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Facts:: G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988

1) The respondent was engaged in transporting goods for various merchants between Manila and Pangasinan for a fee, which made him a common carrier under Philippine law even though transportation was not his primary business. 2) As a common carrier, the respondent is responsible for lost or damaged goods unless the loss was due to a natural disaster, act of war or public enemy, act of the shipper, defect in goods or packaging, or order of public authority. 3) The hijacking of the respondent's truck did not fall under any of the exemptions, but he could still avoid liability by proving he exercised extraordinary diligence. The court found the loss was beyond his control as a fortuitous

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57 views2 pages

Facts:: G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988

1) The respondent was engaged in transporting goods for various merchants between Manila and Pangasinan for a fee, which made him a common carrier under Philippine law even though transportation was not his primary business. 2) As a common carrier, the respondent is responsible for lost or damaged goods unless the loss was due to a natural disaster, act of war or public enemy, act of the shipper, defect in goods or packaging, or order of public authority. 3) The hijacking of the respondent's truck did not fall under any of the exemptions, but he could still avoid liability by proving he exercised extraordinary diligence. The court found the loss was beyond his control as a fortuitous

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De Guzman v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47822; December 22, 1988

FACTS:

Respondent Ernesto Cendaña was a junk dealer. He buys up used bottles and scrap metal in
Pangasinan. He would bring those he gathered to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler
trucks which he owned for hauling. On the return trip to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan.
Respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates for
such service.

In November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk
Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the delivery
of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to an
establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970. On December 1, 1970, respondent
loaded the cargo. Only 150 cartons were delivered to the petitioner, driven by respondent himself;
while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada,
respondent’s driver and employee.Unfortunately, the truck carrying 600 boxes as
hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took
with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo.

Petitioner commenced an action for the amount of P22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost
merchandise, plus damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common
carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent
denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The
trial court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the private respondent is considered a common carrier.


2. Whether or not the hijacking of respondent’s truck was force majeure.

HELD:

(1) Article 1732 which states that:


“Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.’

This makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community
or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment
of the general population. It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely “back-hauled” goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic
or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
respondent’s principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no
dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee
frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here. A certificate of public
convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers.

(2) The hijacking of the carrier’s truck does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of
exempting causes in Art. 1734.It establishes the general rule that common carriers are
responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, “unless
the same is due to any of the following causes only:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4.The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
5.Order or act of competent public authority.”

This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the


part of private respondent. The limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended
by “grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.” The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be
regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous
event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against
all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot
be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence.

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