INING vs VEGA

G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013

FACTS:
In 1997, Leonardo (Ramona's grandson) filed for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession against Gregorai's heirs, claiming that one-half of the subject property
belonged to him as Ramona's surviving heir. He alleged that on several occassions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria's heirs refused and claimed sole
ownership of the property.

Leonardo further alleged that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles
and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included as part of the portion to be
awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband
of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and
transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property; and from 1988,
Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of the property
estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred expenses by way of
attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner
of half of the subject property.

In their answer, Teodora claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against
them and that they have become the sole owners of the subject property as Lucimo Sr.
(Teodora's husband) acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, that
they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious, and exclusive possession of the
property with just title, and that they have been paying taxes on the property, and
Leonardo's claim is barred by estoppel and laches.

During the course of the proceedings, additional information came to light that
the property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized document
dated April 4, 1943. Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on
November 25, 1943 via another private sale document. In 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an
Affidavit of Ownership of Land and obtained a new tax declaration over the property
solely in his name, which a repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made.

Meanwhile, in 1991, Lucimo Sr. died and the property was partitioned among
the petitioners to the exclusion of Leonardo.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that Leonardo's cause of action
has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals did not agree with the trial court's pronouncement that
Leonardo's action for partition was barred by prescription. It held that prescription
began to run not from Leon's death in 1962, but from Lucino Sr.'s execution of the
Affidavit of Ownership, citing Article 494 of the Civil Code:

"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership."

ISSUES:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon's estate.

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.

3. Whether Leonardo's claim has prescribed or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

RULING:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate.

Yes, since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs
– the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death.

Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,

petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the
property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership
or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.

They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person
in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.

The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and
Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that no such sale from Leon to
Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus,
petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their
claim over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr.
took place, the subject property clearly remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing
in 1962.

3. Whether Leonardo's claim has prescribed or that he is barred by estoppel or

laches.

No prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. For prescription to set in, the
repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order
that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be
argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the
co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property.

Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being

married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations,
which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity. Art. 150. Family
relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora
is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he
was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo,
and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.