · (b)(3)
Bomboko, reportedly for fear that Bomboko "might make a
political attack on him:') · .
~-------'

[Hammarskjold also pla~s to set up a Congo planning and

advisory group within the UN secretariat, composed exclusively
of Africans and Asians . Within a few .weeks he hopes to send to
the Congo as his permanent representative either Adnan Pachachl
of Iraq or Robert Gardiner of Ghana, both of whom would be mem-
bers
. .
of the proposed grou:P0
-
the UN (b )( 1)
~------::--------~------~---~
Command has failed to provide leadership in the economic field
·as a result of its preoccupation with political questions·, coupled ·
with Dayal's ignorance of economic factors and his tactic of with-
holding budgetary support as a means of pressuring the Leopold-
ville government. Moreover, foreign aid furnished so far has
suffered from a lack of coordination as well as from inefficiency
and v~nality on the part of Congolese officials. UN financial ex-
perts in Leopoldville believe that the establishment of a flexible
fund under UN control is the only way to salvage the economic
situation, which apparently has not resulted in popular outbreaks
so far only because most of the population is not dependent on the
money economy. However, the population in Leopoldville, where
most of the working force is unemployed, · is vulner~ble to infla-
tion in basic commodities, and the UN econ~mists bi lieve out-
breaks will occur when the price spiral takes hold. _ (b)(3)
I _I ~~

..i (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

8 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELIJGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

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COPY NO. 1a
OCf NO. OH0/61
JI ..
.CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENT RA.l IN T £ l Lt G .ENC ·E AGE N C'Y

OfflCfi .OP <.~f<!NT 1NfttUG!NCf

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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T.bo atao•Pher~ of bttt&r- t-ioo. ,,,. HCG-11 o-f· RJl.~OS.bHI'

aesa bet~etD tbe Ul9 C~~d .Daral trcm Leopo1d\*Ule to Bew
ia nd Congolette •t•T •l~•n.ts fQr•--os1•D91~1J tor «;>~ul~­
ir;ay letO to .oov 9bootiag iaci- tioo-pret:ba'blr le • 11.rat step
donta , aad ·further setbecka b1 Baanar&lljold to oaa.e blD
for tbo UN aftort 1a tbe Coqo. ogt of · the Congo pl~tur• per-
CoDJrO·lese soldS.tts., TttlO •ppar• aoa.ontl:y . MiililH Abba• of the
o~t1y cto oot ~t to tiabt e•e~ 8~01n b•& b•~~ DJJl!QU~e•d D~
otn.• J', • .,. aov4rtbolcum doopb tbe ~v•a aotiai r~pttae~t•tlV41
1n1s-piclo~B o-i W htoot1011g to 10 the Co:Ago.
d1-1tr111 'tbea. 1'lu11 r -e eat
SPO'R1l!.OOO!llillJ . lO 8;QJ lllo&'iHd
-.hreirt ot. OM tnt~erf:erence • es Tb.• ~t.*1!clr oo thp .th1d1u:ieaa.
.iii tllo tocidos:l'.ta wltb llft 8uct• .. · DN ·tot'CfP l&d .'K bU'tOQll to • n-
.f88lt·tn0 OOt'ilcJl•b UOO.P8 U1. connC-o th.at -all of Us 390 troops
N'ahdi. .to tu c~.ng-o ol!'e to bo wttb-
<lti.•u. Ha o.bnae -t:h.-t Ulil or-
t ·l ciiilll 'll'U'D 11100.llpirt'• la.
StCJ'•hl'J e>e-owa.1 81!1!31'•,_ itle u deplo,a•:nt. ot tbo fQ'l'c•
SlcJ:Old. lo.ilo•S:QB 40 (l'll.Ol'IODC7 ~nd d l6: ao1: a.dopt a fin) at-
lllitetlall ol Hie V'll "Ii lS-H uoo tltOdt· ~o•o~o ~ta,.rt.olleltl"
•dvt..o7F co!IBlltt•e, rel)artadl~ u partlJ • oo\'er for tbe la-
ordered :ot.1a 1 to •bolO" tt\e •POtQd•- ~f tiua 'loc• 1 $Vdnoma
C<>n~t(iu10 port-a ,ot a.11 eoate·• ClOIUUia.d-er a.n it a poor pertoraance
•ad to "rote·lro •e t bma • i tll for<io bj bto vott·. Bo11rOvor, suclooeee
U Dece.aaar1. no.e~r~ l'or•t.a.D ·o JUc:1aii. •tat• tba~ tbolr iio•-
.IU...ahtc;r Som:boto oo 8 111.a.rdl ern.11.en~ will coat1noe to refueo
aat.d tbftt b b d i ·would not bo to all09 VAR •ad bloc aid aa-·
r'Ct:'uraed to tflf coot.rol pe!Mtl~ terlol t-O 1)9 \SHC ,_c;r054 tis•
e f'u'l l 1Dveottpttoo of thct d-t..s- Sudaa to tbe $~•ule1vlllt
Ol'~llr-8. 1'1J,.-ro hDJJ baan no hT- r.o (J1.a •
it;.ber- Ul!JUiJ8 1~ -tbe a:rn suce
~ Moreb. ~oi i~9 C~qgolo~• ro-
a.a.U 8~UIPU'l0\I& <>1 U••
Olf, 'nJ~
t.oopoldv.l llo .ao•eranea'· J>lo'-
• ~C~•:r ll,f r -1C• l' lllOO•n t• '
"tua.lol•, . ~ C:OUCtl.r'l'.Ml4 t~t 4•-
1DS oo." th1s OiBtrust as woU ter-iorUi.QIJ eo11di~ions l~ · o O>~
ao OD tbe ec&r-01t7 or ellj>lor- " ·1 1.l lea lie J.t· liOltrtff t. ~
8''3t :I,~ ti•• •"II t ~OClOllt lf J"O'"'
er11ueo SOM lZ, 000· ~Ol!SOl4&9
atluir A.fi"'icmi.18 iii lte oup·
o:f the V1V. NeveJ:'tht·l...,. u b••
t

'f'O.l11o~eor11 by ot 1Uo11. tor "eo• H'Dl an addltio:ntal 600 ceo \o

btliz-ntion" aJ.oiost IJM ''totf)- ro1a•or-c.-1t i ·t.a 2,0(IO troops 41.-
laae. •• rea~)I 1.6 tl)e CoDao-.

Saimara.!tlJ:o ld Ui bol lov-ed more &l&altica~tlt, 1041•

ploaa1~~ ••rl' actlOD· ~o tr1 to plaora to 00:06 am addHlooal
t.mpro¥t Uit Vl'I''& loeaJ. po&t- IOl'CO ot · ~ 7:,10 ~·Jl :.w~:f WltQ.D

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3 , 000 Yil} be JD~at.1ti'.'f l.s'Qops . Tb~ !/lain Jios.t.tt~ @:!~)'
1'l1ey are 1r.cJl..edu10d t4 .l el't& Nii~ uvv .1Dfl:~:n<ied Iodona•.l a , •biG:b
Delhi DO '1 4 .l'.Ch ·a M 'ii'lU bo UDGUDOC<I O<n 7 Mt1.rch tha.t t t
tl!lb lars:est. •ation•l «JQt;illlto·11-t °fllOUlll. &'.•lid • batt.nlton ~o l.bie
in tbe Ooago. Jfa.h.Ju •P.P&n!ntl)' Coci-JQ t.o t-ej)lAatt tha oA• "i.na
b~s inte~pf~~ ttb~~sbebo~la 'lfJ.t.bct.t .• •.u. ''.ii:a view ot tbe·
reoo:atlotijJ~ Oil ·t he Cli>JJ80 a .Dd l.at.o-:&.t ae·y eJ.opna"tA , " OJ•tr•r·ta
UN reqrg~~lat~ioa »r~blecr~ 11a 11,ps>•Nmtlt is ·pi'D.D,1111g ue COD...
n do.l.ibiai-at• :&H~Jlt to 100.lllt.e' thitttd part.k .1 pa·uo111 -on o1:feo-
tQ41• fl"l!GJ t 'l le iea.d illi° .Atr;tcan tlli~ .iaplesenuuo., o1 Oft
n~'liorat.U:ta- anti thu ieoact.er. lttt~8t Securlt:y CoUbc.ll t'•n10•
maw Oiii.lbi •8 l"ebtra..trua !l- 1\IUon.
aDcca . (b )( 1)
.5'lppa'l' t or A •osa••li•
t.
baclr.bandecl JlJ.~ f<ir tbe U!f Ya!ll
voi~ by Pl'0'.81~fJl>i Nkl'WU.b ot
Ohlm.D. du.r11!11J .l \Js 1 1111r.ob "P!COCb
tioto·r a: ttu1 Oeinerd A88tlllblJ.
ljo c:a'l,..U 4 loi' • stte~thoetlllf
01' the W ~nder a ..pr.iau•U.)'"'
~:r.le~~ ~o.cmii.od. Bo ~o.rtbol"
~:ltled. h.19 e.iu•.U.or . J)J!"op05:a\s,
v:b.ietl •c>uld b!l,,~ exclaliod su-
:n>»f~D 'l.ll,Ul!i :to ttw 'm' foree
~" •oulll bvo ~t A8h.o.1t io •
i;J~bordi:nato role,

ft:rui>a.h tol.4 M9r,l~o ol-

f i.o-t•.i.s be ·90-u.14 h &Uiotlecl
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CQl!knJJder IUld
1DCt'OIL$1l i~ tbe Afro-..
Mtao ~Ml'•blP J,n tlie U1'
· e1ta:t ts.. Bo P~nhtd tbe.s:e pro-
poeat•......,t~~ . . , n•ve orici4
~tcd wttb 00.~•'111 Alo~•~dor.
tbo llrtt~•h e~od9r ot tbe
~b~~~s:aii ~~~ torcea--.aa a
nacu1:SJ .t oy et:UtAUaUq a. ril.1 tag-
eQs.a :uio<iis '"1(lG'GlllJ tt-cd nat.!o~
t.o .f u.ti:l.U b tr0op•.

1!iD lleu BOv6i"DKoat on

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tato. CO"'*°leee .0011--tr.ol,. tboix- ~eel t~¢ct$ 1.0 Oi-1Mit:a.1o Prov ..
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TUUUUll'i~~· :tit itse •l~g•111y {re.
pU.'1lio Urmtb rot· lmd.a:r ay· r.n l.eoJ'!l)l4rl.Ue-. ~S' e.ad.
cm a lb.fl!a~..t:to dM -abitiJ:ne., lid .of.tioiill,o. ·bD.lJ..D-vo U111:i: t~...
of ~iM!QSI. 't.ithoob6- •tto C!O.D ... ta. U ttl.• t .Jt.!U; r-~~i.nbs bafm-o
ve:ncd tli.e eomf•roneo~ ·1,-e to tar ta:tl:a·t to,11 aO!t• .ciO»Jil.• tel.J out
4oo1flati~J tl:le· JJIJ'O~e!ed~n;:.
t.s. us.tQ tl!lie t:._,,•ftl C)fi~;I U4ia
aa4 of ~lit'9'0l;t 'f"U'tt· m• eu>rut"®eo-t
.i;oet·it,1.:Ut-j' ot ctl.t10MC.ll'O ·&IMHklJ'
co O,o ·'™·~ •-!) o. Ue~ to ·~lf. t!M> taUtt.orto .r:e\a.U"'lT qu.1.elt'•
th• pntic:lJ)ft.oto ie~o IL ·11aUl,>4
·t rollt. 'Dlo ~"*ro•t •'Uh;q:a.Ha
•9'' '9b:il.i,gll -~Ia.t:1oo • ."n:tc!
U1P Cc:mH.D4 llu .: fa.U•4 ~ ~­
Of l.t@QA l~..SP'WlllJI.\;; -~ l[DJ.o:Qj1 ·ytd9' .t••dtr:e~ip i.a. tbe e<i0aa.l310
to le-t ~ t:d:t; Ui• ~u i• tield u ,._ :io~-11.1lt 01 1u :P "-
~CICJ.nj ,b.t.15 p.r~~1p o.t .tbHI" occup•OoP.. •w:Uh pol..i u~.t. QUM•
~#J)(IQ:t•.. ~ l!Urt·Ollp lC$:ilQs" 110..1'· 'U .gm1. - . ai tuti1oa 10 tntble~
pro:poGOotl i.12.CJ-9•8~4 gJ,l,i.·t.~y <iO•l,1.c;::t.t~d tl!i l*fal '<ti •v:oo.-.
CiQo;pu11.U4:1ia- u~ tbe w.r-~1'%8 Rt~ o-t lt-~C)Jl(l(d(l fil() tO"i'a ~hid
· rea;l.bCtt b tlu;1 Coi'to 4 bv·t iia; his uctu of • w.~:t21iboldlAa; fl;uq-
V1G51 Of ~(t p0\.i.ti>0Al T!:lf'l>.l"J'.lc:I t f>._tcn:·t liv_ppgrt ~ a ac1U1D -of
:U.t,..Le of s:i:,1:n1t1canco 1- ~- · pretas:nr.iac' tu Leo-p;1·d~U.10
~o.t~ to. atif.~ lalii!i•"- (tO?CU".QDCUli:.

~1a~n~ foq10'U o~ th~

D1'i..h.borJ.q- illtiat-O (!~f'48.l,ftf
fomo.r l'r~~ Q,:n~ ttno ~llll<td
to'" •.,tlher Gont:erccao o.n. th•
.Con;-.() 1)'J'Obl-. ti> Jo.t l.n t:b.e
~D.~~"'· Met1.n8", ~lft a INY-0
"1'.~J<OISCct.lltiYll f.'&~@1"*ft&- Q!y 'b9
't.l!!il• .let~~ t.i,u-~111.l o~e un.d~l"
<soa.N ~N t:ie>A b7 Pr.alitG» t. S\?:~
Id.ft 6f t.t.t:..ri.~. flet 'fi"-'9 iwUOd
~ew'X'-1..i prom.u-au 11osrt A.t·ri~•n
1

la.d•~-Nl.~ . .of Chau, 1'wr6

ot GoU~, 8busab01tl~'t-lfo;t1Jn7 O'I :
lWCU'T Clq~C, Jei'C:a Gt lbl.1* UUl ·
Da.lein, o.t ~1gi!ll'1ll..;. •• Cg. ¢01,P N-0:01' '
~4·Has o~ ~· tt.eads
iua oo.t>l.jl· (b)(3)
9 ,f •lt Atf'.i,(JO.Jl · ~lil~G to ~!tC!J?Clini

~­
...mw._:
~

TQl~Y "llil\1'1'1•

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Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C06541063
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF ,(b)(3)

~:Jn a 9 March discussion· on the Congo with an

AmerrcaDofftclal, Hammarskjold expressed the belief that
further outbreaks in the Lower Congo were unlikely for the
· time being. . Refatlons between the UN and local authorities :(b)(3)
however, :remain uneasy. He ·indicated that he had not yet '

found a replacement for Dayal and said that Makki Abbas of

Sudan, the interim appointee for the job, was "not the best
man in the world but would be all right." Hammarskjold ls
also hopeful that several additional countries will contribute
contingents to the UN fore~ Another UN official has said
that the Somali and Malagasy republlcs mlght contribute a
batt~lon each wlthln .a month.
The Tananarive conference, by conceding the existence
of several de facto centers of power in the Congo, has
strengthened Katanga's clalm to autonomy and has enhanced
~l~~~L':,Uos:on..aa the Jeailln« fl•ure
In the anti-~
(Backup, age

~Laos: ~his remarks to Ambassador Thompson on

Laos;-mirushchev to.o k a generally positive line, pointing
· out that the US and the USSR agree that the objective should
be neutrality for Laos, that this represents a step .forward, / /,-
and that bilateral conversatlons should be continued. He said b)(3)
that neither the US nor the USSR stands to gain anything from a
continuation of .the fighting and that this would only damage
relations between the two countries. He warned, however, that
any prolonged ·delay ln reachlng a solution would complicate
the problem and could cause the flghtlng to flare up:. He also)

.b)(3)

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Si~uatlon in the Congo

According to a UN military official in New York, the
1,000-man Moroccan contingent in Katanga seems to have
embarked on a systematic program of harassment and non-
coqperation with the UN Command. Their morale ls said to
be completelY. broken, and they allegedly have ''laid down

LJ
their arms." @ammarskjold had hoped to send the group to (b)(3)
M~tadl in a show of force, but the.troops reportedly stated
. that they would obey directives only from Rabat. Rabat has
ordered this group--the only remaining part of a force which
originally totaled 3,200--to withdraw from the Congo, but
it has been delayed by transportation dlfflcult~

The Tananarive conference apparently has agreed that

the existing centra~ authority should be scrapped, along with
the present provincial structure. In their place a group of
new states~ based largely on tribal lines, would be created,
with an ill-defined "community of united nations" arrange-
ment for a central authority, presumably in ~eopoldvUle,
which would become a "neutral city." The participants ap-
parently are agreed that any solution .re.ached at the conference
will be an interim on~ and that ·any definitive reform must wait
until the country ls pa.elf.led. The absence--and presumably
the nm:1concurrence-... of Glzenga will make implementation
of these proposals difficult and will probably lead to opposl._
tion to them among hls international supporters.
Tshomb6 seems to· have been successful in his efforts
. to reach agreement on replacing O~e present structure with
a loose confederacy. Except for Albert Kal.onji of southern
Kasal--who ls largely dependent on Tshomb6's patronage--
the other participant~ have an interest l~ retaining some
type of central authorlty--Kasavubu and Ileo by vlrtue of their
positions in. the present central government, and Leopold-
ville Provincial President Kamltatu because of his long as-
sociation with Lumurp.ba's ldeais of a unitary state. However,
local ties still have considerable importance for most of them,
and none seems to be willing to face up to. strong pressurei.

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from Tshombe. As a result, the conference has been aQle

to issue a. vague. communiqu·e recognizing states now exist~
lng '11by· right or in fact." ·

The only well~defined point on which the participants

agree seem·s to be opposition to the UN. For the ·most part
they a;re try~ng to Um.i t.their discussions to general princi-
ples, -leaving contentious details to be woi:ked. out in a larger
- · :conference tentatively scheduled for: th~ end of March in
Elisabethville. Such a conference, which· might be attended (b)(3)
by as many as 400 leaders of varying political statur ould
. be Uke~y- to become involved. in extensive wrangling.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

'·

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(bl ~
(b)(~} -
~.i\>iJ>~ -
·;~~· -
~-.

Congo: Hammarskjold is. inc'.!'easingly worried .over the

I:
~::f~·
· possibility of incidents in connection with the arrival of the .
Indian UN conti~gent, whose first units are. to fly into Leopold-
ville on 16 March. He told. American officials on 13 March.
that it was of great political importance that the Indian opera-
I:
~·
tion be carried out, In view of the heavy prestige commitment ~- -
of Nehru and the Indian military. f(b)(1)
I . l~h-e~a-ls-o~r-e_c_og_n_i_z_e_s~tha~t-t_h_e~

Congolese hostility toward the. UN results from the Congolese i-

belief that the 21 February Security Council resolution author- r~
~

izes the disarmament of the Congolese army and the imposition H~·

of UN trusteeship. He apparently feels that this attitude, rein- I:

·fl!if• -
forced by the anti-Asian feelings connected with Dayal, might
focus on the Indian troops. Hammar s\(jold also believes, al-
though he admits he has no specific evidence, that the recent
mllitary incidents in the Congo and the outcome of the Tanana-
rive conference resulted from a Belgian-inspired pfan to b_u_ild ~114~
u a olitical and mUitar_y_b.as_is_ofJ.:e.si.s.tanc..e_to-1he_UN >---~ (b)(ijf
(b)(3)J :
11.·-

~srr.1!
~'

~I~

15 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF . li

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-C~,0. ~ ET·.-."'1 .
1
rm-~------~
)3
~~;:re -
~~~~~~~ ~1·ri..l·
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN '
16.March 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Laos: The failure of the 14-15 March talks between :0~ 0/::
Souvanna Phouma and a delegation of the Vientiane regime i'
makes it clear that an early political solution of the Laotian r::L-<-A!. ,_;t_,_, ]Ji
crisis is unlikely. Souvanna's insistence on.a 14-nation con~_ · _ :;~:-.
a
ferel)Ce as prerequisite to any settlement for Laos is in il's 2, ;- .'.5 3
:~!j
sharp contrast to the flexibility that he evidenced. in explor- '1
;JJ'---·'-:D \~;·.'.
ing solutions. with General Phoumi last week, and is almost " . I ;1A~7
,_
certainly conditioned by the uniformly negat~ve reaction of ';JS"
. the bloc to the.communique he issued with Phoumi. '.tt
Indicating that the Communists foresee the possibility ':1\ -
of a long st_ruggle in Laos, Peiping on 14 March broadcast ·i:;i;;;
··•tz
a-Pathe_t l,a9 order of t):le day calling ln_Laotians to prepare
for a·"prcitracted war of resistance!'
. (Baclrnp, Page 1) · _
l '(b)(3)
)if; .
tl'l! -
(b)(1) -
LL<l.L-' ~(~)(~) :

"-"i ~it
j ··lf~ -:r·

:l~r
'i~i...

ffiarnmarskjold told ~~erican official on 14 March that

he is thinking of sending Dayal back.to the Congo around the
first of April. However, he thought that he might install three)
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 (b)(3)

[African.assistants in Leopoldville before Dayal's return and

----·that these assistants would perform most of the UN re re-
sentative's duties. (bj(1):- .
(b)\~Jj

France-Algeria: The French·Government announced yes- d.-L.L<-&,

terday it is ready to begin official political negotiations with ./-; . .
1:!iJl,
.the Algerian rebels. The meeting of leaders of the rebel pro-!. 5 ;.i.,.3 ', c./ U:,'Wli.
visional Algerian government, which began in Tunis on 14 o.;( ;J~<-<£J ~-j:
March·and will probably continue through this week, report- tJ r ~Ill
edly is assessing ·the results
. of secret preliminary
. contacts J;i'
,,,._.,
with the French. Both the French and the rebels have. attempted ;;;,:,
to keep secret the content of these talks, held in Geneva, but 1;:;~;
reports indicate that some progress was made on.the status of t~'
the French minority and arrangements for a transitional gov- 111:
ernment. The problems of imp.lementing a tacit cease-fire :;~70:
:agreement, which Paris appears willing. to·accept, and deter- 2il:
mining sovereignty over the Sahara are likely to be especially ,~w:fl:

.
difficult points during negotiations. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Backup,
Page.5 )

. Union of South· Africa: 1'outh Airica's decision o. n 15 March

-I
.';il.%f
••

e . .i~i:
nhot t~ sefefk atdillittanhcde to tfhe Commonwealth as afrepublic, and ·'..". ~..:.~..·...:··....c-_.'...··.·.~-
t us m e ec ·to wit raw rom that organization ollowing se- .::::.c
vere condemnation of Pretoria's racial policies, wi_ll probably ,,,,. ,
have little immediate effect on the Union's domestic affairs. 'ff
. The English-speaking ·mtnority--some forty percent of South 0 /( ~
.Africa's whites--bave been politically handcuffed in recent years f~I
and are not likely to provoke significant disorders. An eventual j:'il(b)(3)

CJ . loss of the five-p"'rc.ent tariff preference would not affect more

·than about eight percent of South Africa's. total trade. However,
Pretoria's action is another major step in the Union's virtual
withdrawal from the outside world. Its impact, moreover, may
'.~.J'
;~t
'1.fi
:?)t,
·

be greater in international African and Asian circles, where the ~~

concept of the Commonwealth· as a multiracial ·club will be ~~· .
strengthened. Prime Minister Welensky of the Rhodesi~ ·.~{

.16 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF I

l(b~(3)
ii

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TO~TI
(b)(3)
.'"' . I

Situation in the Congo

· ffi_ammarskjold apparently feels that Dayal 's return to the

Congo is necessitated by the "question of 1ndian prestige";
ultimately, however, he hopes to have an African at the head (b)(3)
of the operation, with another African and an Asian as depu-
ties. He has stated that Makki Abbas, his interim represent-
ative in Leopoldville, is popular with the Congolese--a view
which was confirmed by Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko
in Leopoldville. However, Abbas is to return to his post a8
executive secretary of the Economic Commission for. Afr.ica in
a few weeks]

. With the exception of Joseph Ileo, whose job as prime min-

ister in the Leopoldville regime apparently was abolished, the
participants at the Tananarive conference reportedly are well
satisfied with.the "Confederation of Central African States"·
proposed in the conference's final resolution. The Congolese
apparently. have decided to wait until the confederation's con-
stituent states have been formed before determining its struc-
ture. So far four such states, in addition to the eight proposed
at the conference, have been proclaimed. Three of the twelve
are in Leopoldville Province, and.Kasai and Katanga contain
two each. Another state reportedly has been formed from
parts of Leopoldville, Equateur, and Kasai provinces. In ad-
dition, an Orientale ·"government-in-exile" and.the remainder
of Equateur have joined the confederation as separate entities.
This process of fragmentation is likely to continue. Although
·this trend is derived from the tribalism which.has made the (b)(3)
larger pol.itical groupings unrealistic, the resulting sta"t"'"e"-s_,al=-----
most certainly wiJl be highly unstable.
(b)(3).

(b)(1)

(b )(3)

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;._;TO~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

ITaieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Tunisian foreign

secr'etariat, left Tunis· on 1.3 March for Brussels, where tie is
to be Hammµskjold's representative in talks with the Belgian
Government. c= ~ (b)(1)
11 the timing of his mission is unfortunate, since Belgium is
~the midst of an election campaign and cannot be expected to (b)(3)
take new initiatives· before the formation of a new governm~t)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

_.

-
(b)(3)

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• I
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(b)(3)
v ~LI~~~~~~___,

Situation in ,the Congo

(b)(1)
.----------=-c-:-:-----:-: Katanga President
Tsh,'-o-m~b~e was reserved but cordial and did' not discuss the
specific11 of the Indian troop movement. It is impossible to
determine whether Tshornbe intends to carry 'through his im-
plied threat against Americans; but the consul believes that
----!~if 'violence does occur,, it will have been instigated,bi:Tshombe's (b)(3)
J!::elgian.advisers. /A.ccording to another report, a, European .in
'-----,~Ellsabethville stated·on.15 March that "immediate and serious
internal disorder will result throughout the Congo", ff Indian
.. troops are ~rought ~riJ -.

~ro-Asian representatives at the UN apparently have nqt

. yet developed a position toward, the Tananarive conference.
. Most of them, with the exception of Guinea. are reserving . (b) (1)
. judgment on the conference.( ~
(b)(3)
r-1·---;=hether Kasavubu's installation as head of the confedera-
~validat'ed hfa claim to recognition.by tqe UN, which has
acknowledged him as chief of the republic set up last June.
This question was later raised pubU:c.ly ,by Gh;µia, which asserted
in a 15 March statement that Kasavubu,had abdicated "by ac-
cepting an office which is dependent upoh th_e_cUs_s_QlutiQn_oLthe
Congo Republic?.J\ J (b)(3)

suCs~overn:nrennnrs or~d ~~~ops

(b)(1)
postponed me willidrawat
from thE:) Congo as a result of a strong plea from· Hammarskjo.ld.
.: ~ .:. . . .
The government reportedly has not decided whether to remove (b)(1)
these forces or not. I
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

T (b )(3)

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~L__-~-~~
(b}(3)

Situation in the Congo

{!J:amniarskjold told Western UN delegates on 22 March

that UN forces will run out of supplies if the port of Matadi
is not reopened within one week. He believes that uninter-
rupted transit through Mafadi can be assured only by the
presence of a small UN force in the port area.: Efforts by
Hammarskjold's personal representative, Makki Abbas, to
obtain permission from the Ilea government for UN re·-entry
have not met with· success, and unless a favorable decision (b)(3)
·can be obtained within the riext few days, Hammarskjold sees
(b)(1)

D
no alternative but to bring the whole question of the UN ef---~
f_o_:tt_in_tbJ:_C_omto_oncfL9ore before the Security Council. I I
r- -- - _J Hammarskjold is well aware that it (b)_(1)
Tsunffkely the Security Councll will issue more.positive direc-
tives <in the Congo at this time but he will ask for council action
because he is "fed up with bearing full responsibility himself~

[uN troop commander General McKeown ls now under orders

to proceed from Leopoldville to Matadi with 200 Tunislan soldiers
with the objective of taking control of warehouse and other facili-.
ties. Troops are instructed to use force only in self-defense,
"if stopped and Hred upon.'']

Mobutu stated on 20 March that ''blood would flow" if the

UN attempted to retake .Matadi, and he is.reported to have
warned Congolese officials on 22 March that it would be impos-
sible for him to prevent Congolese troops from resisting with
force such l!N action. He expressed the fear that his troops
would turn against their commanders and government officials
as well lf they were ordered not to resist. In the past, however,
Congolese troops have often refused to stand up to a determined
military unit.

{iasavubu app~rently ls exploring the possibility of a.peace-

(b)(1)
ful UN return to Matadi dill'1n.R:_bls_c_ur-1'.JillLvJ.slLtoJhe reglon,
and Ilea[_ !that a solution

CJ could be fauna, although he could.not predict when the "people"

of the city would permit a re-eritri;) T.he Congolese are likely
to regard the UN initiative as an ultimatum which disregards .
(b)(3)

-
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(b )(3)

their recent efforts at conciliation following Dayal 's departure,

a development which would reverse the recent trend toward
improved. relations between the Leopoldville regime and the
UN Command~

(b)(1)

I ;the Union Mlmere had waY.s ot (b)(1)

bringing pressure on TshombE'\ to reach an agreement with -
-~sayubu,. "lf it really wanted to," (b)(1)

~------------------(b)(1)
. . . . (b)(3)
Peiping has.given a somewhat less than sattsfactory response
to Gizenga's requests.for aid and the namln of a Chinese ambas-
sador to Stanleyvii.le. (b)(1)

[L~::-,,--i::-c·-· ·~c---------$-. --'"-----.-.-----!

(b )( 1)
ast fa.u. the hinese ommunists extended a 2, o00,000 ·monetary
grant to Lumumba supporters. Chou accepted the appointment of
a Congolese ambassador but said transportation difficulties. ruled
out the sending of a Chinese ambassador to Stanleyville at this
time. (b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b )(3)

~-----
(b)(3)
~-----------~

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I
I

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. -.
---- -~...--·

~ I
.
 . -
..
c .
(~)(3)

~(b)( 1 )
~(b)( 3)

•~1
~#Jl"f

--
~~

1
ii
·I'-~~
~
-
II ;

w~

I
. Congo: Ham marskjolci -:-:---::-:-:--- - ---:-:-------:-- ---;,.--__J
- reels Tshomb~'s military operations in northern
.
I .

~)(~ )
-
I-
(1)
Katanga--wruch have already resulted in the capture of Manono
and Kabalo--foreshadow intensified civil war in Katap,ga ~,!gy- 1
~,

-area.
e ish its author_~ti,.~..~~e
f Tshomb6's offensive does not stop soon,
his forces will have to be "neutralized." Hammarskjold has
requested that approximately 1,200 Indian troops be airlifted
ll b;(1)
from: Dar es Salaam to Kamlna with~n the next few days; their
arrival could provoke violent incidents by Tshomb~'s supporters
in Elisabethvllle. Although military talks between Mobutu and
I:
I
_Stanleyvllle General Lundula are apparently proceeding as
scheduled, the po~itical conference between Gizenga and repre-
I~
sentatives of the Leopoldville government.a scheaiiled to ~gin ·
on 9 4eril. has been l?OJ!$llO_Md. The Leopoldville ,emissaries
apparently feared for their s afety, and now have suggested that -,-~Iii! -

:J~nt""""Q ™" helcLin_nentral territorv. Possibly Addis

t b)(3)
JYJ. -
~ b)(1)

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~----~
(b)(3)

..
- Situation in the Congo
(b )( 1)

-
- Tshomb~'s recent military moves in northern Katanga were
made to tindercut hls rival, Jason Sendwe, and to increase
hls own prestige so that he could dominate a conference of
Congolese leaders apparently to take pl~e in late April in
Katanga. The danger of spreadlng the civil war in Katanga

- arises from Sendwe's announcement in Leopoldville on 7

April proClaiming himself chief of .t he ·Luluaba state and
callirig on its people to resist Tshomb~'s invaders.

- Kabalo wa·s reported calm on 9 April, with UN troops

.. holding the railway station and airport. However, there have

been clashes between UN Ethiopian troops and Tshomb6's forces
which have resulted in casualties on both sides, and further

- violence could occur at any time .

- Elsewhere in Katanga, Tshomb~'s government is remov-

ing restrictive measures against UN troops, but gradually so
as not to lose face with the public. UN troops on B April had

- water and electricity in all installations, but food supplies

were still low. The UN commander in southern Katanga

-..
stated on 8 April that continuation of the relatively relaxed
attitude depends on events at Kabalo, reaction to the airlift
of Indian troops to Kamina,. and the ability of the Swedish
and Irish UN forces to maintain order in Elisabethville.
(b )(1)

..
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(b )(3)

- 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

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- (b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Congo: Hammarskjold told a group of Western r.~.P-­

_llGDtiUX§s on 8 ApriJ that K;mayy);n~'s [eC~Pt..lelt~•.~hich
suggested a phased entry of a UN police unit into Matadi,
was unsatisfactory. He said that Canadian communications
personnel, who ·w ould be essential to any military movements
throligh the port, would refuse to go back under such an ar-
rangement. However he stated that the Kasavubu reply did
not warrant stron U ac ion an im 10 a e o o ain
ur er concessions rom the on o ese b ne otiation.
(b)(3)
(b)(1r
(b)(3).

e , -man n an con ngen estme or Ka anga

remains on shipboard off Dar es Salaam pending a decision in
New York concerning its dispositlon. A UN plan to airlift the
contingent into Katanga ls stymied at present by the unavaila-
bility of aviation fuel in Dar es Salaam and by the inadequacy of
the local runway. (b)(3)

President Su rno . U.
will have a 'profound effect" on Peining's_r~-1allons with the rest
of the world.

11 Apr 61 DAI-LY BRIEF ii

(b )(3)

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-
.. Situation in the Congo

- Taieb t:abhani , Hammarskjold's representative in Brus-

sels, said that Belgium was blind to the fact that unless it

- modified its policy, pressures inside and outside the Congo

eventually would deprive Brussels of all its influence in the
country. He asserted that the Belgian arguments with him -.
- were hypocritical and completely unconvincing. In respo.n se
to Sabhani's pressure for the removal of Belgians in. Congo.-
Iese service , the negotiators in Brussels allegedly alternated
- between a narrow legalistic position and references to the
mood of public opinion in Belgium. Their early April announce-

- ., ;
ment that Belgium was prepared to cooperate with the UN al-
legedly was the result of a threat by Sabhani to br eak off ne-
gotiations completely.

After talking with Lefevre and ~aak, who Will probably

head a new Belgian government within the next few days,
Sabhani indicated he had enough hope ......._.......... . . . . . . '-.iLI"----~
:L&Ll............-1l<...........
(b)(3)
and continui di c hem..__

.. (b )( 1 )
(b)(3) .

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- 13 Apr 61
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN P~e 4

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~~ COPY' NQ
OCI
11
·NO. ·onstoi.
rn
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
.WEEKLY
SUMMARY

..

CENft.A.l UoiCTi~- t.l: GEiN<:! AGE.NC.Y

Qfflc;it Cf •CURA!tff INf:mtJOENtE

(b)(3)
I.:. '

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C0 6 5 4.107 3 Approved for Release: 2016/ 07105 C06541073

a·utoo
11aoouvo:r.-.c1 u co:nUAUi·p• paadmit.l y o.t GlMfl&-, !l11d ~­
bot'l'Goa ort1cta~o of t~o Sta:o~ ta ··• 'tr'lp 1t.J1piu-qp UJ W&e f l'\lJ t ...
.l&~ Uo &~d l."lr;1po l«v1 lle r~ leas . Gi~pga r~portedly ia u~­
g~~- · A ~HtlPB l>ttw·H o -vUUn:g· 'to g~ tA> -117 ote:oUa-
CUAIQJa a·~· fttill:lei.r.s ot neo •s t1.0Q• rn11io-11t ltaa:it&tu·, Who •Ol.11.d
e.a,b&i.1.e t re_po:rtedty 9ched1.tlH cot~• 10 att,e:nd. &DY t :llUts 10
f'ol"· 10 .AP,.il did IK>"t uk.e pl.a"i!c. irb~~b tlobwt'1.t b a puU.c:1pa.at .
Ofilo.b ..b 111 botti. c:.DJ>ltab O..P- ' ......
po.ron.tly 1u•-G ~coail~ hlcr<e-u:-
·1ng"l .y dist.l'.iattul of. c111c:tl · oi,llc;i'l'.
Lcopo)dvi.l.LCI Jil'l'O'lt..ncJ.--1 Pv<oa:i-
dont bdllit.a:to , tlbO ha.a tlQOfi a
\~•~ ..r ~n ~\• $ff~~ts to bl-1~ 'J'~o pl;)~. 1~•.uo ~Hia~ o1
tb(} tvo si.d't!e toire-ther • ~ be- .oar; v·toloDC.• b tit>• lo-a:~r Ci>~
lJ. •v(le that "•liiot:i.11-'Uoas wUl 1'1\to'.1' a-ra~ 1>9·t weeri t1ut Coapl~o
't>t9 pos-tpc>n'itd' at l~et uatil ~ U1• 'UN COtmaacS. Ia '""Pl7
n.•Jl'C lfei!k. to lfaiMl•rs~~ld'~ propoc:i~t tb.a.t
~ \Q~~~ li~rla11 p~l~co un~~
'be a.<laltt•d to Jiint:ad.i, KA.sllVU!IU
Tia• cbHf c4u·!:!if8 01 thf t.0$\St•d o_ll • ph11Seod u-rhd.
~-ipo~flfn4Jl1-C •JiPa.NrnHy Q-re Tit.le ·v&a ·ft.ffii.ed uo.:saUora.ctory
an o .r.de.- f:t'Oii Olt.f'.llP "d1:5ai1:11:1.,. bf 'Che ~ecrohry ,;.n.e rm.l, ~
i'n.8" l:l'-8:1L\l~b.Q &.nd *=i a.t~ h.9' told .a .:roap o-t 1footczt'.D .1"0.P"' .
b.y 'fllbt.t'W •t 1.i.tll.. lfl"r•l rse,., ... 1"'08•~t~ti~~e on -8 AJJril tho.t
Uat!oa-a. ~-ub otUo4lrl!; -ot Gi- '. U1• ;e~.ty did nvt- •&J"rllnt ~U'o1:1g
Z.OSIS" '8' Lo:tcee.. Oizea~a., •ha , UM aetton~ 11li.ll:mlrmlJold i!IPU~CI
e1.ui.a ~~·- ~.8 .~oU.nB' h·tr.ad oi U,~ t h~ .h oped ·t o f;'UD fil~U14Jr
U1 ~ '' l~gh:l-oa.t:if g0verame:nt.. be co0Ge-.s5-io:z1111 tFOCa tbo CO'nsolea•
1$ Oll~1·41r,t t4 :t(tfllQ•ei the obiet b)' ae;l):<)Uatioc-:
of atat• it b<O :p:ir-o~e• uttllt ta
,f!OYo.-11 1 11~ i~vticl a. dea.ree re•
f>"laclo.B ~a11,.-uw •itb a npresi- coogoloso ottlclalo tQ
donU:A.1 colleiN··· cotJpti!sed· of Loopol4vtiio woro told oc it
C?IO .,ll\t~ t~i"·~ o.f 16mllm'tm. Is oeab,... Apr-11 ~G.t 1;tJI c~tor .l"<!J>l'0'1!<naia.-
J.'l'lfilt W'Jl.Q oO't ~r~ la ~t anlav•111.o (b )(1 )
tJ.ff ~Y•l. ;ro:\lld ret.u·rfl to tlu)
a2:1d -co.tXo . co~a.0 1 ·;cn+:t,all niat.8t•r. ~bo1to
as:.sttc:ea 'tb:ls. 'i10Ulct l~a.a to ·o.e._,
lm:i1<1ent8 b&t..ieen the V?il Mel
·the c·o oBOl'iM .t !i>ro.n. Do :.Sn.id
·t hat 110 UH .t0:rce:s •'Ould be Bl.-
lO'rle~ t. ~ .Mau.di and tba.t the
l111dian. caati.npot 'Prer.ieat:ly be•
L_~~~~--6,~~~~~~-:--~---' ' t~g ~~•·lif~g4 v.ov4d ~Q t~l"CXS
: oa if it a~blapted to l~d Qtere.
No~pt~flew to ·Bu.Alla on· 9
April J to ar:eot D~~~~-l
all~ged.11 ~Od&t.ufte IU't O.lllbll up
LurMf.'ul•• Gi.u nea • $ G.l'lll' c .o cau11a.r. 8t .L tOP9lffU.l• • -.:rehol.l.e&e u~
~~or . ~oao:r.dio~ to Kcaztt•tu. .st.~a:l>le qUA.lltit'fes of tittb1 ba.·
L1J,IMl.ul• t ·l!lf'U1:1C£11 to OJH!l'llto lP<le- ~ 44.0:t acd Ma' rare di.as· t-o ,.ruto . .

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.\ i!On'l-o.a• 01,Ucii&'a f,l·t · t~• : Congo• tl"oops &t tho .X'W1.,lt1.• buo, •Mr~
l<!&!t t~fOl'C: •Clmp&O:f bl~cJ • Alts" l ,, 400 lft>Oi.A.D tr~.pe
&(atloDcd,. ;ff('(J . . .!~b.lt11DJ
,.r•
l'Olld•
010 .Inf tor. relu-dD~ t.O ";8'-il.e
ln:st.ruu.U.9fla .f.O.t !Sl8U J..tll.l t1~P b.loc~ and cai.1d1111J roads iD tbei·
and '!tatiikil L'b•t. Oo.J1UY, OPfl'll!t- a,~ • • ·1'tt• 11!1 bas r~lnJ'orG•d
UOD!I wrovld '5-0t.>n. l>t '>ot1'l.o.• t, tit cmatill1itt11t o-t fl1.-lop1ans at
GCJ<:ll4Jd at l.IHJJ<>lCl'IUlo. end la.ba.lo; 11 !S~u5'.AU tor ~be or.- •
c.ha.t f1LCiU.ties at l:a.~adl ,..gu\a clllli~l\U'°11 aai.d oo to Apr·H tt.llt
bn.vo t .1> int 1Jh~t d0tm. T.hAI Lo~ '~"' mi VIU.J .Lo · ··o~ittno colltrol..
po-l d11Jll• pH1>lCU!ll • -.c-c.oro.t~ of tbc town .
to t'.fttt <l:omMnY. bMJ ~~i::,t,,,g ·t o
'20' •i~h in• lll;~lJG O°f ltlf" U'OOllll
to. llat:o.d:l . · lftOTte to tlrltft 1.too
lndl•.o tt'OOPi> to
lliilt•n.P ,fraaa
tbe ~o.f'ilr;• pQ.rt. 9, l>tL'P Cl'O
saln.-an • •~•i:• th,o 115 t:r1oiu~
81a~h-t~rd .r.~1:u wtt.b IP.Otlt
it, :.J~ •Rdtu ~roops oa. 'b,olU'd,
hh.CIJ1b& 19 ~OlitlOUJ.a.z' bJt ae •ta.lea&~e.d t<1T. lae'll or eutt- ·
b.11.:rUiBnl'-D.t (If VI Oftli~1'1b tn . abl~ ad:&U.oa 11.io..1 lo. T.ans•.0)'!1'111.
u el'f'Qtt w ll:•it th~ 1r11' 4t.tcopt «11d· U10 lU...t tod o.il'pe>rt fMi .U,1....
to 1>-lW'l't b .1 .5 f>.U .i ,._TY' opol''.liUOo!J. t~o• tl\cec1. Tbe ll)I 4'.pp~ut lJ'
1u.•.ou.nd nbalo. l?UsA.110otb'1.:UU .: u ·•t-tcmpdJJ.it" to 11-.i r.·u h 11Jl or
bt1ou rt_po):'utdlr .n re nc'.t ll'J.Us•.t JXU'I; OJ t;i~.e ID.cf1CLO CODtiq~·.nt la
l\(}JJ~r~ll=8 WI chaab, Ni4 ~Al•~B* lm •t~nt~- ttiun.u9'kJc>ld hu
.allo.'u.t n c-'t~ ..~ ll.l • du11o•a.l.
•'ii.I.ell could oar.rj 40 t~oo11s e.a)I
trl_p. A9J o.t t.u ln4t~ t~&
iiot: U'l"tif:ttcl Pff.w nAbb 16ollld
~ bt ua co ht:adi. or t9 Lac"o!.11
1ucei-a~.

lleiw.t a !ll:Jo'lct ro•rit th•t

·T'tl'.hdlil" ~o elUtu·1 QJl•.r•U.01111
torGc.'b•Oo9 int;e~8if l•d ~1•11 war
io tta'•'lP vl\)."a tb:o cm o.an
0'1'"-6~~'-ll' o:uahl.lo.b .1tl!I &ont:l\o;<lt.f.
Kc bal109tlll t:bn.t ftti:~dbtt 1 9 llO'fG9
·. uo 11.11 ettort;. to '\ltido.rciat. ..Jo.o.1>~
$eiad¥t, ·l!flw ab 7 &ViJ'U 1>roob·•~
M.n!!eU c111e:r or ~he ll<!al~ba. ·
~tilt.ct ano c;alled o:~ He pooplo
to r-01'1..Jt t,,.lw;u:a'b<i•a. troop29 .. 'ft>e,,

~
'f.~¢~t4-~f ~otll'a.l add ttHt .lt.•
UI C..ODi.114f to ·tlJ~ OODGltt.rJi~, tb~ t
~cbcmb6 is "6 L ap l~ • c:::U•1n•l
111Mi ~t1:av" Md tts~t tbo elec-
::) neit ot fotea oa n.11on~ ; s "'~
·l.D 01p.1ocuu,o N r-cd .n:ioa vUa (b)(3)
U.o OJJ .tl\let be r~w~a •
( ·
-t • ..-.-,~
....
~ .,.·~

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n c:Fu.e:l.al rol.a 1.n t.n.o a1.u tn:r
e_t:f'«irt -11pl118~ O•t 0..,.'hib..
trlll~a o.t n.o.rth h t.1uutl'tl
(b )(1 )

1'>1~1,16 D~Hi:i°U7 1~ l;!P-

QQT' wen:ur~ i.rOG tr~u:U UonAU.a t
l.e~d:.C'f-5 .l o Uio l:al'1Ullf.• U•hh-
t\•J:'•), •*1.q ~11.~~ hR'oduoe--d • ~t-vua-t.b.-l!N&, i b• tkl~1~1-
blll ~alJi~g Co~ ~~ ~t:.Ablt.1:l~­ 1illt Pcw'l .. llfelWt s~. 1'bo 1111i1
~6r.w1 ~t • ~ oiuister•s of~' .m~.e t.-.:~t;r ~• t:h•;· "~' iQ.ir(!J.gn
neo . U'fflkJ•· t!l·l~ GYiita T~~w D1A1~tu·. J.JJ. ctJlpGC"CM to adopt.
._. PT-i.triiHQt 11ou,lli lt~YC! • 10.t-.r.o,..
t:y .a.}9.bGlii? ~1~ . sn.d .a~t·ua1.
I),.ao.-. C00'"1Tfl.U•lt p~t:J.~dtt
tO!lila.N ~ll>o· W tnd U Hid t.o
;'IOHT ~ld b_, ·td.&lded' by th~ ~ p.i,~,~~!'lg t.& ·*'~'°'J"b ~i:a. . 1U11-
~eo:!eP.. 'rn• tl'~ill -Uou·u11t!J lst:r1 O!f Af'riaan .A:U•iro 1.nto
~PQTt~b fl~r.o t>t) ~.Q.~tn.n 'tl'ltu.t• t h· Jlot-e;~ lfJ,oJ.tttrJ', h t.h•
c:;11oli~u.. tirtoi.-'l:o~ .• 1&11ltOt" :1to;o o:f eUB1.llat1:Jl£: I\. ntiJ en>
~niorep, t.ri iti"' f.le'1F o;_r.ricie. lttl-. ~OY!l~• ~f. P.l:'~-ht.."°'L"' 1.D. t°lliltill:t-tt
llOllJ:() t~ :60 o:xt:~~o CO~Ol:'"'ll'a.t,l:f'O imtt on 'UU>ort.~o:t cb.ann.ol for
~o il.il ~~Dntt•1' O:PM~~t# W c~o · 'iii!ld:orCOYv'r it<iaU.au;i . wtt.h
ftotg'b.mil aisd i.a ~ae1ra U7 liR- · h1!(.lC!.b6.. '&.e- :fi09 · h."O'l'Clramoa L ,
f:riea<il~ ti' otller turopaia:nii. :b.ow~er·~ 'W'0 uld: 111ot: alhncllte
• ·Co.n.r;o pO:Uc7 q .J,Gb WQ~Hd
:fl&W 1<1u.~n·1 llitoU~O 't~9 SDtg,l.a!t
.PJJ'bUo itnd jeoQOJ.'"dize t.-.e- P'I'"'"'
:pocur la.r' ·tha daaoac:tc .re,.
.t'Orii:fj l~ •\h~~~ th-• CJ! loc:i - (b )(1)
: t;or~1rttr ift: .~ · ;.• 1u ...........
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.. -Congo: The 2,300-man addition to India's UN contingent

has disembarked at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, and the
first planeloads of troops are expected shortly in Katanga. In
view of Tshombe's warnings against the reinforcement of UN
forces in Katanga, Hammarskjold is considering sending UN
military commander McKeown or hi denutv to assume ner- (b)(3)
sonal. command of UN forces there.
•. (b )( 1)

-.. (b)(3)

..
'·· . Angola-Portugal: Terrorist Fl.Ctivity in the area north of

·- Luanda is continuing in the face of a steady Portuguese mil-

itary build-up. According·to the Portuguese news agency ,

- ,.tllousands" of Africans attacked a village about 100 mil~s

northeast of Luanda but were driven off with heavy casualties
by the small garrison there. Disorders have also ·been reported
in. Cabinda.. (b )( 1)

ous an a a ona (b )( 1)
c ial authorities are 'IJ.4UJ..1Cll!._.ll..l..l'-l!.u.u.u.u.i=s:..u:L..d.Uu..__;,LJJ::.....uica::..a..uu..ua:._uL.__ _,

... mobilize reservists.

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)
.... In Portugal, Salazar.has been reshuffling the military sup-
porters of ex-Defens MinL~niz.._lollowinu the c a bin
- <?hanges of 13 April. (b)(3)

·- 15 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

·- : ..• ' .' ·•( :.• " .. :..: .:.

~: - .. ;. .
-
(b )(3)

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..
t '

COPY NO. 4~J

OCI Nn
Ill . iiav.t1e1
10 .April 1911

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

' '

cf NT RA l r
.IN Ell 1G ·f .N c.e AGE N c·v-
·OFF.ltf; Of CUlllf:Ht INflluGotCt:

(b)(3)

• ., L D _.:\ _,,-
~~ a:.~~~~ ...,...-'
cu~ c:•trr..m :iu· m a I::."\
t.,....0..'"TA:'«i:3RU.tL ' ~t$ag
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...
Cl18SEB1' t8'l'IU.t.UiE1K:.B I.£i!ml.y SC!lDIHY

th.ere .. ln"'U~ te> be in...,. MllU:d:i. BIWn:t'~o. la $-4 ~

C:t"Olllllft;t t&w.UOiJILlln 'Wl~1*2 t"ho tl11.li:h!iQ 'll,i~ Priss11n o.n tbi.s · Ls-.-
Co&ttOl~9 ~cu1t.•ril 4( ~~ . "1bit •~ • bu~ · tll.¢1 UJJ .apparO'IJUt· baa
ltata~ Hll'.ioM iD .~..·~tGU:lD.r ap- · , .ureaod ~ 4M~ rooC)e '\'1a
p_(tl).l"A- to b11t irtllt.rlo.a a pO'.l' iod o! ~.int• !lc.dr.~ and Bn,un..,-U le 111
t·n11~iJ<'b.~ U:-tr M ~ 1"1t$.l.l ~ ol ,. CDC> f~CGJ' ~QaC;b (i°l).ll@Q tr V.~
4rDJ> 'l n 'tWllcm'bb 'A praJtt'18!9. o.. :t',1!4LiQ9 ci l,Q.M!J.
t'"l.~ .Sa t.d·b a.l. t«ullUona. · tii.CI •
IV:l>Wi~s o;pPQ.d ttOJJ to tho· Bel•
1,lim prcia"o.~ct. At Ulo &UM Uo11t,. lil!JT•t:t~lA!~;. tlle Hlftt-1.Y'Oly
01.&l~G li:r~ -t.lldl.i;.~t.lon~ UJ. . W ·l b oa.a· ~•to f>l -roh.ttow:a bo~oa
tQJct tlJf and ~b,-e t-f.4icitil .Af'.t .l.O@ LoopoWYU\o R"d t.11e: oX Ccn.i"-<J
pGVar-s arc .adlopt Lnil tou.al~r ·t;~
r.-e?tlr.!JO'OI ~T bj~ot!War D>\pl 'e-
Coq» po~~t~ .. rctllrD to tt.M> COl>IO u llDBIU'-
$fqo~.d '"' "P,rA~ta'\.iv4H· lh1;r.al.
.1'01l0'1'te4-17 .b l!Jc.beclu.lecl ~o u•
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-
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(b)(3)

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C0654 107 6
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(b)(3)

-
.. The Situation in the Congo

.. The UN Command appears increasingly disposed to take

a tough stand in its relations with the Leopoldville and Katanga
gov~rnments. Hammarskjold's unpopular Congo representative,

- Rajeshwar Dayal, reportedly plans to leave for Leopoldville on

28 .April. In Katanga, whe.re the UN continues to airlift· rein-
forcements from Tanganyika in the face of Tshombe's threats,
the situation .remains tense. UN officials in LeopoldviUe have
stepped up efforts to return UN -forces to the port of Matadi

.. even at the risk of jeopardizing the recent improvement in

their relations with the Kasavubu government. Pointe Noire,
which Hammarskjold has mentioned as an alternative port to

- Matadi, handles on an annual basis only one third the tonnage

of Matadi, and all goods brought in there wou~d have to be
brought across the Congo River at Brazzaville.

Only ln Orientale is the UN Command inactive. The status

of the proclaimed truce between Mobutu's Congo Army and the
rebel. forces remains unclear; although a Stanleyville broad-
cast has denied the existence of any truce, it is possible that

- some agreement has been reached among commanders in the

field.

I I (b )( 1)
I_ _ _ ltlle Ministry of African Affairs in B~rus~ (b )( 1)

- sels had assured Belgian officers that service with Tshombe's

forces would be considered equivalent to service in el
forces with respect to retirement.
-
(b )( 1)

-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

'----c~--~
on instructions from Brusse arne Be gian
officers against participating in any action against the UN Com-
mand .
... Prospects for a meeting of Congo political leaders at Kamina,
.. Katanga·~ c~ scheduled for 20 April for
decisions reached at Tananarive- ~ a
the purpose of implementing
ear dubious.[
T~hombes ~a-t-te_n_d~
an~c-
e_i_
s~~~
(b)(3)

- 1n_ques ion,
(b)(1)

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-
.-
- York ·again denouncing the Tananarive conference last March
as "no't representative of the country'.' and as a maneuver "de-

- sigged to c_o_unteract the_mqrk of the General Assembly." -

(b)(3)

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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Congo: Foreign Minister. Bomboko's statement on 7 May

that the Leopoldville government plans to try Tshomb~ for
treason will heigh~en. tension among his followers in Katanga,
who are already· ·concerned regarding possible UN moves to
disarm TshomM's armed forces. An official of the Katanga
government has ageged to the American consul that the UN K
is preparing an "offensive" against Katanga, and warned that O
the· Elisabethville government would sabotage key mining in-
stallations r·a ther than per.qiit them to be turned over to the
'--------~ [ ntrlllJlovernment.· _ _ ___ ____· _ _

<-r-c--- --o-'
Hammarskjold has previously indicated that he hoped
to appoint a committee to assume Dayal's functions, ossibly
ei:Jlls return to 1.eonoldville for a token neriodl - -- r--- - -

rus c ev s remarks on t e in erna iona s ua-

tion. ~ur.ing. a 6 May speech in Yerevan were apparently in-
tended to assure the US that recent events in Laos and Cuba
have not damaged long-term prospects for the improvement
of Soviet-US relations. According to Ambassador Thompson,
the Soviet premie:r laid stro'n g emphasis on the need for dis-
cussion of subst~ntive matters in bilateral disarmament ne-
gotiations with.the US. . Khrushchev referred t~ talks which
were to take place "soon," on the disarmament question and
asserted that Moscow was preparing for these talks with 0 K..
"complete seriousness." Turning to the recent events in Cuba,
Khrushchev called upon Cuba and the US to "live like good·
neighbors," and in generally restrained remarks on the situa-
tion commented that the USSR would like to look "optimistical-
ly" on the .future course of Cuban-American relations. Khru-
shchev reiterated th~t Moscow desires a genuinely independ-
ent and neutral ·Laos. He mad~ clear his view that an improve-
ment in relations with the US depended not only on. the outcqme
of disarmament negotiations but on the settlement of the Ber-
lin and German proble.m s as well. He repeated standard de-
mands for a reorganization of the United Nations, but called

8 May 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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 (b)(3)

Con~ l!iammarskjold said on 9 May that contrary to -

fears in lG.tanga, the UN did not intend to use force to secure (b)(3)
the withdrawal of Belgian military or political advisers from
the Congo. He added, however, that any Belgians who fell
lnto UN hands would be repatriated. Hammarskjold now plans
to keep Dayal in New York for about five weeks; thereafter, lf
relations between Leopoldville and the UN remain cordial, he
wlll return Dayal to Leopoldville for a brief stay. Hammar-
skjold sald that Nkrumah is no~ pressing his threat to Withdraw
Ghana's troops from the Congo and expressed doubts that the
Ghanaian President would do so"J
According to the Amer.lean-Embassy in Brussels, Belgian
Foreign Ministry officials regard the arrest of Tshomb~, who
ls now being removed to Leopoldville under guard, as a stupid
maneuver which might increase unrest in Katanga without facili-
tating a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Stanleyvllle.
Brussels ·reportedly ls attempting to keep ltself disengaged from
the publlc dispute over Tshomb~, although it has told Congolese
. repres;-ntatlves lo li_ew York that lt disapproves of LeoPoldvllle
on~
. l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

• nmeu any IUTwe (b2(3)

demonstrations, except at one spectfled publlc stadium where
assemblles may be he'ld '.'~o express the people's demands" i -
and stated lt will take strong measures to maintain order.
Crowds, including many students, have been in the streets,
however, celebratlng the collapse of Shartf-Emainl's cabinet
and hailing the government's announcement th2.t the pollce of- '----~-_J

fleer responsible for killlng a demonstrator last week would

be prosecuted. The teachers' organization, · which sparked
the earlier demonstrations, appears wllling to continue its
strike for higher wages, although its leader, Mohammad
Derakhshesh, appears undecided. He has been mentioned as
a possible candidate for minister of education, a cabinet post
not ,Yet filled by Aml1!9 .
l!Amini has told the American ambassador that he intends
to draw up a new election law, to work for and wlth the Shah,
and to ask for prompt US aid in carrying out major refor~

11 May 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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Situation in the Congo

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b )(3)

(b)(3)
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---~ {b)(3) -
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(b)(1) ~
(b)(3) _

/Hammarskjold reportedl; told a We~tern official re-

cenUy that he intended.to appoint Rajeshwar Dayal an under··
.secretary gen~ral, in line with a recent recommendation
that the number of such posts be increased. This appoint- (b)_(3)
.ment presumably wou.ld preclude Da retur to the Con o
~~mmarskj Id's re resentative. (b)( 1 )~
(b)(3) -

~I
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-
(b)(3)
Congo: Anti- Gizenga commentary on .R adio Leopoldville
·Lndicates that Kasavubu so far ls holding to his own propos·a ls
on reconvening the Congolese parliament. The Leopoldville
radio on 17 May characterized the Congo crisis as "in its ·
final stages," and after alluding to Gizenga's counterproposal
observed that "no delaying tactics will prevent. . . the convoca
tion~par:llament" by Kasavubu.
elgian officials in Ellsabethville· have again voiced con-
cern at the ·security situation in Katanga will deteriorate as
Be~gian military personnel are replaced in coming weeks. (b)(3)
The Belgian consul general has said that: he had ro confidence ~­
·in the ability of the U:N to protect the. 12,000 Belgians in Ka-
tanga, and that Belgian nationals in Elisabethvine· have drawn
up emergency evacuation plans. The American Consulate be-
lieves that at present these Belgian fears are exaggeratecfJ
fflammarskjold has told Ambassador Stevenson thafn'e
·planSro send Dayal back to Leopoldville on about 25 May for
.roughly one month. Hammarskjold stated that he was con-
vinced that the -r eaction to Dayal's return would not be so'
sharp as to paralyze .UN operations. He insisted that were
Dayal not to return to Leopoldville there was a real danger ·
that India would shift~osition_noi_onlY..JllLthe_C_on~o but on
broader UN issues:] _ b)(3)
·(Backup, Page 3)-:-(M=--a-p~----------- . -.---~

France-Algeria: {[espite the hope of the Provisional Al-

gerian Government (PAG) that the broad outline of an agree-
ment with the French· would be .reached through -preliminary
ontacts before talks begin at Evian on 20 May, recent re~
orts indicate that little common gro~d has been established. b)(3)
he PAG negotiatii:ig team reportedly still feels that Algerian 0 K
overeignty~ -including the S"ahara--must first be recognized
efor.e it can offer concessions for French participation in. the
conomic sphere and guarantees for the European minority.
he PAG is said to hope that the negotiations can be completed
n three months- - but is ready to bre ak them off if no concrete
rog·r ess is made within two weeks.. T.h e French team ls ·.
xpected to be firm but courteous, .since it ls well aware ~rom]

19 May 61 DAILY BRIE~ . iv

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·....., ~

Tlie Situation in the Congo

ffiammarskjold's decision to return Dayal to Leopoldville

--despite the danger of undermining the UN's newly improved re-
r------~1• latlons.with the LeopoldyilJ.e government--reflects his sensitiv-
ity to Nehru's views. Despite Dayal's wipopularity with vir~ (b)(3)
tually all Congo factions, Hammarskjold has long favored re-
turning him to the Congo at l~ast for a token peri~j

Gizenga's determinatioi:i to resist Kasavubu's call for a

meeting of parliament in Leopoldville appears to have sharp-
ened differences among his followers -which .forced the adop-
tion of strict security measures. The American Embassy in
Leopoldville reports , however, that Gizenga has released from
.prison Colonel Yangoie, the army officer who in April nego-
tiated with General Mobutil's representatives concerning the
desirability of reconvening parliament. The embassy specu-
lates that Yangoie's release was prompted by a desire to avoid
unrest in the army.

The embassy notes that recent arrests in Stanleyville stem

from opposition to Gizenga among moderates , notably those in
the Orientale provincial government. The easing by the Leo-
poldville government of the economic blockade of Stanleyville
reportedly permitted an influx of goods to the provincial gov-
ernment which strengthened its hand in relation to GizeQga 's
"national" government. While the Gizenga regime appears
doubtful of its abllity to control a new meeting of the Congo
parliament ap.d continues to b0 troubled by factionalism, the ·
American Embassy believes it is not likely to collapse soon.

' 1fn Katang~, Belgian interests ~ppear wider pressure from

both'7the UN and the Katanga government. Hammarskjold's
personal representative in Brussels has told Ambassador
Stevenson that the new Belgian Government seems to be yield-
ing to .f inancial intere sts and the press and is doing little to ( b )(3)
bring .about a progressive withdrawal of Belgian advisers from
I
~--------'
the Congo, particularly Katanga. In Elisabethville, the Mwiongo
government has severely criticized officials of Union Miniere,7
-
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(b)(3)
· fur alleged acts inimical to Katanga, ~d has said it intends

D
to replace Belgian technicians with ·French advisers. Munongo's (b)(3)
pique has probably contributed to Belgian a rehension con-
cerning the safety of Belgians in Katanga.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

1.9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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 (b)(3)

Congo: {[ammarskjold has informed US officials that

Dayal will not be returned to Leopoldville as senior UN repre-
sentative because of the latef;!t demonstrations of Congolese
hostility toward him. Hammarskjold implied that he regarded
,___ _ ______. the behavior of the Leopoldville government as outrageous and
~ndicated that there might be a delay in dispatching Dayal's suc-
cessor--U Hla Maung of Burma--to Leopoldville. He stated
that Nehru had been informed and had agreed to recall Dayal 1f-lr'
to Indiy ·
li:he Leopoldville government will probably regard Hammar-
skjold's decision as a victory.which will strengthen its hand in
dealing with other Congolese factions. Several reports indicate
that the Leopoldville government is favorably disposed toward
negotiations with Katanga, which recently has indicated its will~
lngness to dis(:• oarlldnatlon In a Congo federation as desired
by KasavubuJ
(Backup, t>a:ge 1ivr
. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistan Air Force planes continue
to bomb hostile concentrations in Pakistan near the Afghan bor-
der. I b)(1)

I !Pakistan con-
tinues to be confident of its ability to handle the situation in the
border area following the 20 May attacks, which were apparently
launched by Afghan special forces disguised as tribesmen and OK
supported by dissident local tribesmen. Kabul continues to deny
that its forces were directly involved in the 20 May attacks, at-
tributing these entirely to local Pushtoon tribesmen resistin
Pakistani GovernIJ:lent "oppressiont '---- - - - - - - - - --------1

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COPY NO. t
TOP SECRCT- MTE 20 Ma;J ttu

\\I
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
REVIEW

c.eNTR A.L I HT El 1.. lGE :N·C E AG EN c v.

' .

~ ·· a: L .. ,

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(b)(3)

AC ·lbii:J a·tag4', 1:'91>91 t~ CCIOtllt0l'8 ptedlct 'll•C tbe tallrJa

rorim111111y pr~uaoni. • lesa. Hrio115 •1.U '10 "'dlfll~~lt.and tcDSa.• "
p!'qb'I qqt r-or Oi.e 'Preticb Oovqr...-
aeoc tba.o -the cont:tn.u1fl8' a,ct:i,,._ Mot1cov tlae tons aalo1ained
i.C'y ot r.lgbC-W:los edremi11!t• • tn t!t111t O!t\lJ' d.tHcC tcalka botne:o
rra.1>Qe. 'lbere 1c JTciLaon. to '.b o- t.b~ i-eb6lis ocd tbq P'tencri on •
Ue•e tbilt tba ae;wor.lr:e of . hui.o Of' eq~Al'lt)' Cllli reJiitore
pl:ot\lor-a couo.lrioJ· ap.bt!lt !Jo ,Peace to Algerill _ lo 11a,.c~,
<b~lle and b~~ po11C1GS ~-~• tollowl.Ag tho anncJ\fDe~oeoc cbo~
not yot bce.n f\lllf expoaed. ta.l1UJ 1t01.tld be held ~ Kb.Mlarn:ibov
8011\b.l:DCB ha..,e cont1.a1Jad Sill Ytcance
food b•ve .VOD bee" stepped up
iD Algtll".1,.; distdbu·t.toa ot
' lomu.a "'°'
u C?o.n'Cl'Cft"ADt:i.omo w1th i\nt> dip..
.a.rr eiicourlllJil:llJ Uao
. ~d U1e ~¥iet bibacmuSor lrt
threa'ten.lo~ lett.cPS aod Pll'!Pblete P&rUi- =iollght' ou~ De OauUe to
O(lt· ou·t by -r£SltUa·i- e.it'\:rmll&U • 11xprua ~J"l#S:M~v'e .boSK" t.ar
goaa on.. Stich •t.tbHy Dllf b!> • Hl'C:etv1 esoulc110ot ., - At tbe
fllrtber fllti~'lU:o-d ~7 ~11- t:r1"1 eame Umct, Soviet 1l1.t'Bt 'Deput7
of. t.b.e iQUl'l'~t' ae'nedD whicb Pl'11it:S$'1."' ir:osnlD. tried. to
opaDti, on 29 l(&y, .DiecoDtcct etUfen the rebe~' ~Je'tartee
v1ib1n tbe aray ta ati~i ~1~&- . · to •Dl' campr9•~~~ wlUI rn.~~e,
spread. Ac tbo &\ltut. 11eeot.ta• a.dv;t,alqg t .be.r t to aeimnd l'-ccog-
t:to~ p~oc:eedl, uu~ fru11trat.lt.>.~ Utlbl!i &d tb.o ao'lo t'OpH1Hn,ta...
or tbe riJbtist CIX~7o=.t9'8 ll'llY tlw~• ·O f Aleett•.
pr.cmp1; l!(aDD ot
tbe1J io nlle a11
·amoiu:.al,lllltlOO 1.1.ltU~C OD l>CI · T.lJi.le t.bcra a.ra ll4VllJ.l"l'98
G-aull.9 a.a ~ 18.!lt· dccpcratc •h tor tbe USSR ln a. eooUnu...
fort. to ,p!'IC!V'cot All$i'1&tl tnde• atio~ ~~ . tbit rer>elUon, So-
pcnuic11.e&. vJ•t leaders a.t tho preeeAt
ti~ a~ pr-obo.bly tOCllued
- Sovt.a·t AtUt1.1&te9 to nJ>J»r:t a settlcaa~t . p:ro-
Vlded the .rttbctla coa ener&e
So~..-iet. :IM!'W~ medi o.~ 'tnl,11$· f 'ro111 tho ~tutiol\9 ta
•dc.omi11g' tbR •I J.U.f 't O.f 1>e-cvUa.- tv1i CO'h'\.l'Ol of lado-
8:Q
·tton:o. till Ve caut.ion.e-cf tha.t ttJ,o P4tflf~.,, A.lgci.r-la, •Ub U.iilted,
~Qn<¢b stand •il.l dot~1M tt · ·anr,, ·Uee WUb ~ct. ·
1'be\.ber tho Aige:rt•.4 problea 't'O,, 'WC!!ix! J (b )(3)
vlll b9 90\'Yed by ~·rieuct.1.u.t
1
.,e.aim or otbor.•tee. · fnoc· com-

T~o aq9'$'J'GJ:l.,.Of lo :toopQ'1d- l98~tl pnr1111crnt ii.a ·nt lb.I oot

v1..::U e bu 1'4!\ftai.Ded t1r.o tn Ue &J11 cro:n:pi~L••· ft:& Leopo;td-
deciis·ion to FOCO!lVIUH, pt.rli&. .. villc ~·~10 ~ e•td tbo Con10
mcn.t tbe-, a 1. U\ou~h tbe Stllll• . c·r 1e1a ia "1.D tto :ti:Ml .sta,se•"'
lOJ\1;1,l i . rq:ime con ti.D\ICUF to a.nd ba:11 wat"nod Uat ' 1n o deLilyi~
deriand t.ha't u . 1DCOt :at ~u.10~ .. ta.c~c9 ~1li preVlDl~ • .. tbe
K&H"9Uh1U ·~~r9 · 10 re~ ca- ·COlllVOfl&UoD ot pmrll•~nt:'' by
.ze.aga. 'i;i c1,a!1a to· rcip:ra~ot tbO X.u awha.

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TOP SECRE,

CORRStfT lN:rEl.Ll CD'CC WEEn.Y RBVJW

In ~otriu;~ . t~Gre ~re iu· .Lctol)C>l~Vllle probably tcela

dlcat.ions t~At ~opoldvtlle GAY tl\at .U8 8\IJCC~ti i:D bloc:ltlcg
~ ·~auUtiUoi: "i.th 1Vbor.tb6 1 ~ tbo ret1trn of lD'- ?OR~~~qtatl•e
9 ucc~oaor·s l~> IUUilU' O XA u l'lltB.. (t Oaytil to th.o Conl!O .bu s ·trenitb-
oarti~1-pa.t 1on lq parlianeat. Tba cncd ti~ na~a . itllJDll:r:i*~old ­
IWnonao ~~1umv~rate io k.ntanga lflfOr~ed W o.thdale on 22 tlay
J' Opor·tedl y ha.:1 lmU.CA tod ta11, t •bu Dayiil WOQJ(t ft Ot· b~
H is p:rcpu-o4 1:0 -ace-opt ,fl -COngo rotur11od ·to Leopoldv.1 lle be-
fcdaratlOll as propa~eG by K~D­ cause ot ~he t11·teat ~XJ»"'l(f• lons
wubu . A Congo'lcaa PQllU ~Ul!J or eoc.z:!::a tsoect Uty coward
tuie iotorocd An.~~eador Tlmbrr-- hi.SJ. r e~Jol~ etated
t~ko tba~ t be K a e~v~bu govcro- ~~II t. tiobru b:l·d bean .lnfQ1'1'.t.ilCI
n9n\ hoe received a ~rogo$al And h~d ag~Qod to rec~ll
fnm ltunoogo aM 19 <lraf i:tng a Oa:r:a1 .
C0UfttQPp~po8k 1 .

Ct f the Congo

TOP 5£tlct:71' I (b )(3)

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--
----~
(b)(3)
"TOP S!efta-Jl.__

Tb~ Stanl.e}'v:t.l:l.o· re1111:e-- hAvqo bffb onlered back lnio t .be

.conf..roated ~•~b t~e l'Qlt~ital Al"Q.IL
tb.r~.t. <>t • t~ppr.ocbc:u1c1111· bo-
tweQ" teopoidvH\o a.ad 11.lit&• le<i.U.ft ·Charg~ &b11an 1«1
tietb.vitle a!Ml 'lli'ltb deterior•~­ t.ooJ)OldYJ. lle; who Ol:l ~18 O'RI
.1ng •eolJUlld.e cooditSoDJP tt> :.in:l.tiltitivc· l\JA8 labored acUvolr
Orhatlile ProvJ.,itC9'-hU n .o ved on. C.iunsa-•e beh&lt, ant9i:t i-e-
to bol::.at4,r UfJ ~U..1.1:.ar1 ,p oautoo. ~enily that ho Q14 'l)Ot b~lieve
Acco.io:1,tln1J 10 prcica 1".0por-t;e , · 01.Eeaga b.• O eeoush YOt'1!1t ta
tl'OOOtt tro• Stan.teyv.1.U~ haYe · to becolDO pr.a.l .er .
Pllt't'll!-ttl!'lit
fl ppe11.rod hi force in las.a..t ~'­ ftAltolllD 1pecubtoCI tltllt i.t Gtzcn-
lbco . Al~boueb tb~r.. 1a no fin:» ~a porwS9t9~ in scek.1118 tho ·pre-
i~fornittoa t.bat .Oise~ pl~ .alotSnl;P lie .rould mn~ely- w~a.keD
11:111 ~l\JOr otteDC11tvc nc't\01'~ ia- tbe ·•· 11at~~a.ll9't"' PoS-iUon a.Dd
~o·r~opt.:d meaHBQlil f ·r oa. Oizenp pa~ ~• •a.1 for di.;:utorahl.O
to ~~ ·have IU'Ked t.bat tbo ~Y SOiile Drzbor of tbe present
Ghansai.1 u Prt·S .idel:lt ~pocU te ue- 't.eoPC>l.d'VUlo ao•eraaent .
~1.t. Ul-C.ing ot Sovle.t araa to
Sfn.ale;vvU~e . .R elllUons 'bono~ c c.be U'lf
And Ka~ •~UM>'.r-ltic• bllvo
lleP,Oi'~• ot IU-l U.ary activ• co~Uaut« etl'ained u a res~l'llC·
i ty to K11.ea't •ll'J"!v to 'h aTO J.ed Of CRf. llOVOG to ret:&lo eoz:ttrol,
~A\P\ll>U (0 fli&C:CI A.ibert 1.alo.Qjt b1 t.orco U aeceasa.ry , 9f 11.•J
v.nder '911rY01l.lca~c., tn. · Coct\li.l• ll~OU .ta nor tbcl"J) K.ata.n1• ~ Al.•
hatvtllo . A OJ r.eport ha.a al.- t~~ah lfua1;uiso tt:reet.ea.ed an1cd
1,.~Gd ·~bat. 8.l;SHllA~V· isoveaAts resut1uu:.o U tbe mt aov04 to
by llal.o ojl •• Jt-lloSPl 8,irn;, iaga.lrui~ ~~ ove-r .atrt.1old11 a.t Albert....
tt lba.l 09J»mttrt.5 folla.-cd a v~ll~ aod NyuQfly, be ca1l11ncd
ll\ltld~vp fildDcod by a 8'lciao bJm.ol,f to • r0:r.aa1 pro~cn..
ni.o ing co~n·v . Ghaa$1lUll UlC of Ulc UM •c.tion a.pd ~ppeared
troopsi, ~1cb teceotl7 voro tUUtiou!i to llVOld • 8UiOll$
vt~bdra.-n fNm 111ou-th91'111 ltU&l, ruptu~o wit.tt \lie llN ~llnd.
('roP &'.IPCnBT I jWc:lrou) (b)(3)

RWl6ra ot a 'POHltll• ~.ill­ depu..t.7 dl.l.or ot Sit>VAk, ropo-rto<t-

ta.ry croup b ,!lV'O lod tbe aav ly 11.u ~ea :reliend ot. ~.ls cc.-
t.rulan Qo-1e.t-nmeDt to tatta 89•- ma.ad: ~,empor1LPU7 } be le.h on !2
~ .la.l preoautio~ . Prl11e •~al.II• Ka.J io.r a. ti"1'9 to Israel. G:ci~~
t~r Ali AD1n1 oa~,bU.$bed IL oioa 1 Fti14\:u> tlU"Okbata, coal:l&.Dchtt
l'IU'tial ·a1i'Uary al.ed OD tb• o1 the Second tndepeDdeot lnf &11- (b )( 1)
•f'eo1a1 ot 19 KAy, ·a tt·O o.I\ a1 tr;v 81-.lpd,O 1.u. Teb:ro.o, baa boee
~"' be told IUI ..Aae·U cil.D otticial filCD~ Ori ..., ••:tn:.poc.U,on trl"."
that, " to _. on 'lie es.at4t
M bad ull.ed Ganara.1 Tt~
~· •i.•,
!BILkhtia:r, folM!le.r cble:t of Ute· lot 16 lfa7· au~'~ tbat (b )( 1)
lllltlo~al lotelli~noe · &114 ~Q­ far~khDi& bad 'Tlei~ed the Vil•
rtf\,. Orli[lt.01•1lt1oQ (·~VA.lQ, to
go to t.h:O C&.8Pl&a tor a fav d'.&15.
l.a,go •ll•" foraer bqei1
t.or Mosso.deq
Pr1Do Ni'A.18-
U v.tn.r
b~ ~or
ll1"ltf11.itJe:r Generlll Ala.v~-Ua.• UY'ttra.l. JOU& &th~ iafor:nad UlO

(b)(3)

2S ~J' 61 '!fUILY UVJEV Po&IJ'• n or 27

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 (b )(3 )

Congo: [Foreign Minister Spaak: of Belgium has informed

Ambassador MacArthur that reports of unrest and anxiety
among .t he Belgians in Katanga have aroused misgivings within
the Belgium Government and furnished certain elements, pre-
sumably economic groups in Brussels with investments in the
Congo, with ammunition to oppose his policies. Spaak empha-

CJ sized that while he is prepared to withdraw Belgian military

personnel as soon as possible from Katanga, there must be UN
. replacements acceptable to Katanga and with the capability of
maintaining order. He indicated that a mass withdrawal of
Belgian civilians and ~echnicians might otherwise occur. If
(b)(3)

such a withdrawal occurred it would result in economic chaos

in Katanga"J
President Kasavubu's ideas on the reconvening of parlia-
ment in the Congo differ notably from U:ammarskjold's. In
contrast to Kasavubu, who appears willing to seek an accom-
modation with Katanga but not wi~ Stanl.eyville, Hammarskjold
has publicly stated that a meeting of parliament without repre-
sentatives of both the Leopoldville and the Stanleyville govern-
me11.ts "would not make sense." He added that the UN-controlled
Kamina base in Katanga- ~the site desired by Gize for (b)(~-~~~: -
meetin of
r'-'"--'-'--__...._- arllament- -would be a ractical site.
""'-=--'=='-";::_.=....:.:....:;____:_:_..=..=::..;:.;;_=-::...-=....o::..:::;._::=..::....::=.==...:=.::...:..i..- - - -- - - - - - ~ .•
(b)(1)

(I,_r

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@ections. He told the US air attach~ that the CNU would

continue to function but with no voice in mllitary affairs.
He noted that all CNU members would be allowed polltical ·
.( {areers following elections~ Tansel claimed Madanoglu
was on his way out and reiterated that the strength of the
country now lay with the commanders of the mllltary forces.
When questioned regarding the status of the General Staff, (b)(3)
Tansel remarked that lt would function as before but under
the control of the minister of defense.
The American Embassy tends to view Tansel's explana-
tion as an overslmpllflcatlon of the forces at work and believes
there may well be more serlous_s_traln6-bJlth_IDtbULtbe_C_N ._,_U
~----­
..____ _ __ (b)(3)
and within the armed.J<ilrceru ~

ong~®zenga;-~tlU."Wgn an mte-rm---ei ,
has presented a plan to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold
under whlch representatives of Glzenga and Kasavubu would
attempt to work out an agreed basis for a meeting of parlia-
ment and formatlon of a new government. He suggested Lulua-
bourg as a possible site for such discussions. Gizenga agreed tv-\ .
to consider the post of deputy premier for himself but insisted ' ~
on parity with Kasavubu in the number of cabinet posts. Under
Gize·nga's proposal, Kasavubu would cease to act as chief of
state until cleared of complicity in the death of Patrice Lumumba.
Dissatisfied with the help he has received from the Soviet bloc,
Glzenga reportedly said he was willing to "cut loose from them
and throw in his lot with the real African nationalists.'' Kasavubu
can be expected to resist the proposals for parlty in the cabinet
and restrictions on his powers. The United Nations, however, 1(b)( 1)
likely to brln ressure to bear_on Kasavubl.Lto enter su.c.h.JlrutC>.=(b)(3)---'
lations

12 June 61 D.AILY BRIEF v

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 wou~d
be suitable for. the premiership because both-had been
"too much involved,"!
I IMeanwhile._,_,S.,.o. _u_v_ann
__a_c_o_n..ti
.,. ,·,_n_u_e_s_t,.-o----;--,
lin _ g_e r_.. in
.,.-----,P=-a- r--,i,--s-, -~
While Souphannouvong is scheduled .to le~ve Peiping for Hanoi
on. 5 July." · · .
_ _ _ ___._, [Mi.litary action .during the past few days has been limited
.to small~ scale skirmishes, . the most notable of which were
·several enem.y probing actions against overrunent ositions
~ut 30 miles nor.t h c;>f Vientiane_]
Bloc air.lift operations continue.__,..o-,--_-.--,e_s_c--.---e--.--u--.--::- e,...,-r--r:--,------.---'
·5 Ju:Iy. I J(Ba~kup , Page 5)
: *Congo: rsecretary General Hammarskjo~d .has been alarmed
by reports· tkat the FrenGh ambassadors in LeopoJdville and
Brazzaville a,re encouraging Mobutu. and Leopoldville's Fore~gn·
Minister Bomboko _to undert~e · a military coup ~ain~t the Ileo
. g<;>vernm.ent, possibly this week if President Kasavubu's cooperar - J
· ti~m can. be secured. Ham.marskjold also has reports of the ar- L _,, ,,I
rival of a _new· group of "French mercenaries" in Katanga, and (b)( 3
.says the UN representative there has demanded .they be expelled. ·
The· secretary general sees these alleged French act_ivities as
·- undermining hopes.for a _moderate Co:r~go settlement a,nd as play~
i~g into· Soviet handsJ . ·
In Brussels, US Am_b assador MacArthur reports _that For-
eign Minister Spaak: ·has objected .to the proposed immediate
withdrawal of Belgian milita,ry .~rom Katanga ProviJ:lce on the
.ground that it would provoke· Tsho~be and create a "definitive .
rupture". between Elisabethville and Leopoldvilie. Spaa,k·main-
.t~ns that. the Belgian. cadres are the backbone of order and
· St~bility ~n Katanga and that thelr sudden wlthdrawal wo~d lea,.d
to chaos made worse by·the possibility of conflict with UN forces
·deployed to replace .them . . Spaak admitted .that.the powerful
Belgian mining interests in Katanga might be "pl~ying a d,iffer...
ent-ganie" ·there.from that of the government, but insisted .that

D he needed .firm evidence o~ Uiis in order to proceed against. them.

[Spaclk :.also opposed w~at: he _.c alled the "B;ritish _the~is" that the]

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.. W.4W~~#ff4W.4W.4W.4W.4W#P'Mi&WAW~.4W~

)(3)

\:congo parliament shou~d convene in the near fu~t_u_r_e_e_v_e_n_·i_·f _ __ __ _ __,

i

Indonesia: Continuing surrenders of leaders of _the insur~ ·

gent: Federal Republic of Indonesia have encouraged Djakarta
officials to bel~eve the. three- year rebellion will collapse within
.a few weeks. The recent surr.ende~ of the dissident commander
D .

in Central Sumatra followed clos~~y .the capituhl.tion ·of most .

leaders in North· Celebes. Negotiations with·important rebel 0
leaders in North Sumatra are reported to. be progress~g. well.
I I
(Backup, Page 7) )(3)

MaJi;.USSR: A c.e ntral m~tenance base .for-Soviet-bui,lt

aircraft supplied to Ghan~, Guinea, and Mali, utilizing ·Soviet
technicians,, may be est~blished at Bamako in Mali,
(b)(1 ---=------~
The French military who now
~-------~---~~
occupy the base will be completely evacuated this month. · Mali re-.
.p ortedly has contracted for two IL-.18s and.three IL-14s as well · 1 1
L_,,1
as other smaller Soviet aircraft for its civil airl.i ne. (b)( L l
I ~O Soviet air and groun.d crew ersonnel
·w ~n...th.e..Jl.exli~
----------.---- - -----'
(b)(1 )
(b 3)

5 J~y 61 DAILY BRIEF iv

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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960

(
I ' i
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO !
i
Congo Premier Lumumbn ':;J support. Soviet of~icial s who
abrupt wi thd:i;awal of his mo·re are working closely ~ith the
extreme charges against Sec:.. Congo Government :wi.~1 probably
retary General Hammarskjold encourage Lumumba ·in! further anti:..
and the UN Conunand in the Con- UN and an.ti--West'e rn lmoves which
go bas forestalled an 5nterna- m,ight receive Afric~n backing.
tional crisis for the time being.
. I
.
Lumumba had threatened to de- The USSR bad s~rongly sup-
mand complete withdrawal of ·the ported .Lumumba illunediately
UN force. prior to the 21 Augu!st UN Secu -
rity Council meeting, In the
Lumumba's about-face fol- forth official Sovi~t stateme nt
lowed a Secu1·ity Council dis- issued ori 20 August,! Moscow con.:
cussion in which the majority gratulated the Congolese on their
voiced suppo r t for Hammarskjolds success so far, and iagain went
policy of ~~ni nterf erence in on record with its Standard arn-
the Ka ta n g<~ dispute . His action J;>iguous warning tha~ "peace- lov-
probably ste mmed f rom realiza- l.ng countries" would have to
tion o f h i s go ver nment' s growing take "othe r s teps " if ·Belgian
i s olat i o n from other Af rican forc e s were not wit~drawn and
nations. The USSR withdrew an :alleged plans to "dismember"
anti-llar.ima rskjold res olution at th e Congo were not abandoned.
the 21 August sess ion when it
failed to g a in As ian-Afr i dan The s tatement contained
first reference to
Mos cow ~ s

P1\RT I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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-

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r ·"·!',1:t'·' .'~ I ..:,.'.,.,~ <"'
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00016846
I . .
I

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUL!t!ARY

25 August 1960

CENTP.Al Afll:ICAN RC:PU3UC

;'· -~UDAN
,/,,.-·... ~·----___,·-
/ . -.. - ... i

!
....
'.
.Stanleyville UGANOA
/ .• Coquilhalville
:.
CC NGO
RE:f'UBUC ... •' ·, ~ .
RE PUBLIC Of;·.

CONGO
\,
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B~vu~• ;~~~°r>~
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K~min~-~ , ·. -· l

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·' ·. · :.rt
ANGOLA . ·.· ·:I ;
.. " EliSa.be111.vill'e . l
.: ·.•· ,. ·· 1
.·
, 2~ AUGUST 1960 • •• , •
·1 :. !
.. . · ..... ·· . ;._, I
FEDERATION :-OF.'.~P.HODESIA
UNCLASSIFIED . AN({ NYA'S'.A.CA:t\40
• 31305 .. · . r: I '
"volunte'ers 1 ,,. ·a "flood 11
of . the Sue~.. c'i-.±Si;,;:.:_·_issued four 1
· which".C6uld coine irom amo'n·g· . days af):er· the •Ang10-FX:eiich I
cease-f:ire was a·nn'OU1iCed.
·,'-'.lo}·al ':friends-" on other Co'n-
"finent's:- ·as -we:ll a.s from Afi-.iC·a·n . ·: ... :I !
·c:o1.ni--'tri"eS . if additioal NATO, sOvi·e:t t~ Kuznetsov_.-ctexeg·a 1!
• tini--t.5 are sent to the co~'iiO:-·:. . :, on 2o A;:,_~sf o:f'f'·iC:_i:.a'.ity_ demanded
:-'.·in.f!. coa·go .On ·2~ A.ug:ust re·je·c_t·ect t:he wi~·1;<li;.Wa.1· C~n.~d:i.an troops?f I

·so\r.ict. ID:ili-tary- help, howe.V'e:r, · from tb.e .Coifgo-~. arid--ldc?livercd a

s.ta:t.in·.g it does not need ·.Sll.Ch statement tO Il<\inmarSkjold pro-
Volunte·ers frorn foreign cuUiJ.:... . testing. -as_' ·1.r.col11j:i.;t:ete1y·· inadmis-
t.i':ies ... The USSR's belated:~--:•.: · .s~bleu ·~i_s·. i?lan .-.:fO:i:'ia :civ.ilian
"re-·.feX:CI?Ce to tl~e possibiJ.·i-fY-: UN adm-in-i·st:C:atio,n ... to -·give tech-
o:f · ~-0·1u·nt:e·ers :is ·rem:i.nisc.6-n:-t·." nical a.rid ildinirl.i~_tra ti.Ve- ~s­
.~{f· ii:s 'Siinil'ar ·th:t'eat du~i?ri·'~( sista.·n-C'e .t:O ":tt1e· ..cOn[i:o Governmsn~ .
....{ .
... .-~.
i'
.'."'. '{::'

OF. iii:;riD:rATE _INTERE~~f

 _:-~-.: .... .....
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEF.KLY SU11MARY

25 Aug11s t 1960

}'oscow, alleging th'at the Lumumba's mos t recent s t ep

US and its allies would occupy to restore the once-effective
posts which h a ve a "key s ignifi- Force Publique has been t o a p-
cance " for the ~con omy and all po i nt Morocc an General Ket."la n i ,
vital activ i t i es of the country, deputy commander o:f the UN Com -
obje c teu to the exclus ion of mand, as his "advisex" in organ-
Zaste rn European e xperts from izing an army. Kettani appoar5
a~ong the 65 e nvisaged in the to have been made available by
plan and to the all~ged ~ele­ Hammarsltjold as a means of
gation of African personnel ~o bringing the UN Command and
"second-rate posts," and charged the Congolese Army into c l oser
s u ch a plan would subordinate coordination. There are p r e s s
the £uture d eve lop~ent o f the reports that the over-all UN
Congo to' Ame rican interests and £o~ce commander, Gerieral · von
could become a "dangerous Horn, may be replaced by a
precedent." Finnish officer, General A.E .
r,1artola, who played ,an im-
Despite his s e tback in porta·.i t role in org~nizing ·~he
the UN, Lu.~umba probably will UNEF during the Sue~ crisis .
return to the offensive. Al-
tho~gh Brussels has announced Lumumba contintles to
that its rem~ ining troops in maioifest uneasiness in his
the Con~o will be withdrawn by handling of internal affairs.
30 August, the Belgi~~ ns reported- A meeting in Elisabethville o f
ly plan to leave behind a token anti-Lumumba Congol~se from
forc e of "technicians." Brussels' several . provinces wa s follo~ed
insisten.c e that the :final status by new a:.r rests ·, of~. Belgian "spies "
of its bases 's hould be the sub- in Leopo:l dville ·a~d . l bt the
ject of bilateral negotiations closing down of . feri,'y s e rvice
witl. the Congo Government may between Leopoldville anct Brazza-
prov . ~de Lumumba with his next ville. '"Luniumba-•s · fears 'of
.issue. collusion between Tshombe and
Presid~nt Youlou of: jthe former
Meanwhile, · Lumumba vrob- French Congo were intensified
ably hopes to develop a Congo- when a Belgian airliner whic h
lese Army, both as an internal mad~ a forced landing at Lulua-
security forc e and as a means bourg on 21 August was found
by which to force his way into to be carrying A-balco officials
Katanga. On 23 a~d 24 August from Brazzaville to i Tshomb~'s
he airlifted between 600 and council of war in Eiisabethville.
1,000 Congolese soldiers to Kasai .I I

Province, os t ensibly to curb ' Opposition to Lumumba in

the :tribal warfare wnich once the Leopoldville area rema i ns
again hns .fl;11·ed be ·i: ween the sporadic and ill defined. Tlie
Lulua and Baluba tribes. Lu- Congo Senate continues to b~ a
rnumba probab l y ho pes, howe ver, focal point for criticism of
th~ t by e stablishing a pres- the regime,but in a ~ governme ntal
e :lce in Ka s ai he can prevent crisis it would prooa~ly be
tt e es t a blishment b y a nt i -Lu- closed dow11 by Lumumba. The
mumb a Con g ole se of a s e pa rate Sec e ssionis t Abako has r e sume d
p rovin c e i n southe rn Knsa i. its criticism of Lwiiumoa, but
There is al s o a possi bil i ty tha t appe ars hamstrung by
the c on-
this i s the opening move for tinued support of Lumumba oy
military a t t i on a g ainst Abako and Congo Pre sident
Ka t a nga, Joseph Kasavubu. '

PATIT I OF ntMEDIATE INTEREST Pa !;e 7 o f lU

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00016846
I

I
cur.m:NT INTELLJGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

25 August 1950

A Canadian en~ineer in the arrival at Matadi on 2.2 Au-;

Leopoldville h~s indic~ted to gust of the soViet veS5el
-rhe American Embassy his con- Arkh~ngel.sk With 100 trucks and
cern over the presence of an an undisclosed number·of tech-
estimated 60 Soviet and satel- nicians aboard. According to
lite ~echnical Personnel io a Congolese official~ Lumumba
LeopolUvill-e, which would prob- is expected to ask for and re-
ably include doctors, medical ceive in the immediate future
technicians, and aircl:ew mem- ~~~~~l!~a/hers for Corigocese
bers. The number of such per-·
sonnel incrensed ~ follOwillg

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PAnT 1 . P.a·;e 8 of 10
 CURTIENT INTELLIGENCE \'(EEKLY S!lil1M:ARY

S September 1960

REPUBLIC OF TRE CONGO

The powe:r struggle between rival factions, but to illany ob-
President· Kz.savubu and P:r-emier servers its actions appeared
Lumumba rer.1ains unresolved and to 1£vor Kasavubu. LumUJTlba
the situation continues iluid. quickly SUill'Iloned the ·cabinet
Lumumba~ who has maintained bis and r~ceived its sup:Port. The
popular suppori and influence cabinet accused KasaVubu of
over the police and most ~rmy tre~son for. trying to dismiss
units, retains the initiative. the p~emier and took ;~ver his
Kasavubu at p:esent appears to functions until the National
have been rebuiied in his biO ASsembly could discus~s the situ-
to oust Lumumbi, and 'several oi ai.:ion~ ~t the me.etirig of the
his cloSest supporte?s are in Chamber o.f Deputies--lthe Senate
the protective custcdy oI the :-efused to meet-- on 7i September.
UN Commdnd in.the Congo. How- Lumumba was in c9~~·r.91. after
ever, the Pre~ident may be gain- making a~ fiery atta:c.k; on the UK
ing signi£icant mi 1.:i.-tary support. for pre-Venting an a"rm'ed attack
on Katanga. The· .chz.ffi'ber 1 s reso-
orl 5 September, K2:.savubu 3.n-· lution de·cre€:d tliit the dis-
nounced the removal of Lur.iumba missals :of Llimumba .. arid Kasa-vubu
from office after the Presi- were invalid, arid.Ludurnba re-
dent's political organization-- mained in the poli ticial saddle.
I .
the Abako--hid put incTeasing
pressure on him to use his con- Lumumba rs cont:ro~l over the
sti tutionRl powers ·to get ri'd L.eopoldville poli.:c·e \./as indi-
of L~mu:n.Oa. Several other po- cated by their attitck' en a pro-
litical groups, generally rep- Kasavubu demOnstratidn on 6
res"entat1.ve of regional int.er- September during ~hich several
ests opposed to Luru.ur.tbR'S st:rong of i:.he mob ~~1.ere kille:d by gun-
central government, joined in fire. Eis control ov'er the Con-
this pressure. However~ UN · golese N'ational Army-:-the former
troops guarding the radio sta- Force .PUOlique--is le'ss clear-
'tion failed to prevent Lum11I[lba cut. On 6 SBptember ~artisans
frc-m Oroadcasting seycral ap- of moda:-i.\'te Jean B01fk~ng:o--the
penJ.s Ior ;;-opular support during aanr;alc.. tribal leader' :from the
which he announced Kasa.."Ubu • s northwest region of t'.ne Congo--
ous·te::- from the presidency. among some troops bro'ught in by
Lumt~C'l'ua fro;n Thysvil1e liberated
The UN took over control of him from jail. Lumumba had
Leopoldv~lle's radio st;;:.tion and arrested him on 1 sePtember for
t•.ro airports to prevan·C tlle• out- ~llegedly plotting against the
break of disorders. Qffici~lly, government. These troops may
the Ul'; Comrr.and was pursuing a str~ngthzn the military position
policy of neutrality between o:f Kasavubu, wno is in alliance

PART I ~age S of 12

Approvea Xor Rslcno9

Date 1· D APR 1976
 . . ._ ., -:...- .... ._._.....,... " .. - -

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUGWARY

8 September 1960

w lth Bollkan g o , Ka- r.: · ~~ ·: •:;-- - .·. •• • •·-:1-• - : •·1-:-:.-':. --:··.~...:. :-.~: ·n:r.-.::::.':.l::'-:.-T ,•r--, '.-::o.:'--
l ouj i o f the Kasai, Cl"''"'•' "~•.C. N • l""'4JC )-1
/"'.... . SUD AN ~
an cl '.rshomb~ o f Ka.tan-
g& . Support of the
Bangalese is vital to
~
( '--.
.·· . r--1 ~

the J?:reside nt beca us e , . . ' .. . ') ~

l o ng with Kasa vul:>u's
~kon~o people, they ... S&.111~·rv1l~. • / VCAHO• ~

~ ominate the p opu-

lation of Leopo l dville REPUBLIC . OF ,
:'.·~ I
t...:r-~
ft
and h~ve f Q~ years
comprised about 40 .• •
THE ·. CONGO"" "
Y•n<1"'·1···vj~MOI ~~
p e r c ent of the f ormer ~, Bru~·11l!~e '"'on rrM~CQ\.11 : •• rt
Force Publique. ~ ()v~ oo!d•·"' ·"' · . ' ' '(' t
!-;c!. (.v...fld! ~\ fANGA,H'n(',\~
0

•, ' ' • • ' •

:; (·.M~~
1
.\!any of Kasa vu-
bu' s supporters with-
in Lumumba' s govern-
ment have sought UN
~u
~
"E"l'll"''i:.......,:. · · ·
l.. hnb-1,.j .11.kwon')• ;

·
" ''""'",
'k;.\ J;:
~·
~
~~~t;~!!~:r~~a~:~!u- ~ .. ~
a tion; Foreign Minis-
.
ter ·Bom b ok o, t ippe
-:>ff by the Congolese
d t:
'I
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··
ANG 0 l A

,I.ob.,
• "'""""'" ,..
.
.
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~
• ~.. , ·•• °" i.~o.;;s,,.
0 ' ' •
chief ot· staff con-
, U...O.AU.1"10 I ,
reou,...oH
ANO NYA.t;~l.ANO __ . )
],
1

cerning his imp e nuing mu ' 1 - - - 1!

. ~~~e~!~r~~~~a!:~a!~adcr for ··- ·-- - ·-·itself quite quicl~l;~~· -~~~th~---·,.-"

asylum and then joined Presi- Belgians, America11s., · and other
I·
dent Kasavubu, Senate President Ni\'J.'O elementri: .wo.u ld .stop their
Ileo--Rasa.vubu's candidate for · "evil man·er!ivers." -.· j
.preniier--and two othe~ miniS- . . 1
~crs at the President's home Such· criticisms raise the
)-lDder UN protection. This re- prOS!JeOt t .h at the . ussaj will en-
liance on UN protection, particu- courage and su~port ne ,~·moves
larly if followed by other Lu~ by the Lumumba regime aimed at
mumba opponents, will provoke
the premier to try cjrastic meas-
modifying tbe role i~e UN
:forces in the Congo. l?reviously,
of
ures a~ainst UN operations in Soviet o:fficia.ls had suggested
the Congo. On 8 Septe mber he to Lumu111ba that call for the he
demanded the withdrawal of all creation o:f an observer group
UN troops from the Congo. comprised of representatives of
various African countr\es which
Soviet a~dEast European would ensure compliance with
propagandists have given strong the UN Security Council reso- ,
s upport t 'o Lumumba in the wake lutions, but did not press the
of the attempt e d coup. Radio proposal because of labk of sup- ~·
,1to s cow on 7 S eptember criti- port from African and ~sian
c ized UN authorities for "cpen governments.
interf erenc e" 1 n the Congo's 1n- i
ternal affairs a n d for "hamper- Hammarsltjold has called for
ing t he est abli s hme nt of law an early meeting of th~ Sec ur i ty
a nd order," ins t e a.d of s uppor t- Council in an effort to st op uni-
ing the country's "lawful ~o v ­ lateral aid from the ohtside.
e rnment." Another Soviet com- ::Ie was presumably re:(erring both
me ntary claims that the situa- ·to Soviet and Belgian a ctions.
tion would !'undoubtedly right He also hopes to secure approval

PART I OF HIMEDIATE INTEREST P~ge 9 of 12

..
~~-----~·- .. ...-...-- -

- I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMll.RY

8 September 1960

:tor the disarn1ing of the Congo- their Soviet crews, to. b ecome
lese troops. involved in actual fighting.

T~e Sovie t b loc h as b 6Cn Other Congol ese t r oop move-

exp:!.nding the scope and size o:f ments indicate that the ?..umumba
its activities in direct s upport government i s planning to move
of the Lumumba regime. There against Kata nga secessionists at
now are well over 200-· bloc · per- an early da te . Lumumb~'s !Prces are
sonne1 in the Congo , including reportedly moving toward the
hi g h-level economic delegations nor thern Katanga border through
:fro~ the USSR ~nd Czechoslovakia Ki vu Province, but an invasion
whic h reportedly are discuss ing attempt must await the outco me
the possibilities of economic. .. of the fighting in Kasai.
aid with Congolese officials~
As a result, agreement s pro- In K3.tanga , the g overnment
viding for larg'e -scal e bloc eco- of President Tshomb~ has had
n omic and techn ical assis tance little suCCHSS in broadening its
to the Lumumba g ~ vernment may international base of support.
be announced shc•rtly. Tshombe's mission to ~es tern
Europe receive d no prqmise s of
. M:e~riwhile; the central gov- aid, but ·nine tons of :a rms ar-
ernment is continuing its efforts rived in Elisa betlwille on 7
to regain control of secessionist Septe mber by plane .fr 9m Be lgium.
ll. reas in _southeastern Congo. · The Belgian comml\nder jot the
Savage but indecis ive fighting is Katanga Air Force hopes that by
occ tfrring between the Congolese November he will be able to pur-
Army and forces of the t ri bal chase six armed aircraft and
"lllining State'' of southeastern fiv e C47s suitabl'e fo'.<' para-
Ka sai Province centered in the troop operations. He !also plans
town oi'. D<>.ltwanga. Battles ha.ve to add ten pilots to the present
t aken place in several villages, total of 15. . !
a nd hundreds of persons--mostly
Tshomb~ may be troubled by
B~luba tribe s men--h ave been
killed. Te n Soviet IL-14 air- dissension among the trib~s in
cr~ft have airlifted Congolese northern Ka'i:anga. Missionaries
troops to s t rengthe n Lumumba's who recently returned ! from the
for ce in Kasai. Moscow is , how- area report that there. is wide-
ever, unlike ly to allow these s pread support fo r Lumumba·, and
aircraft, w~ich no~ bea4 Congo- mos t of the urban centers are un-
lese markings but have r etained der control of force s : oppo5 ing
Tshomb~. ·

P.\RT I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST P agg 10 of 12

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CONTENTS .. . .
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Introduction t .,· .

. •
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. !. . -.~ P•i:~
1. Fact• m•sJ:tng ••••• , •••• t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , ..... , • • , , , • • • • , • •
2
,lt . :
2. 'the two flichts •o Ndola .... .. ............ ,rf. ...:.• : ,; .......... ...... . 4
. ; ~';. J. _,;: •.
:-. Tb.ft accidnt: . . .......... . ........ . .. ........ ,.1·: ··· ·· ················•• 5 1
.:' Accident t.fteory ......... , , ... . .... ; ...... . , •••• ; .. ~•• ·...: , : \ •••• •••• •• •• ••• ••• .i

,,'
5. The aea~n ..............~ ....................... ........ .......... ....... . 10
I
. I I •
~ Tr:tn1sit •••••·. ;., •• , ••• , ....,11., ........... . ,.u........1 ••••• • , • • ,. •• • , • ••• •
. . : ; :· . '. . ~
7••The pm.1 •• , •• ,_, .••• •• , . . . ... .... , ••• , , • •9••;...-··• • ·~ · . . ..... . . , ••. • ·~ •••• •• 13
·" . . .. . I .'. ._.....
L The tn¥e.stt:11tsot1 • •• , , • , •• , ", ..... ~ ... . , , •• : ' :" • • · .: • ..... ... , •• , . ... . . . .. . . 14
'9. The Unto,.. iho•iottt o! piton • ,.;. . ... , ••.• , , ••• ~ •~', 1{ .; ; " • • • • • • • , , , , , • , , • • • • • 17
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t I
I ~ , : ~-. . ii

I lLl.UST.R.ATIONS
·. • , . j I 1;1
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Fl;. I, The rou1e flowft. ••• .. •••• , •••• • ~ ••••• ,~.!\ . ~·.·. .. ,, ,,,,,,,, ,, , ,,,,, 4
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2. Tut aP})t09i:h •• ,, • • ••••• •• ,, •• , •••• • , . ..... ·•.• .: ... ... :c.~ .•••••• •••• • ,.,.,. 6
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3. '11,c iovntigAtion • , ••• , , , ,_...... ;;,., • • , .1:~. >.:, ·. ,., ••• • ,,, ,, •••• • ••• 15
~.Optical U~U1'ktn · ·· · ·•· ···•'· ••·· · ·····'•,•: ·~·' ! .... ... ,.. ,.. , ... .. ,.
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CONTENTS .. . .
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lntroductioll •. : ~ ~ 1 1 •,' '
f •., ,: J'3CO
,· • '1 ·; ,
1.. Patti mls,ing ..... . ....... .. ........... ........ . I .. . -~ •• I •• , • • ' • , • I ' • • , I • ••
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2, The. two fl cgho to NdoJa , • • , , , .... , , . ... . ~ . ••·•tf. . ... ,., • ,; ••, •• , ••• , •• , , , •• 4
. ' ; ~.:..J...1;: •.
~. Th.it 11uu:len1 . .. .. .. ..... .. ....... , ,,, , , ,., •••,\.~··· ·· · · ····· ·· ····· ··• · 5
~. Acciclmt: theory • •".· •••• •• • , •• ~., • •• • •• ••• , • :.·• •.: , , \ . . .. , ....... .. . .... . 7
t .. •
'· The harch ••• •••• •,. •~ 't ... . . " ••• ~ •• ••• •.• •' ••... ' ... ~ •••• ' .. • ~
6.. Tnn1a.ir . . ... .. . . , •• •• •• • • ;,"' •• ,. . .. .... ... ..
; :·.... . . ..'·.... '\ ••• , • •• •• • ••••••
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t·•· ... ,..1••••• • •• · - • •.• •• •••
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7. Th.e prc.1t .. .... . .......... .. . .-. ....... . . ..... . , ;.,,..... 13
. . . .. . '. l .'. :_ ..•..
8, The Jf\¥tlttg11•on ... ,, •••• • I • ' ...... . I ..... . I t . · ~ .. . ·: . ,. . .. . . ' ' • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14
• • • t •'( ·:
~. The minny 1nli'IOM o( JlllOtl • ;_;. • • • • • • • • • • • I • 'r • j .. • " " • " ' ' • ' ' " " " ' '
.: 17
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3. The invmig:..tfou 1' 1 . I • I t ~ ,. • ' ., •I f t t • I I ti# ,. • ~ •: f
1
t I • t t • • t • O t I I I • ' I i • I I 15
I: : •~:' 4. Op1k 1I i\lu,ion t I • 1 '9 t • . 1 • o J .. t t • o 1 I• I • j .;. et·.:·: t I I• I' I I If I I I I j t • • • I. ,~
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1
l#%lill ~,
• •· ;. > , VJ
r·.· tntniiuttlon · ·· _ ·-:··'. ,:-- . _!or ~he pllo" too _. If t}iey <1cupt ~u~ 1lfrtt ln1own t0 be ln_varl:thly mon 11nor\tio- 1-1
--.-. ~:.. - Jox :u the pl.anr1 1n11:hr c~1cr control :irc:i• 1-1
•Assclc~on notili~.ltio.1
P,:'. • • . •· • ··piy for prnn houn.
fl On \he m;:lu bi:iwccn 1!1t t11h :1nJ the '"re ptct<y ... ri abo11t ;,..1.ac happened. They :· :. tn 1'JS9 she Swcdith l'ilou without·11tior or in ether<'"" (Jl
:· lSth Scpicm':>cr 1961 :al'I airpl:lnc «~hcJ uy the ~:xidcttt. 'WU due m miljudgment : Jiscovem:I .l tui;o number or v lolarions of w"hcn i •fli1:ht pl:tn hiJ beet< rcc.:ivcJ a"d

l..
r 11~.>J' NJola in Nonhern Rhodoia (ptcscnt -b)' the pllo~ and thty QR also upb\\I\ bov die oHici:al . flight u~e limitnioM 'Wlthi11 .:o:n1111unic~rion. WU mainuincd with the
<by Z:an\bia). Tlic plane: - & DCGB own• h DlM abou1.; • Traru:air. Tu Board o( Aviation had faltcd plac-e o~ <ks1ina1ion rhe plane appmal. at
co! anJ opcmcd by rht SYdislt <:lurur • . No more lltr~ to~ sa~d before onr con• ln it1 wperviiion of iho cOl'llpan~. h failc.! anotltet . ~lace somo . rh~tt hun~rtd imlu
~otnpany Tu111:Ur - C31Ticd 16 penont . cludn 1hat the 1nvemgu10t\ 'WU llOt m:'cU• l&ain rcg:irdinc lhr C'1~~0 oper.iuOM i11. 11way uU1~g for, [Qn~u1i; 1nt1nm1ons.
I · incluc!ins \~crew'. None of them suniivtd. uid the rcpons 'lttrr no1 worxtd <>11t 111 a.
One oi the pmengcu WU Dsc .Hamrn:U• propff wa.y, . ; :
I 1961.
l'cr'°nal d~u i"cluding nh11ion 'bac'k·
Thr 11 ~ 1 urc of the civil air OpctMions
htini: ~nclucird by urcraf1 11ndtr ch~rtcr
>kjiild, Secret:it)' Genual of tho uniuu!: No tObnM WH 1hr •«idet1t •nn°"nud : ~1w11J ~1111 wniliiiunJ uI du1y durlf!C the . to lh._(,•. l,Jnit.-d. N;1tion' W~• ol»en-cJ by
. · · Nationt. _, _-- ;~ · ·:-0~-th~ rAd~ than 1 """.°u -ailed b~-a-~ . -·,:· . : d•y1 P="dini; the ~~ident belo"g 10 t11y IPALPA {lntor;tational Jltdemiol\ of Alt•
T!ia ~c;cident <aui~d src:1 pvhlic (Oneem: ·f llpct requesnn1t my •1ews on Oy~ g 1n the
anJ rumouNo vere 1m.mtd1a1cly set about; ·Congo. The re..100. 'WU th~• unu . • fcv
1 ~i
~
accident ."'~L ~".the Ndola repO<U thi1
lnfonnauon 11 in•sur.;. }-fad lt been there
line Pilo~s Associuio111). ~t 11n tr-At!' A•
er>~grcu ·~ 1%'2 a rcsolu11on WM aJoptod
1: 11"' ~iru~t.ion c:i<lcd for a 1horo11gh -inveni~. months before the acddent I lud bten~v- l the report$ wol!ld have looked otliet11t~. whkh wu brou~ht to 1he l\Otlto o( 1he s~
i;ation ~nd n resolul1: aod_ final na~cmc11t. _inc. u c:i.pt~in Oil~ pbne. ch:1n~rcd~~ ~he ! h had ihcn been nccmary :dt0 \0 iriveni· rct.:a1y G<ncrnl ohM \IN, ln the re~lutio11
;o> to 1he U •Jsa of the acc1~n't. Ai tt ,_.., U1111cd Na~1oru, Tho ~rme. '\lth1ch'1mpli.cd ; K•tj the pOJ.Sibilicy of crev emn. tPALPf. >tron~ly .urg~ IM 'UN ,.J1er1
"cvrt ::iimcJ for s-uch a ~ri;c1 we :ue to-day_ _-·ttaiupon3c1bri• of UN offic:1:1!5 ,.as nmn- 1 ·17 !"""' y,u···11ie -...orld atp1.1Ad-avia1iua l• ta~cd oporatinu their own n1c:11ns or air ttanivor•
m t!tc nme p osition u if there had ~n 1!0 ' tallied by my ~rn~ny - SAS - for cu1e ; 1
· ~ 1 in ;ic~ordance wi1lt corn1110"ly •ectpte.l t r.don 10 OPor•he in a.ctlW'dat.ce "ith JCAO
in,•rstigation .,. :.II. · yr~. Two mo"tht before 1!i. .Ndola _acci· :;· .f'lllCJ. 7!me )1.,vo bcro form11latrd by 1"11\ci. , : •• • : ·.
On the ~111.cr hand, npul pilots "he de11t Treneair ·ioolt. over with their newly _ .. !CAO (lntcm~tio11~ Civil Av~iDG Ot• lCAO i1 nn iMi1ulio11 u"Ja- iltt Vlllm!
tuv< nude A cuefui nucly of the 111bject boughr D°C"4B, :· ::- I ~~nizntion) ;11d rn:idc rc;ulatiOM by t!le Nntiooi. !.' · · · · ·
... .,-:.. ·. : ;> 1 mem!>c:r sutn. Anioni; oth« tt.in~ mcsc The st~t1:•or affniri of 11" 'UN 1.ir open•
lfacts missing ·~:; rules inaply th.11 die pilot iikt 11 flijtlic pl:11.11 ti0n1 i1)' tl\c ~~1.:n ,i> no1 JiscuJJc~ in ~riy
<, h<!fore '1\\oQ-off. Vitnl.i11f1•t1Mtion front the of the N1l11f;\ rciioru aldiu~i;h 1htt wuul,I
One. r"~' i11111·~fi.1tcly mack 111e ~, n:· was 100 hourt ;11 monih. A strict adherence :: ; j -- mi:ht. pl~11 ;, tmttmlmJ !O at! ;@trOl ·• """~ b~~ll 'prapcr: . .
muk.::bln 1he <itd•lcnt ()((1ltt"'I durinc 10 1hc ere;,, union's <lircetlons 111 «i fri;i.•i· ·. 'il!l"ilt rh~t will M a!Ftc1~J by llic. mct.1. tbc "1ecido11t flir.ht .... by no n..i:an1 ~II
.Tl.c" n ii:ln;. The cri\y ni~ht flyi11i: the SAS pilou nwm d111y 11nd minimum ren li •1'1Ct mada i1 - .:;~ -~ ." ··tti.SfJ mi the flii;lit p\:\n ~ clc~r<\11« it · exception fto1n \JN ro111inc. The \IN A;,
,JiJ in 1hc Cuni:o 'Wn on the bK p~rr of .o11tcl'lrt imrnuH1lc \0 i;tt i1110 the .icii:hbolll'• Y J· , · prrp:1rc1I Mil 1r:i111aniut!\I ro '"" fli~hl ht.- ), Cummii~~ h 1 1.~o!Jvillt •new o.nly, ~S
flii;h1> boun,t for the home b~oc, Ul)f'olJ• hol)lt of !CO 1111un ti m1>tt1h. 'rh~"~tcet~!:' _j · (ore 1~~u-11H, 1·~1.~.urr, .:limb, :ihltudo · '-."mi110M tlrilH' :10 1.•kr"11ff thM 1lc111natu111
ville - ,, l>-'o:l! ~11i!lpt"d . lUf'!Kln.. Odll!r h:i~c col\1c iMo lnlni; in 1h1 lnMc1t _o( · ~ .;:
~h:ini:•s. ,t.,.,1!cu1, nppru~~h ""J
l:alk!itt~ 11 · -_ W:4t Ndu l~,. 'Tli1i:-pi1M i11 COITH~tAnJ di1! 11111
nilll" fly i n~ """' o:nm\;lcnJ 11. hn~~rJ :u nil\ht •a.fc!ty, :Ylrl! p1c-~cciuc11t rll~ht rm 11~ ii1 01ceorJ;1.11cc with dcar.111ce1 i;ivl!11, ~ilv c 11ic'. i'.11rn1it1"· 11dil~ a (!li;h1 pbn, 11~
pt.Jiu lli.ls for n11vl~!ltlun .111J lOMftl\lnl~· tiinc of 1lte Ndola ernr rmmlx:n it not . 1-. 1
.Curio!( ff~hr continous raJio '°'ntch i1 was, howcvcr,"porn1:kltd to -do to-l>ut lor
cinu "WC ;n'11fficir1n. Ar~n ftom,,,~11~, ._A(mlllllC\I ror ih fttl)' or rht rr11nn), Th~rr - 111,iiM., li•<!•I, 1m.il i11n r.-1mru m'f Arnt 111 rt- rtll\lh: t?'1;11ha,,ho11r11- 1'.IO rct·~lll't1l 1111 ~,i.,r.
1
l,11..li11i;' .\I 1111knnw11 11i~~1s dut~~~ilii;ht- ...>~ nn Llc"ription _wh:1t10Cvor of d11\y n1td l\llbr iomv:i!i, an\1 whtn tlac nii:ht pro• in~. '!"he fli~lt~, wi1 11111lc:nnltcn wnlt nu ft~
. -
.ir.: nc,·cr fC(1>m111rnJ1li11:. ,.n 1li~·Ncluln- . l'l:it 1itnc _ 1lurm~ the tln1•• prc<c•li11~ d1e w ___ ~~ 1 11 1i1n.1u.:h Jiffcrel\l ~m1 .,r
n1r11111i· pJrcnt j~fum"\io" ·oo tltc wo~1l1f1 w n.h·
•'"'"" rbc .1ir.:1.1ft 1y1i.c wm1 qui1c new ., ntl riih-nli·:'l1rt> .f.A11tdt hi11•~..~. 1:.\ tst 1l10UJ:h : 1 bllily ji h turnctl (lVtr from flf'IC C<mlnJ! don' •?,c:oul• , l'ott lllt>IO lh~ll -~fl\lt fiolln
;,, ""·" flrinR ln Alri~,,. Yn 11~!11 (lyi"ll' ;· n"l)o'-. 1T1111u,-,1C,.f11t -~111il.n hnn ltnlml 11111, lltlil 111 rlw Olhrr, ' l'l1m• l'll'(~o!urc-1 fonc1Jr1n . ~fr~r r~ 'kc:nf( Clllllltlo.'tll , ...fin t<l l'I~'\' w,,I
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1~,,1 l"" m1o1 •yitt•I~ 0 11 lltr ni~li1 l!C' .-:;·:. . l>llfln-11··•he 20 ~IAyt lm~•llourly 1,..ro,.. ~!
ury 111d l •vcrywh.,rt• they 1liJ .., h1 1%1 ni.1in1~i11i-d. /I l11ri;c 11lW1.'"""' 111 M r11:..1 " 'tt
f..r..- th~ ~ ~.i.t.~1t ~ llii;hlllll l~tia.1\1:>1h•ill11 ;•W ~ci\tcu4 .llio a1J'llo1 flrw 1~8 hn»rs, Hir ""'' ;., J,(ri..-;1 whh ,:11~ o~crri1111 - 11.c flowu 1Yi1ho111 Ptly r<•nmi, oth~r tlhln '.l'f
~re...
. • ,. lltlll'ln~
• whu w:.- th.: r11111c .,, Ill•
- ,..;. ~·le. -r1i,... ~ dl'l!\!11111.'""' Mii llUt Jis· ·{l~!1t'ititc In /\~un 1'<11 ll? hours. or hi' • .· e
· o
~& ~ .
c1M1M'ti in ~">' o( 1ltc .-C(iJChl rtporis. •. ~ I01tt ~.,. hOiin ~7 wcre.~on~ on flight duty. The V 11ltc:J N"iocu 111~in1., incJ !\ lari;e tcnrillni of tltt llii;l\1.
(h~r fuu l3tcr Cllnl~ OUI, The pilots or There is :fell.JOn 10 bclic\'O th;i1 tho m~jor Out or 1t,,nspor1 Jim ·aft in tht Con&o. ThC'lc ~circu11m:inccs .,.. IMAUOftcJ by
,,,.: N,l..b l'fCW h~.1 nu.... n in C'<ttlt of lhe p~n nr •he ((('\If 1lid ~ h:1¥c Qrty .-.~I fUI •nic UN oir ni-cr:ui11nc, l1owt-vcr, 1!1<l by tho inv.-" 111:\lnrs, hw1 no CO!ftmtnlf nrc"f/•
~Jii:h1 time t1mi1,,1i.n11 l'm~rib~,1 hy 1hc tl11rins;· 11te l.m 36 lu)(lrt priur 10 1hc 11cd· rar not mci:t ... ith ii"' !CAO $t~111l~..1s, 11rCf1iCIJ. I ; • .. • • •
·nie
.-s ...-~.1;,11 Ci>·il lk1.m l ,,f Avl.triu11. limit t!ein • · Wlic11 UN vb11tt ;ipf>C~•'<:•! O'fCr simoonJ· Oi1l se.:uh1y 111~1\lm }Ult.'r~ ·fh~J .,'? or
1!i~1.11c.t "'~ $ 1~5 houn a mo11tli. 11ic lii'llit . A highilr Jhan J1or1111il ulilr,11.1io11 of _1hc ing "~·~. 1i.~>' often w r.itltutc1! A hni :ml fly:.1i;~ - ' l'hc.. fll~~c _wu. c1~1I. .1 he pil1m.
P.'~KrilM:oi by th~ w111 v~:on ";rcunen1 pilu'! i1 prori\able for 1ho company, and 10 cirr.~1Jii~d ~vi~·•c11. Tlte UN opcl'lltions "m: utuad with cml p1lor • llcuecs re-

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iiri..~ tliem- tO ~pcr:iM iii ·~<cord1_11~nn1b ~ -~ !tn,:abo-1~ lntfldmlt4 eo~ittonl :Ofi'liahi · -_:-·": -. :.; ~-:;£; ":_(- :Mf n\\lo ·t1mtut ~ni tllf &!most' ditttl ! 'pllthre .- t..lopulJ\.ill~. lam Ii ttP'"«~ I-'
~ii ;1it te:olailcim ._-Gt,·~r itnposaible; m -'~"- !ass die uC11' at lu. O'trll cll.cmiOlli: ·: ::.·( .::'- .->:~ ~ ~/u•C\( -.ii Villa He11tiq11e ln A11tola. l>c:•_'· "'~"I: c•cr 1.slkc 'f~nc~11y~lla. Nci1hu Sa- I-'
~rain rrot!I .f1)'!11g. ; ._ . , ~ottd. I~ p~no m c-o ttVcrc-dugt'r• . .- _~ ..;-_ .._ ~ .; ~ ~~~ -_;;/ -. pt~;, iig""I .,..~, made: a11~ _th~ ~1''°" •· ·11sliu~ riot ~dol~ h~d ~·i•cd any ~ti-
1111 1 (Jl
-· "."' ~~:-/i .-::,:: ,;~. . . .;. ·~~ .:':: <.- ,::~::" _:'." pt11'2! con1tol '\1111u._- lncl\ld1111; S11fabt1rj nnce 1nform:111on ~bout tins alr.:r:i.h which I
_ .- ,.'. ';f::;-:-: :,_ ~::. ._ · · ._ -. .. · ·• · ! y· . ·:, · : _- {;:/ ::. and Ndola ..-· i..- about tht tllgln k· nto hm1u lucr ftrrl""3 over Ndola corn·
ihe two nighll \O'.Naota .: . : ·'.:'. .- : :-~;{ _ -_lorct-cl. T!ie Jihint landed witht11.11 Incl• Ins from thr c.\it. SllBDY dcparttJ u\o-
- . _ . •. . . . '. , ; ·. . ~ ~~! .. ~:-~:_ clmt at Ndolt afw fiu ancl a half ho11T1 · po\dvillc 45 dnutC3 IM~r tl1en CORIC
, 'rhc mne C'C'e.11inc ~~ltct £115ht 'WIL! de'Wnc_:effered ,Ha.mt!li.nkj(lld 10 joi11 hun::: ·
• _,:,-,; or flight, · aftJ arri•etl owr N_Job I hour nnJ 3~ 1111-
~le Ni..,.tt11 Uopoldv1lle :ill4 Ndoli by Dll. hl's plsn1..1Jnfonuit11e\y Hammarskjolcf: · · ., .. :- num 1fm thi' !anJing Qt 001\tC. Al·
iS.l.nm-tA oc:~ ~-i1h NtinnitiOI) lttcert clocll~; :."111• ('Arrit\n of 001\IC filed c(·'. ' -:.'. - Half '" hour l,cfore tlit landing ol thougk It "'" 3Ct .,. (asttt, SE.UDY uwd
lOlUC, ~n~ wotll 1..ord ue.downe from F~ig~t plan fo~ l'ldoln. fll&ht ~ o~•:-: ·. . ·· .-: ~ :.:. '!he OOR.IC. Salubury- -Pliglrt lnfarmadbll 1' •/1 \011gcr m,111 ifmc, 'Tho ro111~ u.kan by
t· Ilnt.t1A a• pi~nger. l.otd Ynt• ' rtaI lhniugll 111 a twt1ne manner a11cl m ..<_· . ·:i . Center ..,,~ Cl\ll~ by ~" airCflfl lde.,tirY' SE!lDY h~s \ic~1\ TtlOn~rvc1cd r.nd i~
. " _ )· hlg itstlf u SllllDY and a.~kbg for inlor· shown - ~J1np~reJ 10 that of 001\IC -

f
PJG, 1:'; :'-:·:. '· :, . m:uia11 abciut 00!\tC. On rcq11i:t1 rror11 ln rii;. 1. Jr i1"' \ic 1101tol 1h~c SF.DOY flew
• ( · .· _ ~ _:; ~-_.. ·; :: · . :: S:1lisbuty S:EllDY gave lu dlntir1a1it:>n u throui;I-. Nairobi l'~l11h1 l11fotll'l"tion l\t~ion
) ~r:N Ti~A l AfF.l_{,f: ~ t!:})V~t,JG; . _ :~: ..~ ,_. :·. 'Nd11lllf,~\~•~U~P:"DC4 and place of clc· wltho11~ r<>ponin11 .\hi• to Nal~.

Y;; ~ ,fr;.~~.:~.~:~L;.;ili' .i,..:·.i~l1: •·.'·J:~'.!lu . :M_-·:. ""';,~~ ; , W..... ~.

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r.~;-~: .':ri~::>~ " _. t!u1:Cff«t, it..,., &elie¥'ed ...t Ndola·•lrpbrt
-
_:: -~~--';-: _.. \$'t~. · - 1~hMt . Him111Mtl)a\ii_;: -Nii•~-o" 11oatd.
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cloaQ11rQ IL• dei«•hl UI ~~ !ttt. ln l'Yl!I• .
'l1mc Ndol~ tliite " OO)S).
11\1ered to222~ • '..:·:·:·,
lt •••

'911\L\llil; i1•e
11i.tu1., tow~r coolrul\1-t tt1•cc •'11:1111111~"1! the
l~ut
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_ • ____!!lfB]Y__ - .., ~_ _ ·;.,:, . · t;,7 :o\ltitVJc• arc 1111\'ll)'t. ginn .,..1111 ttlc•
1l011 n1 1im~er scnln~ ~"J 101,: thf 1)1~ne 10 te•
~~~0~· ,, · · µUc ~\ " _., :·::~:(. m« .:tv t~. 1!rll le:w~I. 11" o!~atlon of port wl1e11 ri:~chhll, 60~ (~ct ·
~ - - - - '~ORIC ,..,!". .,~: -.,_ \ J~.-::·'\~~t N~ti\:: i• 4160 ~~1; 1'1)'111 ~ ovet NJu"1•• 11t Munliii1ll~ C,01\lC we~ i,:cttinl: rc~Jy 10
\,. I"-. 1111u.c:~ "',, . _:<:{t.. :i1tu11d:e5tcd ahot\lde «I~ 6oo.o feet - \l~ing 13lii! i>_fl rOf .~h~lou~.J ~h~I·" to S~h.ibury.
· " _) \ .:: _. . :.:. ;.-.·" :. ·Ndol111 :r.t1lnmet 11est1nR '!- dui ac111d Thct ctinlfollcr ~..,111.i hQve to sec 10 11 th~t
:-:;~::>;~;:;~j;l::.!:;;:S~,ei~~--211111« rhc! ildoJromt ;, mo f~tt- '"l'~miiori-wn• tt1:1i11.1niM•' hc1wccn 1hc 1wo
.:'.~;~< ·:.' ·:.') ti~j:;';/'J'l:i.: .-:tilde~: ..,ulhcr :'W .. line ,,it\, II() -:.iTcrafi.;:f!u '""1;Mp<cti1111 SlWl..)'t 10 CAii
·t;~,::::. '/c::'.:'{~1olllh.·'ilijitlfiM1ollt i11d.c; "iiil1ilhy S 10 to
~f.{~~: . '.::._: :;;:;ii,;,1.;1~:/.~Jlit1t ~: Wilt blo•lnt fr01l> tltc
·~ R~in ttpc111i11~ ' °"° feet. He wo111J 1hc11

/AN
- itnio fo1mic1ioi1t for 1hc awnmh. At he
. -~iJ',1:; : ,;_;:'i;~~~·':11iW:'"iii:lllcl~:\lllltt bnJlnc ~m to be dit1 ll(lt hm irnm 1l1c pb 11e hf cnltcd i1 RI
- -.. ~ - ' ·· ~~~::' ' ;};;~~~ff~'j--~~·'. .~::1!1111
,:~r!~A1~~·~·wew«saiilt.ly 1\111._;ny. ,:~'.1
"" Ni!ol•'• :!.115, There •M nc ""~wtr.
001\ IC l\nw hncl i11 c11i:in~1 r11n11h•i:·
.::, - .. - ••&.11 ~
:.·:~~k~f'¥f+ -N.i:.-jfflillot._s,~l!SY :uktJ for 1.\e.tC111 Sl!UOY wo• '""""C51'f11lly ullo..J 1cver:1l
·:·~ :1j-~ .....: ~:~.~~~J:t
~
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~
~mDl>'t' ·, ; :~~; ,_ .c~r:if'U:e iif lil\-~ti\fly !If~~· h It Vi:ty p~O- tim'5 \,011. f.OM the Uf\V~r ~1111 lr11m
~ .~;;~~-~:\ -b:a\tle tit1u . ltit_,:~tentlon .,.•• 10 -cofuf .\n OOiltC. '11.c roimollct bclicv•,I 1\1:11
i>quttv~ Uopca~·~
'AtrinJ. ?lldol" ..... .
I~
20)S
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2ZIO
.-..·a :~~,;[~~;;-< . ._ •·
t
- ·/:~ o•~r ._Ncl.ota';'.Jliii11lrl 1cHht 1111tw:i1 .ntll s1moY ,,,u aomcwhere well br NJolo ind
W;;rtd~il. tlhlt~de at1c\ apeed in or!ler to p:r· 11~« 6000 feet, · M 2230 0011.IC was
-F l:,;\l tim. . . . . ..... ' 5131 Hovrt:--Minurc: . · ·:!(f iW111 -a::~~~I" 'llin11i111: ~itttsi•. AflP~ch clm.:d for ui..~orr 11n.I l"mucied to ~ly
'-<~ 11 ~,idlnir •o1tlJ ~~ 1 lioc jun A n1u1inc us1wanb !Lcc11iai; below 6COO fen ~1111~
"' \9
i.>';.f~nce 011wn ..... . ll20 17.U Milct
:CM'!' .. Crmwich Mt~n Time ·riii1!:W'.-;!};;"· . .: · . ·· · in tlici .,-lci11iry of N•tul~
L4"'f"'ldv;J~ sifr.4! - GMT--t 1 .. "~~ Sin!-~~- orlgltl~ll)" cave'· It~ tttlni.itv.I Whac h~d httppc11nl to SEllDY? - R~·
.;NJol& tlmf • G>.rt + 2
• · ;~:'.lit?.'r> -- · · .. · ·' · ,
·-
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f~. --.- ·::;:· :". ~=,~~~:~-~::'~.:::· ~r:~~~~~?;:~n~.~:-r::~;~~~{:~..;::;:::?~~:~~~~'.~~}~:;~'J~~'.·~:~~~~;:::'..;~:~~3'.~~~·)"J;~ ·:? 3:.·:~ ;:·:·-·:.i
!:; cf.I) flilll~ tt~ OUI oC thG quition. ln thri' - .runl.tt ddtitty;Now ilia P™'~ ·-:~. ll'11iln1i . -,. ;.~::'<~:?·~ ~",:~·:::· ._:·... . ' -. .. :~ ' • . . ·:.
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[:; C-tte tl~ p!Afll! ~old· lia•e Rl\lmrd "to the" . ..; t11d w"her• ..., ino lH to11nd? . . . . . . :.:~·;;;;·~.;;;:: ~ \II.at dt4 mtdeitt ~ •t llt), .thl'H: :-:c. lt WI! rol!!ld ,th3t Sl!llDY hsd I'"""! •. w
(. ail"J)»rt. ll! h• !.'9t ~11ii;t1c4 altituJc•. 6COO . lt n llOt t;) \II! -..unuercd at i( tht: 1e11Td1 ·'. ' ··~:· · ·; :. ' .:.:: •. '1111\lfttl ahtt "lM Int rMl10 <Dnt~Ct. When ovc~ NJ,,i;j. ~Om\l•il\S: fro1n th~ ~~rt, hc;J. I-'
i· f tt1, .lw:iitin~ ?ii;ht Jignals. f.i' ·
lrcm !'.1~0111 str.rtocl luilf•hurtedly. Tac · .i·. :.·:' __: :·: the-mntroll_
et called SEllDY ai :.1215 h h~d i1111 for ~!!~ '"di<t: bc~con two n11tl ~ hnlf I-'
f··· i!mc h M hii;h tcr~l11 .iiro11nd NJola. f~~t al~,r:ir1 w~t ~t our at 0700~.The .ac• .·, ::,. :~ · : ·.<· alrudr crashed, • mil~'t weit. of thll, ,flcld: Tt h1cl t l1en 111;Jc (J1
l · ~ v."!J"e 110 ob.tNCt10t1t at 6000 feet OP tlVllY mcttaitd dunni: the dat. AJ It wu -: · - a " Ght tu~•\ ..10 -; north-"W~rtcrly he1.!i1111.
:tbovc. A.' 1~ pl.tnc ~ ~bovc 60C0 f«t It ~(ITTed 1h:11 Slill~Y had mumed to ,11c .: ·.' · Suenl witnen;c1 -..t~ ~ncl who hAd :\1'1~ 11f1cq l,l)·h?ll . !n this . ~ir..:aion fo.r :
,.,J, ob-<t....,.!1 u.f~. At !1m die cotitTOllcr. Coni,o0 - whet. 1t pnibably y'41 to be .,_. obttrveci 1lir plane utml 20 OI' Jg ttt0ndt wlu lc m~<lt ).1lcfti1um. SE.llDY 11~,., In a
· tltlhl;ht 1h:1~ the pilot ltad changtd t~ found - the 1Utch wat dircaed'illwar.i.t :·=;.. • Mfim die crash ~hc11 it •ppatt11d1 W'ectr pmcm 1i.1ii!nr 10, th' instrument ltt-chrwn
[ c;uciw;y .:ind ~1 iryinll to coruaet tome st1\:: . ·~he Co~eolest bordtt. It -wa1 a <OnlDlcfc :. · · Mlaw tl~ir liM of vitio11. procNt11~- 11r!~d\)!:1".(1tc fig. 2),
rion in tho Con~. 11lrprl1e "When the ~ttclu1i:c •t uto by .:' · I.'.' •
. There: -~ h<>wcvc:r, a lo~ic:al :answtl 10 ch~cc Wlll fou11d 9 1t1ilrs .....et or N<lola • ' •• ..;, h\!. l. -:. ! I •
L . q•·••1iim'ofthr wMrnhnun nr c;<"DY' · .;.....,...
~,! ·: .IJl.. _._ ' ' _.,,. " T •• • llll • li>r
.,. Accldnt lha0t)I l
t 1 :JJ 'I ·., · ·
' • • '

~~- .lli it :1p~.11re.! ~··ithout· ·prior · noiificariott

~-.· .-
'The c~ation of tlic• accident lite ,..u .. :: , . tt ,..at esc•blishcd tliat S!:Bt>Y In {act ".!c:sc~iulm~·i: was1..,Jei! 'ihli ma be • •
~n in
.
'° . \
I:{ :u.w.t~ 1 1 ~.cly disap9ur the s:nM Y~y. ll . 4l.7 feet a~d lt w~1 J1t1n~ 111 &!tolaie
• ..
i~ did •"e<:ljtC a11111'l'roull ™
Olllr abnormal
, ••
diccnion •t 1il·\ Mg!, ra10 of dcicct1t "'at
y

!:. }ml prob2bly i;ooc back to the Cotlto. · · · bwh. The at1craft ~ ~Atactt.d the ttut .,; ; things being that llO rtpon: vu Rivel\ at m:i.intitintd. ,. • • ·
Tbc Ndoi~ ro""ft controller caull!r.ed : . "~ ilotn1al angle of drM~nt - .:i~ ) ~
•. , . · . . · · , . ·
·. '· 6000 f.- tll.at dlinl1i 111dc
••,. -
w:,
!£It and the ="DY ' : • __, ' Nd I
"''"' ~n""" oYot
1· .1.'
o a eu 1tt m:m
~'lC comro. CCl\ltr s ' Silisbury. At 23~1.:....~ - heild1111g for Ute :urpc!rr ;i.nc! liMd ,.pproatli scal'tl!d vichoot a ~lllU&nce, and d ..a • .... I · ud "l"L • •
• 1 · · _, alt·· t'Xptct~ an<> "1U1 ex«s' a ut c. , "" .,
u1e ast pan or .<n<:
• ..i. L • .• •
rcquat
, • si~ t -.,.__
oe.,s were orig11•11.tn1
• to . :' · up ,..m tne. t\ln~y. .
Spttd and attitv<le .
·• lhat !he airtnft In a viwa\ dC'lcenc!i11.. "l'O+
. or 11.1L- · -'1c:itton
10 :an Ill<> •·· , tnn
t. .,_ I L

n:,ev.a11t .a1rp.om. S:i11, outy, ~1ns~m!tt.,t!:, . :1111!1 bee11 llOnN.l fot •pprouh.. Tiu: lsnd·
1
·: cedure 'Wat brou•ht too' loor. .. ... __,_ ·
1
'"OO•·r h ...__ __
~ "~"'" """"' .110 uu
-n:!pon•c'b'I' · - . J .L. N..1-1 •Ill~ .~r ..,. ......, aoW11 lltld Iock~, I laps -~ ior _,.-.·. . . •• d' ..a ... o • ; i:ct may no """
1
• ny, pttm11u;o ""' .,., a co11- L. • I d '
L· . , • '- · . • ·. : . '-· .. no" '" 111" ~- o.vuutr - 1& 1 not m10 ~at an.mcrutmc r.tte,
no I!. 1.r to clo.e '"' ttauan. D11t1ng die n11:nt . :lppr~h, all 4 nt111es ti~tl been ckTclop· ·.·. '' · · d'ff' 1 \ ' .,.,__ • •
S2hsh\U'y .and Johanneiburg Wttt... bUJt.-- -..;!'lg:.· po•cr .
a11d thor propellen irerc ill nor- .. ; ::·
!"."o-'
· v•rv 1 1c11 t to eit" a111, .,.. 11\vet11•1ton
_, y • 0 W"nen .•rp ·•-•' --'- t11rcr:i
..~nQ.,<n~ · ... II\ det•
( f 'W··••
· , u•• b . • ·• .., ·.·.· · •mQ) pitch t11:11,:c. · · '''" ., lllllst have betll pondtnh" 0¥et t~C "UH- c-• ""'-t• m•••t t" ..t it ••• L~d -·~•• ,,, _ _.
uyu•~ lO eontae11 int "'"'au\ onuc:t ·111t1e ' :..:,:; -i · , • • . " , ., ""~ ' " " ':"'" · "" • ..,..., •r"'"
.- I . .• . • ·· : ;' '."· ·: . ·.· tton. A' noclung tt 'IO~ (ol)fld In t110 .o.cd· Tht _..,,;1 ·., · h.ivt beett ljp tO N J
'··· <:o11~a. Rep :~ fra111 Cotigo a"fl'\11' wero
., • •
"lMo thm alttfl'ICl~ts o( the alrplaOG 'fftrc
-
;,.,..
- ~-- •
; .~ .
·· ..mt rc""ru :l" .....1a11at1on., "vcn
". .... 1 ... '""w mr.,
nafe.. O - ,· "'-It~ cJ 2• • k·
orm;i.
... ·
<·. f)at rcce1nd 1111t1I 054•, It rhrr, l,.eanl(' !0111111 411tl inveatii;aced. Corn:n faltt\dter . (·:!! ; :·. .. r- ' . ..,. , " !'u• •ni; ~ <>l'e - ""· no~. "' 11110
-<"id~nt. chat "n .:icci<ltnt miihl haYe hap• settini h.'ld 'Men tiocd. · ', ~~\, : · !n ~he la•t ndl~ ~rt it 'WH 1tate~ tha1 "'.."'. ~l)l!~dl(nr. l:u1cll114: ~ar •lid fhps ex•
flf"td 10 SE!JDY. Tite technical inn1tigatio1t did ntM 'ft- ' . ~~· 11'1.iurmf1 ~' •~ dcteeht. The iihtmet~r 11em1on is . 16~~ lo.cf~ 'l'o lilted eff e•cc~•
flii;ht tafrt! ~lh £o-r CO-Optn.tiott he• vc:il any m.lfUllCUotlani; tltlt could have ' .' '.-·;:· .«tilng 'Hf d1eca~. Conseq.w.tly tht r.IU- ~etd t~~· ~ft!&ft. Ii \elil 'al (Dllll<Ult tU!l•
t""c:n1 ,~,., p.•!1ia- nr.o!~r cloo.• caimd lhl! acadi!llt. _, · '!/· -'Jltetcn ,.•re \lt1der control. The tower con· tude ,..~h,.p()"!'~!~~f, :ne protedurc may
T>line. In tlti• c~~ tlw nci>li,encc -ef.. tM . All · CYidfllce foW'td pointed 10 11 llOlftlAl ;..· .. ltOllrr rtquntcd tha pbne to re_po~ •t 6000 h•ote uk~n ,4.0 ·~mi,nO. m 1hl1 calC!.
-p;l"t .in ; onm:111if ol SEDOY. wu mattlio:d. appro•ch hui11i; ~ doM .am! that the ·: ~;. :: fett wl1ieh ~'" n.elinow!edgcd by A '.'roger". .. . 'rlic 'IOWCl\~l\ttoll~ tle.,..<t ' '"" SEl'.IDY.
on!:- by thu o1,1lle-air T.raffte CiJllUOl pcir-, airualt Wiit undtr fon c:t1111rol 1>11til i1 liit : r_' ' 'The conclusM>n •> l~llt 11>htti S!l\DY ~·· . 'nie potltion .( ,hho ~mh Jitt and the time
sor.>1d ::111 Uopcl~le "\lt!hicli uw die p!aiie , :tbt trca. . . :·: :· ' _porm! OYcr NJob it •:lt alibv• 6000 fett chiJJi.t:d bct,rt"tn th~ 1lur tlld io mcu~~e end
ui.e .off •11d ~ncn ioolt.' iloo in-t ,in in . ".;.irfllm wttdit1 (ound It wu m:ablit~· _.,; .· .ie~c!Kling. 1hc crash indtcAtt 1i1ftt the 1iraaf1 h:i.d 111s1
1j; ·!• . ~ ·<= i::;<; · ' · ,;,;:·: ·:'. The •tut ·e&tinuited time of arri"a\ trnn.. ·:: y.u;cd tlic'. Hclio bct1t011 w~ 1he !:ur re-
. ~ ... -- .. , '··' - :··· .. -.;,·.: , . :.-,;,:· miitflflroin SEBD"t "'~• 2220. Thi! actU11I ji&rt ..,~, tntad1" ·•·•·:
/., '", · · .-:·· :.;'"< . . , -,;·: .,,.. ·. ·· ":; ;;{· , nrivsil w:11 :tc 2210. /\timing of dw: dtscc_r" ·· · Jf ·the r.ulio ba:iJ" w:l1 pasted at 7000
· JO Iii co be d~wn ~t ~ ftct - the lnlt1nt .· feet or ~botc-'i• m:iy very 'll'dl have t~ken
t ',

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··

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. : :·
...
....
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.
approado•lutude of NJola - ten MIJ'lutt•
~· bo1ore arrival 'lloulll b<1v<! born ci:m:mcly
up to two 1ninuici ·t11 con1ple1c tl1c r!l'l<'.Cll t
10 .t.000 Mil rr.lucit the: tpzci! io 165 knots.
. bill! 1iirm~111hip. The ~ir~ft :mi-.cd tC11 11~i' ·wouhl:lm..-c bo~11 1hc ca.., w!1cdw the
~'Y< ' ..'! ....... _ ~ 0 __ • ~. 1 ;· ~ '. <= ·{·. , ..;l!iinuic• before iu e1tlm~tc, 1'hh it ~nothtt descent wii1 '.;~ 11 ;,1 .:11 hi1:h spml or slow :11
· .:'· in1l~~tion 1hat the :thimdc "'"' ih t>~ecss of tow ~IN'cJ~ . t· .
.11'<'..:itl ntt UIC !\n.lio R111iWftt..:'·= . ·.: 6000. /rec on nrriYA I, 11 ri~r r•:wi"~ 1hr ~irpurt 11"' ~i,..·rnf1 w.i1
lilcv1 ·US7 f.-:1 b~Qln Elow1 ·. .,,.,: · Whtn pnsition 1cpom uc 111ntlc durinc hc:1Jcd our o~lr nn•1i11inli~l>i1cJ, cc~1plc1~ly
Dnt~M" (""1\ 4160 fcr:c . -!leicCrlt a!titt1dc in()i~tion u UJ\l~!I)' give11 bl:itl< :1rc.~ wi!h• 110 41round rd cm•m.
·: • ~y; 9 !Tloiles u e.g. "BOVO feet desunding to liOOO", Jn In 1his situ~t icin R c11rcful pilot wont.I
·t :·.-.. 1h~ l;ut rtpnrt from Sll!IDY only chc word h~vc :ukc:.l for ~ c!c.tr.incc 10 return 10 1hc
...· ~-

\
... - ·- .:::.:: 7
 0
0
. · ·1 0
t:: -' _.:..-_- ~·. .:. ·:._,:-,~-~'?'.?~!··1: ~·.'f~-:::::··>;·~,_~,:~~~l~\\:t;~:~~~t-f':·.: ~:~·.:;; :·=Y;~~;t~F:;:.-\:1}-.\+~~~~0.~~~::,~~:f\;~:"t:'i~3J/ •.. (.: :;~--:7::-~:-''.':·..:::· _,: ... ... : ·,:. ~ ·-· . . . .• ~ '·
~-.: . :.~i1.:'1 ,1 .in .,,.d~r w:Jl\al!c -A llOrl'll.lt l~ndini: :-i At N401a. Thi• IYfH.~i· ..p,;;.;;,;,c~:~~ilt' l~r .: ~~:·: ·:'.;:"·(~fi~t:~dhiocii :.;:,,, :14. "o•en:~.~ or ~t-,.l;lbt· . tliit ll)~~,~:ic. of th. tlii;li1 ~ihlch R~d flOt ·' f-l
U) · .:ir~lt. He "'_oul.1_ no doubt have bte11. : g,~-c:uiet ~ilot 1~ill,
~-. cl.;:,.reJ ~c:Clrci1ngly 11nd 1old 10 repott on UOft ·~ 1ha p1lou
'*-ai'kp,lt ' CO.:opcri-<
~ld M'tC m be very
. ·:;~. ,·'·. "?::::,..,_.lacy. · , •
· · .: .. .,. · · • A d:u1gCtOU1111t11•tion Illa)' h,owevtt ari.o
' be~. ~~~cl:t~li~ • 111 d~ rei:ulu m~nncr
Cll111cidc~t."lt~ 11ot111al piuscnccr nltht.
f-l
U1
·. JQl\'n-""'"'i k.;. Ha -wo11!d. then ha"c m~~e aiu1w1\I~ . "·: if thd approach i1~111 fo1e wcatller 1.nd Wh«lfto th~pofition-ovcr the r~dlo bcuon
. ~ !d1 :urn ~cl. to , he f1tld, muted \ht Mey- pilou ..,.ollld "have a undency to "the runway is visible co 1he pilot, ea~cially had bec11 c;1~b!iil!fd the cap~·1 'd h
. "" f d! L dd .f ... . ,, n lO. ' e
•. nc 11 n~ informN ~n. the rHeeu or op-
I
' .!c•.;cnt at 6 ~1..v. •et .;,n ct tne 1ptt r1>p .um1d-d\u ~rt of the p~eoure whel\ cl:c ·" ~ .:opllo1i.10 make rho radio report. At the
~u. When Cffdtn~ the rictJ. he .~11~d b:l.n • :Ur_cr~ds flown.llUt fron1 t~e radio bcaon. ··:::~ . ·llCa' m.111io ... if.he ii ti~ .°" if the app• SAIN! 1i111c. he ,Slatted a riclu C\lrn to a
·.~v.·crcd ~~~ • lmudc 10 c1mut, bel~ht - It u dtffl(\llt 10 Jl'dsc th' dmanu ttav~tlccl , .• ~h u m1d9 m ~ liumtd 1t11n11tr, Tha nottl'l·l',CJ14r1Y. heading. This action wu
t<tld .:lcv:rnon pl11t 1200 fut - !~ dns cast "when _the runway is behind and ~nnot lie pilot may t.~n 1tnd IO conarunct 011 tl1c quite oorl!\.ll 1'(~~hcr he intended to ma~e
S~CO fut. ~c "'ould h.ave potmoned 1ht saen 1.11d - :after surtini; the turn back - runway lii.htt, b:uc h!t jud,in; on th.t im- al\ i""r\111\eftt .spnro.sch or 10 • • L
. r .> • d I 1•-1 l
. :i.m:r:i ' OP cl)'llln•win Ct; para ~ ,~· ~ ~c "the ri~M! .i~ nnr Ultoe co find hirmtlf •lo>e ·.... • JlrtMi~ he: geu from ' ' - ind .tur~an!
. ..
Ndob ; holcllnc p.iuettt. He ordered ""
10111 1nC

Nl\W.:I)' fla111 ~ ·.:It 20 -d~t- -rruuimutnnc . :aM! b1g'h "'hich wo11ld lo...:e him IO . in:allc .. . . the aliimo~. Dy help or fat~ imprcuion1 copilo1 ·to . re;d ~Ito Dtforc Uflclini; Cheek·
.i •pc:erl of HO >tnoll. When :ahem rhe f'\Kl" .. a ~H~ final t!accnt. .: tw inay_th111 get tbO lo,., and hit the cround. liJt. Fl'lim t\\c moment tht ndio bc~con ,..~,
~"~>' tnd he would have low~N:~ the b.nd• : . 1"he :i.lti1udc i11 thi• cue being ~000 f~ ! M:i.ny_a;;c:Ktc1u1 h:a•e ~urrcd this w.:iy. p:\Pcd 'im~i'.ch~'~ircnfl w:as positioned on
111i:; ~c:al, soon afttrwudt ttaftlll!! a de.. . - 600 lcrt abo.c normal circ.'llit hciC}n - _SE~DY ::'uhed 9 mi~. "1Cu of Ndola. it• new,h~lnji u ·aecorid1 ~bpted. !n diii
wicl111i; le~t hand 1 uni_down ui the J'llft• :: ,.;:. • famw dt:t.t ·~y ptedispou 1he 9il11t co ..~ At. tlus potnc 11 shovld 11111 liaw bNn •I time ,~ position r~~t W.:11 tlladc uid the
~y. This " w l1lOit m~rlc: and s•fe r:ie- .. 1;Cllen't!in ·lie ;$high. . -:''-;:. ~ fecL Thu. •en i"dicuil!M ac 1he :r.ltimct~'r. 'C:htck~d; :Th• uptain .11trmed
thod ol :tp?r~ there 11 :ind every p1h:it . :,:; ·:· "Sooft :af;er·itarting the li:ft wtft dnipaiot · :>' ~ si111 . dt•t SEBl)''t might jlltf h•ve die d~cj!At al' 6000 fen ind srarud ·IO
i• ir~incd in .it. 111!1 crew wo~d have had .:':· &~o1N. rul'lway in sight an<l triu 1~:-mun· :.:'~I COll14I OlitcOf iu li:ft tur11 •hen it hit die blccd· o'r f· ~~ecri·i,~td by 111ainuinrlll: die
p!1:111y of ume to p~re ~lf !Of \be .. ~at th...4!m:i.nce to it. 01.rin3 daylight or -'<: . · gfOliftd~ fl~~ .-wue at to JO ·dci;rim, 1n for a!tirutle·wfdi i ' J- ·powcnc\ting.
1Mdin~ ~nJ ,h.! fin;.,! !lpproach wovlcl hive - lf·"fly1A1: over ll H11l11ed uct 1hi1 m1y .Y •"f · ::;,;:: · ~&UI appto•~· f,.. aU pt'Obabllify c~e land• lt le poniblli·'dut ''" opl.\ill •• •htt
hrc11 n1n1lc cl.nr 10 tl1c runw~y d~ i:n:uly .will be J1>1111, lh1t" the con11l1iom WWJC QI . · :~. · .:111s· CC!lr ltcli \iccft ·tcxw11ch:ll ancl tile rla9f m~u 1PIJ •41w Clljllloc to rtpon chat
<-lin1in;1cini:.i,hc risk-lif c.ronou• J11tli;~ .:::' N1lnl" the ttm1i11 bclov nnd ~tw«I\ tllo \~~:~· ..:>"*·to 20 dq;ttt• whc" the! left UM Till• 6000 Ii.ti! bc~ 1mcbcd 1111J to ulc for per•
in hci~ht, · · ...,.. nlrn;tft ;inJ tllo: rvnw11y w~1 in cl>l•'t'l•~ ·i!~~;!· :·~ IUfltd, fl111pa .l_O ~•ini; bctw JS'lcch:'! "t •
-:~ 01h(r r ih•u wnLil<I h~•o .iu\ecl
·
'°' 11 Jarl11m•. Under i uch ccmdi1ioM it :1( irn· :t:~;~::
(lur~n~c to m:lrr an in11t11111cnt .:ipprl))(h, poltiblt to ;w,e 1he disr-.n~ ~ltn ;'111)' Jo. -.:: .?:
:.f(. later s111i;e. When s~nDY:: w:u CM1tbri11.,J
·,_,·frOfrl the riufio bncon t11Cf piloc flew On In·
n•i'>io"··to'.•noalie "" iqtm.tnmu :lftproacli.
· The c1•pit~~·~vt.~ -11"1! j\111 m,,iJ• n ~ron,
tho114;l11' -.li;t·' ~o• cwld fitst ·tomplctc cite
Wlicn ['M»in~ rhc r.idio bacon they wu11!J gr~~ of nC'.cur~y. 1f d~ccrit 11 SfQrud .1hc ;.q}. ~·urunteim. his'"°"' likely tl•~t t.c was abla cl1ecll lilt"il~til the point wlioni d>c l:uwlinll
h~Yt 1ut nc11 <IS Jci:rect ri~hr 10 a nunh- ."1ltl1otle •houlJ bo ~ct~J 'olrhb dacft11H• ..._;~·;f; .· ) o 1'111\intain hi'1',llltfujjtc: durini: t'hit llQl!C l\C.:lr l•"taJ~ndcd an1I poKp(,HcJ the tnn11-
"'~'"''Y l•c.\<foti;. Afrn ~~· =b,,.ls tbey i11i; 11iS1.i.ntt tn tll( . ntn'il'~)'. A11<1 \1°1t1lci'·,fbo · .. ff:f / rif iht •PJWOlidt th~" t~fu •heft hr i:ot the min li>JI Ct-ltr·.lnwn•Y.il,-1Mlw•vcr, 011!er~
w.111lJ ""'·c .tmi:..1 i . ~rt 1fflnJ uirn ·h:id1 :1buvc ~d:\11!<l clma1mt.\11c:e• it wns c,ulto ... ·~i:;i{ ::~nway in •ltbt. btf"Oi'l!'-lie •hihl itM" -11111 fat in tho chukllu
"' 1he liclJ. l~11rin11 thtt rmaJurti ti.Cy . lmpoMihk tu f11dl(1! 1he \icii;ht. ., -! . ~\~'. .·::;) ;\ll'hcn Si!SOY attl~ed rih NJ111R, 1l1t Riid'l1C1,\lm1 cnntin.;:J wlth tl>1: cbcc!..li.n In
"'' mil.I 11.w a ~u111pcJ t!1i: kscc11t _:lt .6000· A mict :iJhcmiee to dte i111tnJmthr ':.::~k-, _ ., ,, .:.'.:-"i~Hiura af 1t\01101onriot flylng w;o to be :sue·· Iii :miti~blf lori:eitln~, or funhu pl)n po11·
!cc~ ~nil lot tht ...-ii 1lrop 11lr, /\t 1 6~ .'· llf•11~h p~l11reo Wlnll\I not rnoft n1\tell ; )'1 ~}::··~<· '· :_. ...ffod~ \ly the fw.m!Rlltu e>f vfg1>rou1 aiwl I~ his r~\llO·l!)tjSftl:"•
knnl> n~I" wou!.I h<1vc been tet to 10 de· -:. Ji((mncc, Then it ;, 111ppim-d tbAt the air• ~ :-.1;t:~::'; :.:.: ,....·::: p-iso activlc, i'cCjuircJ For 11ppnn(h and '. Con1!1ltiMi011 ·mun be ~~en t0 inc
i;c;:c.s. Afm 1l1e t11rn b:ic'k the ~ctt IQO• . ""'" is flown Ollt from tha r."ldio bc:icon;nt " ... <"' : . ~:~,·,;._'bi\dini;. While the captain .,.,3 flying 1111d fatig11c of IM er- ""'"'"".,,ho wer~ flOI
1uci1t 1u m11 fin~\ lei dnw'll ...,!l;,1,1 h\\n l\}\pro2~h 1rccd, M,\ '" the prumluro· i• ·, .~J-;'. ·:~;. !.":- .: ·· :gj~ing 1he ord~i;. 1ilo .:opilot W:IJ to nmd prtjl:m:J to. lltideruhc the fli~lit. 'I11c 1l11m
hn'll juJ~•1: by o111er'Jint: the ri;nw;1f timrt\ thl' 11ilu1 kno'Wt t!lc •lin~11« from.1l1e. :·.:)'.'; .:~~ .. , rM .dic!cklbt. m11ke tht 11cceunry mlio of · fnti~ur 'lir( tli"incr. There is ;t ilovt
• lii;lm.. The ,l~·~rnt w1111l1l h.wc hc~n tfaru~1I . t;1,li11 bcncon cxprc'k'<I iii n1inuu:1 At1J II!" . .. !;; ;;{:.~':~:~. , ·..., to1itocl• 11nJ~:~sin the c4pt:ii~. 1110· fli~!it Jo~ ili .ii'io~r~l ,wor~. Ahh11ui;h tl1i11i;• aro
hy lowcri11i: rhc b 111linr; 1:c.sr, the ~i,..~{t · · ..-n,,.1., 'Jnc i;rt1c111t iuc3, huwcvcr, .lt that : :,; ·~· .• ·.· '1. :.otlll!inet,. waf tv en•~~ the itcnis c~llcJ liy licl"l: ·it~n~'•lo"wcr they ~"' no• 1.M:i11r: Jone
\\'otilJ Ii.we l>ecn liiic<i Uf with 1hc nan..,;1y 1 finA I clc:sce111 J!iuuld he mncJ -.iiheo in·'. •. . ·::die_Cltpl!oe "dfld rcsponJ to otden from tho more c.•cm~ct.' 'Whc" the ;1ctuci,1 situation
:.nd 1hc alti~1e11 carefully cbeckcd d11rin5 ' boll1'1d and at 11 di•t••ct from the 'ru1Jw1)' ': • :c~pmlsl at.' ° ptl't"er 10ttir.3s, gear and flllps dtm~t1ds a~ionl' •t.• ti11c llO f11tt th11 lllCn•
final ~J>prouh, Durin; the proctdurc 111rn of abour 4 ml!~. 11 i!loulcl be st011p1d *' : ;.szulngi. . 1al WOfk b. lcft behind the individ ~~1 wm
the aircr.\;t would have ~n a1 hr away minimum Qlrin11lt - field elcvatil><I istlis :"·.The pllke arri•~d earlier 1!uin expected. .11!ip aetiOfll ~r ponponc 1'11t1'ft 2nd h• ..,;11
r"...n the licl,t Mg tu? 111i11!1. soo feet, in 1hi1 C:llC 4700 feel. 't'hit'ilftl. ;h it 11Ctilblt tMt the captni11, co~lot or Allill junir '.!O conrh11io111. In ~ud1 Q sil!!J•
. This is th~ in11rumcnt ~pp-ch modi· tvdc $hould 1>~ kept untll 1ha mlio bca~Oll EliQlit en11in~tr "''-' not ' nicd in Iii$ mpcc· tion 'nythin~ may h~ppon. Wlll!rc 1cvMI
•. ( 1,-d for r.i~ht ...,Ith Ti11l)I rcfc~nco to ti.a h:u bun p;mcJ lnhouod and until clofC t0 : - "·d•e ~hlon ai thu tn01Tll?nt. Al\yw;1y, the pcrsOM, ll~ i_ovolvot! C0-<1pctatinn m:ay be
it,TOund. llnJ ur tl10 pN:~ailhl& cimnT1Jt:m• · th<: rllllw~y. 1i1e prtK~uro Im bccn'.Jaid . :· ~tly, 11rriv;tl 'WU 1 111tprko tt> the ~tcw ruined. , ' f •
•en it """ crruinly Vic fa"ctt way 10 b nd dO'f!.h for approach unJq bad :weather ~ ~ . .:i . wnich mi11ht :auo ~Ve M t the b.Jr&in of 1'hc f1e11 thAI S£BOY Ji..d bi:tn d~red

a 9
 . • ,•
______,_
. ()
0

~. ·.;~_:. •"'.'.~?=~r~.:. ~S ~:~:-~:·::~i71i ~~ThT~~t~:-'. :~1~~tt;f.~~!~~Bi(~:1f~~~.~111~;~$i1(;·~\+ ~t~:~~~~rn7~:·~~~~p;:~;.~.:/~;~~-~r:~t.. ·:. <.:..- <. ::·:.:.-.::"-~ · .''.4'~:f' ,_ . .___ . P' ~
-=· ·
10 1 4

·
;·: JO'Wn .co .die, :~111tiat ippniach ,Aln~all~:~r:~ :::nlltf~11 t~ tu~}"'. ·a~t· wlii ni~~.if~-.~~~: ~~;=fi{:~:i;~~~1;f}w\~irolft\-; 'l't11i··~ltitf~fi~ ~ ·ditconeJ -~ '. · ·.'1'11~ l\o.vd or ?i1-.~tlK~1ioo ~t111sitted "r . • w
. NJal11. :iflil tbat thttt w:i1 t111 ndt0, corn• ~- ./Th~ cot\Jitlora, ~tt: tJ~( :fOt;;.u :OJ'ridl'?.?.r.:'';":·.::"'·''.'{~"..1 3 · ln•me reyoft o( 1~·lloml of lrrv.mii;ation. cccl1n1al 11ml ~pm\10n~I t'llpbm, lt ls t i• • f-l
. m11niaiiu.n- wi1h OtMl.I_ mii;ht ila•e' made,~: ··;illusion. A concnbun'ft b~or 111ay h~~~ · •/:'.:',~;:: :. /;: }:'. - Ju tnl. tt!'O" wu diO 1>1;;1 oi'I which the dla•hn1t how tl~ic ex.per~ brin; "P 1111Ut• . f-l
iht , 1pt~1n unrc tlut the.re: ..,,, .no. othst., .'been clult the Ndola nrn'll'iY 11 wry n>,... - :· . . "., : h ,. · lid ~i h Ped tct 111 the abovt 111ent1ontd ~lid at tho same U1
m 1ff..e 11ot0uind. lt <s ~iaitilc tl~ 1'c tA~ ;. ·!!'GW. Dcceltratioo'in fotw~td ~;ecd anJ l(• · . .' · · . · ·" earing. wmi m .: i _e °"
eta1 1i111e 'follthli0hl All lft;i.ttcn clfdka1~ 10 11~
cd to 3UR tke. approuh, compl<te ;t11 'th.;.~ ".(ckratlcn dOWY1.,,arJ1 due: IO. the turli > < ' ~- - . . . Ccnlrniuion or tnqil!fy •'"' tli~ UN Coln· li!Jln on the 4ccidtnt. On•;, /on:cd to IM:·
oj)ttp:lf;UiOIU for l~nd\ni; and ·ihci:i : jart)•;,.,!r:~\nbutM 10 11 <ornplt1e wnaory ilhniori :: ·. minimt, the t:amc dltcv~Oll i1 t0 bf f0\11\(f lie.a that tho \\oard cf Jn"''li~aticlil Mm!d
pett th~t ~ ,.;u Oil final :ipproult;: Sllcb ~· ::~--~ich made tnc ca.ptain believe th.at he -wa• :'." . in tlie npom o( tlioe l'W'll 'llcldits. 11.1 • bctpokc d,panmc111,
;r. ti11c ot :Wion w.iulJ .:om~'idc::Yi1h ;he . too ·Mi;li. H~ orJmc! "Fla.pa JC", ~q>t d~ ". \ ,,
du....il'lg Up of UtC whole fli~l1t.,,aui .a1JO ,pDY.!mttlng l!!W :l'1d W~t .inro a:'.lc1(Cnl : • • ·
wim ~ 1"$tir,~y of: wi.~rn U).~~'\1'-e.: :o~ 111Gn~-ci!J.1\. ~000 f~ct -per miiw1c. ihe co•.: J . Tranu!t i .
-ap«o. .., l1:1J 1l~cR h.. -cp1n1on--ol .i.~~r,~.J!:T·:~ --cncrc~ f11o11ed ..,_~Mo:lt ~e : . · A1 the time of tltc 'Ndola aecidellt t~ id~1nlfy a111l e112t1r. SllllDY wi1h0111 be!n11
~rtUl)! scrvici:s. · .,, · ;'.::.(:: ~;:Mimctct .~l\d went 0 " with d11t e'h«k.li•o. · • ownrr of SEBOY Traimif Swe.!111 wu In · o'b$ttr·1 w-IJ ":ave L-•·tlltre111 \v ' 'ffj.
' . _, 11\e ' '• ' • "' r !\ 1 d 'be ' • >I 0« C f Iii , l
.: ' : ;:.. . . ~~l~•n, ~· °" .
t 'G· "• tncnc 't · ·• · •
0 .... VO
an c:1pa111ive state. Openlion for the Unit- cult.• "'!'(ci•ll)I ·:ta-kine i>110 consideration
'°.
i\f_ur ~s !IC(~ on a 11Gt1h·wH1er!y '.. ~'tlltn. !•ne up_'~~ otrcrafr ..,lt'h' _rhe .Nfl: . . ~ NariDn1 had jun 11:aned al\d """ to bo me unccrninty ... 10 the uprcr~ 1i121e or
~~mi: tl": =·p~in s111ncd a lcfc ~·Du~ . ::'Wlly•. D•tn~ a:i.tuficd tlm. 'he 'WU "' on 110 gmtly inc:rcas.."11. The comp~11y "'"ii\ 1.li arrlnl or StBDY. To 1'hoo1 the pbn•
.to 1ns..rfi.:10111 .. 11p01ICQU ol '.he llit'tRlt:.:. . coru~t: ~ltdt J>Atlt he ll!Ql'~•e_d pawc':t· · .. rcooomiully icn1itive siwati°"' Agaltist dQw11 'Whho\rt t9'vin' d1esm•lte11 jiltot e( _ __, .. . .
t)'pe he du:i~ht rhat he ""~ qv11c ."°"'.
~~;".'.-, ~K«Pl~s. the "COrrctt :apprc.'\Cl~ . -~ hi ..: - ; thu bacl.grolnl4 one unJcnand1 die anin oick11cc WG11fd have llccli i111pouible. · .~ .. • 1
flln"A·~,-. He k,iicw ,,e wH prc_ny h1g~: ~.~ .;~l!"fCbf.;!'wcd.'thc noso ~f. the urcraft,. ~nd . .. . · $Ian plated by the: COll\j»Anl' in toMectl<ln • •. '
befcl'1: th<' tUf'I\ ''"'' ~nril or IOCl)lo.aftC!~ •.;:du11,; actll bc1ni: t'ha "ICtlft\ ot: '" Optlca! ' .L l . . lo 'r11.11 normal 119prouh ptllrtn noWll by.· "• ..' ..I
. . " · "· · ~. ' ,_..-., ... Iii · ;~~- tl ,·. w1.,. I tc 1nvc11111~t 11. !!"'")"' I ". ~ N .
-~"' • 'll4ll Mt "' _, " ."" .,rnc... or ·";,· ;.:· / ·
1-o ,, ,
wMJ• t!tc ~ .wtH1o"'°" w 1'S:A~.~.!':., ;~\l . -~ _.. , t'hc., 011pcaln ·d,11ui;ln 111~ )1111_111'>. =~
d1cn w•lctat .,C~r Jown" nlld ~!*\~~~ :~:.µ~rt')ir~u 'fully uf'c when it :d~en<lcJ. l1tt# i·; 'The SD'."c J:iy. :it the :iccl~e!lt wa1 kn~vn ilut-1.. the c111t111l1111 of l~11tllr:a tiear •ru! · ': -
He 1n tlic •rccll;Jn1p'funl1"l"CO: l·otl:IJ.~~::<•t'Mi-r.fi>inld. . ,.,~. :.. §:f... the pmn!cnt :u«l the n1i:hc openuion, f'npl. U ~Inf "'e nttnil"'t lU'lll.1l1t pla"~
.. • · . : . :•,. , : ·'.-~ · r "~ ·' · · . . . ','.· ' '. !' ;~~ .. ... , m:'l111\.~r of 1~ · (\!lll!"'ny APflCll~ on n1~11~lccd rhe l'ilnt.:_Wftlll\I nil~ hnn re•
..:·;:_.c::: > .' " · • :· " 'H~l " '·; ·;.. Swalrsl1 tdcvill!ciiri lioJ nd.iu 11 liett 111t~- \NC!~I ~t11r iln<l 'Oipt'.lll;nln, ln""·'<I ""
···..,, · Ttu1 "s . .,cl( • ~· ·i lt 'i'.i'·._ i,,& huur. 'l'bil .....~ w\1~n the 1huotini;·J~tt :ul•llil.i11~1 tO tic.:~: or (fap1 wm m :i•
. .• • . - ; ;:: ihcoll' W;l,I •ct abg11t, a m:utttpiuo or PR· fot . f111al. •Vflmcb. Nothing but poor
:J.l ~' Mt\lf..ll 1r 1>J1c wor1tlu~ ov~ the in· . .,,,jfo. 111UUW lta•o nwn•t:-i ." " nrr1.,.11l. n;ttl- '. : ""'rlt, The inil>lic ~t cxnctly whu it Jami, JV'11;t11ent l!y 1!10'-'it'ilin oft nplnin the lu.,
j\~"""Y or d•c ~.loin t~('f ~ontroll~r n_r. l\~ from N:.loln. Jn llus lll>l~llC'Ci . when ~ :: I Nuliully 1!iou~l1t of tlic (:ia thRt the t;..·;i : nhiliiifd ' II l:il~ll'll\'nc~nt -Of fin:11 nflpro-
1« ih~ ~r.!~h.. :;~,1, R • hlle ,,( thuu~ht 11, fh:tln WC\t • .1~t11h~<I under the knist 11!J. ' t Cntlcmen wcr~ mlt ;,, tlic J10•itkin 10 lmow-·. Mk. '(( ~i'ui; ~ 1 r:ic\c4t 1 11 ~ pilim wn111.I
h.w.-...vcr, \.l;l!(C<I •'Y 1.hc . TAct tlut ..~11' 111· t>ntl~~I \'t'ltl<h tl<ll\I thnt 111"'11~11~ Jh1>Uht h~vt!.. 111111¢ tl1~11 any "'"~ pcl'J0!1 j,. SwW1m, lt:i¥~ iold m(Wtf th~ tn1li11, '111~ 11l~M W3S
''.·.uly ~ '" 1 w~ wlu1 h.'IJ h.11•~ic.J . J\t:1h~. lin:tl e:1.~crly ~~!icr•c•:· ."'1'1 f.itlu~hullr:;• Aud !~t~r wl!l'n Tr:111~1it puL lu ll!Cuty in 1111c pit'l:c ~~·I uml1>t ,foll CO•llfol wh1'l ir
1111>1.· wl.1•11 n · ...:curr~~I, .:1~t.1 Jc111 :Yr.1s ,1Ji, l\..1nllnl\ 11nd h!.,abc1.w1llo Jh\'luW hl\Vl! .-. · '· limY11rd to ~t<.~i!m( cmr.n1illliun1 h cerfain• hit il1e·gro11nJ,
, !.i-i ,,,,<\f:
tlw (\lfllrnll.'t \0(11\lJ tlii nk ..r. \1c llfl.'n ~Pl (lfott l!Ult1 Ir W~I ktlU'\1111 th~• . . ly I l1 tr
.111..! th~ R110J,..i.1i1 11ir 1~ffi.: ,...,,11ml -s'ta-;:; Sl!JIUY hQJ bn<k<I. Nu1hi11s uf··tho 1un .;;'- r.n ~~' mo. 'l'hc t~d111lcal h1vcrui;"11un n·u,11rJ 18'
'Yi•'C pn...:~1letl io A•-.!Ofll:u~ wid1 t.:i.-v1J '. k'ippenccl . Alhl Uop6tdvillo dosiid iia It:\•.: ; . Shoul.J s.l!nDY h•vc Dull -forced d~n prior to accid1ont 11111lf11nttionini: i~ ~'?'
ti""' t1i J \IOITll in L':lte of li~tt!tl'11p1i111\ of" tiun fur tf.c nii:,ht cn111i1111 ,1c1.;\y in tho ~;;: by ~n :air •; •1nck the~ wiu but 01•c l'lolll!_lo ~ JY.!tt uf 1!1a plonc, Tlui \i11tl~1 or 1hc 1.1ld1v1·
"'"""'""1ic:uio1> whh , ;,,.,;\f(, lola t ri1lci,m: 1c.:ircl1 for stnov. TI!C! ln~ttcr is llOC •~!\Cf! :·~ ': COlll\CC1 " 11h ih.l t (\~~ck, n.~mcly, the _K"\ : clu~lt rnponslhlc .fM f11m11 1!1t lllftr;!ft
i• Jir...;inl t.-v~,J, the ~h1lllni3h iiir 'lt:.li• "l' in ihc ncd.lcn1 r~poru. ~ . -~~ .. , ' . ' . IA~f.~ Fo11i;;1 ~?.f.lnl'I', ~ ~"~II Jl~t;j:~ ·:. wrre cuminc,I, N11 b.1lk1 'W~n,lt Wffe
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bmh 1r.11il~nc •le<IJ:nn! fnr •~. \ltm11 ""'' fir!•:·: fotm<I, '11\c cM•h Jhc, 1hc tc1nt11\ .m11nul
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Yt\lc. fly.mM. tu lmo "'' :It ;,mt= "1 tne In•
• • • • •
nllll lt1t11en1h 111~ r~·~· '1••Wn by Shll!)Y
The ~'!If'"'"' or ScllUY w~s ~ul~ly fl!6- t.i1111 ,,, 1110 the 11 r (~Hie conil'6t ser.icq at'fi.'.: v..:s11i:11unc oo~r.I. It ""~' found out 1h~1 w~~ s=hoJ lor cv1tlcncc of jliDOuni:.
ponsil>lc for the foct th<1~ tho :icciiltM "W1ll . bcln; c:rl!leiMd. Tha Uritislr J-tlsh Commis- .. ; '· :' the l'our;:i h:ttl llM'Ct flown ever Rhodesian Nuthini; was found, A world lc1,.Jing crimi•
not im~i.ttely diMXJttred. Ry st~tflns tho ·aiM cr in 1\bodcsia 1tnd .11jii Ndol~ Airpurt . " " 1aHltory without pcrmiuion, it had "ot . no!oi;ht wu cnQPi;od by tlie t.111i1cJ N:i·
IJ>flru.~ch wi1hn111 a clce1rnncc, '9o'hl•out nm\~l\CT were to rcctlvo· Mt 'H~mmnr.:,J.;: .: '. .. liown on Sc1mmbcr 17th, it h~d n~er rio11s. After :1 cnmprchcnti~o ~,,J;;,,t1ic.1•
c~ -i:Mni: nmi~e, h~ p11~ \lie wht1lc ~· ..-ekj8icl. Whor1 he did I'll!( Affilfi!'.•iity ihoui;ht : !: '.' : flo wn ,!utinH nl~ht l\J i1 WM not cq11ip1ml )01U invcui11Mion ha rcjcctc1l alt 11,wli~ of
•'1l1'iry sy>1U:1>1 ®t of fun.:tfon. Tltit 111~~" . thl\t Mr Ha~mj4i!4(l\iiJ ch"ll~ed hit (01 :1i~htllyi11n and it did ili>t have. <he i,hooti"i; 1luw11, qbo~~e an1l tcch"il;,,1 de-
u R'1t diK~ 1>y the i11v~i11-1on.. •' . . ; .. nrltul (or polmcl\I ru1911J, .•IKI rtturncJ 10 ·r!\nae w r~d• Ndola. ra:o, anJ Jecfa~ thmt 11~ Gc-.:lJcnt WAI

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TQ. crrruigt. ~ rcndn·YOUI "-10~ or Ndil!iii Jue t6 pilo1 amlr.

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hiac~yjust. ai~mertrliir. c.hc-pb'nt-~·.- .. '1ier ~~ t<i . ~.,;~art ,-lc :.,idi a110 ~bt~ · ... · ....·· : :·· _,..··: ·" , , The,;.1a iri1i ,1 •. · • I-'
>hot COWTI or ,nposed to Hl>o!age. Dot J[' pl:i.nt'l 1i~1i;ht lfYual c!ayt am. ".. : . : °/: Jal ••: • • I-'
is Jiff1n1lt to preunr· "' .!cr:ileii -dicCH)' · · ':· · · 1" dC011ing with \he Nd?la actlae11t the In lmid1wjt~ che \JN - ~nno~ rhAt it U1
""On!i a rri;'ll. Tnns:i.ir tried. "The comp;any . The tapt;till of tilt mt pllJ\e ~11 fUghr ·. ·· • • Swrdish:P.tCN 'Waned a lot pf printc!t._ i11bt '\:.'ould l)<I\ lie r:cl're•cn1ed 1~ the RllOl!ttian
p11t io lien t~cltnir:i.I aod oponriona1 .. operation• .nm1.-i:« in i'r.truair. Ncit ·the on ~1~rional Huff uf no nl u~ Vtrj' little l\1l11lc, Co!"1Tiivlo11 ~F Inquiry tJ1i 1 wu
br:i.ins at ""ork, decided for the Jboodng . ·one ,,.!to wa1 oo TV. Thi• ..,u a new one, of factual inform:ui01\ ,.,._~ given. 111e n- checrcd1by;,r~ Swcdi1h prcH :u :a wi1e dcri•
.!.n1·n line, :ind omc out with a thcoi'y' " and ."'11mb~ nto in ~ r°"' of thtt:a ill a ptru Oft aviation wen ~i1r~udcd. H t!ie 1i<:r1.i• .;; 11 ,.. ,
whi.:i1, l1own-c:, cEd nm ~.nd tht ~t ~ .· yur, 011, OM -.{t&1io11 he sbow~ ~ & _, pnn had_btcn,thc k:a1t i.11~m1:cd in whu Ac~o'ri!i.~~ tQ,tY'llid intcrn;i.tion;\ ai:tec·
fore any uf the <Qmm1n1on1. And yet. pooro wblch !t~ h.1d ukcn on a. day·lighc the Sw~11h P1lou Auoc1&tion had to uy mtnn ti~ Rho,9cs1an com minion w;11 the
'°
ir.1n..:iir "'"as in a very ;;ood position 111 appro1dl l'tdola. He told~ tht Kt w111 it would soon h;i.vc found 011\ ,.,bit W~ '°r"'ccjWdy ~ cltJ with tlM! ciie. lntct-
pcnonncl from the cornpany took ;pan ti\ on hit way to the Swedish lloard of Avia- · wrong with the i11vcni~atlon. 11~1i111tal rnle• \'ttf'Ct 'haw~nr, diucl)orJL-cl,
~he ·l«h~icr.l invmi1;~ti0t1, ~d .rim_Juuul.: :< tidt\. .By help of the photo )ie 'lrOuld --:"• · ,. At "' urly Jt4Gt o~ the l11Y~tlgatkln lt A UN ~orp,":i~io11 ha~ ~" forme<! al\d i11
u•fomu:ion w~l illus ~t aU 11me1 an1lt b!c; · ·~lain thtt ihere cou_ld h;ve bccft flO . mis• . • was found that JC)Jlle or 1!ie bod1H o.{ter l~ "P.°'~ 'Y~! .~wa!t.cd wn!i lu;h•i:ruos tr.pee•
Jud;cmcl\t of th• hcight by die captain of : pcuoiu ..,he h.\d ~~ on board S'EBOY m1bn1~ . · 1
H p.,..cv~r unmlistic and lruitl~ the
SUDY. copwncd bYlleu, . '!'ho bis. ~~·. nniclc. To ~. ~~~ iht UN report ..,... received
~cul~uiCJ•u 3 \,0111 shooting c!own :>ncl U· . .•
down on tht p>~bhc. Swcd:srt 1
H11u111al a · 1.y 1l1e ~"<\ icliih.p~~ i: may bo 1wit~ble 10
h0til' t: h;i.vi: l:cco they have ..crvcd ;i 111..jor To me thu photo m~nt quite die 'Op• · , :.
. p~ were di,pa1ched 1_0 the b.n~lt-ficld in re~~· ~C! ~P, Dt~• NyMttr {d;e -L>~ily
purpo.sc. '!'hat it to c!raw tl1e at1ent!vn f rOlll poairc, The~ Wat the flu del(l~tc b1i1h . :!:
.·,. : oruct TI> Je~1tro the nide1\te. Afw " fffl Ncws),;?'l\'~d~'1 ljjggqt niornini; p~~.
ti..: n"'ti:=I exphinarlon1 of ~ aceid¢11t. "WUt ol Ndob., cx:i.<r.ly the type of terni" .; · 0

_ill(o which planes dtW:nd 1zi s'ittillar '"i~ ~ · day1 'leFf lntlc waa heard. The """ -m ~e1e"teii """"' 1.,0
Tut 11ii;hu we~ m.>Oe in ardet tO check . ~ "illlu. (In :appioacli· d•:rini: 11l~h1 :it i1 ~ '.~ ' The built.lb~ qv.ii. ll(lf!llal. <)n boatd ~&l'·...,.\<1~:11e~dli11tt1 "Shirp cri1icllll'l by
i>n 1cr.irnUT1iC<J i;iven by "WitnC1scs who saw · · fl;ia11 oYtf' il \>lack hole., rl.e i:il°' Qo.,a .'. .'.f· S'E8DY ..,,..~: IOl'llO :onnrd UN 10!dierL UN i~•CJC:g.,.iim •Gain11 che aviatio"
SEOO'\' on the ~ccidC\tt 1\liht, :Tna"s3lr ihat thuo •n: no ohrtrucriont befuw. he.., : Th_ey aitricd afll!m11!1ition f,,r their t112· :1uthon:~rr:·~( ~~~...i:r." ud ''TM Ndala
(wlin c-.,?) p11t i'plafte and a uew tO ~•:;;~ -~c• hi1 l:ei11ht by 1he flln-•')': Jlghil '.!;_: ch1n~uu. W!lc11 ·dti: plano .:ru!ttd and cuu<ropfi~·· a1·Mplettl)'. 11rnclnd my1·
poiaL A• a ·l'Ulllt.of tht test flights it.oWi:"· alicad 11.nd -Onund1 in10 tlie groun<!. · ::/ · tiaU&lit,fire the amniu.nitio111u1plodcd. Thas 1ery", ;· ····-.: •' •
coruidcrci" possibility,lhac stl!OY 111ii;ht <:.. - of the bCldlft <011ai11ed not {)nlr \wt- Th• t'ir~t'll"iii!tifie nlrh io the uit.iciam
b"r b.:.eJ, lowet tlmt 6000 ft>..>t alnady Tdo nor kl\Ow what the tcsu.lr ,;., o( the · _:': lets 1"ar abo ~n:ridi;e-c.a~s, Tht !nj11riu directed lt.V,,.,di t~ IJrhitll Hii;h Corttlf!is...
when j1 pated OY~r tht' field. talk. :at th~ ll(latcl of Avist ior.. , .. wrre "~ ~~rft<ial. le wa1 e1ttbli1hed sion~ ill ~('iiodtti~.&11d cht Ndola • irport
<. th:tt nonoi of '1ie buUea had pe1red t!lc bore mo\l\t~r. ~f~ itc\iiral'fr pmend• tbn the
lf SEBDY rc..lly wa1 d1u low, alld to 'rJie i mtrc1tin11 }'IOillt [s, 00wt\'tt1 uat . ,.~ I ":.bl ;1. wnpo:i.. :· UN -<0·!1111\'is1i61d1#.s come aero" 50methini;
ma
test plane 10 ye•n e&r• ~ i:_
itnt1ijitY,·n~. ~:e criticism it an f~aC1 copy
1
lhc l11iow!:d'e of the captaln, :llett wu l\O tlu: r.tpuin .of
mnon lor thtt ·~iJe approuh 1111d~ ..,a, or Iler si:rvecl a. copilo< Oii' a DC.6 .,1i1c1., on < ·.L:..,'l'•ninlbftiu .by Mrlcaiu v lto had eccn
.:, ~& alii•li p)aftt behind dte big" WaJ lnOtner ol wMt WBS ) ODS before Slll~d Ill ;n« rt-
. Ndol.t. 11p:iro~ch ta Cairo ""dl1:' eonffi1icmw 1imllar ~:·; .· to
. "'111er 'wme- e\'Cll editorial1 on, pom f;.;\o\ 'thC° toard of fo"eitiC>'tion ind
to tliaae •t ~doll\, hit the gro~ad, A m11iA .·;·:;!...·
11 tl1c pl ~tlC· 'W:ls
iow clue 14 mim:Ading hndins -.;m brob olf and 1~ '. J!!•n• :. ,.:/ lf 1hc Swedish tritninal ~p~m Cit the the Kli.;acit.\n"C<i1-nn1iwioK of ltiq~ty.
tC4M llad bttn a1ked the wliclc thing could Twod nJlvkluals, one of 1hen\ tll)t at all
orthe altimcius or misunderwinding o( the . l.ouneed in'° the 11ir •11•ln. Tht piloti madc.:.f' 'ha.,,e ~ dropped 111 once. A ~y pttton eonnecl'c-clllwith ' :l•i~<ion AU1ho1itle1, none
clcv;ition of tbc airport, o~~ o"l1 lllY lt 10 the n&r.,.,ay •hm thci pb1u c™~·;::­
may act confumf by the n~vi11at1ol\ 11ncl pf thtm.~~tive '11, the ~I r tr~Jl1c C011tr01 aer•
th::it 1h! JI l:.nc was bound to cmh. Tha p•'8engcr1 alld the :rcw -wmr 1lil'td~ · .- '.•
... ~n1i-cdllrlon llg1m of 1 bi~ p:mc~scr •ir• vi~cs, ,l~e b)"'. r11t· O~s;cn• Nyhetcr c0t1YcrttJ
O,i11ccrnins t~ Wt.imol\its io th!; fta- No IC)t Jlit;l1n "C1'& m~dc ~t. Ndoia !i. c:r~ft. ~ tn\irnoniH wcr~ ch11ngcd t'Yt ry 10 "tl•e' a•H~.dmt. authori1ici of RhoJclli"'.
No (~ n11Wiaillh ttiticl~cd ii\ any w;y tM
1
pcn, cirh:r ?lie crew of SimD'Y w:u lre- Of'1!er U> flnd 011~ ab:iut \ht f'O'!ibilitlei lor now 1it1d. .thtn. Some of th1:n1 rdertttl in
mcndm:•ly in~~t or ihc wirne..J. m!1juJRio11 rhg hci11h1, • ... tin•c ro ihc J,u11ini; of OORIC. Son1c of ll.ho•lc•fon :~ v ili 1.lon nu1'"1ritlcs "'l1ich wure
~ tt' -ffl<l\:· ' the wi1nc11n aM•' 1hc cr~'11 11nd tll1I 110t. re- fo11nJ •.101 h·n,.cl'•~ctccl <:•::tctly the way one
Onco l A•llc.I fllRht or~atlan1 m1111ag~ rtirt it, othcn IO<l1cJ the pfoc• l\011r• ~- <:nultl 'll~ 11~c1, -wn•itl•rh1111hc 11e1u~I 1hua•
Jr is v~~Y Jiffi,uh to ~11li:o ~ hti~l1t "Of 1!!rcc ol Tfl\n~ir about hi1 •icwt
1'11111bcir fort fh~ wrcck~~a wi\• cliKnvcrc:tl. tiun, · ~1i1\I _In ·~c<..-onlAllcc wi1h rq:ut~tl""s
.l<1 ov~fl;ri"r. 1iw~ft. In t lii1 itt•l~n« ·1hc on ih.: N•lnln 1\Cchle11t, Thftt w1 bf1111'9 ltt1 111c neilr1r~11cn m'ksetl die inwcsilnit lni.t 1lqw11~1 ·1• 1. <~
• wio1enc1 wore to :wmp~tt -rli.: ~1cight ul 'l'r:ms.~ir n11rt, w~ b. ,..~, ·.1ill will\ ~111 point though. The .,,itnaste• weni founJ in ·r~n1>n;:-·i:~ 1-0~ o( m~ucn Qa tf1c'"'~bovc
tll<l tcs< flll'!IC with th.· u of sn1m Y. Wh1!11 C ivil Avl~ttOl'\1 lloard; He WJi.yf.t•j relll(• N1lo~ tieer·h.:l!lf 11nd ~ro1.1gh1 forwm! by mentlonrd:-rs of "1)1lrte ~11 ~ccllc111 " "'Y to
iMy t.l.., SellDY iic hcig!n did 111>t me:tn • t.int. Hi1 onl' tofMll!ilt ..,,.,::tfi~t"thr &Cci· 11 STicdc by n!lme .Mcimon. ~ven l1fC(rii11ciition !ron1 wh:11 u fflCl!ri1I,
<1rnt l111d bc<0rue a. p<itit.~~:I :."°'~:: : Wlwi 1!.~ S'!l~l;h go'l'Crll1111mt - hand In•n11l ~tlitotinl inc ncx: cby rhc D't.fll'

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' tl1ini; 111 them .as tl1c,- dill no1 k11ow thl\t

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!\11hc1ct ln1inumd 1~1 the Nclol01 cop1rot: pointing out tl1': oi inap~!>illry i~iSDC"fl,
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lcr ;;we !ilmDY ioi:om:u •hia1c1ct sc1ti11!;. h did nOl. ma1w iF this w~ done by ~n n~ · .-:. . .:r·:i+.,i.i .. Ul

jc~ ·§O o I, .;~··l·

I fa \lntnn~ful ~'tion. There would Ile r.;i "I - . • ·'
\ ; Herc w-1• a 1;n1.,1ion whc11 il 'JIM 2on- e . .... i::
1
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<:>l\C villing to corrcc1 it. - 'There 'Wat,
"\ ' ;l<!C1"al :ips:ropri~1c \0 :id~ctti>c the ~p:l· ~
howcvu. h WM clone: by ltic"i111: 1he Avi~·
I bilily of Swcdi,h pilou, s ...odh!I inves0,:i- tio11 Docird into opcmian. 't~ ~y a./:c
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yl ion, Swedish :i111iiori1ii:i. Swedcl in ~enc·' 1be D"Ccnt Nybcror had UI ptin; ' roctl•
I- u.I, and th~ o:iuld "'t:r'f well bt: done by fyi11~ nocc •isncd by die hc~d of 1hc bo;irJ.. ...~. .~e 1-00i ·.·. 1.~~<I ...! .!,.• I•!
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1\irmft uciclcnt nUdc Dealing with the Ndola K.C]dcnt i11 , '·· • ';:: · ··,
in onfor IQ !ind th~ ca.lllC. [n 11) clo~G 'OM
ha~ ~he Wiii by wlucn JI -y k pou1blc &o
way1 ~~Id l1~v1 lll'IUI' tha~ dte l\hod~a.1:1
:luthomau alone J°111Nld ha~.-becn ttlj!OI\•
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a•oid furihu 11cc:idcnlf of die J;lme typ. sible for thl invemi;~clo!)1 ·l'h UK·'W011\ci ,.
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ThD invcstiga1ion1 ahoul\! be ;ccountcd '11cn h•'l'C ~- trc.ncd · !~ ·Briti1h scylc. i. , , ; ·1;, (l 't!
f..>r in such a 'Way dm die ~-.iblic w:hir:h Kno~ing that i~ ~tpofl ~Id_ be llCNti~I· ., ~: c ••i. ~ - , •
cn1r~u i1~lf ro ai.t <no.poN4ion d~uly ud "' cYU)'._1ie11~•l Dlc ;l\llodwan con\11115-
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..~ Ull ~ . I CVttythU\g h~ bcc11 IJOllC ill Jion wou!t!, h••n l\ad. :1q C°"11 OIK w\ih '- •. . • .,1· f : ·r~

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or.kt " . ··_ul ~".IY cMec:t al1~t mii;ht ~!'- full C>1pla11;1rion ~ ~ ~c ~~°"~ •1!91'9rt• .) j -1., f • .~
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cd br ~lt.fac1,1 "1u1 "
bonn11 on 1(.
A11{pcnoM IJC!>".tfn&ini; d ie Unluol Na- • .
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.uul thr U..'iA. fl• tl1e iol'nti+;.u~'" ,.,,,.,.., p ·,.,. °ff'atWir arrlv~I .ill ch~ •~IO, 31'tl u11.lcr ·· ::- . ii: ~ ~ I , ';· 1 _,.~
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11,J 11, fo11r ~·;ii!Jh!~ 111 d>C pYMi.: 1 , 1.1 Jii·· .-- 11K •dr(1111"1A1~es t1_1Ct"c_" tt01 vet~ much to · ·::'.: ·. . ;' .1•i.·1·"'' i · -;;: .:··
c~ibu1c1l ..II Jro11nJ .1hc wc:irlJ tlic J11.,,cs1ii;~· IJY a.liu~t is. T., Min;; Ill Swedc1m11ic ~l\• , '.,.' ! ,1!1..1.· ·~I ····
•~ !"'" rommin ion i1 p~t ~do iu unnolt .,~1li;at10n l\ou.t wu, however,, to lmn;
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· _.,; --.
...i;t:· inardcnofindtb~gu1c-of .1ht!· nccidcn1":· ill AnothM; !.'!~!'ll" 11nJ 0111l"1~iw-J!in -. ' · · /. •- ·: ':! -j~·g · ~.-. t .'1.,; .:=1.::! ;:
a!IJ lo m~ke ihc ~pnri 11nq\IC)lionaillc.. D!1ilcnopky;, r·.· - ~t H · . ~,il ·.
• Tn Glhet '°""ui~ inveui11:Uio1u Jm t.c111 (C~1ls·
1;'

~· • To mali.c:1h'.n111 '#one 1l1q UN .8 < a:i ·· :·. ;· :• 1I 1I ,

t· ool.11c.I ft"'." rulil1c o~rv:ulo~. tl1c r~ j~ll. w~ ~WcJ "~' - ~ .t0mrn1JllOC'I
'Wllh ·~ll Jtlfm~t 11t all in finrhna 1hc, C!IY.!JI
. ·
., J: •
I l ·.:[
~ ·,I '
I· .g i-
i
pom nmatn (Dnfi.Jcrnial an,! ot1ly ;,,
uf 11\, ai:ciJc~J, E . .~ '!:lfl •.:i-- o .~

T l :.: ·'
'umminA 11J' i1 f1wb!l 1hcJ, Jia. chc accitl<llt
~t'll (.iri:oucn Bculun, ac all 11 p11liliihed.
0 0

One can hardly blama the JlhoJaian -!ii ~ · ~~ i"2'~ IT ~ iJ tt

II• rnu11 ~,ci,le<m :uc UllC Ill-pilot Cf?Or
chc ii.:ciJ~111 ·~rurt1 are ,,( i;rc.lt ....iluc ta
~u1b(lriti1:J clut i1 .»'Ill ll\lllJc ~ 11".CU o( dlC
i1h•.:s1i11Mio1l. ,. ..
' :g l;
o::i Cl
- 'c E
] ~ . ·· ·.
J .J-'
I ~IQ.-< ..
~ ... r 1· s~ .
c::i "':..
'&
~
•he rii.- Jt. ~:-c pilu1lc~rn•fruM 1lic 111i1· Tiie diffffGlll :1wd1ori1io that clcah wit~ .· p;:S :1·~'.~ ·!;. \
c~\.<:t u1lia p1'-: ~:a\~ "l~c UM he maka ~~e NJ1>!" ac~i.tcn1 .aa "'ell .u &he ~i1·

IJ
.. ; ·: '. '. L1; , J....:._J
1umM'lf ""'1 co1e hi.ft h11 lifc.
. Ar a rcs11t,..
..L clif'
I - l .,.., !
'".,." ill a~owtt•'
' '401>1 and -dic1t n:J)Otu ate shown 111 Ii; l.
·, .. l
Tho UN cormninion coruiucO "' per.ions
·..
,,
· ·.
··
.
.· ·
· ·.
:·
·
. ·,:... : !
• • ' ·
1 -,. ; ::-
\,, ,
,_. _ ·, :
I c;
:J
c
0 >,
·::.::. 1-
~·· ~'"""'"".' < . -r :: I• ~.. fr
ini: _lor •ccidcm invUti~ioia, .A~iu11 from Sweden, Y11got~avla. Sicrr.t. Lcoae, . _. · ·.: .. ;; · _-.. .• _ . ;; " : '. :..._.. ~~ ·~ g. t
u.:iilcft1 •Cf"ltt\ arc of,_. aclvaar:.Ge to Nepal aocl thQ Ar~CJ111nc, . . · _ . . - -.. ·. . · -~ ; .. ·- ...·. I :· : ·· . · ·· l'~'i •; .. 1-" - -
"""'"" •""'· .... ·•· .........
~er hu th" po11ibf1i11 t11 ~d ... Swnliah
..,,.,,,,,., •1• ........,..
lknrd of AYia1i011 appointc' ~ DNrd
.. ·• ·
af . ..:. :· .:. -:; . . •
·-,','.' :· ··.. , 2 '. ·.,, , .·
. .-:-...: .....· ·:;:;. : ...·. . ~ -
.. . ·
: I. I . ., , •
i ,!!..

t~' :c~~~,~tna1. tA11~~;:tion. ~ _n~~ .~~-;~~;O,::~;;:::;t~r, 1': ~?~::~ ·-,.:.:~_;'~.~:-~."·<~-;,::j:;·+ /~~>(;:~~:;ftf.;t:i·t!~{::?_:-~ /~::~:;:~:~·i;~ {~;·:_: :~:;.:-·.}('. :~-~ ·.!::.·.· . .·.
· h~. -~ ~- .~~.of
hen - •. Tr.an,!~\!' :11o!!.·}.fAl:fl\'~•;•'J•~:. :-. :! _:~ .~'
[ .A.vl.il{l!I, -~ ~- .H::, •.' ·:" ·.
,.. ..... .
,;;..;..
... -
L~ .:.,· · :;:,·,. ·~..:
•
:.·. ,... ""
·-
. ,.,,,• <-:t·.· · -_·'. ..' .. ,_,.
. .. _ • '
. . • •;,, ..
' ... . . . ,~ - · ~·....
,,,,,.1 .• "i:,,;,...,,_·.p.;.·
... .... .. . ._ __. • , , __ _
,
• , 1 ...
.
·J ~ •l
•/·.· _t
1 ..1 . • :~ .(.l._l'il."-''' J::'

i
 .. .. - . I; . n
~ ' ·;·. '· ..:l·:·· • ' ~ ~ 0
,. ... .. . :.. ..· ~ i .. 0

.,..~re atud:cd 10 it. This bod)' of teeh11~ c1hcr th.o1ic.1 and '"'~that the ace!· ~-~·. h~4' d:~let."arc .not VffY pr:,b.ble it nrobb\r'-te• •;,~~- ~~. tlDlla1, h as no1 ,__
0
ill •
--~-
[\..)
~uJ orc•.nion:1I c1q1em 1
t111: ~
rn.iuc •.
L
nwc1ut
•
_,_
·
ucnt
·
_.
w;u Ci\We<. Y ......---
I b ·1
pi.~ • ~
f·-'-....i
"- · Lj-~
,- ·.·· ,:':<•"l'!f', IJl<.""11 tq
I :~. ori <nh~r
m.tucrl'
"'
made,-~t · 1c~~ '• has nor •uoeq aCQ!u11tc1
-· ._, ~l
1>e"ll
w,
1.1i1ion :i.J•prop~N:J a l'Lj)Orl ,.,.., wi-: ...e - · ...::.!"'Hie! ........ . ;imJyJtl"of 1:~ Cat~gcxy ~(

~I
fc:ir. 111 !01hcr 0'whre11 IL • . . • .
- h" h I 1 , d< ,_. ,
Wh)' WAJ the profo;sor
'·
al all pvt I\(
. . . ·c -~ II ,. • " '"' lllYC11t1~nuo11 1,
b.un "" ~· 1c 1.'e 1an1'1lJ wcr;: m~ ~ .,.,.. _. wor..> : .: '·." _llM'4 "'~~ Vll4 ~~a 'I ton1k!o1t1 11101t 011ly i1Alf di:1ncl1' 1. .: · -
fore 1hc n!ioddL.aA F11hlic ComtnlnlOI\ _of . '1'lur trim of :he NciolA cue bc!or-e the
0 : "; . ./::~- · .. .·. . ' ..:· · : . •"\ · ". ,1 .: : ··:: .
l!UJoiff ;iod 1hc UN Commiuio11. l\~l(W!c,ion :uul UN comminions wcra tlCO.• .·:=·•:;:,-:._: . .. :!~: :·: :· ,. _.. · ~ =;:.: - ' · • \ · • •. · ·
I

T!11: lklAr•I or J1wni.iµ1ioe 'Wotknl on' · miflc1\ h)I t. wlll'llini; co1111ui11tc O.J)~i~1cJ ::~-~:: .. ·:; '.'~_:;:/:{~. .. ~ _ll!f!Stlly ·i~~'OllS .::.!j pilot~ . ' - _:•. ',•_ ., ...
!our 11\cDfitt 1\au l1a.J bi:m . laid Jo>itl\
. be•. · by tkc SW"~dlsh · • f · ( Tha
!;i>VUDlllC!li. £ '°rnmntcc} • 1. . · ·' ·:. '.Jii itli~{:;1..' i 1~1. -- > of a...;"~l!On
' 1 .. ~ \ l -
· (C.·.>
.: ; . . i1n:rt .• l'O'VlfljP.J
· '.: :· fli•ht And .bo
· . JI L
lon:b;inJ, i.e. cN:!!IY ~1ion. u~''' tee•. ~11prQK&l ln •~tu a..:POtt o c.o11nc wit., -wcri·i~w~ .pc.lely \>y Mlp ·~r. ch ~ 1111 · .'·. · '"~·I".( .11 . d'( . .- ;1 · ~' - nc
I . · . . . :··· ··· tlO!'I

nic:il malfon;:;ioii ~nJ pile\ ·mor. ay •Hi· 1hc way tlii ~IC w:i.1 Jcalc llitll. lt l'll\y be prcsslont ·~at tlit pilo ..;~ .· ~.1 Ll:i ~.:: a ;iw:u~,r, ~ .1.f1~-ult1ea.
-01ni11g ~'be .ftrn lhrci: of 1hete theories M d _.' it"!=-in1> UtLt die c;1llllll\!ncc \'C<ltlltcC <Aru.11\ &q.,~~u ~ti'*.' · ~':ui,;:: °D'1t, tl~~ro ls. ~:10th" ~itu1ldo11, r.n.i rid I·
~;itin; Ali w6tk OD Ulll/(l lh~y ••m~ apcoc~fi.4 rain•rlt.1. ., ind. a.1 \\i«~ l..dlt•tt1~· ~~II\ ~ -colo1nl)'i c~ou~I\ when fM"ll . ir,_.fitto 111~· i
climiuattd, and piloicrcor •as illd~ ... 11\iollt "the Rho.iulan commluion iuaich • Cllft'I~: :·~·. i. ' '.'. ·~~ •~. d•c~, •!1'1'! ~·,when 6pproad1ill1> a run'fi~Y
bcin;; die Qu1c ci \li~ accidCllt. ..., ''The!~illC 'llM in every respect p\Jb•
h•is rhc fini time an a"idcnl invntic~~:· lie!< ··1,11· ni;~•lk. lrnp~nWjcy and comp\:-
1ion lw ~n lmtcd ihii ,..} which w. ·· un~ i,_.G,\1~.,d irou "1lt&Ads. All artu•
com" Jis.utrolll whrn the diHctcnt ihto· lllClltalion ~m\ded ••~pied a11d d1~N
_ . . .· _,,: ;·· :::~,
•·· ;.::: ; : .: . .'

..,_, ' ·: · •llificM:nt for ltl1b~ in poor ' !lllii>ilhy. The ~c. Su;i:1,_!\l!M•'i! iind
•. d~n~~ ~~~hl. ~E
.:··· ··· -: ··· ·. ·.'"J'IU. 1D•ll"~catlo11.wa.,'"l1ow•~et', not 'IVit"l-~o ~ti. ~n~ilbllcd a"3 thc~c la-llO tto11\l-

' . ·:.:: . piloc wed lii~_.MJUc• Im tb~lll gave him l:fDlln1 teie~nc:'es, and if l11d 111iw:d ~ the
1hc nmw..y

'°
l..~t\IAtcd
~I\ ~v~ chc pilot · · I
rics ap~r :igciin in• fW!lhling up. It wu -...u ~ .renrimOft. m libcf1Y of the rep~ ·.::; . f.U..~t~s. l~1~en1e~•rc d~~· . al~ k~iu.ha l~nd=rlu, ~ ..QJily ctif· .
-1
c.:nainly JO in alii1 cut u me ponioiliriu KMil~VC· of pantc:a ~.call aad hear Wit• '.~ .;.· ·· ~ fot lnl~lllellt dy1ni;: tn ~~ ~tl the ferc.o.e:f~p~ ~ ~ayl1£1\t a~pto~ch 11 th~t ~It · • .
ior piloc error were not diJcimed and th• MBOS. ·Tlie rcpreseom1vcs co11ld fruly "!'• ·
opcr.iionol dai:a wich ;. buries on piloc fotd..-ckotc v1cva uwi~C0111mcat on wlm •d -.'
.:: ~-- · ~w.meou~ et.uted 1na ~i.!ou d1ff!Qll·
:.i .
ho~ll " ·. ni1s:s1~i;: llut 1r ih' appro:ich 11
~ Tbt "~di11~• w~e not "!111plo cnollllt :-iad11 over "'•ter O'~ O\'cr • ::1~1cr1 an1& there
I
•o -'os~glu fonll.: ·· : '° '1Ja•la'~ •nlO 1)\~ 1n!or111a1K>n. nHdcd, Is I! no . o_c h~ ~111'?-do rclncMo e11ccpt the
ttrGt were miuina.
·~ h ... L , • ,..__ Abo11ohc UN-commi.aion \he eomll\!llff · ;: bppycd 1~.u pilou rather -~lined . Jn appt<>atlj A,nd .rvnway lighu. The impm·
~· · f ' L L. '
I
•nd '11• UN C:Ommh· .~: ..Advcne .tt111arll 1111ttt, bo_wC\l:r, bo -·"··: . . 1ltcir own • - , v.O _ac.ad~~ OtCUtrod. tlOM .o ~n!'-le :'.1~~
e vip0ru (rom 1 c "'-'esllti ........,. .-·. · . · ·
Th of Inquiry
mi.iioD
i bl . ( "B ni of . .made 01\ the factthat die procceilillg before , _ The Lin~·~ were 1mrrov.d. •nd ""' tht p1lot._l~.l1.c ,1ft.t1rcd he has a Ol'<lllt: 1~·
"" ""'f
• 'L • •
convinc•Ajl IO j
~ 00 m:n: e ~11t .ppon 11 c1~ oa · ·.. the commiai~n. :is a rule did noc inch1de .....-,.. io!i.ll'ilOCllU desig11ed and 'piloo 'have dency 1~ fycus hir eyc1 01\ thi 1\IOW-t)' -
"°..,;
TillCJtiS~Uon, • • • . • JUth a-~ or lh& 'mi.ioi\i1y of"tu wimn·. ·.·.f~ if~d'9 b:ccll fl)'l!ll lnllC" "'9fC 111f•f which is_:at;an 11ur;icfrJe Jjn-0,1~ - rachct
The ~.n1ln1:il\ COl'llR\ISHOI\ cttaloluhcd tH a1, a«otdi"I: to Al\glo-~lCOn eundard, °" in"rllll!SflU 'han wlU. vi1u.l -.rtfc~c~ dun Gn ihe mao of ir.u.nnn~a with ihei:
t!lac •he uu14 of tb< :icclJ~lt w.upl)~t...~ . n mode ~y."c1ou·enminatiot1". I ro·~ llfQUnc!.. diglu anJ. :11oii1ms right la 'fro11t of hilll.
ror. Tlir« "1C'llbe"* of the S"itdisli Aviatloa .,.,. . . of . • He checl1s-j1he lllnl\ld11 ilnd hclllh< ,f tlie
. . a mod•m airctak • f • '-.. · " ·
.!! rom111m1PO amn,cu tn~ a11r t~ J •invu1111at1on QtrctA r :vf\ll'~·{r~ar.l \g th• -~n1u1 ll11hti,
.1 L- ( · • . , . IJ\11tU1110111a110n
e
l.. Th • 0
no ..rd wbo cook put in • • •
d .\. ·. . b '" L
•II "''' v~ulOI) y 'fl'H~n It "n ...
c. ·
I ..•.• . h . ~· . ..
111corics m • 1umm111g 11p an11 cone ....c... · bavo wri\~n • report In s~.. ts.,. ncl\C1l~
• ' , .. J • L . --' Hown .
on , . . . · . on Y · &JY111tl \ t c a1nl""'"' ,ln\ltai\Or 11111,k
. IU 114tlhllf)Clin II lrc~doutly 1mprtt• gl~ntet, 1 • •
1
wt llCMIC of ''um eo1ald bt climlNted (ul.,.. . · lG : • d k d ••ConfiJ ti I"
lll cop1e1 an mar t cu a ' uvc - nen to the profu.[011al in•~
• •· .. ·
Y0!~~1~J. ..., Nt~!~~ .mllkl. ?c.i~I• _:.~o_!~!~ Theipi\ot !'lay-in 1hh w~y b~Cl>IM tdb~t
. :P- ·. ·' · ' • ·
. . ; . · ..
The CClnch1slol\ (If tht UN co111J11illion it radio.a ll. Fly1oa w~h vuual tcftrcnu ~o 1~ lD an 11r.1ital illu1ion. ln Cis •. 4 II jhown
riJic;ulou• burlni; 111 mind tbi:repOA by dt 'TM invcniguion hat been commented i:rourul 11nd uum1mcnt flyiils arc 1wo .Uf.. how the opilc~l illii~~ ~Im.
frft.Su\~, . • . . . upon by -a ~ilo& cirpcrt o( th. Swcdi1ll P~· fdrcnt .iu, The profcai.<>nal !li!C>t 11111 & be_·
1
A ~1111~ay ~111:ncd OJI "' 1011i;111 or latid 11
Dr Fr~l·ur, Clu~f vf t~c Sricntittc 1on Auoclat1on. lilt comft\Cfll suru as !oi· ,. able ~aat~r boill of '"~· Trollhlo tl\ay, sm1 th1Jus;l1 1 t1\i:. c;o!;Kpi1 wind~hivld of ""
10
Dt~RlllCnl oft~u~ich Polio: ;and Pt~· \()Wil • • . howcnr, arlH -when l~rr-& " a ll\htt11rc of . aircrni~ 1!'P'~~hi11i; over the ""°'"' 111'ldcr
fa- ef Sclmcc ctun1nolo1:y 11 thci \J~1- "The m\'ut1i:a1ion •Pl'~f1 to hav.i l>"'I ~~ t".'o olMlthoda ilf lli,hr, or ~htn ,,...._ Jiffc:r•nt:,,.Mt"itiom. The di~taucc co 1tlc
. trcnicy o( 2'1rich wu cspcci"ll7· cni;.i.i;cJ by ma11c "'1th all d11 can:Mncu •hat it '"'' "' uuon1114 frocn .OllC lO chc oilier, · ; runwoy ii:in' ali ini1anccs tho 1.amc - 11bo111
'lie UN 'CCfC:Ul'ille h1 ci~c~ 10 iotrc.Ui;ue tomary. 11.ovidcd "that lh& rttulu •CC!lun1· Thi1 i1 rhe c•ie •lien cho alrcnri af1tr:= ·.·.half . ,.,,;;.:, •··•
inm chc J'O"ibilims that tlie pl~nc had cd for uc facn one ""scarcely
. c~cn sup• · · 14 i1111nimcnc apr•-• .. ~•rh• 1u.:,••
-~ L, iht clou~i • , · .. · I n :) a1w
M _;1 b\'J ·.\..
.,,c approaco · ·•h ma.. ~c dunn~•
· "lie~ •I "\loin or npo1cJ 10 1.1hoc:i.:c.
· The
· JIDic a;iboca~c
· ·or 1h001ini; down · u p411ul>MI
I • ·• ·. the run-y licJ · ahw;I· and. •'"c ~ P.'·!lOI v•11.~ ~ cl•yl' .I•''
" '8".. ,·'·1'[ "- • CCitA•'Jere d ln;lt '- t I10 ~1r((a
• r1
"J'IU:•· ~ ~ ~ n\Ott .::ireful
·1 ..Luanunauon.
I l d · · · l11.1is
':lllln. f "'"'to"Y lO ntablil\H
.. d PQ!':-.
IC ·. . .
1..... • ·.
.. . allv'
ll'llUI 1be Jue .-01" of.•lit a"nroach
... " rr
. ....
• ·.
-~ - \;I
· 0 n : -r)'«t •l'J s-p.i.u1
.L •
m I It 11
a 1, , tlfll •
. :. , I"n11 rcpon he a1arct lM\ • , ..c p a.nc 1;i t1biluy o !hcsc two ~a~IJCI tuc ~w . """ · ·:~ . :' ; :· .. '·· ~·ha.a. l!ow~ef: ciu.-niya mi11ilt' for chc. ·... oqwir'-'l•3r 1h:i1 ic ii ·IOO low 111 b), .
.·: *" 1\m ~OWTI ~ espo~ to .,boQ\;e he howaftr, Ill my Opll\1911• bcc:om~ -rather . ..:: ·::: ~· ·,:. ,: ~!~J~_.Aparnch :11114 f\lll.;tay llrhd!I,.·~·, ·~ · l" C:} • n.1 I) ,L..
• .... L. _, .. I • • •..I' d """- .. 1' .. h 1..1'-~--· .. ·. i . D • • . -· ~ .. ' . .... •.PPfv;\C'1 II· "'~d a t;.1lllH\£
A ••

_ ~cl~"'~. · ....... n.c ~ll~r~.}~ ':"6..,~~.-,(</:_.·~·.":;~.:. ~ h~~.~"P~~t:ai~n~::~~Ji~J~'lli~J.~ hlt~ti\".1i•;; -~-~"hr. . ~j ·i:f _nq. _htir~ "~ !let. Ja.~J. , .. .
• . . " • J: . . .
O\I"' '"" 'IXl"1">11 .a 1 . JC"ll
16 - - • ~ . '· ... . _,__ ........ ' ·.· . I, . .. ··":, ..; ·····:.- :i•.·•.,· :-;;:.··'."-···,;_· '" .-":O'•. ·J:.·:1-~ .•7 .•..1.• :· :."':·::.:;;_~;;J:,(..,;i;- ,

." 1"'
 0
.. ;. .. :1 .. ~· \0
.,, .. :o
•' ~ ·:l . ..
• • ' , . 0
way, die nci.at cnJ of whicll ii lower dia ~iJ~J li,:rkdi1~n - or no di1CUuiOft ~t 1 ~
FIG,
chc fu 11~ i.#, the londing viii be made ' •.all\ -1:-·' 'llbt>u~ \11~ diffiC111t:C1 ind their
<4
1-1
b up•slope. \hini; the 11.l>Qve n1cn1ioncd .111~' .;·.~.:.tJk.,1 /1~ 'It mnn, no pilot believe$ 1lut 1-1
tiled the ain:ralt will then bci bro~ht ~ . •hbiwo\l!d -ever !!y into die ;round unJcr Ul
li>v duri11g ~1~ approa.ch, - ' ·· · ,'he' ' mn.iirimu. And 7,t - t11.11 j , .,.,Jut
R.11n..,ay1 ,..jd\ proportiOM:. bctwtcn . :~JPP~,n~;, · .
lcn~ and widu \ha• t.rr;..QQ' 11or111al .~ill : ~~bou, 20 ycan •go-the lnltnlllicnt tud• ~

. ~o co11f111e 1l1e pilot.. .:··-. ._i11g.S~t611u(lt.S) ""'' ~igMd, Tho syRCJI\

r
. . The glid.:-puh fo~ an •"S~.witll
hori1C011tal pl1ne. 7\ii• 11.11,lc ii '10tn1ally 3
'"° . ..L •~rounJ1 'tq11ipmtnt as 'Well as aircrtfc
, . ~liipmcllt•• ,.... hat btcr\ hnprciv~ c11tr
.. (~hl'tt) clc;rcu. MlrJ11d,111C11u u : u1oio , 1~1qe, ~ore •nd more NllWllY' •ro ~uipp·

. e .: .~~-· d . . tncna<>nsd abo•1 can ~ ..-id lo· br ·~uwd ·~4 ~i~h U.S, Pan -of .,he lt.S la a cll~pa1h
by a misplacing of tllo lmai;ioary. horizon. ,,Ji;\t\srnif'CJ'' on GtOUnd and a cUda•path
.
.~.<:~:/;t~D
Ju J1111ch aa tlic horl'lOll 11 mlspl~tcd ac ,1~vaf 1iai 1hc aircrafr. On an iutN111c~t

n~
,. . .,~.. '_ . '.·-'. ·!··..: :~~h~H\ die :&trcn(c clcyiatc ft01J1 ihc COi'*
.ccct ··glide>pa1b. Thi• ~M th•~· .u the
Ndol• ~c1de11i the borlz-o11 "tlU ~pla~~d
tbc ·p;!ot ~n ebc~k hi• poil~ion in ttlauo"
..10 1h~ i;llslc-}tarll. 'rhe lLS ,,., d41i.,.,..~d for
b~ wmhcr approachn but ii ii o ( ccurie
.·<:';~:. . · . :. ): . ;-... leas tlial\',' d"rccs, M 1he ~levatioii of the
:!; a«idcnt"me .... u a liul~:·~i@~ ~fl me
,11scit rdio. i11 fine w~thcr,
l~denq and urrow OH:O~• o( &W•
... : .:.:·::: nnway. .. ·· · · . · ,deng ·h.avc:Mt~~'cd odict doisn•. In•
_·,~~~::;· ··~ .
:"!": · ·· . The famier aYay ono:it:lr- die r11n•izy 11;iU11\iQR;~ viS11al Glido•patn indicauin
.·- ·

1-----
e .::::. t ;.:· th: mo,_ dlfflCllit i< Q:..\I>: jlld,c dic-corttet •t.hill.il>ccn ·i;oi11g Oii fOf dic la11 10 ycan.
.:;~~~·~>. glidc·~il1. 111c nrOt in =1icigl1\ c.t~ by. ;Thimi, i•··lll lii;ht orran, c:rncnc on bo1lt 1iJca
miJJll~cinio \!111 huri~;)l)·~~ft"-'ICI wj1h in• . of tlic r110111Ay en.!. Sec.ii fronL~n ;\pj~Ch•
. ··;:;;.·
~rca1in& .<lilcncwc from t'l<e:Nn~y· A one · !ini;·airc.r.:1(1 \hi• o~"QCl!lCl!1 llivca d1e pik>I
dq;fco fl1i1plaCC111c11t of tM ~orizo~ 11~iu . ;ml ti.,tutindicati~:~n he ia below •he
·::1cm dat\~ SO le.« emir in hQi1tl1t 1n o Ji&· l\\liJt-p:i.1l1, • , <:. '..'
12ncc uf ht\U " milr. - u in f~• .+, At· 9 i ;~1hcn;1inttt\ltinp, thao 1ytei:in1 Pfiority ii
I ~ 111il1:a J~1a11u - A• M NJ.ol~ - i~ 411ci111 • ;1( ~11ni:1\:i111m 111 l\lrponi wi11> lt~vy uAf·
•lS ic« crrw ill hci~11, · 1lic;•111d •to1d1c n111w1y11lt(J~t\y ln ·UMI, t'or
·n,c n1i~j11J~HIC11\ IO far Ji~uiJOd is Hll\ny )'\1'111 n> "°"IC 'l1~rc wlll lio 1' ~mt
•"'"l•Mtn, ~lnl)' c1ic li~ltu (0011in11 the '""• on ""'VC-:' 14liJe-p011h but i11 II ctll!lll luw Al• c:>.vwJ purc:ly by upti,a\ :\11111iun1, 1f tl1c n\1111hCf of t1111W~YJ whhOlll ;i11y ~lr1J of
W.lJ '~R be 1\'Tll. le it 1tlf!I (llau•ib1c U) ~·· tit¥dc as;., (), pilu1 i• ~11uc1 11"' inflllC1l~C of 1ecol~.i.1iDn ~lid•·p:,,11 lnclk ~ rl"'!. ·
•~IM 11',111 1!\c ain;r.-(1 i1 011 .,.'""' 111i,lc- ·:. 'l1u: nciiu111'1 of II••' •ircrAfl cNlr1i;n with fo r.:t:i - ;11 \I( h wlw11 ftllllt.lni: ;i tum ·- ;"111a 1•~oblch1 it, howevcr, 110101117:i1'11~1·
!'-''" ia ') ..nJ Cl.II> lilw in J). 111c ..-.1nclu· · ·. mlft)' ~;iriablca - upt.:i11ly rpccd ,;:nJ raut 1hc n1at1er bwimc• more hu1icQto, 01hcr ·.t cr of. i;cuin~ ~~!fer cquip.rnc111 ..h •ctu~lly
'"'" i1 aTTmJ 10 by imalri,.qi11i; \\le hon:toll . ef dl!ICGM - 111.J d11rin~ ~pPfonch the air· >ell!e• conic ir110 chc picniro ~nJ it may \)e 'h~ppens '. th;i1 pijci11 If.UH 1hcir own tlmlits
.\ml I'"' it"' tlw: "'n" pb~ .ll• iii .l) .:ln.1 b). . ,nkis 1<1bFc:c co ~re~• aui111dc clia"GC'• more ..orrc.:r 10 •~Y th;tr 1!io 'Pilo1 is sub- ·u1 n•rh a· ·dl."11.reC lhil they climr,Anl 11\irlc-
h j, l..tnJ of a KCU.IJ IUIUrC Wilh 1Mlill$ Ill /\I (.'\II all\I be M:CD ( t4'111 (i • '4 the ruU•
•J
j~tcJ Ill •~n~nry illusina11, ,,;,;h. inili~~1io111 - \lorh Hn'\ M•I vi$U.\\ -
im.ti;i11c •h.:tt tk h1•n1A11• ii 'WMll it .::m· W.l)' cnanollr. Aivc iliHcrc:rnt'pcnpcctivc:t l\ny :1ppro~'h 1h~t ;, m.1 Jc untlcr rli.c ~nc(m•!<cj11\c Af'1•n>~cll 1oa low,
''"' lNI .c..i.. 1 tltpcnolin1: ~n wl•i~h h.i""t i1 ·ii ~n from. ~-011Ji1ioni di11:usml here cousu :1ny pilc>C :111cre h 1101 m11eh lhcrMurc on rhc 1en•
'°
The .us111np1ion ~ 11'4 .alrcr,11h'• po•i· 111ia i1 a co11dilion 1l~t i• 'llml by niany diHicul1i~1. Gener.ally the 1ircraf1 is ;!!,); illu1il)l11 of pi!°'a. aAd wlm d1~re is
tion i11 n:btioll IO tho .111lilc-pa1h in c) and .pilou. They c;my in IJlinJ a pic11uc of lhc brought lower that1 daittd during 1t1fllC' has ~n ·p\lbli1hcd by flichc SafCI}' Fo11n•
J) IM)' be COrte(t, b111 le may aJIO be com• &:OnWllC the runway .JtoulJ form w}tM teen puc of 1hc approach. ~i(hcr 1lic pilot ·al duion Jnc•. ·New York. Tlln is !ht caic
ttlnd, "'t0ai;. lrOfll the ideal &lidc-pacl\. 1bc ...on1rol1 or the other pilot di1COvcr1 the · ·wirh a p~pot w1i11cn by cap1ai~ f, !>, Coe·
The •is.ta\ -itnprcuion of e) a1~y tcfcc 10 • Thar method -0£ j11d&rncnt !JIAY bu 11\e(~I .
coodicion, po•er it •pplicd,·11nd 1ho 11lr- . quylf dliof pih11 of SAGE.NA •irlloet. Cap•
craft i1 bro11cli! blck JO it•c c!c1i"d glide· ! : ;:iin ·eaeq11y(1 p~pc, 11 cntidcJ:.11'11c Seti· ··•
c) i,a,, l\ir aircnh ia 100 low aiid n t1yin& when approachin~ wcll·llno'VA r1111"ayt, i~ ·
iA ~ 1111\0 hi~h ;iui1uJc, a11J di; impi~Uin · other 1i11•:"ioo1 ii may be J~lf0\11. ., .
.. 11.uh, . .: . : ·: '· i ;.· .;: H.olrY; JlltniQll• of Pil~" •11d .~" p11bli1h~ . :
-7-hc 11ra11gc ~nin~ t,;, ~owevtt; .ma~ ~h,rc : ,;, in 1.~.5.t. ;k i~ .P~~blr. ~~1~!:, ·~ ·""°'' .CJ.~.···.·.'
.ivud11 dr m~ni'~P~«.!i~i. -
~ , - ~\• -
inh• cue wh91\ approadiilit:
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ftttiiVC 11/0rll. 1h::rc U OD th~ l11Uje::t. with an uiide by M. l!. S?.tulding Jt. in
:Since t~
time of t~ f\!pon of c:ipt1.~ Dv1incfl Commm:ial Av~tion, January
C.Xquyr a i;rnr number of accidents ~ 1959. R.:forring to dsht rcunt accicknu
to sen'°rr ilh11io111 ~ ...: O«Urrc.l. As pro· Jht •11•hOr pointed Out now "VitUa{ C11et
ll.ib!c ou;ie h.:as kca itidicucd pilot cf'l'or ~ Miskad Y(111H.
M pilo1 ·mi1judgment bui .:a41> H•lSOfJ' ill11• What c.n 'be done to avoid •cci;knts Jue
aiotis &11d tomc.:imcs wilh a tcfr:rcnc;c co to ~llu1io01~ - Airport equipment awl ait•
Q?ttin C<ic<J'IY''' p;ip~. cr;ifc irurrumcot:i.t!on it bdni; improv~.
.
Scn$Qry illllsioiu do llO'I: o~ ly
. .
cauu ~pp• Din in 1951 taptain ~cquyt ~tioncd
otlicr itcmsa · .
ro.u;h ~i.Unu, but ;i!ao ulu-oft.accidcnu• .
And, in how M&ny &ee.i.lm11 hav~ JCAIOI")' "A mo1t comprche1uive s!U(fy of ..!ii dif·
illwioru been & <<intn'buliol\U)' l:ac1or1 lcrt11l phenomena. of illuJtOl\ll ~ theif
COllu.qller.ut•" - "lrf'hm\ •lll iJ1~' ltUQ)' \Jt
"Th~ i.aet th3r :i'ciden11 oecur duet-o WI• . .111.0Cj
~y illusions iJ dianuWnc. Not m"'n to 10 ·-· "'Take dfective W.pt nt ~h fli;ht pe...
autt.oritin or airline opi:r:awn ai 10 pllou fimnc_l_t...-ato of.~ da11~r of nlusiew11." -
wM-1 :a ~Meiencc, Wa~in~ 10 fellow pl· w~n Jaow ll!MY pilots hav~ teen c:apuin
l11u h.wc bun prodiiad.1'hi1 wu d·.c C011C Co~11rr~ inpct1 -
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SUSJEC1': Jnf.:>rmation Co,'1ce1:1iiJlg 'the .Accidental D\;!a th of .·. , ;!?!!

Dag HA:\J~1ARSKJOLD .~ ~­
~~-·~~i~~(:~.~~1~:~~~:·~~ ;).~~· !\ '
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L Tl<O f\les a.re kept on Dag HANMARSXJOLD at ClA: one ; _;:
by C~S, t.h e other a 201 d oss ier in ~he DDO.• Neither o~ ~h-~se ;.;: :.~::~~:
pro v ides 3. CIA analysis of nor imp.lies any unusual · act;l.Y.ltles .. .. ~;.~
surrounding his d~ath: . .. · ·; . ,.· ...., ... .'.>:).:,'-'.§1
- - . ·~ : . . .. . .. . . - .... - ·:,: ·_~:~~:,,· :
2. The CRS file con sists primarily of neHspa.per clippings • ·:; .,~~f
State traffic, and biographi c al assessments. from various s o urce:;- •. -7i;,
Th.ere is only one docu.lllent dealing with his death ( a ttached CIA · .._- ~-..~~
telegra;o.) It is simply a summa ry of ·the UN c omrais$io n 's repor't _. -.- .: ::..;
that the death was prob abl y d ue_ to pilot e r rot' (i.e . ,. ina ttenti:op; > - ~:~•.
to the ·alti.'!1eter.) . · · ! . >'~'.'~
. . • ,;·· . ~ ·.,,,:~·~
. .. . . . ·.· : ... ...~, '

3. Th~ 201 do ssi e r a lso con t.a:ins biog raphical data and a~ .:. ... :;:_?.';.\
s e:ssraen ts. The primary cont en-~s of the £old er a re copies of .. ·. . :.;,' ;~.,:;
v a rio us FBI docurr.~n'ts of a routine nature; . INS .decumcnts_ gTant ... :· :..,;;'.-' t.:;:
.i.ng admissio n to the US , dest:;riptions of the identities and itin-: 'c· : ";· ~,
e raries of various delegati'.~ms visitin g Mr. Ha~wa1·skjolJ . and CIA '.::.-.
reporti n~ about is ~;>\es raised at the UN. ·· · .· - .·. ' · ., ....,...,-
? . "'\.'" · '.'·~ .

. . .. . . . :- .. "~~t.·.~;:\_~~~
Although they do not ne~essari1.y deal dir·e c.tly with his ·:.· ) J
4.
death, the ZOl dossier does c o ntain a few . in.teresting docu111ertt s . .. .. ~'.."
They include• .. ·'· . . .. .;.. , .i ,f.!
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Che ck which st<..tes that- ~··. -: :.-~~ ~. -~-1~:~~ !:~

here is no positive d'-;uo-gator.r
Hammarskjold. ~ ~ . .
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The booklet· Ndo'J.a Accident by Bengt-Ake Bcnos· •:';":i~\1~
.. .. . ~'1~~\;'.~~-~
· w«i~h alludes to irregulnrit1es: surrounding ~he death. bbi · d~~ I
:r.~t in'fQlvc the CIA i n any, way .f.c;opy at~ach·e~.J. _ . ... :_ :::·.\,.·~::~2~~~~~

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 . -·-·-- -- - - - - -- - -- - - - -
Approved for Release : 2016/07/05 C00395104

CURRF.NT IN'l'ELLIGBNC~ WEEKLY SUMMARY

4 August 1960

PART I
0

OF IMMEDIA'l'E INTEREST
------·----- --
REPUBLIC OF THE ~ONGO

Belgium, in agreeing to the Lumumba government . Belgian

withdraw its forces in Katanga . officials have declared that UN
Province to one base t here, ap- e ntry does not e ntail the im-
pears to be moving s.l owly_to- mediate evacuation of Belgian
ward a total mi l it ary evacuation troops from Kamina. In Brussels,
of the Congo. Brussels' crit.i - the Congo crisis has led to clis -
ci sm of UN Secretary General c ussions amone; gove rnment lead-
Hammarskjold's announcement that ers of a possible cabinet re-
UN troops will enter Katanga on shuffle . Social Christian and
6 August and its characteriza- Liberal coalition partners, al-
tion of the Katanga question as though agreeing to share ro-
an "internal" .matter subject to sponsi bi li ty for the Congo de-
discussion runong the Congolese bacie, have urged the repJace-
appear designed to support Katan- ment of Congo Ministers de
~.!\. Premier Tshombl! without com- Schrijver and ~gheyven.
mitting Belgium to his defense.
Meanwhile, the major effort
'l's·homb{i, in his convcrsr.- being made · by Ghana's Nkrumah
tions with UN Under Secretary and Guinea's Sekou !l'ourll to in-
Dr. Bunche, may seek UN support fluence ~remicr Lum\Uoba and
for a compro~ise in which Katanga other. members of the Congolese
would rejoin the Congo in return . Gove1·nment may presae;e an early
for . ~ reorganization of the Con- announcement of s ome form of
go into a federation of semi- association ainong the three
autonornous pl·ovinces. ThP. UN states.
will rlmost certainly attempt
to awoi~ becoming further in- Guinean political repres ent-
volved a~ mediator of an inter- atives, brought into Leopold-
nal Congo , dispute, however, and ville under military cover, havo
will probably seek morely to b_e en obs erved along with Soviet
dissuade Tshombe from forcibly r·epresentatives denouncing the
opposing the entry of UN troops. UN to Congolese officials. The
Tshomb6'H angry opposition to Guinoans- - who appear to be wo1·k-
tho UN occupation may force a ing clo8ely with the Russians
delay in the entry; he probably in Loopoldvillo- - reportedly ~lso
has no more than 500 trained have urged the Lumumba regime to
non-Bele;ian troops at his dis- take strong measures a gainst
posal, however, and would be domestlc opponents and against
unable to offe r effective re- Beleians . At . least some Congo-
sistance to the UN forces, which l e se officials arc concerned ·
now number _ovor 11,000 mon. ~bout Guinean activities in tho
Congo, as evidenced by Foreigu
Brussels appears determined Minister Bomboko' s suggc·stion to
to retain its two Conf~o bases-- nn American Embassy officer on
Krunina in Katanga and ICi tona in ?. August that efforts be made
Leopoldville Pl'Ovince--until such to bring in advisers from the
time as it can negotiate te1·111s Federation of Mali ns a counte1·-
fOl' !l complo1;e withdrawal with weight to the Guineans.

PART ~ OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 7

AI;Pl' O\'CU i v•" 1.;:;. l u<1 i.h l

• • • • • l l i l • • • • • - - - - s Approved for Release: 2016107105- c'c)o3ss104_ _ _ _ _ _ _.-'l"lii

l ~--.........ii·-..-..........-._.
'c0o395104 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00395104

CUHREN'l' IN'i'ELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUAfMAlW

4 August 1960

c~ - CENTRAl AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

LJ ..
I
\..1 ... . . . , . .• . •

. ........
L' ' ··· ..

.• staule yville UGANDA

~ Coquilh:itville

CONGO REPUBLIC I
Dukovu ·: RUANOA
. • · URUNOJ
THE CONGO
Brazz.J.ville®
®Leopoldville
CU\NDA
.... Luluaburq TANGANYIKA
( 0 t• •" •: · · ,•

Ka mina.

ANGOLA 'I
Elisab othvillel

4 AUGUS T 1960
0 MI LE , 2 00 FEDERATION O F RI IODESIA
'"'-- ··'----""
UNCll\SSlflED AND NYl\SAlAND
31294

Lurnmnba 1 s departure from UN delegat~ after conferring

New York on 2 August apparently with the Congolese premier, met
frustrated Soviet plans to request with the UN Scc1·etariat 1·ega1·d-
a Security Council me e ting on ing tho need fol' a Sec\lrity
the issue of Belgian withdrawal Council ses sion. · ~'ASS a1111ouuc ed
from Katanga. 'l'he 'fASS chief on 2 August that 20 Soviet medi-
at the UN told correspondents cal workers, including experience<
on l August that the USSR would doctors and s urgeons, would leave
ask for a i:nooting while Lumuruba for the Congo in a few dn.ys--pl'e-
was in Now York, and a Soviet smnably the medical aid p~· oniiscd
on 3i July. ·

' OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 7

PART I
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00395104 -
 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00395104

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU~MARY

4 August 1960

1-loscow ha s s teppecl up its compliccs' of trying to strangle

efforts to discredit the UN role the Congolese Republic ec.onomical-
in the Congo, and Soviet .offi- ly and smother its .indepe ndence
cials in Leopoldville and in the by armed force. A TASS report
UN arc actively encouraging of Lumumba's 28 July Washington
Congolese authorities in their .press conference noted his re-
demands for totitl Belgian with-- marks concerning a possible
drawal, Soviet moves appear appeal for US military aid , and
aimed at stimulating hostility referred to "provocative" ques·-
among the Congolese toward UN tions from US reporters regarding
efforta and at dividing the a request for Soviet help--ap-
Afro-Asian staten from West~rn parently to play down the s ub .
members of the organization. j e ct of unilateral intervention
by the USSR.
Mos co w propaganda has been
!specially critical of Hammar- Moscow announced on l Au-
;kjold, charging that he is guat the appointment of M. K.
;upporting the NATO colonial Yakolev, former foreign minister
?Owers 'by his "more than con- of the Russian Republic (RSFSR),
~il ia tory position" and aggra- as ambassador to the Con~o. A.
vating the sit~ation with his Fomin, who arrived in Leopold-
" demagoguery. rt Dr. Bunche has ville with a small party of of-
been accused of "directly par-- ficials on 21 July aboard a So~et
ticipating" in Belgian attempts food plane, has been named charg~
to hring about an economic cl'affaires.
: risis "in the Cougo in order to
di~credi t the J.umumba government, UN Technical Assistance
and UN troops. have been charged
with acting as a shield to cover Hammarskjold is formulating
Western military aggression. plans for UN technical assistance
to the Congo. Implelllentation. de-
Moscow continues to stress pends on the UN's success in se-
the USSR's support for the Congo- curing its recognit;ion as the
lese Govet•nme'n t and its readi- controllin~ channel for assist-
ness to "take resolute measures ance from various F,overnments
to rebuff the aggressors"--re -- and private groups and in per-
iterated in a Soviet statement suading the Lumumba govern-
of 31 July--but there is no in- ment to make its requests for
dication i~ rec~nt statements aicl to the UN. Hamm~.rskjold is
that dispatch of Soviet forces reliably said to be firmly op-
is contemplated, Citing the p'osed to ' . "freewheeling" on
NATO conn ti•ies as a group, the the part of any group, including
Soviet statement ~lso accused the UN specialized agencies.
the "agg1•cssors and their 1.;ac- (SECfiE'1' NOFORN) .

· ·· Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C00395104t.,,,_

"'""·- ·~- · - ·
C00897919
~ Approved for Rele~897919
(b)(3)

~-----

5 AUGUST 1961 CHECKLIST (COPY)

2. CONGO. UN OFFICIALS IN THE CoNGO HAVE AGAIHH STATED THAT

THE UN WILL ROT OPPOSE ANY MOVES BY THE CENTRAL GOVERRJIENT TO REDiTE-

r-GRATE KATANG:A , I (b)(1 )

(b)(3)

L- MEA1f11HILE, IR
- - -- ---,
STARLKYVILLE, GIZENGA IS llAIHTAIHIRG •IS PUBLI<; SILENCE ~ (b)(1)

_____________(r3)
NR

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C00897919 (b )(3)

NR

(b)(3

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C00898012
. ..
• , I ' I •

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:

THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

18 SEPTEMBER 1961
~

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LATE ITEM

The UN has declared Hammarskold's plane missing, and an

e x tensive air search with US participation is n ow underway . An
unconfirmed broadcast from Rhodesia reports that the wreckage
~~r~e~~1ne has been sighted neal ' the Congo-Northern Rhodesia
(b)(3)

For The President Onl y ~

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l. Katan~a situation a) There is no firm word -on the ·

whereaboµts : of .Jlammarskjold. Be (b)(3)
flew out of Leopoldville yesterday ,.
but did not arrive in Northern
Rhodesia for a meeting with Tshomb~,
as alleged in press reports. Our
Embassy in Leopoldv ille believes
that his plane was lost near Kdolo
(Rhodesia), possibly shot down by
the lone Katangan jet.
b) As of this morning, UN units in
Elisabethville and Kamina were still
under severe pressure fr.om .Katangan
forces. ;
c) in Jadotville , the impromptu
cease-fire reported · yesterday now
appears to have broken down; the
UN relief column has still not
succeeded in pushing through.

2. Berlin developments a) No concrete new measures of sig-

nificance on the part of the Communists
have been reported . The bloc is now
focussing its propaganda on the W.~ st

_I German jets incident. (b)(3)

b) The East Germans have asked for
temporary custody bt the two pilots,
and Soviet planes were noted recon-
noitering Tegel airfield where the
west German planes are located .
6 ) Yesterday's East German local
elec tions appear to have eo~_o1_f~~~~
in routine fashi on . (b)(1)

For The Preside nt Onl y-~

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3. Soviet nuclear tests There may have been another test

today at the Arctic testing · ground.
(b )(3)
The thh tc Jat;A test in the current
series occu~a in the same area
on Saturday,! (b )(1)
I !There was another
one y~:at..e.r.da~alatinsk
area,
I ~-------~
I A
~-n-
a ~y
-s~S-0
(b )( 1)
the 1 , 13, and 16 September tests
in the Arctic indicate that· the
devices may have been delivered by
medium-or short-range surface-to-
allistic missiles .
(b )( 1)
..I 4. Assessment of Canadian The chief features of the recent
foreign affairs debate debate in the Bouse of Commons, as
seen by our Embassy in Otta~a were:
a) the government firmly supported (b)(3)
the Western position on Berlin and
identified Berl!~ as an instance
of the world~wide· confrontation ·
between Soviet aggressive tendencies
and the fr.ee world;
b) the government called for firmness
of pur.pose an.d recognized the pos-
sibility· of ~•ar while urging
negoti~ti'o·ns for an honorable
settlement; ·
c) the'.gov·ernment announced new
defense measures;
d) the Liberal Party opposition
endorsed the government's position
on Berlin and NATO;
e) the government and the Liberals
vigorously castigated the USSR for its
resumption of nuclear testing, while
mildly criticizing the US for lack of
consultation in our decision to
proceed with te.s ting. (b)(1)

Fer The Preside nt Only~

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1'0TES

(b )(1)

B. Turkish security officials have imposed a ban on any public

d i scussion of the trials just GOncluded. There have been
no serious incidents stemming f~CJLtion"l of Mender es
(and his two former associates) l_ _J (b)(3)
l
J c. The Iraqi military action against dissident Kurds during the
past week was apparently fairly successful and has probably
diminished the threat of a major insurrection. I J (b )(3)
I
J D. Afghan Fo~eign Minister Naim is reportedly consideri~g a
Washington trip following his visit t os OW··· now underway.
(b )(3)
E. Both Moscow and
second US test.
r esumption has been (b )(3)

For The President Only ~

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C008980 1 2 _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ (b)(1)
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(b )(3)

..___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ A~~rove d for Release: 2016/07/05 C00898012

 - ---·-··..,. -=~·~ ·-·

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- -r:-- - .. -• -- --
~ 1··.,- :' ...
.. - .
1_'. '
• I
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 C020t)0190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02000190
TO~RET ~

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
:elliize.n:::ln this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARN ING
This <;locument contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
a n unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United Sta te.s or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United Sta tes.
(b)(3)

,,..,,ti•·:a. •
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C.02000 1 90 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02000190
(b)(3)
~SE~ I
B February 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BU.L LETIN

CONTENTS

(b )( 1)
1. Laos: [
(b )( 1)
I (b)(3)
2. Congo: Kasavubu opposes enlarging the mandate of the
UN forces in the Congo. ( Pq,ge t)

3. India: New Delhi. has reportedly.purchased1 ltwin- (b)( 1)

engine IL-14 transport aircraft from USSR~)

4. Turkey: Soviet ambassador arns government (b )( 1)

leaders ·t hat Soviet-American re a ons are improving
rapidly and Turkey may soon be "outside .th,e club." JPage H)

5. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin

(?ituahon. (Page t t t)

(b )(3)

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..
I

c -- H
• 0

I N A CHINA

"

I:

,.

T H A ILA N D

LAOS
R T(IJMUAR"' l96 l

• li•1\·~rni1w 11t fun·es

(b)(3)
G O\'t!1'111tl.'1 11

Antii.:rl\'e rnm enl

• Kn11i: L<! ' PathCI La" !or ros

' 7, Main route number

- - -- Road
- -- - T r ail

A. Chl nusc N.i..1t i:rnalis1 Crn~.: ulars

c A 8 0 D I A
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Js 56 /~ 160 K
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- '-'J-• --/ ._,. ... ,.., i • r•..J,
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(b)(3)

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. - -~- - - - - - - ---~ -- - · --
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 February 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Laos: I

Hanoi on 7Tebruary broadcast a reGent interview with

Kong Le in which he expressed his thanks for aid from "the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries." This is the sec-
ond recent pul:>lic reference to Soviet assistance for pro-
Communist forces in Laos. On 2 February, Chen Yi, Com-
munist China's foreign minister, commented that Soviet
"support" was a "righteous action." Chen Yi's remark may

I:
have been intended to justify his own offer of Chinese Com-
munist support~ - "if Uie lawful government of Laos headed
:onvanna Phonma" asks for it. I
. ion~o: £Yresident Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bom-
boko ave expressed strong opposition to any plan which ~ A
-----~ would enlarge the mandate of the UN force in .t he .Congo. - / .... ~
They reportedly believe that such a move would infringe
on the Congo's sovereignty and feel that a UN attempt to
neutralize the Congolese Army would interfere with .t heir
planned operation against Kivu Province, which Bomboko
stated was imminent, At the UN, Soviet delegate Zor.!!!J

. i

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. - - - - ---'[ ·reiterated Moscow's position that elimination of Belgian in-

uence and the ·r elease of Lumumba were prerequisites for
a solution of the situation in the ·Congo. He opposed a neu-
tralization of the troops supporting Lumumba until these
--:c~- conditlons had been fulfilled:l Stepped-up political and mil-
itary activity in Leopoldviife" is coinciding·with indications
that Katanga may take a more· strongly separatist line under
the influence of Tshombe's new French miJltary adviser, who
stat~d on 4 Fe ru that he believed. a unified Con o state is
unrealizable.
(Backup, Pag·~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _
e --..-. _J

lr.idia-VSSR: Wew Delhi's determination to build up its

airlift capability in the Himalayan frontier regions appar-
entlv h~ led Indian officials to arrange fo s f
J JI · L- 14 C a; e trans orts. (b )( 1)
- -1 c'.£( bf(3)
These twin-engine piston transports wil~appa;ently
supplement th~ -119 "Flying Boxcars" and · N~ 12
. (Cub) turboprop . transports purchased last year rom the (b)(1)
Un~ted States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the
AN ... 12s, whlch. are sched,uled to arrive i n India before April,
the IL-.l4s are probably being purchased at bargai1,.__..u...u..;,,c,::i.___~ (b )(3)
and for ru ees rather than hard foreign currency.
_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _____J(b)(3)
USSR-Turkey: rAs part of Moscow's effo.rt to induce the
Turkish GovernmeiW-to adopt a friendlier policy. toward .the
· USSR, the Soviet ambassador has been, !warning Turk-
ish ·leaders that Soviet-American relations are improvlng very
rapidly to a point where agreement might be reached which
~------' would leave Turkey "outside the club." The ambassador also de-
livered a note on 3 February ~quiring if reports in the lo~

8 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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·., l»ress that NATO ffiBM bases ~re being constructed in Tur-
,, key are correct, The ·n ote reaffirmed .t he USSR 's desire for
\"good nei~hborly relations" and warned against any steps
CJ that might draw Tu~key 'nto "dangerous ventures." Soviet
Wplomats employed s.imilar ·tactics following. Khrushchev's
~lslt to the US in 1959, accusing smaller NATO countries,
lncluqing Greece and Turkey, of being out of step with .the
f~new trend" in East~West relations: }
i. !llirkish ·Foreign Minister ·sarper has described Premier
P\lrEJel as "furious" ~t the Soviet ambassador's action but he
~l!JO expressed some apprehension over the possible reaction
. ~o the latest f°tt'At.....Jra~ hv the "more naive" officials in the
governmenQ[
'(Backup, Pag:.:::e:--4:11)~-------._ _ _ __ __ __ __J

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE

ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the .following conclusions reached

by its Speci~l Berlin Subcommittee which .reviewed the situa-
tion for the period 17 January 1961 through .6 February 1961.

1. . We are currently in an interim period during which

.the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment ot the new ·us
administration ~d the pos~ibilities of negotiating with the
West on major issues. Therefore, for the next few months
the USSR is unUkely to increase tensions over Berlin. How-
ever, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period
esthnat~ that additional pressure would be ·calculated to bring
.the West more quickly to high... level negotiations with .the USSR,
they m.aY .increase the threat ot unilateral action in an e:(fort to
expedite.talks. ·
2. The East German control practices on the Berlin in-
tersector boundary have not softened to the extent that.West

8 Feb 61 DAILY. BRIEF 111

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Germany had. been led to expect as part of the price for rein-
f;Jtituting ·the Inte.r zonal Trade agreements. However, the
.West German Economic Ministry is "still not unhopeful" that
· action will occur soon in accord with earlier assurances.
3. There. are indications that East Germany has begun
.on some of the necessacy long-range moves in an effort to
ma,ke its economy independent of Western imports and thereby
deprive the West of this le_yera~i!Lfuture negotiations over
Betlln. (b)(3

8 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv

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'-" ....,
.
Tbe Situation in the Congo l I (b)(3)
fr.r~sident Kasavubu anb J:i'o'te1gn Minister Bomooko, m
a conversation with the American charg~ in Leopoldville on
·aFebruary, expressed the belief that events are moving in
their favor in the political and military fields and that a
neutralization of the Congolese Army would reverse this trend.
They also reportedly feel that the UN wou.ld use any addition-
al powers to the disadvantage of their government and might
eventually impose a trusteeship over the Congo. The charg~
comments that Kasavubu is unlikely to consent to such a pro-
gram so Jong as he feels time is on his side-j
-
/A._ccording to Bomboko, an attempt by the UN to bring the
Congolese Army under its control would thwart the Leopold-
ville government's plans to mount a military operation against
Ki.vu Province within ten days. Bomboko and Kasavubu ap-
parently believe that their chances for regaining ·control of
eastern Congo are fairly good as a result of disaffection among
Gizenga's troops. At the same time, Kasavubu stated that
Congolese officials were attempting to form a "provisional"
government which could be installed immediate~7
·-
l~mmarskjold has scoffed at Western concern for Kasa-
:vubu s position, stating that the Congolese President "has no
prestige." He continues to believe that a military solution to
the Congolese situation is impossible, and he reportedly feels
~hat Mobutu and Bomboko are too closely tied to Belgium to
have any future in the Congo. Hammarskjold feels that if they
are removed, Ka.savubu can be persuaded to form a constitu-
tional government.)
_,..

(inriet UN representative Zarin told Ambassador Stevenson

on 6 February that the UN would not be able to deal with troops
which are subject to colonial dominatfon--presumably a refer-
ence to Mobutu's and Tshomb~'s forces--in the same manner
as those which support the "legitimate government." He ques-
ti-Oned ·whether the latter would lay down their arms until Lu-
mumba·· is released and parliament is reconvened, Zarin also
reiterated the Soviet charge that Hammarskjold has failed to
carry out ~revious Security Council mandates:;'
{~.Colonel Roger Trinquier, the French officer who report-
edly .ts to become the chief of Tshomb~'s Katanga armed forces,
...... _

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Cia.id a press conference on 4 February that a unified Congo
state is unrealizabl~. Pressure from Trinquier, whom previ-
ous reports had linked with separatist members of Tshomb~'s
government, may weaken Tshomb~'s willingness to maintain
his present tenuous contacts with Leopoldville and make it
even more difficult to bring Katamra into a federa.te.eLCon
stat~ (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

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India_'.'. ;,.rch;&se~ &lvlet IL-14 Transports [ ' ,; (b)(3)1

~jections by Indian military leaders to th n:=e-:p=u=r=c"l:-

h= as=e~o..,...
f _ _____
__J

Soviet equipment appear to have been overruled recently by

econo~ic facto;rs, especially the gradually worsening foreign
exchange position, coupled with New Delhi's desire to dem-
onstrate .its cordial relations with Moscow as a hedge against
Peiping in the ..Sino-Indian border dispute, These same fac-
tors, plus the desire for a high-altitude capability, led New
Delhi to seek MI-4 (Hound) helicopters from the Soviet Union
in late 1960. The failure of the demonstrator on its first
pr.oving fllgllts in the Ladakh area. has apparently stalled fur-
ther negotiations for helicopteiij

fihe reported purchase of IL-14.s reflects also the Defense

· Mintsfry's desire to relieve the mounting pressure on its fleet
of aging C-47 (Dakota) transports, which have borne the brunt
of New Delhi's logistic support of road-building crews and mili-
tary for~es in the sensitive and remote Indo-Tibetan frontier
region] _
{ipe IL-14 is capable of operating at a·l titudes some 7,000-
8, 000 feet higher and carries about 2, 000 pounds more cargo than
the C-47. The USSR has substantial numbers of IL-14s in
civil air. service, but they are expected to be largely replaced
by the newer , higher performance TU-124 and AN-24. Nearly
100 otthese aircraft have been. furnished by the bloc to non-
bloc countries. The purchase of IL-14s wi ll provide New Delhi
with, a stopgap aircraft until it decides on a more suitable C-47
replacement to be manufactured. in India. The cabinet is now
considering proto es desi ned b Lockheed and AVRO, a
British fi:_m.} (b)(3)
(b)(1)

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S{>viet Attitude Toward Turkey (b )(3 )

lince the overthrow of the n eres regime last May,

the USSR has maintained a cautious but friendly attitude to-
ward the Gursel government and sought to encourage the
Turkish. leaders to adopt a more independent foreign policy.
Khru,,hchev invited General Gursel to make the trip to Mos-
cow which had been scheduled for last July by his predeces- ·
. sor but Gursel refused. While expressing disappointment
: that the ·new regime was not going to return to Ataturk's policy
of neutrality but was planning to remain in NA TO and CENTO,
Khrushchev indicated there was no reason why Soviet-Turkish
relations could not be gradually improve2)

~viet officials on a number of occasions have offered

Turkey economic aid, including credits of up to $500,000,000.
In a talk with Turkish Foreign Minister &trper in New York
last October, Khrushchev reiterated offers of Soviet assistance
and asserted that Turkey's membership in Western alliances
is not a major obstacle to better relations. He suggested that
the two countries establish a demilitarized zone along their
common frontier by withdrawing their forces "several hundred
kilometers," and observed that the Black Sea could be turned
into a "sea of peace. " Shortly thereafter, the Soviet ambassa-
dor in Ankar~ told a key Turkish government figure that the
USSR .is willing to demonstrate. its good will toward Turkey by
reducing its Black ·Sea Fleet and naval installations in the
area and by guaranteeing to respect the present Soviet-Turkish
bordei}

Gome members of the ruling military Committee of Na-

tional Unity reportedly favor accepting economic aid from, and
improving relations with, the Soviet bloc, but such action would
run counter to popular feeling in Turkey. Both Gursel and
Sarper are co~mitted to maintenance of Turkev's drn~e t.iP.i:i j
(b)( 3)
with the We~ ---------------~·
I
. L-

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.. ~ '"''"'... ,...,...,.~ r
~HE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of state
The Under Secretary of state
The Deputy Under Secretary of state for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense .
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of staif
The Director, The Joint Staif
Chief of staff, United states Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United states Navy
Chief of Staff, United states Air Force
Commandant, United states Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint staif
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of staff, Inte lligence, Department of the Air Force
b'upreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Dep~rtment of Justice
The Attorney General
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
. The Director
National Security Age ncy
The Direc tor
National Indications Cente r
The Director

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.· ... ·....-1-..,. ~ _..__..... p • , r •. , .

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C0200-0199
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,.
TOP"1iECRET
- ~

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary conce.rn is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with ari asterisk.
I Intelligencl in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-ls:now basis.

WARNIN.G
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

TOP SE6RFT

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.............
---······~~~

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'WJt' ~ . ._:_ _ _ _ __ _ __,
r

20 February 1961

CENTRAL IN.TELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Congo: Situation of Gizenga regime. remains chaotic;

Nkrum3.h calls Casablanca .Conference countries to
Accra to study .Con o uestion and ossibility of Afri-
can high command. (Page t)

2. Laos:. King's speech reaffirms Laotian neutrality and

sets stage for invitation to unonal.i gned neighbors" to
form neutral nations commission. (Page t)

3.

4.

5.

6.

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. ·CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ·BULLETIN

20 February 1961

DAILY BRIEF

· Congo:. The situation of the Gizenga regime in Stanleyvill (b)(31

continues to be chaotlc. ..Press sources hint that Chief of
/8-taff Lundula mav be about to negotiate with Mobutu. r--- -- L
(b)(1 )
(b)(3)
I
~
~
Ir

. .
*Laos: King Savang's speech on 19 February reaffirmed Lao-
tian neutrality and Galled for an end .to foreign intervention. The
~ng expressed the hope that C;;tmbodia, Burma, and Malaya woul
form a com.mission to come to Laos and ·"establish that the country.____ _
threatens no one and aspires solely to peace. " Although lt 'is too .
early for ·reports of International reaction to have been received,
the Pathet Lao radio, in an anticipatory denunciation of the ne~tral

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natlons commission proposal, on 1.8 February termed it

merely another US device to avoid reconvening the 19·54 (b)( )
Geneva Conference or holding Cambodia ce._Sibi:tnOllk!i 3
_ _ __ _ _ p
~ ro~p~o~s~e~d:...:1~4~-~n~a~tl~o~n~c~o:!!n~
f e~
re~n~c~e~~~~L__ _ __ _ _ ____, - - (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

20 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF il

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

20 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii

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Situation in the Congo :

The internal situation in the Congo continues to pre- (b )( 1)

occupy other African governments • .Ghana President
Nkrumah's ro osed an-African com and
!obtai1,-n...,,i_n_g _,,l..,..ts_ e_n-=
d-o_r s_e___ _. (b )( 1)
~...,....,........,.__,........,.'i'i7i'cwp>TOe'e"'ar
i'ii'TyU"t"n---..aiYnwu;-;;ar;:;;Tiy;--;a;;itfithe C as ablane a con-
ference of chiefs of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco,
and the UAR. Ceylon and Libya were represented by ob- ·
servers at Casablanca. .The five so-called Casablanca powers (b)(3)
have all recognized the Gizenga regime and, except for Ghana,
have withdrawn their troops from the UN Comm din the
Congo~ (b )( 1)

~IL ::::===-===========~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-----r
(b){1)

Meanwhile, Moscow is continuing to a-yoid direct criti-

cism or comment on US policy on the Congo question--an ap-
parent attempt to cushion the impact on US-Soviet relations ·
of the USSR's extreme demands for a Congo solution. Soviet
propaganda treatment of both the President's press confer-
ence statement on the Congo and Ambassador Stevenson's
speech at the UN acknowledges that the US and Soviet posi-
tions are sharply opposed. Moscow refrains, however, from

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implicating. the US by name in its attacks against Belgium,

Hammarskjold, and the Congolese leaders. Implied crit-
.icisms of the US are conveyed only in references to Belgium's
NATO al,es and hv some n:uota.t.ioru:..trom foreign press (b )(3)
sources. -
_J .
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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(b )(1)
(b)(3)

- - - - --

(b)(3)

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. J __,____

Unrest May Be Spreading in Portuguese Africa

Portugal's East African province of Mozambique is not

now experiencing unrest similar to that in Angola, but nation-
alist-inspired disorders occurred last summer in the north-
ern part of the province, bordering on Tanganyil\a. Tribes~
men reportedly attacked Portuguese administrative posts and
staged large demonstrations in several areas . While most of
the tribesmen .were armed with their traditional weapo s . _ _ ____,
some of them may have been.carrying modern firearms (b)(1)

The Mozambique government has been particularly con~

cerned over the inflammatory effect of foreign radiobroad~
casts. Radio Peiping announced last October that it was sched-
uling seven hours of Portqguese=language broadcasts per week
to Africa and described the Portuguese provinces as "the dark-
est areas" of Africa. Furthermore, there is fear that thous~
ands of Africans returni~g from work in the Rhodesias and
South Africa might spark extremi~t n~tionalist movements .
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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-
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)
I
I
I
I
I
I
J

(b)(3)

20 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN P age 5

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(b )(3)
Racial Disorders Threaten Northern Rhodesia

CTbe breaku.p of the conference on 19 February was

brought about by the inability of the British, Africans, and
Rhodesian whites to reconcile their differences over the
terms of the new constitution for Northern Rhodesia. Afri-
can leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, president of the United
National Independence party, and Harry Nkumbula, leader
of the rival African National Congress, have demanded that
Britain give the Africans a majority of the seats in both the
Legislative and Executive Councils. There are over 2,000,-
000 Africans as compared with some 75,000 Europeans in the
country, but the Africans have only nine members out of 30
on the Legislatiye Council and two of 10 on the Executive
Councif}

tw.hite settlers, on the other hand, have strenuously op-

posed any such increase of African influence. Prime Minis-
ter Welensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
has stated .that Southern . Rhodesia~~ a self~ governing colony
under settler control~- might secede from the federation if
Britain granted the Africans' demanct:9
(b)(1)

LAI !fra nchise is envisaged for Southern Rho~ (b)(1 )

desia, where it has received support from moderate Afri~av

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~ationalist groups. However, the nationalists are better or-

ga,nized and more extremist in the protectorate of Northern
Rhodesia, where native leaders ar~ greatly influenced by the
recent political advances of African giroups in Nyasala.I!_<!)
(b)(1)
(b )(3)

20 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7

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(b )(3)

Hanoi Expands Subversive Appa.ratus in South Vietnam

The~ast h~
(b )(1)
Diem could be overthrown in J·961- -has also been made by
high-ranking North Vietnamese officials. I I (b )( 1 )

Ifeel that the presidential electionsI The Communists evidently

scheduled for April will .
(b)(1)

provide excellent opportunities for stepped- up political and

paramilitary action.

The Communist strategy for the moment is apparently

to emphasize propaganda activities, inspire popular demon-
strations, and promote small-scale violence, but to avoid
tests of strength with South Vietnamese regular military
units. Si11ce the end of December, Communist-initiated
clashes have.generally been confin~d to small-scale hit-and-
run terrorist attacks, harassment of village offices and secu-
rity posts, kidnapings, and murders. "Tax" collections from
the peasants du.r ing the current rice harvest are helping to fi-
nance much of the Communist program.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

~L----------~ (b)(3)

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• THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Execu t ive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Coope ration Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Novy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Ope rations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army ·
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commande r in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The J oint Staff
The Dire ctor for Intelligence, The Jo int Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligence, Department of Army
The Dire ctor of Naval Intel I igence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intell igence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
the Federal Bureau of Investigat ion
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Di rector
The United States Informat ion Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

CONFIDENTIAL_

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. -

• I . ,· • I I - .

..
.,. ., ·- ·. __ ...,.

I - ·...·. .
C02001976
i .

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
L elligencJ n this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b )(3)

-,I OP SECRET

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'-' ~ '-'
5 April 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

2. Congo: Relations still tense between Tshombe's farces

and UN in Elisabethville. (Page u)

4. USSR ~India: Soviet. presidium member Suslov to.attend

Indian Communist party congress. (Page ttt)
5. Ceylon ~ Communist China: Annual rice~ rubber barter
agreement renewed. (Page ttt)

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(b)(1)
(b )(3)

,,
II -
-
'
~

..

5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 April 1961

,-~~~~~~~~~~~.l!!!LJ_L_.J__D.RJ,_.__._~~~~~~~~~~~~~----'

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C0200 1 976
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I
.i
. .. . ,...
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.
;

Scatters .,fo rce

MOBUTU
3,.400

t Coqullhatvllle • Boende
ETHIOPIA
200

Scattered Forces

KiIona

INOONESIA
300

,~ ~ ­

® Approximate area nominally controlled by: J

t:-,·
";''

Luanda D Kasavubu-Mobutu
D Gize nga
D Kalonji
D Tshombii
~ United Nations Forces
- - Selected road
::;;.;;: Selected railroa d
--r- Selected ai rfield

0 STATU T E MILE$ 400 '· ....

6 10405 2 (b)(3)
(b)(3)
~

5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

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 Cong_o: ·An agreement to return to the status quo at
Ellsabethvllle airport, with Katangan troops and a ~wedish
UN contingent exercising joint control, apparently has (JI I<
papered over the immediate cause of the 3 April confronta- d,J.;..;t:;_j 17> :i.-
tion between UN and Katangan forces. The i.n cldent seems (..'j- ~../' 7P ~
to have .b een set off by the Katangans, who attempted to o-1- -t... ~
block the airport runway and were apprehended and disarmed tJ -o.. '
by the Swedes. TshomW's regime remains apprehensive that <¥- A~ ·3 1
the UN will attempt to airlift Indian troops into southern Ka- II 1 :f
tanga from Kamina. This distrust has been communicated --t.. ().. ~
to the civilian population and the armed forces, and civilian
demonstrations against the UN occurred on 4 April.
fin a discussion in New York with··American and British
offiCrals, Hammarskjold indicated that he is hopeful rela-
tions between the UN and the Leopoldville regime will im-
~---~ prove. He remains adamant, however, that UN military
units must be readmitted to the port of Matadi in the near
future. He disclosed that in an effort to meet Congolese ob-
jections, his representative in Leopoldvllle was being in-
----~ structed to suggest that the force in the port might be lim-
ited to 100 Nigerian police for the time being. He said he
was asking for an early answer and stated that if no favor-
able reply were receiv~ed he would bring the question be-
fore the Security Council.
Soviet presidium mber Brezhnev told the Swiss
ambassador recently that the USSR has little interest or
hopes in the Congo but is going to use the issue as a means
of obtaining its objectives concerning the UN Secretariat,
including the removal of Secretary Gereral Hammarskjold.
~Backup, Page 3)
L-.
(~
M~a-
p~) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J

5 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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USSR-India: ~· A. Suslov, member of the .Soviet party

presidium and ·secretariat in charge of lia.ison with .f oreign
Communist par.ties, is reportedly scheduled to atte~d the
Indian Communist party's sixth congress which opens on 7
April. The decision to send Suslov, who has played a cen-
tral role in the Sino-Soviet d1spute and particularly in the
drafting of the resolution at .the November 1960 conference
~---__,of Communist parties, is probably related to the deepening
split between those elements of the Indian party oriented to-
ward Mos·cow and the group wnich generally follows the Pei-
ping line. Suslov may also be bringing new instructions· to
- - - - - - 'the Indian party, reflecting the Soviet Union's concern that
India's foreign policy has been shifting toward the West in
the past few months. Soviet Ambassador to India Benediktov
r ·e cently commented to Indian Foreign Secretary Dutt on the
growing rapport between the Indian and US governments and
bluntly inquired if this renresented a change in India's policy
toward the USSB.l I
I I
Ceylon - Communist China: Colombo and Peiping on 4
April signed the annual protocol to their second five-year
rice-rubber barter agreement (1958- 62). The 1961 proto-
col calls for a rE;lturn to the higher level of trade which ob-
tained from 1953 through 1959. The resumption of previous
trade levels stems more from Ceylonese economic necessity
than from the neutralist Ceylonese Government's policy of
increasing the bloc's small share of the island's trade. Last
year Colombo eventually had to buy considerably more rice
from China than the reduced amount specified in the annual
contract. The Chinese rice commitment to Ceylon- ~ set at
200,000 tons for 1961 ~ ~ is to be met by re~ exports of the
rice Peiping is purchasing from Burma./
I I ~~~~~~~~__J

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(b)(3)
~------------------'

Situation in Laos

A Soviet broadcast in Vietnamese on 4 April contended

that convening of the conference should not be made condi-
tional on a prior cease-fire verified by·the ICC as proposed
by the British. Moscow ·radio also acknowledged that an
early truce in Laos would help create a favorable atmosphere
for negotiations. The broadcast, however, repeated the po-
sition taken in the Soviet note of 1 April that a cease- fire
should be concluded by the Laotian "parties" themselves. The
broadcast also urged that a "coalition government represent-
ative of a united Laotian peopleu be·formed prior to the in-
ternational conferenc~ but "with the help of the member coun-
tries of that conference."
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

~I
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Sltuation in the Congo (b)(3)

fi'he tension in Elisabethville is un e y o er er

Tshomb~'s reported plans to move on Ka.halo in the northern
part of Katanga althou h the· operation may be delayed some-
what.
' - ----=------:-:-'
w i e and African units have been airlifted to Kon- (b )( 1)
golo, north of Kabala, and a move southward is imminent.
l{ammarskjold stated on 3 April that in his opinion, the pres-
ence of Indian troops at Kamina had brought Tshomb~'s offen-
sive to a halt and a resumption of the operation was unlikely.
However, the commanders in northern Katanga are likely to
base their estimate of UN military effectiveness on the re-
fusal of the Nigerian troops at Manono to intervene in the bat-
tle there. The operation thus may be undertaken despite the
enlarged UN force in Ka.tang~
~mmarskjold said_he believed that the Congolese in Leo-
poldville were becoming apprehensive of Tshomb~'s ambitions
and are happy to see the UN exerting pressure on Katanga. The
24-hour time limit set by Hammarskjold for a reply from Leo-
poldville probably is a bargaining position and subject to modi-
fication. Hammarskjold does feel, however, tha~ ;a prompt
. settlement~f the Matadi dispute is a prerequisite for an im..:
n .. n ..omont in relations between the UN and Leopoldvi110'7 [
.-- - - - (b)(3)
/ I =1 -
(b)(3)

(b )(1)
(b)(3)

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(b )( 1)
(b)(3

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(b )(3)

. USSR. Reportedly Will [ end llC Top Leader to IDdian"

Party Congress ·

{§_uslov, ·a leading Soviet ideologist, led delegations to the

French Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1959 and to
the Italian Communist party congresses. in 1956 and 1960.
He also visited Great Britain as a guest of the British Par-
liament in 1947, toured the Brussels World Fair in 1958,
and revisited England "informally" at the invitation of the
British Labor party to promote Anglo-Soviet relations . His
prospective trip to India, the first he has made to an Asian
country, points up the seriousness with which the Soviet
leaders view the inroads Chinese concepts have made in a
party in which USSR .h as long had the predominant influenc.51
(b )( 1)
there will be no Chinese delegates at (b )( 1)
t:nepartycongress. he Chinese had apparently intended to
have the delegation to the just concluded World Peace Coun-
cil meeting in New Delhi. remain in India to represent them
at the congress. The Indian Government- -apparently de~
liberately discriminating against Peiping--reportedly turned
down the delegation's requests for visa extensions while ap-
proving visas for other foreign delegates. Nehru's govern-
ment, while highly critical of any foreign influence in Indian
political affair s, may hope that the Soviet Communist party,
in contrast to the Chinese party, will exer cise a moderating
influence on the Indian partl:}
[Ihe last Indian Communist party congress was held in
April 1958 at Amritsar , where the par ty formally adopted a
"peaceful, parliamentary approach to power." Chronic fac-
tionalism among the Indian Communist leaders soon led to a
renewed struggle over party policy, and the dissension was
accentuated by the recent Sino-Soviet ideological dispute . A
series of ·executive meetings in February failed to br eak the
deadlock between the moderate and extremist groups . Lead-
ers of the various factions are preparing for a showdown fight
at the national congress in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, but
the final outcome is more likely to take the form of a com-
promise designed to 'hold the party together for the elections!
-
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~rly next year. Suslov's presence will increase the pressure

on rival leaders to compromise their differencei!J

lfu.recent months, Indian policies on the Congo, on the

reorganization of the UN Secretariat, and on J.,aos have re-
_a.LU.U::.LL.JL.LLjCL_Uletetloratlon_o.Lindo- Soviet relations. (b )( 1)
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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Colombo and Peiping Sign 1961 Rice-Rubber Contract

The first five-year barter agreement was negotiated in

late 1952. The conservative, pro-Western United National
party government then in office was motivated solely by eco-
nomic factors : at that time rice was difficult to obtain and
world rubber prices were low.

Colombo has continued the exchange during the past eight

years because the arrangem·ent has provided a reliable source
of nearly half the: island's annual rice Jmport requirements and
a steady market for one of its three exports . . Since 1953 all
the annual contracts except last year's have involved a minimum
exchange of about 200,000 tons of rice for 30,000 tons of Cey-
lon's rubber.

Negotiation of the yearly contract takes place alternately

in Colombo and Peiping and normally is a routine process, al-
though there occasionally have been protracted dispute.a over
prices ~ The lengthy discussions on the 1960 contract marked
the only occasion when the talks have taken a somewhat polit-
ical turn; a few officials in the conservative caretaker regime
in power in Ceylon at that t~me hoped to reduce the island's
dependence on the pact, as well aa to free for sale at better
prices some of the rubber committed to Chin~ at fixed prices.

ports. (b )(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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..._; '-"
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assi stant for Notional Security Affairs
The Scientific Advi ser to the President
The Director of the Budge t
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretory of State
The Director, Internationa l Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State fo r Politi cal Affairs
The Deputy Unde r Secretary of State for Administration
The Counse lor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intellige nce and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretory of De fense
The Secretory of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Se cretary of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chie f of Nava l Operations, United States No vy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U. S . Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commande r in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The J o int Staff
The Director for Inte lligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligence, Departme nt of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Na vy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intellige nce , Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General'
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commi ssion
The Chairman
The National Secu rity Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

CONF lfJENTIA 1

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co:2-0{)1976'l'//////~~~"CC{C{{.{({o,{{{.{o(oC{~
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Approved for Rel ease: 2016/07/05 C02001976
 ·- .__.___.. ___________.___ -- -

A pproved for Release: 2016/ 07/05 C02026612

C02026612 A. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02026612
. TOP SE~REI _. _.... :

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

·~.....
~................lm!ll. . . . . . . . . . . . .~-::!'~OZ?P~s:c~G~R~F~T~-iiiiil...~m
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·r··
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21 February

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

4. Iran-Iraq: Dispute over Shatt-al-·Arab River approaches

to Abadan refinery has again broken out. (Page it)

5. USSR: · Gromyko says Khrushchev will not attend UN

Gene.ral Assembly session resuming 7 March. (Page tit)

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21 February 1961

DAILY BRIEF

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A V'A ~·L___ __ __ _ _ __ __ _ ,

Iran-Iraci: The long-smoldering dispute between Iraq and (/} ,e:-

Iran over navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab River, which

21 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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•,

controls the approaches to the oil refinery of Abadan, has

again broken out. Iranian insistence on 17 February that hence-
·forth its personnel, rather than Iraqi pilots, handle tankers
calling at the refinery has halted tanker traffic, Heretofore,
only Iraqi pilots have worked on the run to Abaqan. As many
as two dozen tankers, chartered by the consortium of Western
oil companies .which operates· Iran's oil industry, are probably
already involved. Meanwhile a shortage of storage space has
forced the Abadan refinery to cut back production irom the nor-
mal 350,000 barrels a day to less than a third of this figure on
20 February. Output probably will be cut further-.-perhaps to
50,000 barrels a day--in an effort to avert a complete shutdown,
which would fUrthe..r.....weaken Iran's already strained economy,
I !Page 7) (Map) .

fussR: Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Finnish for-

eign ~r recently that neither he nor Khrushchev will
attend the UN General Assembly session, which resumes on
7 March. He stated, however, that Khrushc hev was still will-
ing to come to the US for talks with the President. Gromyko's fL-0
remarks suggest that Khrushchev has reversed his decision
since First Deputy Premier Kosygin's assertion to the West
German ambassador in early February that Khrushchev would

CJattend the UN meeting. The Soviet premier probably recog-

nizes that his decision to exploit Lumumba's death to the max-
imum and renew his attacks on Hammarskjold will make a s harp
US-Soviet clash unavoidable, and that his personal participa-
tion in such a debate would undermine the prospects of a meet-
[ g with the President during the ~ sesslon:r \ J

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Situation in the Congo

The conciliation commission is subordinate to Ham-

marskjold's Congo advisory committee, and its members
are nominally divorced from the policies of their govern-
ments. On it are represented those African and Asian
nations which have had troops in the Congo-- with the ex-
ception <;>f Guinea, Mali,. Indonesia, and the UAR, which
refused to participate because the commission refused to
recommend outright the reinstatement of Lumumba's
"legitimate government." As a rest4t of the absence of
these neutralist states, the commission has definite mod-
erate and pro-Western leanings.

Since its recomm,endations use the Ileo government as

a starting point for re-establishing a national regime, the
report is likely to be pleasing to Kasavubu. However,
Tshomt>e, who is now almost completely isolaJ:ed inte~­
nationally and who is currently pushing a military cam-
paign to consolidate his position, will probably be unwill-
ing to accept it; in .fact, recent reports indicate that
Tshombe and his entourage are unlikely to accept any
·reconciliation proposals in .their presep.t mood.

The reaction of the Gizenga regime wUl probably depend

on the dissidents' estimate of their ability to resist continued
economic, political, and military pressure from a broadly
based Leopoldville government. Although Gizenga's position
apparently i~ weakening, he has little to hope for ~n a rap-
·prochement with Kasavubu and would be reluctant to accept (b)(3)

L icanUnfluence T
a political solution imposed by the UN q.nless assured of sig-
the .L eopoldville government. ~j-----~
(b)(3)

(b )( 1)

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

~l-_ _ _ __ _ _ _ .
(b)(3)

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... . ··- --< ,

·: ! {;
~ _.
..... \ ' · ··~"
.,.,,
, ALONG THE
~ I ATT AL ARAB •
'.>.,.···
...'
~

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->n 11.:K'ly .:JI 1937

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(b)(3)

21 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

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The S'natt-al-Arab Question

Between the Persian Gulf and a point a few miles north

of Khorramshahr the Iranian-Iraqi_frontier runs along the
low-water mark on the Iranian shore of the Shatt-al-Arab ex-
cept for two short stretches opposite the major Iranian ports
of Khorramshahr and Abadan, where it follows the thalweg
--the middle of the river--so as to leave these two ports in
Iranian waters. Sea-going vessels bound for these Iranian
ports thus have to pass through Iraqi waters. Navigation
on the river is governed by the Iranian-Iraqi treaty of 4 July
1937.

For several years Iran has periodically agitated for a

commission to negotiate changes in the 1937. treaty and has
threatened to take unilateral action if Iraq refuses to co-oper-
ate. This treaty recognizes mo st of the Shatt as Iraqi terri-
torial waters. Tehran has complained that the treaty was
inva~id ·· because it was signed under British pressure. De-
spite this view, Iran was willing to leave control of the Shatt
to Iraq as long as the Basra Port Authority was, for practical
purposes, under British control.

An important change in the Iranian position took place

following the July 1958 coup in Iraq whicb brought Qasim to
power. Viewing the Qasim regime as .basically unfriendly
and wary of the presence of Soviet technicians in Basra,
Iran began to demand a greater voice in control of the Shatt,
including adoption of the thalweg principle along the entire
length of the river. Since 1958 there has been a series of
incidents between the two cruntries. Iran's present insistence
on use of its pilots· is its most ambitious effort thus far to
pressure Iraq to begin negotiating. However, fully a third
of Iran's ·oil production of more tban 1,000,000 barrels a .
day is refined at Aba.d an, and with an already shaky economy
~ent c ould i II afford m re than a token shutdown.
(b)(3)

(b )( 1)

CON/i'ID£VTIAL

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-
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,._...
. . THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to t he President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, Natrona! Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, Notional Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
Th!3 Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State 'for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Di rector of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defe nse
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Se cretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Nava l Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Eu rope
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Di rector, The Joint St~ff
The Director for Inte lligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The qirector of Naval Intelligence , Department of Navy
The Assistant Chi ef of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
lhe Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The Nati onal Security ,Aeency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indicati ons Center
The Director

CONfilDENTJA L.

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. ..
·- •1.==---; ~. ·~-- ~ - -- ., ' I ~--- - - ~- - ~~-- r---r-.
..... ~

"
I •
• I • I,
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C"020Z6615 .-Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02026615
! • ,.., T~ ~
!·

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
I I . (b )(3)
I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionag·e
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
forei _n b.e.J:if.triment oLthe United Stat. =-- - - - - -- - ---,
(b)(3)

TOP SEGREL

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3 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Congo:· I !concerned over the

explosive atmosphere developing between the UN com-
mand and Congolese for ces. (Page t )

2. France-Algeria: Bourguiba reportedly convinced ·

Abbas should respond to De Gaulle's overtures; some
rebel leaders still distrustful of negotiations with
France. (Page tt)
· ~";,i\\i
-~::t.1
(b)(1)

.;~.'G.l
; ·~
" '
4. Laos. (Pags tt)

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altered fortes

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(b)(3)
~·
(b)(3)
f-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*1ongo: Ambassador Timberlake ls extremely concerned ( ' k

overt e explosive atmosphere developing between the UN com-.·- . x3~
mand and Congolese forces. He says the UN command seems ..._,_... L.!f:u
increasingly likely to use a display of force which he fears would fl-L
complicate rather than solve the problem and could spell dis- .;J.,.L:.__.4..t ..-~
aster for the UN effort in the Congo. Press reports that Ham-"///,;z ;, ;
marskjold has asked UN special representative Dayal to remail.{"~ &
for "some months," if confirmed, will exacerbate the situation,i -t.L~
in view of the alrea~y ac_ute antipathy between Da al and the ·c ,,.:±,
ConP.9lese government. ;) -i...tl • .~ z,i , b (3)
(.aelglum's ·announcement that lt will withdraw its troops I )J..t ,j ~,,.;.,~,•..o
from the Kamina and Kitona bases by 15 March and "invite" /- ;/> .
Belgian mercenaries to return home will probably be regarded /" 3
by pro-Gizenga states in the UN as only token acceptance by
~---~ Belgium of demands that all Belgian military personnel and ad-
visers be removed from the Congo. Hammarskjold has indicated
he hoped the Belgian announcement would meet Indian conditions
for fUrnishing more troops to the UN Command. The Belgian
----~ action will not necessarily influence the numerous Belgian ad-
visers to Tshomb~ in Katanga, or the nearly 1,000 non-Belgian
Euro eans re ortedl servin in Tshomb~'s arm hl

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France-Algeria: lTunisian President Bourguiba now seems

convinced that D~ Ga~e has dee ided all aspects of colonialism
must dis.;:i.ppear from .Algeria, even to the point of full independ-
ence. Bourguiba reportedly went from .Paris to Rabat deter-
mined to induce rebel premier Ferhat Abbas to respond to De
Gaullets overtures. Bourguiba is presumably aware that some
rebel ieaders are distrustful of negotiations with France. ~
.Previous reports have raised the question whether all rebel
military commanders would comply with orders to end the
fighting, should such orders be given by the provisional Algerian
government in the course of negotiations with De Gaulle. The 1
March joint communiqu~ issued by Abbas, Bourguiba, and King
Hassan of Morocco declaring that the way is now open to direct
negotiations for :Algerian independenc·e in a North African frame-
work suggests that Tunisia and Morocco desire to have some role
.in French-rebel negotiation8;j
[ ~Backup, Page 3.--..-- - - -- - - - - -- --'

'
*Laos: @ouvanna Phouma, who returned to ~hnom Penh on ~ (b)~3 )
1 March after a week in northern .Laos, is reported to have reac (b 3)
a decision with his supporters in Pathet Lao - held territory tha
a 14-power conference is the only means to a peaceful solution ·°2__

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Ghe Laotian crisis.

,--- - -- l __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __j General Phouml, meanwhile,

1
says he still hopes to confer with Souvanna, but is proceeding
with separate plans to .revamp the Boun Oum government re-
gardless of Souvanna's attitude toward accepting a post\
lSouvanna is reported to have found the Kong Le - Pathet
Lao troops "extremely well organized," with high morale, and
actively recruiting new personnel. The Plaine des Jarres area
held by these troops ls said to have been completely brought
under the Communist way of life; Communist slogans,--- and -left-
- - - --
ist outh roups are prominent t,h oughout the area.

REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Probable Communist Reactions ~o Certain US Courses

of Action With Respect to Laos. U.S. I. B. SNIE 58-61.21 ·
·February 1961. 0036778. (TOP SECRET)

Prospects for Iran : Stability of the Shah's .Regime, the Role

of the Mllitary, the Economy, and Foreign Policy Toward US
and USSR. U.S. I. B. NIE 34-61. 28 February 1961. -(SECRET)

Comparison of Capital Investment in the US and the USSR,

1950-59. Bibliography, graphs, tables. 0. R.R. CIA/RR ER
61-7. 57pp. February 1961. (UNCLASSIFIED) ·

3 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ill

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(b)(3)

Situation in the Congo

.~----.,.-----0----_j~elieves that Hammarskjold (b )( 1)
and his staff have been so conditioned by Dayal's reporting
that they might consider any incident to be the ''final st a . ._
" _ __
Iond. fpp] tbot the I me for a display of force. (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

Although Congolese soldiers lack tne wn1 to ngm eacu ou1er--

as illustrated by the recent Luluabourg inctdent--they would
probably fight UN troops, especially in the present atmosphere
of Congolese suspicion and distrust of the UN. Kasavubu's
speech of 27 February "mobilizing" the country against UN
"tutelage" and calling for volunteers has, according to a Brus-
sels broadcast of 2 March, already produced over 12,000 .' re-
servists and volunteers--probably more than the Leopoldv,ille
government can arm. I Jfeels that· UN (b )(1)
troops would win any actual battle with cong01e e forces--but
that Congolese troops elsewhere would retaliate against Euro-
p~ans and isolated UN personnel. (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

(b)(3)

(b )( 1)

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'-61 TO~ '-------'

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De-Gaulle - Boorguiba-Ta.!Ks-
J (b)(3)

(9ne of De Gaulle's major objectives in inviting Bourguiba

to visit Paris was to convince the Tunisian President of his
w~llingness to negotiate a settlement of the Algerian war and
to have this impression conveyed to the leaders of the provi-
sional Algerian government. De Gaulle probably hoped thereby
to strengthen the moderate wing of the rebel movement and en-
courage steps toward negotiations on terms acceptable to France.
De Gaulle has in the past indicated that he will insist on guaran-
tees for the Europeans in Algeria and for certain French eco-
nomic interests and military base rightSJ

Uollowing his Paris conversation with De Gaulle, Bour-

guiba told Ambassador Averill Harriman in Rabat he believed
there was no longer any real difficulty on the French side. He
said De Gaulle understood the necessity of preventing a recur-
rence of the stalemate last June when preliminary talks failed
to settle .even matters of protocol. Bourguiba is optimistic
that De Gaulle will free rebel leader Ben Bella and give sym-
pathetic consideration to the release of political prisoners de-
tained by the French in Algeria;J

G.n an ·effort to move the rebels to negotiations, Bourguiba

has broadcast to the Algerians in Tunisia stressing his convic-
tion of the. genuineness of De Gaulle's intentions. Bourguiba
apparently has in mind, however, that negotiations could fail
because of the inability of the moderate leaders to control all
factions of the rebel movement. Some 15,0QO to 20,000 rebel
fighters operate in Algeria with only a minimum of coordina-
tion and control by the rebel government in Tunis. If these
forces object to a moderate. settlement and continue military
and terrorist activities,.De Gaulle might halt political negotia-
tions:) ·

[In another report on the Bourguiba - De Gaulle conversation,

Habib Bourguiba, Jr. , recently nominated as Tunisian ambas-
sador to the US, said that De Gaulle "silenced" French Premier
Debre, whose statements had nearly prevented the Bourguiba -
De Gaulle meeting. Debre, while on a visit to the Sahara, said
in a public statement that France intended to remain there:J

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[According to Bourguiba, Jr. , Debra also made difficulties dur-

ing Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Masmoudl 's (b )( 1)
earlier tr. · _the BourI?uiba - De Gaul (b)(3)
meeting".

(b )(1)
(b)(3)

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(b )(3)

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'-"'
THE PRESIDENT """'
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politi cal Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Polley Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defensti (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint StaH
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel I igence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of lnvesti"gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director .
The National Indications Center
The Director

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for Release: 201 6/07/05 C02026615 / / / / / // / / / / / / / //

~ ,_, IU~ ~ . . ~

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~ . . ~
~ ~
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----· - ......
.••
. ,
.I ~I
.• I ••
~
I"" -
. .
C02'415912 Approved fo;:Release: 2016/07/05 C02415912
I V r 4::11 £..'-'--ns..a.__
•

..
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
.
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with -
r
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
IntelliP-ence this publication is based on all sources, including ..
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
-.
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
..
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
..
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage •
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
-
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
-
(b)(3)

-...
-
-
-..
..... -........ ---.--. ...--
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415912
-
C02'4 15 912

4 April 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)

2. Congo: TshomM's position in Ma.nono apparently

not yet secure. (Page t t)

3. France-Portupl: Maneuvering against US on UN

Cuban issue. L
C02if 15912 Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C0241 5912 •
-..
·,,""' ·-....
..
~ ·~ ..
...,. -.............

'

\:] .·. .'<"' ,.;, '' ·-·,J' \ ...

PHO N G SAL Y
..
{
~fH~ •o;oo: •oPho

\ ./'""-•..,/ "
/ .
L U ANG
0
r) Som Neuo e
.... _,,,
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- ] .: -· . '.. \....( SAM NEU A

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I!

SAYABOURY f.
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e/
M
...._. .../.
:---'x t ENG
's .
/.
\.·""'·'U·\
K H OUANG
e Bon Bon
,
\
..
-
; '1 u OnJil OU.
;· ~(
Pl,ou K ho~n • ..:.>. e Xicng Kho•,ong"
·, Muorw Ka n y ,.,.,. '\/'. Bon Ta Via ng
r
. .
\!./.1
../~.,,..
•
\
.
•
e Tho Thor
r.._. _..J...-...r·\;;;""...........\
•"11 ·. .
I

'
-
-
[ V I ENTI A N E
_/ : • rj
/ r ~· Kam Keut ·

j! \..__ /
j
• •
1/. lok Soo
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KHAMMOUANE

-
:
NORTHERN LAOS

~·~~~'~:·~ ;~THET LAO t F~~~~::;

·1. •

-
KONG LE - PATH ET LAO AREAS

ROAD
•
I -
-
0 50 JOO ... L•I
TRAIL L..............._._...._...._...._.._.._.......,
STATUIE MILES
ROUTE NUM BER , . - - - - - -- -- -,
610404 (b )(3)
•(b)(3)

•
[ :.~ -]
4 Apr 61 CENTR AT TN"T'C' T T Tl"'!C' ...T,., ~ T"OTTT 'T ..,.TIN
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415912 Map Page -
C0 2 41 5912
'A~
oved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241 591 2
T Tl~~~~~~~~~~__J
)(3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 April 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Laos: Vientiane has adopted an official position of "no

comment" pending study of the Soviet reply to the British
proposal; privately, however, General Phoumi and Premier
Boun C>.im are taking a gloomy line over prospects, stress-
ing . the weak military situation. A country team appraisal
of the military situation in Laos underscores the defensive
psychology of the Laotian Army which is enabling the aggres-
sive enemy forces to fight at a tempo of their own choosing,
and to build up strength for attack on any point. According
to this appraisal, General Phoumi appears increasingly to
feel that the Laotian Army alone will be unable to control
the military situation and is increasingly anxious for outside
help.
Major elements of the government force which withdrew
from Tha Thom have reached Borikhane, and some control
over them has been established. Other government units in the
area have been ordered farther north to make contact with the enemv
in an effort to stabilize the situation. I

,
TOP--sEbR.EI &~~-~)(3)
~· ·'· · ;r

~--~~~;;~•.APP.E9Y.~~J9f..~~!-~-~-~-~- ; _?._01 ~I0?.!9.?..99.?.~1__5~-~ ~.,{~~ff;j~!,~tf~ ·1,~¥%~~~~

C02"415912 Approved fo r Release: 2016/07/05 C02415912 ..
..
-..
I
l t ¥emen a

'--· .. -
MOB UTU
800 .
Basoko

-t'- Coquilhatville • Boende ETHIOPIA

-
ETHIOPIA
200 Ike la _-
~
1,500
GIZENGA
--r.....___..
7.000
-r- -
+ B ukavu
Kindu r - - - - .
NIGERIA
~sumbura
-
.; ~. ' •' I I '
Scattered Forces

r--.--~ncqui Kl\LONJI
l,500
500

-
Ki Iona
GHANAl
1600
~

-
IN DO NES IA
NIGERIA

•Manono
900

-
-
300

® Approximate area nominally controlled by:

Lu an d ~ D Kasavubu·Mobutu
D G1zenga
D Kalonji
D Tshombe
-
-
[][] United Nations Forces
- - Se lected road
"tz Selected railroad
Selected airfield

610404 2
0 S 'rATUTE M !LE'li •oo

-
( b)(3)

(b)(3)

-
4 Apr 61 Map Page •
C02 'il5912

(b )(3)

Congo: Tshomb~'s position in Manono apparently is not

yet secure, although the reinforcements sent there on 1 April
will make a Baluba counterattack difficult. Baluba snipers
reportedly are infiltrating the Ka.tanga army lines and are
inflicting casualties on Tshombe's white mercenaries. The
mercenaries, who seem to be the only reliable and aggres-
sive elements of Tshom~'s forces, apparently are becom-
ing increasingly nervous. Further operations by Tshombe
will also be hampered by the 1, 700-man Indjan UN contineent
L -
which is being flown to netrby Kamina.
J (Map)
l
c _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ .
(b )(3)

(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

4 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

(b )(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415912

C02"4 1 59 1 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241591 2 (b)(3)

~~ --
..
.. Laos

.. The apparently growing number of North Vietnamese in-

volved on the enemy side is particu~rly discoul_"aging to General
.. Phouml, according to American officials in Vientiane. Amer-
ican military personnel formerly stationed at Tha Thom de-
scribe the actions taken by the enemy forces during the six
.. weeks preceding the town's capture on 31 March as "profes-
sional" and not of a type that could be executed by the average

.. Pathet Lao. Three Soviet IL-14s on apparent air-drop mis-

sions in the Tha Thom area were seen by reliable observers .
on 31 March, and additional drops in the same general vicinity
reportedly occurred on 30 March. So sudden and furious was
• the enemy action at Tha Thom that it appears that all the gov-
ernment's crew-served weapons, including two 105-mm. how-
itzers, were captured intact.
(b)(1)

-..
- Senior American officials in Vientiane believe that the
leadership of both the Laotian Army and government is "ter-
.. ribly uncertain" and vulnerable to factors and forces over
which the leaders feel they have little control. One such fac-

- tor is the enemy's military potential, which General Phoumi

feels is greater than his own at this time. A second crucial
factor is US political, economic, and military support; if this

- appears to weaken or waver, a further loss of confidence can

be expected, and with rapidity.

- In his recent discussions with Admiral Felt, Phoumi re-

vealed that he has a standing agreement with South Vietnam
for a Vietnamese division to enter southern Laos as an inter-
- vention force in case he asks for assistance. He stated that
he has not yet called for entry of this division since the__situa-
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

.. tion does not warrant intervention .

I (b)(3)

- CE?JTRA T. "C'rT'IN Page 1

- 4 Apr 61 T?J'l'l<!T .T .Tf'!1i'Ml""1" 'DTTT T
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241591 2
C02~ 1 5912
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T ET
(b)(3)

.. (b )( 1)

.. Soviet propaganda has underscored Moscow's contention

(b)(3)

- that the way ls now .open for a peaceful solution in Laos. Presi-
dent Kennedy's remarks on the 1 April Soviet reply to the Brit-

- ish proposals on Laos have been widely circulated. Moscow

radio carried the text of the President's statement and reported
that it ls carried in full in the 3 April issue of Pravda. Soviet

- broadcasts have also reported· an article in the Peiping People's

Daily of 1 April which called for an enlarged Geneva conference
as the "only way" to solve the Laotian problem. Moscow, in
- broadcasting the remarks made by Chen Yi in Djakarta, omitted
any reference to his threat to send Chinese troops to Laos. The

- Soviet broadcast quoted Chen Yi as saying that Peiping "will not

remain indifferent in the event SEATO launches direct military
intervention in Laos."
.. Terming the Soviet reply to the British note "practical and

-
correct," Hanoi's official newspaper Nhan Dan on 3 April called
for prompt convocation of an international conference. The
conference also was endorsed by Pathet Lao leader Prince Sou-

- phannouvong and by the Xieng Khouang "government." Souphannou-

vong, in a 1 April statement, and Souvanna Phouma's Xieng
Khouang "representative'' Qulnim Pholsena, in a statement of 2
April, both demanded withdrawal of "US, Thal, South Vieblamese,
and Kuomintang military personnel." The emphasis on this with-

- drawal suggests it is a point which may be used to prolong any

cease-fire negotiations such as the USSR s d
tween the "interested partle s of Laos."
ld be held be.._,,.=-~
(b)(3)
_ __j---- (b )(1)

-
-
-
-
-
-
- TO~ I __ (b)(3)

4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTE LLIGENr.F. 'RITT .T .li!'T'Tll.l; Page 2

- Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C02415912
C02~ 1 59 1 2
- . i"!c (b)(3)

-
-
.. Situation in the Congo

Tshomb~'s white mercenaries from South Africa reported-

. ly are annoyed by the Belgians in command of the African units

at Manono. The Belgian officers apparently are taking credit
for the capture of the town, although their .A frican troops re-
.. portedly refused to fight and the brunt of the fighting was borne
by the white legionnaires . (b)(3)

..
.
I __ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ,

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

..

-
..
.. In Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, who apparently expects to
be named the next foreign minister as a result of the 26 March
elections, reportedly believes that Brussels has been helping
.. Katanga too extensively and that more effort should be expended
in support of the Leopoldville regime. The Belgian caretaker
government reportedly agreed on 24 March to make available
.. to Leopoldville $4,000,000, but the actual turnover of the funds
is likely to be delayed.

In New Delhi yesterday, Nehru took note of the "campaign

against Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal" and made public his opposition
.. to the replacement of Dayal now "or in the near future." He
said removal of Dayal "would also have some effect on the main-
taining of our forces" in the Congo. Dayal, the Indian diplomat
- who has served as Hammarskjold's personal representative in

.. (b)(3}

- 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTET.T.TGENr.F. RTTT .T.F.TIN Page 3

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~ I-
(b)(3)
- - - - -- - - - - - -----'
..
.. the Congo, is now in New York for consultations and is not ex-
pected to return to the Congo for several weeks. Dayal alienated
many Congolese official~ and there has been apprehension in Leo-
poldville that his return may generate new tensions and nossthlv
touch off new anti- UN disorders. !.___ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___, (b)(3)

.. (b )(1)

..
...
...
..

..
..
•

..

-
.. (b)(3)

- 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415912
Page 4
COZ415912
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TU~ ~~~~~~~~~~~--'
(b)(3)

-
- France May Use Cuban Issue in UN to Press US

.. France has continually opposed what it considers the

United states' indiscriminate efforts to win the political sup-

- port of the Afro-Asian states in the UN. Paris is motivated

partly by fear of establishing precedents which will pave the
way for increased UN activity in Africa to the detriment of
.. French interests, particularly in Algeria. Principally, how-
ever, De Gaulle views the UN as a heterogeneous mixture
numerically dominated by new states ~ fundamentally incapa-
- ble of action but increasingly tending to assume the respon-
sibility of the large powers for the maintenance of peace.

The US vote in the Security Council on 15 March in favor

of the Liberian resolution calling for UN consideration of the

- Angolan question probably was the immediate occasion for

the French suggestion to the Portuguese. Various French

.. political commentators have recently berated the US for

failure to "stand with its allies"" The influential and usually
pro-American Raymond Aron said in an article on 22 March
in Le Figaro that the US "double standard" will backfire when
"the Marxists train their guns on US 'imperialism' in Latin
America." Paris can be expected to continue to urge the other

- colonial powers to utilize the Cuban resolution or any similar

resolutions, particularly those critical of US policy in Latin
.. America, as an opportunity to make this point forcefully .

Lisbon's sharply hostile reaction to the recent US vote

- suggests that it will give serious consideration to the French

tactic. Portuguese officials believe the US position has en-
couraged Afro-Asian attacks on the colonial powers, and Lis-
- bon has been seeking ways to induce the US to change its Af-
rican policies. The vitriolic anti-American press campaign
.. and demonstrations in Portugal have linked the US stand with
that of the Soviet Union and have singled out Ambassador
Stevenson as the chief villain. A leading editorial on 29 March

- in the government-controlled newspaper Diario de Noticias

stressed that the US bases in the Azores had been granted with
the understanding that Portuguese sovereignty would be re-
- spected in all of the Portuguese colonies, that Portugal had

- (b)(3)

- Page 5
- 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL TNTELLTGENCF. RTJLLETIN
Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C02415912
C022! 1 5912 Approved f or Release: 201 6/07/05 C024 15912----~
(b)(3)
~ ~:~~~~~~
-
.. only joined the UN on the insistence of the US and :Britain, and
that the loyalty and solidarity Lfsbon had given the NATO al-

- liance had been forgotten.

The Cuban request for UN General Assembly considera-

.. tion of "the clear threat to international peace and security"
posed by "the various plans of aggression and acts of interven-
tion" of the United states against the Cuban Government was
originally submitted last October. Cuba has subsequently
(b )( 1)
further detai~ed its c~rges against the U: i:~:ver:l f:~mal
- j
complaints circulated m the UN. I __ __ . __ _ ._
jindonesia and uumea 1 t su mi a res-
olution in the General Assembly recommending that the US
(b )( 1)

- and Cuba make every effort to settle their differences b eace-

L ful means... in bilateral discussions," (b)(1)

-
- vernment is actively pushing such a resolution.

For some weeks, Cuba's public position has been that it

- is willing and anxious to engage in bilateral discussions with
the US, provided such discussions are on a ''basis of equality

- and with an open agenda," but that the present US attitude pre-
vents such discussions. In its note of 8 March rejecting the
Argentine offer of good offices toward easing US- Cuban ''dif-
- ferences," Havana reiterated these views but added, "The
conduct of the US Government and the statements of its offi-
cials" would make anr effort toward bilateral discussions :L-J
this time "useless." (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

-
-
-
- "TOP S£GREI
(b)(3)

- 4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

'------------~

Page 6
- Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C0241 5912
.,.
-
C02?J 15 91 2 Approv ed for Release: 2016/07/ OS C0241 S912

~
I
I
. -,.
~-"
. l '

- THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House

- The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

- The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Ntobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

- Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State
The Secretary of State

- The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

- The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Deportment
The Secretary of the Treasury

- The Department of Defense

The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense

-
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force

- The Assistant Secretary of Defens~ (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army

- Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Mili tary Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

- Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

-
The Director for Intel Iigence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligen ce, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

- The Assistant Chie f of Stoff, Intelligence , Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice
The Attorney General

- The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission

- The Chairman
The National Securi ty ~ency
The Dire ctor

- The United States Information ~ency

The Director

-
The Nat ional Indications Center
The Di rector

- -CONFI9ENTLAL
Approved for Release: 2016/07/OS C02415912
- ....... - 11 - - --::::-:-
I .. - - - - - ------,, -

.• •.L•
•
·"'le
• '
I
- ,
I
I
I
I
I - ~ - I : --'
C02~15921
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921
1ur~ -
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
wi.th as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence_in_trs publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in th e light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligen ce items
may be c:tisseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting th e national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an un authorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b )(3)

~ ....... ~--
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921
...
COZ4 1 5921 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241 5921 (b)(3)
I U' J .._, ~
·~~~~~~~~~~-

2B April 1961
' '

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Laos. ( Page t )
2. Congo: Hammarskjold sees Congo problem as in
"most hopeful" new phase. (Page i tt )
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

4. Nepal: Plans of exiled le ade r in India to ous t King

Mahendra. ( Page t ti)
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

A pproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241 5921

c o 2·4 15 921 Approved for Release: 2016/ 07/05 C02415921 ..

l.-'-\ .. lp i· Chcu
r"
.~
Phong Soly
"l
- PHONG SA LY
I /" ~ • Dien uie•1 Phu

r' /·'-.\... ':

/ / . '-..-·,..\-J
r.,. \
.·"
/ NAM 1 HA .,.; ., . . ,; • f N•.1••·
'
I \.
._/- ./"'-._,., · / :: r)
\ "'· "" ;·J, "" •
·-..., / , .. LI.JANG PRA.)BANG \ ...
1-- - ' .., S AM N E U A
J ... . " . ' . Y' / •
L ,./~ . .._• ..__...,,-.\ ·•.-' .
......__ • ../ X I E N G
\.·-""·
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SAYAROURY , <" K H ?UANG \
( ' . .~ .. ;.·µ """~ e l<i I ' ' ' \

,. < Pho111-.1(11 1,
_) e '-'il·11 rr 1 1 1• ..-:11

, . .! ·.·• / . ·v--.'\ \ \ • 11.,. I

,./ • I
\./ -~ ·- .J".J'~'-
/ " \
I'/ '" V I ENT I ANE
..:1. ' -;.
·e '.
~· ,--- ·~. j
/
l /'" . . \.__ --- .,,,/ ""· -- .J • •1.:·1"
r, / ' -f...J - \,
\
\
.,,,.,
1-. 11 1\MMOlJAl\IE

\ ·..... ' ' I I II

•
-
.... ..

KONG
• ..
NORTHERN LAOS
. I . ~. ~ r
'-·-' f:·1 : ~ .: ( ron 1o c1
LE - Pl\THL r LAO 11.REAS
\ Fo1 CP.S in

:
I

.- ·""' ·-
J
ROAD
lllA IL 0 !X) 100
L-...._i--1._.__.__._....._..__.i.........I , ,
\'.l " l l!lf Mllf ' ,
l~OU T[ N UMBER
(b)(3)

28 Apr 61 CRN'T'R AT Tl\T'T'ti'T T Tr"'C''l\.U... T.'> .... .r T ... LETIN

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921 Map Page
 C02415921
_, --,,,..,.A~;p, f~S ~e)ease: 2016/07/05 C02415921
lUl ~ (b)(3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

28 April 1961

DAILY BRIEF

Laos: The Pathet Lao reportedly have rejected General

Phoumi's proposal that cease-fire negotiations begin today in
Luang Prabang, and have repeated their suggestion that the
talks be held in Xieng Khouang town. Vientiane subsequently
issued a declaration calling for a cease-fire to become effec-
tive at noon on the same date. In an effort at compromise, the
Boun Oum government plans today to attempt an informal con-
tact with the Pathet Lao in the Vang Vieng area to establish the
time and place for future discussions. Meanwhile, Laotian and
foreign dignitaries, including Prince Sihanouk, are converging
on Luang Prabang for the funeral ceremonies for the late King.
Thus far, there has been no definite word as to whether Sou-
vanna Phouma and Pathet Lao representatives will attend.
*No major military developments have been reported,~b_u~t--~
Communist pressure on government positions continues.I (b)(1)
(b)(3)

The Watch .Committee in a special meeting on 27 April ex-

amined the statii'S";;i 516'C-iii'.iiTiarfforc.es in relation to a possible
ove:::-t bloc military intervention in Laos, and issued the following
statement;
We have re-examined the ~~Y-..S_li.\l!!-ti~n-~~--"S!'!-2.'\ No,rth
Vietnam, an~££p,~m!:'.J.~l3l.¢.h\.'!~.~E,_re!a,t12n,. fc03_e .rece~t Commu-
nist militar}'. ov.eratlons in Laos and see no devefopment whiCh
would suggest anv~C!CfecF"Glte"r've'nhcin bv outside Communist forces
at this time. I
(b )( 1)

~ ~-----------.-.--J
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921

C024 1 5921 ~~Pe<;-vedj~ ~~!~~s.e: 2016101105 co241 5921 (b )(3)
-· -

(b )( 1)

No other
military movements related to Laos by either Communist
growid or naval forces outside of Laos have been discerned.
It is to be noted, however, that Commwiist forces have a
ca11ability of intervention with little or no warning. I J (b)(3)

DAILY BRIEF ii
28 Apr 61

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0241 5921

C02'415921 Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C02415921 •

ETHIOPIA
UDO

, + .isaa
S1.. ,11tered for c.n •
'v1 Ull:I TU
3 ,400

-!"" Coqu1lhal v1ll1! • Boende

Ef HIO P1A
"'' GCRIA
500
200

-+ Kindu
Bukavu

~
Pointe ~
Noy Leopo l dv~l1e -··
:ysville ;
-- ·
Ba nana• Matadi
Kilona

INOONE SI A
8 70

Approxi mate area nomi nally controlled by:

D Kasavubu- Mobulu
D G1zenea
D Kalon11
D Tshombe
[QQ] Uml•?d Nations Forces ( Service For ces
Sele1;ted road not i ncl uded ) INOI A
......._ Selected railroad .l?OrJ
· I - Selcc:led airfield l"t LA/'1 0
6'.·0

0 ~. T ATUT£ M IL. r s •co

61 114 ?7 ?
L..~~~~~~~~~~
I

r (b)(3)

28 Apr 61 CENTRAL IN'T'F.T.T.Tn RNrH' "QTTLLETIN Map P age

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(b )(3)

-
- Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, noting signs
of improved relations between the UN and the Kasavubu gov-
ernment, has characterized the Congo problem as in a "most
hopeful" new phase. Commenting on the political difficulties
besetting President Tshombe, Hammarskjold observed that the

- UN's task would be "keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombe low."

He indicated that while Dayal would have to return to the Congo,
be might shortly be removed by substituting a five-man com-

- mission for the post of senior UN representative.

The circumstances surrounding Tshomoo's detention at

-
Coquilhatville continue obscure, with spokesmen for the Leo-
poldville government denying that he is under arrest. Reports
that Interior Min~ster Munongo has seiz~wer in Kat~ /__'
=.J
- ....-~-
are unconfirmed.
(Backup, Page 4r1 Map) ~
~~-
(b )(3)

- (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

-
-
-..
- L - - - - - - - - ---- Nepal: Following recent conversations in New Delhi with

- Nehru and Defense Minister Menon, Nepali Con_gress party re-

~
sistance leader Subarna ShumshereC __ (b)(1)

-
- 28 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF
iii

- ~I
,.'" ", a" 'lj·~-.t~tt~'.?~~~t~~~~;~*(~~~i~~: ~y ~ ~· '·'.?~~i:~ f1i::'ii f;;~~~~trJt~'~l~~'iZ;:,. t.:~A~)b~q;\t~f -
· ··· , .,... i· ·. ··
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 c o2415921 · ·· ··

 (b)(3)

!~lans an "all-out" effort against King Mahendra in mid~JWle . (b)( 1)

Subarna, who has been in India i:;lnce the King's takeover in
Katmandu in December, recognizes that his plans are depend-

- ent on. the success of his efforts during the coming month to ob-
tain arms and additional financing. Nehru, who has been dis-

- turbed by the King's autocratic actions, reportedly again assured

Subarna of his "sympathy," but the degree of sunnort which New
Delhi will give Subarna is at present WlClear. j
(Backup, Page 5) '-------------~
(b )(3)

-•
(b )( 1)

..
' .
.... .
~:

-- SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
t ,··

REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

- (Available during the preceding week)

- Soviet C~abilitiesJn__Q~_
25 April 1961.[
_ · Hes. U.S. I. B . NIE 11- 5-61.
I (b )(3)

-
L__~~~~~~~~----'

Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany.

I
-
U.S . I . B. NIE 11_- 7- 61. 25 April 1961. I (b)(3)

Possibility of Soviet Nuclear T-esting During the Moratorium.

U.S. I. B. NIE 11-9~61. 25 April 1961. ' . (b)(3)

28 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv . .

_;

-j~ (b)(3)

~~~~~'%~~~~~,~~~$ _

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C024.1_
5921
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _..,.._pproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921

(b)(3)

-
- Situation in Laos

North of Phou Khoun junction, on Route 13, enemy ar-

- tillery and mortar fire continues to harass government troops
occupying blocking positions on the southern approach to Luang

- Prabang. However, ground r econnaissance revealed the ar-

rival in this area by 26 April of a 20-truck enemy convoy, and
the local government commander is expecting an imminent at-
- tack. On 25 April, aerial reconnaissance had spotted probably
the same convoy of 20 vehicles--including two-and-one-half-ton

- trucks and armored cars--heading west along Route 7 from the

Plaine des Jarres. Below Vang Vieng, shelling of the govern-
ment battalion just north of the Nam Lik continues, and there

- are some indications that the enemy will attempt a flanking

movement.

- North of Luang Prabang, the former garrison force at Muong

Sal is withdrawing southwest from that post without apparent

- enemy pursuit. However, the enemy force , estimated at three

battalions with artillery and mortar support, is considered capa-
ble of advancing virtually unopposed toward Luang Prabang at

- any time of its choosing. MAAG personnel evacuated from Muong

Sai report that the accuracy and timing of the enemy artillery ,

- mortars , and heavy weapons during the attack indicated that

highly trained troops were involved. In the Pak Sane area, the
enemy has undertaken small-scale probing attacks on Borikhane .

- (SECRET NOFORN)
(b )( 1)

-
-
-
-
- (b)(3)
-
28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

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-
~'----
'
(b )(3)

- - --

- (b )( 1)
(b )(3)

-
-
- Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin on 25 April indi-
cated the USSR 's displeasure with the UK's announcement fol-

- lowing the joint cease- fire appeal that it would not attend the
conference without prior verification of an effective cease-fire.
Pushkin's remarks apparently were designed to lay the ground-

- work for placing the blame on the West for any postponement
or collapse of the Geneva conference· scheduled to begin on 12

- May. The Soviet official reiterated Moscow's position that only

the Laotians themselves could work out cease-fire arrangements
and that this was not the responsibility of either the UK or the

- Soviet Union.
Communist propaganda is already seeking to place on the

- US and Vientiane the onus for any failure to reach a truce in

Laos. Hanoi on 27 April quoted a Pathet Lao radio charge that

- the Phoumi - Boun Oum forces have "launched new attacks" and
that the Vientiane government does not really want a cease-fire.
Hanoi also quoted Khamsouk Keola, acting premier of the Xieng

- Khouang "government: ' as warning that in the face of defeat the

"US and its followers" have called for negotiations to gain time

- to "consolidate their forces and launch a new attack."

Enlarging on the Peiping government's statement of 26 April,

- a People's Daily editorial commented on the "aspects" involved

in 11bringingaoout" a cease-fire. The Chinese called for a "check"
on assistance to Phoumi, the withdrawal by the US and its allies

- of all military personnel and equipment in Laos, and the expul-

sion of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Insisting that a cease-

-
f.i re can "only" be achieved through negotiation between the "par~
ties concerned," the Chinese indicated that the prospects for a
cease-fire would depend on the attitude of the Vientiane author-

- ities.
Although Chinese Communists did not label these "aspects"
as explicit conditions for a cease-fire, they clearly regard them
(b)(3)

- 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2

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- ~,-------------'
(b)(3)

...
- as legitimate points for consideration in cease- fire negotiations.
They afford the Communists excellent gambits for delaying an

- effective truce while the military situation continues to develop

in their favor.

- (b)( 1)
(b)(3)

-
-
...
-
-
-
-
-
-
..
...
-
-
- (b)(3)

- 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

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-
-
-
- The Situation in the Congo

- Hammarskjold's characterization of the Congo as in a

"most hopeful" phase stems 1n part from his satisfaction at
- the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombe's failing polit ~
ical fortunes . Hammarskjold expressed the belief that Kasa-

- vubu's ascendancy over Tshomhe will improve prospects for

agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that
he had received confirmation of the .e xistence of a military
- agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga forces .
Hammarskjold's expressed optimism may be in part in-
- tended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the
intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this

- should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal re-

turns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's
return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious con-
- ditions to permit Hammarskjold to remove him without seeming
to bow to Congolese pressure.

- The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged

Hammarskjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombe's re-

- lease from detention in Coquilhatville. He also asked the United

States to m~e representations to Hammarskjold, urging that

- Tshombe's immediate release was required to prevent a ·cou in

Katan ab "more intractable elements." I (b)(1)

-
(b )(3)

-
-
-
-
- Rl
'>Q An-r CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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'
- :it,~

-
... Nepali Congress Exiles Planning stepped-up Campaign Against
King

- Following Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's

actions in December, hi;: appeared willing to adopt a wait-and-

- see attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while

affording the exiles a haven in India. I (b)(1)

-
- Nehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he
- may be moving toward more direct suµport of the Nepali
Congress party. I (at their meeting (b)(1)

- L
early in April, Neliru interposed no obstacles to Su]J_ayna's
Qlans to Qromote non-violent agitation from India.
==1 suggests Nehru did not express disae.p~r_o_v_a_l~~
of resort~iolence as well. In addition,
(b)(1)

- I lKrishna Menon gave no indicatio~n-h~e_w_o_u_Ia-keep

Sllbarna f"rom importing arms, although Menon refused any
(b)(1)

direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali

Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders
.. abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase
from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party.

- There is little doubt that at this time only active Indian

support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party
effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a
- . Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to
intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress

- party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are

more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping
that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation,
- will so erode the King's positi.p-n_i!l_at the need for active Indian
intervention will be obviated. I (b)(1)

- (b)(3)

-
-
-
28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
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- (b )(3)

- (b)(1)
(b )(3)

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
(b)(3)

-
- 28 Apr 61
TOP SECRE'[
CENTRAL INTELIJGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

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C02 41592 1------------..-:-:=
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- ( l

- THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President

-
Executive Offi ces of the White House
The Special Assistant for NoHonol Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget

- The Director, Office of Civil and Defense M>bilization

The Director, Notional Aeronautics and Space Administration

-
Chairman, Boord of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Deportment of State
The Secretory of State

- The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairmen of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research

- The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treosury

-
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense

-
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Novy
The Secretory of the Air Force

- The Assistant Secretory of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs o f Stoff

- Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force

-
Chief of Stoff, United States Army
Commandant, United States N.arine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

-
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The J oint Stoff

-
The Director for Inte ll igence, The Jo int Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligence, Deportment of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence , Department of Navy

-
The Assistant Chi ef of Stoff, Intellige nce, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General

- The Federal Bureau of Investigati on

The Di rector
The Atomic Energy Commission

- The Choi rman

The National Security Agency
The Di rector

- The United States Information Agency

The Director

-
The National Indi cations Center
The Director

CONFIBEfllTIAL
-
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02415921
• I - -L"Iii ....,,..,.._ - - , Ii .
CG2 44~3 08 Approv;Jtor Release: ~Oj~~ C02444308
-
-
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
•
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
-
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
•
Intelligence in thi J publication is based on all sources, including
. (b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
-
-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated fUrther, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
-
This document contains classified information affecting the national
•
security of the United States within the meanin g of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
•
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any •
foreign government to t he detriment of the United States.
. (b)(3)

•
•
•
-.
•

-,.nP lll:'CDl:'T
.
Approved for Re lease: 2016/07/05 C02444308
 2 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

~·

CONTENTS .11. .
t.'
:~ '
~· j

1. Congo :· Luluabourg under UN control; Gizenga reneats ~h

{.
demands for aid from UAR and bloc. j (b)(3~~\:
(IWJe t) . ~~~~~~~
~ (b)(3)
J~~ !'.>~
~;:...
l''· ~

~': 2. India-Congo : Nehru warns Khrushchev solution to Congo ~~~ ~:

problem impossible unless the issues of Hammarskjold's i~'
:;~··
:.·/' .
status and the Congo are separate.ti. (Page t) ·.'"!'
.;.,
(b)( 1v ~.
(b)(3) . :

4. France: New nuclear test will coincide with resumed

US-UK-USSR test ban talks in Geneva. ( Page ttt)

5. Communist China: Peiping revives "100 flowers" con-

cept; calls for limited increase in scientific freedom of ~·­
expression. (IWJe ttt) j

(b)(1).:
(b)(3)."~
... .>
...

7. Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga t hreatens to resign;

opposes President Velasco's increasingly favorable policy
toward Cuba. (Rzge tv)

8. Watch Committee conclusions. ( RJ,g11 tv)

IOP S~CREI (b)(,3 )

r ved for R~~~~~~2o16/o7/os
....P.P._~-········-··--·-··- C02444308~~,~~"W~:.:
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CQ2444308 ~nr.rr
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-
-
-
-
•
-
-..
•
•
..
GHANA
1.900
\ -
Appro,1mate area controlled by:
D Kuavubo .liloOlftu
D Glll llll•
ail
D
Kalonli
Tshombe •

-
00 United llatlons f!H'tes
- - Selected roa4
- - - selected rail !~
. . , . Selected airfield

-
X Cut ra ilioad
5T lo.TU T£ ..,, 11..5:5 • OO
0

31594 "' (b)(3)

-
( b)(3)

-
-
2 Mar 61
,.,..,. ...Trrn AT . Thl'TF.T .T .TGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02444308
Map P age
-
 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02444308;----,

~ ''-----------
::··::;.;
·.·
(b).( 1}
;. .. . ~~. ~
:
;~;. ·;

~~t ;
~~ u sequent · scuss1on y e su omm1 ee m ca e ·.· /.
~th~a~t!""P'o~~~ehru and Defense Minister Menon are thinking in
terms of sending a brigade-size unit (about 3 ,000 men) of In-
dian soldiers to the Congo. A final decision, however, awaits
assurances from Hammarskjold that Belgian personnel are in
fact being withdrawn from the Congo. In addition, Nehru is '·
~'f
,
:· ;
awaiting a reply from Nasir to a letter sent on 26 February in :~· .. ,(~,
..
which the lndti!l1l~i9~1~,~tt§iwittiW.U~,.9~§~
·-.~ -

,. :
ability ol rel"iiFordng1Jie·tfitioriPJi.!..L1!.~ ,£?IJ:~o. Furthermore,
~

Nehru is reported especially concernedabout avoiding clashes

between Indian troops and any African troops which might be (b)(3)
sent unilaterally to....sllilport the Gizenga regime. I
I ~ ~.~~~ (b)(3)
(b )( 1)

::,,,.
.....

"·
~.
"-:·

2 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

C02444308
... ,. . Approved for Re lease: 2016/07/05 C024443081- - - - - -
·: (b)(3)
'
TDr-5ECRQj - - _ ________, -.;

, ... (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

:·

..
.•.
':.~ ..
France: The fourth French nuclear weapons test in the .,
~·.

Sahara is expected to be a tower shot in late March or April.

The test will coincide with US-UK-USSR test ban talks which ,,
are to be resumed in Geneva be innin 21 March. De Gaulle,
e ermine o o mem. ers 1p m t e afomic club," ..
continues to maintain that France would not agree to a test ban
'•
unless it were bound up with agreements on the destruction of n ',.,
~·
nuclear weapons stockpiles. Paris is apparently willing t o face
the increasingly hostile reaction which is expected from African
and Middle Eastern states, including a censure move in the
United Nations. The announcement that later French tests will ,,
l e underground is unllkely to caliii this hostile reaction. \ j .:· (b)(3)

~:
..
~~
: ~·

..•
:.
·..·

Communist China: Peiping appears to feel the need for a

limited Uberatization of scientific o t Jn .:,,

~·
ree om o e ression amon the co r • · &,luals. An ;;
; ~~ ··1
e itoria pu ished in the February issue of the party journal, : ~~
Red Flag, reviving the concept of "let 100 flowers bloom," states ~:·~1 ; :.';
.

-
• •' ~.
that the findings of scientists should be welcomed even if they ;..1';
., lack a "Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." The Chinese Communists
h
have recently released and allowed to appear in public several
prominent intellectuals who were arrested in the aftermath of
the 1957 liberalization fiasco. Remembering the campaign
against those who had expressed themselves too freely before,
the intellectuals will be extremely warv about th_e_new_inritat.i. .o,....n~-~
'.i."(b)(3)
to "bloom and contend." LI- - -- - - -- -- - - - - - - - - -

2 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii

 .. .,,..
(b)(1)
( b )(~)

.·..
; '.
-
Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiribog~ ·(b)(1)
intends to resign at the cab=-=
m"""'e"""t,....,m
=-=
e=e~
u=n=
g~o
-n~3---------'
_ ( ~1( 1 )
e-.,.--.-----.---...-
e ~P e i en Vela c a rees to chan e his in-
ly favorable polic toward Cuba. hiri gas reSlgna-
on co provo e a ca me er s s :-"1'he foreign minister' s
stand is directly related to the return from Havana of the pro-
Cuban, pro-Soviet former minister of government, Manuel
Araujo, a key .lieutenant of Velasco who publicly denounced . ·t;.
·!"'- Chiriboga on 21 February as a "State Department servant."
Araujo reportedly plans to promote mass unrest and may have
gained a dominant influence over Velasco in regard to policies
toward both Cuba and the Soviet bloc. j (b)(3)
~--------------'
(b)(3)
·::-.
~~-

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United

~· .,
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
;:r ;
A. No change from last week.

B. No change from last week.

C. No significant military activity has occurred in Laos dur-

ing the last week. There are ng iQ.c;l~~iJ,ijQma ,tbit ~Olll­
munist forces in the Plaine des Jarres intend to lal!Q.£!1

''

~-··
;;~:',\:·

2 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iv

i
(b)(3)
CQ2444308
-
• :1-
Approved fo r Release: 2016/07/0S C02444308,----~
T~~~~~~~

.;:ap..;.c;;.ou;;;;n;;;.t;;;,;e;.;;r;..-~op,;;f-.fe•n•s•i•v~e~inp;j..ith-.-e.;i-.miiiii0im•ediiiiiiiiii·OiiiaiatP.e•f8u,_tu~r,..e._.a:.;.:ta.A¥.~r-"·•
ey ave e capa y to o so. ere is an uncon-
firmed report that the Communists have a plan to
;• initiate operations at an unspecified time in the south
, Y~
of Laos. They have the capability to initiate such ac-
tion on a small diversionary basis using Pathet Lao ~
Kong Le resources. Large-scale action woqJd regui[~
outside resources such .as Viet Minh~ we consider this to
... be µplikely at tbi!!J time. ~eanwhite,, the Communist bloc
continues its build- up of Souvanna Phouma as the "legal"
prime minister and persists in its refusal to negotiate
• 1!111 except on its terms .
;~ ........ ~~

D.
••

::-
"f. "

~(b)(3)
•
Ii~~:
~v. ~-;;

:~-

·•

J.~0.1
·""
. ,.. 2 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF v ~jl
·- ii:~t
~;(b){3)
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(b)(3)
-rar ;)t:i{;t(t'L~.____ _ _ _ _ _ ____, f'\ c_
•

- Situation in the Congo

- The threat the Gizengist incursion into Luluabourg appeared

to pose to Leopoldville reportedly aroused many leaders of
Kasavubu's government to the point of being willlng,for the first

- time, to take forceful action. These leaders are said to be

urging Mobutu, who is now near Bumba with about 1, 500 men,

-
to attack Orientale Province "even if the troops must open
fire ." It ls questionable, however, whether Mobutu's forces
would fight even if such an order were given, especially since

-
•
the threat to Leopoldville has at least temporarily been reduced.
Hammarskjold said that the Luluabourg ep~sode was not a
military victory for Stanleyville but that it did show the disintegra-
tion of the Congolese Army. He implied that a parallel situation

-
•
is now shaping up in Equateur Province , where Stanleyville troops
easily disarmed the garrison at Ikela and are now moving toward
Coquilhatville, which is virtually unguarded by troops of the
Leopoldville governtrelt because Mobutu has taken most of its
garrison to the Bumba area. Press reports on 1 March say

-
that .Mobutu forces in Coquilhatville are defecting to Gizenga.
Hammarskjold also questioned where Mobutu stood in relation
to recent events, pointing out that he was not particularly loyal

- to Ka.savubu or Ileo, and that he had never broken personally with

Lumumba. The secretary general pointed out that Mobutu had

-
started toward Stanleyville with "the most publicized--and
slowest- -military offensive in history" and then last week told
UN Commander McKeown that he was taking up positions only
for defense against infiltrators from Stanl~yvllle. Hammarskjold
• felt there was a chance, although not a probability, that Mobutu

-
and Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, might bf nlannin p= a mili- (b)(3)
tary grouping directed against all politicians. _ I
L_ I (b )(3)

- (b){3)

-
-
- (b)(3)
I
- 2 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
(b )( 1)
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- (b)(1)
(b)(3)

-
.. Yugoslavia's first serious effort to broaden its economic
and political relations with Latin America came in mid-1959

- when a Yugoslav cabinet officer led a good-will mission to seven

Latin American capitals. Several months later, another high re-
gime official visited four other Latin American states, resulting
in rumors that Tito would tour the area the following year.

.. Yugoslavia's relations with the West are generally good; the

West is Belgrade's primary source of developmental capital and

.. provides roughly 65 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. In

January, Yugoslavia put into effect a foreign trade and exchange
reform which brings its foreign trade practices into closer ac-
cord with those of the West. Tito has long wanted to make an
• official state visit to the United States, but his regime continues
publicly to view the West as the chief villain in international af-
fairs.
Tito is currently in Ghan~, the first stop on a two-month

- African tour that will include official visits to Togo, Liberia,

Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia and an unofficial call on UAR

- (b)(3)
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-
- President Nasir. Thi s is the third tour Tito has made to in-

- crease Yugoslavia's ties with the uncommitted and underdevel-

oped countries; trips through the Middle and Far East were
made in 1954-55 and 1958-59. Belgrade believes that close

- identification with the uncommitted states is its best defense

~ainst possible future political and economic pressure from
East or West and the best possible platform from which to
voice its views on international affairs. At the UN session
last fall, the UAR's Nasir--long Yugoslavia's closest collab-

-.. orator--Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and India's

Nehru worked closely with Tito in an effort to ease East-
West tensions. Since then, Belgrade has advocated that the
neutrals confer more often, collaborate mor e closely, and
act in concert more frequently.

In contrast to virtually nonexistent party-to-party rela-

tions, Belgrade has gener;;illy satisfactory relations with the
.. Communist world at the state level, except for Albania and
Communist China. Tito and Khrushchev held conversations
in New York last fall, one result of which was an agreement
to exchange visits by their foreign µiinisters . Moscow and Bel-
grade hold similar views on most international issues, such as

.. disarmament and colonialism. Albania and Communist China

disapprove of close state relations with Yu oslavia and maintain
them at a minimal level. (b)(3)
.. (b)(1)

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- Violence May Break Out in Ecuador Over the Cuban Issue

Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum in early February

- that he was greatly concerned over the Ecuadorean political

situation, and predicted another postponement of the eleventh

- Inter-American Conference now set for Quito on 24 May. He

noted President Velasco's desire for closer relations with
Cuba, his friendship for Araujo, and his refusal to take action

- against Communist or Cuban activities in Ecuador.

- The potential for violence over the Cuban issue was indi-
cated recently by Communist-backed student unrest in both
Quito and Guayaquil which caused demonstrations against

- Chiriboga and the incumbent minister of government. The

Castro regime has cultivated relations with Velasco, particu-
larly by expressing support for Ecuador in its long-standing

- boundary dispute with Peru.

- Chiriboga also stated to an American official on 28 Febru-

ary that a military coup was being planned in Guayaquil. Such
an attempt has been considered by a group of about 50 high-
ranking officers, under the leadership of the former army com-
mander, who were retired soon after Velasco was inaugurated
last September. As minister of government, Araujo accused
these officials of treason--a move which touched off a political
controversy and helped precipitate his resignation. Although

- Velasco has a substantial following among the office r corps, he

might alienate it if he reappoints Araujo to a top government

.. position and follows a pro-Castro, pro-Soviet policy. Chiriboga

said he had information that at a cabinet meeting last Saturday
Velasco agreed to repudiate Araujo and threaten him with jail

- if he continued his activities; but Chiriboga also said he was

certain Velasco will not follow through on this.

- Araujo recently spent about three weeks in Cuba, and he

has reportedly maintained close contact with the Cuban Embassy
in Quito. An advocate of close relations with the bloc, he pos-

- i l t cted one or more bloc missions while in Havana.

(b)(1)

- (b)(3)

- SECRET_
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THE PRESIDENT

- The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
• The Di rector of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense iV.obi Ii zation
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
•, The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
• The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politi col Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

-
•
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Di rector of Intel Iigence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretory of the Treasury
The Department of Defense

-
The Secretory of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army

-
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretory of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense:: (International Security Affairs)

- The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Specia l Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

- Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States fv4.arine Corps

- U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Al 1i ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joi nt Staff
• The Director for Intelligence, The J oint Staff

-
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel ligence , Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Inte lligence, Deportment of the Air Force

-
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation

- The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman

- The National Security Agency

The Director
The United States Informa tion Agency

- The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

- CONhDENTJAI.

.. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02444308

 -
C02444315 Approved fo_!" ~e!eas~: ~Oj £?/~710_5 C02444315
-
-
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
-
•
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern ls not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
-
(b)(3)
I I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi- •
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
•
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. •
WARNING •
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
•
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
•
(b)@)

•
-
•
-
-
•
Ill

~DC'T
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02444315
C02444315 ·
- GCc....-
(b)(3)
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... 13 March 1961

- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

- CONTENTS

-
- 1. Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Thomps·o n.
( Page t)

- 2. Situation in Laos. (Page t)

·- 3 . Congolese reportedly believe Indian troops are coming

to enforce ''Dayal's plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
(Pa_ge ti)

(b)(1)\
(b)(3) l
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lcb

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF

USSR: In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson

on 9 March, Khrushchev raised the Berlin and German ques-
tion and stated his desire not to worsen but to improve US-

- Soviet relations. He refrained from proposing resumption of

negotiations or setting a deadline for action, but did reiterate
his warning that the USSR would si a se arate eace treat
·-w ast ermany if. the wartime allies did not ~~!'.!~.~?...a
treaty with both Q~rm&l.a.t»-tes.
On the disarmament issue, Khrushchev again tied Soviet
• agreement to general disarmament with the proposal to reor-
ganize the UN secretariat, and used the Congo situation to
Ltn_SB reoeatedlv the ne_e_d for revision o_Lihe__UNJ (b)(3)

- *Laos: Vientiane re resentati ves and Souvanna Phouma

ected to meet t is we.e e~~'":..

·....- era program annowice Y ene,r Phoumi nan • ouvanna .~fl- ..

their talks at Phnom Pel}h. Souyanna's departure from Pfmom
Penh on a world tour is still scheduled for 15 March.
Moscow characterized the Phnom Penh discussions as a
diplomatic defeat for the Phoumi forces and emphasized that
Souvanna stood firm on the need to convene an international
;· ·
' ·•
conference to settle the Laotian problem. Both Peiping and
Hanoi have indicated that they are interested in the vaguely
worded communique, only as a depwure point fof.H9.J2!S.3.!1~­
·- dizing the deteriorating position of the Boun QJil!!l r_egim.~:

.. Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in both the Phou Khoun and

Muong Kassy sectors apparently are consolidating their posi-
tions. Their patrols continue to maintain contact with overn-

.. ment forces. lL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

(b)(3)

•• i

- (b)(3)
 (b)(3)

~ The expected iifiXil! .Qf ~ litst ~ntiggept

of InCIIi'Stroo s on 16 March will confron the N with its
... · r _n o.mto .. a&~ording to Amb'!ss;Wst:J'J.m-
berlake. He feels that ther~ is widespread belief among the

.. Congolese that India's troops are coming to enforce ''Dayal's

plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
Khrushchev, in his recent talk with Ambassador Thomp-

- son, showed little interest in the possibilities of a Congo set-

tlement and used the occasion to reiterate Soviet char es of

-
the ineffectiveness of the llN..Jlolicies in the Co (b )(3)

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)
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...
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-
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-
- 13 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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...
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".,.. .
~ '

.· :~ .

.. :

~ :. :
- .
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.- ''
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. ,,...
..
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: .
13 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii
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-CONFID£~1TJA T.

-
- Khrushchev Spells Out Soviet Position on Germany,

- Disarmament, and the UN

At the end of his conversation with Ambassador Thompson,

Khrushchev spelled out the Soviet position on Germany and
Berlin along the lines of the recent memorandum to Bonn. He
stressed the necessity of a peace settlement with both Germanys

-.. in order to confirm postwar developments and provide a legal

foundation for the postwar borders. He denied that the bloc had
any desire to expand to the West and offered to make a state-
ment to this effect if the US was prepared to begin peace treaty
negotiations.

- In connection with his threat to sign a separate treaty with

- East Germany, Khrushchev was careful. to evade any response

to the ambassador's question on how a separate treaty would
affect the Allied position in West Berlin. Khrushchev reaf-

- firmed that a peace treaty would include a clause providing

creation of a free city for West Berlin, but urged that the US
and USSR join in working out a new status for West Berlin.

-.. Khrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion of

the Berlin problem in asserting that the USSR would provide
any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in
West Berlin and to assure the United States that its prestige

- would not suffer. As examples of guarantees, he mentioned

a joint police force, presumably composed of the four powers,
and he repeated a previous Soviet proposal to permit stationing

- of symbolic forces of the four powers in West Berlin. He made

it clear that East Berlin was excluded from a settlement on the

-
..
grounds that it was the capital of East Germany, but he com-
mitted Ulbricht to sign any guarantees for West Berlin.

The Soviet leader concluded his remarks by repeating that

if the US and USSR could sign a treaty on Germany, it would
mark great progress in their relations and establish an atmos-
.. phere of trust. He added that a treaty could be implemented by
installments and provide for a gradual withdrawal of Soviet and
American troops from Germany, which would aid in negotiations
- and disarmament.

- The most notable aspect of Khrushchev's statements was his

failure to stress the urgency of early negotiations on Berlin, as

- "'CONFIDENT' 4 L..

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- he has in his recent conversations with Western diplomats

. and the Soviet memorandum to Bonn. This suggests that the

USSR will continue to hold the Berlin question in reserve un-
til the Soviet leaders assess more fully the US position on
major East- West questions. Khrushchev's remarks on Ade~
nauer's role and references to the memorandum to Bonn also
suggest that he may be awaiting a reply as a pretext for pre-
.. senting a more exact demand on negotiations. A French For-
eign Ministry official was recently told by his Soviet counter-
part that Moscow was considering a foreign ministers'

- conference on Berlin and Germany.

- On the disarmament question Khrushchev implied that the

Western powers were attempting to defer negotiations. His
insistence that Soviet acceptance of general disarmament was

- linked to UN revision was the same position he took last fall

at the UN General Assembly. At that time, however, he ex-
plained that the reorganization scheme was not a prerequisite
for negotiations.

- In his statements to Ambassador Thompson on the Congo,

Khrushchev labeled UN policy as "colonialist" and stressed that
the USSR would oppose it "with all its means." He emphasized

- that a reorganization of the UN was necessary t o prevent another

situation such as that in the Congo, and argued that the US should

-
have an interest in reorganization, since it might be in a minor-
ity position some time in the future. Khrushchev's revival of the
link between UN revision and disarmament, which has been

- played down in recent Soviet statements, probably foreshadows

a more intensive eff9rt to use the appeal of disarmament to gain
support for at least Hammarskjold's resignation or progress to-

- ward a greater Soviet role in the UN executive organs.

- Khrushchev showed considerable satisfaction when informed

by Thompson that the US hoped shortly to lift its ban on Soviet
crabmeat imports, although he expressed some disappointment

- at the recent canceling of a license for precision grinding ma-

chines. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that trade
relations must be normalized and again emphasized that the USSR
-
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.. trades with other Western powers. In addition, he pointed out

that the USSR does not compete with the US in trade and could

- be a very good customer for American exports. Khrushchev

avoided mentioning Mosc<jl~s nr.eYi.o.us_reauest_for credits to _ _

.. finance Soviet purchases. (b )( 1)

(b)(3)

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..
Situation in Laos
-Pl~ / .

-.. General Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that during

his recent visit to Phnom Penh, he was able to clear up the
misconceptions of the Cambodian foreign minister over King
Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission--com-
posed of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya-:..and that Souvanna

- himself now would attempt to persuade Sihanouk to reconsider

his rejection of the commission's chairmanship.

- Although Phoumi and his aides returned to Vientiane ap-

parently convinced of Souvanna's acquiescence to an investiga-
tive commission prior to a full- scale international conference,
there is already some indication that Souvanna may have been
temporizing. Souvanna is reported to have stated publicly on
11 March that the three·- nation commission should meet "about
the same time" as the 14- power conference proposed by Si-
hanouk, in order to enable the conference to give directives

- to the commission.

.. Phoumi also reports that he and Souvanna, in their discus-

sion of the question of a coalition government including the
Pathet Lao, agreed that Communists should hold no posts.
.. Phoumi, however, apparently did not rule out the possibility
that "non-Communist" members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS),
the Pathet Lao's political arm, might be included. A long..
- standing argument of Souvanna, which has found favor among
many Laotian officials, is that Prince Souphannouvong--hea~

- of the NLHS--and many other party members are nationalists

rat~er than Communists. c:1

- Moscow's initial reaction to the discussions between Phoumi

and Souvanna Phouma indicates that the USSR will claim that the
general compromised his own position as a result of his visit to
- Phnom Penh and that Souvanna will accept no solution in Laos
which does not make the convening of an international conference

- the first order of business.

A Pathet Lao statement, rebroadcast by both Peiping and

- Hanoi, vigorously attacked Phou.mi's mission.to Phnom Penh as

an effort to "use the name of Premier Souvanna Phouma" to split

-
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~
/.'

-
the Laotian people. The Pathet Lao radio claimed it was
only because of military reverses that Phoumi "attempted to

- compel Prince Phouma to negotiate with and make conces-

sions to the traitors' clique." The statement clearly indicated

- that the Communists do not re.c ognize the Phnom Penh commu~
nique as in any way restricting their freedom of action.

- Reflecting some uneasiness over the possibility that Sou-

vanna may have made some deal with Phoumi, the Pathet Lao
radio stressed the unflinching support of the Pathet Lao forces

- for Souvanna. It pointed out that Souvarina's speeches and

statements made in Xieng Khouang during his visit there prove

-.. that he would refuse "to knuckle under in any circumstances

before the traitors' clique in Vientiane." The statement reit-
erated the bloc contention that an international conference must
be held, to be followed by an international commission to work
in Laos in accordance with the specific powers granted to it
by the conference.
- The recent successes of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces

- appear to have been due less to aggressive action on their part

than to withdrawal by the Vientiane forces in the face of such a
threat. Vientiane troops north of Phou Khoun junction are re-

- ported in a state of low morale and unlikely to put up much re-

sistance to any further Pathet Lao advance. All supplies that

.. had been stockpiled by these troops at the junction wer T__.,,_le=f=t--~

intact when the withdrew and now are in enemy hands . (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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- Situation in the Congo

.. Hammarskjold recently sent a conciliatory letter to

Kasavubu, who is attending the Tananarive conference of
.. Congolese leaders, in an attempt to lessen the likelihood of
a conflict between Indian and Congolese troops. He tried

-
to reassure Kasavubu that the arrival of these troops was not
part of a planned military build-up to be used against the
Congolese Army, explaining that the Security Council had not
authorized such action in connection with the proposed reor-
ganization of the army .
•
In a discussion with an American official, Hammarskjold
indicated a belief that "some kind of political game was going
on in Leopoldville" between two rival acting prime ministers
in the absence of Ileo, who accompanied Kasavubu to Tananarive.
He noted that acting Prime Minister Delvaux modified his earlier

.. hostile attitude toward the UN and became willing to negotiate

after Massa suddenly "took over" that office. Hammarskjold
remarked that "there are too many untutored people with guns
who become involved in political moves" in the Congo .
•
Tshombe's apparent success in dominating the proceedings
at Tananarive has been complemented by another success in
• Katanga. Before leaving for the conference, Tshombe--appar-
ently fearing that his deputy Kibwe and French Colonel Trinquier
were plotting to oust him--ordered Trinquier to leave the coun-
try by 10 March. The American Consul in Elisabethvllle reported
that Trinquier, under pressure from Katangan authorities and
• possibly the UN, departed for Brussels on 11 March.

- When informed that Brussels intended to remove some 30

Belgian military technicians from Katanga, Tshomoo indicated
.. he would oppose this action by all means possible and that he
might close the Belgian Consulate General in Elisabethville .

- In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev

said it was clear that the US and the Soviet Union were in com-
plete disagreement on the Congo. Khrushchev failed to respond
to Ambassador Thompson's remark that there was nothing in the

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•
...
Congo situation basic to US or Soviet interests. The ambas-
sador noted that the Soviet premier refrained from mention-
.. ing any new approach to a solution of the Congo problem and
referred t~ the internal Congo situation only in terms of the
past .
... Khrushchev used the Congo question to launch a vigorous
attack on UN policies; he told the ambassador that the US and
... the Soviet Union had different positions on this question and

.. prospects were not bright. He reiterated the standard charges

that
death.
UN and Hammarskjold were responsible for Lumumba's
(b )( 1)

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"'"""'"' "' ~ .. .. ...., ......... a er

-
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offi ces of the White House

- The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

-
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Deportment of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State

- The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intell igence and Research

- The Treosury Deportment

The Secretory of the Treasury
The Department of Defense

- The Secretory of Defense

The Deputy Secretory of Defense
The Secretory of the Army

- The Secretary of the Novy

The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretory of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)

- The Assistant to Secretory of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

-
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Ai r Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee ond Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

- Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

-
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Stoff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intell igence, Deportment of Navy

-
The Assistant Chief of Stoff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General

-
The Federal Bureau of lnvesti"gation
The Di rector
The Atomic Energy Commissi on

- The Chairman
The Notional Security Age ncy

-
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center

- The Director

CONFIDENTJA l.
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02444315
C029 93705 -
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02993705
.._... IU~ ~
.

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-µp material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,

II
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

Approved fs>r _R~lea.§_e~2.Q1_~07 ~05 C02993705

C0 2 9 9 3 7 0 5 (b )( )
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pproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02993705, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
(b)(3)
1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 December 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*Communist China - Taiwan: Communist shelling of

. the off shore islands has· almost ceased for the past month.
Only one firing of 33 propaganda rounds has occurred since
27 November--the lowest ebb since the odd~ day firing pat-
tern was established-in October 1958. In addition, the "lib-
erate Taiwru'.\," theme has been a negligible ingredient in main-
land propaganda since mid-1960. On th.e few occasions when
the Taiwan issue is mentioned, however, Peiping continues
to underscore its determination to use force if necessary while
expressing hope for a peaceful solution .
. In contrast to the Communist behavior, Chinese National.-
1st -b atteries have increased the number of high-·explosive
shells fired against the mainland since mid-November. Tai-
. pei apparent.l y believes it is politically advantageous to keep
a state of tension .i n the strait. [
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J

I I. ASIA-AFRICA

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*Co£f?O: Hammarskjold has sent a letter to Kasavubu im-

plying . _at he will ask the Security Council to take the UN out
of the Co.ngo if Mobutu uses force in an attempt to take Orien-
tale· Proyince- -still nominally controlled by Antoine Gizenga's
"government." Hammarskjold told US officials, however, that
he does not expect civil war in the Stanleyville area, since he
believes neither Gizenga nor Mobutu is strong enough to force
a fight. Hammarskjold plans to be in the Congo on 3 and 4 Jan-
uary. Khrushchev, after a delay of ten Clays, responded to
Gizenga's appeal for support by .reiterating Soviet promises
of suppQrt and sympathy but avoiding any specific commitment
o~ assistance. Sudan continues to refuse transit to UAR planes
bound for Stanleyville, but Pres.ident Abboud admits that flights
over remote areas of the country could probably be made without
. Sudanese knQwledge.J
I ---
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--1

· 26 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

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· *Ethioeia~ Although ·the leaders of the attempted coup

against Emperor Haile Selassie are now reported to have been
killed or captured,. considerable synip~thy for the coup ~ffort
persists, and the Imperial Go.v ernment's position may still. be
·precarious. Because of the elaborate precautions considered
. necessary for the Emperor's safety, .t he royal family has not
. attended the funerals of the government ministers killed by the
rebels. The Emperor reportedly decided on 21 December to re-
constitute the Royal Bpdyguard, . and some junior officers and
men have already been re.leased from custody. This action co4ld
seriously antagonize the army, which crushed the revolt. Offi~
cials of .the government claim to have captured documents which
.they say clearly indicate Soviet and Czech· involvement in the
COUp ~ttempt, but tl;i'e offiCials.Jla.YfLDOt nroduced the evidence
they claim to have. I
L_-~--~------~----~

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for. National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Off~e. of ,Civil and Defe~se Mobllizatlon
Dir~~tor, ,1 Nati1;m~_ 1Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assist~t for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
. Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary! National Security Cou·n cll
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International .Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department ·
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
·The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staf~
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Ope rations
Direc tor for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Inte lligel}ce, Department of Army .
Director of Naval Inte lligence, Departme nt of Navy
As sis tant Chief of Staff, Inte lligence, Department of the Air F or ce
. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
National Security Agency
The Direc tor
National Indications Center
The Direc tor

rrnvFTA &:NT T4 1
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C029~753 1 ~
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02997531
- -- --~-

..

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
I I (b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publica tion rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for
no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law .prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of t he United States or for the ben efit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~l'nr.­
Approved for Release: 2016/07 /qs C02997531
C0 2 9 ~ 7 5 3 l - - - - - - - -A-p-pr-ov_ e_d-fo_ r_R_e_le-as_e_: -2 0-1-6/-0-7/_0_5 -C-0 2-9-97_ 5_3_1 _ __ _ __ _ _ __ (b )(1)
(b)(3)

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(b){
'-'~
l

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

~--------

II
(b)(3 ~
29 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

L THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East Germany: The number of East Germans registering

at the West Berlin refugee ce1'ter durii:ig. the week ending 23
August was 4,034-- 1,791 more than during the corresponding
1959 period, and the fifth highest weekly total since 1955.
Since the regime began forced agricultural collectivization
last winter, refugee flow to W~st Berlin has been consistently DJ6
higher than during 1959, Although the peak in defections is
usually reached in late August and September, the present
greatly increased flow of refugees reflects growing popular
fear that further repressive measures may be impendiI~g and .
that tighter controls may be imposed on travel to Berlin. Re~
gime pressure during the harvest period may have led many
farmers to flee immediately a;fter selling their last privately
owned crops. j - - - - i

'·
II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia: Political tensions are increasipg .in Indonesia

D~
.. over ffie army's ban on 24 August of the Communist party and
its front groups in South Borneo. Although South Borneo is not
an area of Communist strength, the ban is a s_ignificant act of
(lefiance against President Sukarno and is presumably a retalia-
tory move for the .Pre$ident's dissolutiori on 17 August of the anti =
--------, Communist Masjumi ctnd Sociali~t part~es. (§ukarno is reported
"very angry" over the army's ban and undoubtedly will take some

-~ 1
counteraction, which could lead to a showdown wjth army chief
of sta;ff General NasutionJ I - -- -
L - . - , - - - - -- - -- ' (b)(3) I
(b)~~

i II
(b) 3 ~
C029$ 75 3 1
(b)(3h

I
I
.. . ..rfingo: Premier Lumumba's success against the secession-
ist" ning State" i n Kas~ Province may encourage him to plan
an early invasion of neighboring Katanga Province .. Katanga
II
President Tshombe has already started defensive military meas-
ures. In an effort to forestall UN intervention,. Lumumba may I
soon press his demand that UN troops leave the Congo as soon as
Belgian troops complete their withdrawal--expected .in early Sep- ~
tember. ·
Secretary General Hammarskjold indicate
II
(b) 1 ~
26 August that he would regard such a demand by Lumumba a8
a "formal request" and would.call an emergency session of the
Security Council. He would tell the council that the Congolese
Army could not maintain order and that a UN withdrawal would
:Jead to fo~eign intervention. ~ammarskjold believes the Congo
crisis will come to a head within the next week. The mood of the
Congolese Army was demonstrated when it made widespread at-
tacks on Europeans--including American and UN personnel--at
Stanleyville on 27 August.
The American ambassador in Leopoldville believes that the
USSR has selected "foodlifts" as an easy way to introduce men
and materials into the Congo without the usual customs inspec-
tion. He reports that "over 100 Caucasians" have arrived in the
Congo via Soviet aircraft since 1 August and expects that a sub- (b)(3 )
stantial number will arrive soon aboar{l_lO large Soviet a.lx:craft
understood to be en route. I,_____ _ _ __________~~

29 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

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(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

II
I
LATE lTEMS

*Laos: Delegations from .Savannakhet and Vientiane, led re-

spectively by General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, are arriv-
ing in the ·r oyal capital of Luang Prabang to mediate differences
before a reunited National Assembly in sessions now scheduled
to start on 30 August. Mutual sUS,.picion and personal antagon-
isms are still running high but there -l.s. cautious optimism
among American observers that a compromise settlement can
be reached. Although overt mllltary command in Vientiane is
passing increasingly into the hands of Laotian Army commander
General Ouane, Captain Kong Le is app~rently stlµ.Jn a nosltion___, (b)(3)
to lnfluence the formation of e new government. L_ ___J
~----~ (b)(

.. ....
~

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*Cuba: Cuba's defiant walkout from the OAS foreign

minls~rs' meeting on 28 August further 1solates the
Castro regime from other hemisphere nations and emp.~a­
sizes to them that the Cuban Government has rejected the-
lnter-Amerlcan system in favor of greater dependence on
support from the Sino-Soviet bloc.· Cuban Foreign Minister (J/L
Roa, whose position was based on the alleged "imminent
threat" of US military intervention, hinted that Cuba . may
take its case back to the UN Security Council. His speeches
clearly tmp.l led that the Castro regime continues to regard
itself as the vanguard of "the antiimperlalist re~tiQn' '
that will event.uallv_swe_en.J:h~tlre continent.
·I _J . '----~
(b)(3)

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Increased Political Tensions in Indonesia

Political. tensions are .i ncreasing in Indonesia over the

army's ban on 24 August of ~he Communist party and its front
groups in South Borneo. These devefopments will further ag-
gravate the strai~ between the army and ·President Sukarno
and could culminate in a showdown.between the two.

~resident. Sukarno is reported "very angry" ove~ the army's

ban and has questioned army chief of staff General Nasution con- (b)(3)
cernhl.g the local commander's authority to take such action. The
army, however, intends to extend the ban, on a staggered basis,
to South Celebes, South Sumatra, and.the Lesser SWldas. The
Gommun.i st party has protested to the attorney general's office
.that the South Borneo comi:nander has no right to ban the party,
and has asked the War Administration Office, which is headed by
·Sukarno, to review his ac.t io10

The South. Borneo commander banned the party :within the

broad powers he holds as regional war administrator under the
·prevailing state of emergency in .most areas of Indonesia. Al-
though-the Communist party is active in South Borneo, it is not
an area of Communist strength, and any overt resistance to the
·ban can be easily ~ontained. The ban is a significant act of defi-
ance against Sukarno and is presumably a retaliatory move for the
President's dissolution on 17 August of the anti- Communist Masi"t))(1)
and Socialist parties. _ (b)(3)

I (b)(3)

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The Situation in the Congo

Premier Lumumba's success in capturing the capital of the

secessionist "Mining State" in Kasai Province may encourage him
to p~an an early invasion of provincial President Tshombe's rebel-
lious Katanga Province. Tshombe's forces have already begun
preparing defensive installations, and UN Ethiopian troops have
reportedly taken up positions along the Kasai-Katanga border, pre-
sumably to discourage attacks from either si.d e. Lumumba's de-
sire to avoid possib~e intervention by UN troops in his invasion
plans may cause him to press for rapid compliance with his re-
newed demand of 26 August that UN troops leave the Congo as soon
as Belgian troops complete their withdrawal--now expected .within
a week.

G seAcretary General Hammarskjold, I

on 2 6 ugust, stated that Lumumba muSt."oe- 1.'broken."- He
m=J. (b)(1)

plied this might be ac~omplished by discrediting Lumumba in the

UN should the African leader persist in his demand for withdrawal
of UN troops from the Congo. The secretary general indicated he
would regard this as a "formal request" and would. call an emergency
session of the Security Council for instructions. He added that his
intention in this event is to inform the cowicil that the Congolese Ar-
my could under no circumstances maintain peace and order in the
Congo and.that a withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to
~oreign intervention and therefore to a breach of the peac~

(!Iammarskjold b~lieves the Congo crisis will come to a head

following the end of the current meeting of African leaders in Leo-
poldville- - expected on 30 August- ~e,articularly if Lumumba believes
he has the support of these leaders;)
'
The conferees, however, reportedly have advised Lumumba
against taking any move to weaken UN influence in the Congo and
indicated further that any aid given by their countries must be chan··
neled through the UN.
The mood of the Congolese Army was demonstrated on 27 August
when it :µiade widespread attacks on Europeans---including the crew

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of an American transport aircraft as well as Swedish and Cana-

dian ·members of. the local UN headquarte.r s- - in the Stan.l eyville
area. The army has repeatedly used strong- arm tactics against
numerous "white" UN personnel as well as against Caucasian
members of the press throughout the Congo crisis.

Meanwhi,le the Communist bloc continues to make significant

gains in .t he Congo. The American ambassador in Leopoldville
reported .t hat "over 100 Caucasians" had arrived on Soviet air-
craft since 1. August and a "substantial number" was expected soon
aboard 10 large. Sovlet aircraft understood to be en route--osten-
sibly carrying food. The ambassador believes the USSR has se- .
lected."foodlifts . .. as an easy way to introduce men and materials
with impunity," since these Soviet aircraft are permitted to dis-
pense with normal customs procedures. In addition, an undisclosed
number of bloc tee rr · oviet
vessel on 22 August. (b)(3)
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I_

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Situation in Laos L
----
{$ey members of the two contending political factions in
Laos, headed by General Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, are
converging on the royal capital of Luang Prabang to resolve
-------- (b)(3)

their differences before a reunited National Assembly, now

scheduled to open sessions on 30 August. Phoumi, accompanied
by 22 assembly deputies and other principal supporters, a.r rived
from Savannakhet on 28 August. Premier-designate Souvanna
and 34 fellow deputies from Vientiane are scheduled ·to arrive
on 29 August. Both Phouml and Souvanna are anxious to have
private discussions with King Savang prior to the assembly
deliberations, since his attitude could be a decisive factor;]
\§pokesmen for both factions claim the loyalty of a majority .
of the deputies, but the attitude of many :.is open to question
since party affiliations have been severely shaken by the 9 Au- ·
gu:stco1:1p.. Mutual suspicion and personal antagonisms are still
running high between the principal leaders of the two groups,
but there is cautious optimism among American observers in
Laos that a compromise settlement is in the making. The
assembly apparently will vote again on the motion of nonconfi-
dence in the pi;-evious Somsanith government and on the investiture
of the Souvanna cabinet which Phoumi asserts were originally
voted under duress in Vientiane;) ·

(formation of a new government' will be influenced by the fact

that Captain Kong Le still retains considerable authority in the
Vientiane area, despite the passing of overt control to General
Ouane, commander of the Laotian Army. Kong Le has relinquished
command of the 2nd Paratroop Battalion to a subordinate officer,
apparently in order to concentrate on his position as Ouane's
deputy_) .
\}lost of the paratroops are positioned on strategic approach
routes several miles outside Vientiane where they reportedly
are actlng as cadres for irregular forces assisting ln the
capital's defense. r (b)(1)

--==--~~~~~~--'
Ouane also places the total forces in the
Vientiane area at about 6, 000, but the American mllltary attach6
believes this figure is too high, even if police elements are in-
clude~

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. [puane stated on 27 August that he assumed that the 3, 800

arms issued to civilians would not be collected until Phoumi's
countercou forces withdrew or a olttlcal reement was (b)( 1 )
reached.
(b)(1)
(b )(3)

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Sec retary of State
The Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director , The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United State s Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special 0}lerations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Inte lligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Paciflc
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Comme rce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

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eo2-997
. '
532
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-' --- -~ ,_,

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Cen.tral Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
[In.t.ellie:ence_iJthis publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law.prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
1

to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~b.l:""r
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02~97532
C02 9;97 532 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02997532 (b )( 1)
(b )(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02997532

~02997532
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:Sb.~
'-I ....,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Finland: Khrushchev may use. his visit to Helsinki

beginning on :2 September to exploit Soviet claims .of Scandinavian
involvem·e nt in the U-2 incident. T,he-visit was arranged at Soviet Pi u
initiative. Since there are. no pressing bilateral problems, the C/ ~
main purpose of the trip may be to ·provide an opportunity for the
Soviet premier to reinforce his warnings of the dangers of Amer-
ican po_licy for the Scandinavian countdes and to expand his re-
cent statements in Austria designed to intimidate neutral states
into supporting the bloc campaign against US overseas bases. He
also can be e,Xpected to reaffirm his peaceful coexistence policy
and his continuing interest in high- level exchanges with free~world
leaders.I I

i
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firan: The resignation of Premier Eqbal on .28 August is

pafrOrtlie Shah's effort to salvage some of his seriously dam-
aged prestige. The Shah is insisting -that others must make
"sacrifices" in order to relieve him of blame .for the rigged
and grossly mismanaged elections which are still going on in
Iran. Sh~rif Emami, the newly app<?inted acting premier, has
been min,lster of industry a.p.d mines. While the· Shah's plan
fl ((b)~~
appa:rent.l y 'ls to aUow the new parliament to convene on the basis
of the current electiol).s, amend the electoral law, and then.hold
I
· I11
,.--------- ----' new elections, he may come to .feel that outright nullification of
the present elections is necessa even thou h not as "le al" a (b)(3)
course as he would refer. ~

-~-~~-~-~~~-~~~~----~~-~-
(b-
) ( -"
111
9
1) 1
I II. THE WEST
•
(b)\~JJ

(b )(3)

I 1121

I
I-
Italy: l!ialian Premier Fanfani has told the US ambassador
in Rome that he hopes to hold the long-postponed nationwide lo~
cal elections--involving more than 32 million voters- - ea~ly in
November. Prior. to the elections he expects passage of a re~ ~(/
• \. 0 ( b)(~JJ
vised electoral law, an aim of which would be. to force a separa~
I
tion.between.the· Nenni Socialists and the Communists. Although
Fanfani insisted that his party has "bounced back" in public es-
_ _ __ __, teem and that the June-July disorders _in Italy have boomeranged
II
against the Communists, his estimate seems over! opti!!l!sticl I
(b) 3 ~
[ ___ ~ --- -
30 Aug 60 DAILY BRlEF ii

~
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LATE JTEMS

~epublic of the Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold

ap~s liopeful that firm UN resistance to Lumumba's pro-,
jected seizure of the Leopoldville airport will discredit Lu-
mumba and. bring about his downfall. On 27 August, a UN of-
ficial stated that Hammarskjold had received a communication
from Lumumba warning that.he· planned to take over Leopold-
----~ ville airport "within a week." On the same day, Hammarskjold ,
affirmed that the UN· would not' yield con~rol of the airport, which (b)~
it has administered since the first of a series of assaults on UN
personnel there on 18 August.
IIm•
----~ Elsewhere, open resentment in the Col)go Senate of Lu- I
mumba's authoritarian measures may lead to the arrest of op- I
position leaders. The premier has alleged that "loyal elements" '
esire.the arrest of one oooosiUQil_fil)okesman. Jean Bolikango,(b)(1) ~
(b)(3) ~

a s: e-ctencate process ot ettectmg a ponncaI ~

__J
ment ·between the Souvanna Phouma- Kong Le group and General
setne~

Pho':1m.i 's countercoup force~ has begun with the opening of the
I
(b )(3)~

National Af;;sembly session m Luang Prabang. . The King's re~

111•
II
designation of Souvanna to form a new government is a gesture
in support of Phoumi 's contention that Souvanna's original desig- {ti
nation in mid-August was illegal because the predecessor Som-
/C:...,
I1.•
sanith government ~1¢, 'b een forced to resign under duress. Sou- II
vanna must next negotiate th~ composition of his new cabinet, which
could present serious difficulties. If he tries to win a new vote of
approval fo~ the small and weak cabinet he organized in Vientiane
--·
II
two wee.k s ~o, his compromise agreement with Phoumi will almost
certai~ly breal,t down. If, on the other hand, he is too liberal in
.1mi·
granµng. cabine~ portfolios to Phoumi followers, he is likely to in- .1
vite the wrath of Captain Kong Le, whose military influence in Vien-
tiane.has diminished little, if any. IJ'he American embassy in Vien-
tiane notes that Kong is still in a co~ky mood .a nd consider~ it en-
-
II
tir~ly possible·~at he may tollow the lead of the Pathet Lao in op- (b)( 3,
posing any settlement with the "Phoumi. clique." A Pathet Lao rA
broadc~st of 28 August stated that whatever the assem~l oes ih -
Luan Prab it will be a ainst the will of the eo le. (b),(~
- (b)(1) 11
(b)(3 I
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l ~~~~~ 1
(b )( 1 ~
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Khrushchev O\'...~uui.c;:; v. .a.i:u" \.v .... .1.11.LCUAu CONFI.:._;.A'TIA L_

Khrushchev may use his visit to Helsinki on 2-5 Septemb~r ,

in honor of Finnish President Kekkonen's 60th birthday, to ex-
ploit statements in the Powers trial involving Finland, Sweden,
and Norway in the U-2 incident. The visit was arranged on So-
viet initiative and, since there are no critical bilateral prob-
lems, its main purpose may be to provide an opportunity for
the Soviet premier to reiterate his warnings of the dangers of
American policy for the Scandinavian countries. He may also
expand on his statements in Austria designed to intimidate
neutral states into supporting the bloc campaign against
US overseas bases. Khrushchev would hope that a repetition
of this line, together with a. warning that the USSR would not
"remain idle" in the face of a violation of neutrality, will
generate Scandinavian .p.ressure on Norway to adopt a more
restrictive policy on US bases.

The Soviet announcement appears to have come as a com-

plete surprise to high Finnish off~Cials. While some of them
interpreted the coming visit as a. sign of Soviet good will, the
fact that its scheduling appears to have been accomplished with
little or no coordination with the Finns appears to have caused
some uneasiness in Helsinki. Foreign Minister Toerngren has
stated that no preparations had been made .in Finland for the
visit nor did he know what matters Khrushchev wished to discuss.

One question which might be raised is that of Finland's re-

lations with the European. Free Trade Association (EFTA). Al-
though the matter has been under cons.i deration for several
months, the Finnish Government has hesitated to proceed on
grounds that there is some ilncertainty regarding Moscow's at-
titude toward Finnish me.tnbership in EFTA.

President Kekkonen is reported to be pessimistic about the

prospects for the West in the political and economic strgggle
with the bloc. Fearful that there is a real danger of war, partio-
ularJ.y over Berlin, he regards it as imperative that Finland
conduct a fore ign policy having as its basic aim the development
of "trustful" relations between the two countries. With this goal
in mind, Kekkonen has actively encouraged increased trade, mil-
itary, and cultura l contacts with the USSR. This has been evi-
dent most recently in Finnish moves to purchase increased
quantities of Soviet military equipment and in a growing num-
ber of exchan e visits b military official the t o co tr
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

TuNiWENTJ..41.
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(b)(3)

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. ~~
I ' '
~-- .....,
. ~~~ ~schar~:s Pr~~i~r .to Sbift Blame for Rigged
Iranian Elections

L Premier Eqbal's. resignation on 28 August, after the Shah

had publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
parliamentary elections in progress since early August, is
part of the Shah's Ian to resto e· _e.r_elY_damal?.e
prestige. (b)( 1)

(b )( 1)

The 9lah ·has been under considerable pressure from some

of his principal adviser13 to declare the elections void and to
dismiss Eqbal as the scapegoat. Eqbal, since he became pre-
mier in early 1957, has been a faithful executor of the Shah's
will. Because of .this, . he has become unpopular and has cre-
ated enemies among the Shah's closest associates. Sharif
Emami, the 51-year-old pro-Western minister of industry
and mines, has been appointed act~ng prem~er.
Apparently the Shah now plans to allow the new parliament
to convene, to dema.nd the passage of a new election law, and
then. dismiss it to hold new elections. The need for strong
steps by the Shah to re-establish. his authority and prestige,
however, could convince him to take illegal measures, such (b)(3)
as annulllng the elect~ons and assumin direct control of af-
fairs endin elections.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b )(3)

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~_,, SEeffE.r_._ . ..,,,

f : I
, .'
(Italian P ·rehiier Wants N~tionwide Local Elections ~arly
·'lJn ·November · .

In a talk with the American ambassador on 24 August, Pre-

mier Fanfani stated confidentially that his Christian Democratic
party has agreed on the desirability of holding nationwide local
election~ early in November. These elections have already been
postponed twice, and Fanfani said his ·party now must show the
country it has confidence in its own strength. He claims that his
party has come back in public esteem and is more popular now
than in the recent past, and says--with apparent overoptimism- -
tl:lat the Communists have lost strength because of the degenera~
tion. of the June-July demonstrations against the neo-Fascists into
Communist-led disorders.

Parliament reconvenes on 5 September, and Fanfani believes

that by early October he can secure passage of an electoral re-
form law which would tlforce" the Nenni Socialists to run separate
lists from the Communists,and the Monarchists to run separate
from the neo-Fascists. Both Socialists and Monarchists have
urged passage of the new law' which would drop the present ma-
jority requirement and adopt a modified proportional system for
.the provincial elections .. Both parties indicated a degree. of ap-
proval of the present Christian Democratic government by abstain~
ing rather than voting against it in. the confidence vote on. 18 July n

Fanfani said Nenni "would get his .t hroat cut" if he returned

to his alliance with the Com~uni~ts. The premier believes that
60 percent of the· Socialist party hierarchy and an even larger pro- (b )( )
portion of the party's electorate su ort Nenni's stand favorin 3
.----l"""""""'"'o~.Y~fr_o_m_the Comml.lDists. L--~~~~~~~~~~~~~--;

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

30 Aug 60 ri:~TD AI l~TS:l I 1r-.i:~1ri:

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~ -CO~'FID£!VTTAk_ .._,,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affal_r s
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelltgence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secre tary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operaticms, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Sec retary of Defense for Special Operations .
-Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, bepartment of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Sec retary of Commerce
Feder.al Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
·The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

CONF'iDENTJA I
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C02997533

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
l c l h i s publication is based on all sources, including (b}(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publicati.on rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized pei·son, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit; of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~~ ..... -.--
Approved for Release: 2016/07j05 C02997533
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C02 99 753 3
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~ J
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. TIIE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Japan: Peiping. has moved to dispel

any impression that it is willing·to resume full-scale trade
w.i th Japan in the ~bsence of a government-level trade agree- o K---
ment. In late August a Japanese visitor q~oted Chou En-lai
as saying that even in the absence of su~h a pact, trade could
be resumed under. contracts between industrial interests. The
Japanese Government received this report with caution, ·but
hopes were revived among Japanese ·bus1nessmen that trade
might be resumed. On 12 September, however, Peiping re-
leased the minutes of the late A\lgUst conversation, and quoted
Chou·as having asserted that Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda,
instead of meeting China's preconditions for government-to-
government agree:rnents, had made statements which were "not
good," and that China must therefore "w~t and see." Chou in-
dicated that no significant trade with Japan is possible without
a government.~ 1eve1 trade pact. I '--~~~~~~~~~~~~~

*Communist China-· Guinea: Peiping signed.aid, trade, and

friendship agreements with Guinea during P r esident Sekou Toure's
visit in Communist China this week. The joint communique re-~
leased on 13 Septembe r states China has extended an interest--· c:J A:::.
free $25,000,000 credit to Guinea and signed a trade pact call-
ing for almost $10,000,000 in annual exchanges. During Toure's
visit to Moscow last.week, the USSR agreed to increase its eco-
nomic support to Guinea by participating in the construction of
the Konkoure River aluminum -~hydroelectric development proj-
ect.

i
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'-------------~

II. ASIA- AFRICA

. Indonesia: President Sukarno's "temporary suspension" on

13 September of all political activity in Indonesia frees him from
the necessity of making a direct choice between the army and
the Communists. It also frees U>.e army from having. to decide
0 /:!_,
at this time on.whether to oppose Suka:r;-no further by extending
its anti-Communist ban . . Sukarno's action will permit him to
proceed more easily with organization of hls N~tlonali}i'~ont, a mass
organ! n hich he ex ects all arties and roups to coop-
---~lr-'-<--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___J.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ l(b)(3)
(b )(~
1)
(b~ 3

*Congo: \fudependent African st ates are wavering in their sup-

port for Hammarskjold's Congo policy. Many of the current pro-
posals being informally considered by UN members , including
- - - - - . Ghana's suggestion of a good offices commission of Afro-Asian
members of the UN Command to mediate differences between
KasaV1,1bu .and Lumumba, wowd have the effect of helping Lurnum- '}lAJ
ba. Khrushchev, in bis strongest attack on Hammarskjo,l d's handling
of the Congo crisis, charged on 13 September that the UN secr~taty
general is "consciously working in the interests of the imperiaJjsts8
_ _ ____, tin Leopoldville, Kasavubu moved to ·gain t)le upper hand by
surrounding the radio station--released from UN control og

14 Sept 60 DAILY f3RIEF ii

Gsm_inlster
September along with alrfielde- -wlth loyal troops, while his
of informatloij broadcast an appeal for popular support
and announced that Lu~umba was being sought for arrest. Re-
laxation of the UN ban cm air acttvity will probably enable Lu-
mumba to utilize Soviet transport aircraft to re.i nforce hls troops
in the Kasai region..:.] I
(Page 5) '---- - - - - - - -- - - - -------'

14 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

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,._; SECREZ_ '-'
· Pe~ping Indicates Extensive Trade With Japan Not Imminent

Communist China has moved to dispel any impression in

J apan that Chou En-lai's recent remarks to a Japanese visitor
foreshadowed an imminent resumption of full-scale. trade. Ac-
cordiJ1g to the visitor, Chou told him on 27 August that even in
the absence of a government-level agreement, trade could be
resumed on a fairly extensive scale through contracts between
industrial interests.

On ~2 September, Peiping released its version of the conver-

sation. According to this, Chou s~d the embargo imposed in
1958 would be relaxed to permit private trade contracts. He im-
plied, however, that extensive trade was impossible in the ab-
sence of a _government-to-government agreement, which Tokyo
has resisted. Chou further emphasized that China stands firm
on its preconditions for such an agreement--that Japan end its
hostile attitude, stop supporting the "two Chinas" concept, and
refrain from impeding normalization of relations. He added
that, instead of meeting China's conditions, Prime Minister Ikeda
had made statements which were "not good;' and China must there-
fore pursue its "wait and see" attitude.

Hoping that a taste of direct trade will increase pressure in

Japan for meeting Chinese terms, an official Chinese Communist
trading concern recently placed three orders for heavy machinery
from Japan. Perhaps to make c1e·a r that there is no alternative to
direct trade, Chinese Communist authorities in Hong Kong have re-
portedly tightened up the poorly enforced prohibition against indi-
rect trade through that colony and have again urged Hong Kong mer-
chants to boycott Japanese goods.

The Ikeda government has adopted a cautious attitude and has

indicated that in no case would measures to improve relations with
Communist China be taken until after the Japanese elections ex-
pected in November. Although Japanese businessmen's hopes for
resumption of trade with Communist China have been stimulated
by Peiping's recent statements and action, widespread awareness
in Japan that Peiping has manipulated the trade issue for political
purposes has created. consid le_ausnicion. esoecial.4.,L__......"""""'....._-~
some lar e Ja anese firms . (b)(3)
(b)(1)

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Communist China Strengthens Its Ties With Guinea .·

Peiping has announced that it will pro-vide Guidea with·eco-
nomic aid .amounting.to $25,000,000 during the next. three years,
under. an agreement concluded during Sekou: Toure's. visit to Com-
. munlst China. A trade agreement. calling for an annual exchange
of almost $10,000,000 in goods also was negotiated during. the
Guinean president's stay in Peiping. The. joint commbnique on
Toure's visit, released on.13 September, reveals that ln addi-
tion to the economic ·a gl'eements a Chinese-Guinean friendship
t;featy was signed by Chou . En~ Lai and Toure.
Although the· $25,000,000 interest-free credit represents the
first formal "economic and technical cooperation" agreement be~·
tween ·P eiping and Conakry, 60 Chinese "~rlculturallsts" have
been working on rice cultivation proj~cts. in Guinea since.the spring
of this year. The new agreement presumably allo~s for additional
Chinese technicians to enter ·Guinea to assist in the projects to be
implemented under the crec:Ut. .
. Chinese trade with Guinea thus far has been slight. However,
if the goals r;Jet by the ·commercial agreement are reached, Peiping
may account for about ten percent of Guinea's ~ual. foreign trade.
Prior to .vlsiting China, Toure spent a few days in Moscow wh~re
he was assured of receiving additional Soviet economlc aid. The So~
vlet Union ag:reed to extend its $35,000,000 long=term crec:Ut to in~
clude ·assistance for Guinea's Konkoure River hydroelectdc dam and
aluminum development scheme. Moscow also announced that it plans
to extend the Conakry-Mamou rai road Soviet en neers are to build
to Kankan in eastern Guinea. (b)(3)
(b )( 1 )

cONFIDEJ'l!TlA L_

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'61 . -SECRET- ...,.;

President Sukarno Bans Activities of All Political Parties

President Sukarno issued a temporary ban .on the activi-

ties Of all political parties on 13 September, apparently after
having gone through the motions of submitting it for discussion
at an emergency meeting of regional and national officials·. He
apparently plans to decide by 30 November ·which. parties may
operate legally. ·

The ban reportedly was drafted by the army at Sukarno's

request as a compromise solution to the problem posed by the
army's. proscription of Communist activity in three .military
commands .last month. The army's move in August was a di-
rect challenge to Sukarno, who has conciliated the Commun~sts
and who, on 17 August, had dissolved the anti-Communist
Masjumi and Socialist parties. The new all-party ban frees .
Sukarno from the necessity of making a direct choice between
the army and the Communists and obviates an army decision
on whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending its anti-
communist ban. . .
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

The ban will permit Sukarno to proceed more easily with

his Na tional Front, a mass organization in ·which he expects
all parties and groups to cooperate . He installed the 63-mem-
ber centrai board of the National Front on 8 SepteII)ber ; at
least 18 membe rs--28 percent of the membership--are sus-
ceptible to Communist direction. Should the front become a
viable organization, it could be a considerable asset to the
Communists by provi d henLaJr.OYe.rn1rumt orlranizatil..... ..__ _ _~
within_which to w.ork. (b )(3)
(b )( 1)

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(b )(3)
·The Co:ngo Situation

Jjvobbling support .by Jp.dependent African states, at least in

part a result of Soviet pressure, ls frustrating.Secretary General
Hammars~jQld's efforts to gain.the. backing of the UN Security
Council for st-rengthening.- hls hand in dealing w~th - the Congo situ-
ation] . . ·
~t the 12 September Security ·council session, all proposals
which were under informal.consideration. seemed to be disadvanta-
geous to Kasavubu, and the session was postponed when it appeared
that any ·early action by the council would almost certainly help
Lumumba. Tunisia was already feeling Soviet .pressure; exerted
.through such Afro-Asian states as Guinea, ~ndonesia, the UAR,
Morocco, and Ghanf]
~ile the British Government h~s so far ·been reluctant to
comm.i t itself to supporting either Lumumba or Kasa'Vl,lbu ·.until
. the situation is clarified, its UN delegation takes the position that
Lumumba.is more likely to win out. The delegation is th_e refore
encouraging Ghana's plan to propose that. a .good offices committee
. composed of the Afro-Asian members of the UN Command in the ·
Congo (UNOC) be established by the. Security Council. to resolve the
crisis through mediat.lon~

~rushchev, in_. the strongest Soviet attack on Hammarskjold

to date, charged on.13 September·that the UN secretary general. ls
"consciously work~ng in the interests of the imperialists" in the
Congo and that his actions "dovetail with the policies of the coun-
tries whi~h. have always esp~used the positions of colonialism."
Answering questions aboard the Baltika, the Soviet premier -de-
nounced Hammarskjold's insistence that all. aid to the Congo Gov-
ernment be chan11eled thro~gh the UN as a .f urther effort to uphold
colonialist interests, and indicated that he· may press ther-C;=...o=n~g'"""o:....___---. (b)(3)
issue at the forthcomiiuz ~ General Assembly meetin~
I . . J . (b)(3)

cJn Leopoldville, President Kasavubu quickly sent loyal. troops

to surround the radio station after.the UN on 13 Sept.ember.lifted
its ban on air trafilc and radiobroadcastlng. In an effort to gain
· .the upper,hand in the fight against Premier Lumumba, Kasavubu's
minister."of information, Jean Bolikango, broadcast a promise to
make an il.11-out effort to relieve hunger and unemployment and :J

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~ ~ ~
. l'a.nnounced that Kasavubu had signed a new arrest warrant for
Premier Lumumba and six of his cabinet ministers=.]
. .
~resident Nkrumah of Gha.n a warned Hammarskjold on 13
September that if Lumumba were not allowed to use Radio Leo-
poldville, Ghana would withdraw its 2,300 troops from the UN
Comman4 and reserve the right to place them entirr-e-'1.- ~ at-'--'-
th_e_ _ _----,
,.................cv:sal of the 111.e.f!itlmate Lumumba government." (b )( 1)
(b)(1)

[)luring this struggle for power between Kasavubu and Lumumba,

1 oseph Ileo, the premier-designate of Kasavubu, remains ln Brazza-
ville where he ls under the protection of President Youlou--tribally
related to Kasavubu--of the Congo Republic ·(the former French
Congo) . Youlou has glven all possible support to Kasavubu, and
now plans to provide him wlth small arms and financial asststanc·e
to organize demonstratlons1
t:Although the UN wlll retain control of main airport installations
and approaches, relaxation of the UN ban on non- UN a:tr flights will
probably permit Lumumba to utilize Soviet transport aircraft to air-
lift ·reinforcements and additional supplies to the Ka.s at. During the UN
ban, these planes have been groundedJ
~.he Congolese parliament on 13 September reaffirmed its support
of Lumumba and granted him virtually unlimited powers. Most oppo-
sition members were absent, however, and it is questionable whether
the assembly mustered a quorum. Nevertheless, the vote ·reflects
the Kasavubu group's contlnuiruLbt ii brin he sitlon to
Lumumba into the open. (b)(3)
(b )( 1)

14 Sept 60 CEl'JTDAI INTFI 11r,FNCE BULLETIN P~e 6

Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C02997533
C02 99 75 33

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign lntelltgence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Polley
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sl;lcretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Sec retary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter.national Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air· Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff , United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chair man
National Security Agenc y
The Di rec tor
National Indications Center
The Director

ThJiVFH>ENTIAk_
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I -_-:'I~.._--~~ .......

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C03004220 ~- -- - - --
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03004220

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or ag·ency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
I I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prej udicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

T~
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03004220
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~TOP S£CRErJ
CENTRAL INTELLIG~EN--=-c=e=----cs=--=-u--=-o-L-=-=LE"""""l~IN-o------ --'
3 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF •• i'

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

I I. ASIA-AFRICA

*Republic of the Congo: UN Secretary General Hammar-

sk)old announced ln Leopoldville late on 2 August that UN
. troops w,111 enter Katan:ga Province on 6 August. Dr. Bunche
reportedly will go to Elisabethville on 5 August to lay the f1. o
groundwork for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the
province.
The threat by the ·Lumumba government to expropriate
all Belgian firms which do not reopen for business by 10 Au-
. gust may stimulate new anti-European iIJ,cidents in the Congo.
The security situati9n remains uncertain; tdbal warfare has
flared up once again in Kasai Province. The UN forces appear
hesitant about becoming involved in the tribal warfare, and of-
ficial statements have characterized it as "an internal matter"
beyond UN j':1risqiction. (Page 1)

Pe.r sian Gulf Oil: A sharp break in the posted prices of Per-
sian GUlf c.rude oil appears imminent. For the past several
months the Western-owned oil companies have fourid it necessary
to· grant substantial discounts to sell this oil. The drop is ex-
,pected to be more .t han 10 percent--a somewhat larger cut than 11_ o
the.18-cents-pera·barrel. reduction made in early 1959. The 1959
reduction-"."'the first in.the Persian Gulf--cost the oil-producing .
states there an estimated $140,000,000 in expected 1959 revenues.
Reaction to the prospect of an additional drop is ~xpected to be
even more severe than in 1959 and will add to frictions between
. the Ar~bian-.,American Oil Company and Saudi Arabia, betWeen
the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company and the UAR, and .between
the Iraq Petroleum Company and Iraq. Arab governments are

lthe
almost certain.to step up their pressures for a ~reater voice in
management of Western-owned oil concerns.

~I

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. . Aden: {iritain is planning a showdown with Nasir-controlled
labor unions in Aden whose activities are disrupting the colony's
~------, conomy and threaten eventually to challenge British control.
egislation is to be passed which will outlaw strikes, make ar~
itration compulsory, and provide for unusually severe penal-
.___ _ _ _ ~ies for strike leaders. The proposed legislation may lead to a
general strike and violent demonstrations which could paralyze
all port activity. The British appear confident that ~uritv
precautions they have taken can contain the situatio~-
1 I . ~~

Indonesia: Political maneuvering among major power ele-

ments is increasing. The army, which apparently instigated
last week's anti-Communist demonstration in South Sumatra and
plans others, is testing how far it can go without incurring strong
reaction from Sukarno. The ·Communists, who recently indulged
in open criticism of the government, are apprehensive over Su-
karno's failure to prevent the ·army from harassing them. Sukarno
thus far has employed his usual tactic of maintaining the uneasy
balance between the ~rm and the Communists withmrt_,compromis-
ing his own position. j
L---------------~
I

3 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

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~TOP~

Sltuation in the Congo Continues Critical

UN Se.c·retary General Hammarskjold announced late on 2 Au-

gust that UN troops will move.into Katanga Province on 6 August.
Dr. Bunche reportedly· will go to Elisabethville on 5 Au.g ust to lay
the groundwork for Belgian evacuation of the province. ffiammar-
1, J skjold had been under growing pressure from the Congolese cab-
I
.,. ,;
1.,"
'· ' inet which had threatened to appeal to the UN Security Council to
hasten the entrance of UN forces into Kat~ga.:J The Secretary Gen~
eral has apparently postponed his scheduled trip to South Africa
until next week in case Katangan Premier Tshombe should carry
. out his threat to oppose UN military intervention. CThere has been
t ) , } !'.. .
\
I no official Belgian announcement as to the status of Belgian. troops
in Katanga although it is reported that Brussels has apparently ac-
cepted the inevitability of an early withdrawa!J

The threat by the Lumumba government to expropriate all

Belgian firms which have not reopened for business by 10 August
may stimulate new anti- European disorders in the Congo. The
Belgian Government has estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000
Europeans remain in the Congo, compared with about 115,000
shortly before independence.

The security situation there remains precarious, with inter-

,......._.L.u.LJ.......__.,._,,._~ax:eJlaJl.inll...il.ared aP-ain
· Province. I (b)(1) C::
!.-..-~~~~~~---~~--:----..,-~--:-:-~~~~
officers of the UN force
{ ··
..( . ..l •. ,.
'1 ,.
ave yet o receive any instructions concerning the rehabilitation
of the once- effective Force Publique] Nonetheless, the UN forces
appear unwilling to take action to contain intertribal warfare; state-
ments by the UN. Command haye characterized the tribal clashes as (b)(3)
"an internal roatter" t o he handJed hv the "C1ngo Army." j l(b)( )
3
(b )(1)

(b)(3)

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-
( British Crackdown on Adeni Nationalists May Lead to Violence

The colonial governmentts announcement on 1 August that

it intends to obtain legislation which. will enable it to crack· (b)( 3 )
down on Nasir-controlled unions in Aden may lead.to a general
strike and violent demonstrations which. could paralyze all port
activity. The British move is likely to close the ranks of the
feuding leadersrof the Aden Trade Union Congress and increase
the possibility of violence. Cairo is likely to make a big prop-
aganda play over the "imperialist repression.''

Britain regards this as a showdown with Arab nationalists

.led from Cairo who are using domination of the~ labor movement
'
I --the strongest political force in the colony--to challenge con-
l tinued British control. The British feel that the unions have
been given every chance to develop responsibility but are inter-
ested only in nationalist politics, not labor benefits. Politically
motivated strikes, which the new legislation will outlaw, are
damaging Aden's economy and have· convinced U:>ndon that strong
action. is necessary . There. were over 70 strikes in 1959, and
a 70-day refinery strike. this spring just recently was brought
to final settlement. The new legislation to be voted about 15
I
I August by the colonyts legislative council Will provide for com-
!' pulsory arbitration except in certain limited circumstances.
I Instigators of "political" strikes disguised as industrial dis-
putes will be tried as felons under the criminal code.
The British apparently believe the extra security precau-
tions they have taken can contain the situation. They now have
4, 700 troops--including a commando unit--in Aden to ensure
maintenance of essential services in the event of a eneral
strike as :well as rovide internal security. {b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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.I ntensified Maneuvering in Indonesia

Indonesia's major power elements are once again inten-

sively maneuvering against one another.

The Communist party, which triggered the latest round

of maneuvering by Severely criticizing the government in an
8 July statement, now appears apprehensive over President
.------------, Sukarno's permitting an army investigation of party leaders. (b )(3)
The army has interrogated five members of the politburo
since 16 July, planned to begin a more intensive "second
phase" interrogation on 30 July, §id allegedly hopes ulti- ·
mately to br4J.g thE~ . politburo to trial on charges of violating
the criminal code. An emergenc'y meeting of Communist
provincial leaders was reported scheduled for' 20 to 23 July.
Depending on Sukarno's reaction, the Communist leadership
L------~~ is reported making plans to go underground for an indefinite
period] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _I (b)(1)
~_:__-=:::L__

Sukarno is angry over the army's activities among non-

Communist political parties and reportedly has decided to
displace .Colonel ~Ukendro, who has served as the army~
liaison.with political parties. I (b )( 1)
t__-----------~1

Although Sukarno at first interfered with the army's in-

terrogation of Communist party. leaders, he now seems in-
clined to wait and see how far the army is prepared to go and

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"-' ~ ~·

what resources the Communists can muster. Several times

during the past two weeks, however, he has, in effect, ~eas­
sured the Commw1ists by stating publicly that his views. coin-
cide in many areas with those of the party. &ikarno undoubt-
edly desires to preserve the party as a balance against army
ower in. order to maintain his own re""e ent i

(b )( 1)

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·co3004220
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. •'
~ CU1'¥F1V"L1'\' l J A 1, _ -....,.;

" THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Moblll.zation
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sec retary of State
The Under Sec r e tary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inte rnational Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air F o r ce
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Direc tor , The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operatio ns, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United State s Marine Corps
Assistant to Sec r etary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Ass istant Chief of Staff, · Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Direc tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

l".ONF'Jf)gNTIA I .
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I
I

c~13oo i377 1'/////////////////////////////////////////////////

• ~ _ • • ._;pprovi\~;;:1ea~300:,7 ~(3)

~ 1 March 1961
~
~(3)
~
"(b)(3)
~ Copy No. c I ~

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--· - .. -.- - - -- _, • •- - - 1------:~

•. I
-·- .• :ii ~ .
I
'
.
I•
I
C0'3007 377 ...........
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03007377
r.._; TUP~ET ,..._

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as m uch consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
I I . (b )( 1)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain in telligence ite~s in this pu blication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for th e benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b )( 1)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03007377

 'Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03007377
'-' s~~ ...,

1 March ~961

CENTRAL INTELIJGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

2. USSR- UN: Contrary to previous report, Gromyko

will attend resumed General Assembly session in
March. (Page H)

3. Mali: Bloc offers to purchase entire 1960-61 pea-

nut crop. (Pa.ge tt)

5. Israel - Arab States! Forthcoming Israeli test mo-

bilization may be used by Nasir as occasion to de-
nounce Israel. (Page tt t)
6. USSR: Comment on Kalchenko's dismissal. (Page ttt)

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"T~ [ ~-----------~

~USSR:-UN:(jhe designation of Foreign Minister Gromyko

to head the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly which
· resumes on 7 March apparently marks a change in Soviet plans .
. Khrushchev may wi~h to. show that despite his harsh attacks on
• Hammarskjold and Western policy in the Congo, he has not lost
interest in im:proved relations with the US and a meeting with the
President. Gromyko told the Finnish foreign minister in mid- ~
- - - ------. February that neither he nor Khrushchev would return to New
York for this session of the UN but indicated that Khrushchev
was still willing to come to the US for talks with the President.
One of Gromyko's purposes may be the arrangement of such a
-----~ meeting. The decision to send Gromyko coincides with an inten-
sive effort by the Soviet UN delegates to confine General Assem-
bly debate to a few items so as not to hinder restoration of "norr·
mal" US~Soviet i:;elationS:-}-\ - (b )( 1).
(b~
l\i;[ali~Bloc:CMali is reportedly engaged in negotiations based\ (b2C3)
oh a joint Soviet~ Czech offer to purchase Mali's entire 1960- 6 /
:peanut crop- -about 50,000 metric tons--for approximately I
$20,000,000. Since this single commodity accounts for about
90 percent of the country's export earnings, consummation of th
- - - ------. deal would lead to an early reorientation of the Malian economy
toward the bloc. France has offered to continue taking Mali's
'
(b) 3)
I
peanuts at premium prices, but Mali's leaders are apparently - - -- ---
-----~ attracted by the willingness of the bloc countries to make a 25-
percent payment i~ US dollars and by the prospect of shar 1 re-
ducing Mali's economic dependence on France) I

1 Ma.r 61 DAILY BRIEF ii

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(b){3)

Israel - Arab States : A surprise test mobilization of Israel's

armed forces is scheduled to take place shortly after 2 March.
Jordan has been informed of the impending test through UN arm-
istice commission channels. Nasir, who will probably also learn 6K
of the test, is nevertheless likely to use it as an occasion to de-
nounce Israel during his current campaign to generate more en-
thusiasm in Syria for the union with Egypt. The scheduling of the
test at this time is probably designed by the Tel Aviv.'government
to unify the country following the disruption caused by a govern-
ment crisis over the Lavon affair and to stren then Ben-Gurion's
Mapai party in new elec.ti.Q
L
7J *USSR: The dismissal oruKraiman Premier KaicnenRo tor-a~ -
cultural failures emphasizes Khrushchev's determination to achieve
a sharp improvement in Sovie~ agriculture this year, and serves
notice on officials responsible for agricultural performance at all
levels that they stand to lose their jobs if they fail to get results.
Numerous lesser officials have been fired on similar grounds since(] IC
January, when the party central committee aired the agricultural
problem. Kalchenko, who has been government chief in the Ukraine
since 1954, has been replaced by Vladimir Scherbitsky, one of the
Ukrainian party secretaries. Many more members of the party
central committee may be involved in the weeding out process be-
fore a new co'mmittee is elected by the next party congress i.n Oc-
tober. [ jCBackup, Page 6)

1 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii

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Mali

In the five months of its existence Mali has established

diplomatic relations with six bloc countries, including the
USSR and Communist China, received a large number of
visiting bloc delegations, and sent a number of special mis-
sions to bloc countries. Except for one rather vague eco-
nomic agreement with Czechoslovakia signed last Novembei:;
these contacts have so far produced few overt results.
Nevertheless, the way seems to be open for the bloc to pen-
etrate Mali as it has done in neighboring Guinea. The USSR
is !mown to have been developing a comprehensive plan for
the industrial development of Mali, while the Czechs have ,
evinced interest in Mali's civil aviation, industrial develop-
ment, and geol<?gical surveys. Malian Minister of Commerce
Ndour~ stated last week that he was "inundated" with bloc
economic proposals, adding that he was under heavy politi-
cal pressure to accept such offers without delay.
Mali's Marxist-influenced one-party regime is moving
to reduce French influence. The regime, motivated by a
militant anticolonialism, considers such a reduction a
necessary prerequisite to the attainment of its proclaimed
goal of "total" political and economic independence. Atthe
same time Malians continue to resent the part ijiey believe
French elements played in neighboring Senegal's secession
from its former federation with Mall last summer. After
finally acceptirig the federation's demise , Mali's leaders
declared their country's dissociation from the French Com-
munity and .began to institute measures aimed at undercut-
ting French commercial interests.
(b )( 1 )

g me spo es- (b)(3)

men nave rett ur e CIOurn- tnat tur tner es to reduce
French influence--especially in the economic sphere-- (b )( 1)
..__ _ __.. would be forthcoming. A decision to shift the bulk of Mall'.51

l:Ol~"FID6NTIA L

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CHI NA

...·......
·······.
CHINA

*New Delhi

INDIA

• AREAS CLAIMED llY .

CHINA IN BHUTAN BURMA

0 MILES 300 (b )(3)

30942

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export trade to the bloc would suggest a pos~ible early break

with the French franc currenc zone.
(b )(1 )
(b)(3)
r

~l\.TTIAI
\,;,-\;,ll"l-FHJ~

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High Soviet Official Dismissed for Agriculture Failures

Khrushchev showed strong dissatisfaction with the condition of

Ukrainian agriculture early in the central committee meeting in mid-
J anuary when he interrupted the speech of Ukrainian party chief
Podgorny, a member of the ruling party presidium, with sharp
criticism. The first sign that Kalchenko was personally in trouble,
ca~e only a few days later when Khrushchev, ln hls own speech,
accused the Ukrainian Premier of panicking with disastrous re-
sults, during_a drought in 1956. ''There he sits," said Khrushchev,
"a member of the central committee and everything.rolls off him
as water does off a duck's back. lt doesn't matter to him that he
made a mistake."

Vladimir Matskevich, like Kalchenko a former subordinate

of Khrushchev's in the Ukraine, was fired as Soviet agriculture
minister in December. Their ousters and Podgorny's precarious
· position are further signs that the Ukraine and Khrushchev's old
associates can no longer expect special tre_a tment from Moscow

The new premier, Vladimir Shcherbitsky has been a secre-

tary of the Ukrainian party organization since late 1957, special-
izing in industrial matters. He is one of several younger party
administrators who have been brought recently into prominence.
A party member only since World War II, Shcherbitsky got
started in the Ukrainian party organization during the early 1950's
and became party boss in the industrial center of Dnepropetrovsk
in 1954. He attracted the attention of the Moscow leadership, and
was given a seat on the party's Central Auditing Commission at the
Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in 1956. ~ I --------~ (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

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CONF}BE,~TlA L_ "fl
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Advise r to the President
The Di rector of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, Notional Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Deportment of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Coope.ration Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretory of De fense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Nava l Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant , United States Mari ne Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chi ef, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Stoff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Stoff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence , Department of Novy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel I igence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Departm.ent of Justice
The Attorney Gene ral
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National lndi cations Center
The Director

-CulVFIDENTlAl:_

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~ TOrsEGRD:__ _..

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departmen ts and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in thij publication is based on all sources, including
(b ),(3)
I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate.and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793 , 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

' •
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6 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Situation .in the Congo. (Pa.ge t)

2. Laos: Souvanna Phouma reported planning to leave on

world tour this week. · (Page t)
3. Pakistan and USSR sign agreement on oil exploration.
(Page H)

4. West Germany revalues the ma;rk. (Page H)

6. P~namanian delegate to "peace conference" may ·intro-

duce resolution. on Canal Zone sovereignty. (Page tH)

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6 March 1961
3
*Con110: The sl:::~:ln~:~ E:anana-Matadl-Kltona area :--- - ----'] )
r.emat.ns tense, and the 120-man Sudanese garrison at Matadl
has withdrawn to avert further c~ashes. Congoles·e. forces ap
b (3)

parently have ignored a cease -fire negotlated earlier by UN ·

.special representative Dayal and Congolese .Foreign _M inister
Bomoko. UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, following a
two and a half hour· emergency meeti'ng of the UN's 18-nation
Congo advisory committee, ls reported to have ordered the UN
commander to meet today with Congolese military leaders in
an effort to restore UN control in the area. Dayal confirmed
on 4 March that he had orders from Hammarskjold to hold
Banana and Kltona at all costs, and to retake them if lost,by
force if necessary.
Brussels radio has announced that Gizenga and Kashamura
wlll attend the roun.d -table conference called by Tshomb6 which
ls to begin on 6 March ln Tananarive ~ .Tshomb~ , Kalonji, and
lleo arrived in Tananarive on 4 March, and Kasavubu reportedly
will join them on 6 March, following a plea from Tshomb6 that
the conference would not succeed without hlm. The conference
i's unlikely to result ln more than broad agreements to cooperate
on ''unlfylng" the Congo. The proclamation on 4 March of the
State of Maniema, in Klvu Province, by Antoine Omarl is prob-
ably' an effort on his part to align himself with the anti-Communist
grouping. of Tshomb6, Kalonji, and lleo announced on 28 February.
It is doubtful that Omar t c ontrols enaueh of Kivu Province to make
this move significant. I
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J

Laos : &ormer Laotian premier Souvanna Phouma is report-

edly plarining to leave Cambodia between 7 and 11 March on his
: - - - - world tour seeking support for his "legal" government. Former
finance minister lnpeng Suradhay is still trying to .a rrange talks
between Souvanna fl,nd General Phoum,i. Inpeng, who arrived in
,.----~ Vientl.ane and i.uang Prabang durlng Souvanna's re cent vlsl.t t()_)

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Gebel- held territory, planned an eai:-ly return to Phnom Penh

to convey Phoumi's willingness to meet Souvanna,. possibly in
Rangoon:-)
(}. team from Taipei was expected to arr! ve in Bangkok by
6 March to negotiate arrangements for the repatriation of Chinese
Nationalist irregular troops from the Thai-Burma-Laotian border·
area. The team plans to visit villages in Laos and Thailand, where
irregulars crossing over from Burma have concentrated, to per-
suade as many as possible to return.to Taiwan. Although a Lao~
tian government spokesman has stated that Kuomintang elements
in Laos are now being disarmed,/ ~ in the border
area has re orted seeing a well-armed uniCmfils village. / I
· bout 1,000 ir-
~~:.r.:;~'"v;-;;~=--...,~~'""''"""..,......,..YTr...,..-.....nnr,,..,...,~.~ tSSJ~_ba~
ck
..._~~-

· Pak1stan~ USSR: v:t'he agreement on oil exploration signed in \

Karachi on 4 March after several months of bargaining is the first
major Soviet aid program accepted by the Pakistani Government.
The agreement provides for a credit of $30,000,000 to finance a
five-year program of technical assistance in oil prospecting and
surveying. The credit carries the usual favorable terms--repay-"1'====~
. ment over 12 years at 2.5- percent interest. Pakistani officials,
impressed by the discoveries of Soviet teams in India and Afghan-
istan, hope that the Soviets will succeed where Western oil com-
panies have failed. Leaders of the military government probably
are also motivated by po.itical considerations. WhHe maintaining
J>akistan's commitment to its Western alliances and continuing to c . . . __ _ __

rely strongly on US aid, President Ayub and his associates have

sought in recent months to demonstrate a greater "independence"
in. foreign policy as a reminder that Pakistan's cooperation shou.l d
not be taken for granted. L .
]<Backup, P~ge 3)
West Germany:Qn a sudden move, Bonn has raised the ex-
change value of the West German mark 5 percent in an effort to ({) t:-
halt the steady influx of for~ign exchange--chiefly dollars- - which
has contributed to US balance=of=payments difficulties. The:Netherlands
---~ has announced tha~ the guilder is being similarly revalued. Althoug~

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[Ger.man government an4 banking.efflclals-..;;~nd~r. strong pres- ·:: )

~~,'it
SU1'es fr.om ·industrial and··commerclal interests...:·-·had re.,. .. . ~~
peatedly rejected revaluation, the failure of Bonn's recent
· easin,g in its tight monetary policy to correct West Germany's
chroriic billion-dollar payments surplus and the threat of •'0.>.7:¥{~{1

another wave of speculation apparently convinced Bonn offi- (b)(3) .:~~

----~ cials that a more realistic pegging of the mark was unavoid-
~ble . This action~~w~ich applies a 'bi'aka on inflation but (b)(1 )"~~""
also makes Germane orts more ex ensive' - - - - - -- , - - - - - - '
ay be
intended to demonstrate Chanc~llor Adenauer's willingness to
take additional ste s to ease ressure on the dolla~ [ J ·,

.( ~Jl 3)

(b)(3)l i

(b)(1 )
~-1;~~
(b)(3)~ . ; '
":~ ~~:~r
:.'···
1·

Latin America:0 demand for full Panamani;µi sovereignty

in. the Canal Zone is likely to be one of the propaganda high_lights
of the Communist-backed "Latin American Conference on National
Sovereignty, Economic· Emancipation, and Peace," meeting in
Mexico City from 5 to 8 March. Pro-Castro deputy Thelma King, :,~m.l
head of the Panamanian .delegation, reportedly will introduce the
~~-
_ _ ____,·resolution on th~ CanaJ Zo.n e and another coridemlling US "aggres- :•.;. ~·

sion against Cuba." . The conference is sponsored pr_incipally by (/) /:'- (b)(3)
:;.~'.~~
former Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas, a Stalin Peace i ~'.·ot

-=
·\~~~ ..
Prize winner ·whose prestige .as a revolutionary is high in Latin ,.,,.......
~-

America, although he has allowed himself to be .us d increasin ly .~:::_

. l.b.Y..:.b__o.1lLCami and the Communists. (~J3)
(b)(3)

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Conqo

MALAYA
150
Gemcna

. , .-, ~

Scattered Forcer -8
~ '"'M""'o,.,..a'""
ur-u""
~ 1;500

TUNISIA
2,600

MALAYA.
610 .

·,
'
GHANA
1,900

SUDAN
390
. - .. ...
-

,! i -·· - •
:1

,...e Luanda Approxlmale area controlled by:

.'; 0 Kasavubu-Mobutu
EJ
•
Gizenga
htonji
'
D f sho_mbe
00 United Nations Forces
( ) f1 "*:n - - Selected road
"t"
0
X
Selected railroad
Selected airtield
Cut railroad
liTA T U TE M I LEb •oo
\
·-.
I
'
. :' 31594 c (b)(3)

I
I
iI
I
[
!
l
I

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v ~ ""

Situation in the Congo

The fighting around Banana has resulted in casualties

on both sldes--which will make it even more difficult for
either UN or Congolese forces in Leopoldville to control the
situation. ! jC ongolese troops have used (b)(1)
artillery, mortars, and even as 11 m hibious o eratlon
against the Sudanese UN forces. (b )( 1)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _!the incident co._ul-=-=
d__,t,--o_u_
c-=--
h-o--=f=
f -=f_,....
ig-=h~t~
in
_g_e~s
-e--__J
(b )( 1)
where.

(b )( 1)
e g um w no ms s on
'"--;;Je
"'p
.-.a
"-r
= ur
~e•o
=<n=."'e~""
e r.9't.,.
an---....-.-~ ry, par a military, and ·p oli t-
lcal personnel who are under contract to the Katanga govern-
ment. Military technicians not under contract- -probably
about 40 in various ministries of the Katanga government--
apparently will be recalled, however. Tshomb~ would react
strongly to such a move.

Glzenga, after having indicated several times that he

would not attend the Tananarive conference, informed UN of-
ficials on 4 March that he was eager to participate and asked
the UN to furnish transportation. The conference, originally
planned for Geneva, was suddenly .reset for Tananarive on 1
March- -apparently without the M~agasy governme".n t's having
been consulted. The r e is no known agenda, but some .reports
indicate that the conference will last for six days. Malagasy
President Tslranama, who apparently will take no part in the
meetlngs1 on 3 March broadcast advice to the population to
receive the Congolese as brothers but not to take sides with
any faction. j I (b )(3)
Meanwhile, Gizenga continues to explore ways of getting
outside help for .his hard-pressed regime. / (b )( 1)
- --

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(b)(3)
._,r~~I~~~~~-----"

(b )( 1)

(b )(1)
(b )(3)

~I (b)(3)

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Pakistan and USSR Sign Agreement on. Soviet Aid in Oil Ex-
ploration ·

Agreement in principle on the Soviet credit was reached

in Moscow in December during the visit of the Pakistani min-
.ister of fuel, power, and natural resources, but consumma-
tion of the deal was delayed pending further negotiations in
Karachi. Pakistani officials had originally hoped that Moscow
would agree to share the expense. of exploration if oil is not
found--Pakistan paid only 25 percent of the cost of explora-
tion undertaken by Western oil companies--but this idea was
promptly dismissed by Soviet negotiators. Pakistani officials
also pressed for even more favorable credit terms than they
received, including repayment in nonconvertible rupees. In
the end Pakistan apparently conceded its main points, al-
though the Soviets, in agre.eingtorupee repayment, probably
assl,lred Pakistani officials that Moscow·would not demand
conversion to hard currency unless acceptable exports were
not available .

. The Soviet ambassador recently discussed publicly the

possibility of additional assistance in such areas as atomic-
energy development for peaceful purposes, medical training,
and agrarian problems. He. also expressed hope that a cul-
tural agreement would be signed. Pakistani officials have
shown some reluctance with regard to further aid programs,
but conclusion of the oil deal may make it difficult for them
to turn down publicized offers in the. social welfare field,
because these are keyed to popular demands and have stirred
considerable public interest.
Despite President Ayub's repeated reaffirmation of
Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy and commitment to
the CENTO and SEA TO alliances, neutralist tendencies have
been increasingly evident in government circles since mid-
1960 . A number of top officials, sharing the view held by
many intellectuals and large sections of the public, question
the value of a rigid commitment to the West, noting that

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neutralist countries often gain more by exploiting the competing

interests of both major power blocs. The military government
since early this year has permitted much of the press to carry
on a sustained ·editorial campaign calling for "gradual disen-
gagement from the role of a committed nation" and for improved
relations with the bloc. The line taken by the press presum-
ably has reinforced the latent neutralist sentiment of the bulk
of the population, especially in East Pakistan.

Cm his latest conversation with Amb~ssador Rountree, Ayub

explained that in. view of Pakistants "extremely difficult stra-
tegic p.o sition"--with enemies or potential enemies on all sides,,
excepting Iran--it was essential to avoid trouble with Commu-
nist China. Ayub felt he could not secure a border settlement
from Peiping--which would ease the threat to Pakistan's se-
curity from that direction--without modifying his governmentts
~-------, position on Chinese representation in the UN and specialized (b )(3)
agencies. Ayub indicated that Pakistani delegations would
abstain on procedural questions involving the seating of Chinese
Communist representatives, and would have to vote for ac-
'--------~ ceptance should a substantive resolution coine to a voty

(},..yub and his associates also calculate that an accommoda-

tion with Peiping will increase pr.essure on India in connection
with the Kashmir dispute, and that better relations with ¥oscow
will put Afghanistan at a disadvantage in its dispute with--'-
P_a _k;..'_. · ----.
.istan over the: Pushtoonstan issue... (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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(b )(3)
Bonn Raises Value of West German J k

£Foreign exchange trading in West Germany was briefly

interrupt'ed on 4 March and· then resumed at a new rate of four
German marks to the dollar, compared with the old rate of
4.23. Later, Economics Minister Erhard confirmed that Bonn
has revalued the mark and described himself as the "initiator
and driving force behind the action." He explaine.d the move as
a necessary step to maintain the stability of the German cur-
rency and price levels in West Germany, as well as to stem the specu-
lat.i ve influx of dollars into the country. International financial
circles have long been concerned over Bonn's chronic balance-of-
payments surplus, which increased another $2 billion in 1960 for
a total. gold and foreign exchange reserve of more than ·$ 7. 5 bi~­
lion. Revaluation is intended to help correct this imbalance.
Although the move .benefits German consumers through lower
or stable prices, German businessmen and labor leaders are
critical because of .the resultant reduction of Bonn's competitive
price edge in.world mark;ets, which they fear m.ay put a damper
on Bonn's continuing boom~
[Wh.ile praising the move, some Western o.fficials have ques-
tioned whether a 5-percent revaluation is ·sufficient to reverse the
imbalance. These officials suggest that instead of an immediate
flow of dollars back to the United States, speculators might stand
pat iil anticipation of. fu~ther changes not only in the mark but in
other curre.n cies as well' )
Un a press interview on 5 March, Erhard gave assurances that
in addition to revaluing the mark, Bonn intends to go ahead wi.th
plans for a billion dollar aid program for underdeveloped .~c= oun
=---~
tries as a fu~her ineans of easing the US financial. burder>:~ (b )( 1)
(b) (3)

cONFlDE.NTlA~

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Hostility to Trujillo Intensifying

Arrests. and tortures have increased markedly in recent

weeks, particularly in traditionally anti-Trujillo cities in the
interior, according to information reaching the Americ~ Con-
su_Iate from a number· of independent sources. Although oppo-
sition to Trujillo e21;tends to all social and economic levels ex-
cept the generally politically inert peasantry, it has long been
led by middle class and professional elements who are moderate
and friendly 'to the United States. It is these groups that have
been most. gravely weakened by :the government's ·repression and
.by ~he econom,ic difficulties of the past two years. Dissident
leaders fear that un.Iess Trujillo is soon ousted, there win be
.l ittle hope of a moderate successor. ·

The military and police organizations, which remain the

key to Trujillo's survival, show no sign of disaffection. How ~
ever, relatives of certain key officers have been victims of
Trujillo in the pa.s t year, and these and othel'.' offfoers may well
desert- him if they become convinced that his end is near.

The American Consulate noted on .3 Ma:rc.h that Trujillo,

who is probably aware of the gravity of the current political and
economic situations., may be planning a simulated coup. Under
such a plan, the government would be turned over to a military
junta composed ·Of ojficers ostensibly opposed to Trujillo but
actually controlled by him. After OAS sanctions against the
Dominican Republic had . 'been lifted and the governm,ent a,ssured
of a market for Dominican .sugar in.the US, Trujillo would be
recalled. Such a .st rategy is consistent with TruUllo's mentality
and with tactics he has used in :the past. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)
l.ommmnst ana-.::astro-.ntlu=:rant in Latin American
Peace Congress

/in attack on the US position in the Ca,nal Zone would be en-

thusiastically supported by delegates to the.conference; as well
. as by observers who are attending·from most Communist coun-
tries, including China. The Panamanian demand for sovereignty
may be used as part of a campaign against us retention of the
naval base at Guantanamd:J
[Thelma King has a long record of involvement in~subversive
political activity, and her current plotting with other (b )( 1)
~~~----
Panamanian politicans has contributed to the instability of the
Chiari government. Reportedly subsidized by Castro, she has
been .successful in arousing support for him among student and
other groups3 ·

lrhe conference seems to be the fruition of Communist ef-

forts to convene a Latin Amer.l ean "people's .·congress," originally
set for Apdl 1959 when Castro's prestige .was at lts height. De-
signed to promote anti- US and pro- Castro sentiment, its agenda
includes such topics as anti- imperialism, antlcolonialism, de-
fense of national resources, and disarmament, as well as support
of ~e Cuban revolution] ·

fA secretariat drawn from Communist front peace groups in

0

sev\i~al Latin American countries has been in Me~iCo since De-

cember:working out details of the meeting. Programs to arouse
interest have .been held rece~tly. among student, labor, and cul-
tural groups in various countries, particularly in Mexico. Car~
denas--whose widespread popularity in Mexico g.i ves him some
influence in the Lopez Mateos government- - and other conference
organizers have met several times recently with the Soviet am-
bassador to Me~co, Bazykin, and two Venezuelan delegates called
on the envoy soon after their arrival on 16 Februari:)
li3azykin plans to leave soon on a Latin American tour prob-
ably designed to explore possibilities for increasing Soviet diplo-
matic and economic ties. Several countries, including Panama,
have delayed issuing visas requested by him, and Colombia has
actually refused to grant a visa, ~a,.~in ·the "time is not appro-
(b )( 1)
riate for such a visietj ___]
(b )(3)

-s
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- - - . - -- - - ----...:.:::.. \_,;

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretory of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Poll cy Planning Counci I
The Director of lntell igence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretory of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretory of Defense (Special Operations)
· The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Stoff, United States Air Force
Chief of Sta.f f, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
· U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Iied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, lntell igence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security ~ency
The Director·
The United States Information ~ency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director

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r .. ~ TO~T ,....---, ' ,

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(1 )i
I I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and prellminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelli~ence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
I
(b )( 1)

i
t

(b )( 1)
i

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CON'l'ENTS

1. Situation in the Congo. (Pa.gs t)

·i··.'$
...,.~~-
-; ,,

jj·.
3. Argentma: Frondtzi moves to mediate between US and ~
~(.4•
Cuba, (Page ft)

4• . Bolivia plans arrest of Communist union leaders if ~w..r~

teachers' strike cont~nues; requests arms from US r.:'~~·
'"#'r/f.~
for use ln case of violence. (Page tt ) ·.:,.
; ..

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

7 March 1961

DAILY BRIEF

.Cobgo: The Tananarive round-tabie conference, sched- ') k

uied to egin on 5 March, has been delayed to await the ar- .~
rival of Kasavubu and Gizenga. There has been no further
fighting between UN forces and the Congolese troops in Matadi ~ ~ J°l':;,
and Banana, ·and both UN and Congolese authorities have re- fJ"f ~
portedly agreed, for the t~e being, not to send reinforcementso
to the Lower Congo regi.on. Further clashes seem likely, how~
ever, since Hammarskjold has insisted that UN forces must
reoccupy Matadi, while Kasavubu's Foreign Minister Bomboko
stated on 6 March that Matadi would not be returned to the UN
pending a full investigation. Khartoum has announced that
Sudanese troops will be withdrawn from the Congo because
of allegep "e:rave_misiakes~ by UN officials during the recent
clashes. L _L(Backuo ,__Eag_e~l_._
) _.(.M
._.a.a.,.>£<._ _ _ _ __ _~

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(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

Argentina-Cuba: Argentina has decided to send special

envoys to the United States and Cuban governments to seek
means of alleviating "tension" between the two countries, de-
cpite its previous skepticism regarding the value of single-
<:ountry mediation efforts. This action ls probably intended
;;o counter the apparent bid of Brazilian President Quadros for ·
Latin American leadership through a play to leftist sentiment. .
.!'....!though officials have denied that domestic political considera-
tions are responsible for the move, it is probably also influ-
enced in part by the recent electoral triumph in Buenos Aires
of a Soci3.lli;J.-di!J>Jll who campaigned on a pro-Castro platform.
. (b)(3)
Backup, Page 2) ·
Bollvla: President Victor Paz Estenssoro told American·
Ambassador Strom on 5 March that his government plans exten-
sive arrests of Comm•Jn1 ~t U-ade union leaders lf the Confedera-
tion of Urb:m Teachers ... -which ls reported under strong Com-
munist lnfluence-...conUna.es its strike for higher wages after the
morning of rz March. Anticipating possible violence, Paz ls
asking for tear-gas grenades, machine-gun ammunltton, and
small bombs for use ln P-51 air.craft, from the United States.
-A substantial wage increase for teachers would strengthen
· Via~e demands from other g~ernment employees and lmpede
the Paz government's di"lve to Increase the cowitey's production.
The powerful unions of the natlonallzed tin mlnes are threaten ...
I lng to strike betlnnllng ·B March..1 ---------~ L_
(b)(~)
(b)(3)

'l Mar 81 DAILY BRIEF .. u

.... , · ;..... ,...-:;-. ~

.
,,. .
. 'I· ·-

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·A rgentlna to Se.nd Speclal Envoys to US and Cuba

In tts reply to Cuba's circular note of late February

sollcltlng sympathy from the varlous Latin American govern-
ments, Argentina announced Its Intention to send special en-
. voys to tha US and Cuban governments. Argentina apparently
acted without consulting any of the other countries ln advanc~.

A Foreign Ministry official said on ·4 March that Argen·

tina's lnlUatlve was based on the following conslderatlons:
1) the ·Cuban sltuatlon remains a dlsturblng influence on the
relations of other countries witll lhe US; 2) a solution to
....... . .. ,.;.
tbs problem must be one which will ellmlnate Soviet and Com-
munist Influence In Cuba and, without arousing leftist elements
in the hemisphere, stop Cuba's efforts to spread .Its revolution
aoroad; and 3) the ove·r throw of Castro by anti-Castro Cubans
from the US o~ Guatemala would probably prompt criticism
which would worsen Inter-American relations.

Argentina's action, however, ls probably intended pri-

marily for ~ts efiect on public oplnton both at houie and
abroad. Heretofore, Argentina has .been the strongest
crltlc of Cuba among the large Latin American countries and
has matntalned that the Cuban problem should be handled only
through the OAS. Recently, however, President Frondlzl
expressed doubt that a vote for collective action would get
even a slim majority.·

Brazlllan President Quadros' statements on Cuba In-

j· ..: crease pressure on Frondlzl to make a gesture of his own on
i ,·
·,·, . ..
• ia' . :
Cuba. A Br azlllan press report on 4 March quoted Quadros
as stating that "even supposing that there ls Communist ln-
flltratlon In the Cuban Government, the Castro revolution baa ·
our sympathies and we are not In any manner disposed to up-
:_ · . l hold any action contrary to the prlnclple of nonintervention
ln Internal ailalrs of other countries so long as Castro does
not .try to export Fldelismo~" \ (b)(1)
(b)(3)

..
.... .. .. ... . . .. - -·
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' .
'1 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Pqe a

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C03p0 7 3 7 9

THE PRESIDENT
'.-._,,.,/

The Vice President

~-----·-·

. ---
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Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defe nse Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretory of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counse lor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intel Iigence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army ·
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defenst: (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretory of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep. , Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Al Ii ed Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intel Iigence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intel I ige nce, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Stoff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Di rector
The United States Info rmation Agency
The Director
The Nat ional Indi cations Ce nter
The Director

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- 1

MSC .BRIEFING 7 December 1960

CONGO

I. Immediate question in Congo is whether Lumumba supporters in Orien~ale

Province can obtain sufficient foreign aid to make good their

"s'e cession. 11
A. Mobutu's threat to move Congo ~rmy against Orientale poses threat
of civil war.
II. Pro-Lumumba official has indicated 'to Embassy Leopoldville that
proclamation of independent Orientale Province had been decided even
I

prior to ~umumba's capture 2 December..

A. However, Lumumbist position appears vulnerable in absence of a
leader with Lumumba's rabble-rousing capacity. In · addition, they ~
1..

face serious problem in gain~ng outside material aid.

l, Although at least two emissaries have sought Soviet bloc aid
in past two months, geography likely to preclude any large-
scale supply effort.
(b )( 1 )

III. Recent Mobutu · action•, however, likely to increase international

pressures :tor political solution o:t Congo crisi• which will give
some status to Lumumba forcea.

(b)(3)
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C-031603 1 8 (b) (3)

A. Rough treatment of Lumumba after arre•t, together with Mobutut•

indefinite exten•ion of his interim government beyond 31 December,
made bad impression.
1. The USSR immediately reaponded to Lumumba'• capture with of-
ficial statement on 3 December calling for UN protection of
depo•ed premier. Another government •tatement on 5 December
demanded in acathing terms that Lumumba be relea•ed and re-
stored to authority and that Mobututs forces ~e, disarmed.
B. UN faced with problem of possible large-scale Afro-Asian defec-
tions from UN force. Ceylon announced on 7 December the withdrawal
of its token mis•ion, and UAR expected momentarily to announce
withdrawal it• 500-man battalion.
1. Nasir believed to have communicated with Afro-Asian nation•
regarding ConiO• ~ther nations, including Ghana and Guinea.
may withdraw from U'.N force.
c. Hammarskjold likely to •tep up pr essure for a roundtable political
conference of ~ongo partie• or for reconvening of parliament.
Ei t her one could be fir st step tows.rd• "regularization" of Congo
g~v_prnmeut .•

1. Once first flush of hi• victory past Mobutu may be willing

diacuaa •uch alternative•.

• Situa·t"ion in Katania po&es pr oblem• on both diplomatic and military

tronta.
A. Neither Tahomb6 nor Ka•avubu have made move• neceaaary to
reach agreement on a Congo confederation.
-2-

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1. ·Tshomb~'s current trip to Brussels--reportedly the first

move in a campaign to obtain. diplomatic recognition wherever

poasible--not likely enhance his prestige in Africa or else-

where.

B. In northern Katanga, depredations by anti-Tshomb~ Baluba tribes-

men show no sign o! letup. UN officials Elisabethville !ear that

stepped-up UN .operation ~e~uired if order to be re•tored.

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~ · ; · · 1 UI" ~I: I 0
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~ ~
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~ ~
~~ This document contains c ! ! ! ~:~!auon affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
~0
I'/ laws, US Code, Title 18, ~ections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits '/",/
I'/ its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to '/",/
I'/ an unautho~ized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial 0
~ ~r~~=~~~!~r~i!~~et:t t~et~:;::~e:t~~a~~ o~~~t'e!h~~~~=·fit of any 0
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 I -.~-_..- .... .,~: L

- -- - --~~-- -
C03160556 ~-----
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~ .._,,. ..

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligenc.e_in] this p~blication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may ·be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~Ds:'T
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31 ~
60~
55;-
6- - - - - - -(b )( 1)
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C03160556 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160556
·'W '/ 'O~.~-----­
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
· 28 July 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: A revislo ..._,,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.:;;'.~t~ of estimated characteristics and capa-

;;·~~l
~~~~~~----,,-~~~

bilitles of. the Soviet W-class submarines has resulted .in a (b )( 1)

·::~!~~~ reduction by one third in the estimated range capabilities. . This
~;'.;! reduced range would preclude W-class ·submarine wartime op-
erations off US coasts unless the submarine.s are refueled en
:s~m . '~y·
{ / ,' l.......
Toute. Of the USSR's submarine force of ~13 units, approx-
~-:~~'":7::
imately half are W-class types. About 40 Soviet snorkel-
~~;!~~ equipped ·submarines of other classes haye an operational ra-
dius--wlthout refueling- -adequate for wartime · operations along
~~I US coasts. These include 13 units probably" equipped to launch
surface-to-surface guided missiles. ~I-----------~
.. .:.-:.;;~~

ti
~,,¥"-'%
II . ASIA~AFRICA

o:
Secretary General Hammarskjold,"
'"'
w....,o"""""""P"'P"" en route to the Congo, in-
e.,.--...,n.----cJ,..
r= u=
s""
se"."'s~yeste:rday
tended to take a "very strong line" with the Belgians by asking
them to withdraw from their bases arid to acquiesce in moving UN
.·7/0,.J troops into Katanga.. The Belgian Government is opposed to the UN
f~I
~}1
;
resolution calling for Belgium's evacuation of Congo bases and hopes
by stalling on the issue eventually to be able to retain them. Brussels
1
·1
~-~
also hopes to gain sUfficient time to strengthen Tshomb~ in Katanga
and to win llraduallv broader recoP"nl H otL.OLJ:ha..Ka.tira.___p'overn-
.)_~~t
i";~~~
ment. [ ___ _____ JP~~-?) __] J
~rfil~
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(b)(1 r ;: :
(b)(3f ~'··
. .
. · .;.·

[. Turkex: General Gursel and Colonel Turkes indicated to

Ambassador Warren on 24 July that they are determined to go
ahe.a d with the forced retirement of many of Turkey's senior
~----, military officers even though they would not receive American
(b)(3)
financial support for the program . The Turks insisted they
would "find· that money somewhere:' While the ambassador warns
that he would not be surprised "by any move" Gursel may make,
it is not believed that Tur~ey · he (b)(3)
necessarv funds at this time.
(b)(3)

(b )(1)
(b)(3)

·III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to

D
(b)(3)
initiate hostilities. the Watch Com_mittee conclusiona..r..emain nea:a-
tin. L J
(b)(3)

28 July 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

C0316Q556 Approved for Release: 2016107/05 C03160556

(b)(3)

:·· .....:
.......
' ..
' ·'

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...

.,
L
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·- ~ ~' J (b)(3)
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C03 1 60556 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160556
,,_,.. :;, ~CHl:....l_ ...,

Qeerating Range of W-class Submarines Sharpl~ Reduced

A revision of estimates on characteristics and capabili-

ties of the Soviet W-cla s u (b)(1)
s resulted in a
... arp re uc on-- y one third--in the estimate of range-capa-
bilities. This reduced range would preclude wartime opera-
tions by W-class submarines off US coasts unless the sub..:
marines were refueled en route. The USSR's 223 W-class
submarines constitute approximately half of its total sub-
marine force of 413 units. Approximately 40 Soviet snorkel-
equipped submarines of other classes have an operating range- -
without refueling- -adequate for wartime operations along US
coasts. These include 13 units probably equipped to launch
surface-to-surface bruided missiles.

Estimated W-class wartime operating radii

1 day on patrol station 10 days on patrol station

(revised) 290.0 n. m. 2500 n. m.

(previous
estimate) 4100 n. m. 3700 n. rn.

W-class submarines are estimated to be 247 feet long;

they have diesel engines, snorkels, and six torpedo tubes
which are also suitable for minelaying operations.

From 1950 to 1957, the USSR constructed about 235 W-class

submarines in four ma· or hi ( b )( 1 )

1g , manne an con rolled by Soviet (b )( 1)

personne , opera e out of th~ Soviet submarine base in Valona
Bay, Albania. The remainder are based in four major Soviet
fleet areas.
Communist China, with Soviet assistance, has been con-
structing W-class submarines since 1955 and has completed
about 20.1 I (b )(3)

28 July 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

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~
·._,-
CUNt•JDt;N "l "JA I.
.
- ~
.

[ Belgians Opeose UN Resolution on the Congo J

.1__.Belgium is opposed to the UN resolution calling for the
evacuation of Belgian. bases in the Congo and will attempt to stall
its implementation. Prime Minister Eyskens has lodged protests
with. Secretary General Hammarskjold and Under Secretary Bunche
against political statements attributed to UN General.von Horn re-
garding the dispatch of UN troops to Katanga and the withdrawal of
Belgian forces from the Congo and Belgian bases. Belgian officials
maintain that Belgium's right to occupy the Kam~na ~nd Kitona mil-
itary bases was obtained in the friendship treaty signed with the
Congo Government. 1 ·
(!3russels. hopes that the passage of time will strengthen the
position of Premier Tshomb6:· in Katanga and enable him to nego-
tiate with Congolese Premier Lumumba the conditions under which
Katanga might rejoin a loose_ly formed Congo federation. J (b )(3)
(b )( 1)

I'
:..On the other hand, reports from the US Embassy in Brussels
indicate that the UK is cautioning both Hammarskjold and the Bel-
gians, advising the secretary general to "go slow" regarding the
Belgian base issue. and Ka.tanga, and warning the Belgians of the
. dangers their stand on these issues could pose for the UN effort.
The French ambassador in Brus·s els apparently has agreed to ap-
proach Hammarskjold in. support of the Belgian interpretation of.
the ~ resolution. · France continues to justify Belgian troop move-
ments to the. Congo and, because of the implications for French
(b)(3)
. bases in West Africa, will probabl o ose an effort to force Bel-
ian.trooQ..urom their. bas
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(3)

28 July 60 --.. ·-- ... . . ·--·. ·-- .. --- - · ·· - --·...

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• [ Turkish Lea~s Determined to Implement Co.npulsory
, RfJtirement Program _1

( General Gursel, the interim chief of state, and Jtis adviser

Colonel Turkes, in their recent discussion with Ambassador
Warren, left no doubt that they intend to go ahead with the com-
pulsory retirement program for senior military officers. Dis-
regarding ·warren 'a suggestion for an "effective moderate plan,"
they concentrated almost exclusively on the question of the Amer-
ican financial support they .had requested for the program. Gursel
askeq, in effect, ''Do we or do we not get the money?" Turkes
commented that the funds were needed quickly and 'We shall find
the money somewhere." J
·_The retirement plan .as originally presented to American dip-
lomatic and military representatives in Ankara two weeks ago
would result in the compulsory retirement of from 2,000 to 3,000
senior military officers, and could be .used by the National Unity (b)(3)
Committee to purge the military establishment of potential sources
of opposition. Of the 32 generals and 52 colonels and lieutenant
colonels retired on 15 July, at least one is known to be a case of
compulsory early retirement. ]
(b )( 1)
r Accordin to Warren G r el
(b )( 1)
cou no ave een more Tur ish in his unyielding at ~ (b )( 1)
'-r==
u-:'.Y7
e -=n=-=o-=
r:--:m~-='
ore
provincial in his interest in getting the money re ~
. quested. The ambassador warns that he would not be surprised at
any move Gursel may make. Turkes, who is rumored as a possible
replacement for Gursel "some day," apparently showed more emo-
tion and as much determination as Gursel and indicated neither in~
terest in nor understanding of the US position. J

!_Th[ ~ttitude of the Turkish. leaders in (b )( 1)

this matter is further indication of the probable difficulties ahead,
both within Turkey and in Turkish~ American relations. Although
Turkey is not likely to alter. its basically pro~Western orientation
and alignment, its present leaders win be particularly sensitive in (b )(3)
matters involving .prestige and soverei n and concessions will
be ranted onl t · r1?ain1
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

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CU1Yr1Ubi¥J .fAk_
. ..
• .. • ~ r.
'-' ...._,,
·•·
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Di rec tor of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Moblllzation
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sec retary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelllgence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Fo rce
The Chairman, The Jo int Chiefs of Staff
The Direc to r, The Joint Staff ·
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations , United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United State s Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence , The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelltgence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe ·
Commande r tn Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commer ce
The Secretary of Co mmerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commis sion
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Direc tor

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
ntelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
( b )(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~R~T
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(b )( 1)
' (b)(3)

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- i

30 July 1960

DAILY BRIEF
:----------~~~~~---------(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Republic of the Congo: Tension is mounting in Elisabethville,

the capital of Katanga, according to the American Consulate. The
African populace is said to fear violence stemming from Katanga's
secession. Its pro-B~lgian premier, Moise Tshombe, is making
an effort to ensure the loyalty of the Katanga Army and the police.
Although Belgian troops have been largely successful in restoring
order in Katanga, its claim to independence has been disavowed
by Tshombe's parliamentary opposition, the Balubakat party. The
consulate believes that the Lumumba government may encourage (b)( )
!l11 Incident In Katanga to dramatize "popular OpPositlon" to an ln- 3
de endent Katan a d the need for UN troops. LL_ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ l (b)(3)

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b )(3)
 (b)(1)
(b )(3)

1 a an: · e gn n s er os a mp ie o m a a t>r (b)(3)

Mac rthur on 27 July that MY move toward accommodation
with Peiping would be delayed until·after the general election
expected this fall . Kosaka stressed1 however, the government's
need to maintain a public posture ot "reasonableness and de ...
·sire" to improve relations with Japan's Communist neighbors;
~---~this might initially be limited to the negotiation of a series of
(b)(3)
technical agreements on such matters as postal affairs and mete-
orological exchanges. He expressed his personal view that the
issue of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control should be avoided
during the coming election campaign. Kosaka also appeared per~
'-----~ sonally more willing to compromise with South Korea~ -within the
limits imnosed bv· nubli.c ooinion--than did his predecessor.
(b)(3)
I

30 July 60 DAILY BRIEF· ii

(b)(3)
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~ OONF IB£l¥TIA L
Katanga Situation Approaching Cr.itical Stage
- ~

. Tension .is mounting in Elisabethville, the capital of Katan-

ga, in the absence of any agreement among tl)e Belgians, the .
United Nations, and the Congolese concerning Katanga's political
future. Africans in Elisabethville reportedly fear violence, and
many have sent their families out of the city. Premier Tshomb~
has strengthened his personal security measures and has an-
nounced-that all membets of the Force Publlque and police who
have demonstrated their loyalty to his government are td be
given an extra month's pay.
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who reportedly was
invited to visit Katanga by Tsho~ , has rejected suggestions
that he go there. · His refusal to meet with Tshomb~ reflects
Hammarskjold's tough stand in favor of Congo unity and his in-
sistence on a complete Belgian troop withdrawal. Brussels'
announcement that it will withdraw to Belgium 1,500 of its
10,000 troops in the Congo appears designed as a gesture in
the. directjon of compliance with the UN resolution for the
evacuation of Belgian forces. Brussels apparently hopes that
Tshomb~ will be able to negotiate with Lumumba conditions
under. which Katanga could rejoin the Congo; Belgian Premier
Eyskens declared on 28 July that the question is "no longer"
the unity of the Congo but the form which a unified Congo should
take. Tshomb~'is opposed to the highly centralized form of
government espoused by Lumumba, but is prepared to accept a
loosely joined Congo federation.
Despite some support in Brussels, Tshombt1s ·position ap-
pears tenuous. Not even Belgium has formally recognized
Katanga's independence, and Tshomb~'s parliamentary opposi-
tion walked out of the assembly on 27 July in protest over the
premier's "arbitrary" declaration of Katanga's independence .
The US Consulate observes that the Lumumba government may
encourage an incident in Katanga to dramatize "popular opposi-
tion" to an independent Katamra and the .need for UN tr.oons,_ __ _ ~
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

"'CONFIEJENTIAL
-
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[ ~New · Japane~vernm~~t'V~ •F;r-;ign Pctlky ·- ._t

CJapanese. Foreign Minister· Kosaka implied to Ambassador

MacArthur on 27 July that Japan's new government would de-
lay in seeking any accommodation with Communist China un-
til after th13 general election expected this fall. However, he
emphasized the government's need to maintain a public posture
of "i:easonableness and desire" to improve relations with Ja-
pan's Communist neighbors; this might initially be limited to
.t he negotiation of a series of agreements relating to postal af-
. fairs, exchange of meteorological information; and other tech-
nical matters. ] .

lKosaka flatly rejected a neutralist course for Japan and (b)(3)

said that a decisive Liberal-Democratic party victory in the
election must be the new government's first step in restoring
free-world confidence in Japan. He indicated his personal in-
tent to avoid pressing the US to retur.n Okinawa as long as the
American civil administration does not try to alienate· the
Okinawans from Japan and continues to cooperate with the
Japanese in long-term economic development projects on
Okinawa. Kosaka complained, however, of the US x-efusal to
allow the Okinawans to fly Japanese flags. · He added that he
hoped Tokyo would be permitted to introduce on Okinawa a
family registratiop system along Japanese lines. j

[Kosaka said_he and Prime Minister Ikeda consider South

Korea the first line of Japanese defense against Communist
aggression and acknowledged the need to improve relations
with Seoul. He appeared more willing than his predecessor
to consider South Korean objections to the repatri2.tion of Ko-
rean residents in Japan to North Korea but emphasized that
Japanese opinion, especially during an election campaign,
would limit his ability to compromise. .--\

[Ikeda told MacArthur on 28 July that he plans to stress

domestic rather than foreign policy issues during the coming
campaign and will concentrate on improving social welfare
and strengthening democratic government. Ikeda asserted
that, while he felt quite expert on domestic problems, he
plans to regard former Prime Minister Yoshida as his main
adviser on international matters. Because Kosaka lacks
diplomatic experience, it is likely that Yoshida and Ikeda rath-
er than the foreign minister will set the foreie:n_nillicY_line.
- (b)(1)
(b)(3)

I
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"-' cum·iUbP.JTIAL
- ...,
· TllE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special .Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Actlvitles
Special Assistant for Foreign .Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Unde:r Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director 1 International Cooperation Adminlstratlon
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secre tary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commh.nder, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Dlrec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

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CEN~AL
-
I
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
I
I
I
1 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II
(3'i

11. ASIA-AFmcA
.
CJIII
. nepubUc of the Congo: The threat of violence .in the Congo fj
appears not to have ended with.the arrival of about 10, 000 UN
troops. The embassy in Leopqldville characterizes the UN mil-
I·
1~
ltary effort as lackir:ig in direction; in.most areas it has yet to 11~
bring the Force Publlque under control. An organization of the
1
1~
(b )(i!J.
dominant Bah~ba tribe in .K asai Province has threatened a gen~ ~
eral st~e u.nless the p~vlrice is partitioned between .the Bal.ii.bas
and their. tribal dvals. Leopoldville, UN Secretary General L-(b)(~
the United Nations, and the Katanga government concerning the
status of Katanga and Of Belgian bases in the CongiiJj I
l:lammarskjo~d conti11ues .to seek agreement among the Belgians,
•
(b)(19
1•

Continuing its effort to p_ose as Congo's champion, Moscow

has announced readiness to provide "extensive" economic and
technical assistance and, has reiterated its warning that the USSR
will "rebuff agffressors . . . who are trying. to strangle. the Congo
economically." l
~----~~~-~~~--~~~~~~~~--
 \ Soi,ith Korea: The overwhelming victory of Chang Myon's
conservaUve Democraij.c party in the 29 July parliamentary
elections appears like.ly to be followed by a strong factional
struggle for the premiership and pres,idency, possi~ly leading
to a party split. . Anti- Chang factlonists may hope to form a
. government of their own with the support of independents and
former Rhee elements. However,. the. factions may try to avoid
an open split by dividing the two highest off.i ces between them.
Acting Chief of State Huh· Chung has stated that the largely cere- !
I
mon,ial post of president will be fiUed on or before 15 August
whether or not a new nrime minister has been named by then.
I
(b )(3)1
I !
i
· Japan-Kore.a: Frictions in Japanese - South Korean rela-
Uons'·are. expected to continue as a result of Tokyo's unwilling=
ness to meet fully. Seoul's dema11ds that an early date be set for
terminating the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to
North Korea. The new Ikeda government's first major foreign
policy move==an announcement that it desires to accommodate
some of.Seoul's objections to the repatriation program~-has pro-
voked widespread adverse reaction.,in Japan~ Most major news-
papers are demandil)g that the government grant North Korea's (b)( 3 )
request for an unquaUfied one-year extension of th[ reoatrlatio~

I
agreement. now scheduled tJ
expire..in November.
. .
(b)(
3

I I .I . THE WEST

. Dominican Republic: Mounting pressures . on ~e Trujillo

dictatorship include. moves by international labor unions to j.n- {C::::...
duce a boycott of Dominican ports, a growing uncertainty as to 0
oil supplies, and a general. expectation that some form of inter-
national sanctions against the regime will be recommended by
. the OAS .: for~ign ministers' meeting. scheduled for 16 August in
Costa Rica. The foreign minieters will consider Venezuela's

l .Aug 60 DA.ILY BRIEF ii

- 1_ (b)

.~P.P.f.QY.:~:~:f9i:J~~l:~~~~~::?.2I$.(.9:t.t.9:~:.¢..9.~.~.§.9.~.~~. .~m•maaaBm•mmm
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. charges of Dominican aggression. Trujillo has responded to

the increasing pressu several wa s including intensi-
d-'!'01i~Q_T.n.eaJ1lures~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J

1 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

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Security Situation in Congo

Resolution of the immediate Congo crisis continues to de-

pend on agreement among the .Belgians, United Nations officials,
and the Katanga government concerning the status of Katanga
and of Belgian basie s in the Congo. []Ji Secretary General Ham=
marskjold repoJ:.i;edly has ~old the Belgians that the UN will not
I attempt to force jts way Into Katanga, but will establish· contacts (b)(3)
with the Tshombe government there with a view to gaining its con-
r . Jsent to the entry of UN force!J The Lumumba government, sup-
·ported by propaganda from the Soviet bloc, has become critical
. of the failure of the UN to take steps to occup Ka . . a. (b )( 1)

.T here are indications, meanwhile, that the threat of violence

in the Congo has not ended with the arr.ival of approximately 10, 000
UN troops. An organization of the Baluba tribe--the do:piinant
group in Kasai Province~~has threatened a general strike if its
demand for the partitioning of Kasai between .the Balubas and their
Lulua ;rivals is not granted by the Lumumba government. The
Baluba ulthnatum. threatened~ -for the first time since independence--
a resumption of the tribal warfare which prior. to 30 June was kept
under control. by the Force Publique.
The massive exo(lus of Belgians from the Congo is believed to
have thrown at least 150, 000 Africans out of work and has brought
commerce to a virtual standstill. In Leopoldville, · UN patrols have
been strengthened .as a precaution against violence by the city's es-
timated .80,000 unemployed Africans. The danger of a severe food
shortage appears t o have been alleviated for the time being. (b)(3)
~'============='------~-=--=--===-(b)(3)
(b)(1)

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South Korean Election Outcome

The overwhelming victory of former .Vice President Chang

Myon's conservative Democratic party in. the 29 July parliamen~
.tary elections appears likely to be. followed by a strong factional
. struggle for the premiership and presidency, possibly leading to
a party split. The anti~ Chang faction may hope to form a govern- (b )( 1)
ment of its o n with e oJWI.Lof.J.ru:hmendent and former Rha
e:ments

D [
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)
wever,-me ons may ry o avo · an open sp t y divid-
ing. the two highest offices between ..them.
(b)(1)
_ jthere. is wide- .
s reaa-puou-c-exp~-ctatron that the fall of the Rhee regime marked
th~ beginning of a new era from which great things can.be. ex-
(b)(3)

CJ
pected. This feeling appears to be particularly strong in the ru.,
ral areas, where students have been traveling among the people
"explaining" the significance of the. April revolution. Disappoint.,
ment could lead to an early revival of widespread frustration and
resentment against the government)

Incomplete returns indicate that the Democrats have approx-

imately a two-thirds majority in the 233 ~ seat lower house, inde-
pendents. and minor parties about 43· seats, Liberals about 10, and
the new left~ of-center Social Masses party about 4. Returns for
the upper. house are not scheduled to be released until 5 August,
but early reports suggest .t hat ,it will also be controlled by the
Democrats.

Acting ·Ghief of St~te Huh Chung has stated that a president

will be inaugurated before 15 August even if the prime minister
has not been. chosen by then. The pres.idency, a nonpartisan and
largely ceremonial. post under :the. ·terms of the new constitution,
is filled by decision of a joint session of the legislature. HQh, be~
cause of his national prestige and lack of p_art_v_ti_es ,_is_consider.e_d (b)(3)
a likely prospect for the post. j j
(b )(3)
(b)( 1)

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New Japane&r~Government Arouses Controvers°y Over
. .Its Korean Policy

An· attempt by Hayato Ikeda's new Japanese Government to

improve relations with South Korea by modifying the program
for repatriating· Korean .residents in Japan to North Korea has
provoked extensive adverse public reaction in Japan. The gov-
ernment's announcement that it desires to "accommodate as
much as possible" South Korea's objections to the program has
prompted demands by most major newspapers that Tokyo ex-
tend for a year the agreement which expires in November.

Tokyo's announcement presumably will also raise.new dif-

ficulties with North Korea. The North Korean Red Cross on
23 July called for a simple one-year extension, and implications
that Tokyo contemplates anything less are likely to draw strong
propaganda reaction in an effort to keep pressure on the Jap-
anese Government. Pyongyang has said the agreement may·be
reJ;tewed by an e~change of cables and has not replied to a J ap-
anese suggestion that both sides meet in Japan to discuss renew-
al. .

Since the program was inaugurated last November, approx-

imately 33 ,000 Korean .residents have been repatriated aboard
Soviet ships, and as many as 100,000=-one sixth of the Korean
population in Japan-~may elect to go unless the program is re-
stricted or terminated.

Japan has not yet disclosed publicly that in discussions with

South KQrea it has indicated a willingness to consider setting a
deadline, possibly mid-October, for ~he registration of repatri-
ates and terminat.lng the program once all reglstrants had de-
parted. Korean residents subsequently desiring to be repatri-
ated would have to arrange their own travel and financing.
South Korean dissatisfaction with Tokyo's apparent refusal
to terminate the entire program by November at the latest has
dampened hopes _that the Ikeda government and the South Korean
government to be formed: in August mil!Jt be able to negotiate a
settlement of outstanding differences. t is possible that the
Japanese position will induce acting South Korean Chief of State (b)(3)

D uh .Chung, to revoke his reported acquiescence to the suggestion

made by his Foreign Ministry that Japanese fishing vessels wlticJ
limit their enetratlon of the Rhee line to 15 ilea not be seized.
(b )(3)

(b)(1)

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Situation in ~e Dominican Republic

.. I·

The Trujillo dictatorship is under growing pressures, both

economic and political . . Western hemisphere labor unions, in-
cluding AFL:-CIO, have been seeking a boycott of shipping to and
.irom the Dominican Republic. The Jnternatlonal Transport Fed-
eration, meeting in a world congress in Bern, passed.a resolution
. on 28 July urging all. Am.e rican governments to break diplomatic
relations w~th Trujillo and impose. severe economic sanctions a~
gainst his regime.

The Dominican Republic already faces oil shortages as a re-

sult of Venezuelan .pressure on normal petroleum suppliers in the
Netherlands West Indies to refuse oil shipments. Alternative
sources will be more expensive, and there is some danger that
shartu:utb.acksiinelectric power will be. necessary. Washington's
exclusion of the Dominican Republic from the redistribution of
sugar allocations recenOy withdrawn from Cuba has brought charg~·
es of "economic. aggression" from Truj1llo, but has probably en~
couraged the domestic· opposition. ·

Some form of multilateral action against the Dominican Gov-

ernment will almost. certainly_be recommended when .the OAS for-
eign ministers meet. to consider Venezuela's charges that the Tru-
jillo dictatorship is guilty of aggression, particularly in connec-
tion with the attempted assassin,ation of President Betancourt on
. 24 June. The OAS meeting: now is announced.for .San Jose, Costa
Rica, on _16 August.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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'-"" CUJVFil:J~f\11 IA1=!_ ._·
..
'TH~ PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Sec retary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Sec retary of State
The Under Secretary of State
T he Under Secretary of State for Politi.c al Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air F orce
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Sec retary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intellige nce, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelllgence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelllgence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Gommander ln Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Comme rce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Dir ec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UN: [l'rl6r to the announcement mat KJlrusrrcrre

would head the Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly,'------- --'
Deputy Minister Kuznetsov on three separate occasions at- '--J~ /
1
....------'\ tempted to persuade Hammarskjold to issue invitations to //l.A/
President Eisenhower, Macmillan, and De Gaulle, as well
as Khrushchev. Khrushchev has also written to Nehru urging
'--------,.,- him to attend. These overtures probably reflect Khrushchev's
desire to use his UN appearance to underscore his commit-
ment to a policy of coexistence and high-leve s with_free ...
I world leaders, particularly on disarmament.

i
C031.605 6 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160562 I
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

W#ddd-'Wd#///U#Q///?#////###/Q////##M 5C0316056
....P.P..~!?.Y-~.~..!9.E..B~.1.~~~~-~.?.Q~.§!9..?.!.9...................................
 · Iran: lfhe demonstration by Iranian nationalist students
; in Teiirin on 1 .September was easily broken up by police.
r Army units had also been alerted to be read to move against
the demonstrators ·u necessary,
I ~~~~

Meanwhile, ~
- -- - 1new y "elected" members of parliament are resigning to
clear the way for another round of elections, following the
Shah's order. Opposition ~lements re ortedl are elate=d~b~v_ _ _ __,,
~u..._w_x-_o_spects o ne elections:·

;a1aria~~ Republlc: Parliamentary elections in the Malagasy

Repu~lfcMa agascar) on 4 September will be the first impor-
tant test of strength between President Tsiranana's pro~Western
coaUtion government and the Congress party for the lndepend~
ence of Madagascar (AKFM), an extreme nationalist party dom ~
inated by militant Communists. Although tdbal rivalry and the
republic's attainment last June of independence within the Frenc)l p
Community should benefit the moderate parties, the AKFM ap=
pears to have attracted wide support since its strong showi11g in
mun.i clpal elections last fall . The AKFM is well organized and
reportedly has been receiving substantial financial support from
the French Community Communist Party and the Sino-Soviet
(Joe. I : I

3 Sept 60 . DAILY BRlEF iii

C03 1.605 62
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III. THE WEST

Peru-Cuba: fPeru is considering breaking relations with

Cuba. President-Prado, under pressure from the Peruvian mil-
. -- - ---,itary, has agreed-in principle to this move when the time is pro- )1,;0
pitious and particularly if other Latin American countries take
similar action. Guatemala and Nicaragua bro~e relations with
----~ cuba earUer this year. ·colombia, which is incensed by a re-
_,
cent vitriolic outburst ~ the .Cuban ambassador in Bogota, will ,'

3 Sept 60 DAILY BWEF iv

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probably at the least declare him persona non grata. Vene-

zuelan President Betancourt, who has become increasingly
hostile toward Castro and is concerned by the threat of pro-
Castro gime, also seems to be nearing a
~~. ~

3 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF v

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C03 1.60 5 62 i . - -
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C03160562
Peru. Conside~ Breaking Relations With Cub~·
CPeru is conside~ing breaking relations with Cuba, apparent-
ly to recoup some of the prestige it lost through Foreign Minis-
ter Porras' actions at the seventh meeting of foreign ministers
in San Jose. After Peru had initiated the meeting, Porras. failed
to take the lead in promoting the·resolution against extracon-
tinental intervention in the hemisphere, defied his government's
instructions, and finally refused to sign. President Prado, un-
der pressure from the Peruvian military, has agreed to this
move when the time is propitious, and particularly if other Latin
American countries take similar action. Guatemala and Nicaragua
broke relations with Cuba. earlier this year. Colombia, which
is. incensed by a recent outburst by the Cuban ambassador in
Bogota, will at least declare him persona non grata. Venezue-
lan President Betancourt, who has become increasingly hostile
toward Castro and. concerned by the threat of pro-Castro vio-
lence to his regime, also seems to be approaching a break.

Prado is reluctant to force the resignation ~f Porras, a

friend of the leftist but non-Communist APRA party, for fear of
alienating the APRA's general backing of his administration. The
cabinet unanimously censured his actions at San Jose, and the
military representatives are insisting on his ouster.
APRA, a bitter enemy of the Peruvian military and conserva-
tive elements, has tended to sympathize with the objectives of
the Cuban revoluti.on; a dissident and militant wing of the party is
strongly pro-Castro. However, Ramiro Priale, APRA's top lead-
er in Peru, who advised Prado that the par ty would accede to a
break of relations with Cuba, has informed the US Embassy in
Lima that it will not withdraw its support of Prado in the event
Porras resigns--presumably voluntar i.ly.
(b )( 1)
Porras' position at San Jose was simHar to that of Venezue- (b)(3)
lan Foreign Minister Arcaya, a stanch supporter of Castro, who
refused to sign the ~inal resolution of the meeting which was ap-
proved by .Qis government. This deve lopment has caused consider-
able tension in V-enezuela, where pro-Ca stro groups are strong,
and could threaten President Betancourt 9s three-oartv coalition. :

3 Sept 60
C0 31.60 562
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~co~~
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executlve Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Moblllzatlon
Director, . National Aeroriautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence AcUvltles
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Secu1·ity Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Admlnlstratlon
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Alr Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelllgence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Dlrec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

~
Approved for Rel ease: 2016/07/05 C03160562
 ~
G03160566
..... . ~· ..,~
~
...
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160566
~

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intellie.:eru:..e_r this publication is based on all sources, including
(b )(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the e:;pionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~ ......... __
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160566
Go3 1 60566 ---~-~--~-----
Approved for Re lease: 2016/07/05 C 03~16~05~66~--~-~~-((bb))(( 3
1 ))

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 ..•>1•••->1..>0>•~-•~•..•••••••••U
~·•

C 0 3 1 6 0 5 6 6====-"--'--'--- Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160566

 -·--·-··-----············ ··-····"Y.
C03 1·6056 6

Berlin: East German Foreign Trade Min.l ater Rau pub~

licly waql.ed West Germany on 6 September. against curtail~
ing trade with East Germany in reprisal for Communist
pressures on.West Berlin, and rejected Bonn's contention
that inter~ Germ.an trade is ·contingent on unhampered com-
munications with West Berlin. Rau asserted that retaliatory t !'-._ :
measures .by West Germany "will only hasten the measures
needed to make West Be.rlin· a. free city." West Berlin officials
fear that the East Germans may impose new travel restrictions
this coming week end in connection .with the West Ber lin Indus.-.
.trial Fair and the visit of .acting Chancellor Erhard. L
(Pagel) ~~~~~~~

II. ASIA- AFRICA

India: The Indian Communist party leadership on 7 Sep- C'f<
tember formally reaffirmed· its-policy of achieving power throuph...__ _ __,
"peaceful" means, thus in effect-lining up with Moscow in the
Sino- Soviet ideological dispute. The resolution passed by the
Indian party's central executive committee climaxed a bitter de-
bate during recent weeks between pro-Moscow moderates and an
...
extremist "left sectarian" group which
. has supported Peiping's
views on various questions. 1The Indian Communist leaders re-
main deeply divided, but theposition of the moderate faction re-
portedly has been bolstered by indications that even the "left
sectarians" now deem it expedient to show some support for the
Moscow lin.i} Almosf all of the world's Communist parties which
have thus far declared .themselves in the Sino- Soviet dispute have
sided cow with none as et declarin clearly for Pei-
ping.

8 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

.C03 1 60566
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] ·u~1

Iran: fr_he immediate task of the new Iranian Government

is.lo improve relations with the USSR, although nothing will
r - - - -----t be done in this regard at the expense of Iran's ties with the West, 1,l l
1
according to Prime Minister. Sharif-Emami. The new premier
told Ambassador Wailes on. 4 September that he intends to ap~
proach the problem with firmn.e ss, but without the belligerency..
of his predecessor. He said he hopes to improve trade relations
- - - ---.. with the USSR and to settle outstanding border problems, but
disclaimed any interest in Soviet loans, saying these lead to po-
litical involvement.
Congo: The.r e is a growing threat of extensive fighting in ·
Leopoldv{lle between the military factions· suppordng Premier
Lumumba and those backing President Kasavubu and other mod-
erate leaders. Kas~vubu has so far failed in his attempt to oust
Lumumba, and at least one of his moderate supporters in the
cabinet--Foreign Minister Bomboko--sought asylum in the Amer----- -- -
ican Embassy· alter learning that pro-·Lumumba troops brought up
from Thysville were searching for him . Kasavubu's position may
be strengthened, however, by the reported arrival in Leopoldville
of some of his military-adherents, as well as by the release from
jail on 6 September of Bangala leader Bolikango by soldiers op-
posing Lumumba. The Congolese ChamQer of Deputies did noth-
ing to clarify the situation on 7 September when it voted that the
actions of both Lumumba ~d Kasavubu in attempting to oust each
other were invalid.
na,dio Moscow's criticisms that the UN authorities have in-
. terfered in the Congo's internal affairs and fail.ed to support the
"lawful government" suggest Soviet support for n~ moves by
'-----~ Lumumba to modify the UN's status in the Congo. l.Qhana, how-
ever, is giving greater support to the UN. Nkrumah on 5 Sep-
tember urged another Security Council meetin~ to give the UN
,.-----L Ue~r h;md in resolving the Congo problei IL__ ______ _J

8 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

.C03160566
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III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities

against the On.i ted States or its possessions in the imme-
diate future.
No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to in~tiate 1 ~· o
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future .
C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploi-
tation by Soviet/ Commun,ist hostUe action which could jeop-
ardlze the security of the us in the immediate future:
General Phoumi, fearing fo:r h_is safety and
opposed to Souvanna Phouma's neutralist pol..:
icies, is refusing. to re.t urn to Vientiane to
assume his governm.e nt post. Thus, the situ-
ation· in Laos has not stabUized and may lead
to further developments favorable to the Com-
munists. ·

The .increasing support given .to th~ Lumumba

forces by the Communist. bloc appears designed
to undermine the UN position in the Congo and
may result in clashes between UN forces and

I
Congolese troops. ,
I ~~----'--~~~~~~

'

8 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iv

C03 1 60566

East Germany Threatens Bonn With Reprisals in

Ber Un Situation

In a press conference held in connection with the Leipzig

Fair on 6 September, East German Foreign Trade Minister
Heinrich Rau warned Bonn agaiilst trying to retaliate against
East Germany's intensified restrictions on West German travel
to Berlin. . "If West Germany takes steps it will only hasten
the measures needed to make West Berlin a free city," he
declared. Moreover, he denied that ·continued trade between
East and West Germany is contingent on the maintenance of
West Berlin's free communic~tions with the West. West Ger-
man officials say the Ulbricht regime has tacitly accepted
this condition since the initial agreement was signed in 1951.

Echoing Rau's remarks, Gerhard Eisler, East Germany's

leading propagandist, asserted that "interzonal trade must
be kept completely free of politics." These arguments are
aimed at West German businessmen, who have been reluctant
to take any steps to break off trade.

The East Germans on 2 September began halting German

barge traffic with Berlin. Oil the grounds that shipping with
draft in excess of the legal limit was traveling on the Havel
canal, 17 barges· were forced to return to ~he border crossing
pointat·&hna:ekenbm.ans·subjecte:dtO.longdelays. In contrast
with past usage, the barges were not permitted for legalistic
reasons to take an alternate route to West Berlin.

West Berlin Deputy Mayor Amrehn has expressed fears

that new harassments may be attempteci on 10 September in
connection with the West Berlin Industrial Fair and the visit
to West Berlin of Vice Chancellor Erhard. -E rhard is to dis-
cuss possible economic reprisals with Brandt, who has
threatened the. East Germans with a. "moral boycott" including
economic measur_e_s if there.is any further disturbance of ac-
cess to the city.
L__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---'
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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Situation in the Congo

President Kasavubu's coup attempt against Premier Lu-

mumba thus far has failed to gain popular support or to under-
mine the premier's political position, although the situation re-
mains fluid. There is a growing.threat of violence in the capi-
tal city of Leopoldville as military adherents of both men ar-
rive there. Lumumba has retained influence over the police--
on 6 September they fired on pro-Kasavubu demonstrators--
and on 7 September he called in troops from Thysville, appar-
ently in an effort to capture the moderate foreign minister and
Kasavubu supporter, Justin Bomboko. Bomboko sought asylum
in the American Embassy, an action which may be followed by
other moderate Congolese leaders who fear Lumumba's retalia-
tion.

If the UN forces- -already providing a protective guard for

Senate President Ileo and President Kasavubu at the latter's
residence--extend such cover to other Congolese, Premier Lu-
mumba may be sufficiently provoked at UN "interference in
internal Congolese affairs" to demand the withdrawal of all UN
troops from the Congo, He has already protested UN control of
the radio station and airfields . Lumumba on 7 September ap-
pealed to the independent African states for immediate military
aid--troops, armament, and aircraft for troop transportation--
to be given outside of the UN. He had earlier cabled an urgent
appeal to Sukarno to place the Indonesian battalions under the
control of the central Congo government.

Kasavubu's position seems to be strengthened if reports

that some of his military adherents have arrived in ·L eopold-
ville and that opposition leader Jean Bolikango has been liber-
ated from prison are substantiated. Bolikango is an influen-
tial tribal leader f~om the northwest Congo, and his Bangala
tribesmen comprised 40 percent of the former Force Publiqu.e
as well as being numerous in the Leopoldville area.
Lumumba's recourse to the National Assembly did not re-
sult in any .clarification of the situation. The Chamber of

8 Sept 60 CF~ITl~AI INTFI UGF.NCE BULLETIN Page 3

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"-'~"'"''"~
~· """"'

Deputies on 7 September passed a resolution calling invalid

the actions of both Kasavubu and I.wnumba in attempting to
dismiss each other.
Soviet and East European propaganda media have given
strong propaganda support for Lumumba in the wake of the
attempted coup and have publicly criticized UN authorities
for "open interference" in the Congo's internal .affairs and
for "hampering the establishment of law and order." &lch
. criticisms raise the prospect that Moscow will support Lu-
mumba in new moves aimed at modifying.the role ~nd status
of UN forces. Previously, Soviet officials had enc<:>Uraged
Lumumba to call for the creation of an observer gi=oup com-
prised of representatives of various African countries which
would ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolu-
tions, but did not press the proposal because of lack of sup-
port by Afro-Asian governments.

~eanwhile, President Nkrumah of Ghana has reiterated

in strong terms his support of the UN in its Congo operations.
On 5 September, he told the American ambassador in Accra
that he was greatly disturbed over events in the Congo. He (b)(3)
stated that he had tried to restrain Lumumba, but.the. Congo-
lese premier had replied that he could expect no direct help
from Ghana. because Accra was totally committed to the UN:
Nkrumah said that something must be done immediately to
stop Lumumba's aggressiveness and the Soviet bloc 9s meddling
outside of the UN framework. The President added that he
had just drafted a message to Hammarskjold urging another (b)(3)
meeting of the Security Counci.~l~t~
o__&!c.!.
v~ e~tc!J
h~ e~,u__i~.i...=......._J..AH~__.&.LI-......,
resolvin the Con o roblem.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

8 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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v (.;Ul'Jl'IDbl"'l 1 l.'1 I'- . '-'

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Actlvltles
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of !ta.te
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secreta.ry of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense · ·
The Secretary of Defense
Th~ Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the .Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States .Army
Chief of Naval Operations, 'United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelllgence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Alr Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160566

- ~ • • I __ ~-~" -.. - I
c 0·31 6 () 5 6 7
-"'
-
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160567
IU ... ~ -

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ls

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with

Jntel1iuence r
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person , as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2616101ios C0316.Q567

 - ---=-=-=-=-== - - - - - - -- - - -- - -- - - - - - - - -- (b)(1)
C 0 316 0 5 6 7 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160567 (b)(3)

A roved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03160567

C0316 0 567 · \.:pproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C0316C7 .

CENTRAL lNT E ;__~ ' S E !,~CE BULLETIN

9 Se--:.7. :.::.·.. .- .:: r 1960

I DAii.. Y BRIEF
:
I

I. THE c o:c-.~ :JNIST i3LOC

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

*Be rlin: The East German Government decree announced

on 8 September requiring \Vest- Germa:ns to secure special per-
mits to enter East Berlin is a furthe r step toward incorporation
of the Soviet sector of Berlin into E ast Germany and gi ves the
city sector border the char a.cter of a:n East German frontier.
The West Germans now must meet the same requirements for
entry into East Be rlin as for travel in E ast Germany. The move,
which clearly violates the four-power agreem ents guarante eing
freedom <?f. movement within the c·i ty, appears to have bypassed
the procedures normal in the past under which East Berlin munici-
pal authorities re- en a.cteclJuw leg-islation__anotvinir tQlb_e So-vi e.L.._ I
(b)(3);
sector of Berlin. IL - - - -- - - - -- - - - , - - - - - -- - - - --'·
r

I
I Approved for Release: 201 6/07/05 C03160567 I
 Communist China: · Peipµig has used the occasion of the
100th Sino~ US ambassadorial meeting to indicate that it does
ncit expect any material results from further negotiations with
the United States. A long editorial in· the 8 September issue of
J;>~9ple's D~·1Jt asserts that Peipi~g has no "unrealistic illusions"
about the ta · s, but is willing to continue the meetings, which
have been ·going on since. 1955. The editorial reiterates Pei-
ping's ref\lsal to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait
area.

9 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

C03 1 6t'.J 5 67
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~ lLJ~~·~~--~~~~~~I

Con_g_o: Premier Lumumba's formal request on 8 Septem-

.ber for the withdrawal of UN troops increases the threat of
---~ fighting ~tween UN forces and Lumumba's supporters in the
Co1,1go. The. premier's demand resuits from his belief that the
UN offic as were back.i ng h.i s r ival Kasavubu;J. He probably has
been encouraged to adopt a tough attitude by the propaganda sup-
port he has received from the USSR fo.llowlng Kasa.vubu's coup
attempt.
. Hammarskjold can be expected to put the whole weight oLhls
office behind ·Jiis effort to retain the UN troops in the Congo. Un
- - - --. 1ate August, before the Congolese crisis had reached its present
impasse, he indicated.that Lumumba must be "broken." He
planned to insist that the UN forces must remain in the Congo
to maintain peace and order because,.the Congolese National
Army was incapable of ~olng so] /
In Leopoldville the situation remains fluid between Kasavubu
and Lumumba, but the premier won unexpected backing from the
Senate--formerly believed to be an opposition stronghold--which
his ccusations alnst Belgium and the United Nations.

9 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

C0316056 7
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III: SIG l'~::: · :·/~~11' INTELLIGE NCE

RE PG ." -:·'B A ND ESTIMATES

(Available c.i;!:::.·;.ng the preceding week)

Flag Issue in P anama.: Significance tn.JlS~P!'l n~ n'-'l n i!:>n _

Relations, SNIE 84-60. G Septe mber 1960. L-------:---~ (b )(3)'

.Offshore Islands : Li!.-.dihood of Rene we d Communist .b~:

Chinese Military Activity in the ·Area in the Next Year or so
and Consequence of the Loss, Evacuation, or Succe s sful
.r
Defens e ds. S~"IE 43-60. 6 Septembe r 1960, ~~
( b)(~)
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Chinese Communists Issue Statement on Sino~ US

Ambassadorial Talks

Peiping has used the occasion of the lOOth Slno ~US ambas-
sadorial meeting, which took place in Warsaw on 6 September,
for a long People's Daily editorial blaming US "insincerity" for
the fruitlessness of the talks. The editorial says that Peiping
harbors no "unrealistic illusions" about the meetings, which
have gone on since 1955, indicating that the Chinese do not ex~
pect any material results from further negotiations. Peiping
argues that "imperialist" states will negotiate seriously and
carry out agreements only when compelled to do so by a superi··
or Communist negotiating position.
While Peiping says it will continue the meetings as long as
the United States is also willing, it apparently intends to main-
tain its adamant position on all Sino-US issues. In the editorial
the Chinese again assert that they will not renou,nce the use of
force in the Taiwan Strait and rei~erate their insistence on an
agreement guaranteeing the '~equal and reciprocal" exchange of
newsmen between the US and China. Peiping has called for such
an agreement since the United States said in 1957 that it could
not guarantee "reciprocal" admission because of existing laws
and regulations. The editorial reasserts the Chinese position
that US "nationals" detained in China are rightfully convicted
"criminals" and thus not subject to r~lease under the Stno..:.us
agreement of 1955.I '----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'
(b)(3)

(b)(1)

CONFIBENTIAL
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Congo Situation

Premier Lumumba's formal request on 8 September for the

withdrawal of UN troops stems from his anger over what he sees
as UN support for his rival Kasavubu•. UNtroops, in addition to
controlling the radio. station and the two Leopoldville airports,
are guarding Kasawbu's residence. As a result of. the steadily
increas~g tension, violent incidents may take place between UN
forces and supporters of the premier. .

UN Secretary General Hammarskj~ld can be expected to put

the whole weight of h~office behind his effort to retain the UN
~----~ troops in the Congo. \!!l late August, before the Congo crisis had
reached its present impasse, he indicated that Lumumba must be (b )(3)
"bro~en." He planned to insist that the UN forces must remain in
the Congo to maintain peace and order because the Congolese
National Army was incapab.l e of doing so. Hi.s aim at that time
was to avoid a Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal,
rguing that in the absence of such· a resolution !~e UN military
resence in the Congo would in effect be endorse~

Radio Moscow followed up its strong support of Lumumba in

Kasavubu 's attempt to oust the premier with a slashing attack on
Hammarskjold and the UN authorities in the Congo. In a widely
broadcast commentary on 7 September it charged that they have
"grossly contravened" the UN Security Council's resolutions by
"openly pursuing an inimical·attitude toward the Congo's legal gov~
ernment." Another commentary, based on an Izvestia article,
charged that the Western powers, especially the United States,
are acting under the "cover" of the United Nations banner and
. that Hammarskjold bas violated his duty by "grossly interfering
in the Congo's domestic aifalrs." Such support presumably en-
couraged Lumumba in his demands for evacuation of United
Nations forces . ·

In Leopoldville the power struggle between Lumumba and Kasa~

vubu remains unresolved. Lumumba, however, retains the initia-
tive and has reasserted his control over the Congolese legislature.
Following the confused session of the ·lowe r house on 7 September~~

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whose res_u lts pro~ Lumumba forces are treating as a victory for
the premier... -Lumumba won unexpected backing .f rom the Senate,
which supported the government with a 41-2 vote of confidence.
The large number of abstentions and absences in the 78-member
house indicates that opponents of Lumumba are unwilling to en-
gage in an open .test of strel).gth with the premier.

Sympathy for Kasavubu's moderate position is indicated in

the recenf activity of army _Chief of Staff Mobutu, who apparently
is accepted in bOth the Kasa\rubu.and .the Lumumba camps and is
~ighly regarded by Western mi.litary· observers. Mobutu warned ·
Foreign Minister Bomboko of his impen<Ung ar.rest, thereby ena-
bling Bomboko to escape to the American Embassy and th~nce to
Kasavubu's residence. Mobutu apparently is trying to remove the
army from politics and is also concerned ove r the presence with
the ar my of Soviet mechanics who accom anied the recent ship-
ment of trucks from the USSR. (b)(3)
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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CONF JVtiN ·1·1AL.- ~
'-"'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobtllzation
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
T he Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Sec retary of the Air For~e
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Direc tor, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, lJnited States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marin e Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director .for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelltgence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The "Chairman
National Security Agency
The Dlrec tor
National Indications Center
The Di rec tor

-COlWIDENTIA l.
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30 SEPTEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev's interview with Tito shows

lie intends to determine bloc foreign polic:,r ·
regardless of Peiping's views. (j)
Peiping reaffirms stand in Sino-Soviet
dispute . - .@

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Member s of new petroleum organization

planning to insist oil companies disregard
price cuts in computing income tax. @
Cypriot CommWlists benefiting from
agricultural crisis. ©
Congo- -Anti- 1.A.tmumba forces prepare
for round-table conference. ®
Sltuat!on in Laos. ©

~
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLE .-------~
30 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR- Yugoslavia-China: Khrushchev's statement follow-

ing his two-hour meeting with Tito on 28 September that "we
fully come to terms" and that "our viewpoints coincide or tP .
are very close" seems to have been made despite awareness
that it would be· offensive to the Chinese Communists, who
have long directed their most abusive attacks against the Yu-
. goslav regime. These demonstrative gestures toward Tito,
while not a sign of an ideological rapprochement, have the
. effect of serving notice on the Chinese that Khrushchev is de-
termined to set the course of bloc foreign policy regardless .of
Peiping's views. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J

*China- USSR: The Chinese Communist party's central

committee, in a lengthy commentary on a new publication of
Mao's works, has reaffirmed several of Peiping's most im-
portant positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on world Commu- o!<J
nist strategy. The Chinese will probably take the same
hard line in any talks with the Soviet and other Communist
parties prior to the bloc conference in Moscow in November
and at the conference itself.

I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East Oil: Member~- of the Organization of. Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC)-_~ Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait~
Iran, and Venezuela--are expe.cted to demand that in calcu- OL
lating 1960 oil revenues the international oil companies operating
in. the Persian Gulf area disregard the August cuts in crude oil
prices. Such a move would cos~ the companies well over

.... P.l?.f.2Y.~.q.. f!?.E..B~l.~~~~.:...?9..1.§!9..?.tQ.~..9..Q~.1..~.9.?.?..

 $100,000,000 this year. Saudi oil boss Tariki has told an offi-
cial of the Arabian-American Oil Company that all oil com-
panies operating in the Middle East will soon receive letters
demanding that 1960 income taxes be computed on the basis of
the pre-August prices. I
~--------------~

Cyprus: An agricultural crisis caused by three years

of drought ls presenting the Communists with new opportuni-
ties for political exploitation. The Cypriot Communists are
winning increasing support among farmers, and the USSR re-
cently offered "unconditional" economic assistance. /~-----
1

*Republic of the Congo: Improved cooperation between

President Kasavubu and the Mobutu interim government ap-
pears motivated by a mutual desire to forestall any seizure olf
r
power by Lumumba at the forthcoming political round-table
conference. Mobutu has moved to publicize recent Ghanaian
intervention on behalf of Lumumba through disclosure of a
letter from Nkrumah to Lumumba which advised the Congo- ----
lese leader on means by which he might consolidate his posi-
tion. At the same time, Kasavubu has echoed Mobutu's de-
mand--presently under UN consideration--for the withdrawal
of Ghanaian and Guinean forces from the Congo, and has en-
dorsed the legitima~y of the Mobutu government. Qvhile
Foreign Minister Bomboko, who will attend the round-table

~
conference, has professed confidence that Lumumba will
not be permitted to regain power, there are indications.
that IAlmumba's supporters hope to restore him to power
under a new constitutiorljl .,
. *Laos: [Aggressive tactics by Vientiane forces threaten
the highly tentative military agreement reached at Luang
----~ Prabang under the auspices of King Savang. General Phoumi r------~
has protested to the King both against attacks on his forward
elements in central la.os in violation of the 28 September
cease-fire and against the maneuvers which led to the switch
----~ in allegiance of the 2nd Military Region to Vientiane. A token
force of Captain Kong u's paratroopers reportedly partici-
pated with Pathet Lao guerrilla units in the takeover of &l.m--t
.J

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Qleua town and airfield on .28 September. The Phoumi troops

defending &m _N eua reportedly retreated southward, probably
(b)(1}
(b)(3)

REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Situation and Prospects in Haiti. SNIE 86. 1-60. 27 Sep-

tember 1960. [ I

30 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

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Khrushchev-Tito Meetings Will Affront Chinese

Khrushchev's statement following his two-hour meeting

with Tito on 28 September that "we have fully come to terms"
and that "our viewpoints coincide or are very close" seems to
have been a calculated gesture of contempt for the Chinese
leaders, who have long directed their most abusive attacks
against the Yugoslav regime . During the past year of bitter
and open debate with the Soviet Union, the Chinese have often
used Yugoslavia and the "revisionist views" of its: ~eaders
as a symbol behind which to mask their condemnations of So-
viet policy. Khrushchev's demonstrative gestures toward
Tito while in New York will serve further notice on the Chi-
nese that the Soviet premier has no intention of making any
concessions to Peiping's views,

It seems likely that Khrushchev's preoccupation with the

dispute with Peiping played a part in his decision to make anti-
colonialism the keystone of his UN position. His great empha-
sis on this issue seems a~ least partly, intended to strengthen
his hand in dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute, in which the
question of the correct policy to be pursued toward the uncom-
mitted nations has figured prominently. Khrushchev may be-
lieve that his drive to reassert unquestioned Soviet ideological
and political leadership of the bloc would be best advanced by
portraying the USSR as the. fervent champion of the "anti-im-
perialist forces ,"

Although Khrushchev's anticolonial pronouncements re-

semble the Chinese positions more than earlier Soviet state-
ments on this issue, his ardent wooing of "bourgeois nation-
alists" and his four meetings with Tito indicate that the de-
mand for the final liquidation of colonialism is not a response
to Chinese pressure . In this respect, his attentions to Tito,
whose declarations on colonialism, disarmament, and the
Congo fit hand and glove with Khrushchev's own, are an obvi-
ous effort to bolster Soviet prestige with the "neutralists."
For his part, Tito probably believes that Yugoslavia's
prestige as a leader of the "neutralist bloc" has been enhanced
by his meeting's with Khrushchev. Although Soviet-Yugoslav
relations remain on a state-to-state level and no ideological
rapprochement has been achieved, Tito probably also views
the conferences as a brea ch in the bloc's isoJa.t~ Yugo-
slavia. C
L___ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J
_~ (b)(3)

~::izu~'JENTJAL_ (b)(3)
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T.,,_I CUl'lf'lUt.1\' l lAk_ '-'

Peiping Reaffirms Stand in Sino-Soviet Dispute

In the most substantial Chinese statement on disputed is-

sues since th<;} Bucharest meeting of Communist parties last
June, the Chinese party's central committee has reaffirmed
several of the most important of Peiping's positions in the Sino-
So.v iet dispute on world Communist strategy,

A lengthy commentary on the publication of the fourth

volume of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works (1945-49) warns
against "illusions about imperialism," cites past Western
peace "tricks,' 1 insists that peace can be achieved only thr.ough
struggle, rebukes those who overestimate the. strength of the
enemy and underestimate the strength of revolutionary forces,
and reiterates that imperialism is a "paper tiger." The com-
mentary concludes that the volume is of "tremendous signifi-
cance" for the current situation and wUl become a powerful
weapon in ''intensifyiµg the struggle against iµiperialism and
modern . revisioilism"--the latter phrase the... Chinese de~
scription qf Soviet po,l icy. ·
In reaffirming that Mao's propositions were successful in
the Chinese revolution, the Chinese party--contrary to some
Western press interpretations- -appears to be asserting that
it has been right all along and that Soviet ·arguments have not
persuaded it to change its views. While Mao may yet decide,
owing to Soviet and world Communist pressure, that a nominal
compromise with the Soviet party is necessary, is seems like-
ly that the hard line taken in this central committee commentary
will represent the Chinese party's position in· any bilat~ral talks
with. the Soviet party and other parties prior to the November
conclave of world Communist narties and at the conclave it-
self. I (b)(3)
(b)(1 )

CO!<i""FfDE.\lTJ 4.1 I

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Middle East Oil Price Cuts ~jected

In a move that could cost the international oil companies

operating in the Persian Gulf well over $100,000,000 this year,
members of the newly formed ·Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC)--Kuwait, &udi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,
and Venezuela--have rejected the August price cuts which re-
duced oil prices by 4 to 14 cents a barrel. Saudi oil boss Abdul-
lah Tariki told the chairman of the Arabian American Oil Com-
pany (ARAMCO) that his and other Middle East oil companies
would soon receive a letter demanding the 1960 revenues be
calculat~d on the basis of pre-August prices.

The formation of OPEC--announced in Baghdad on 14 Sep-

tember--is a collective effort of the member countries to halt
the continued decline in oil prices. These countries have over
80 percent of the free world oil reserves and supply more than
half of the petroleum moving in international trade. Eventually
the organization will attempt to set up a system of world-wide
"proration"--sharing of markets and fixing of prices, as well
,as controlling production.

Prospects for a successful prorationing scheme are re-

mote,however, without the active cooperation of the oil com-
panies and the major consumers, and neither group is likely
to support OPEC aspirations. In addition the .very competitive
economic interests of the member states and their mutual dis-
trust further mitigate against any scheme for controlling pro-
duction.
The OPEC members can, however, agree on schemes
against the oil companies. The OPEC members probably will
remain firm in their refusal to "recognize" the August price
cuts. The companies are expected to argue that market forces
alone establish oil prices. In any event, their . several con-
cession·agreements make no rovision for overnment inter-
vention in settin . rices. (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

CVl<JP'tDENTJ..4. L

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Communists Seek to 'E xploit Cypriot Economic Crisis

I

Drought conditions prevailing in Cyprus for nearly three

years have drastically curtailed production. of cereals, re-
sulted in a crisis for the. large agricultural segment of the
population, and presented the Communists ·with new opportuni-
ties for political exploitation. Should next winter's cereal
crop fail, the situation will :become critical, according to the
American ambassador in Nicosia.

Between 1953 and 1958, wheat production averaged about

70,000 tons per year and barley production about 65,000 tons.
In 1959, however, production of these two grains, Cypr\ls'
major cereal crops, dropped some 20 percent, and a. further
drastic reduction occurred this year. The reduction in wheat
production was due in part to the drought and in part to rust.
As Cypriot demand for wheat :runs from 80,0.00 to 100,000 tons
a year, considerable quantities must be imported. The em-
bassy estimates that Cyprus will need an additional ·40,000
tons during the next few months.
With their funds exhausted and the banks and cooperatives
refusing credit, the. farmers have. petitioned the government
for relief. On 22 September, the cabinet approved a bill allo-
cating approximately $700,000 for distribution of seed and fer-
tilizer.
Local Communists, acting through the left-wing Union of
Cypriot Farmers, are having new successes in their campaign
to win the. support of the normally conservative rural popula-
tion. During a recent visit to Cyprus, the Soviet ambassador
to Greece promised economic aid without strings, and rumors
circulating in Nicosia pr.edict that the new Soviet ambassador
to Cyprus, . expected to arrive soon ill make a ft of several
shiploads of grain. (b)(3)
·~~----L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

(b)(1)

CONf IDENTI 41,_

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The Situation in the Congo

llnproved cooperation between President l{asavubu and

the Mobutu interim government appears motivated by a mutual
desire to forestall any seizure of power by LUJl}umba at the
forthcoming round~ table conference of Congolese political
leaders. Mobutu on 28 September released to the press four
documents purportedly found among the effects of deposed
premier Lumumba. Two were pleas for aid directed to Mos-
cow and :peiping, while two others were letters to Lumumba
from Ghanaian President Nkrumah describing tactical meas-
ures Lumumba should use to consolidate his position.

On 29 September, Kasavubu reiterated his support for

the Mobutu regime with an announcement that it should be re - .
garded as an official provisional government. Kasavubu added
further that he supported Mobutu's demand that the UN secure
the withdrawal of the Ghanaian and Guinean contingents in the
. Congo. {j. senior UN official has indicated that while th~ UN
. _) intended eventually to move Ghanaian troops out of Leopold- _
ville, Nkrumah had protested to Hammarskjold even this move_]

Such efforts to isolate Lumumba from his outside support-

ers probably prompted the warning by a pro-Lumumba spokes-
man that the round-table conference could bring-armed clashes
between pro= and anti- Lumumba partisans. /Joreign Minister
Bomboko, who will attend the conference, has professed con-
fidence that Lumumba will not be ermitted to r e ain power. (b)(1)
the de~
pose premier p ans o convene e ongo ese par iament on (b)(3)
14 October and rush through it a pro-Lumumba constitution.
~----~ Lumumba's supporters allege that Mobutu's 14 September sus-
pension of parliament is legal only for 30 days, and that after
that neriod narliament can reconvene on its own initiative.(
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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'-" CON~ '-111
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
S,Pecial Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assis tant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on F'oreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Adminis tration
The Director of Intelligence and Researc h
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Sec urity Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Sec retary of the Navy
The Secre tary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Dtrector, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Inte lligence , The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commis sion
The Chairman
National Security Age ncy
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

~AL
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...

~· ~ ·

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
Interpretations of. intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
. (b)(3)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 August 1960 (b)I
DAILY BRIEF

.
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

North Korea - South Korea: Premier.Kim ll~ sung on

.

. 14 August proposed a loose federation of North and South· ·

II
Korea .in an apparent effort to take the. propaganda initiative
from the new South Korean regime, which has indicated sup-
port for UN-supervised elections to reunify the· penin~ula.
Khrushchev ·can be expected to dramatize .Communist propos-
als for· a Korean. settlement when he visits Pyongyang in early
~ /<.....

II
October. The Communists will attempt to use South Korea's
rejection of the federation idea as grounds for charg.e s ~,...____ _ -----.
Seoul is r·e s onsible for ·th·e continued division ·of Korea.
I
(b)~~
(b)( 1)1
(b}(3) 1

II
II
II
- -- - - - -- I;-AS-IA--AFRI~A ~--~,I
. . \ (b)(3 ~
: . The Congo: Secreta:ry General Hammarskjold, who has )
rebUffed Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non- African U1'f
contingents from the Congo, is calling an ·early meeting of the!
Security C.ouncll. He -ls expected to request a council rulln.g_ I
. r
i
concerning his opi~ion that the UN force cannot be used on
Lumumba's behalf to subdue Katanga. The action .by Leo-
poldville:palice·10n 16 'August in detaining for investigation
several hundred Europeans--including UN personnel- ~ sug~
gests that. as he develops his own police force Lumumba may
attempt even.greater harassments in dealing with the UN and
his political opponents. Later on tl)e 16th Lumumba decreed
m ial l w over the entire countr for eriod of six mo"""n.....,th~s"'-'-----

17 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

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~ SEeR:E.:{_ ~

*South Korea: Newly elected South Korean President Yun

p~pbably will nominate former 'Vice President Chang 1dyon for
prime mit:lister following the House o~ Representatives'. rejection
of Kim To-yun, thf3 President's first selection for the post. How-
evei:-, the na-rrow· margin of Kim's defeat--three votes less than
the simple majority nece·ssary for conflrmation--suggests that a
government headed by Chang would have tenuous support. Chang, ok__
titular chief of the majority Pemocratic party, controls a llttle
less than half of his party's two-thirds majority in the powerful
233-seat lower house. · [L _ __ _ _ __ _ __ __ __ _ __ __

17 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

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~CONFIBENTIAL_ ....,.·

Kim 11-sung Calls for. Federation of North and South Korea

Keynoting a "libe:r ation day" celebration_in Pyongyang, North

Korean Premier Kim 11-sung on 14 August attempted to take. the
propaganda initiative on Korean reunification from the new South
Korean Government, which has .indicated support for UN-supervised
peninsula-wide elections.

Kim called for elections "without outside intervention" and sug-

gested an interim North- South federation jn which a "supreme na-
tional committee" with representatives from both sides would work
. out economic and cultural cooperation. Such cooperation, !Gm said,
would help to solve South Korea's "economic catastrophe." Kim also
suggested .t hat North and South Korea each reduce its troop strength
to "100,000 or less." Implicit in the premier's speech was Pyong-
yang's usual insistence on withdrawal of US forces from South Korea
before "peaceful unification" can be achieved. ·

A South Korean ·Democratic party spokesman has publicly re-

jected the North Korean proposal, and on 15 August acting Prime
Minister Huh Chung termed it "another rehash of a.worn-out prop-
aganda tactic." Pyongyang probably nqw will attempt to exploit this
rejection in efforts to make Seoul appear responsible for continued
division-of Korea.
J{hrushchev, who has accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang
in e~rly October, can be expected to provide dramatic publicity on
Communist proposals for .a Korean settlement. He also may use
this vis.it to amplify Moscow's position in the current Sino-Soviet
dispute, just before a high-level meeting of Communist parties which
may be he.Id in Moscow in coniunction with the USSR's Bolshevik Rev-
olution celebration. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~____,
(b)(3)

(b )( 1)
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,_., s~

The Situation in the Congo

Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lu-

- ~umba's demand for the withdrawal of non-African UN con-
til!gentsfr.o m the Congo, is calling an early meeting.: of the Se- (b)(3)
cur~ Council. fiie has indicated that should Lumumba formal-
ly request the withdrawal of non-African contingents he. would
recommend the withdrawal of the UN force · in its entir~_tt/
r Hammarskjold has interpreted the UN resolution of 9 Au:
gusfi.s meaning that the UN comma.lid in the Congo could not
be used on behalf of the central government, as in any move
to subdue Katanga. He will request a ruling on this interpreta-
tion at the Security Council meeting)
The action by the Leopoldville police on 16 August in de-
taining for investigation several hundred Europeans--including
UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own security
forces Lumumba will increase his harassment of both the UN
and his political opponents. An estimated 400 .to 500 Europeans
were detained for document checks after Lumumba charged
that Belgiah officials still iri Leopoldville were avoiding arrest
by wearing UN arm bands.
Meanwhile, Ghanaian President Nkrumah--who together
with Guinea's Sekou Tour~ . has warmly supported Lumumba's
cause--may be moving to dissociate himself ~what from -Lu-
position~r_e_g_a_r_di_·n_g_Ka_t_an-ga_._~_
' (b)(3)

~---~ ~1
l
~s-g-
1v
_
mumba's extreme

n_g~a_c_v_e-co_n_s
According to Ghana radio, Nkrumah
_ _e~ration" to an invitation from Presi-
dent TshoinM to visit Katanga and see conditions there. In
_ __ __ __,

Monrovia, President Tubman has stated that Nkrumah now

agrees with him that an African "summit" meeting scheciuled
for Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August is not required, and
that any ineeting there could be held on the ministerial level.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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Selection of South Korean Prime Minister

Newly elected. South KOrean President Yun Bo-sun probably

will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime
minister following the House of Representatives' rejectlon ·on 17
August of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post.
Under the constl.t ution, if the ,President's second nominee is re-
jected, the lower house selects the prime minister whose election
then requires only a plurality of votes. The President mµst announce
his second choice within five days ilDd the house must ac~ upon his
recommendation in not less than 2i hours and not more than 48 hours.
'
Kim's defeat by·a narrow margin of only three votes suggests
that a government headed by Chang would have a tenuous majorlty.
Chang, titular chief of the Democratlc party, controls slightly less
than · half of the party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 2a3-·seat
lower house. Kim,. leader of the party's right-wing faction, has
strongly opposed any compromise with Chang's followers and at times
he has appeared to ~avor a party split.

Chang has stated that lf he becomes .prime minister he would

select a broadly representative cabinet, which would include members
of both factions and presumably independents. Early press reports
indicate that Kim was defeated after a group of independents rejected
his answers to a list of questions which they submitted to him and
Chang. Should most of the 44 independents in the lower house act ,.
as a unified group they might exerclse the balance of power betwe(b)(1) !:
the nearly evenl divided -ro- and ti-Chan factions of the (b)(3)
majorlty party. '--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

(b )( 1)

CONF ltJENTI 4 L_

17 Aug 60 ('Fl\ITP.A I 11\JTFI 11r.i:tJrs: RI 111 i:TltJ Page 7

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THE PRESIDENT
._, c- -
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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director , Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, Nat.tonal Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
· The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, Inte.rnationitl Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense · ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Direc tor, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operati ons, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allie d Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Direc tor
National Indications Center
The Director

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C0317·2662 4'Zbrn - . . ~_...., ...
Approved for Release : 2016/ 07/05 C03172662
'V' ,...,.

The Daily Brief of the ·CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the D:irector of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-1,lp material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,

Intelligence r
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
this publicati~n is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate a nd preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication. in the light of further information and more complete
analysis. ·

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

... ·..

~ET
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF
(b )(1)
(b)(3)

I I . ASIAQAFIUCA
(b)(3)
Republic of the Congo: Lumumba's 19 August statement
that he is prepared to ,:' renounce" the services of the UN troops
in. the Congo ls his strongest implication to date that he may de-
mand a complete UN withdrawal. Although Lumumba hinted that
he had commitments of "unselfish" aid from unnamed countries,
he did not repeat his earlier threat to take unilateral action .·
· against Katanga unless given satisfaction by the UN Security
Council by·24 August.
> Umbassador Timberlake has reported that anti-Lumumba
elements in the Congo might attempt to overthrow the govern-
ment by assassinating Lumumba or by attempting a coup. The

(b )(3)
C03 17.2 662 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172662
V TO~~
I _ _ _ _ __

=
li:ons~itution
requi;res that a motion.in the. Senate for a vote of
(b) ~~
no confidence be ':followed by a 48~hour waiting period. This .
would allow time for Lwmrmba to take what stens he felt neces:.
s~ry to prevf;!nt a.quorum] J •
(b)i
I
I I I. THE WEST
I
West Germany - France:L_West German Foreign Minister
Brentano has told US Ambassador Dowling that Adenauer and
he arE! seriously concerned regarding the plans of De Gaul.l e for
a European. confederation .and ·revamping,.of. NATO which are
"qUtte opposed" to the views still held by' Bonn. Although·Ade-
I
(b)i
nauer feels he cannot ·di·rectly oppose De· Qaulle, lie hope·s to
wear him down by demonstrating the impracticality of De Gaulle's ·
plans. · Brentano said·Adenauer and De Gaulle do agree that the
I11
powers of the Commori Market's executive should be. reduced in
I
favor of'the council of the six national forE!ign ministers, but
Dowllng·believes this "seeml~ retreat from integration" by Ade ~
nauer .is o~ly a tactical
. move.
' _ . il
(c___ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ J
_J
I
(b) 3 ~

20 Aug 60. DAILY BRIEF ii

'"' ""' ' "' "~--

..
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~-
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(b )(1)
(b)(3)

*Mali Federation : The newly independent Mali Federatlon--

: • l comprlslng the states of Senegal and Soudan--appears to have
broken· apart as a result of the vote of the National Assembly of 7 l" ~' ·
Senegal on 19 August to withdraw from the federation and proclaim
~ ~z:.~: the independence of Senegal. Senegal's action raises the imminent
. .·:-:-~
. ....~· threat of civil war, .because Mall President Modlbo Kelta recently
warned that secession was unconstitutional and would lead to blood-
shed. The main differences concern foreign oolicv and the alloca-
tion of top administrative posts. (b)(3)

• 1:

'
·~

20 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

.... ~~

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The Situation in the Congo

Lumumba's statement on 19 August that he is prepared to

"renounce" the services of UN troops in the Congo is his
strongest implication to date that he may demand a compl~te
withdrawal of UN forces . Lumumba charged that Hammarskjold
had "betrayed the United Nations," alleging that the incident on
18 August in which Canadian officers were assaulted by Congq~
Iese police·had been "blown out of proportion" by Hammarskjold
in order to influen·c e the forthcoming Security Council debate~
Although Lumumba hinted that he had commitments of "unselfish"
aid from certain countries, he did not repeat his earlier thre·a t
to take unilateral action against Katanga if the Security Council
did not act by 24 August.
The Security Council is expected to begin debate on the UN
role in the Congo on 21 August. !An Indian delegate estimated on
18 August that African delegations will support the secretary gen-
.' t
eral. · Since then the incident involving the Canadians has stlmu-
latecf'criticism of Lumumba from a number of African contingents
in the Congo. This will probably operate to Hammarskjold's ad~
vantage in the UN debate,
(Ambassador Timberlake has reported that anti~ Lumumba
elements in the Congo might'.attempt to overthrow the government
by assassinating Lwnumba or by attempting a coup. If an attempt
were made to oust the government by a vote of no confidence, the
compulsory 48-hour waiting period would give Lumumba time to
take strong-arm a ction to prevent a quorum. No single leader of
anti-Lumumba forces has emerged, · although the Senate was a focal
point of anti-Lum\.1mba sentiment in the early weeks following in~
dependence. ·

While current negotiations in Geneva between Belgium and

the Congo on the division of assets of the Central Congo Bank and
the protection of Ruanda=Urundi interests are reportedly going
well, Belgians fear that Lurhumba will refuse to implement the

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agreements reached there. Be~gium probably will transfer ex~

change- control powers to the Congo Government in Leopoldville
this week, and the Congo finance minister. probably will then is-
sue a decree blocking all foreign currency transactions. It will
then be impossible for the Belgian Government to pay Belgian
technicians in the Congo outside Katanga, ·and most of them would
leave rather than accept their salaries in. nontransferable currency.
This could result in greater confusion, as it is doubtful that the UN
to
will be·· able replace them effectively for some time to comec__._ _ _
(b )(1)
(b) 3)

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(b)(3)

. ~enauer's Differences With De Gaulle OV'er EUrOpean

Integration and NATO
Lln. a. conversation with US Ambassador Dowling on 16 Au-
gust, West German Foreign Minister Brentano declared that
Chancellor Adenauer and he are "seriously concerned" over
French President de Gaulle's plans for a European conf edera-
tion and a revamping of NATO- -plans which are "quite opposed "
to the vi~ws still held by Bonn. .

LBrentano said De Gaulle seems even more set in.· his views
than two years ago, and implied it was the chancellor's strategy
to attempt to "wear De Gaulle do'Wn" by demonstratil\g the im-
practicality· of his plans. Adenauer has accordingly written a
·personal letter to De Gaulle and has sent Deputy Foreign Min-
ister van Scherpenberg to Paris to make clear that Bonn re-
mains dedicated to the realization of European integration.
While Brentano said that Adenauer and De Gaulle are substan-
tially agreed on reducing the supranational powers of the Com-
mon Marketvs executive commission, Dowling believes this
"seeming retreat from integration" is only tactical and is at-
tributable in part to electoral pressures on the chancellor. ·r
·-'
{_!)espite the. fact that this tactical shift would seem to have
brought Adenauer closer to De Gaulle's opposition to suprana-
tional institutions, Brentano's remarks tend to confirm earlier
impressions that Bonn is not yet prepared to accept as an al-
ternative a loose, French-dominated confederation with anti-
British and possibly anti-NATO overtones. This reserve would
account for Adenauer's friendly offer during Macmillan's visit
1 to Bonn.on 10-11 August to work out a long-range solution to
the split between the Common Market and the British-led Outer
Seven.

De _Gaulle's plans, still not fully known, reportedly involve

the creation of ·a council of heads of government of the six
Common Market countries and three ministerial committees to
coodinate political, defense, and cultural policies. No such _.r

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( committee would be set up for economic affairs, which would
·oe left in the institutional fr~mework of the Common Market.
T~is new structure would presumably be the basis for De Gaulle's
proposed "revitalization" of NATO, which, according to Van
Scherpenberg, De Gaulle Wfl.IltS to replace with an "alliance" of (b)( )
the US speaking for itself, Britain speaking for the Common- 3
wealth and France reoresenting- the Common Market. J
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

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Situation in Mali FederaUon

The newly independent Federation of Mali, beset with growing

friction between lts· compo·n ent states of Senegal and Soudan, ap-
pears to be ·tn the throes of dissolution and perhaps on the threshold
of civil war. On 19 August the· Senegalese National Assembly voted
to withdraw from the federation and proclaim Senegal's independence.
The immediate causes ·of the friction are differences over the allo-
cation of top administrative posts. However, underlying cultural
dlssimilariUes and opposing· attitudes on foreign policy have led to
growing suspicion and µiistrust. , Senegalese leaders such as Leo-
pold Senghor and· '4amadou Dia have urged a moderate, generally
pro-French course ·o f action, while the Soudanese, under the leader-
ship of Modibo Keita, hav~ favored a more extreme nationalist
viewpoint.

Civil war may be imminent, in view of previous warnings by

Modibo Keita, president of the Mall Council of Ministers, that
there was no constitutional provision for secession and that any
such effort would result in bloodshed. Kelta has declared a state
of emergency, and the c~binet has granted him security powers.
He reportedly has mpved troops into positions around government
buildings in the f~deratlon's capital of Dakar and has discharged
Senegalese Premier Mamadou Dia f.rom his office as Mall vice
president. In. a speech to the Senegalese assembly, Dla accused
Keita of attempting a coup and called on hls countrymen to mobilize.

The landlocked Soudan ls economically dependent on Senegal,

alt}lough the Soudanese comprise 60 percent of Mall's population of
6,500,000. If the federal ttes are severed, the Soudanese leaders
may consider closer relations with neighboring Guinea, with which
conslderable polltical rapport has existed in the past.

- Dissolution of the federation poses several problems for

France. Mali ls an independent member of the French Community,
and Paris has both mJlitary and economic agreements with the

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federation, including defense lnstallatlons at the modern port

of Dakar. Furthermore, the influential French minority of .
about 50,000 at Dakar might become involved lf clvll war breaks
out. A ·rupture· of the federation may create international
problems over recognition similar to those prevailing between
the Congo and Katanga Province. The ··U N Security Council ap-
proved Mall's bid for m.embershl soon after that state alned
1 de ndence ln mld-l \ine. (b)( 1)
(b)(3)

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.. CONl'IfJEHTIA L
- _
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Direc tor of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics aJ1d Space Administration
Spec.ial Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for· Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secre tary of the Tre asury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The . Under Secretary of State
T he Unde r Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, Inte rnational Cooperation Administration
The Direc tor of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Sec retary of Defense
The Deputy Secr etary of Defense
Assistant Se cretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Sec retary of the Army
The Secr etary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Jolnt Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff 1 United States Army
Chief of Naval Overaticms, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air F o rce
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pac ific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
·Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Direc tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Direc tor
National Indi~ations Ce nter
The Direc tor

~AL
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, L " -4 - " ·.• •• I , • ~ ._..cm.... • L~ "
G:03172664
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..
·--
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is n ot practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
] (b)(1)
(b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to. modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but on:Iy on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States. ·

(b )(1)
(b )(3)

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....P.PE.O.Y.~~ ..f.9.r. ..!3.~.!~.~.~-~-:............................................................
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West Germany: W'onowing conversations with Chancellor

Adenauer and Foreign Minister Brentano, West German Am-
bassador to Moscow Hans Kroll feels it now is virtually cer~
tain that no Bundestag meeting will be held in Berlin before
November. In a radio speech on.21 August, West Berlin Mayor µ/fl (b)(3)~
Brandt again demanded such a meeting be held despite Soviet I
threats to sign a separate East German peace treaty. Although 1-~
Brandt claimed British support for his position, the British Gov- 1.~
ernment has recently indicated opposition to the holding of the -
Bundestag meeting in Ber11~4n n r :l ture o rounds that B.
this might provoke the USSR.!J~-----~------==---.-----..:.(_,_, b)(3 I
!NATION) {--rnf., /hr>se.u.AJ <180/ ?..-<> ~ c;,_,., {SaJ!..el- .yrs /3ll{) ;
~ Lond.,;.r... . ~ -z 1./ 1 1 f1.M.1 ~ o ( &rv-J .S/ ~/ ; lUP7 W 6
s -3-z. ~ 21 a_~~ c ~J
LATE ITEMS

*Congo: Premier Lumumba's modification of certain of his

charges against the UN probably stemmed from failure of other
African nations to give him full support. Although he will con-
tinue to press the UN concerning Katanga, for the time being he
may not demand total withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo. () /u
The UN Security Council president, in a statement of the major- / u1 ~~ j y
ity view on 22 August, upheld Hammarskjold's authority and his VJ_
interpretations of the council's previous Congo resolutions. r . j. 3.
Brussels' repo1·ted agreement to withdraw its remaining ~ .·L
forces- -about 6 ,000 men- ..from its Congo bases will partially [) rr
undercut anti-Belgian propaganda at the conference of African "b
foreign ministers scheduled to begin in Leopoldville on 25 Au-
gust. The Belgians plan to retain "technicians" at the bases, how-
ever, and continue t o regard their disoositioIL.a.fLa subiect for ne-
gotiatio·n with -the Congo Government. I iPage :~::)

23 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

 . . . . . ,. -.. . . . . .
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*Laos: [i>remler Souvanna Phouma, Lao .~~Y commander

Generatl5uane, a representative of rebel·Captaln ;Kong Le, and
the UnUed Nations deputy rep~esentative ln Laos arrived ln 7
Savannakhet on 23 August to attempt to reach a settlement with

II
~-------. General. Phoumi, leader of the ·countercoup group. They pre- . ( b )(~
sumably wlll stress the danger that ·rebel paratroop Captain
Kong Le, whose troops control the Vient.l ane area:, ·will. join . IJ(L
f'orce·s· ~:.wl~h.. the pro-Communist Pathet Lao dissidents lf·Phoumi
persists tn· attempting to nullify the· coup. The degree of present
collusion between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao is unclear, but
.
General <Juane has stated that talks have been held and that the
I•1•
"Pathets would attack Phoumi's forces for us" in any move against
,------~•vtentiaile. There are indlcat~ons that Genera.I Phoumi hopes to
set up a rival government at his headquarters in Savannakhet,
where near~~ a auo:rum_oLNatlonal Assem.hlv dennties thus far
II
(b) 3 ~
have rallle'SJIL-------------------~

23 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

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U~£
._..' ''-'£

The Situation in the Congo

Premier Lumumba's modification of certain of his charges

against the. UN probably stemmed from the failure of other Afri-
can nations to, give hi~ full support. Although he will continue
to press the UN concerning Katanga, for the time being he may
not demand withdrawal of all UN forces from the Congo. The
UN Security CouncH president, in a statement of the ~ajority
view on 22: August, upheld Secretary General Hammarskjold's
authority and his interpretations of the council's previous Con-
go resolutions.

Brussels' rep<;>rted agreement to withdraw its remaining

forces--about 6,000 men--from its Congo bases may serve to
undercut anti-Belgian propaganda at the conference of African
foreign ministers in Leopoldville beginning on 25 August. The
Belgians plan to retain "technicians" at the bases, however,
and continue to regard their eventual disposition as subject to
negotiations with the Congo Government.
The tone .of the Leopoldville meeting is also likely to be
. affected by African doubts concerning Lumumba's attacks on
the UN. Ghana's foreign minister stated on 19 August that he
expects the initial sessions to be held on the foreign-minister
level, with subsequent sessions among heads of state to be
held in either Leopoldville or Accra.

The meeting, as ·first projected by Lumumba and Ghanaian

President Nkrumah, 'was designed in part as a forum to dram-
atize : ·AfriCan , s,u pport for a united Congo. More recently,
,.-1l!rlWeYl~__.8.frj'LC.an...backine for Lu mu mha has he.c................._........_.,...,._.._......_._......__,
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

In Elisabethyille ·~.tt. Katanga, a conference between provincial

President Moise Tshdmb~ and officials of the anti- Lumumba

~T
(b)('3)
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Abako party is the first known effort by the two opposition

groups to work out a. common plan of act~on. Lumumba con-
tinues to suppress opposition in Leopoldville Province; .anti-
Lumumba moves in the Congo Senate may have prompted the
arrest of a legislator from Lumumba's own party, despite
his legislative immunity.

The USSR continues its strong support of the Lumumba

government. On 20 and 21 August, Moscow protested as "com-
p.letely inadmissible" Hammarskjold's plan for a civilian UN
administration in the Congo, demanded the immediate with-
drawal of Canadian forces, and issued its fourth official state-
ment on the Congo crisis, again warning that "peace-loving
countries" would have to take "other steps" if Belgian troops
are not withdrawn and alleged plans to "dismember" the Congo
are nqt abandoned. 1 I (b)(3)

Sources: AP' LEOPOLDVILLE, 22 Aug 60; REUTERS BRUSSELS, 22 Aug

60; !!§!:.. s7ofQOD/'1'26038, 16 Aug 60 (Top Secret Daunt);
FJ1B t£2M_ 259, 19 Aug 60 (Conf).

~ET ~I_ ___. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Situation in Laos I
· (Erem~er Souvanna Phouma, accompanied by Lao ~my
commander General Ouane, a representative of rebel para-
troop Captain Kong Le, and the United Nations deputy rep-
resentative in Laos, flew from Vientiane to Savannakhet
on 23 August for negotiations with General Phoumi, leader
of the countercoup movement. Presumably, the delegation
will stress the danger that rebel paratroop Captain .Kong Le,
whose troops firmly control the Vientiane . area, will join
forces with the pro- Communist Pathet Lao dissidents if
Phoumi persists in attempting to nullify the 9 August coup
and succeeding· developments) ·

tthe Mgh-level composition of this delegation should

facilitate the task of reaching a compromise settlement
of differences. However, Phoumi may still question the
extent of Souvanna's real authority, and may have in ·mind
the creation of a rival government to challenge the Souvanna
regime, which he considers illegal. The gravitation of Lao
VIPs to Savannakhet continues. ·Prince Boun Oum Na
Champassa~, inspector gen·e ral of the '.kingdom, arrived on
21 August via Thailand after flight from Vientiane. Leaf-
lets dropped in Vientiane on 2·2 August requested pro-Phoumi
deputies to. re-form the National Assembly at Savannakhet.
The arrival of three more deputies reported en route from
Vientiane would bring the unofficial count of deputies at
Savannakhet to 25, or five short of a quorum..J .

· cliie bulk of the 800 battle-harden·eQ troops .o f Kong Le's

2nd Paratroop Battalion reportedly have set up a ·d efense
perimeter several miles outside Vientiane, and Pathet Lao (b )( 1)
elements apparently are also in blocking position astride ·road
and river a roaches to the ca ital.
(b )( 1)

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L l aeneral (b)( 1)
Ouane told the American army attach~ in Vientiane on 22 August
· that '.'the Pathet Lao would attack Phoumi's forces for us" if an
attack were made on VientlaneJ

frhe degree of present collusion between Kong Le and. the

Pathet Lao ls unclear. General Ouane confirms. that talks have
been held but states that no llais exist l (b)(1)

Estimates of Pathet Lao strength in

-~
(b)(1)
the Vientiane viCinity vary from several hundred to 2.000: the
.lowe.r figure ls believed more accurate.)J (b)(3)

(b )( 1)

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COJVfitBENTlA k.
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Di rec tor of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operati{ms, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency .-
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

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1v r ~ _

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of depart ments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departmen ts and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
L rna. no i o
0
tjs publication is based on all sources, including (b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in t he light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication m ay be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of t he espionage
laws, US·Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prej udicial
to the safety or interest o( the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

Approved f;'r"R:i'ease: 2016i07Tcls C03174708

Co3 1 .,~470 8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~((bb))((31))
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~Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 r:~~~-r--·'
C03174708
mw

(b (3)
. . · J vr ~.c:;Cft&..L,. .
- --
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN '
13 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

=

II. ASIA~ AFRICA

Tunisia-Al~eria:l:R,resident Bou~guiba, whose restrictio~s /9 K

on Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia·
have hampered rebel operations in Algeria, appears to be adopt-
ing a more permissive attitude toward the FLN. His recent pub-
lic speeches indicate a change in attitude, and he reportedly now
has agreed to permit "volunteers" for the Algerian fighting, in-
cluding any that might be sent from Comm1.1.Ilist China, to transit
Tunisia. Bourguiba presumably is motivated by a number of fac-
tors, including disilluslon with De Gaulle's Algerian policy, con-
cern that the FLN might sabotage the newly opened oil pipeline·
from ~aharan Algeria to the Tunisian c.oast, and even fear of an
FLN- engineered
(Page 3) assassination attempg ..______ _ __ _ _ __,

i
 Congo: The Security Council's decision on 12 September
to adjourn indefinitely its consideration of the Congo crisis will
probably be vtewed by Premier Lumumba as a victory over
Secretary General Hammarskjold and may encourage him to at-
tempt a new assault on UN-held installations in Leopoldville--the "'>-1
radio station and airfields. In the Congo capital, Lumumba con- ' !.... 0
tinues to resist the efforts of President Kasavubu to remove him
from office. Army units arrested the premier on 12 September
under a warrant signed by Kasavubu and took him to a local army
camp, but within a few hours the premier was back in Leopoldvllle.
He toured the city and denounced the attempted coup against him.
Meanwhile, the National Assembly backed the premier by cabling
the UN not to recognize Justin Bomboko--Kasavubu's choice for new
foreign minister. Lumumba also received support from the UAR
when Cairo reportedly decided to withdraw its force of 515 men from
the UN command in the Cong~arging the UN had violated Congo
sovereignty. I ~Page 5)
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'-' 5EeRE.x_. '-'

"'-
\
l.J.unisian President Gives Firmer Support to Algerian Rebels
I 1

i
1 President Bourguiba, whose restrictions on National Libera-
( tion Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia have hampered rebel opera..
tions in Algeria, appears to be adopting a somewhat more permis-
sive attitude toward the FLN. He reportedly stated recently that
he. might permit a convoy to cross Tunisia with much- needed arms
\ and ammunition for· the rebel army in Algeria. (b)(1)
1 e has agreed to allow "volunteers" from other (b)(1)
'\ coun r1es~- nc uding any which might be sent from Communist
China~~ to pass through Tunisia on their way to Algeria. He re-
f
cently publicly reaffirmed his support for the FLN ·a nd sharply
criticized France.

Bourguiba continues to be deeply concerned over the disrup-

tive effects of the Algei"ian rebellion on North Africa in gener3.l
and on Tunisia in particular. He ls also faced with the imme~
diate security problem engendered by the pJ;'esence of an esti~­
mated 10,000 rebel troops within his country's borders. As a
result, although he has publicly championed .the rebel cause, he
has sharply restricted the movement of troops and supplies with.~
in Tunisia. At the same time, he has attempted.to act as a me-
diator between Fr.a nce and the FLN. His apparent shift toward
closer identification with the FLN probably is motivated partly by
disappointment with De Gaune·•s Algerian policy and partly by con-
cern that the FLN might sabotage the new oil pipeline from Saharan
Algeria to the Tilnisian coast. In addition, Bourguiba reportedly
believes that t~e restrictions he has imposed on the FLN have made
him an assassin·a uon target for the r.e bels, and he may be attempt-
ing tQ placate the Algerian leaders.
Bourguiba is also assisting in the rebel campaign to bring
the Algerian dispute into international forums . He stated on
3 September that the Tunisians are ready "to join our fate with
that of Algeria if this union .would hasten the end of the war."
/ /have recently announced that their govern- . (b)(1)
ment and the provisional Algerian government are studying ways J

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Goachieve "an eventual organic and political fusion of Tunisia

and Algeria." Such a .move presumably would be designed to
l _,. give the rebel government a certain amount of official standing
r~in2.:.:the_for1hcomlrur_s.ess1Jn of the UN General Assembly.
(b )(3)

(b )( 1)

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-T~ I
(b )(3)
I

Situation in Congo

The Security Council's decision on 12 September to ad~

journ its consideration of the Congo c~j.Sil:Litid~initely Will
probably be viewed by Premier Lumumba as a victory over
Secretary General Hammarskjold. The ·Security Council,
however, may send a fact"'.' findii;ig subcommitt ee to the Congo
with additional instructions to seek mediation between Lumumba
and Kasavubu factions. The premier had asked that no resolu-
tion be passed because he feared that such action would strength~
en Hammarskjold's hand in the Congo and restrict his own free-
dom of action against Katanga and moderates in the Congo. Lu~
mumba now may be encouraged to attempt a new assault on UN~
held installations in Leopoldville.,. -the radio station and the air-
fields .
Although there have been indications that Kasavubu was im~
proving his position, Premier Lumumba now appears to have
regained some of .the initiative. On 13 Septembe·r , ·he repeated
his threat to seek aid outside the UN. President Tshombe of
Katanga has weakened Kasavubu's group~ =which he is considered
to favor~~by declaring for an independent Katanga and by refus-
ing to accept the post of vice president in the new government.
Lfiammarskjold.is still convinced that he must break Lumumba and
'. I .~ that he will be able to do it. He is prepared to turn down any
: f' .

Lumumba demand.for UN withdrawal'.{

Premier Lumumba was arrested on 12 September on a war-
rant issued by Kasavubu, but was soon release~, and toured Leo-
poldville boasting of the failure of the plot against him. On 12
September the National Assembly supported Lumumba when it
cabled the Security Council, that "the Boinboko delegation is not
recognized by the Parliament, and cannot be received by the
Security Council or speak on behalf of the Congo." The premier
has had strong support from the USSR, and has recently re-
ceived backing from Ghana and the UAR. On 11 September Ghana
condemned the government named by Kasavubu as "bogus" and
declared .it would be inadmissible for the UN to recognize it as
the Congo government. On 12 September, Cairo radio announced

~ET .
I _ __ _ ____.
(b )(3)

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v TO~T I~----~
that the UAR had decided to withdraw its 515-man contingent
from the UN forces in the Congo rather than face the possi-
.bility of clashes with Congolese troops. On 7 September, the
UAR charge in Leopoldville suggested that Cairo reassure Lu-
mumba of its complete readiness to respond to the Congolese
government's request for military assistance, and ask Lumumba
for specific information as to requirements. The assignment of
a top off.i cial in the UAR foreign ministry~ -Dr. Murad Ghallb- ~ as
ambassador in Leopoldville may ~ead to a further .sfr.e ngthenlng
of UAR influence in the Congo following his arrival expected on
13 September.

Two Soviet cargo vessels ~ -the Voroshilov and the Krasnodar~ ­

are off the West African coast and may be heading for the Congo.
On 11 September they were off Guinea and proceeding southward.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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· · ._, TOP- SKREI_ - ~
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~ 1Septe mber1960 ~

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 .
C-03184166 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03184166
·- IUI"'~ -

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
L ernrrence ] this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

r esent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
ficat ion in the light of further information and more complete
analysis. ·

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793 , 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the det riment of the United States.
(b)(3)

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~ ror-sECB.EI_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

North Korea - Cuba: North Korea has received its first

dipfomatic recognition outside .the bloc with the 29 August agree-
to
ment exchange ambassadors with Cuba "as soon as possible."
Cuba has little to gain econom1cally from North Korea, but es-
tablishment of relations at this time is consistent with the in-
creasingly close ~ies between Cuba and the Sino- Soviet bloc and O' I/
probably fo~eshadows establishment of relations between Cuba !\.__
and Communist China. . Pyongyang will probably publicize this
development to show that Western opposition to the North Korean
~egime need not be a barrier to recognltion.
"(Page 3) '--------- - - - - - - - '

. Blo~·UN: There are increasing signs that Khrushchev and /\ )(__

safellite Jeaaers will attend the opening of the forthcoming UN U
General Assembly session on 20 September. Khrushchev may
use his short visit to Finland as the occasion to appeal. to world
leaders to attend the General Assembly discussion, announce.his
intention to attf nd the meetirut._a.rulhint at some new .iilitiative on
disarmament. _ l
I I . ASIA-AFRlCA

1.Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF 11

C-03184166
J
(b)(1)
(b)(3

III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

No. Sino~ Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the immedi-
ate future .
. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct mi.l itary action against US forces abroad, US allies, or
areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future .

NOTE: There .have been no new developments with respect 'f.1 O

to West Berlin :which would require a change in the fl,,
conclusions of the special Watch Committee meet-
I
ing of 30 August.
l
! c. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploita-
tion by· Soviet/ Communist hostile action which.could jeopardize
the security of the· US· in the immediate future:
The new Souvanna Phouma cabinet, comprising sup-
porter s of both General Phoumi and Souvanna, ap-
pears to be acceptable to Lao officials other than
Kong Le. The new Laotian government will .probably
adopt neutralist policies which would afford oppor-
tunities for increased Communist presence in Laos.

1 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

~/A?/
/#/
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C03 1 8 41 6 6 Approved for Release: 2016/ 07/05 C03184166
"""' ·1 ·~~-------__J

LATE ITEMS

*Situation in Laos as of 0230 EDT : ~- a sudden about face

Captain Kong Le is reported to ·have dropped his opposition to
the compromise government put together iri Luang .Prabang by
'--------~ premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi. If
true, this would appear to remove the last major stumbllng
block to the· restoration of constitutional order in Laos. · An
atmosphere of distrust prevails however. After Kong Le's in-
itial rejection of the government on 31 August on the grounds
that Phoumi and other members of the ousted Somsanlth govern-
ment would "try to seize power again1.1 ·a nd will resume civil war, "
Phoumi :returned to his base at Savannakhet but agreed to come
-----~ back to Luang Prabang on 1 September if Souvanna Phouma won
Ko~Le's coope.ratio0 ·
~ouvanna, .who flew to Vientiane on 31 August immediately
6 /G
after the national assembly voted confidence in his government,
has issued an invitation over Vientiane radio for the Communist
Pat~et Lao to send .representatives to Vientiane where he be-
lieved "outstanding problems can be settled within a few days. "
Presumably Souvanna made this gesture to convince Kong Le
that the aims of his coup woµld be incorporated into the policies
of the new government. He may also have made other con-
prove unacceptable to
the new governmen0
Lauml
cessions to secure Kong's cooperation which could ultimately
and other anti-Communists in
~---------------~

*Iran:~atlonalist and anti-government elements in Tehran,

pparently encouraged by the Shah's 27 August statement criti- · .
izlng irregularities in the recent parliamenta:ry elections, re~~
ortedly have scheduled a major demonstration in the capital~

1 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iv

co"3i "84i " 6_6_ _ __
· · ·
.
v Apr.roved for Release : 2016/ 07/05 C03184166
1 ·u~·rrt·b.t
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, J_
. _ _ _ ____ __ _J
~ b (3)

f1' September. - Allahyar Saleh, leader of the Iran Par_ty and

former associate of ·ex-Premier Mossadeq who has aroused
considerable popular enthusiasm with his criticism of the
elections, may come to Tehran from the proyincial city of
Kashan in conjunction with the demonstration. The government
ls probably aware of the nationalists' plans and may initiate
action to prevent the demonstration. Should this not deter
the natlonalls~s_._se.r.loua.clashes with tha..securitv
could occur)._L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __._
ces · fof

1 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF v.

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North Korea and Cuba to Establish Diplomatic Relations

North Korea has received its first diplomatic recognition
outside the bloc with the 29 August agreement to exchange am-
bassadors with· Cuba "as soon as possible." The announcement
was made:in a j.oint declaration issued in Havana after Cuba's
acting Foreign Minister Cepero Bonilla and North Korean Finance
Minister Han Sang-tu had signed a cultural exchange agreement.

Before this agreement with Havana, Pyongyang had been con-

spicuously unsuccessful in its efforts to gain recognition from
non-Communist cow:itries, although it did manage to make a few
trade and cultural contacts. Now it will make every effort'- to
flaunt its first nonbloc embassy in efforts to convince neutral na~
tions they too can ignore Western opposition and accept the Pyong-
yang regime as a member of the international community.
Havana's action is consistent with the increasingly close ties
being developed betwe·e n Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc and may
foreshadow recognition of Peiping, with which Cuba concluded a
trade pact in July. Gommunist China has displayed particular
sympathy for the Cuban revolution, and Chou En~ lai 'On 15 August
pledged the Cuban people "every possible aid, with no strings at-
tached," in .their anti- US "struggle."'
Fidel Castro, in his recent public attacks on the United States,
has repeatedly declared Cuba's intention "to be the friend of the
Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic because they have
proved to be our friends." On 30 August, he condemned "US in-
tervention everywhere in the world- ~ in Korea, Taiwan, Indochina,
and ever he.re else . .. defending the Chiang Kai-shek puppet."
(b)(3)

(b )( 1 )

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(b)(3)
Situation in U_tongo TOP~~!----~
. The Katanga government of President Tshombe expects an
early invasion by Congolese Army units of Premier Lumumba
and ls taking· defensive military measures along 250 miles of
frontier with Kasai Province. Bridges, roads, and railway con-
nections have been destroyed to a depth of '12 miles from the
frontier, and recruitment and troop trainin~ efforts stepped up.
The fear of -invasion has prompted Tshombe to press the UN for
a .firm commitment regarding the former Belgian base of Kamina,
which is located in Katanga Province .and contains one of the best
airfields and supply depots in the Congo. In a communique on 30
August he threatened to put the base out of action~~he might be
able to cut off the base's 15,000~ man labor supply-.~ unless Katanga's
sovereignty was "respected" at Kamina and the UN guaranteed that
Lumumba's troops would be barred from landing there. The UN
Command has reinforced its strength at Kami.na by sending Swed-
ish troops to join an Irish unit.

On 31 August, when it was discovered that 400 paratroopers,

100 airfield guards, and a school of aviation still remained at
Kamina, Secretary General Hammarskjold criticized Beigium for
failing to live up to the evacuation terms. The UN had authorized
several hundred technicians to remain, and Lumumba and Moscow
radio have already condemned this action. Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov delivered a strong protest to Hammarskjold
against the continued presence of Belgian forces in the Congo.

In neighboring Kasai Province the situation remains confused,

with officials of the secessionist "Mining State" claiming that
Baluba tribesmen have recaptured their capital of Bakwanga from
Lumumba's troops.

The USSR's prestige in the Congo will be enhanced by the im-

minent arrival of twelve IL-14s carrying.foodstuffs. The planes
may remain in the Congo to be used in behalf of Lumumba's efforts
to consolidate his power throughout the country, .but it is doubtful
that the USSR will permit them to become inv ed directl in mil-
. itar o erations against Katanga forces. (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)
~ '--------------'
1 Sept 60 CENTRAi. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
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~ ?;01w1·DEMTIA L.. ;,.1

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under -Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Sec retary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The J oint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operati,ms, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense 'for Special Of>erations
Director for Inte lligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence , Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Fede ral Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

-CvNFIDEfllTlAL_
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~ · _ . - TO~- ~
~ · . ~
~ 20 September 1960
~x)
~

(,b~3)
Copy No. C IS ~

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BULLET!
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- .-
- . -. . . - - - - --- - . . . . . -

I -:. ·. .....
' ' '
I . I

.
C031'84169
r
-
--
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03184169
I Ul""'~I - '

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
InteJ1iP-ence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
I
Interpretatiorn: of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resen t immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of fur ther information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligen ce items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated furt her, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within t he meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793 , 794, and 798. The law .prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as·well as its u se in any manner prejudicial
t o the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign governmen t to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

_-:::-::::---_ ____
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1)
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C031·8
.. 41 69
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~ - I
'----------------~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

I I. ASIA-AFRICA

$Quth Vietnam: [communist guerrillas in South Vietnam

reportedly have been ordered to intensify their terrorist and
sabotage activities in connection with the 15th anniversary on
23 September of the anti-French resistance movement in
Indochina. The prime target is said to be &Ligon, although
stepped-up attacks on militar oats and atrols in the coun-
tryside are also planned.
Commurilst groups may attemp o p an exp os ves n p ces
frequented by Americans, and has advised against any night
driving · in &ligpn f.rom 21 to 24 September "j I
I !(Page 1) . ._____ _____,
c ~~· i:S-4i-6 9'\!l!tt:l:0\1~'l;~~~~~~~ll1~Wr ~ i llfmnlll~~~~[ l
;~!I . .. . . ....... 1 u~I . :~~::· = 3
·~{ifj LATE ITEMS ; -:;,;
r·.-l T f :. ~ !

lit ~~:;r~t;:1~~~~:0i~~JI:~~R~~1r;~~~i:~~~~~~~
dicatlons that military comma.n ders there :;u-e loyal to General
Phouml, the Pathet Lao leadership may have ·b een motivated by
r::
. I

:1- <.l'
concern th.a t add,itlonal mllitary pressure at this time might
(b)(3)
serve to reunify the badly divided Lao army. The order calling
·:, .'
for a cease fire left numerous loopholes in case the"Pathet Lao
should decide to· resume the offensive in Sam Neua. : The insurgents'
propaganda activities in the province wiU be facilitiated by the
withdrawal of army troops from outlying posts to form a small
defense perimeter around Sam Neua town. Premier Souvanna's
cancellation of a planned cabinet meeting in Luang Prabang with
the king on 19 September may have been influenced by an announce- :: ~ .
ment over Phoumi 's Radio Savannakhet th t it "11 er in f rce "
were launching an assault on Vientiane . (b )(1)
(b )( 1)
oumi s units is imminent;
...,,.,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(b)(3)
(b)( 1)
( b )(~)
.i •;.: ·.
··:.· .· ;

..· ··"-:
.·,
. ; .....:;,
,_ ) ~ '!", ::·

'- .

·:, ;-

.;.. ··· :

·~ ;

Press reports on 19 September pointed toward a possible early

announcement of some compromise arrange·m ent; a Kasavubu spokes-
man publicly acknowledged that peace talks were in progress and
indicated that the Ileo government recently named by Kasavubu was

20 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

.··:. . ~ : -:
·~··
c63is··4-f6"9'•-- ·~~J~~~~--~.,
, .

.
.

.
. , V~dbob~e,li~s.~;2016/07/0SC03184169
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~ (b)(3)
.
l
.; ~lj
!II~
~~­~~
r..:ff,_,,,
considering a "cabinet post" for Lumumba. Later Lumumba's ;;,..,, ·
representative at the UN claimed an agreement had been reached '~<;;

:::~~h::c::m:e::::: :: :::e~::: :::::::a~ng:::~o

1 0

situation closed early on 20 September when the USSR abandoned

~I
~. ;,;,;·:~::s
-,, ',.
its ·e fforts to obtain .c ensure of Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo. ·J;.~1
This paved the way for the overwhelming endorsement by the as- ·' ..
sembly of the As\an-Afrlcan resolution backing the secretary general ,· 't·:i
LnnasinYa~d :o
3 the Congo except through UN channels. 3
(b)( L;!~

'f.j~
:~~f!hl ·

~~*
-~W.:;11

~j

20 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

(b)p)
C031·84 1 69 - .
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Possible Communist Violence in Saigon

( Communist guerrilla units in south Vietnam have reported-

ly b-een ordered to intensify terrorism and sabotage in connec- (b )( 1)
tion w:lth. the 15th anniversary on 23 September of the be nin
of armed resistance a ainst French colonial rule .
(b )(3)
~------------------------..J
he
primary focus of such activity wUl be in Saigon, although the Com-
munists are also expected to step up attacks against military (b)(1)
posts and patrols of regular Vietaame se army troops as well as
civil guard and self-defense forces in the countryside ~
i
,i
r
5\)ecial action groups are believed to h~ve been infiltrated
·into the capital with the aim of committing~_act~ of sabotage
! against key installations, includin Tan Son Nhut air ort s-
; oline depots and bridges. (b )(1)

,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, believes that attempts may be made to

plant explosives in places frequented by Americans and has ad-
i vised against night driving in &Ligon during the period 21-24
September. _1 • · ·

1The upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity during the

past ·nine months has affected provinces in the Mekong delta
. area. south and west of Sligon ~nd main routes l~ading from
Saigon, but the capital city itself has previously been "consl d- ·
\ ered secure. The:re has been renewed emphasis by the Com-
1munist regime in North Vietnam on the "struggle against the
~ US-Diem clique" in the South, and plans to create incidents in
i Saigon may be partly intended to stir up further discontent a-
~ mong non-Communist oppo.b.ents of the Diem administJ:ation
· in Saigon. I I (b )(3)

(b )( 1)

20 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

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(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

Press reports .on 19 September pointed toward a possible

early announcement of some sort of compromise arrangement.
A Kasavubu spokesman publicly acknowledged· that talks between
the contending factions were in pi:ogress and indicated that the
lleo government recently named by Kasavubu--but still... not
formally tnvested--was considering a "cabinet post" for Lumumba.
La~er ·Lumumba's representative at the UN claimed knowledg~ of
an agreement under which Lumumba would ren~.ain "chief of the·
legal government."

Mobutu, meanwhile, was reported on 19 September to have

survived a second attempt on his life by Lumumba adherents.
The American Embassy in Leopoldville has characterized Mobutu,
who appears to lean heavily on Moroccan General Kettanl, as an
honest and dedicated man who ls appalled by the magnitude of the
Congo's problems. On 18 September he was still talking naively
about a "council of students" to run an .interim government pending
the "transfer" of power to a Kasavubu-· Ileo reglme by. the end of
Octoper.

The special session of the UN General Assembly on the Congo

~ituation ended early on 20 September when the USSR suddenly
abandoned its efforts to obtain endorsement of its resolution which
would in effect have censured Secretary General Hammarskjold's
actions in the Congo and upheld the right of unilateral aid to the
Congolese Government. The assembly backed overwhelmingly the
Asian-African resolution supporting l{ammarskjold and opposing
any ll1ilitary ald to the Congo except through UN channels. The
Congo situation, however, will almost certainly be discussed
further during the 15th General Assembly, which opens this after-
noon. (b)(3)

(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

(b)(3)

20 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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C03184169
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~· co~~

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Di rec tor of the Budget
Director, Office of Civll and Defense Mob1llzat1on
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Aqministratlon
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Actlvltles
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Trea~mry
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for .Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of D~fense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Alr Force
The Chairman, 'the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, t.Tnited States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

~
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03184169
C03185148 ~.---r ..
--
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185148

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

producecj. by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
I (b)(3)
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the r evelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person s, a s well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government. to the detriment of the United States.

(b)(3)

TO~~T
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185148
c;03 18514 8 (b )( 1)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185148 (b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185148

C03185 14 8 . ~Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185148
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(b)(3)

. . ... ·'
~:

.... j
 ~t~
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·1 ·u~~t'. I
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Indonesia= Netherlands ~ The recent arrival of Dutch naval

units} .incijidlng the airc.raft carrier ~arel Doorman, in West
New Guinea==an area claimed by lndonesia-- poses the possibil=
ity of an armed clash between Indonesian and Dutch forces . In~
donesian public concern over the Dutch naval movements has ) /
L.
been deliberately revived by the Djakarta government, and the 0
likelihood of a highly emotional speech on the subject by Pres=
ident Sukarno on 17 August, Indonesian independence day, will
further increase tension. The most critical period will be from
24 to 26 August when the Dutch ships are scheduled to be exercis ~
ing north of New Guinea . Danger would appear to stem, not from
deliberate provocation by either side, but from chance encounter s
between Indonesian air patro~s and the Dutch ·ships. which could
lead-to an unpre medit ate.clincidentJ

III. THE WE
Cuba: F idel and Raul Castro's week-.end harangues expressed
confidence and determination that neither the US, which Fidel
called t 1militarily second best," nor the "lackey foreign ministe r s
of the OAS," can s top the Cuban revolution and L~.tin America's
"liberation from the Yankee colonial yoke." The Castros' uncom~ O)<
promising vehemence and the decree in effect ordering confisca~
tion of most remaining American properUes in. Cuba came t en days
before the opening of the OAS .foreign ministers' meetings . They
suggest that the Cuban leaders are convinced that US military inter~
vention in Cuba, wh.ich they might even be.. trying to provoke , would
enhance the orosoects fo.r..Latin America's "revolution oUi.b~ -----
_ ______...,..,.n.•!J

8 Aug 60 DAILY . BRIEF ii

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~ 1 ·u~ 1~-------------'

LATE ITEM

*Republic of the Congo: President Kasavubu' s Abako party,

which is strong in the lower Congo region, has revived its pre-
lndependence demands for "independence" within a loose con-
federation. This may be followed by similar declarations by (b)(3)
other opponents of Congolese Premier Lumumb.a 's concept of a
highly centralized state . Encouraged by the success of Katanga
Province's Premier Tshomb~ in inducing the UN to hold up its
scheduled move of tr oops into Katanga, the anti-Lumumba ele-
ments appear to be attempting to join forces ln an effort to unde
mine and possibly oust Lumumba. Tshomb~' s regime, mean-
while, is pushing the buildup of its new security force :;md still
appears determined to resist any external force attempting to
move into the province.

The UN Security Council session on the Congo crisis, which

was scheduled for 7 August, was postponed· until 8 August.
Tunisia, Ceylon, Ar gentina, and Ecuador are reportedly work-
ing on a resolution designed both to meet Hammarskjold's re-
quest for new assurances to Tshomb~ of the UN' s neutrality in
the Congo's constitutional controversy and to gain the acceptance
of .AfriCan countries backing Lumumba. Ghana and Guinea have
already offered milita_r_y_a ss..is.t.ancJL.to Lumumba inde.o.e ndenLoL,
the UN effort~. ---------~--------__J
LI ___.

8 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii

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c;03 185148 -, •» ••rnrnrar'T"r A r
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. LATE ITEM
~ ......
The Situation in the Congo

As the UN Security Council prepares to consider the Congo

crisis again on 8 August, tension has once more risen sharply
in the Congo amidst signs pointing toward an early showdown
between Premier Lumumba--who is due back in Leopoldville
on 8 August--and Congolese political elements opposed to him
and his concept of a highly centralized Congo state. President
Kasavubu' s Abako pa rty, which is dominant in the lower Congo
region, revived publicly on 7 August its earlier demands .for
"independence" within a loosely-joined Congo confederation
and adopted a formal expression of no confidence in Lumumba.

Kasavubu's failure to dissociate himself from his party's

action suggests he may be behind it and perhaps also working
with leaders of other. parties to undermine and possibly oust
Lumumba.. Earlier Kasa'vubu and Lumumba were bitter rivals
for the pre·miership of the first Congolese government. Premier
Tshomb~ of separatist Katanga Province indicated on 7 August
that he was engaged in "negotiatfons" with other confederation-
minded Congolese leaders, including "some" from the lower Congo
and also Equator Province.

Time appears to be working against Lumumba' s opponents.

There is increasing evidence that Lumumba is proceeding rapid-
ly to reorganize the disintegrated Force Publique as part of his
personal political organization. This presumably accounts in
part for the lack of interest and. evasiveness of Lumumba-
appointed Congolese officers toward UN suggestions for the
organization of a national a:rmy.

In Katanga, Tshomb~ is endeavoring to strengthen his bargain-

ing position in any future negotiations with the central government
and to counteract cha-rges that he i s merely a Belgian puppet.
Tshomb~ declared on 6 August that his government did not intend
to preserve an exclusive role for Belgians in the exploitation of
Katanga' s great mineral wealth and that Belgian troops would leave
the province as soon.the new Katanga forces are strong enough
to maintain security: elgium, apparently encouraged by indications
- - - - - - . . hat wide Katangan 's port for Tshomb~ is fac ilit.a'. ·ing a rapid build- (b )(3)
~P of the new force toward a 3, 000- man goal'Es offered to mak:

"°CONFIBENTIA L_

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an early announcement of its intention to withdraw Belgian troops

ll~om Katanga withiri a few weeks, according to a Belgian official (b)(3)
[_ _ _ Jin Elisabethville~
Tshomb6vs regime still appears determined to resist with
all lts resources any external force, whether or not under UN
auspices, which might attempt to move into Katanga Province~
Plans for resistance apparently include the harassment of
"invaders" by tribesmen employing guerrilla-tactics. A Belgian
official who visited the province last week returned to Leopoldville
with reports that tribes loyal to Tshomb~ were "preparing for
war. " Such reports are contributing to the great concern being
displayed among the approximately 15, 000 Belgian civilians re-
. maining in the Katanga.

. Moscow, which . has become increasingly critical of the UN

intervention, has ·denounced Hammarskjold for "capitulation to
the colonialists. " Izvestia on 6 August said the Security Council
must call for an immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from
Katanga and an end to "attempts to tear this province from the
Congo Republic. "

In a statement of 5 August terming the Congo situation as

"absolutely intolerable," ·the Soviet Government charged
Belgium, supported by its NATO allies, with defying the United
Nations. W4ile the statement carefully avoided commiting the
USSR to any unilateral action, it attempted to sustain the. im-
pression that Communist bloc countries stand ready to send
forces if the present- UN contingents are unable to enforce the
Security Councll's resolutions. Soviet leaders· apparently hope
that their implied thr eats of unilateral action will increase
pressure for an early withdrawal of Belgian forces, thus en-
abling the USSR subsequently to claim credit for havinf!' orotected ' b)(3)
Congolese independence and unity. I
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

' •.
"
!
I

-CONFJB6NT1Ak_

8 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 '

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031 85148
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·._)
"'vnr •~• •.• lft • ._,
'tHE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Sec retary, National S~curity Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Sec retary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Sec retary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Researc h
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The De puty Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna tional Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Sec retar y of the Navy
The Secretar y of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, T he Joint Staff
Chief of Staff , Unit~d State s Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, Unite d States Air Force
Commandant, Unite d State s Ma rine Corps
Assistant to Secr e ta ry of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Inte lligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Inte lligence, Department of Navy
Ass istant Chief of Staff, Inte lligence, Department of the Air Force ·
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pac ific
The Department of Co mmerce
The Secretary of Commerce
F ederal Bureau of Investigation
The Direc tor
Atomic Energy Commis sion
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Ce nte r
The Direc tor

~L
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185148
_- _"l'""UJ.Jlil I
C031.8514 9 ~---- ......-...
Approved for Release: 2016/07/0§.._C03185149
·~

The Daily Brief of the ·CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligem:j in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in t he light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a n eed-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

~l!'.T
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185149
 - -- - - - - -- -- - - -- - - -- - - - -(b)(1)
C 0 3 1.8 514 9 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185149 (b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185149

co3is.si 4 9 ~.1.:. mrn::rn::::;:~ :.n~ m.""''-.rn:rn::~'''~~~ ~~~~ ~
. . .
...
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185149- - - - -- _ ,
..
( b)_(~)
· '-"TOP SECREI ~ I _ _ __ __ _ __ __J

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN .. ~

..--- ____-\·. ~
.
;
9 August 1960
....-- :;,;.:..
?~~'.
~ - ··.

DAILY BRIEF -~)b):3)

,~ .. .
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

III. THE WEST

Brazil-Cuba-US: \)>resident Kubitschek's desire to pry

"massive support" from the United States for his La.tin_)

i
C03 1 85 14 9 Approved for Release : 2016/07/05 C031 85149
.... =~
:.._,; TO~ \L-_ _ _ _ __ _ __,

-· ~· . ·;
.'-· · ..... -: Umerican economic development plan, "Operation Pan Ameri-
.::~~~( ca," is resulting in a cautious and neutralist Brazilian approach
':.0 . , to the Cuban problem and ~ tolerance for Cuban and pro-Commu-
nist activities in Brazll. Kubitschek's policy ls based on the
...... views of his key foreign policy adviser. Frederico Schmidt.
_:.;.::·
..
. ·...;.:
:

LATE ITEMS

*Republic Of The Congo: Increased stresses within the Congo-

lese Government suggest that Premier Lumumba may not be able ;........
d:%·'.~ to retain power in the absence of outside aid. The endorsement . .
:~·;:~l~l by Kasavubu's Abako party of a ~ongo confederation such as is {) K_., · ~:: ~~
'; '.:'.\' . favored by Kata~ga Premier Tshomb~, togeth~r with disaffectioff:t;n ~-~
:'.-~{;~! in Equator Province and near anarchy in Kasai Province , may ·' 'f'.' . .J- ?~~~ii!X')'
E(i1li prompt Lumumba to request that Ghana and Guinea unila1:1rally . P/.W / . . ~'!'.,.,,~
,;~g,~ dispatch troops to bolster his regime. j _J(P age 4) f,""".(b (~_.~.y :
\Cjj The UN Security Council has again called for the imme d iate ~~,,
·.~;_...,·.-~.:·':_·._;:,·'._~:-·:·. =':, withdrawal
given of Belgian
assurances troops from
to Tshomb~ the Congo
and other and has,
dissident in effect,
provincial ;: ..J---;n
lead-yv....... J];~~;
rr 12:-;
ers .that the UN will in no way interfere with their attempts to ,. ...
~t~11 organize a Congo confederation. Armed with this resolution ~ :~:·;~:.

:tj. ~~ ~i~~T::~o~~i~ 1~t~r~~~~Yr:~:~ \~!h:o;t~~1°o:~~ep~~~~c:~th __ ,......

'.-,::~,
assistance. ~'-'fL1:..w r /
preparatory .to..Jmolementin~ plans for large scale te<;Jmical
75 4-tf 7 a......._'i i o
:: .. .::-:
S;(b)(3 .. ·

*L,a,os: The second parachute ·b attalion under Capt~in Kong Le ;:~z;;;

on 8 August seized control of Vientiane and a nearby army base "·~>
in a sudden and unexpected action. The takeover was seemingly ~
carried out unilaterally by Kong Le , although it may ha.ve ha d
(b)(3) I
the secret backing of certain high-tanking army officers . di sgruntled
over the meteoric r ise to preeminence of Defense Minister Gen - ·. '>'
eral Phoumi. 'rhe objectives of the takeover are as yet unclear; jtt~'.:~
however, a leaflet signed by the "revolutionary committee " exhorts ::;~ ·

I '.:';f{~

9 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF Page ii

':·•"'

~
--~! _,,.. ·:~
~ (b)i~
'''-~"·'
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Approved fo r Release: 2016/07/05 C03185149 _ _ _ _ _ ___,__ _~
·.._,;1ur ~I (b).(3)
~-------------~

....:::: ~·
"Lao patriots to.... chase the government out that demands money
from the great powers," suggesting that the revolutionaries may
•' at the least seek a more neutralist.alignment.

It ls still too early to determine whether the revolutionaries can

make their takeover hold up. Phoumi, however, suffers a serious
disadvantage ln that the troops at his disposal for counteraction
---""""'-""-':.wideJv disnersed_thro11ab011Lthe conntrv j l <b)(3)
(b)(1)

....
. . ~~

.. '
,. ...• ..

·.{

~· ~ ....

·~; .:'
~ .

·.:t':
~ ,. !

; 3;~~·~
.:m ·: 9 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF Page iii
. "?-~)
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___:..__ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ (b)(1)
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@azH Relates Cuban Problem to US Aid for Economic Development

The dominant group of Brazilian officials concerned with

foreign policy, including President Kubitschek and his chief
adviser, Augusto Frederico Schmidt, favors a . cautious neutral
approach to th~. Cuban problem, in contrast to Brazil's past pol-
icy of rnarsh~ling support tor the US at inter-American meetings.
This group, spearheaded by Schmidt, sees in this ~pproach a way
to pry "massive support" from the US for Kubitschek's plan for
La.tin American economic development, "Operation Pan America"
(OPA), which he regards as essential to hemisphere security.

A minority group in_the Foreign Ministry, including Foreign

Ministef la.fer and Political Chief Pio Correa, advocates a "hard (b)(3)
· " · cted Sch idt (b)(1 )

Iputting special restrictions onKubitschek almost fire

I o orrea or
the issuance of visas to Cuban na-
(b)(1 )

tionals, and he rescinded the restrictions immediately.

(b )( 1)

The American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro believes that at the

forthcoming meeting of foreign mini.sters in Costa Rica, Brazil
will probably tend to withhold full cooperation on the Cuban issue
unless it receives quid pro quo on OPA or unless other Latin
American nations rovide ·substantial unreserved support for US
viewpoints. (b)(3)
(b )( 1)

9 Aug 60
_ _ .. ,_..,;,A. I It..·--· I ·~-t..

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~1'HEPRESIDENT
-CONFtB&~TTAL
-
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobllization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Polley
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary· of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The -Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelllgence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

CONF1DEz':TlAL
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185149
--...·..-1 .11-L~- 111- . . . . . . . . . ~,.
 .
C,0318,5151
~
---
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151
--- - ~

....,,

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,

L-1.li.o=:il
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-

resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
.· fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person s, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government. to the detriment of the United States.
(b )(3)

~DIC"'I'"
Approved for Release : 2016/07/05 C031~5151
- - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - -(b)(1)
C,0 318. 5151 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151 (b)(3)

Ap roved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185151

C.03 18.5 151 .. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031 85 151
~ '-' & '-'.__,cs I '-L (b )i~L
1t~~·-;!·'.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

.... ~ -~: 13 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

_ _ ____:_;:__ __ _ _ _ _ __ =
I·:.-.=
TH=E__,,C"'--"
.O=MM
=~,..,.__,,,_.
T B_LOC_ _ __ _ _ __ __ ( b )( Y~;~:.~;
1
( b )(3tr.,:~

\
;-~:'::
:~
!~·~
... ...

r-~'""
~~ ·•··

Co.m munist China - Indonesia: Peiping is following up its ' ~ ...

coriclliaµon on bo~dary questions with Burma and Nepal with
moves to soften its dispute with Indonesia. Chinese Communist
.' Foreign Minister Chen Yi has e~ressed satisfaction with Dja- OK--
··:"-i_ _ __ __,...arta's regrets over last month's incident in which two Overseas
,.--..
{b)(3)
hinese were killed, and he has pJOmised to consider endipg
eiping's abusive radio attacks. IJD,.addition, Communist China " :·
~ -~ : ..··
as agreed to the designation of a new Indonesian ambass.ado.,__ _ __,
ho was reviou · · · cceptab1~4 (b )(3)'
'---------~

(b)(3)

I I. ASIA-AFRICA ... ..,;.:~

.·...: ~~
....:,;
Mali: Discord between leaders of Senegal and Soudan--the D }:!.;
«.~onsTitiient states of the newly independent Federation of Mali~ -
is sharpening to such an extent that it could lead to an early
break- up of the federation. Senegalese leaders have bec.ome in~
creasingly antagonized by Soud.a nese attempts to dominate the
...
. -~"
1

(b)(3)
~'L•I ID'R~~
C 03f85.i5-i ~~"E~~~"~~~~~~~-IDJ--~-~;;;,
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·· :.:.' :c: .I '-JI IJ~L J I
---- ~-----------~ ; ..
I,'..:::. :
~·~~··· -.
~~.)>Y

~\'!;
federation, and the Soudanese apparently are backing away ~""i'·
from an earlier commltment to support Leopold Senghor,
Senegal's top leader, for r1he ores.idencv_of Mali in a vote now £.::::!::.

scheduled for 27 August. [

'------~---~--~~-~-~

I I I. THE WEST

Or an~zation of American States: tYen.ezuela is demanding

that a reso ution c ling.for a compete break in relations with
.th~ DomiQican Republic be passed at the first of the 'two Organ-
ization .of American States (OAS) meetings .b~giniling 16 August ~--~ ..
in San Jose; Costa Rica. Peru will support a break in cllplo- ..:··

~~.~
matlc relations--a step already taken by Lima--but not a break
in commercial relations, according to the American charg~ in (b) ~_~_)'.
.Lima. At the subsequent meeting on the C4ban issue, which
:Peru proposed, .it will back a ·strong reso.l ution condemning Sino-
Soviet. interference .in the hemisphere . . Unless Cuba makes new
attacks on the.OAS ·or on Peru, the Peruvian Government would
not however want to su ort a resoluti n t

LA'.l'E ITEMS
*La()s: The Revolutionary Committee's announcement in Vien- ~ ...
tiane that the Somsanith government is on.the point of s:ubmitt.µ·,.,.,,..__~
its re~ignation is unconfirmed, and may be overly 0 timistic. (b)~~x
~:: ·:: .

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

In order to strengthen his hand in any show- (b ) ('1')~

- -- - . fPlJ'iouarrolr's-W- h the rebellious units in Vientiane, Phoumi
-r-irunun-n,..-,.
~- ..,,.,
~ ..":J:',~
is makj.ng urgent plans for the transfer to Savannakhet of the 200 Lao : .·
paratroopers in training in Thailand. Meanwhile, the latest commu~
niqu~s issued by Captain Kong Le, leader of the Revolutionary Com-
mittee, are considerably more moderate in tone than those imme-
diately following the t~e- over of Vientiane on 8 August. They

13 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

c.o3i8-5i:Si~E~· ::m.~t:t1-m .
~,cm~ J.B•~"'''~~ii
· ~:.~~· . . .. AEerovr~~r R~1171os co31as1s1 (b~~3.)
:.~:.~1~ ·-;:

~.~',.l.~_j,t
-~~~
~
{~;: :~ ·~-
--...~., assert the Revolutionary Committee's respect for the monarchy
iihif and the constitution, anct do not give support to press reports to
; .~~·" the effect that all Amedc~ personneJ would be expelled from
.·qtfl ···'<:'•
Laos and that Communist bloc assistance would be sought.
~!
:,...''!":
~- ""
Radio Hanoi reports that the pro-Communist Pathet Lao
1:.;;;iF movement has expressed "full support" for the coup group in
: ~·1, Vientiane, has proposed the prompt formation .of a "national
·'~~jj coalition government,". and has . called for joint actio~. by Lao
:~· ;#,i government and Pathet Lao forces to . for~~ er es b
,,,.,~i ·the US and pro-American forces in Laos ~ (b)(3)
.1-:.:-:_~~-
.,;;.;"~'
...._.
::::_~F~
··~-.:~·~.
(b )( 1)

;'
(b)(3)

..:·ri1~

···~il

~1
.... ...
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:
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13 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii
,. ....

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..;. .. TOP -sECRE"L I (b)(3)
~~~~~~a!~-~~ l?.Et.9.Y.~.g...f.9.r...B~!.~~-~-~.:-?..Q1.§!.QZ!.Q?....9.Q~1..~?..!.§.~.JJ,l•• ee;g~gj~~m!IRl~f;:
- - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- (b)(1)
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L---------~-~-
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JC.,l..,-n&..L_

-
Peiping Displays Softer Attitude Toward Indonesia

To help dispel an appearance of unreasonableness, Pei-

ping is following ·up its conciliation on boundary questions with
Burma and Nepal with moves to calm its dispute with Djakarta
over Indonesian treatment of Overseas Chinese. This dispute
was sharpened considerably a month ago when two Overseas
Chinese who resisted resettlement measures were killed by In-
donesian troops in Tjimahi, West Java. Foreign Minister C.h en
Yi recently told two Indonesian journalists in Peiping he was
satisfied with Djaka,rta's expression of regret over the incident,
and he promised to consider an end to abusive radio attacks
which have greatly annoyed.the Indonesians. President Sukarno
refused for over four weeks to receive the. Chinese ambassador,
who was eager to present "urgent messages" from Peiping.
•.
~.Communist China has also agreed to accept the new Indo-
nesian ambassador who it had previously indicated was not wel-
come. Peiping had stalled on accepting the ambassador, whose
name was submitted at the time of the. Tjimahi incident, in or- (b)(3)
der to show
.
its displeasure
.
over the Overseas Chinese issue~!
......
Chinese Communist propaganda is pointing to Peiping's
ability to resolve disputes with other Asian countries to sug- (b) ( ) .
gest that indian rather than Chinese stubbornness is re,...,,.,IUAO......___ _ ~ 1
ble for the impasse in Sino-Indian pgrder negotiations. ~-------!,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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._,..._.'-'.I\.~

Senegalese-Soudanese Friction Shaking Mali Federation

Discord·between Senegal and Soudan- ~the constituent states

of the newly. independent Federation of Mali--has recently inten-
sified to such an extent that an early break- up of the federation
is possible. This latest and most serious in a serles of such.
crises between the federal partners--vihose basic outlooks and
temperaments diverge. widely-.is the result of .increasing resent-
ment on the part of the moderate Sen~gaj.ese over Soudanese at-
tempts .to dominate Mali. 'The Soudan.e se, whose top leader,
Modibo Keita, is foreign minister as well as head of the Mali
Government, have been placing a disproportionate number of
their people in federal positions. They have also been trying,
quite openly, on at least one recent occasion, to induce younger
. elements in the Senegalese Government to work for the more vig-
orous domestic policies and the ·more aggressive, pan-African-
oriented foreign policy favored by Soudan.
This heighteped friction, already reflected in a wrangle over
. the naming of a chief of staff for the Mali Army, appears to be
.building.up toward a showdown in connection with the election,
now scheduled for 27 August, of a federal president by the com ~
bined legislatures of Mali, Senegal, and Soudan. A top-level
decision reached .last May supposedly cleared the way for the
election.to this post of Leopold Senghor, Senegal's principal
spokesman and the c;:hief architect of the Mall Federation. Now,
however) the Soudanese are insisting they agreed onl that the
presidency should go to ·a representat~ve of Senegal. (b)(1)
(b )( 1)
(b )(3)

enghor's supporters are ·reacting to these .indications with (b)(1)

· ir pr tlictions implying a possible move by Senegal to secede
from the federation if Senghor is not chose~. I =1 (b)(3)

(b)(1)

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--~-~--- L

Possible DeMopments at OAS Meetin~

funezuela is demanding that a resolu._ti.·,--o-n- cal
--,--,-li_n_g__f_o_r_a_ c_o_m_-_
__J

plete break in relations with the Dominican Republic be passed

at the first of the· two Organization of American States (OAS) meetings
beginning 16 August in San Jose, Costa Rica. Peru will support
a break.in diplomatic relations--a step already taken by Lima--
but not a break in commercial relations, according to the US
cha.rg~ _in Lima. At the subsequent meeting on the Cuban issue,
which Peru proposed, it will back a strong resolution condemning
Sino-Soviet interlerence in the hemispher(! . . U~ess Cuba makes
new attacks on the OAS or Peru, the Peruvian Government would
not, however, want to support a resolution against Cub9

~e Trujillo regime nQW has no supporters among the Latin

American states. In its propaganda efforts and in the statements
of its officials, it is showing a bitterness against the United States
which, in many aspects, closely paralJels that of the Castro regime
in Cuba. The two regimes, heretofore genera,lly considered at op-
posite ideological poles, may well find themselves allies at the
foreign ministers' meetings. In a letter to air force officers prior
to his departure for Europe on 7 August, General "Ra,mfis" Tru-
jillo, the dictator's son, stated that the United States has turned
against both Trujillo and Castro becaus~ both attacked US business
interests--"When those people's dollars and cents are touched, no
one can shut them up." The American . Embassy interprets the let~
ter, a bitter tirade against the United States, as clear indication
that dictator Trujillo intends to retain control and.t hat he is "to some
extent at least sympathetic to Castro.,'.!l ·

\.£9mmunists and other pro•Castro groups in Costa Rica are

evidently planning disturbances during the conference, including
· picketing the conference site -and holding public meetings denounc-
ing the OAS. However, there is no large group of dissatisfied in-
dividuals in the Costa Rican capital that would be readily exploit-
. a~le- in mob action, and ·any disturbances are likely to be carried
out by individuals and small groups whicb could be controlled by
. Costa Rica's 2,400--man civil security force . The American Em-
bassy reported on 11 August that minor disturbances are probable
...._i..·~en.c.als....nossible..._but either will nrohahlll..Jlp controJJo ._.._._~
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

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>JLJv&\.~

~- · ..._,
Situation in Laos

Emissaries continue to shuttle back and forth between

the Somsanlth government temporarily seated in Luang
Prabang and the Revolutionary Committee holding forth ln
Vientiane, but these indirect negotiations thus far have been
inconclusive. Claims by the Revolutionary Committee that
the government ls about to tender its resignation are unsub-
stantiated and may be overly optimistic. · Government lead-
ers may be stalling for time in order to assess their political
and military strength throughout the country before entering
into serious negotiations or initiating· possibl~ military counter-
action.
(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

There are growing signs that Captain Kong Le, leader of

the coup group, ls operating on a shoestring and ls attempting
to stampede the government lnto a quick settlement before his
situation becomes read.Uy apparent. His exhortations over the
Vientiane radio for the Lao people to rise up and support his
reform movement have evoked no discernible response thus far
from either civil or military quarters outside Vientiane. tJiebel
strength in .Vientiane ls about 1,200 men, but all of these ap-
parently are not strongly loyal to Kong Le. The troops, fatigued ·
c.o 31as1 s 1 Approved for Relea-se: 2016/07/05 C03185151
..
.,._,, ...,,,,_.....,..
"~

....,

v /1 .
/
/" .~..
Qrom practically continuous duty since 8 August are be-
c _11\lruulhabbv and are 0 •
(b )( 1)

(b)(3)
(b )( 1)

The latest communiqu~s issued by the Revolutionary

Committee ·are considerably more moderate ·than its
initial statements following the takeover on 8 ·August. It.
announced on 12 August that the term "Revolutionary
Committee" is inappropriate, and that "coup d'etat com-
mittee" is preferable inasmuch as the committee has. no
desire to change the system of adminlstr.ation and fully
respects the king and ·constitution. It also stressed that
no political gro.up or foreign nation .was behind the coup.
Press reports to the effect that all American personnel
would be expelled from Laos and that Communist bloc as-
sistance would be sought were termed "completely unfounded. "
The situation in Vientiane ls outwardly calm, but food
supplies are dwindling and the Revolutionary Committee has
warned merchants against hiking prices. Rumors are rlfe,
and a local USIS employee reports that the people believe
the "Communists" have taken over the town.
The Communists are exploiting these developments • .
According to Radio Hanoi, the dissident Pathet Lao move....
ment has voiced "full support" for the coup group in Vientiane,
has proposed the prompt formation of a "natlo~al cqalition
government, " and· has called for joint action by the Lao govern-
ment. and Pathet J,,ao forces to forestall countermoves by the
US and· pro-American forces in Laos. Hanoi has lauded the
pollcy of "peace and neutrality" proclaimed by Kong Le and .
has: assured the Laotian people of the "sympathy and support
of peace-loving people throughout the world. " Peiping,
breaking almost three days' silence on the. coup, has begun to
carry extensive reports on the situation in Laos. Moscow radio
comments that events in Laos are another expression of the
process taklng place in various cou,ltrtes linked to the United
States b " · ressive militar blocs. " (b)(1)
(b)(3)

13 A 60 rs:"-lTD A I .....ITC:! I 1~ci..1rc DI II I CT1a...1 p 6

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(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
(b) 3)

Moscow could be expected to accompany such .demands by of-

fers of economic and technical assistance to the Congo G.o vern-
ment, despite disclaimers by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuz-
netsov to Hammarskjold on 10 August that the Soviet Union would
be willing-- in contrast with normal Soviet olic ~ - to channe l its
aid to the Congo through the UN. (b)(3)
I ~ The Soviet Union has al
'-;-r-e _ad___y_p-
ro
-vi
~ d-
e -.----
s_ o_
m_e~~r-
e-c~~--' ( b )(3)
in the form of food, medical assistance, and one transport aircraft.
I I (b)(3)

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

13 Aug 60 ,..r! ... I T n .. I .... l'T"r"'I I'""~ ....,....- n1 II I r-T•~ I

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THE PRESIDENT
·~
The Vice President
c- '.,_/
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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Sec urity Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assist ant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Sec retary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Sec retary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense ·
The Secretary of Defe nse
The Deputy .Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff , United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assista.J.lt to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
· Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of ~rmy
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

"CO/'\'Fa'fJiNT!A!:._
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.....--. - • • "1iiiiil- ...... - . - -.- •

. I .
L
.
• : • • ·- •
•
t..
• : ;..i .
~ C03185152 -
Approved for Release: 2o167o7i65 C03185152

The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is

produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
(b)(3)
I
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated

specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a n eed-to-know basis.

WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the m eaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its cont ents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~l:"T
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185152
 - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- - - - - (b)(1)
~ C0 318 515 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185152 (b )(3)

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-
C03 1 S·51-5-2•·---~-~~._~~~~--~,·-------
Approved for Rel ease: 2016/ 07/05 C031 851 52 (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

;. ...···

:.-.· •.·.:··

.' ~

. ;, •••H ••:
 Approved for Release: 2016/ 07/05 C03185152
'-"1ur~1 ..,..

II I. THE WEST

Belgium: Uvhi.le no decision has been taken to cut the Bel-

gian defense budget in line with Prlnie Minister Eyskens' an~
nouncement on 9 August that Be.l gium wui revise its NATO com=
mitments -in view of Congo developments, political pressure
continues for a drastic reduction of $120,000,000-=one third of
the. budget. Cancellation of the F-104G fighter- plane program and
a partial withdrawal of Belgian troops from West Germany are ('P
considered likely first steps in the event such a reduction is or=
dered. According to a high B~lgian defense official, the whole
... future of Belgium's military forces is very fluid and depends on
,;~} events in the Congo, especially the effect on the pub~c of loss
·. '.~i of the K..~.mlna bafilLand the r...emo.x.aLoUr..ooos from Ruanda- t,:.~~'lt
· ' ~~"· Urundi:J_ (b)(3)~
. '~iir-'- - - - ---'\__ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ (b)(1 "'
,;) (b )(3),;i;i~~
.·.]
~- ~:~:~;
I ~._;·~
.:'. ·.~ ~.r i.·
iii~~
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.....
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t·~lj~
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.
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~~

'~
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;.:·~gi------------------------------------'
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~-·~-~~

!'11 15 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii

\1
\
, C 03 1 8 5 1·s·:z·~,,~~~~~~~~~~ ,~~
(ba
)~("".:.~:),t
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~
. TI JP"-Sli..I._" I-{,.. T
. ....... ..,~ '-----~~-----
3

*Laos: The rebel-controlled Vientiane radio has announced

that iang-savang has .designated National Assembly President
. - ·,. Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. Thls ·action follows
Savang's acceptance on 14 August of the resignation of the Som-
sanlth government, which had received a vote of no confidence
the previous day from the assembly in Vientiane. The assembly's
vote, which was "unanimous;' apparently had been forced by the
rebel Kong Le group controlling Vientiane, and Premier Som-
sanith and other government leaders in Luang Prabang ini~ially
dismissed it as illegal. The king presumably acted to avert
a military showdown, which was becoming increasingly likely
with the .failure of -repeated efforts to negotiate a settlement

I (b )( 1)

Souvanna Phouma engineered the short-lived integration

settlement with the Communist Pathet Lao dissidents whlle
premier in 1957. He still feels that Laos' best interests can
be served by a rapproachement with the Pathet Lao and
pursuance of a pollcy of strict neutrality. (b)(3)
(Page 5) .__ __ _ _ _ __ ___J

15 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF tu

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(b)(3)

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J L.:.'-' c, l

The Situation in the Congo

The entry ·of UN forces ·into Elisabethville and the begin~

ings of a Belgi~ troop withdrawal from Katanga have not
brought any resolution of the pqlitical status of the disputed
rovince.
\ (b )( 1)
(b)(3)

\\

Although spokesmen for Tshomb~ have characterized his

talks with Hammarskjold as "cordial," it appears likely that
there are considerable areas of disagreement. Hammarskjold
almost certainly failed to recognize the "independence" of Ka-
tanga, and probably i ndicated that he could not permit Tshombe
to establish the n\imber and nationalities of the .UN soldiers to
be moved into Katanga. ·
. .
Congo Premier Lumt.unba's 13 August demand for the with-
drawal of white contingents of the UN force appears likely to
meet an equally negative response from the Secretary General.
Lumumba possibly hoped that an all=African force would be sus-
ceptible to .pressure for the forcible unification of the Congo if
sufficiently pressed by himself and his Ghanaian and Guinean al~ I
lies . The anti-white sentiment implicit in Lumumba's demand,
however, will increase the apprehension of Europeans in both
·the Congo and Katanga.
I
On 14 August, Congo President Kasavubu broke a long silence
with a radio speech in which he urged Congolese to support the cen-
·tral government. He stopped short of endorsing Lumumba's pol~
icies, however, and his plea appears unlikely to halt anti~ Lumumba I
plotting among elements of the Abako party. Spokesmen for Lu~
mumba have hinted at the imposition of press censorship, and I

(b)(3)

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~------~

Lumumba has alluded to "special tribunals" which would be set

up to judge an ersons who " rovoke trouble" b their attitudes
or writings. (b)(1)
b)(3)

~ . ._ I_ _ ~
(b}(3)

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Drastic Cuts 1'M"eJt=e=n=-e,. . . . .=---~r=r=--=-~=-:::-=~~-=e:-r----~
\!lie American Embassy in Brussels reports continuing polit~
ical pressure for a one~third reduction of' the Belgian defense
budget, in line with Prime Minister Eyskens' announcement on
9 August that developments in the Congo wil.l result in a revision
in Belgium's NATO commitments. Cancellation of the F-104G
fighter-plane program and a partial withdrawal of Belgian troops
from West Germany are considered likely first steps in the event
such a reduction is ordereq;J

~cording to a high Belgian defense official, the whole future

of Belgium's military forces is very fluid and turns on the outcome
of events in the Congo, especially on public reaction to the loss of
the Kamina base and the removal of troops from Ruanda- Urundi.
The embassy expects considerable "in~ fighting" at the highest lev=
els of the government before the defense issue is resolved...-!

(At his press conference on 9 August Eyskens, embittered by

wharhe considered lack of support from Belgium's NATO partners
during the Congo crisis, announced that his government would ini~
tiate an "austerity program" involving reductions in orders for
military equipment within the framework of NATO and amortization
of Ute Belgian bases in the Congo, which were built in the rearma~
ment period following the Korean .w ar. at a cost of $70,000,000.
Some Belgian political leaders have already privately criticized
Eyskens' statement ·as "untimely and childish_j

tf.rior to the Congo crisis, however, parliament had already

trimmed the defense estimates calling for an 8-percent increase
over the 1959 budget and the Senate had asked to reconsider de ..
fense expenditures in the fall. The .weak Eyskens coalition gov~
ernment, sensitive to a strong public sentiment in favor of reduc ·~
ing defense spending, has never fully met its NATO requirements
since it took office in November 1958. Moreover, the Belgian
press, angered by the Security Council's r esolutions on the Congo,
has stressed the uselessness of continuing costly military efforts (b)(3)
within NATO when the Western powers have demon ~ mole:~-~
indifference to Bel2:ian interest
L - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - j(b)(1)
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(b)(3)

Situation in Laos
King Savang has designated National Assembly President
Souvanna Phol?-nia to form a new governmen~ according to the
rebel-controlled Vientiane radio. This action follows Savang's
acceptance on 14 August of the .resignation of the Somsanith
government, which had received a v.ote of no confidence the pre-
viou~ day from the National Assembly in Vientiane. The assembly's
"Wlanlmous" vote apparently had been forced by the ·rebel Kong Le
group controlling Vientiane, and Premier Somsanith and other
government leaders in Luang Prabaniz_iniltallY dismissed. it as
ille~
(b )( 1)

These developments occurred when the government seemed to

be gaining the upper hand over Kong Le, who had been unsuccessful
in extending hls control beyond Vientiane and only had about 1200
troops at his dispos al. The king presumably acted in the interests
of national unity, since a military showdown was becoming in-
creasingly likely with the fall.ure of repeated efforts to negotiate
a settlement wlth Kong Le. Lao Defense Minister Phoumi, chief
advocate of direct action to settle the revolt, had already initiated
psychological warfare ~ctlvities against the rebel paratrpop units
in Vientiane with the introduction of Lao special agents and ·teams,
and was proceeding rapidly with attack plans.
(b )( 1)

The king's course may have been influenced by fear that Kong
Le might defect. with his troops to the side of the Communist Pathet .
Lao dissidents if he couldn't derive satisfaction from the government for
his demands for policy. reforms. Kong Le has sharply accused the
United States of interfering in Laotian affairs, and advocates friendly
relations with all nations including the Communist bloc.

(b)(3)

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s • I
(b)(3)
~ .,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Premier-designate Souvanna engineered the short-lived

unification agreement with the Pathet Lao dissidents in
November 1957 while premier, and still feels strongly that
Laos' best interests can be served by finding common ground
with the Pathets and b followln . a olic f strlc
~.:.:::..~~~~~~~~=a:~~~~~~~...........,"-"-LL---( b) ( 1 )

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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"111 COJVFIDENTIA L_ . ._,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executlve Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army.
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Alr Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for lntelllgence, Department of Army
Direc tor of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assis tant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Di rec tor
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director

-Cl>f\TlDENTlAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

THE WEEK I N B R I E F

" .::
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1

Khrushchev's sharp denunciation of US plans to re-
strict his movements during his stay in New York sug-
gests he is seeking to exploit this issue as a deliberate
effort on the part of the United States to create a hos-
tile atmosphere . He has also· used this issue to renew
charges that the US is not interested in settling major
international issues at the General Assembly . Moscow's
extensive propaganda build-up for this UN session im-
plies that Khrushche v will advance ostensibly new pro-
posals on disarmament. Along ~ith Eastern European
party leaders, Khrushchev can be expected to underline
the urgent need for disarmament by citing alleged ·
Western provocations in Berlin and the rearmament of
West Germany as major factors in___:t_ae_ae.:t__e-1:19-~
r=a~t~i~
o=n~~~~~
of East-West relations. (b)(3)
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The first large shipment of arms from the USSR ar-
rived in Cuba on 8 September . Communist China is moving
rapidly to establis h its diplomatic mission in Havana ,
and Khrushchev is expected in Cuba after taking part
in the opening meetings of the UN General Assembly.
Fidel Castro is to head Cuba's UN delegation , which
is likely to support the Soviet position on all major
issues . In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo re-
gime has reacted to mounting international pressures
by calling a mass meeting for 24 September to demon-
strate its " popular support'' and by threatening re-
taliation against US businessmen. Continuing tension
is evident in Venezuela despite President Betancourt's
success in maintaining his three-party coalition fol-
lowing t he force 4 resi2nation of pro-Cuban Foreig!!..__
Minister Arcaya . l ~~~~
(b )(3)
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Page 5
The struggle for power between Premier Lumumba ,
Preside nt Kasavubu , and Colonel Mobutu in the Congo re-
ma i ns unres olved. UN i nitiatives aimed at c ombating
Lumumba's extremism have been hampered by the
concern of African states-- exploited by the USSR
--that the UN is in f ringing on the Congo ' s
sovereignty. Meanwhile , Soviet involvement in
the Congo ' situation continue s to inc rease. In

--.ZEGPSJI _ .
i CONFlDl:.tic' irt•
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

PART I (continued)

addition to expanding the scope of its direct aid to

Lum._1unb~ _ _ I (b)(1)
[ ~ USSR as affirmed its inteu=-
tion of bypassing UN channels in supplying aid, and
Khrushchev on 13 September strongly attacked Hammar-
skjold for "consciously working in the interests of
the imperialists " in the Congo . ---------------~
LI
(b )(3)

SITUATION IN LAOS Page 8

The proclamation of a rival government by General
Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum in opposition to the Souvanna
Phouma government has brought the situation in Laos
into a new and more critical phase. Souvanna has re-
acted moderately to this new threat and has sought
to keep the door open for a new compromise by refrain-
ing from branding Phoumi and Boun Oum as rebels. The
refusal of the King to take sides, in effect a repudia-
tion of Souvanna , has dimmed prospects for a recon-
ciliation between Souvanna and Phoumi, however, and
may lead to Souvanna's early resignation . Captain
Kong Le is still in military control of Vientiane.
The Communist Pathet Lao continues to exploit the
division in Laos' non-Communist ranks, exerting mili-
tary pressure in regions ostensibly loyal to Phoumi
and waging a vigorous propaganda campaign calling
on all Laotians to get behind the SOuvanna government
and Kong Le in air struvvle against the tt traitnrnu"' "
Phoumi clique . (b )(3)
L------------------~~------~~

PART I I
NOTES AND COMMENTS

ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1

A contest between the Soviet bloc and the West
over the election of the president of the 15th UN
General Assembly is in prospect when the assembly
opens on 20 September . The competition between two
rival Wes~ern candidates--Frederick Boland of Ire-
land and Thor Thors of lceland--improves the chances
of Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia. Cuba's intention
to seek th~ ~ecurity Council seat relinquished by
Argentina--in opposition to Chile, the choice of the
Latin American caucus--may induce delegates from
other areas. "Oar_ticularlv Afr.ica._______:t_o_ saek thi !':: i::AAt
(b)(3)
I

~
SLG!tki
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CURRENT INTELL~qENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

PART II (continued)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE Page 2

The fourth general conference of the UN's Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, convening in Vienna on
the same day the General Assembly opens in New York ,
will probably be marked by East-West c9nflicts on
several issues, includin~ the per~nni~l one of Chinese
representation . (b )(3)

SINO-SOVIET RELATIO~S Page 3

At the North Vietnamese party congress-~the first
important bloc forum since the Bucharest meeting in June
--Soviet and Chinese spokesmen reaffirmed their posi-
tions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese , who
were again criticized for lobby~ng among other parties
and for disrµpt~ng international organizations, have in
fact continued to pres~ their opposition to Soviet
policies in other Communist-9ontrolled international
bodies . As to governmental relati9n~, the USSR con-
tinues to schedule the delivery of military and other
aid to China, but there are several indications of a
worsening relationship. I
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----'
(b)(3)

BERLIN SITUATION . • . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . Page 5

The East German Government continues to extend
its restrictions on travel of West German citizens in
East Berlin and East Germany . The · Bonn government
is reluctant to apply strong countermeasures, such
as an embargo on interzonal trade, lest they lead to
worse Eas~ German retaliation, particularly against
West Bsrlin 's large trade with West Germany. East
German party boss Ulbricht has disclosed in a mem-
orandum to the UN a Vlan fo~ the phased disarmament
of Germany , ~ncluding provisions for signing a peace
treaty with the "two German states," Western troop
withdrawal from West Berlin. and a " fre e city" ' of
West Berlin . (b)(3)
EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL
MEASURES • • ••• • •. ••••• • •• • •• • • Page 7
Despite intensified East German security measures ,
the refugee flow to West Berlin and West Germ.any i s
continuing at a high rate . More than 3 ,000 refugees
reached West Berlin during the week ending 6 September ,
although this period included the five-day near-
blockade of the East Berlin "escape hatch" to the
Western sectors. Some 126,500 East Germans have
crossed over in the first eight months of the year--

..
far above last year's r~te --and the 1960 total is
likely to be well above last year's total of 143 , 000 .
There has also been a decrease in·,.....t=h~e~n=u=m=b~e=r
~=o=
f~-----------.
persons going from West to East. I (b )(3)
~~~~~~~

111
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

PART II (continued)
POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN Page 8
Berlin by early 1961 will probably be ringed with
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites . The ring may
eventually contain eight or more launch sites, each
with local support facilities . In addition there may
be two central support facilities . All of the support
facilities were reported under construction this
summer, and could be completed, with launch sites
installed, in early 1961 . The two existing operational
SA.14 sites in East Germany--not a part of the Berlin (b )(3 )
complex--are manned by Soviet personnel, but there
is evidence that the East Germans may eventuallv
narticinate in thicz a c +i1r=1+.. I
(b )(3)

MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COKJrfUNICATIONS CABLE Page 10

A high-capacity underground coaxial cable is
being installed between Finland and the USSR. Since
the cable will provide a circuit capacity greatly in
excess of civil requirements, it could be used for trans-
mitting air- defense information into the USSR, under
terms of the___,[iJmish.='.Sa..v.i.a:t_mu:tll.a.l__a~stance pact
·L
of 1947 L _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ___J__, (b )(3 )

A~BANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT

OF MOSCOW . • . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The ouster from the Albanian party politburo of
a leading ideologist and the elevation to the party
secretariat of an agitprop specialist suggest that
Tirana is preparing to revamp its equivocal propaganda
line on basic issues in the Sino-Soviet controversy.
The ideologist will probably be a scapegoat in this
instance for the regime's "collective error" in past
support of the Chinese on such matters as the "in-
evitability of war and the nature of the imperialist
tpreat . Her ouster, probably a direct result of
Soviet pressure, will serve to deter others in the
Albanian party an~_e..w.h.ex..e_wbo_:t:.end tn £.sur~he
(b)(3)
Chin~se view. Lc==~~~~~~~~~~~~~---,-__J~~
NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS TMIRD PARTY CONGRESS Page 13
Two themes dominated the sessions of North Viet-
nam' a third party congress, which m~t in Hanoi from
5 to 10 September--how best to modernize and in-
dustrialize the country in accordance with Communist
principles and how to reunify Vietnam. Hanoi, hoping
for the overthrow of President Diem , plans to solve
the latter problem by forming a coalition government
with a "democratic" successor government . The long

~
iv
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CURRENT INTELLIGENC,ll: WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

PART II (continued)
continuity of leadership within the Lao Dong party was
again underscored by the continuation of the politburo
without changes in membership . It became clear at the
congress that Le Duan , an individual closely associated
with the direction of subversive . activities against
South Vi Atnam__j_g__;ie_c.nru:LJ..n...__nowAr--±..o~esident Ho Chi
Minh • [ _ _ __ _ J (b)(3)

GUINEA STRENGTHENS CO)()f{JNIST BLOC TIES Page 15

Guinea ' s economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc
have been strengthened further as a result of President
Toure's current visit to several Communist bloc countries ,
In Moscow, Toure secured a Soviet cOJllJDitment to partici-
pate in the proposed Kookour~ hydroelectric project--
Guinea ' s priority development scheme--while Peiping
extended a $25,000 , 000 interest-free credit, its first
large-scale economic aid to any Black African country.
In addition, Tour6 endorsed a number of Moscow'~ policy
positions and appears to have moved ~t~o~w~a=r~d=-~c~l=o=s~e~r'--~~~~~~~~~-.
alignment with the Communist world. L I
(b)(3)

USSR AND IRAN MAKING NEW EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS Page 16

Both Moscow and Tehran are making new moves to
relieve the long-standing tension in their relations.
Following the ouster on 28 August of the stanchly anti -
communist Eqbal as Iranian prime minister, Soviet Am-
bassador Pegov returned to Tehran, and the Soviet
GOvernment diminished its propaganda attacks on the
Shah. Sharif Emami, Iran's new prime minister , feels
that the immediate task of his government is to im-
prove relations with Moscow, but not at the expense
of i t s ties to the West. Iran has halted i .ts .counter-
propaganda and bas begun to display greater coopera-
i!~~.!~ rinor matters toward Sov i a+ offi ri olg in
(b )(3)

INDONESIA Page 17
The confrontation of President Sukarno and the
Indonesian Army over the Communist issue appears to
have been once more postponed by Sukarno's ban issued
on 13 September on the activities of all political
.· parties. The ban frees Sukarno f~m the necessity
of makin~ a direct choice between the army and the
Communists; it also obviates an army decision on
whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending to
other areas the proscripti9n of Communist activity
announced last month in three militar commands.
(b )(1)
(b)(3)

THE WF.'F.Jr TN RR T ~ li'

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15 September 1960

PART II (continued)
SOUTH KOREAN CABINET RESHUFFLE Page 18
South Korean Prime Minister Chang Myon and his op-
ponents within his party agreed on 12 September to a
compromise cabinet des igned to give Chang a working
majority in the National Assembly . Although the new
cabinet appears to strengthen Chang's position for the
time being by drawing his opponents into sharing re-
sponsibility for government policy , the terms of the
compromise will make it easy for the anti-Chang fac-
tionists to function as a de facto o osition bloc in
future tests of strength. (b )(3)

CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE Page 19

The new Belgian coalition cabinet , recently an-
nounc ed by Premier Eysken s . in respo~se to public
criticism of the government's Congo policy, contains
no new influential figures, and may not last through
the winter . No major chariges in defense and foreign
policies are likely; Eyskens ' austerity economic pro-
gram , however , involves defense cuts ranging between (b )(3)
7 and 13 percen~ and the drift away from active oar-
! ticipation in NATO will J robably continue . I~~~~~~~~~ (b)(3)

EL SALVADOR ' S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS . . Page 20

The moderately progressive regime of Salvadoran
President Lemus has been seriously shaken by persist-
ent attacks from leftist student and labor elements ,
many of whom are pro-Comm~nist and pro-Castro . Ten-
sions have subsided somewhat recently as a result
of mediating efforts by ~usinessmen and civic leaders ;
but the state of siege declared on 5 September still
continues , and the outlook for government stability
remains uncertain . ~ (b )(3 )

PART III
PATTERNS AND, PERSPECTIVES

CHINESE IU:PRESENTATION I~ THE UNITgo NATIONS . Page 1

Although :katt"onalist China is expected to retain
China's seat in the UN through the procedu~al device
of the moratorium at this year's G$neral Assembly ,
the prospect for maintaining the mofatoriwn beyond
1961 is increasingly uncertain. Taipei, despite its
association in African minds with 11colonial powers , "

vi
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

PART III (continued)

may even pick up additional support from newly sover-
eign states if they are admitted to the UN before the
vote . Many UN members, even among those which have
consistently supported the moratorium, have long be-
lieved that UN membership with its attendant obliga-
tions offers a way of bringing Peiping under some
form of international restraint. A strong appeal
to this body of opinion may be made in Khrushchev's
forthcoming speech to the assembly in which he is
expected to call for Communist China ' s admission
while developing his theme of peaceful coexistence.
~ _ (Secret
___:____ Noforn)
_____:__ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

PART IV

OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES

Published during the week of 7 - 13 September 1960

THF. WF.F.K TN R~TR~

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA.RY

15 September 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Khrushchev has seized on during the first weeks of the

the question of US security General Assembly are Nasir,
precautions during his stay in Sukarno , Tito, Sihanouk of
New York as head of the USSR's Cambodia, Moulay Hassan of
delegation to the UN General Morocco, and Koirala of Nepal .
Assembly as a pretext for de- Nehru , U Nu, Sekou Toure, and
nouncing the American Oovern- Nkrumah are apparently planning
ment 's attitude toward the UN . to attend, but probably not un-
In a telegram answering ques- til early October . Prime Min-
tions of the London Daily Ex- isters Daud of Afghanistan and
press on 13 September, the---So- Abboud of Sudan are apparently
v:re-r-premier charged that the still undecided . Prior to
restrictions on his activitdes Eisenhower's announcement that
indicate that the United States he intends to address the UN
"does1ndt sympathize with the on 22 September, no heads of
effort to resolve the major is- gove rnment o~ prime ministers
sues" to be considered by the of Western states were planning
UN. Moscow's formal protest to come, exc~pt Cuba's ·Castro,
note to the US took a similar who will fully suppor t the So-
line, alleging that the purpose viet line .
of the restrictions was to
" worsen in advance the inte rna- Sovi e t propaganda has rep-
tional climate" when the heads resented this turnout as a suc-
of government meet at the Gen- ces s for Soviet diplomacy and
eral Assembly. a defeat for the West . Moscow's
initial reaction to the announce-
The sharp reaction by Khru- ment that President Eisenhower
shchev, who will arrive on 19 would address the UN was to dis-
Septe mber, suggests that he miss 1 t as a "forced concession''
anticipates a cool public recep- to world opinion which TASS
tion and is seeking an issue to claimed strongly supported the
charge the US with intentionally initiative of the USSR .
creating a hostile atmosphere .
Propaganda allegations that Disarmament
Khrushchev has received numer-
ous invitations from Americans The extensive ·soviet prop-
for visits and public appear- aganda build-up on the UN meet-
ances also fit into the pattern ing has emphasized disarmament.
of creating an impression that A Pravda editorial of 10 Sep-
Washington is attempting to tember cited Khrushchev's visit
block Khrushchev's contacts as "new proof" of the USSR's de-
with the American public . termination to break the dead-
lock on that issue. Moscow has
The Soviet campaign to also suggested that Khrushchev
persuade free-world leaders to will e xpand his mos t r~cent
att end the meeting has met with disarmament propos als. Propa-
moderate success. Among the g anda implies that he will un-
heads of government who plan v e il a n ew s cheme ; while staying
to attend the initial debates within the context of complete

PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 10

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15 September 1960

and general disarmamen~, it will eral Assembly rule that disarm-

probably be designed to appeal ament must be complete . "
to Afro-Asian neutral states.
Colonialism
Such a bid for this s~p­
port may involve a revised ver- The reference in the Khru-
sion of proposals presented on shchev-Toure communique to the
2 June, with additional emphasis "national independence of peo-
on the economic benefits of ples" as a cardinal issue to
disarmament in terms of making be taken up by the General As-
funds available for underdevel- sembly also indicates that in
oped areas . Previous Soviet his address to the assembly the
plans have stopped short of Soviet premier will stress at-
proposing the establishment of tacks on "colonialism" and West-
a joint fund which would func- ern attempts to use the UN ac-
tion as a channel for "savings'' tion in the Congo crisis as a
from disarmament to be used in "cover for imperialism." Khru-
aid programs. Moscow may feel, shchev probably anticipates that
however, that a specific pro- with the admission of new Af-
posal at this time will gain rican members to the UN and the
widespread Afro-Asian support attendance of some leaders of
for its over-all disarmament other Afro-Asian countries,
plan. This approach is re- such attacks will garner con-
flected in Khrushchev's joint siderable support .
communique with Guinea Presi-
dent Toure on 8 September, Germany and Berlin
which listed disarmament . and
economic security as principal The Polish deputy foreign
topics for UN discussions. minister indicated that Berlin
would be raised in connection
Polish Deputy Foreign Min- with disarmament. East German
ister Naszkowski told American party leader Ulbricht's new
Embassy representatives that plan for phased disarmament
Khrushchev would propose an for Germany could provide
. enlargement of the disarmament the cue f~r Khrushchev to stress
talks to include some neutrals that the rearmament of Germany
but not the Chinese Collllnunists. and the situation in Berlin are
major obstacles to a relaxation
Kl'lrusbchev's immediate aim of tension~ . He can also be ex-
o·n disarmament will be to elic- pected to use these problems
it support in the UN General to underline the urgency of dis-
Assembly for a subsequent reso- armament .
lu.t ion endorsing "complete and
I
general disarmament" as the It does not seem likely,
prime objective in any future however, that Khrushchev will
East-West negotiations. In his advance any new proposals on
Pravda. interview on 9 August, Berlin, such as presenting an
Khrushchev foreshadowed such a ultimatum to the West demand-
position by claiming that "the ing acceptance of Soviet posi-
Soviet Union wants the General . tions on disarmament, Germany,
Assembly to recognize universal and Berlin. Although a Soviet
and complete disarmament as the diplomat in Vienna told a New
crucial question." He added, York Times reporter that tliTS
"It is essential that the Gen- would---oe--xhrushchev's position,

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15 September 1960

precipitation of a showdown on formal presentations of bloc

these issues woulµ not be in charges against Bonn to be
keeping with the general em- made by the satellite leaders .
phasis on creating an image of Gomulka declared recently that
the peace-loving Soviet Union the Polish delegation would
in the presence of high-level use the UN rostrum to "warn
Afro-Asian delegations, the nations against the dan-
ger of German militarism."
Nevertheless , Khrushchev ·ue added that Czechoslovakia
may clarify his position on was also entitled ,_........._ ..,...........,.._____
Berlin in his informal remarks a similar warnin . (b)(3)
to the press, while leaving
(b)(3)

CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Soviet ship Ilya Mech- Cuba after his trip to New York
nikov arrived at Havana with- a for the opening of the UN Gen-
large car.g o on 8 September , eral Assembly. The Cuban Gov-
the first major bloc arms ship- ernment has announced that Fidel
ment to the Castro regime . The Castro himself is to head Cuba's
cargo apparently included UN General Assembly delegation ,
armored vehicle~ artillery, and which will also include Foreign
a variety of other w~apons and Minister Roa and Nunez Jimenez,
equipment. Jet aircraft also the head of Cuba's Communist-
may have been delivered. In dominated Agrarian Reform In-
July , four or fi~e Soviet MI-4 stitute. Castro will use the
helicopters and at least 10, 000 world forum for further attacks
Czech rifles and submachine on the United States and to
guns h~d been delivered to hold up his revolution as an ex-
lJavana. ample for all underdeveloped
nations and colonial areas. The
Following Castro's 2 Cuban delegation is expected
September anouncement that to support the Soviet position
Cuba will establish relations on all important issues.
· with Peiping, the head of the
Havana office of the New Chi- J

na News Agency Has notified Meanwhile, open opposi~

the Cuban Foreign Ministry tion to Castro inside Cuba is
that he had been designated still uncoordinated and lacks
by Peiping to ne·gotiate the eftective leadership. The
e~hange of diplomatic . mis- Castro fo~ces apparently have
sions. had no success in routing the
guerrilla bands that have been
Kbrusbcbev is expected to for~ing in the Escambray Moun-
pay his long-promised visit to tains of central Cuba for some

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15 September 1960

months. Castro publicly mini- minican Government . At tacks ·

mized the importance of the on "US imperialism" continue,
gu~rrillas on 9 September, but however, and on 13 September
the regime actually appears to
be taking the threat of
tilla build-up seriously,
Ji Radio Caribe lashed out at the
United States in a vicious at-
tack, calling the US Government
"the strongest dictatorship on (b)( 1)
earth," dominated by "Wall
Street and eight capita lists."
1

__ J
While Trujillo now is at-
tempting to give the impression
that he is not personally re-
sponsible for the viciously
anti-US line of his propaganda
The Cuban consul in Hong outlets, he undoubtedly could
Kong broke with the Castro re- control them if he wished. At
gime on 12 September and wants the same time, his propagandists
to come to the United States. are active in the United States ,
where tbey are attempting to .
Dominican Republic portray the dictator as a stalwart
defender against Communism who
Trujillo has reacted to has been grievously wronged by
mounting international pres- bis great friend, the United
sures by announcing a mass States. He is report edly spend-
meeting for 24 September to ing considerable money in the
demonstrate his regime's " pqp- United States to this end .
ular support." Calling a care- Trujillo's statement of 13 Au-
fully organized rally for this gust declaring that his country
purpose is a device the regime is determined to "remain outside
has used before; in this in- the orbit of cannibalistic Com-
stance it may also provide an munism" was undoubtedly made
occasion for Trujillo to an- with a view only to its impact
nounce his resumption of the in the United States.
presidency in response to ••pop-
ular demand •." Venezuela
The government-controlled Despite Foreign Minister
Radio Caribe has warned US Arcaya's resignation, President
businessmen to begin defendin·g Betancourt is successfully main-
Trujillo against US attacks if taining the three-party coali-
they want to continue doing tion which has backed his gov-
business in his country. The ernment since its inauguration
US Consulate sees the future in Februarjy 1959. Nevertheless,
of US interests there as " in- continuing tension in Venezuela
creasingly bleak" as long as is s~ggested by rumors of high-
Trujillo retains control. leve l changes in the armed
forces--including the army com-
Radio Caribe's propaganda mander in chief and the chief
favorable to Castro and the of the joint general staff .
Soviet bloc showed a marked Other indicators are a Communist-
drop following the USSR's un- instigated armed battle in a
successful demand that the UN key petroleum labor union mee t-
Security Council endorse the ing in which one man was killed
OAS sanctions against the Do- and 30 injured, and the brief

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15 September 1960

seizure of a Caracas radio sta- cratic Union (URD)--have pre-

tion on 12 September by a na- sented a united civilian front
tional guard officer who report- against the recurring threa·t of
edly hoped to inspire co-con- a new dictatorship by Vene-
spira tors to fulfill a revo- zuela's traditionally political
lutionary plan originally set armed forces.
for 10 September.
Little unity has been pos-
Arcaya's resignation may sible , however, either within
have been regarded by anti- or among the parties on the
government elements as creating Cuban issue . Betancourt has
a weak point in the united indicated that he does not want
front of Venezuela's three ma- the resignation of the pro-
jor parties which have made up Cuban Arcaya,who is prominent
the government coalition since in the URD, to be the cause for
President Betancourt's inaugura- breaking the coalition. Betan-
tion in February 1959. These court bel i eves that many URD
left-of-center parties--Betan- members are disillusioned with
court' s Democratic Action (AD) their party and could eventu-
group~ the Christian Democratic ally be convinced to leave it.
COPE!, and the Republican Demo- (b )(3)

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The confusion surrounding rival political factions to
the Congo situation has been reach an agreement . During the
compounded by two coups at- interim a "collect" of Congolese
tempted against Premier Lumumba. students and technicians would
President Ka.savubu's effort to run the Congo in cooperation
dismiss the premier and appoint with the UN. He proposed to
moderate Joseph Ileo, the presi- stop the Congo' s drift toward
dent of the Senate, in his stead Communism by closing the Soviet
did not receive popular or mil- and Czech e mbassies and consu-
itary support, and Ileo chose lates, placing military guards
the safety of Brazzaville in around the premises, and forcing
President Youlou's Congo Repub- the diplomats to leave within
lic instead of the political 48 hours.
struggle in Leopoldville. In
fact, both Kasavubu and Ileo In the absence of disorders
have moved so slowly that or strong reactions on the part
American Embassy officials de- of leading Congoiese politicians,
scribe their pace as snail-like, it appeared that the coup might
and report that Kasavubu "acts be succeeding. However, by mid- •
more like a vegetable every morn i ng of 15 September, forces
day. " loyal to Lumumba seemed to have
regained the initiative. Lumum-
On 14 September ~ Colonel ba's claim that Mobutu had been
Mobutu, newly appointed army arrested was subsequently denied,
commander in chief, announced however. 'rhe situation remains
that the army was taking charge extremely fluid, with the sympa-
and would enforce a truce until thies of the bulk of the Congo-
31 .December, thus enabling the lese Army unclear.

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15 September 1960

Lumumba, after
be a ting off Kasavubus
effort to dismiss
him , called a rump
session of the Na~ ·
tional Assembly whicl
on 13 September vote~
him undefined "full
po wers ," and backed
hi s attacks on the
UN' s role in the Con-
go. The premier ap-
parentl y hopes to
use this action--
challenged by the
opposition on the
grounds a quorum was
lacking-- to justify
the e stablishment of
a dictatorship.

The premier's
ability to retain
power has made the UN
tas k vastly more dif- 11:11 81Efl"TIMOI R 10 9 0
..1t1t• ..,.,
ficult . F\lrther
trouble for Secretary Jll'l (b)(3)
Gener al Hammarskj old
has arisen from several of the whose fears have been exploite d
Af r ican states which sympathize by the USSR . The council ses-
wi t h Lumumba's proclaimed ef- sion on 12 September was ad-
forts to preserve the unity of journed because all contemplat ed
the Congo and to combat foreign measures would have aided Lu-
- -notably Belgian and French-- mumba, not Kasavubu; the ses-
impe rialism. Guinea, Ghana, sion on 14 September was ad-
Sudan , and the UAR have all journed when Tunisia proposed
threatened ' to withdraw troops a good-off ices commiss ion to
from th e UN Command and implied mediate between opposing Congo-
that they would be put at Lu- lese factions--a step which
mumba 's disposal. Witbin · the would seem to accord equal ree -
last few days, however, as the ogni tion to Kasavubu and Lu-
UN relaxed its control of the numba.
Leopoldville radio station and
a ir 'f ields , Ghana and Sudan have For several days ther e has
a dopted a more conciliatory pol- been a lessening of bloodshed
ic y toward the secretary g en- in the Kasai area , althoug h it
eral . is n ot clear whether thi s has
resulted from the general cease -
Nevertheless, Hammarskjold fire which the UN announced on
has b e en handicapped in his e f - 10 Se ptember had been orde red
fort s in the Security Council by the Congolese Army . This
to get backing f or a tough pol - easing o f the situation was prob-
icy. in the Congo by the waver- ably in part a result of the
ing of Afro-Asian government~, UN's prohibition against other

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15 September 1960

air flights in the Congo. This the policies of the countries

restriction had grounded the which have always espoused the
ten Soviet IL-l4s which had been positions of colonialism. "
used to transport some 200 Lu- Answering questions aboard
mumba troops to the Kasai bat- the Baltika, the Soviet premier
tlefront. With the relaxation denounced Hammarskjold's insist -
of the UN restrictions, Lumumba ence that all aid to t he Congo
will probably give new attention Government be channeled through
to the Kasai secessionist prob- the UN as a further effort to
lem in an effort to clean up uphold colonialist interests ,
the area preparatory to an all- and indicated that he may press
out Katanga campaign . the Congo issue at the forth-
coming UN General Assembly meet-
Following the small-scale ing.
action at two points along the
Katanga-Kivu frontier last week, In the fifth Soviet Govern-
the Katanga border remained me nt statement on the subject,
quiet until 15 Septembe~ when issue d on 9 September, the USSR
reports reached Elisabethville accused Hammarskjold of f ailing
that 300 Congolese troops loyal to show the ·~i~i~um of impar-
to Lumumba were attempting to tiality" and of ''ope nl y working
invade Katanga from Kivu, At for the benefit of the colonial-
the same time 1 President TshombUs ist s , thereby compromising t he
Katanga regime was confronted UN." Moscow demanded that UN
with an apparently_ ·serious up- f orces occupying Congolese air-
rising by Baluba tribesmen at fields a nd radio stations b e
Manono. di smissed, and called on the
governments whose troops are in
Tshomb~ we lcomed Ileo ' s the Congo to carry ou t the "good,
designation as premier and has correct dec isions" of the Se-
sent two representatives to curity Counc il, b y passing the
meet with Ileo's delegates in UN Command if nec.essary.
Brazzaville to discuss a fed-
erated Congo. At the same time, The USSR's reply on 10 Sep-
Tshomb~ continues to make state- t e mber to a note from Hanunar-
ments favoring complete inde- skj old regarding direct Soviet
pendence for Katanga. This ap- aid to the Congo indicated Mos-
parently is largely a bargaining cow's intention to continue its
tactic, but also designed to unilate ral s upport for Lumumba.
appeal to local advocates of a The Soviet note stated that the
separate Katanga. Security Council resolutions
" do not and cannot r e s t rict"
Communist-Bloc Moves the right of the Congolese Gov-
ernme nt to r eques t and receive
The Communist bloc is be- ass istanc e directl y from gov-
coming more involved in the ernments of othe r countries and
Congo s ituation. Khrushchev , asse rte d that Soviet aid in the
in th e strongest Soviet attack form of civil aircraft and motor
on Hammarskjold to date, charged vehicles was " fully consistent "
on 13 September that the UN sec- with these resolutions. Moscow
retary general is " consciously expressed surprise that the sec-
working in the interests of the retary general was attempting to
imperialists" in the Congo and control the Congo's relations
tbat his actions " dovetail with with other states , specificall y
th e USSR.

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15 September 1960

(b )( 1)
(b)(3)

SITUATION IN LAOS
The situation in Laos has While in effect setting up
taken a new and more critical a de facto government · in Sa-
turn with the repudiation of the vannakhet, Boun OUm and Phoumi
Souvanna Phouma government by apparently do not intend this
General Phoumi and Prince Soun to be a separatist ' regime, at
Oum . Their self-styled "Revolu- least at this time. They have
tionary Committee" proclaimed pledged s~pport to King Savang
over Radio Savannakhet on 10 and sent emissaries to Luang
September that it had temporar- Prabang to explain their ac-
ily set aside the Constitution, tions to the monarch.
"ousted" the Souvanna govern-
ment, and decreed marti~l law The Savannakhet group claims
t .hroughout Laos. All military the loyalty of all four military
commanders, civil servants, and region commanders outside of
people were requested to rec- Vientiane, as well as ten of
ognize the authority of com- the country's 12 provincial gov-
mittee Chairman Soun Oum and to ernors, but their sustained al-
disregard Vientiane's orders , legiance and unity of purpose
is open to question, 'lbe first
Boun Oum is the 50-year- military region commander, with
old hereditary ruler of south- headquarters in Luang Prabang,
ern Laos who renounced his has reversed himself twice· and
claims in 1946 in favor of a now seems tentatively to be
unified Laos under the King of supporting the Souvanna govern-
Luang Prabang. Described as ment. The loyalty of lower
an earthy, practical man of ac- echelon military units is even
tion, Soun Oum is believed to more difficult to assess. Boun
have chafed in recent years Oum and Phoumi will require
over the lack of scope offered outside financial and logistic
for his energies by his sine- support if they are to carry
cure position as inspector gen- out their plans .
eral of the Kingdom . Boun OUm
was an anti-Japanese resistance Thus far, Souvanna has
leader in World War II, and in reacted to the Boun Oum - Phoumi
1954 he led commando troops challenge with moderation, ap-
against the invading Viet Minh. parently still hoping for a
Be was premier in 1949-50. He compromise. He has declared a
favors alignment with the West state of emergency throughout
and the imposition of authori- the country, but has not yet
tarian government . branded Phoumi and Boun Oum as

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA.RY
1 5 Se p t ember 1960

In a talk with
Ambassador Brown on
CH IN A 13 September, the King
said that Souvanna
had '' full powers " to
deal wi th the revolt
and that if be could
not settle it , be
should resi g n. The
King added that he
would then appoint
a new ~remier , prob-
l uang Prabang G ULF a~ly Boun Oum. The
King made it clear
OF that he privately fa -
vored the Phoumi group
TONKIN and hoped Souvanna
would res ign . Souvanna
appeared close to do-
ing so on 14 Septem-
ber, but a Radio Vten-
tiane broadc a st o f
THAILAND 15 September quoting
the premier to the
effect t hat the Ki ng
had " given him a
fresh vote of confi-
dence " indicates h e
m~y try t o hold on .

The prospec t s
10 aC etlCM B EA IPI O for a · compromise solu-
tion in Laos appear (b)(3)
0 9TATUTI: M IL.ES
I to be diminishing.
31320 Captain Kong Le stil l .
controls Vientiane,
and he would probably
rebels . He bas a lso· canceled reject any · resolution of the
p e nding negotiations with the cr ~ sis in f avor of the Savanna-
Pathet Lao ~n s urgents on the khet ·, group. For their part,
ground t hat Pboumi's de fection Phoumi and Boun Oum seem to be .
has dange r ously weake ned hi s in no mood f o r any kind o f com ·-
barga ini ng pos iti o n. The pre- promise . They appear confi-
mier has t lown to Luang Pr atiang deht that Souvanna will be
tw i ce , bu~ has fai~ed to get for'ceci t o resign and seem pr e-
from the King any denunc i ation pat ed t o Undertake the re duc-
of the Savann~kJ?.et . revoiuti ~n . tidd ofthe Vientiane garrison
He has also b e en unsuc cessful und~r ~ong Le . Phoumi's re-
i n luring Phoumi Or Baun Oum ported announcement that be
to Luang Prabang for fresh will '' never" negotiate with
peace talks under the royal Souvanna wbuld appear to close
aegis. t he door to new peace talks .

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15 September 1960

The Pathet Lao insurgents Hanoi and Peiping have not

are exploiting the division of given events in Laos exceptional
Laos' non-Communist elements. attention in their propaganda .
They have increased military North Vietnam has rebroadcast
pressure in Sam Neua, Phong Pathet Lao statements attacking
Saly, and Xieng Khouang prov- Phoumi and Boun Oum and voicin g
inces in the north and Cham- willingness to cooperate with
passak Province in the south. Souvanna Phouma. Peiping has de-
In the propaganda realm, voted very little space to the
Phoumi's revolt has enabled the subject, but on 14 September the
Pathet Lao movement to range Chinese Communist radio did ac-
itself on the side of legitimacy cuse Thailand of plotting to use
in the current crisis. The SEATO as a cover to partition
clandestine Pathet Lao radio Laos. The paucity of inde p e ndent
has called on all Laotians to commentary in the Communist cap-
support the legal Souvanna itals may be due to a desire to
government and the coup d'etat picture the matter as purely an
group of Kong Le in the strug- internal Laotian affair and
gle against the " traitorous forestall accus ations of Chinese
and rebellious PhOum1 · c1ique.~ 0£._ ~ie tname s_e_in± e.r.v_e_n t..J_on
(b)(3)

* * *

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CE@l'!I! I awew - COPY NO. E:dt ·

I . OCI NO. 4a9a/ 60

6 October 1960

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY (

CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
... _,

D()pU~ENTNO.
HO CHANGE IN CL.ASS.
0
'
OE<:LASSIFIED ~-
0 I I
1_'.. \ c:1,_
\ I \.
(b)(3)

Cl.ASS. CHANGED TO: TS C L---------~----------..--J_ l -

NEXTREVIEWDATE:
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/) I I .
.•)
Aunt: HR 70-2
DATE: . REVIEWER:@
• A_
.S-'f -r£fl :;:>
~
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14 MAY · . _·: ·· ~ ...__ .·

1900
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Tms MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-

ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE1UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPI ONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, T:aE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHIC~ IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORiiED PERSON IS PROHIBITE.D BY LAW.

The Current Intelligence· Weekly Summary has been prepared

primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent t he
immediate appraisal of the Office_of Current Intelligence.

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SSLERI.,,J ....

CURRENT I NTELLI
. GENCE
.
WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 October 1960

T HE WE E K I N B R I E F

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE I NTEREST

KHRUSHCHEV AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1

Khr ushchev seems determined to overcome any impres- ·
slon tha t the bloc l s on the .defensive as a r esult of the
general ly adverse reaction to his UN reorganlzation plan.
Khr ushche v pr obably believed t hat the President ' s letter
t ur ning down a meeting and Macmillmn ' s ·speech at the UN
r e q uir ed a. vigorous reply to dispel any suggestion of re-
tr~a t . His performance indicates that the bloc will 'pui- ··
sue an uncompromising line toward the West for . the remainder
of the UN session, but in ! · :=____J talks with Prime Minister (b)(1 )
Macmillan he has indicate d-ni--a~ a summi t negotiation on
t he Berlin question might be possible in a few months.
· Hammar skjold ·will be under increasing .pressure · from
Asi a n-Af rican UN members to revamp the senior echelons
of the UN Secretariat to make i t s comoo_siiion_mo~e reor e-
senta t ive of the present membershi p . I (b)(3)

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Page 4

The government cris is in Leopoldville continues , al-
t hough Lumumba appears t o have l ost the support of many
of t he deputies from his own stronghold of Stanleyville
and may no longer be able to carr y the assembly. The
projected round-table .confer ence of political leaders
now may be shelved by Colonel Mobu t u in favor of a .
direct appeal to the Congolese assembly. The apparent
erosion of Lumumba's support will make it more difficult
for his African allies--the UAR , Ghana, and Guinea--to
restore him to power. Meanwhile, the UN Command is
turning greater attentj.on to~ he Co~~~e economic
and health problems . ~'~~~~~~~~~~~~ _J (b )(3)

SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6

Premier Souvanna Phouma seems t o be gaining the upper
hand in his struggle with General Phoumi ' s Savannakhet
Revolutionary Group. Souva nna's improved position is re-
flected in h i s growing reluctance to negotiate with
. Sa vannakhet . Negotiations between Souvanna and the
Communist Pathet Lao are apparently imminent. The
Pathet Lao will be negotiating from a strong position
because of · ontrol of Sa m Ne ua Province. ~
[ ~~~~~~~~~ (b)(3)

SE!itLJ'
l

nm WEE1( TN BRIEF

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 October 1960

PART II

NOTES AND CO~NTS

S !NO-SOVIET RELATIONS Page 1

Moscow evidently sent a high-level delegation, pos-

sibly including Mikoyan and Suslov ~ to Peiping in September,
presumably to attempt again to firid some way to compose the
dispute between · the ·soviet ·and Chinese· Conimunist parties
and end the bitter recriminations of recent months : Moscow
may have · felt that as a result of its campaign to · isolate
the Ch_inese party in the world Communist movemerit, Peiping
wot.i.ld · be more ready to compromise. Recent Chinese state..:. ·
merits, however, suggest that no progress toward reconcilia-
tion has been made, and a further deterioration in rela-
tions appears likely. (b)(3)
PEIPING CELEBRATES NATIONAL DAY Page 4

The 11th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese

Communist regime was cel.ebrated on 1 October in a more
subdued spirit than in previous years. Peiping had no
otitstanding economic achievements to announce; indeed,
the principal speaker this year, Foreign Minister Chen
Yi, dwelt on the effects of natural disasters on this
year 9 s grain harvest. The failure of all bloc coun-
tries, except Albania, to send delegations underlined
the stresses in the Sino-Soviet alliance. A highlight
6f .. th~ day was the signing of the Sino-Burmese .boundary
treaty--an event stressed in holiday propaganda, particu-
larly for neutral countries, as proof of Chinese adher-
ence to peaceful coexistence. (b)(3)

ALBANIA REAFFIRMS SUPPORT OF CHINESE POSITIONS . Page 5

Albania, the smallest and least significant of the
satellites, in the last three weeks has firmly aligned it-
self with the Chinese Communist positions in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. China is supporting Albania in the face
of growing Soviet disapproval of the Tirana regime. The
Soviet leaders probably view Albania's continued willing-
ness to defy Moscow as a threat to their campaign to
isolate Chin• ~nd to their authority in Eastern Europe,
and can be expected to make futther moves to bring
Albania into line. Tirana leaders earlier were reported
to be uneasy and tense, apparently because of Soviet
pressure, and· evidently have postponed their party
congress scheduled for November. I (b)(3)

ITALIAN COMMUNISTS AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE . . Page 7

The Sino-Soviet dispute has revived the "hard-soft"

controversy that has long plagued Italy's Communist party"."'-
the largest outside the Soviet bloc. Secretary Ge neral

SF£R fr· 5

ii
THE WEEK IN BRIEF

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 October 1960

PART II (continued)
Togli a tti can be expected · t~ . ke~.P.: tn~ _· party:: f .iJ:'.~lr.
oriented toward ' Moscow, but opposition elements may
at.t empt to use the Sino-Soviet cf:~spute · t? _i.ifi~~~cut 'tlie
present party 1Eiaders . Provincial congr.es~es r~port_~dly
will - be held throughout I t aly this fall to discuss
"peaceful coexistenc e between"'d iverse systems and the
noninevi tability of war." \ J
(b)(3)

TENS .IONS OVER BERLIN . . .. . . . . . . . . . ' ' .. .• Page 8

BOnn ' s termination of its 1961 trade agreement with
East Germany--announced on 30 Se ptemoer in retaliation for
Communist ha r assment of West Berlin--will probably not re-
sult · in a n end· to interzonal trade ~ but it puts ·west
Germany in a legal position to take further ac::tlon to
restrlct ·trade . Bonn and- West Berlin authorities - are
considering a plan to strengthen West Berli.n Is . pos'ition '
by-· routing all iri.terzonal shipments through 'West Berl~nt
the~~by ' ~jkin~ it diffi cult ' fot the ~a~t Ger~ari~ ··to ·
tamper wit h . Berlin ~ ccess routes .without blocking the i r
own imports. Pa rty boss Ulbricht on 4 October strongly
ass·e .rted East Ger ma·n " sovereignty" over East Berlin . and
de mande d establishment of a demilit a r i zed "free city" of
West Be rlin, but gave no ind i cation of what counter-
measures. his regime intends to take.. His cautious atti-
tude may mean that a ny decision on count~u~eB_m..u
await Khr ushchev ' s return f~om New York. I (b)(3)

CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS Pa ge 10
Fidel Castro ' s experience at the UN General As sembly
has appar e ntly streng the ned his ·vie w o f himself a s a
leader of the peoples· o f all underdeveloped countri es
"against i mperialism," and there are indications that he
may· r e turn to the UN later this month. Castro has an-
nounced tha t Nkrumah and Nasir may visit Cuba, and his
regime is increasing its propaganda- support of the
Algerian rebels. Meanwhile , the government is further
strenj thening its_j; i es ___.t_o__the__Si ~o-Soviet bloc in various
ways . . J (b)(3)

NEW PARTY STRUCTURE IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES Pa ge 12

A plan set forth in May to expand the r~gular party

struc ture in the Soviet armed services now is being im-
pleme nte d as a r esult of a new de cree of the Soviet central
committee . Battalion ~ level party organizations are being
given powers formerly exercte·ed at the regimental level.
Further steps t oward replacing the political departments
in military units with the type of party organizatio nal
forms found in civili an life will probably depend on the
suc cess the new organizations have 1 n safeg uarding party
iriteres t s in the milit a ry· I I (b)(3)

tjfQPST
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 October 1960
PART II (continued)
USSR INTENSIFIES CAMPAIGN AGAINST IDLERS . Page 12
Moscow has stepped up its drive against "parasites"
and idlers, and greater efforts are being made to generate
widespread public indignation against all forms of unde-
sirable behavior. The campaign has spread into all soc t al
levels, even the upper levels of the bureaucracy, and in-
cludes particularly vehement attacks on the tendency to
acquire private property . Parasitism in all its varieties
is characterize, as the most serious vice of nresent-day
Soviet society. _ I (b )(3)

ALGERIA . . . . . Page · 14
Representatives of the Algerian rebels are intensify-
ing their efforts both in New York and in Western capitals
to secure backing for a UN-conducted referendum to settle
Algeria's political future. Rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas'
trip to Peiping was probably undertaken to demonstrate to
Western governments that the rebels were in earnest when
they stated they would accept a id "wherever it can be
found." Meanwhile, Morocco and Tunisia are engaged in

L maneuvers designed to enlist UN intervention in Algeria

the oattern of Ij operations . in the Congo . .____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ (b)(3)

MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Page 15

The situation along the Syrian-Jordanian border has
eased somewhat, but efforts to arrange a meeting between
Husayn and Nasir have been unsuccessful, and the tensions
between the two countries persist. Jordan's recognition
of the Qasim regime in Iraq stems from the antipathy of
both governments toward the UAR; the two countries now may
cooperate to support secessionist tendencies in the UAR's
Syrian region . On a neighboring border, Israel's resump- ~
tion of dredging work in the Jordan River is causing new
friction with the trAR.
In Iraq, the regime's crackdown on extremism in the
press appears to be damaging the Communists more than the
nationalists. Relations between the Qasim government and
the Iraq Petroleum Company are worsen i ng . New efforts are
under way in Sudan to form a coalition among the various
nfl.ue.ntia..l_e.lemen:ts_s.AA~ to oust the Abboud regi.me .
(b )(3)

AFGHAN-PAKISTANI P.ORDER TROUBLES Page 18

Fighting among the Pushtoon tribes living along the
Afghan-Pakistani border north of the Khyber Pass now ap-
pears to be slackening . Despite the continuing build-up
of military forces in the area and the exchange of re-
criminations, both Kabul and Rawal l indi seem to be tr n
to keep the disturbance localized. _ (b )(3)

~
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.;;~~ .

CURRENT. INTEL~-IGENCE
.. - . ·- _\ .-. . ..WEE;KLY
.
SUMMARY
6 October 1960

PART II (continued)
SINO-BURMESE BORDER TREATY . . Page 20

"The Burmese consider the border treaty signed on 1

October in Peipipg their most significant diplomatic
achievement since independence. The exact! tude of the .
langua~e and co~pleteness of detail in the :treaty appear
to be products of the Burmese chief negotiator ' s : deter-
mined effort to make it difficult ·for Peipfng to find any
basis for future disputes over the treaty's interpretation.
The Burmese still view the Chinese as. a dangerous neigh-
bor and have placed the frontier areas under specia_l~­
army administration. ~--~- (b)(3)

PHlLIPPINE CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF HUK

ACTIVITY .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 20

A recent wave of killings in Luzon provinces , possibly

politically motivated, has caused speculation in the
Philippines concerning a possible resurgence of the Commu-
nist-led Huk rebellion. The Huks apparently have no more
than a nuisance capability, however, and the Philippine
Communists are not believed to be abandoning their
primary reliance on tactics of subversion and on efforts
to exploit the country's growing nationalist sentiment.
I I (b)(3 )

SOUTH KOREAN UNREST • • '! • • • • ' • Page 2 1

Increasing South Korean student unrest, agitation

among lower ranking officers in the armed forces, and
press criticism suggest growing popular dissatisfaction
with the Chang Myon government. The situation is aggra-
vated by the political stalemate resulting from factional-
ism in the ru·ling party which prevents the gorernm.an.:t_ t.rom
taki~g _ a firm lead in shaping public opinion. ~-~~~~~~~~~~~ (b )(3)

THE COMMON MARKET'S FARM PROBLEM . . . Page 22

The Common Market is encountering strong opposition
to its program for gradually equalizjng agricultural
prices among the member states , supporting prices with
variable import duties, and replacing nationa·l marketing
bodies with community agencies. The program, which had
been recently revised by the Common Market Commission
in an effort t"o satisfy both internal and external criti-
cism, is still criticized as either insufficiently pro-
tectionist or not liberal enough. An · agreed farm policy,
however, is probably prerequisite to full implementation
of last Ma·y ' t :_c..ision to accelerate the Common Mari et 's
development. (b )(3)

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

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.,·

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

· 6 October 1960

PART II (continued)

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN Et SAI.:VADOR . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23

The Salvadoran Government has emerged from its recent

political crisis in a dangerously weakened condition and
on 3 October extended the state of siege for an additional
30 days . Communist and pro-Castro elements are actively
exploiting growing popular pressure for socio-econo~ic
re.forms, and President Lemus has been unable to provide
the leadership required to carry out his electoral prom~
ises of moderate progress in this field . A new political
crisis could arise at any ti~e and might result in a
military seizure of power and the subsequent transfer of
L e oresidencv to the still or pular ex-President Osorio . (b)(3)

PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND

NYASALAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24

The publication on 11 October of the Monckton Com-

mission report on possible structural changes · in the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will revive controver-
sy as London tries to reach an accommodation between white-
settler and African-nationalist lnterests. While now
tending to concede to African aspirations, London will
be unwilling to "sell out" the white settlers at a con-
stitutional conference which may follow as early as
Decemtier. Britain ' s recent moves to promote harmonious
relations with African nationalists will probably not
prove wholly successful, and the federations' white-
settler prime minister already opposes the reported
recommendation that Nyasaland and Northern ·Rhodesia be
free to secede after five years. ~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_____, (b )(3 )

REPUBLIC REFERENDUM IN SOUTH AFRICA Page 26

The victory of Prime Minister Verwoerd's Nationalist

party in the refere~dum on 5 October gives Verwoerd ~
mandate to press for the early reconstitution of South
Africa as a republic. The strong showing of the o'pposi-
tion indicates that the deep split between the Afrikaans-
and English-speaking communities has not been lessened.
Verwoerd may call for new elections to increase his com-
manding lead in parliament . His announced intention to
proceed with the establishment of a republic regardless
of Commonwealth disapproval could lead to the republic's
denial of membership--the first suc~ommon-
weal th ~istory . L
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ {b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN TURKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page l

As the military regime in Turkey enters its fifth

month in power, the restoration of civil authority , which
the regime still profes•es as its goal, appears more
distant than ever. The ruling Committee of National Union
( CNU), having consolidated its position, has launched a
widespread program of reform . Despite outward signs of
stability , however, there are growing indications of
cleavage and tension within the ruling group and of
possible adverse public reaction . to the forthcoming
t rials of officials of the ousted Menderes government.
In developing its foreign policy, the CNU may in effect
[~~OJILQ...t_~ositive neutralitv~nd accept Soviet aid offers.
(b)(3)
FRENCH LABOR AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC . . . . . . . Page 4

French labor unions have been in a rela~ively · un­

favorable position under the De Gaulle regime, and until
well into 1959 were hesitant to press demands on the
government . Since then strike activity has increa·s ed,
out the government has ignored most union demands and
is unlikely to change its basic policy of tight wage
controls . The Communist leaders of the General Labor
Confederation are confident t hat they have laid a firm
basis for broad joint action ~w
"'-'-""'
i~ t=
h._,t~h~~,,,_......----""~'-'-"-"""""....,_,._~~~~~
unions at some future date . (b )(3 )

(b)( 1

BOLIV I A UNDER THE NEW PAZ ADMINISTRATION . Page 13

In its first two months in office the leftist Paz
Estenssoro administration has initiated a drive for
foreign aid in improving Bolivia's economy, which is
nearly bankrupt despite continuing US help.· Paz

vii
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•._, - ·w ,.--...•~•

6 October 1960

PART III (continued)

apparently hopes for substantial investment in the tin

mines from· Germany· or France; i'n · addi ti6n the· USSR has
sugges,.teid the· .pos"?ibility :of. aid.. .Paz may,..hope that
deionstrable econ6mici. progress ~ill free hi~ irom.his
conside;ra ble poli ticai depend.ence on the Communist-
inf i l tra ted labor forces linked with Vice' President
Juan Lechin. These forces have been strengthened in
the past year or two by Bolivia's continued failure to (b)(3)
achieive th!" economi _e:r_o:w_th_ru:01nis.e_d_in_the_s_wae_n~·~~--­
revolution of 1952.
(b ( 1)

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CURRENT INTELiIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 October 1960

SiNO-BURMESE BORDER TREATY

Burmese political leaders ty of the Sino-BuJ:'.mese boundary"
view the new Sino-Burmese border --an issue in dispute between
treaty, signed on 1 October in 'China and India .
Peiping, as their most signif i-
cant diplomatic achievement :since The treaty and attached
independence . For the first time notes provide restrictions which
in modern hi~tory, the entire should help limit illegal bor-
border between the two countries der crossings by the tribal peo-
has been defined in terms ac- ples residing on both sides of
ceptable to both governments. the frontier. Re~idents in the
The treaty has eliminated legal transferred areas automatically
justification for Chinese incur- take on the citizenship of the
sions by doing away with over- administering government unless
lapping terr~torial claims.More- tbey declare their .allegiance : to
over, Burma made far fewer ter- the former government within ;
ritorial concessions in the proc- one year and move out within ,
ess of reaching agreement than two years, trans-frontier culti-
it had feared would be nece~­ vation is to be eliminated with-
sary. in three years, and the tradi-
tional right of the tribal peo-
The text of the 12-article ples to visit across the fron-
treaty and attached notes carry tier is eliminated.
strong evidence of the sk~ll of '
Burma's chief negotiator, Briga- Even though 1. October was
dier Aung Gyi, who is. deeply declared a national holiday in
suspicious of China's intentions. Burma to celebrate the border
Throughout there is a marked treaty, the Burmese leaders con-
exactitude of language which is tinue tc;> rec.ognize Communist ·
intended to avoid fut4re dtf~ China as a dangerous neighbor.
ferences in interpretation of In an effort to develop at least
the treaty. Whereiv.~r the .Ian:-:" .. minimal qef enses against poten-
gu!a·g e· of the: treaty appears am- tial ;inc'u·rs;ions from the north .,
biguous, it is supplemented by the government has turned over
a detailed map. The only in- the frontier areas in . the Shan
tentional ambiguity . remain- and Kachin states t~ ' soecial
ing in the treaty is t~e army adm.inistratio~ l(b)(3)
identity of the "western extremi- I -1~~~

PHILIPPINE CONCERN OVER' POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF HUK ACTIVITY

A . recent wave 0£ k~llings ers met to consider the implica-
in rural areas of Luzon has '.:: : tion of report~ that 13 provinci-
caused considerable speculation al murd~rs in a two-week period
in the Philippines concerning a were part of a Communist liquida-
possible resurgence of the Com- tion campaign against former
munist-led Huk rebellion, which Huk.s who had turned government
posed a serious internal threat informers. Armed Forces Chief
after World War I I. of Staff Lt. Gen. Cabal ordered
a reinforcement of constabulary
In mid-September, Philip- units on Luzon with 2,000 army
pine defense and military lead- troops and placed all troops on

PART II NOT~S AND COMMENTS . Page 20 of 27

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU!!MARY

6 October 1960

alert status. Since the subse- The number of armed Huks in

quent capture of two relatively the Philippines is estimated at
senior Huks, military leaders less than 300; this number could
appear less apprehensive of a be increased by recruiting among
new Corrununist uprising. presently passive supporters,
particularly in central Luzon
Although this drive, like where abuses persist over land
past ones, does not appear to tenure. Some Philippine offi~
have eliminated any major pocket cials have noted a directive in
of remaining Huk strength, Phi1- the most recently captured Com-
ij).pine." defense leade.rs have munist 11 poli ti cal transmission 11
given it considerable publicity. to "increasing the present armed
According to the American Em- element." The major part of the
bassy, there has been no real document, however, continues to
evidence of a Huk resurgence, al- emphasize nonviolent tactics and
though Communist responsibility the necessity for supporting the
for the provincial murders can- forces of Philippine nationalism.
not be discounted. A P.\lj.lij)pine Although the Garcia administra-
security agency has recently re- tion has recently tended to mute
ported that it has evidence of the anfi-American overtones.of
Communist plans to assassinate its "Filipino First" programs,
certain political leaders in the Comniunists have had some suc-
Manila, including Vice President cess in exploiting this theme
Macapagal, in order to create a among the student·; · _te.lle_c_tllal-
political crisis durj_ng the 1961 and labor circles. (b)(3)
elections.

SOUTH KOREAN UNREST

Increasing South Korean ances, but the government ap-

student unrest, agitation among parently feels powerless to act
lower ranking officers in the because students are generally·
armed forces, and the appearance still considered almost sacrosanct.
of editorial criticism suggest Many students are critical of the
growing popular dissatisfaction UN formula for unification, which
with the Chang Myon government. calls for UN-sponsored elections
The situation is aggravated by in both parts of the country,
the political stalemate result- and favor 'the nueutraliza ti on"
ing from factionalism in the of Korea, increased contacts be-
ruling party which prevents the tween North and South, and a
government from taking a firm 11
Korean summit 11 conference to
_lead in shaping public opinion. explore too· possibili tj_es •of urii-
flying the country. One group
The government is con- of students favors a mil"i tary
cerned over the unrest and con- coup.
fusion encouraged by continuing
demonstrations by students and A group of junior officers
other groups which the police in the army, hoping for promo-
report have involved 775,000 per- tion, is agitating for the ou~t­
so~s since Ap~il. Conse~~ati~e er of senior commanders. Junior
elements are tiring of the al- officers recently visited Prime
most continuous street disturb- Minister Chang and the minister

PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 21 o:f 27

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. - COPY NO. 77
SE:CRET 1 OCI NO. 0275/61

\ ·'. 13 April 1961

1
CURRENT /.
INTELLIGENCE·
WEEKLY
SU MM.ARY

',.,._ -.
I
L . •,;

'

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

(b )(3)

_/_
h!O CHANGE ff·J CL!1SS. 0 ____.,,.
Ci DECLASSlF!EO .._.__.-
7
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,•
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 0Ur.1l.W.llY

A senior official· of : the ·Congo- troops at the Kamina base, where

lese transport company blamed ' some 1,400 Indian troops are
the UN for refusing to issue stationed, are maintaining road-
instructions for distribution blocks and mining roads in the
and warned that compan~ opera- area. The UN has reinforced
tions would soon be bottle- its contingent of Ethiopians at
necked at ·Leopoldville, and Kabalo; a ·spokesman for the or-
that facilities at Matadi would ganization said on 10 April that
have to be shut down. The Leo- the UN was in "complete control"
poldville problem, 'according of the town.
to the company, has nothing to
do with the issue of UN tro9ps
~n. Matadi. Efforts to airlift 1~200
Indian troops to Katanga from
the Tanganyika port of Dar es
Military Operations in ~atanga Salaam, where the· US transport
Blatchford remains With some
2,300 Indian troops on board,
Tshombe is continuing his are stalemated for lack of suit-
harassment of UN officials in able aviation fuel in Tanganyika
an effort to halt the UN ~ttempt and the limited airport facili-
to blunt his military operations ties there. The UN apparently
around Kabalo. Elisabethville is attempting to ai~lift all or
banks reportedly are no longer part of the Indian conting~nt in
honoring UN checks, and Katanga UN aircraft . Hammarskjold has
· about 15 C-54s at his disposal,
which could carry 40 troops each
~l :...: p u b i i t" o f t It ~ C0 n uo trip. Any of the Indian troops
not airlifted presumably would
go by sea to Matadi, or t6 Lagos,
Nigeria.

Hammarskjold fears that

Tshombe's military operations
foreshadow intensified civil war
in Katanga unless ~he . UN can
promptly establish its authority.
He believes that Tshombe's moves
are an effort to undercut Jason ·
Sendwe, who on 7 April proclaimed
Kon1olo himself chief of +he Lualaba
AltMrt..t lle
state and called oa its people
\ \ , .. __(
,.....'-····
Kab1 lo

. M1nono
to res ist Tshombe ' s troops. Th~
secretary general said that he
. K1mllf'l1.
() . is coming to the conclusio~ that
Tshomb~ is "simply n. criminal

,
.... ... ..
\
.. and outlaw" and that the ele-
l~ [/lsr.bc; tw1Jjr (
{ ment of force on Tshombe's side
UNCLASSIFllD -
- .., / \ \ in diplomatic barg~ining with
I> A~•H t. 1eet ••••. ) -..J i
the UN must -be removed.
• 'f•TU1'f "'11"-IU
\ . .i
S160:I

~
13 Apr 61 WEEKLY l~. ki:'\Y )[ '.-; w Pa ge 5 o:t 21
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"');~ ... . :J ..•

~
,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

(b )(1)
White mercenaries played
a crucial role in the military
effort against the Baluba
tribesmen of north Katanga;
(b)(1)

Tshombe apparently is un-

der pressure from traditionalist
leaders in the Katanga legisla-
ture, who have introduced a Nevertheless, the Social-
bill calling for the establish- ist Paul-Henri Spaak, who will
ment of a prime minister's of~ : most likely be the next foreign
fice. Under this system Tshomb~ minister, is expected to adopt
as president would have a large- a more cooperative attitude
ly symbolic role, and actual toward the UN and is said to
power would be wielded by the· be planning to absorb the Min-
premier, The traditionalists istry of African Affairs into
reportedly hope to install their the Foreign Ministry, in the
spokesman, Interior Minister hope of eliminating a . major
Munongo,in the new office. Mu- source of pro-Katanga influence
nongo is an extreme co_n servative and an important c-hannel for
who is strongly opposed to the undercover dealings with
Belgians and is generally un- Tshombe. The new goverr:(b)(1 ): ,
f ri e ndl y to other Europeans. however, would not advoc(b)(3)
a Congo policy which would
seriously arouse the Belgian
public and jeopardize the pros-
pects for' the domestic re-
forms in which the elec-
torate is orimarilv inter-
este d. (b)(3)

~
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'tON FIOE~~TI A(
SIECr\c I COPY NO. 68
OCI NO. 0297/61
14 September 1961
I

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DO~UMENT 110. _ _ _ q...____
llO CHJl.l!llE Ill CLASS. 0
0 DECLiUiSI FIW ..
C!.!iSa. CH Ari'.!L;D TO: TS 5\.._!:J 1a
0 0
N!:.H Rl:V IHV DATE1 ----'--~.l~l-..
AUTH: HR 1il·2

DATE1 :lO :r.l"e ~I I(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

.,CONGO
.. '
. ' .·,... .,

Co~tinuing friction ·between gime and a re-establishment of

the UN .and the Katang~ r~gime of the central government's au-
Moise Tshombe erupted in~o open thority. There is some evidence
f ight,ng _in E~isabethvi~le on ~~ that the UN encouraged tl'~e " mi-
September. UN forces seiz~d key g~a tion of anti-Tshombe Baluba
points in the city,· · and Pr emier tribesmen to the Elisabethville
Adoula in Leop0ldvi11e . has mQyed area as a means of neutralizing
to take· ·over tbe adrrdnistra.t .ioo. pro-·Tshombe . sentiment there.
of xa, ta~ga unQ.er . a> $eri~s Qf _- ..
emerge*~:r direct! ves .. . . .... . . The American consui quoted
. . '• i . .. . ·. . . . .. . .. ' . two young BaJ,ubas as saying
.'!!he :$·~owdowti ·. be tweer) · th.e . :., that: they ·woulg not return to
UN arid Tshombe·. came af·t er · uN· their homes until Tshorobe was
repre~eritat.i ve :0 ~j3~iE:in : had; .h ee1'·. overthrown, regardless of what
unsqcc~$~.fu.l, in p're~s.i)ig ..Tshqmbe $&fe-conduct . guarantees they
into ~egotia ti,oris .'wi-t~· ·~dc)µla . might be offered.
aimed ·at reintegrating ":i,nd,e-
pe~de~t" Katanga .. yd.,~.li . t~~ Go,P.go. . On 11 Septe mber O'Brien
Initially, the . UN appea·rs · t<>" · wa rned Tshombe to go to Leopold-
have f ·el t . .that J. ts· arrest . oil .·. . '.: ._ ville "at ali costs," failing
28 . August: o:f -the. Ka ta,l)g'-~ · 1!'-.r \lly .' ·s which " s erious consequences ··
whi·te of ;f icer.~ ;·wou)ll , ·p'roye : s(lf- · .would re~ult. On the following
ftc{ent ... to to.t>pie · Tshom~.~ '$ ; t~~ day , O ' Brien . pres e nt.e d Tshombe
g;t.m~ . Tshombe( ~~math.e_d,.. 4,e r iap~ r .· with a •irtual ultimatu~ to
b9W.~ve:r;/, a ~l:thfrtJgh . ::.i,n: .e arly ..s~P'"' ·. me et wi th UN S~ cretary General
tember he: had indicated". that · he· Harnm~.r~kj o ld , who · arrived in ·
was. ~i>.re.:p~i-E}~ to.·,. liql~ ~.3:i~$·.wt·th ·. Leoi>oldyille on ·l3 September.
AdouJa . ·if ·~· t~~Y . ;we.r.~ : .liel<I · so.ID~"":'. ·
where othe-r .. than in -. Le<;}pold-v ,1 ·11e'.. ·. . · T.he .fighting which brought
. .. , , · · - · ..· · . ; .. ... · . .. . . · ~ bout Tshombe 's , overthro.w. began
.> . B~fqr_e he · .~e. ft_- 6n·.
~ . :~~Pt~.mber . · ~t·· d~wi::i. ·on 13 September,.. .when · ·
for ...the ~~·lgraqe <::on~~~enC:e:, :. :: . UN· fo.r .c es . in Elisabethvi.lle
Adoula · r.~por.tediy . c;l.ire(:!.t ed· ,·a·~i6Y · · · m«:>ved , to se:J,.zEf the Ka tanga
·c hief · ~ob.ii tu :to .i>~epar~ - P·! ·8;_n·s ::fo:: .radio· sta ti~n; sour~e ·of anti-
tbe military occ'up~;~ion of : · ·· . . · UN b roadcasts · which had o~- ­
northerQ. ~a ~anga by two b,a t.tai'~oni:> · ca.sion¢d protes:ts by o' Brien.
of Congol~se .: troop$'. . . · ne.p~:h: ~$ ... of '.".'. . Kat iangan gendarmerie reportedly
~uch continge~cy plannitjg : o~~ , · fired on the. UN soldiers, and the
viously m}lcie a dee.P . imp:~..e~~.ion '.. . :resulting fighting spr~ad to the
in Elisabet6ville., ~here"..~ · . post office building and the
spokesmen-: had °!"arn~d.. Tsl_l6m~~ residenc e of Vi c e President Kibwe .
.that the UN would not inter fere Afte r three hours of fighting,
with, and in ~a:ct m:i.g!i..! .. aid., . in which about 40 persons died,
military action by Leopoldville 0 9 Brien announc ed that the UN
to pu.:t · a..n en~ , to Ka1;;~ilga.? ~n-: . was to c ontrol of the city and
depe ndenc~ . . In a press con- tha t Katanga ' s secession had
f erence .on: 12. September 1 .Tshonibe .ended. Tshombe, who denounced the
charged . the · .UN w;i. th seeking· to UN action as "treachery,'' is
destroy ·JC.~tanga and w.i th · ·fomen ·t- . b e li e ved to have e s caped With
ing ·· · "inc ;i ~en~s'' in order to . ~nte ri o r . Minis te r Munongo.
justify _.UN military interven~ion. Sporadic fir i ng cont inued during
In a . .refe re:1:1ce .to invasi.o~.- rl,ln:iors , the ·nigh t of 13- 14 Septe mber,
Tshombe warned that if suffi- and t h e r e we r e reports ·of fight-
cient.l y pr~ssed ~e would . <;l ~stroy :i,ng i n Jadotville , near E.lisabeth-
Ka tang a• s .· "ecotjc;>rnic appara_tu $ "-- v·1 1 lEl .
aq apparent ref~ren~e to , t h e
c opper m;1n,es whic.h,. are t he Aao ula was qui ck to follow up
prov ince's mai'n economi c asset . . on the eve n ts i n Elisabe thvi lle .
He a nno unced on 13 September the
UN officials d~ni e ~ on l l appointme nt of Egide Bocheley-
and 12 ~ep.tember that the y · ·CQn- Da vidson- -one -time hatchetman for
t e mplated ·~ny f uthe r u se o f ' Gi zenga- - a s ''spe cial commissioner"
for c e . in.. ~at~~ga. · The_y, .·c.o n- , .. f o r Ka t 'a n ga . Adou la ; also . s:ta t ed
tinue_d,, . h«;>w.ever, . to., s e,ek.:-.a . ·. : that new ele ct i ons would b e h e ld
d·issolut
. i 6n
' o f Ts ho'mbe !s . r e- . fpr the Ka t anga ri ass embly .
• I ' · ~- ~ ; '

·~
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.. . .~SECREX..
CURREN.T l.NTELUGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Certajn Katangan army units Meanwhile, there are indi-

may remain . loyal to Tshomb~ and cations that UN and central
~ttempt to .wage guerrilla warfare government representatives have
from the bush . In the absence of been succes$ful in largely curbing
the financial resources which Gizengist activity in Stanley-
were ·at 'his command as Katanga ville . Two of Gizenga's former
president, however, it i~ doubtful lieutenants reportedly are in
whether Tshombe could effectively hiding to avoid arrest. UN
oppose the central government. representative Linner has stated
The Rhodesian Federation .,has that in view of . Gizenga's appar-
ind;f.cated that it will grant him ent decision to remain in Leo-
and Munongo asylum, and pro- poldville , the . "Stanleyville
Ka ta:nga. sentimen1; among Euro.peans problem" has been ''practically
in R.Qodesia . could 't -ake the form
of support for a Katangan gov-
I
so1 vect... r (b)(3)
ernl!'lent-.-in exile.

NR

·· " ~-· t,
~
.. _,_, l.J..... '·'· ., .
·- t ·. ~..~ :
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eif!@"!T- a COPY NO. 6S

I . OCI NO. 4445/ ao
22 Sept ember 1960

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE O F CURRENT INTELLIG ENCE

DOCUME~.fT NO. ~~------!

NO Cf"iA!'JGE IN CLASS. 0
A (b)(3)
rJ 0[CLASSl:"l!:O
~ L-----------------:-'~.,-r--'
CLM;3. CHANGED TO: TS
~~~:/it~~~~O~:TE:J/{"!f9o~--------,
(/ /]
/ > (, I
(b)(3)
!>ATE: REVIEWER.1-~~~----' / .
13 MAY i93U - ·· ~ ··'"'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

22 September 1960

has tempora.rily abated as a re- a liaison capacity to prepare

sult of a cease-fire called by the way for the peace talks
the Pathet Lao high command on which were a major aim of the
18 September. The cease-fire Kong Le coup and an important
applies only to areas loyal to plan in Souvanna ' s program for
Souvanna; the inclusion of Sam solving Laos' problems.
Neua in this category may have
stemm~d from a letter purport- As the Asian Communist re-
edly written by the Sam Neua gime most directly concerned
commander affirming loyalty to with events in Laos, Hanoi bas
Souvanna. T~e letter was broad- charged that the United States
cast over Vientiane radio, but is "instigating a civil war"
its authenticity is sus~ect. which could be transformed into
·The Sam Neua garrison bas in any an "international conflagration."
event reaffirmed its loyalty The sa~e 19 September broadcast
to Phoumi since that time. When stated the Laotian situation is
it becomes clear to the insur- "a direct threat to the securi-
gents that the region ~s in fact ty" of North Vietnam and that
loyal to Phoumi, they may well "the Vietnamese people cannot
resume their slow adva~ce on remain indifferent . " Hanoi in-
Sam Neua town, with its vital sists, however, that there are
airfield . no North Vietnamese personnel in
Laos. Both Moscow and Peiping
The Laotian Army garri~on also have sought to create an
in Sam Neua has been reinforced air of foreboding about the
by a company of paratroopers Laotian situation without, how-
dropped by Phoumi and resup- ever, threatening direct bloc
plied by Vientiane . The com- intervention.
mander ordered the abandonment
of several of bis outlying posts On 21 September, Moscow is-
and is reportedly regrouping his sued a statement char.ging "crude
forces in a defense perimeter interference" 'by the United
around the town of Sam Neua. States and SEATO in Laotian af-
While this may be a more ration- fairs and remarking that the "So-
al defense plan, it enables the viet Union is attentively watch-
Pathet Lao. to operate at will ing the courageous struggle waged
in the rest of the province. by the peopil:es of Laos ." All
tbr.ee Communist nations seem to
Pathet Lao propaganda now confine the "struggle" to the
is coming out more unqualifiedly Laotian people and are bitterly
in support of the Souvanna denouncing what they term "US
regime. Souvanna has admitted instigation of intervention" by
that · a higb-ra·nking Pathet South Vietnam and Thailand .
Lao leader is in Vientiane in I (b)(3)

REPUBLIC · OF THE CONGO

Colonel Mobutu is strengtb- staffed by Congolese university
ening bis position in the Leo- graduates and students, to admin-
poldville area. He has set up ister the Congo teml>orarily .
a technical commission, beaded Although he has publicly announced
by Foreign Minister Bomboko and that bbe commission will serve

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

22 September 1960

during a three-month
political truce while
th~ various political
factions seek an un-
derstanding, ldobutu
has privately stated
that a Kasavubu-Ileo
government will take ,Slonleyv1lle
over at the end of ' •,
October. During the c,
interim, the commis- "f.7 RE PU B LI C 0 Fj
sion will take orders I• I J .. ~::~·. :~,~

from President Kasawbu. J ~]::.~ .f THE. CONGO ., Kindu .

c~ld
. .... .!~, .. Port F'J\r ncqui
ope V I11e - .. I
I •
. ' \
Mobutu controls ·fl::kwarn;i•
the troops in the Le- ' Lup ul•' .'
opo ldv i 11 e area, but I
their loyalty is large-
ly dependent on trib-
al allegiances. The
three assassination
attempts against the
colonel--at least one
of them put Mobutu in FEDER ATION Of RHODESIA
grave personal dap- AND NYASAlAND
(b)(3)
ger--show the weak-
ness of his security system oial residence . As a re-
and the real thv eat pos e d by sult, Mobutu has protested
extremist action. to the UN Command and de-
manded the withdrawal of
Ghanaian and Guinean troops
Premier Lumumba apparently ' from the Congo. The UN has
has, been unable to marshal sig- agreed to replace Ghana's
nificant support among the troops troops in the capital with
and populace of the Leopoldville Sudanese .
area, and his influence is di-
minishing. He remains a very
real threat to any successor Lumumba has s o far been
government , however, particu- frustrated in his effort to
larly as long as he retains the reach the UN Gener al As sembly
backi n g of several influential sess ion in New York. The possi-
Afri can states-- Ghana, Guinea , bility of s uccess of s uch an
a nd the UAR . ef f or t cannot be disre garde d
de s pit e Mobutu' s police cont r ol
and inte ntion to arres t Lumumba
The Guine an Embass y played i f h e tri es to l e ave the c ountry .
a maj or role in protec tin g Lu-
mumba fr om a r r es.t by Mobutu's
troo ps, as did the Ghanaian De v e lopme n ts in Katang a
troops which rin ged hi s of f i P. " Provinc e s :u.gges.t that ·th e secession

PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 o f 10

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

22 September 1960

problpm ·will .. . become :. of : maj~r situation continues to smolder

importance for Colonel Mobutu as tribal warfare against
and play into the hands of Lu- the troops of the central
mumba. Katanga's strong espousal government in behalf of seces-
of its separate identity and sionist forces occurs i n
strong-arm action against dis- scattered localities .
sident tribesmen will arouse
the indignation of many Congo- Bloc Moves
lese--including moderate sup-
porters of Kasavubu--and strength- · At the UN General Assembly
en the conviction of leaders in special session on the Congo
Ghana, Guinea, and other African which ended on 20 September,
states that Lumumba is needed to the USSR abandoned its efforts
prevent a breakup of the Congo. to obtain endorsement of its
draft resolution which, in ef-
On 19 September Katanga fect, would have censured Ham-
President Tshombe stated pri- marskjold's actions in the Congo
vately that his province .would and secured UN approval for uni-
not join any political associa- lateral aid to the Congolese
tion with the other Congolese Government. The bloc opposed,
provinces despite a recent agree- but abstained, on the Afro-Asian
ment signed between representa~ · resolution--passed overwhelming-
tives of Katanga and the Ileo ly by the assembly~-supporting
"government" of the Congo. De- Hammarskjold and opposing any
siring to avoid . the political military assistance to the Congo
instability he foresees for Le- outside UN channels.
opoldville for a least five
years, Katanga's President wants Soviet Deputy Foreign Minis-
nothing more than a loose eco- ter Zorin, in a statement to the
nomic association with the Congo. assembly, attributed the Congo
He expects that equally close crisis to a "criminal coalition of
economic ties between Katanga colonialists led by the US" which
and other central African areas utilized the UN Command and secre-
will reduce· the significance of tary general for its own purposes.
the political question in the He charged that the UN Command in
future. the Congo was preventing the "law-
ful" government from exercising
The danger of war between its functions and that Hammar-
Congolese and Katangan forces is skjold had abused Security Coun-
considerably diminished at pres- cil resolutions.
ent as a result of the UN-spon-
sored cease-fire under which In the face of UN develop-
both sides have withdrawn their ments adverse to
Lumumba, who
troops from the border area. from the initial phases of the
However, tribal warfare in sev- Congo crisis had received Mos-
eral areas of · central and north- cow's diplomatic and propaganda
ern Katanga against the Tshombe support as well as direct materi-
regime has caused a good many' al aid, Soviet policy-makers ap-
casualties. Furthermore, the ex- parently decided to acquiesce
cesses of Tshombe's forces dur- without risking a further loss
ing their clean-up operations of Soviet prestige , particularly
have caused an official protest with Khrushchev now at the UN.
by the UN Command and threaten On orders from Mobutu, the USSR
to involve it in serious con- and Czechoslovakia closed their
troversy with the Katanga gov- embassies in Leopoldville on 17
ernment. In Kasai Province the September.

PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 10

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMJ4.ARY

22 September 1960

The Soviet Government's lution sponsored by 16 African

statement on 18 September, not- and Asian countries, Soviet prop-
ing the "temporary" recall of aganda voiced its first criti-
the Soviet Embassy staff from cism of the Afro-Asian position
the Congo, explained that as a in the Congo situation. Moscow
resul·t of the "intrigues of the radio on 19 September said that
colonialists and their agents African and Asian representatives
as well as the undisguised in- . "did not have enough courage to
terf erence o·f the UN Command in condemn totally" the policy pur-
the Congo's internal affairs," sued in Africa by t he US, and
the legal Congolese Government Hammarskjold's activities in
and parliament bad been removed, the Congo. Terming the resolu-
making it impossible for the tion "incorrect" in having given
Soviet Embassy to function nor- authority to the secretary gen-
mally. The statement reaffirmed eral to dispose of UN military
the USSR's "invariable friend- aid in the Congo at his own dis-
ship" toward the Congo Republic cretion, the Soviet broadcast
and its continued support and asserted that only the "social-
help to the Congolese people, ist:·· states" have consistently
but made no specific reference upheld the interests of the Con-
to Lumumoa--indicating a more golese people and resolutely de-
cautious Soviet approach to Con- manded the immediate end of the
golese internal developments. NATO powers' intervention in the
Prague issued a similar state- Congo Republic.
ment at the same time. ·
Congo e vents have received
The hasty departure of Soviet bri e f cove rage in the Soviet
a ircra.ft makes i:t unlike:ly press since Mobutu's coup. In
that . ~ll . bloc ! technic4ans have .. addition, the "indefinite
been evacuated. An observer in postponement" of a Moscow
Khartoum saw one Soviet and public lecture on the Congo
seven Czech diplomats and 124 scheduled for 21 September
bloc technicians--hbou~ half of suggests that the Kremlin is
the number reported in the Congo having difficulty in explain-
--aboard the planes. ing recent Congolese develop -
c :s to the Sovie t people (b)( )
Coinciding with the General 3
Assem~ly's approval of the reso- 1

* * *

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.
I . -.

,. ·- t. . liAt;~~. r·~'~·: " ·~f.~l~'ll'!PIAn\

~~i;'\J~;;..:;~ rb r.11~ II ·~ «

SECRET COPY NO. 77

I OCI NO. 02s11a1

25 May 1961

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCfDDCUMENTNO. • _:;-
ND CHANCE IN CLASS. n
[ I DECLJ,SS:Flf:;) C.
CL/l':;S. CH/;:·i12 1:c :·o: TS s 0)
NE:,<T F1'.::.\'1::r:o r1n:: ~
/•.U:i·I: 11:-: !CV!
Df..V::.:;:>(l/·r/80
r •
nr_V!EWER: 0 19360

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CONTINUED CONTROL iw/$D:~:~~ J-Box~1
JOB ~

;2 2 y _s,;Jj!
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SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

At this stage, rebel ter- whether the Algerian problem

orism may present a less serious will be solved by "peaceful
problem for the French Govern- means or otherwise . " Bloc com-
ment than the continuing activ- mentators predict that the t~lks
ity of right-wing extremists in will be 11 difficult and tense."
France. There is reason to be-
lieve that the networks of Moscow has long maintained
plotters conspiring against De that only direct talks between
Gaulle and his policies have the rebels and the French on a
not yet b~en fully exposed. basis of equality can restore
Bombings have continued in pea ce to Algeria. In March,
France and have even been · · following the announc ement that
stepped up in Algeria; distri- talks would be held, the Soviet
bution of threatening letters ambassador in Paris sought out
and pamphlets put out by right- De Gaulle to express Khrushchev's
ist extremists goes on. Such hope for a p eaceful settle ment.
activity may be further stimu- At the same time, Soviet First
lated by the trial of the insur- Deputy Premier Kosygin tried to
gent generals which opens on 29 stiffen the rebels' resistance
May. Discontent within the army to any compromise with France,
is still widespread. As the advising them to demand recog-
Evian negotiations proceed, the nition as the sole represent-
frustration of the rightist ex- atives of Algeria.
tremists may prompt some of them
to make an assassination at- While there are advantages
tempt on De Gaulle as a last for the USSR in a continu-
desperate effort to prevent Al- ation of the rebellion, So-
gerian independence. viet leaders at the present
time are probably inclined
Soviet Attitudes to support a settlement, pro-
vided th~ rebels can emerge
Soviet news media, while from the negotiations in
welcoming the start of n@gotia- fvll coptrol of an inde-
tions, have cautioned that the pendent Algeria, with· limited, ,
French stand will determine if any, ties with France. (SECRET)

CONGO
The government in Leopold- legal government as ruling out
ville has remained firm in its any compromis e. The Leopold-
decision to reconvene parlia- ville radio has s aid the Congo
ment there, although the Stan- crisis i s "in its final s tages"
leyville regime cont·inues to and has warned that "no delaying
demand that i t me et at Kamina. tactic s will preve n t • . • the
Kasavubu appears to regard Gi- convocat i on of parliament" by
zenga' s claim to represent the Kasavubu.

SECRET

25 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Pa ge 8 of 2 5

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SECRET

' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

In contrast, there are in- Re ports of military activ-

dications that Leopoldville may ity in Kasai appear to have led
be negotiating with Tshombe 's Kasavubu to place Albert Kalonji
successors to assure Katanga's under surveillance in Coquil-
participation in parliament. The hatville. A UN report has al-
Munongo triumvirate in Katanga leged that aggressive movements
reportedly has indicated that by Kalonji's Kasai army against
it is prepared to accept a Congo tribal opponents followed a
federation as proposed by Kasa- build-up financed by a Belgian
vubu. ' A Congolese politician mining company. Ghanaian UN
has informed Ambassador Timber- troops, which recently were
lake that the Kasavubu govern- withdrawn from southern Kasai,
ment has received a proposal have been ordered back into the
from Munongo and is drafting a area.
counterproposal.
Indian Charge Rahman in
Leopoldville probably feels Leopoldville, who on his own
that its success in blocking initiative has labored actively
the return of UN representative on Gizenga's behalf, stated re-
Dayal to the Congo has strength- cently that he did not believe
ened its hand. Hammarskjold Gizenga had enough votes in
informed US officials on 22 May parliament to become premier.
that Dayal would not be Rahman speculated that if Gizen-
returned to Leopoldville be- ga persisted in seeking the pre-
cause of the latest expressions miership he would merely weaken
of Congolese hostility toward the "nationalist" position and
him. Hammarskjold stated pave the way for a dictatorship
that Nehru had been informed by some member of the present
and had agreed to recall Leopoldville government.
Dayal.

Relations between the UN

·The Stanleyville regime-- and Katanga authorities have
confronted with the political continued strained as a result
threat of a rapprochement be- of UN moves to retain control,
tween Leopoldville and Elisa- by force if necessary, of key
bethville and with deteriorat- areas in northern Katanga. Al-
ing economic conditions in though Munongo threatened armed
Orientale Province--has moved resistance if the UN moved to
to bolster its military position. take over airfields at Albert-
According to press reports, ville and Nyunzu, he confined
troops from Stanleyville have himself to a formal protest
appeared in force in Kasai Prov- of the UN action and appeared
ince. There is no firm in- anxious to avoid a serious
formation that Gizenga plans rupture with the UN Command.
any major offensive action . (SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET
25 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 25
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....
,,..

COPY NO.
OCI NO.
I
027a/ 61

4 May 1961

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE Of CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO. _.•___..2.
_ _ __
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
[ , DE:CLASf.iFIED -·
CLASS . CHANGED TO~ . _ _ _
NEXT REVIEWDATE: ~
AUTH : HR 70·2
DATE:/.9.L5'./da._ REVIEWER: 0 193 60

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

(b)(1)

CONGO

With Tshombe under deten- disarmament of army elements in

tion at Coquilhatville, the Ka- Katanga and the withdrawal of
tanga regime is in the hands of the province's foreign advisers.
elements somewhat more favor- Tshombe's release apparently
ably disposed toward the UN and is a precondition for this con-
toward limited cooperation with cession, which reflects anti-
Leopoldville. Leopoldville of- Belgian sentiment on the part
ficials apparently believe that of Tshombe's lieutenants as
with UN help the Congolese Army well as a somewhat more coopera-
units now directed from Stanley- tive attitude toward the UN than
. ville and Elisabethville c~-~~~ was evinced by Tshombe and his
put under their control. Belgian advisers. (b)(1)

tn~r- Tsbombe reportedly is to

~t
~h---
e-.,.~
o-q~
uilhatville
conference remain in Coquilhatville until
was to immobilize Tshombe and the current conference ends on
put pressure on the Katanga and about 8 May . Leopoldville lead-
Orientale regimes to permit the ers are reluctant to permit him
disarmament of their forces. to attend the meetings , however.
His continued absence from Ka-
The Elisabethville r .e gime tanga will further weaken hi:s
announced on 2 May that it was position in the province and may
ready to discuss with the UN lead to bis replacement by an

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY

anti-Belgian group beaded by developments--notably the re-

Interior Minister Munongo. turn of Dayal as UN representa-
tive or an intransigent stand
Con'tacts between military by Congolese military leaders
representatives from Leopold- on the Matadi issue--migbt dis-
ville and Stanleyville bave rupt the rapport.
continued. Six officers from
Gizenga's forces attended the In New York, Hammarskjold
Coquilhatville conference and believes that Kasavubu's agree-
reportedly have returned borne ment with the UN over Matadi,
to try to persuade Gizenga to together wit~ the Ledpoldville.
put in an appearance. Gizenga regime's apparent willingness
--backed ·up by bis military com- to force ·the disarmament issue
mander, General Lundula--con- with Katanga, has put the
tinues adamant that a conven- Congo problem in a "mo'st hope-
ing of parliament is a prere- ful"· new phase. He told Amer-
quisite for reponciliation, and ican officials recently that
the Stanleyville military rep- the action against Tshombe im-
resentatives apparently have proved the chances of a rapproche-
insisted that the Stanleyville ment between Leopoldville and
officials be.included in any Stanleyville, adding that he
unified government. had received confirmation of
the existence of a military
Military leaders, who have agreement between the Mobutu
consistently favored a unitary and Gizenga forces. He also
constitution. for the Congo; .ap- indicated that as a result of
parently are also exerting pres- the improved situation, he
sure on the Leopoldville govern- might be able to shorten Dayal's
ment to this end. Their efforts stay in the Congo and shortly
are likely to be abetted by For- to substitute a ;five-man com-
eign Minister Bomboko, who bas mission .for the post of senior
been the key figure at Coquil- UN representative.
hatville; they may be opposed by
Kasavubu, however, However, the Congol.ese con-
tinue to oppose even a brief
teturn to Dayal. Mobutu .re-

7
Jthe Gizenga
i°'s:--;s"'t=r"'o"'n"'g=-e=r~ac!nd
more stable than
re:::ie portedly told UN military com-
mander McKeown that all coopera-
tion would cease if reports
(b)(1)

in the past. There reportedly of Dayal's return were true.

is little internal dissension Kasavubu allegedly ·is consider-
within the govern~ent; however, ing sending a telegram to
friction still exists between Hammarskjold, declining all
the Gizenga "central government" responsibility for events if
and the moderate Orientale Dayal should be sent back to
provincial regime headed by Leopoldville.
Jean Foster Man,,;ikala. Economic
conditions continue to deterio- In addition, Mobutu appar-
rate in the province, although ently bas unilaterally imposed
the scarcity of banknotes ap- restrictiqns on UN activity in
parently has been alleviated Ma tadi which go beyond the re-
and trade across the Uganda cent agreement between Kasavubu
border has picked up slightly. and the UN. Neither tbe UN'nor
the Congolese seem desirous of
Relations between Kasavubu inflating this issue into a ma-
and the UN remain relatively jor conflict; however, incidents
cordial, but several possible could occur as a result of the
dispute. (b)(3)

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--g[GRET- COPY NO. 71
OCI NO. 0295/a1
7 September 1961
1

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT HO. --~lG---511
NO C!U\fiG!: IN CLASS, 0
O DECLAESIFIED ~
CLA SS. c~1;.;~J:: o TO: TS S; 0 I 11a 0
NE ~·r nl.'tii.:·;1 UAH1 _ _._._&,....,_
__:__.,=--i...
__

AllTi:: iiCI 16·2

I
(b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 5~~i

CONGO

Joint efforts by Premier large numbers of Elisabethville

Adoula and the UN to unite the Balubas, as well as to launch
Congo under the new central punitive operations in the north
government showed some progress which were generally opposed by
in Orientale Province, where the UN. O'Brien, noting . the
Gizenga was finally induced to presence of up to 15,000 Baluba
leave his Stanleyville strong- refugees in southern Katanga,
hold for Belgrade. In Katanga, denounced Tshombe's treatment ·of
however, the UN's effort to the Balubas . Tshomb~, however,
force the province's reintegra- · · gave assurances on 2 September
tion with the Congo appears that refugees desiring to return
stalled, while the security to work would not be molested
situation in Elisabethville has and promised to investigate
deteriorated. Despite the UN reports of their mistreatment.
pressure, Tshomb~ persists in
his refusal to negotiate with The verbal warfare between
Adoula "under duress." O'Brien and Tshombe has in-
creased tension in Elisabethville.
After a long period of On 2 September , Belgian, British,
vacillation, Gizenga on 3 French, and Portuguese diplomats
September yielded to the urgings in Elisabethville made a . joint
of associates and of foreign approach to O'Brien, a.sking what
diplomats : ±·n Stanleyvi.lle that plans the UN had made for the
he accompany Adoula to the protection of the European com-
conference of nonaligned nations. munity. O'Brien characterized
Gizenga's acceptance of a sub- the diplomats as strongly opposed
ordinate role to Adoula at Bel- to recent UN actions and anxious
grade, following the USSR's to dissociate themselves. The
recognition of ·Adoula on 30 Au- US Consulate believes the,.. joint
gust, appears to preclude his re- approach was motivated less by
establishing himself as an in- concern over security than by
dependent force in Orientale. a desire to demonstrate ~
Certain of his followers, how- support for Tshomb~'s resistance
ever, have proclaimed a new · to O'Brien .
"Lumumbist" party and may hope
to succeed to some of the The danger of clashes be-
financial support which has tween UN and Kat~gan forces
been accorded Gizenga by the increased on 5 and 6 September
radical African states. with the mounting of demonstra-
tions--seemingly government
In Elisabethville, re- inspired--against UN instal-
lations between UN represent- lations and the US Consulate.
ative O'Brien and Katanga Presi- UN heactquarters in Elisabeth-
dent Tshomb~ reached a low point ville, a target of stone-throwing
following the UN roundup of demonstrations, was moved from
Tshomb~'s Belgian officers on the center of the city to the
28-30 August . On 1 September outskirts on 6 September . In
O'Brien "broke relations" with the provincial parliament,
the Katanga government, following T~homb~ ' s fo reign minister
Tshombe's refusal to suspend implied that Katanga was studying
from office Interior Min ister the poss ibility of using its
Munongo . O'Brien had accused arme d forces against the UN.
Munongo of masterminding an
assassination plot directed The UN reportedly will
against key UN officials. continue its campaign against
O,Brien "resumed r e lations 11 Be lgian advisers in the Congo
the following day, however. proper, and plans the ouster of
about 30 Be lgians who served as
UN pressure against Tshomb~ advisors to the. defunct Ilea
was accompanied by a worsening of government. It is uncertain
the s ituation with respect to whether UN plans c all for drastic
Baluba refugees in Katanga. action against Gize nga' s cohorts
Depredations in northern Katanga in Stanleyville. On 30 August
by anti-Tshombe Baluba tribesmen the UN began to airlift Malayan
had prompted Tshomb~· to jail troops , complete with armed
"""!;tcR£ T-
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CURRENT IND'EJ.LIGENCE· WEEKLY S U1il!!AR~

vehicles, to Stanleyville, os- MacArthur in Brussels comments

tensibly to "quie.t ·unri::estt:··." t·n · .. ,
· thrt'· ·s ach a .· de"\'elopment could
view of Gizenga's emergence from threaten the Lefevre-Spaak coa-
his isolation, however, tbe UN lition government, since it
may defer action with a view to would be held responsible for
examining Gizenga's behavior the loss of Belgian investments.
following his return from Bel- Brussels is also angry over the
grade. abrupt manner in which the UN
and the Adoula government are
A high official of the Union handling the dismissal of Belgian
Miniere in Brussels has sa~id that advisers to the former central
the Katanga government, enraged government. Foreign Minister
at Belgium fo~ acquiescing in Spaak has protested to . Secretary
the UN action . ag~inst Tshomb~, Genera 1 Hammarskjold •I and if
bas decided to nationalize the dismissals continue, the
Union Minier.e and other Belgian Belgian G~ernment may termina tc(b)(3)
companies in Katanga . Am~assador its technical assistance program.
I I
NR

SECRET
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·"

t:O COPY NO.

tlllil!'f OCI NO. 029s/61
21 September 1961

'CURRENT
'

INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE Of CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO. I0
NO CHMiCE I~ CLASS. 0
0 DtC~ ,~l; $ i i' l l: O /'--..
CLASS. rn :.i'ii.:::O T01 TS S ~_.-' \ "''lO
ll !: ~·r lio..'r': :..W UATEI - -- --"--
1_
AIJi'li : llK l i1·2

·· --·•-v · (b)(3)

(b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUPml&RY

CONGO

Moise Tshomb~ and Mahmound which the UN had counted on to

Khiari, the Tunisian head of end Katangan air superiority,
the UN's civil · operations in was held up pending UN as-
the Congo, reached agreement surances that adequate nav.iga-
late on 20 SeP.tember for a pro- tional aids, fuel, and soa
visional cease~fire in Katanga. parts were available ..,' (b )(1)
This will provide an opportu~
nity for substantive negotia- (b)(3)J

tions concerning Katanga's re- chief representative Linner

integration with the Congo. had told his headquarters that
unless the airlift could be
Tshomb~ probably believes re s umed, "we seriously risk the
that the stipulated "'freeze'1 on defeat of UN forces."
the .movement of troops and sup-
plies will permit him to main- Brigadier lnder Jit Rikhye,
tain his military superiority --an Indian who was Hammarskjold's
and to drive a hard bargain in military adviser and who, with
the negotiations. UN officials Under Be cretary Ralph Bunche,
in Leopoldville indicated on 20 see ms to have assumed direction
September that he was continuing of the Congo o}eration--on 18
to demand major concessions from September gave (b)(1)
the UN. Earl~er he had insisted his analysis o the difficulti(b)(3)
that the UN not only forego any encountered by:·· the UN forces in
reinforcement~ but that its Katanga. According to Rikhye,
forces retire to their Katanga the orig i nal UN plan had had the
bases in return for a cease- limited objec tive of closing
fire. down the Elisabethville radio
stat i on. However p the action
The UN's military position triggered the return to their
had been deteriorating. A units of many of the European
besieged Irish unit at Jadot- merce narie s who were in the proc-
ville was overcome early .this e s s o f repatriation, and fight-
week, ·and UN officials in New ing s pre a d unexp ecte dly. The
York told l / UN then found that the Katanga(b)(1)
that the 3,000 Katangans in addition to the ir ove rwhe lm(b)(1)
w=
n~o~ a~a,....., been engaged in the
n~ numerical superiority, often (b)(3)
operation were being organized we re better armed than the UN
by Interior Minister Munongo troops.
for a move to Elisabethville.
The tiN gar~ison at Kamina was Rikhye added that the
under attack from 1 , 000 well- limited UN airlift capability--
armed tribesmen with Belgian no aircraft larger than a DC-4
officers. · is avai lable--has prevent e d t he
u s e o f either s upport art il l e ry
A planne d UN airli f t ot or t rans port in ade quate quantity.
one Indian and one or t wo He c riti cized the organization~j
Ethiopian battalions into Katanga i nt e llig ence s taf f , which he
h a d b e en halted by a combinition s ai d fr e quently depended on r e -
of Katangan a ir activity and por ts f rom d i plomatic posts in
the inade quac y of night- f lying the Cong o, and he s tated that
a ids . t h e Swe d ish and I rish troops had
been tra ine d mai nly in po lice fu n c -
The f l ight to Elisabe thville tions and t hu s we r e i neffective ·
o f three Ethiopian F-86 jet s , in comba t .

-CON FIOE~~TIAL
.i1esnnw
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

-·~
I

.
•
( of the Congo
~-_F'---'~.

CONGO

[QQ] Un11ed Nalions Forces*

- - Se1ec1ed road
*Does not include wpoor t troops or
-+-t- Selected railroad
units in the process of r~dep l oymcn: .
t Selected ~irfie l d

0 •OO
(b)(3)
J

~~~~~~~~~
Premier Adoula' I I s ent iment among Con- (b)(3)
has been under increasing pres- golese leg is la tors is vir- (b)(1)
sure to order the Congolese tually unanimous in favor o f (b)(3)
Army to intervene in Katanga. army intervention. The Congole:(b)(1)

tOt44FIDENTIAL
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CONF10ft'4Tln

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

senate has al~eady passed a for a cease-fire il.nd.:would not

reso·lution favoring military consru~er itself in any way
action, and General Lunduia, bound by one . Aware that his
Gizenga's former military army is not equipped at this
commander, has offered to time for an operation against
place his troops at the dis- Katanga, Ado ula probably took
posal of the government for this step to appease the ele-
an operation against Katanga . ments see king strong action
against -Katanga.

Adoula, in a conversation
on 18 September, indicated to Ant i-American s e ntiment
Ambassador Gullion that he is increasing in Be lgium as
realized such. intervention a result of Congo developme nts,
probably would lead to civil and even responsible Belgians
war and stated that he hoped feel that the United States
to head off pressure for mil- has been lax in assuring it-
itary action through a series self that the UN would prop-
of delay ing tactics. Bunche erly use the mat erial and
told! Ion political sup'p ort placed at (b)(1)
the same day, however, that its disposal. · The Be lgians (b)( 3)
the Adou1a · government had bitterly resent UN accusations
asked the UN to put its troops that the Be lgian mi l itary
in a posi~ion to fight on . are respo nsible for t he figh t -
equal terms with the Katangans ing in Ka tanga , with t he im- · ·
within 24 ho~rs. Leopoldville plication that Tshombe's
added that · if the UN could not mercenaries are under the
continue the fight, the Congo- control of the government o f
lese Government would under- Belgiti.m. J
take operations of its own 1(b)(1)
and would ask friendly coun-
tries for assistance .
I easilyI lead to a rapid in-
(b)(3)

cr e ase in neutralism in a
country whe r e fatalism and
On 19 September, Adoula apathy are alre ady strong.
informed the UN that his I I (b)(3)
government would not give
its a·p proval to negotiations

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I . COPY NO.
OCI NO. 02a5/51

. 22 June 1961
fi o

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENT NO. 9 .. ,_..~·-"""""·";~

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 ~ .!
[J DECLASSIFIED •'
<£)'--
CLASS. CHANG!;O TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990

(b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

CONGO
The agreement on 19 June faction is becoming increasingly
between representatives of the concerned at its inability to
Leopoldville and Stanleyville exert close control over its
regime~ on the reopening of supporters.
parliament raises the prospect
that the long impasse between The position of the Katanga
Kasavubu and Gizenga may be regime on the question of parlia-
nearing an end . The agreement ment is unclear. Negotiations
calls for parliament to meet in Milan earlier this month be-
at Lovanium University near Leo- tween Katanga and Leopoldville
poldville on 25 June, but the officials produced the begin~
senior UN representative in nings of a rapprochement; how-
the Congo considers 15 July ever, Congolese in Elisabeth-
a more likely date. The UN is ville , in conversations with UN
to provide protection for all representatives, have been ignor-
deputies and institute rigid ing the talks and their implica-
security measures to minimize tions . On 20 June the parlia-
the threat of outside influence. mentarians from Katanga announced
they would not come to Leopold-
The agreement apparently ville unless Tshombe was released
was reached over the protests and the confederal structure
of Premier Ileo, who has long proposed at the Tananarive con-
been reluctant to call parlia- ference last March adopted as
ment. Ileo, who bas little the basis for a constitutional
legislative backing , probably revision.
will be dropped as head of the
government; his most likely re- Tshombe has now been re-
placement is Cyrille Adoula, leased and has announced his
the moderate and able interior plans to r et urn to Elisabeth-
minister in the Ileo cabinet. ville, and a Katanga spokes-
Adoula would probably be able man has apparently withdrawn
to obtain support from elements the condition concerning the
in both the Kasavubu and the Tananarive resolutions. The
Gizenga groups; Gizenga 0 s spokes- deputies controlled by Elisa-
man in New York has expressed bethville would furnish valuable
the opinion that the Stanley- support to the Kasavubu bloc
ville leader would accept a in its disputes with Gizenga.
vice premiership under Adoula .
Congolese Foreign Minister
Estimates of the relative Bomboko recently told an Ameri-
parliamentary strengths of the can official that Leopoldville
Kasavubu and Gizenga blocs con- authqrities had proof that In-
tinue to indicate that the Leo- dian Charge Rahman had been in-
poldville faction is in the volved in subversive activities
lead . Gizenga has a strong agains Leo oldville overn-

rlLimll
minority position, however , with ment.
about 40 of the 1 3 7 vot es, and a mem e r o e n
many of the other legislators con't"":ln gent and other UN of-
are unknown quantities . More- icated as well.
over, his supporters are the
best organized group and prob- ~hman w~
ably will be able to wield an ~ot i nvolving a youth group
influence out of proportion to and Congolese army e l e ments.
their number. There are indi- The leader of the youth group
cations that the Leopoldville was arrested last we ek and may
(b )(1)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

have furnished a basis for stable for at least a year that

Bomboko's charges. Bomboko any substantial UN withdrawal
allegedly hoped to ask Nehru wouJ d be dangerous . Hammarskjold ,
to remove Rahmah quietly in the in stating his v iews to British
interest of Congolese-Indian officials in early June , had
relations. Should the charges also said he hoped to reduce
be widely publicized, the re- the annual cost ·. of UN operations
cent improvement in New Delhi's in the Congo from $120,000,000
attitude toward the Congolese to $20,000JOOO.
Government probably would be
nullified. Spaak appears to be increas-
ingly realistic regarding the
Neutralist nations continue withdrawal of Be Jg ian elements
to encounter difficulties in from the Congo . He ha s told the
their efforts to send aid to American ambassador in Brussels
Gizenga. A flight to Stanley- that if Munongo does not release
ville , of a Ghanaian IL-18 al- all of the 23 advisers whose re-
legedly to transport "medical turn has been requested by Spaak,
supplies" and "embassy person- they will be ordered to return
nel , " was canceled at the re- to Belgium immediately. On the
quest of the UN chief in the other hand, Spaak is reluctant
Congo. to force the return of Belgian
officers serving in the Katanga
In Brussels, Foreign Min- gendarmeri c u ntil replacements
ister Spaak recently took is- are .available . He has also de-
sue with Hammarskjold's view cided to send a hig h Foreign
that UN forces in the Congo Ministry official to Katanga to
probably could be reduced from represent him, a l though for "po-
20,000 to 5,000 by the end of litical" r e asons he couJd not
the year. Spaak believes the imme diately withdraw Belgian Con-
situation will remajn so un- ~ul General Crener ~ who does not
' •.
ha ve t r -_c_onfi a e nce_o..f _Il.N a £ r ·
c ia l s. (b)(3)
I

(b )(1)

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~- ""'

, !l!@RET -CONFIDENTIAi_
I . COPY NO.
OCI NO. 4444/ 60

15 September 1960

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

_I
. . \ '-·(
\(b)(3)

( , . ..

_t.pproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654

 •
C03 1 85654 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03185654
_.; ....,• '

.....

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-

ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared

primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office . of Current Intelligence.

. ...,. .

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.._,I ~·

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMlliARY

15 September 1960

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

· ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

~ contest between the So- candidacy . H~gh-ranking offi-
viet bloc and the West over the cials of the UN secretariat,
election of the president of moreover, believe that granting
the 15th UN General Assembly is a high elective UN office to
in prospect when the assembly the Soviet bloc is a "matter of
opens on 20 September . equity. '' Prior to the Congo
crisis, UN Secretary General
Late starter Thor Thors of Hammarskjold indicat e d his pref-
Iceland has campaigned exten- erence for a n Eastern European
sively, particularly among Latin for the presidency , which, by
American members , despite strong common conse nt, goes to Europe
Western urging that he withdraw this year .
his candidacy in favor of Fred-
erick Boland · o f Ireland--the The generally capable Boland
West's early choice. Although has gaine d a large p e rsonal fol-
Thors' chances of election are lowing in the relatively few
slim, he has succeede d in si- years Ireland has been a member
phoning off some support from of the Unit e d Nations, and his
Boland, who f aces a strong op- country's formal neutrality may
ponent in Jiri Nosek of Czech- increase his potential appeal
os lova.kia . among Asian-African bloc mem-
bers. As of 9 September, h e
~he Soviet bloc intensi- had approximately 35 firm commit-
fied its drive for high elective ments of support--including two
UN offices two years ago with or three Arab states and eight
the announced intention Of get- Latin American--with 55 votes
ting a bloc delegate elected needed for election .
as president of this assembly .
Nosek's early campaign , his The elections to fill two
personal popularity at t he UN, o f the three vacan t seats on
and the fact that Eastern Europe the Security Council will prob-
has n ever h e ld the presidency a bly be more :o.r less routine, with
are strong points favoring his the UAR replacing Tunisia in the

N OSEK THORS BOLAND

PART II NOTE S AND COMMENTR Pag-e 1 of 21

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 Septefuber 1960

Middle East seat and Portugal which Latin America has enjoyed
replacing Italy as Western since 1945 . Lack of a single
Europe's representative . Ar- agreed Latin American candi-
gentina's seat is being sought date probably will encourage
by both Cuba and Chile, Chile others to seek the seat, par-
being the choic9 of the Latin ticularly Asian and African
American bloc. The Cuban members, who believe their
candidacy, although unlikely growing numbers are not ade-
to gain much support beyon~ the quately reflected in Se~~
12 Communist votes , jeopardizes Council representation . l
the "right" to two of the six (b)(3)
elective seats on the council

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE

The fourth general confer- The bloc may find opportu- I

ence of the UN's International nities for obstructionism and
Atomic Energy Agency, convening propaganda on the nuclear weap-
in Vienna on the same day the ons question in the issue of I
General Assembly opens in New safeguards against diversion I
York, will probably be marked of nuclear materials fr om
by East-West conflicts on sev- peaceful purposes to military I
eral important issues, includ- uses . A document concerning
ing the perennial one of Chi- safeguards, which Moscow has I
nese representation. stigmatized as a Western de-
vice for preventing underde- I
veloped countries from gaining
The first problem confront - a nuclear capability of their I
ing the 20 September - 7 Octo-
ber meeting ·is the election of
own , has been provisionally
approved by the Western-con- I
a conference president . The trolled Board of Governors . I
Bulgarian scientist Georgi The : United · States,· : ~ritain;
Nadzhakov . is expected to be and Canada will press for a
procedural resolution which
I
elected conference president
and a Westerner as chairman of simply gives it conference ap- I
proval and returns it to the
the Board of Governors . The
Soviet Uni on will probably make board for implementation. I
a new attempt to gain consulta- I
tive status for the World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (WFTU) . The West's problem will
This effort to enhance the be to keep discussions limited
WFTU's prestige was sidetracked to the document as a whole and
at last year ' s ·general confer- to forestall any attempts by
ence, but a number of pro-West- bloc or neutral delegates to
ern delegations seem cool to
th~ American view that the is-
sue should not be raised again .
c--
debate its seoarate nAr~Q
_l (b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENC~ WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 ·september 1960

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Neither Moscow nor Peiping tions in the works of the

has retreated from its basic founders of Marxism-Leninism ,
positions in the Sino-Soviet . .. they try to sell their
dispute . At the North Vietnam- erroneous views as Marxist-
ese party congress that closed Leninist truth and force
this week--the first important them on others .. . . They at
international Communist forum times oppose their narrow
since the Bucharest conference national interests to the
in June--the Soviet and Chinese international tasks of the
spokesmen each reiterated in world proletariat or even
strong terms some of his par- regard them as superior.
ty's central propositions in Their sectarian activities
the long controversy. in international organiza-
tions harm the democratic
Li Fu-chun, the Chinese forces of the world and the
delegate , emphasized "revision- interests of the socialist
ism''--his country's description camp.
of Soviet policy--as the main
danger to Communist unity. He As Mukhitdinov implies, the
warned against using the "fight Chinese have continued to press
against dogmatism"--dogmatism their opposition to Soviet poli-
being one of the charges leveled cies in international organiza-
at Peiping by Khrushchev--as a tions, despit e the fact that
"pretext to depart from the s uch b e havior was the immediate
fundamental theoretical stand cause o f the Soviet denuncia-
on Marxism-Leninism." Li was tion of the Chinese party at
the author of the emotional Bucharest . There now is evi-
art.icle · in the mid-August Re.d dence that at the Third World
Flag which attacked "modern-- Conference of° Te achers, held in
revisionists," described the Conakry f rom 27 July to 1 Au-
Chinese as "real Marxist-Len- gust, there were the s am e direct
inists , " and warned that those clashes and sharp excha nges be-
attempting to isolate China tween the Soviet and Chinese
would isolate thems e lves . delegat e s that occurred at the
WFTU me eting in Peiping in early
Presidium me mber N. A. June.
Mukhitdinov, t he Soviet dele-
gate, in one speech extolled The Russian delegate at
Khrushchev as a ''great Lenin- Conakry, in a relatively moder-
ist" and insi s ted that his prop- at e speech, criticized the West,
ositions on the noninevitability including the United States, on
of war a re a continuation of the grounds that We s tern educa-
Lenin' s policy. In a later tional systems were no t as ad-
speech, he again struck hard vanced as the "socialist" one,
at the Chinese . After denounc- but in ge neral he stressed the
ing Yugoslav revisio nists , he need for peace f ul coex i stence
s aid: and avoidance of war in t he nu-
clear age. The Chinese , in a
No l e ss harmful to the complete ly p o l i tic al and very
international Communist violent s peech, attacke d th e
movement i s the mani f esta~ Uni te d States 15 times by name
tion of dogmatism and sec- a nd much oftene r by infe rence.
tarianis m. Parading loud Th e Chine se d e legate 's :s pe e ch,
r e volutionary phrases , hid- f ollowing the Russ ian' s , was a
ing behind i s olate d propos i - dire ct chal l enge to the Soviet
position .

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

A meeting of theoreticians 65-man Cnine~e song-and-dance

from Communist parties of de- ensemble left for the Soviet
veloped as well ~~ underdeve~~ Union.
oped countries is reportedly
set for Bucharest this month to -
(b )( 1)
discuss the "national libera-
tion movement and the agrarian
question . " Such a forum will
almost certainly consider the
differences between the Soviet
and Chinese views on the pace
and forms of the revolution·· in
underdeveloped countries. The
Chinese apparently boycotted
the last such meeting in Leipzig
last fall.

While party relations con-

tinue on the downgrade, govern-
mental relations between Moscow
and Peiping give a mixed impres-
sion. The Soviet Union this ·: .·~v~io~me~is , 1~ ·. ~~~t~~~ ...1
year made a formal request that Eu:nop~ continue ,, to· . ref'.l.eot the . .
a motion to seat Peiping in the Sino-~ov·t~t .. dispute ·.. .,. The , . ~lba­
United Nations be : put on the nian . par.ty ' ·ohan~ea .:wsre · app~r'!" :>.
agenda for the forthcomin Gen- ently the ·result, of, Soviet ·:pres-
eral Assembl , sµre · on Tiitaila to ... end •its· ;.,_ o-... : (b)( 1)
• J

ea ui:v.oca:t. ·1 . nn v ~

Both sides have also taken

some steps to reduce public
manifestat~ons of the dispute .
The eight-week blackout of Mos-
cow home servtce commentary on
Chinese affairs was lifted on Recent developments in the
5 September with a story of Sino-Soviet di~pute have led
progress in a Chinese steel Ambassador Thompson in Moscow
plant . On 1 September t:wo un- and the US consul general at
dated issues of Ki tai, the ·R us- Hong Kong to conclude that
sian~language edition of the while the Russians and Chinese
Chinese pictorial biweekly, were may succeed in "plastering over
put on sale · in Moscow, follow- the cracks" in their relation-
ing an apparent "·.suspension °df ship, they will probably not
the m.a gazine in July . The Chi- succeed in actually resolving
nese, for their part, gave cov- their differences. Thompson
erage to Sino-Soviet friendship does not expect a complete
meetings in commemoration of the break in relations--i.e., a
victory over Japan, including break at all levels--but he
a meeting held in Moscow on 2 does not exclude the possibility
September which the USSR did that the two_parties wi.11 seve·r
not report . On 2 September a relations . (b )(3)

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~URR~NT INTELLIGENCE WEEK~Y SUMMARY

15 September 1960

BERLIN SITUATION

The East German Government making another attempt at nego-

on 8 September announced that tiations · does not mean that West
all West German. citizens must Germans and West Berliners
obtain special per~its to enter should be permitted to "aggra-
·East Berlin, thereby forcing vate the anomalous situation
them to .meet the same require- in West Berlin . " He i ntimated
ments to go to East Berlin as that his government will con-
to East Germany. The move is tinue attempts to weaken Wes t
a further step toward iqcor- Berlin's ties ::with West
pora ting xhe ~oviet sector of Germ.a ny.
the · city into Ea~t Germany and
gives the sector border the
character of an East German The regime has sent a
frontier . By making an East letter to Secretary General
German law directly . ·.appli- Hammarskjold requesting per-
cable .to East Berlin, the mission £or East German repre-
East German regime not on l y by- s~ntatives--presumably includ-
passed the normal procedures ing Ulbricht as new head of
under which East Berlin munic- state--to present their views
ipal authorities have re-en on the German and Berlin ques-
~cted any l~~islatiOn applying tions . to the General Assembly .
to the Soviet sector of Berlin Tbis ~equest is ob~iously in-
but it also . ciearly violate~ ' tended to bolster East German
four-power ~greements . guaraQtee­ claims to sovereignty and
ing freed6m of move~ent ~ithi~ eqQali ty With Wes·t Germany--
the city. Which, al though :not a 'UN
membe1•, maintains observers
in ;New York.
On the same d~y, party
boss Ulbricht revealed his plan
for a phased disarmament of The East German statement
Ge'rma'ny in a memorandum to the of 13 September that the regime
United N~tions. This plan is w~ll refuse to recognize West
a rehash of pr.evioQs proposals German passport~ issued to West
and· contains provisions for Berli·ners who intend to travel
signing a pe~ce treaty ~ith abroad--i . e . , to bloc countries
the "two German states , " with- --is Qesigned to emphasize the
drawal of western troops from East German contention that West
West Berlin, and the transfor- Berlin is not a part of West
ma·tion of west Berlin into Germany but is a separate legal
a demilitarized free city at the entity . In practice, the new
expiratiqn or the f ~rst phase regulation probably will cause
in 1961 . few ·di.f ficul ties, since the East
Germ~ns are continuing--at least
for the time being--to accept
Ulbricht warned that West Berlin identity documents
Khrushchev'~ pledge not to· take issued by west Berlin author-
unilateral steps to '. dhange the i tie~ in lieu of passports . The
status qu9 in Berlin before announcement states that these

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SWlllARY

15 ·September 1960

identity cards will also be ac- The Bonn government--tbrough

cepted from West Berliners trav- Vice Chancellor Erhard--has so
eling between the city and West far merely called on German busi-
Germany. nessmen not to subject themselves
to the new East German entry re-
The announcement does not quirements and to avoid travel
state whether West Berliners will to East Germany as long as the
be required to obtain East German restrictions continue. Bonn is
permits to visit East Berlin, as still unwilling to suspend in-
they are required to do to visit terzonal trade with East Ger-
East Germany; the regime's an- many.
nouncement :of 9 September impos-
ing restrictions on West German There are fears in Bonn and
travel to Ea~t Berlin expressly in industrial circles that East
excepted West Berliners. It Germany might retaliate against an
appears that for tbe time being embargo of trade with East Ger-
there will be no attempt to many by cutting off West Berlin's
force West Berliners to acknowl- supply lines to West Germany,
edge ·, East German "sovereignty" over which more than one and a
over East Berlin by accepting half billion dollars ' worth of
special documentation . goods were brought to the city
in 1959. These shipments dwarf
Western Reaction West German exports to East
Germany, which amounted to less
West German and West Berlin than 2 percent of West Germany's
officials view the East German total exports during the last
harassment as the beginning of three years, reaching a peak
a new series of probing actions value in 1959 of $256, 800,.000 ; .
against West Berlin's ties with
West Germany. / C.h ancellor Ade.., · American Ambassador Dowling
nauer on vacation in Italy--has in Bonn feels that the Western
sent word to bis cabinet in Allies should urge Bonn to cut
Bonn to avoid "any rash moves" interzonal trade , and fears
in dealing with the East German that the ' principal Allied
harassments and in effect to
leave the initia~ive on counter-
WEST GERMAN TRADE
measures to the Western Allies. f MILLIONS OF DOLLARS l

Adenauer sharply criticized IMPORTS I I WITH WEST tlRllN

Vice Chancellor Erhard's refer- fXPORTSlll

e.nce on 11 September to West IMPORTS r::J

WITH EAST GERMANY
EXPORTS-
Berlin as "Federal Republic
territory" and called on the cab- 3,000
inet to advise West Berlin Mayor 1, 310
Brandt to stop making demands 2,soo
for Western retaliations, thereby 2 272
926
1,110

implying that be is speaking for

the Bonn government. With fur-
ther East German actions expected,
Adenauer stressed that counter-
measures, including trade sanc-
tions, must be used judiciously
lest they lead to worse Communist
measures, especially against West 1957 1958 1959

Berlin's large trade with Bonn ~~ DOtli I, S Ll'I LMO(lf l?r60 (b)(3)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUllllARY

15 September 1960

counteraction thus far taken-- auxiliary police force by in-

the refusal of tra~el permits to itiating training of 115 members
selected categories of East Ger- of the regular police force to
mans--is not Jikely to have act as instructors . Although
much effect on the Ulbricht the n~w force would be used
regime. • primarily for static guard
duties, it would be available to
· Allied officials have ex- support the regular 13,500-man
pressed concern over ' Mayor police force in time o j crisis
Brandt's plans to go ahead with and civil disturbance . (b)(3)
establishment of a 4,000-man ~~~~~~~~-''

EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL MEASURES

The East German populace gee status in West Germany and
continues to "vote with its West Berlin, compared with ap-
feet" against the Ulbricht re- proximately 98,000 during the
gime . In the week ending 6 corresponding period in 1959.
September , more than 3,000 ref- The escapees, more than · balf ·
ugees escaped to West Berlin, of whom belong- to the labor
despite a five-day near-blockade force, include large numbers of
by East German authorities farmers, technici~ns, and
against travel to Berlin, long
the principal escape hatch from
East Germany . The total for the REfUOHS ESCAPING TO WlST ll RLIN
(b)(3)
previous week · bad been more than
4,500. wu11 •:o,~! 'r - ,-"r"-r-..,."'-• -,--.;;'ooor----r--'':r"'--,.----=:;
JHo
" .... i---r--t--l----l-- +--lr--+-- 1---11- - l
- - -l- - + - - - 1 -
--
-
" JAN
Monthly figures have risen
steadily, both absolutely and
H JAN
11(1 - - ---- ·- - - --
" " l----+---1-- 1 - - --4
in comparison with last year. 1'fB

Almost 21,500 refugees escaped n 111

--
to the West in August of this
l----+---1---1- - ·--- - -- -
I1 •Al
-
' '" t - - - t - - + - -1---- 1 - r--- -- -
year, compared with only 13 , 610 IS MU - -
in August 1959, according to the lt H.AI - -
2t MU - i---
-
- -
---
-
--~
--r- -
- ·-

West German Ministry of Refu- S AO

gees. Of the 21,500, more than 12 API l --f---t---+- -l--1---1--- 1 - 11- - 1 - -1

18,000 fled to West Berlin. This 1• JiPI

2' . , .
- - - - f - - --t----1-- - - - - ·
.. _
exceeds the flow of 16,189 in I M-.Y t - - - t- - t -- I· - - - -

May in the wake of the forced llMAY ----i---

collectivization and ·is far above 17 MAY l----+---1---1----1-- -f---1-- 11- --
U MAT .. - -....-.- - - -- -
the 10,857 who fled to West Ber- JI MAT ,...___
lin following the uprising in 7 JU"
HI JUN r---r--t--1--1--+--l!----f-- l--i----I
June 1953 . 21 JUI t---t--+--1----+·- - -
U JUN
JJtlL
The total of flights to 11 ....
- 1 - · -1 - - - t - - I· - -
i---r--+-1----1-·-l---11-
- - - - ----

- -
West Germany and w·e st Berlin was " JUL
almost identical with that of UJUl
-+--l---1 - ~ -
21 ; 595 in August 1958, when mass 1: AUO
• AU ~ l- - + ---1-- 1- -+· - - - - - - - f--·-

flights of intellectuals were at 1• AU'

AUO I---+-~- -I
their height . During the first JI

eight months of 1960 more than lO l UCi

t S"l r--·-t-- 1- -1----1---1- - -1- r- - - - -~-

126,500 persons applied for refu- 0~ 1.~

~~~.~~.-"'--~*~.--'---:c,~''=--'-~
." '

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...,,)
~
-· · - ··- -..
..... ..
~- ·p ·•o> • · -~ · - ·· ··· · ";. MI,,_,........ _ ..._ .. ...... ,.... _ .... . .... ... ~ .. ..... .._ _
•.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

a sharp drop in the number of (b)(3)

NUMBER APPLYING FOR REFUGEE STATUS individuals asking for admission
TO WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN this spring and that East German
1950 officials were being much more
1---1--f--+--+---+----I--~
1951 careful in their security proc-
1952
l - ----+-
essing of such individuals.
l--~·--l-'--
1953
1954
l-----+--+--+---~-
Whereas last year the East
1955
l-----+-- -t-- -+- Germans frequently boasted of
1956
1--- - l -- f - - + --+- - 1-- -i- the high return flow, this year
1---- 1- --1- - they have been reticent. Their
1957
1------1- --+- --+- - - >- - - · ·-- - claim that 26,000 persons asked
1951
--- - - · - -- - ·- for ttasylum" during the first
1959
oL ---l- -
10....1.0,000
-_ ...L_.__2_
00-'-.o-oo- . 1 - -
3-oo'-.oo-o- 3--'50,ooo six months contrasts with the
FIGURES ON APPLICANrs WER[ FIRST KEPT aEGINNING SEP TEMBER 1949.
claimed figure of 62,000 for the
THE FIGURE FOR I ME LAST FOUR MONTHS or l949 WAS 59.24 ~. whole of 1959 .
00912 30 13 SEPTEMBER 1960

professional men, whose services The East Germans are likely

are badly needed by the Ulbricht to continue their harassment of
regime. Indications point to a West Berlin, with the aim of
total considerably in excess of reducing its importance as an
last year's 144,000, despite in- escape route , and probably will
tensified East German security also continue to enforce special
precautions . controls to limit travel by East
Germans to East Berlin. Secu•
Reflecting increased inter- rity precautions on the East -
national tension and unsettled West German frontier are already
conditions in East Germany, the at a high point and are likely
number of persons returning from to be maintained at this level.
West to Eas~ Germany or drawn The strict measures now in .
there by hope of better jobs bas effect , however, may well cause
fallen this year in comparison many East Germans to try to es-
with 1959. Refugees reaching cape at this time if possible,
West Berlin in July who bad pre- out of fear that all es-
viously resettled from West to cape routes may soon be
East Germany told British author- closed . __J(b)(3)
.
I _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

ities in Berlin that there was

POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN

Berlin by early 1961 prob- German Army is under way at some
ably will be ringed with sur- ten locations around Berlin, one
face-to-air missile (SAM) sites. adjacent to a missile launch
The complex apparently will con- site under construction near
tain at least eight launch sites, Rauen . [ l(b)(1)
~acb with local logistic support I _ -~ hese ten include eight
facilities, and may be connected SAM launch and two central sup-
to two central support facili- nort facilities. b)(1)
ties. The local support facili-
ties are located about 25 miles
from the ce.nter of the city and
are 16 to 22 miles apart .
l- - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - -(b)(1)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUllllARY

15 September 1960

(b )( 1)
survey ng, poss y or a
'----~~---'
aunch
site, at another of I
the ten locations . (b)(1)

S nee a
'---~~--:~--.,--~~~~
ese (b )(1)
projects were reported under I
way during the summer of 1960,
completion is possible during
the first quarter of 1961.
All evidence indicates that (b )( 1)
the Glau and Jueterbog sites are
manned by Soviet personnel.
There are indications , however ,
that the East Germans themselves
with eventually participate in
SAM operations. These include
participation of tbe East German
Army in the construction of the
SAM launch site at Rauen and in
the survey for another possible
lauµch site, the extension of
contracts for work on these sites
to civilian concerns by the East

17

WEST
/
J
GERMANY .'
/

,,.,,....
//
~ .-· ··-,·"'""'""~
~;_~__,,/- \
' ' • "\__.... • •· ""Hl!lmstedl ~
e ConfJrmed tLtrfoc• ·fO· o lr ml.slle sire
0 Conatruc."°'1 proiod
- · - Rallrood

0 M ILES
tD 81trTO: MDER 1880 (b)(3)
31J!2

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUllMARY
15 September 1960

German Army, the reported es- equipped with missiles, and re-
tablishment at Pinnow--also near ports of possible SAM training
Berlin but outside the SAM com- of East Germa n Army personne_l~...__~
plex--of an East German anti- (b)(3)
aircraft artillery unit possibly

MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE

A high-capacity, under- (b)(1
ground hardened coaxial cable
is being :.1n$talled between Fin-
land and the . USSR. When com-
pleted) the cable will extend Finland has ~ radar net-
from Moscow via Len~ngrad and work of rather low technical
intermediate points in Finland level which cou l d, however,
to Helsinki. and will provide a ~ugment the Soviet air-defense
circuit capacity double that system . According to the
needed for envisioned civil re- Finnish-Soviet mutual ~ssistance
pact concluded in
Coaxial Cable Lines in the USSR and Finland -- 1960 1947, Finland might
be obliged to pass
- - in opero 1lon such data to the So-
- - - - undar ccnstructlon
•••••••• plo nMd
viet Union in the
NORWAY
event Moscow consider-
ed itself threatened
with an attack via
Finland.

Three years ago

the Russians ·made the
first proposal for an
underground cable to
connect Leningrad and
Helsinki, and final
agreement was reached
in early 1960. Com-
pletion of the line
is scheduled for 1962,
with both countries
financing their own
portion of the work
and providing their
own equipment . Finland
has placed orders with
Western firms for (b)(3)
coaxial cable and
carrier equipment
quirements. The installation which reportedly will be used
of the cable may lead to closer on their portion of the circuit.
political, economic, and cul-
tural cooperation between the Finland already has two

countries. I~~~~~~~~~~~
four-tube coaxial cables on (b )( 1)
two separate routes from Helsinki
to Kouvala . Beginning in Sep-
tember 1960, one cable with a

SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIOIARY

15 September 1960

(b )( 1)

capacity of 1,920 telephone natural and man-made . damage,

channels will be extended to including bomb blast.
Vyborg in the USSR.
The stated reason for the
The Finnish section will new coaxial cable to Helsinki
probably .be laid in a manner is to increase telephone service
similar to the recently complet- between · the USSR and Finland.
ed cable out of Moscow to Kiev However, there are no known
arid the extension under con- plans for increases in either
struction from Moscow to Vyborg. telephone or television services
This type of cable, laid under- which would require such a large
ground about 100 feet from the number of channels. Present
edge of the highway, has unique, plans call for only 960 channels
underground repeater stations to be used for civil require-
approximately four miles apart. ments; this would leave a sur-
This mode of underground con- plus of 960 channels which could
struction, also employed in the be used for military pur-
US and elsewhere, is more costly poses, including the trans-
than wire and overhead cable mit..t.al_o aJ..r=..d eh..nse data
lines or high-capacity microwave
radio relay lines, but offers
[ (b )(3)
I

greater ·protection against

ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE. SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT OF MOSCOW

The ouster of a leading troversy. Politburo member and

Albanian Communist ideologist-- party secretary Liri Belishova,
announced on 9 September--and the fifth-ranking party leader,
the elevation to the party sec- was removed from her party posi-
retariat of an agitprop special- tions by a central committee
ist suggest that the regime is plenum for committing "grave
preparing to revamp its equivo- errors in the party line." A
cal propaganda line on the basic report on her activities was made
issues in the Sino-soviet con- by the politburo and delivered

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUlfilA.RY

15 September 1960

HOXHA
ALIJA M ARKO

to the central committee by ~n .· a plenary s ess i on on

politburo member Rita Marko, 13 July .
who returned a few months ago
from · extensive training in the Albanian propa ganda , pre-
USSR, and probably represented sumably in the f ace of Sovie t
the Sovi et i nterest in the af- pressure, has subseque ntly ma de
fair . limited adjustments, subscribed
in general terms to "peaceful
The central committee also coexistence," and acknowledged
ousted from party membership the '' leading role o f the USSR,"
the he ad of the Central Audit - but it has not followed the
ing Commission for "activitie s other East European s ate llites
hostile t o the party." No elu- in criticizing "dogma tism . "
cidation on the charges was
made in the central committee's While Belishov a wa s one
communiqu~, nor has there been of three important r egime of-
any further comment by the ficials to visit Chi na thi s
r e gime . summer and has , in t he p a st ,
made statements favorable to
Long-st anding Albanian
pr~ fe rence . f or the Chinese
Communist position on certain
i s s ues in the Sino-Soviet dis -
pute was evident at the Rumanian
party congress in June. Party
boss Enver Hoxha was the only
East European party leader who
did not attend, and the chief
Albanian d e l egate , politburo
me mbe r Hysni Ka.po, was the only
Eas t Europe an who f a i l e d s p e -
c i f ica l l y t o e ndors e Khrus hchev's
s peec h a nd the only one who
f avore d the Ch i n ese pos ition on
wa r a nd t h e na t u r e of the im-
p e rial 1st · t h rea t. ·The Alba-
BELISHOVA
nian c e n tra l ·committee late r
e ndorsed Ka po 's statement s

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15 September 1960

the Chin·e se, it is unlikely that The continued espousal of

she alone was responsible for pro-Chinese views despite Soviet
the Albanian positions. It is :i.nsib4'uct:i~.nfs t.~ ·it.he 'C.on·tra.·r y .hM!I·
true that . her main responsibility probably give~ rise to faction-
was for ideology, but all the :al:ism amo.n g the party leaders,
leaders at one time or another and the Belishova ouster may be
have been commi.tted to a hard- the first indication~~ that the
1 ine, Chinese type of outlook. position of other topc leaders
Use of .her a~ ~scapegoat for will. be challenged in coming
what is presumably a •" collective months.. While~.- purge of Hoxh~,
error" suggests that the regime who has led the party since 1943,
leaders are preparing to revamp is not likely, he will probably
the agitprop apparatus and to be under pressure to "clean up"
move into. close.r conformity with his party prior to the scheduled
Moscow's line. fourth party congress in November.
Ramiz Alija, 34-year-old The removal of Belishova
polit~uro c~ndidate member and will assist other East European
propaganda specialist who is party leaders in keeping dogmatic
considered to be pro-Soviet, elements repressed in their own
was elected by the plenum to parties. These elements, now in
the party secretariat, ap- the background, could weaken satel-
parently replacing Belisho- lite support t.S..C.O:W a t _ so_
me_ _
va. future ti111e. (b)( 3)

NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS THIRD PARTY CONGRESS

T~o themes dominated the six on the secretariat. The
sessions of North Vietnam's congress elected 43 persons to
third party congre~s, which met the central committee plus 28
in Hanoi from 5 to 10 Septem- alternates, but all members of
ber: how best to modernize and the previous central committee
industrialize the country in and politbu~o retained their
accordance with Communist prin- positions, ·including Minister
ciples and how to reunify Viet- of National Defense Vo Nguyen
nam. Hanoi plans to solve the Giap, who has been out of the
latter problem by forming a public view much of the last
coalition government with a six months. Two al:ter.na tes ,:
"democratic" southern regime the minister o·f ·..public secµJ;i ty
once President Diem has been and the :.a:tmy ohi~:f! of .;staff' •.
overthrown.• were ·.added .:to•::the _11:-man· poli t-
buro. ·
Prior to this congress, ·-Changes
the Lao Dong party had never were also made in
issued a list of its central the party secretariat and the
committee members, although 31 orde;r.. of::precedence:i ::with the
individuals had been identified politburo,, ·: · Party :Chairman Uo
as members. Eleven of these Chi. Minh -relinqu,ished · his ·con-
also sat on the politburo and current ~ost of · secretary.·

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15 Se ptember 1960

general ; the position was re- Thus, a "southern clique"

titled "first secretary" and may exist within the Lao Doµg
conferred ' on Le Duan, who until party , which has been increas-
1957 was responsible for direct- ing its power since early 1958.
ing subversion in South Vietnam The power held by this clique
and thus was out of the l i me- may do much to explain Hanoi's
" a c tivist•• policy toward South
Vietnam--a policy which excludes
overt invasion of the south but
implies that almost every other
tactic to achieve reunification
is legitimate .

Duan, apparently second in

power to Ho, noted that "the
balance of forces . . . is gradually
changing in favor of a revolution"
in South Vietnam. Hanoi has
dropped its customary formulation
that "reunification will be a
long, arduo us , and complicated
task" and now sta t es that the
"immedia te t a sk,. is to overthrow
Di e m and f o r a "democ ratic coa-
HO CHI MINH lit ion government " wi th· which. ··!
the nor th can do business ~
light . Two of the new i ndivid-
ual s na med to the party secre- Hanoi ' s Five-Yea r Plan for
tariat served w ~th Le Duan in 1 9 61-65 a s outlined by Le Duan
South Vietnam : Pham Hung , who indicates that Hanoi will hence-
in· July wa~ given over-all con- forth pursue a long-range eco-
trol of the government's agri- nomic program of industrial-
cultural programs. and Le Due ization, with emphasis on the
development of heavy industry.
This formulation is more in line
with normal Communist practice
than was Hanoi's past practice
of emphasizing agriculture .
However, the economic realities
of North Vietnam's lim i ted in-
dustrial base , the ·serious
shortage of technical and mana-
gerial skills , and the basic
importance of agriculture in
the economy will keep the regime
frbm moving rapidly toward its
goal of industrialization .

No specific plan targets

for individual commodities have
been released, but the scope of
LE DUAN the regime ' s ambitions is indi-
cated by the general goal of in-
Tho, who now may be in charge creasing the value of industrfal
o~ party o~ganization . They are production by 20 percent a year
the only two to be elevated in and that of agricultural pro-
the pol i tburo order of prece- duction by 10 percent a year
flence . during the plan.

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15 September 1960

Another subject with which this year the original Three-

the congress dealt at length Year Plan (1958-60) goal of
was the ''peasant problem"--a 100 percent of peasant house-
euphemism for continued peasant holds in cooperatives was re-
opposition to cooperativization. vised downward to 75 percent in
The party has CODllJlitted itself the face of peasant opposition.
to the "basic completion"--i.e . ,
75 percent--of agricultural co- The new party statutes
operativization by the end of approved by the congress incor-
the year . At a rural cadres porate ·more stringent qualif i-
conference held earlier this cations for party membership.
summer it was noted that the Hanoi conducted its first major
program was lagging behind, party membership campaign since
with only 55 percent of peasant the 1954 cease-~ire early this
households in cooperatives, year when it increased the mem-
just 10 percent more than at bership 25 percent, bringing the
the end of 1959. total to 500,000 . In reviewing
the qualifications of its 100,000
Cooperativtzation remains new members, the party now may
the most explosive issue facing feel that not enough care was
the regime . Concerted opposi- taken in their selection, and,
t i on of a stubborn peasantry by strengthening the qualifi-
forced the regime to back down cations for membership, it may
on socialization in 1956 when hope to avoid s m ar~
the "correction of errors" pro- the future . b)( 3)
gram was instituted, and earlier

GUINEA STRENGTHENS BLOC TIES

Guinea's economic ties with of a dam and power plant capable

the Sino-Soviet bloc have been of furnishing up to 3.2 billion
strengthened further as a re- kilowatt-hours of cheap elec-
sult of Pres.ident Sekou Tour~' s tricity a ye·ar.
current visit to several bloc
countries. In addition, Tour~, The energy would be used
who cla ims to follow a policy primarily to establish an alu-
of "positive neutrality, 11 ap- . minum 'industry based on Guinea's
pears to have moved toward clos- large bauxite deposits, some of
er propaganda and ideological which are already being exploited
alignment with the Communist by private Western interests.
world. The project, for which the Tour~
regime has been actively solicit-
In Moscow, his first for- ing foreign support since last
mal stop on a three-week trip spring, bas highest priority in
which also included state visits the Three-Year Plan for economic
to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and development launched by Guinea
Hanoi, Tour~ secured a Soviet in July.
commitmept to · participate in
Guinea's proposed Konkour6 hydro- Although the joint Soviet-
electric project . As developed Guinean communiqu~ of 8 Septem-
b~ . French planners before Guinea ber did not announce the extent
became independent in 1958, of the Soviet commitment to
this scheme envisaged the con- "the planned complex of projects
struction on the Konkour~ River on the Konkour~ River," Moscow

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15 Septemb~r 1960

presumabiy is prepared to make first head of an African state

additional long-term credits to come to Communist China--by
available to Conakry. Tbe USSR~ •nri9uncing a~ agreement provid-
present economic aid program in ing for the extension 1D Guinea
Guinea is cov~red by a $3&,ooo,- over the next three years of a
ooo credit extended in August $25,000,000 interest~free cred-
1959 . it ~ . This first large-scale
economic aid arrangement to be
For bis part, Tour~ abetted concluded by the Chinese with
Soviet policy objectives by com- any country in Black Africa
mitting himself to a personal points up tbe importance Peiping
appearance at the for~hcoming attaches to its intense competi-
UN Gene~al Assembly sessiQn, as tion with Taipei for recognition
well as by formally endorsi~g tn that area . Presumably the
the Soviet propaganda line on agreement will bring in addi-
the nonpolit~cal character of tional Chine•~ personnel to join
the USSR's African activities the app;roximately 60 "agricul-
and on the cause--himper.ialist tura li::;ts" who have been working
ag«ression"--of tl,le Con~o crisis. on rice c~ltivation projects in
Moreover, the Soviet press q..oted Guin~a since last spring. In
the Guinean leader as having addition, a friendship treaty
acknowledged in a Kremlin speech was signed.
that "progress" made by th.e bloc
was "decisive in the liberation Tour~'s trip has also pro-
of African peoples"--a point duced new five-yea~ trade pacts
Moscow has been attempting to with both the VSSR and Communist
make in its propaganda to under- China. The ~greement with Pei-
developed countries . ping--Guinea 's first with that
regime~-calls for an annual ex-
Tour~ also reportedly called change . of almost $10,000,000
on newly indepenqent Africa~ worth of goods, a level which,
countries to carry on "class if reached, would boost Guinea's
warfare," a concept which Tour~, presently negligible trade with
while Marxist-trained , Qas here- the Chinese to perhaps 10 per-
tofQre maintained was not app~i- · cent of its total annual foreign
cable to Africa in its present trade. In any event , the new
stage of development. During a trade ~acts are likely to accel-
brief stop at Budapest airp9rt e~ate the diversion from the
en route to Moscow, Tour~ st~ted w~st to the bloc of the bulk of
that Guinean-Hungarian relatiora- Guin~a's fore~gn trade. Based
wbicb have no~ yet been est~b­ lar~ely on barter arra ngements,
lished on a formal basis--rested this new pattern of trade is
on an "affinity of political resulting in the mortgaging to
or ien tat ion . " bloc countries of future as well
In . Peiping the ~hinese
marked the visit of Tour~-~the
·[~_a_s_c_u_r_r_e_n_t_G__u_i n_ _ea_ n_ br 3 )
e_ x_ p_ o_ r_ ts_ _ _ _ _(_,

USSR AND IRAN MAKING ' NEW ~tFORT TO tMPROVE RELATIONS

aoth the USSR and l~an ~re 1ehr~n on 14 September after a
making 6ew moves to relieve tbe 11
dipl6matic" absence of about
long-standihg t~nsion in their nine months. His return there
relations. Soviet Ambassador last September , after a similar
Pegov returned to his post in extended absence , coincided with

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Soviet efforts .to induce the as prime minister by criticizing

Shah, who had offered to ex- the conduct of the elections--
clude foreign missile bases that Iran was ready to have
from Iranian soil , to expand friendly relations with the
his proposed guarantee to ex- USSR and would give serious con-
clude foreign military bases of sideration to Soviet aid offers.
all types. Despite many sub-
sequent diplomatic exchanges Although the Iranian ruler
involving leading figures on has in the past made similar . .
both sides, the Shah continued statements for the record, the
to resist the Soviet demands. quick endorsement by most Tehran
newspapers may have been viewed
The USSR has also modi- in Moscow as a sign that the
fied its propaganda 1 ine on Jr an, Shah--who is gravely concerned
as it did during the brief thaw over the future of Iran and his
in Soviet-Iranian relations in regime--is again ready to try
I
September 19p9. Although the to better relations. I
"National Voice of Iran"--a b)(3)
clandestine station in the · ·so-
viet Caucasus--and the Tudeh
(Communist) p~ ty ' broadcasts
from East Be·rlin continue to
criticize the . Shah and Iran's
policies, Radio Moscow on 31
August halted its attacks on the ·
Iranian ruler and began to blame
ousted Prime Minister Eqbal-- The new prime min ister,
the Shah's scapegoat for the Sharif ~ami, told Ambassador
election fiasco--for ·all dif- Wailes on 4 September that ' the
ferences with Iran. immediate task of his govern-
ment in t~e foreign policy
Soviet leaders, who have field is to improve relations
alternated pressure moves with with Moscow, but he asserted
blandishments in the hope of that this would not be done at
undercutting Iran's close po- the expense of Iran's ties with
litical cooperation and military the West. As a st~p in this
defense ties with Western powers, direction, Tehran on 4 September
probably have been encouraged ceased its counterpropaganda
by developments in Tehran. The aimed at blunting the Communist
Shah noted at his 27 August bloc's radio attacks on the
press conference--~n which he Shah and Iran's _QA'.e_i~ and___
precipitated the resignation of domestic ol_i_c es b)(3)
the stanchly anti-Communist Eqbal

: INDONES~A

The confrontation of Pres- decide before 30 November which

ident Sukarno and the Indonesi- parties may function legally
a n Army over the Communist is- thereafter.
s 11e appears to have been once
more postponed Uy President Su- The ban reportedly was
karno's ban, issued on 13 Sep- d r afted by the army at Sukarno's
tember, on the activities of request and serves as a compro-
all political parties. He will . mise s olution to the problem

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 September 1960

posed by the army last month in Sukarno's ban will permit him
proscribing Communist activity to proceed more easily with his Na-
in three military commands. The tional front , a mass organization
army's move was a direct chal- in which he expects all parties
lenge to Sukarno, who has per- and groups to cooperate. He in-
sistently conciliated the Com- stalled the 63-member central board
munists and who, on 17 August, of the National Front on 8 Sep-
had dissolved the anti-Communist tember; at least 18 of its members
Masjumi and Socialist parties . are susceptible to Communist di-
The ban frees Sukarno f rorn the rection . Should the front become
necessity of choosing between a viable organization, it could
the army and the Communists and be a considerable asset to the
obviates an army decision on Communists by providing them a
whether to oppose Sukarno fur..,. protected government organization
ther l;>y extending its anti-Commu- within which to work.
nist ban to other areas .
Colonel Basuki, a high-rank-
ing officer in the office adminis- (b)( 1)
tering Indonesia's martial law,
says that among the army's diffi-
culties with Sukarno are the lat-
ter's closest advisers . These in-
clude Ruslan Abdulgani who, as
vice chairman of the Supreme Ad-
visory Council , is very close to
the President , is antiarmy, and
The army, nowever, continues to tries to manipulate government
be concerned over President Su- activities and issues so thatthey
karno's insistence on for g ing are detrimental to army interests.
a united political effort in In- The so-called palace clique con-
donesia with considerable reli- sists mostly of leftistst and army
ance on the Communists . efforts to break up this g roup have
been unsuccessful· I (b)(3)]

SOUTH KOREAN CABINET RESHUFFLE

South Korean Prime Minister ing responsibility for government

Chang Myon and his opponents, the policy, the terms of the compro-
majority Democ'r atic party, agreed mise will make it easy for the
on 12 September to a compromise anti-Chang factionists to func -
cabinet · designed to give Chang tion as a de facto opposition
a working majority in the Na- bloc in future tests of strength .
tional Assembly. The party has
over two thirds of the 233 seats The balance of power be-
in the powerful House of Repre- tween the Democratic factions
sentatives 9 but these are about has rested with about 40 inde-
evenly divided between support- pendent and minor party legisla-
ers and opponents of the prime tors. On 7 September four of
minister . Although the new cab- Chang's ministers submitted
inet appears to strengthen Chang's their resignations to open the
position for the time being by way for the formation of a cabi-
drawing his opponents into shar- net based on broader · party

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15 September 1960

representation. After consider- opponent for the premiership,

able negotiation, the anti-Chang Kim To-yun. None of the four is
faction agreed to enter the cab- among the top ten of the oppO- ·
inetq sition faction .
The new cabinet is made up The opposition faction ex-
of seven Chang supporters, four acted--as the price of its partic-
adherents of and one defector ipation in the cabinet--Chang's
from the opposition faction, recognition of it as an independ-
and two independents. The Com- ent "negotil!lting group" in the
munications Ministry post, as- legislature with the right to re-
signed to the anti-Chang faction, ca 11 its men from the cabinet at
has not yet been filled . The any time. However, while the an-
four opposition faction ministers ti-Chang faction retains a strong
named are Defense Minister Kwon bargaining position, it is likely
Chong-ton, Reconstruction Min- to be restrained at least for the
ister Kim U-pyong , Transportation time being by current public op-
Minister Pak Hae-cbong, and position to a party split, by its
Health and Social Affairs Minis- lack of a working majority in the
xer . Ne Yong-kyun. At least legislature, and, most important-
three of these men are believed ly, by the likelihood that a no-
to oppose an open party split, confidence vote would lead to
and three of them reportedly dissolution of the lower
had been selected for possible house and new e_l~~__t_ion"'-"=~
· ~~~
cabinet positions under Chang ' s
~I----------~(9)(3)

CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE

The new Belgian coalition The austerity program is
cabinet, recently announced by basically aimed at offsetting
Premier Eyskens in response to economic losses as a result of
public criticism ot the govern- the Congo situation . The Congo
ment's Congo policy, contains was estimated last spring to
no new infiuential figures, and contribute about 6 percent of
may not last through the winter. Belgium qs gross national prod-
No major changes in defense ~nd uct of $9.5 billion. The new
foreign policies are likely; program · calls for a reduction
~yskens ' austerity economic of all current expenditures
program, however, involves de- in the 1961 extraordinary budg-
fense cuts ranging between 7 et and for $120,000,000 in new
and 13 percent. taxes. Cuts amounting to
$200,000,000 are to be made in
Three newly appointed national defense, education,
ministers--two Social Christians and social benefits such as
and one Liberal--are to sit as unemployment and sickness in-
a kind of supercabinet with the surance and pensions.
premier, Foreign Minister Wigny,
and possibly Defense Minister Defense cuts , variously
Gilson to 'handle major policy report e d as ranging from $30,-
questions--primarily Eyskens' 000, 000 to $50 , 000,000--or 7
proposed new program of social to 13 percent of the proposed
progress through "economic ex- defense budget for 1961--would
pansion based on financial te- be made by cutting out some
form;. '·' 25,000 military and civilian

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15 Se ptember 1960

positions in the armed forces bassy in Brussels foresees a

and by economies in maintaining continuation of the drift away
Belgian troops in West Germany. from active participation in
The defens~ minister insists, NATO .
however, that Belgium will carry
Eyskens' program may en-
counter a stormy reception when
presented to Parliament on 27
September. Business interests
are opposed to tax increases,
while the Socialists and Catholic
labor groups are hostile to
measures to reduce social bene-
fits . The government will also
be hard put to convince public
opinion that it intends to give
a "new look" to its African
policy, in view of the appoint-
ment of Count d'Aspremont Lynden
as minister of African affairs.
His choice is attributed to
pressure from the King, and his
EYSKENS public association recently with
Katanga Province as chief of the
Belgian technical mission there
out contracts for building F-104G may make it difficult for Belgium
fighter planes, provided the to improve its position with the
United States contributes finan- inde endent African tates.
cial support. The American Em- (b)(3)

EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENTSHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS

The moderately progressive
regime of Salvadoran President
Lemus has been seriously shaken
by persistent attacks from left- The state of siege~ al-
ist student and la·bor elements' though removing the immediate
many of whom are pro-Communist threat to the administration
and pro-Castro. The small and from the militar~ did not halt
densely populated country is leftists from exploiting the
particularly vulnerable to left- strong public indignation over
ist agitation because of the the security police's indis-
unusually wide e conomic gap criminate use of force in the
between the peasants and the 2 September disorders. New dis-
few weal thy . landowning families. orders were averted when bus-
iness and community leaders,
Af t~r a student and labor including the the archbishop of
demonstration on 2 September San Salvador, held separate
in which one youth was killed conciliatory meetings with
and many p eople were seriously student leaders and the Presi-
injured ~ as a result of police dent immediately prior to the
action , Lemus on 5 September leftist demonstration of 9
decreed a 30-day state of siege-- September, which the~ was carried
El Salvador' s first since 1952. out peacefully . Communists and
Tne· President 1 .. himself . a mili- pro-Castro elements, however,
tary man, took this action wilI prob~bly be quick to en -
under pressu·re from officers courage new demonstrations as
of the armed forces '------ -- - - ---' opportunity offers in an attempt (b)(1)
to undermine the government.

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15 September 1960

~he US Embassy has ex- hesitance in taking resolute

pressed the belief that most . action to curb Communist and pro-
responsible leaders recognize Castro subversive activity has·
the necessity to support the prompted many moderate and con-
President through the current s~.rvative elements to look to ·
crisis. Nevertheless, the gen- his immediate predeeessor, ex-
eral popularity Lemus enjoyed President Osorio, for more ef-
at the time of hi~ election in fective leadership. Osorio ..
1956 has been on the . decline probably would be reluctant to
for almost a year, and the Pres- promote a coup against Lemus,
ident ~ s incPeasingly aloof but his dess scrupulous follow-
manner has eveµ alienated ma ny ers might seek to use future
of his working associates . His leftist disorders as an excuse
.. to seize ower themselves.
.---~---

(b)(3)

* *

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PA'RT III .

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Peiping ' s claim to China's for subst:an.t ·1v..e consideration

:tsc expected ·. to : · be ~;ptit
!IUN: ~ seat : of the issue . New Delhi's bor-
off once more through the pro- der troubles with Peiping are
cedural device of the annual probably the reason for this de-
moratorium at this year ' s UN cision. However, on 30 August
General Assembly, which opens on the Indian deputy foreign min-
20 September. The newly sov- ister publicly reaffirmed his
ereign African states, although government ' s conviction that
assocating T:a.J pei with "colo- Comm~nist China must be admitted
nial powers," may support it to the UN . The USSR early this
if admitted to the UN before month requested inscription of
the expected moratorium vote . the i t'em .
The prospect of maintaining
this device beyond 1961, how- 15th..General Assembly
ever, is increasingly uncertain .
Of the 82 members of the
Moratorium UN, 31 r e cognize Peiping--most

The General As- MORATORIUM ON CHINESE UN REPRESENTATION

sembly at each of its
past nine sessions has I
VOTES OF UN MEMBERS
(b)(3)
voted a moratorium on VOTts NOT TOTAi
FOR AGAINST ABSTENTIONS RECORDED MEMBERSHIP
c onsideration of the
· Chinese representation 19S1 37 11 4 8 60
question . This pro- 1952 42 7 11 60
cedural device for de- 19s3 44 10 2 4 60
laying a decision re- 19S4 43 11 6 60
quires only a simple 1955 42 12 6 60
majority of votes. Any 19S6 47 24 8 79
vote on substance, 19S7 48 27 6 82
such as an ouster of 1958 44 28. 9 81
Taipei or admittance 1959 44 29 9 82
o~ Peiping, requires
0091 2 2: 15 SEflTEMDl:::R 19GO

a two-thirds majori-
ty to pass; neither government recently Guinea and Cuba. Forty-
seems to have sufficient support three recognize T4ipei, and
at this time. five acknowledge neither gov-
ernment; the remaining three
For the first five years , UN members are Nationalist Chi-
Nationalist China commanded a na and the two constituent re-
majority of over two thirds in publics of the USSR which have
favor of the moratorium. How- UN membership .
ever, since the admission of
22 new members, mostly from Partly as a result of good-
Asia and Africa, it has mus- will missions to Africa, includ-
tered on~y a simple majority. ing private trade missions and
This fact has encouraged the technical training offers, Na -
nations which advocate .Peiping's tionalist Cnina has picked up
admission to insist on substan- considerable support from newly
tive discussion of the Chinese independent African nations.
representation question . The Nationalists have estab-
lished diplomatic relations this
For the first time since year with Cameroun, Togo , and
1956 , India decided aig~il'lJ3.t ·i;n,.. .the Malagasy Republic and are
troducing an agenda ~t.em. ea:l~ing negotiating with nine other

PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES .Page 1 of 6

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·. •
CURRENT INTE~LIGENCE WEEKLY S$0US'Y
15 September 1960

Recognition of China by UN Members ;...-,~__,<"

·~
and new African states not yet members tC EL.Ar-tD
"/ t \
• Wcotr:;. "'".....,"o USSR
HO•W1U ) ,-
C AN ADA /

.. . . __
' I\
U N ITED 1. • , -
STATES J A ...AN
ATLANTIC

TAIWAN
• f .. ~, ,;
~~~!r.:~::
l 'AClfi'TC OCF:AN cv •u . ,, ; •Al'f ; V£NE"l.UIELA
PACIFIC OC&IN
COL~MB~ .t .,'- )ti'\.~/ 4

OCEAN
llCUA~~~t'-)

< 1
'°EA U ... . ~ ,
B RAZ IL
I ·~
IND/AN OCEAN
' '
~•ouv1•'-
1,..-1,;,.L A USTRA LIA
CHU.•~: - ( :~
D Recogn ize~ Comm unist China
~ f'u-;.IJGUA¥
LJ Rccogni2es Nationallst China
{ARGEN~INA
0 Recognizes neither ZEA LAND
1~ SEPTEMDEA 1980

I l~i
i (b)(3)

former French t ·erri tories--Mal i, support of Ethiopia , which ab-

Congo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Up- stained; this year it may lose
per Volta, Ivory Coast, Gabon , that of Tunisia, which is re-
and the Central African Repub- portedly considering aligning
lic . These nations will prob- itself with the other Afro-
ably support Taipei if they are Asians on this issue.
admitted to the UN before the
vote on the moratorium. Nationalist China's chief
UN del~gate estimates that with-
Havana's recognition of out the new members, this year's
Peiping on 2 September marks vote would be close to last
the first definite break in year ' s, when 44 members sup-
western hemisphere support for ported the moratorium , 29 voted
-Taipei. Cuba abstained last against it, and 9 abstained .
year and is expected to oppose
t he moratoriwq this year. There Peiping's Attitude
is a possibility that the Do-
minican Republic will vote a- The Chinese Communis t s do
gainst the moratorium in reac- not expect to become a member
tion to the condemnation by the of the UN this year. Their re-
other American ·,republics. Most cent propaganda has ignored the
other members of the Latin subject, and the regime con-
American bl·o c probably will tinues to depict t he UN as a
continue to support Nationalist "tool o:f American aggre s sive
China. policy."
(b )( 1)
As in the past, National-
ist China probably will have
the support of the Western and
Asian nations allied with the
United States in defense treat-
ies. Last year Taipei lost the

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·.
'

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

· ·1 5·; S:e ptember 1960

(b )( 1)
be accepted by the UN as a
whole, Peiping as a member
would automatically be bound
by the terms of the treaty.

Outlook
The present Sino-Soviet
controversy may enlist support
for Peiping's entry from those
UN members who are eager to see
Peiping exposed to the rough-
and-tumble of UN debates and
voting line-ups. These members,
which include Britain and Pak-
istan, believe that possible
differences between Communist
China and the USSR could be ex-
ploited to the fullest at the
UN.
Khrushchev's Appearance
The prospects for maintain-
Khrushchev, scheduled to ing a favorable UN vote on the
appear at the opening of this moratorium in future years are
assembly along with satellite becoming increasingly uncertain .
party chieftains, is expected There is some possibility that
to develop his theme of peace- a shift in the voting balance
ful! coexistence and thereby might result not from a gradual
underscore Peiping's isolation erosion of Taipei's position but
within the bloc. At the same from a sudden "breakthrough."
time, he will .Probably call for If it appeared that the vote
the immediate admission o'f· Com-··· would be close and that in any
munist China to the UN. In event Peiping's admission in
this cont$xt his arguments will the ~ear future was inevitable,
probably appeal to many UN a bandwagon situation could de-
members who, although ready to velop which would result in a
vote for the moratorium this defeat of the moratorium; or
year, have long held the be- should· ·Peiping dema·nd : admi~tance
lief that the obligations of t 'o .the · UN as its price .for ·ad-
UN membership offer a way of hering to any disarmament or.
bringing Peiping under some form nuclear test ba·n agreement, ..
of international restraint. Taipei's position might become
even · mo~e . precarious. lt is
Such members as Japan are likely ~ . that a; UN vote against
particularly desirous of ensur- the meratorium · would be fol-
ing that Communist China be a lowed. 'by. · a vote in :favor · of
party to any big-power agree- admitting Communist .China to
ment on banning nuclear tests the UN and giving it a perma-
or on other forms of disarma·- . ment seat on the Securitv Coun-
ment. They point out that
since any such agreement will cil. ~'-----------~~b)(3)

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