Crisis Group Statement

2 January 2018

By Rob Malley, President and CEO of International Crisis Group

First published in Foreign Policy

10 Conflicts to Watch in 2018

From North Korea to Venezuela, here Rob Malley, formerly
are the conflicts to watch in 2018. Crisis Group’s Middle East
and North Africa Program
Director, was previously a
It’s not all about Donald Trump. Special Assistant to former
U.S. Presidents Barack
That’s a statement more easily written than Obama and Bill Clinton.
believed, given the U.S. president’s erratic
comportment on the world stage – his tweets paid by those perpetrating it. But one ought not
and taunts, his cavalier disregard of interna- forget that Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) in the
tional accords, his readiness to undercut his same election season, and Barack Obama, as a
own diplomats, his odd choice of foes, and his candidate in the preceding ones, both rejected
even odder choice of friends. And yet, a more foreign entanglements and belittled nation
inward-looking United States and a greater building. Trump wasn’t shaping the public
international diffusion of power, increasingly mood. He was reflecting it.
militarized foreign policy, and shrinking space The retrenchment is a matter of degree,
for multilateralism and diplomacy are features of course, given the approximately 200,000
of the international order that predate the cur- active-duty U.S. troops deployed worldwide.
rent occupant of the White House and look set But in terms of ability to manipulate or mold
to outlast him. events around the globe, U.S. influence has
The first trend – U.S. retrenchment – has been waning as power spreads to the east and
been in the making for years, hastened by the south, creating a more multipolar world in
2003 Iraq War that, intended to showcase which armed nonstate actors are playing a
American power, did more to demonstrate much larger role.
its limitations. Overreach abroad, fatigue at The second trend, the growing militariza-
home, and a natural rebalancing after the rela- tion of foreign policy, also represents continu-
tively brief period of largely uncontested U.S. ity as much as departure. Trump exhibits a
supremacy in the 1990s mean the decline was taste for generals and disdain for diplomats;
likely inevitable. Trump’s signature “America his secretary of state has an even more curious
First” slogan harbors a toxic nativist, exclu- penchant to dismember the institution from
sionary, and intolerant worldview. His failure which he derives his power. But they are mag-
to appreciate the value of alliances to U.S. nifying a wider and older pattern. The space for
interests and his occasional disparagement of diplomacy was shrinking long before Trump’s
traditional partners is particularly self-defeat- administration took an ax to the State Depart-
ing. His lamentations about the cost of U.S. ment. Throughout conflict zones, leaders
overseas intervention lack any introspection increasingly appear prone to fight more than
regarding the price paid by peoples subjected to talk – and to fight by violating international
to that intervention, focusing solely on that norms rather than respecting them.
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

This owes much to how the rhetoric of The most ominous threats in 2018 – nuclear
counterterrorism has come to dominate foreign war on the Korean Peninsula and a spiraling
policy in theory and in practice. It has given confrontation pitting the United States and its
license to governments to first label their armed allies against Iran – could both be aggravated
opponents as terrorists and then treat them by Trump’s actions, inactions, and idiosyncra-
as such. Over a decade of intensive Western sies. U.S. demands (in the North Korean case,
military operations has contributed to a more denuclearization; in Iran’s, unilateral renego-
permissive environment for the use of force. tiation of the nuclear deal or Tehran’s regional
Many recent conflicts have involved valuable retreat) are unrealistic without serious diplo-

“ Over a decade of intensive Western military

operations has contributed to a more permissive
environment for the use of force.”

geopolitical real estate, escalating regional and matic engagement or reciprocal concessions. In
major power rivalries, more outside involve- the former, Washington could face the prospect
ment in conflicts, and the fragmentation and of provoking a nuclear war in order to avoid
proliferation of armed groups. There is more one, and in the latter, there is the possibility of
to play for, more players in the game, and less jeopardizing a nuclear deal that is succeeding
overlap among their core interests. All of these for the sake of a confrontation with Iran that
developments present obstacles to negotiated almost certainly will not.
settlements. (A third potential flashpoint that didn’t
The third trend is the erosion of multilat- make it into our top 10 – because it came so
eralism. Whereas former President Obama late and was so unexpected and gratuitous – is
sought (with mixed success) to manage and the Jerusalem powder keg. At the time of writ-
cushion America’s relative decline by bolstering ing, it has not yet exploded, perhaps because
international agreements – such as trade deals, when one is as hopeless as the Palestinians
the Paris climate accord, and the Iran nuclear there is little hope left to be dashed. Still, the
negotiations – President Trump recoils from all Trump administration’s decision to recognize
that. Where Obama opted for burden-sharing, Jerusalem as the capital of Israel for purely
Trump’s instinct is for burden-shedding. domestic political reasons, with no conceiv-
Even this dynamic, however, has deeper able foreign-policy gain and a risk of explosion,
roots. On matters of international peace and must rank as a prime example of diplomatic
security in particular, multilateralism has been malpractice.)
manhandled for years. Animosity between As with all trends, there are countervail-
Russia and Western powers has rendered the ing ones often propelled by discomfort that
United Nations Security Council impotent on the dominant trends provoke. Europeans are
major conflicts since at least the 2011 Libya defending the Iranian nuclear deal and may
intervention; that animosity now infects end up deepening their own common security
debates on most crises on the council’s agenda. and strategic independence, President Emma-
Trump is not the only leader emphasizing bilat- nuel Macron is testing the reach of French
eral arrangements and ad hoc alliances above diplomacy, and international consensus on
multilateral diplomacy and intergovernmental action against climate change has held. Perhaps
institutions. African states, already leading efforts to man-
Then again, much of it is about Trump, ines- age crises on the continent, will step up in the
capably. Democratic Republic of the Congo or another
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

of the continent’s major conflicts. Perhaps they be dissuaded from retaliating in the event of
or another assortment of actors could make the limited, targeted military action.
case for more engagement and dialogue and for For now, the United States is implementing
defusing crises rather than exacerbating them. a “maximum pressure strategy”: corralling the
These may seem slender reeds on which to Security Council into tougher sanctions, press-
rest our hopes. But, as the following list of the ing China to do more to strangle its neighbor’s
International Crisis Group’s top 10 conflicts to economy, conducting large Air Force and Navy
watch in 2018 unhappily illustrates, and for now drills, and signaling directly or through con-
at least, they may well be the only reeds we have. gressional allies that it does not fear military
confrontation. Despite conflicting messages
1.  North Korea from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the
North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing cou- Trump administration is making clear that it
pled with the White House’s bellicose rhetoric is not interested in talks whose goal would be
make the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula anything short of North Korea’s denucleariza-
– even a catastrophic nuclear confrontation – tion, an objective as worthy as it is delusional.
higher now than at any time in recent history. As the White House sees it, the approach is
Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test in September working: U.S. military action is no longer
2017 and the increasing range of its mis- unimaginable for either North Korea or China.
siles clearly demonstrate its determination to It hopes the former will be compelled to back
advance its nuclear program and intercontinen- down and the latter will get them there.
tal strike capability. From the United States, But this approach means a race against
meanwhile, comes careless saber-rattling and time – with Washington almost certainly on
confusing signals about diplomacy. the losing side. Restrictive measures will not
Kim Jong Un’s push for nuclear arms is bite immediately, and they will bite the North
driven partly by fear that without such deter- Korean leadership last; ordinary citizens will
rence he risks being deposed by outside powers suffer sooner and worse. Feeling threatened,
and partly by perceived threats inside North Pyongyang is more likely to accelerate weapons
Korea, notably elite rivalries, the tightly man- development than halt or slow it. Both China
aged but still unpredictable impact of economic and South Korea support tighter sanctions
reform, and his difficulty in controlling infor- and are as frustrated with Pyongyang as they
mation flow – including from foreign media are alarmed by the prospect of U.S. military
channels. action. But South Korea has little power to alter
The aggressive tone from Washington the situation, China’s willingness to pressure
reflects equal urgency in the opposite direc- North Korea may be reaching its limit, and its
tion. At least some senior officials believe influence over a fiercely independent neigh-
North Korea must be prevented at all costs bor resentful of its reliance on Beijing is easily
from advancing its nuclear program, in par- overstated. While Chinese President Xi Jinping
ticular from being able to strike the continental fears the prospect of war on the peninsula
United States with a missile carrying a nuclear bringing chaos, a possibly U.S.-aligned regime,
payload. After crossing that threshold, they and U.S. troops to his doorstep, he also fears
believe, Kim Jong Un will conclude that he can that squeezing Pyongyang could precipitate
deter Washington from protecting its allies turmoil that could spill over into China.
and thus impose demands – from lifting trade Without a viable diplomatic offramp,
restrictions to expelling U.S. troops, all the way Washington risks cornering itself into military
to Korean reunification on his terms. Those action. Even a precisely targeted attack would
same officials appear convinced that he can likely provoke a North Korean response. While
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

Pyongyang would think twice before initiating a at least as high a price for its actions as it can
conventional strike on Seoul, it could take other inflict on its adversaries.
steps: an attack on a soft South Korean target; The strategy seems to involve multiple
an asymmetric strike against U.S. assets on or forms of pressure to contain, squeeze, exhaust,
around the peninsula; or crippling cyberat- and ultimately push back Iran. It has an
tacks. These might not immediately trigger economic dimension (via U.S. sanctions); a
regional conflict, but they would provoke an diplomatic one (witness vocal U.S. and Saudi
unpredictable escalation. denunciations of Iran’s regional behavior and
A successful diplomatic initiative ultimately Riyadh’s ham-handed attempt to force Leba-
will need to address two competing preoccu- nese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation);
pations: U.S. and wider international fears of and a military one (so far exerted principally by
what the Pyongyang regime would do with an Saudi Arabia in Yemen and by Israel in Syria).
advanced nuclear capacity, and the regime’s Whether it will work is another ques-
fear of what might happen to it without one. tion. Although recent protests in Iran have
The U.S. government should marry its sanc- introduced a new and unpredictable variable,
tions and those of the UN to a clear and realis- Tehran and its partners still appear to be in a
tic political goal. An incremental solution could strong position. The Bashar al-Assad regime,
include pauses on North Korean testing of its backed by Russian air power, is prevailing in
missile system or weapons, before Pyongyang Syria. Across Iraq, Iran-linked Shiite militias
crosses what the White House sees as a red are entrenching themselves in state institu-
line; the United States agreeing to less pro- tions. In Yemen, Tehran’s relatively small
vocative military exercises; and consensus on investment in backing the Houthis has helped
humanitarian support even as sanctions kick them weather the Saudi-led campaign and even
in. That might not satisfy anyone. But at least launch missiles of unprecedented range and
it would provide the space needed to explore a accuracy into Saudi territory.
more durable resolution. Despite demonstrating its resolve to con-
front Iran and its partners, Riyadh has been
2.  U.S.-Saudi-Iran Rivalry unable to alter the balance of power. Forcing
This rivalry will likely eclipse other Middle Hariri’s resignation backfired, not just because
Eastern fault lines in 2018. It is enabled and he later withdrew it, but also because all of
exacerbated by three parallel developments: Lebanon united against the move and Hariri
the consolidation of the authority of Moham- then inched closer to Lebanese President
med bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s assertive Michel Aoun and Hezbollah. In Yemen, Riyadh
crown prince; the Trump administration’s more turned the Houthis and former President Ali
aggressive strategy toward Iran; and the end of Abdullah Saleh against each other, but in doing
the Islamic State’s territorial control in Iraq and so further fragmented the country and compli-
Syria, which allows Washington and Riyadh to cated the search for a settlement and a face-
aim the spotlight more firmly on Iran. saving Saudi exit from a war that is enormously
The contours of a U.S./Saudi strategy (with costly not only to Yemenis but also to Riyadh’s
an important Israeli assist) are becoming clear. international standing. The Trump administra-
It is based on an overriding assumption that tion confronts similar obstacles. Thus far its
Iran has exploited passive regional and inter- belligerence, refusal to certify the nuclear deal,
national actors to bolster its position in Syria, threats of new sanctions, and launching of sev-
Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. Washington and eral strikes at and near regime targets in Syria
Riyadh seek to re-establish a sense of deter- have done little to reverse Tehran’s reach.
rence by convincing Tehran that it will pay With so many flashpoints, and so little
diplomacy, the risk of an escalatory cycle is
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

great: Any move – new U.S. sanctions that security for all communities, grants the Roh-
Iran would see as violating the nuclear deal; ingya freedom of movement as well as access to
a Houthi missile strike hitting Riyadh or Abu services and other rights, and allows humani-
Dhabi, for which Washington and Riyadh tarian and refugee agencies unfettered access.
would hold Tehran responsible; or an Israeli While publicly, Bangladesh’s government is
strike in Syria that kills Iranians – could trigger trying to persuade Myanmar to take the refu-
a broader confrontation. gees back, privately it acknowledges the hope-
lessness of that endeavor. It has neither defined
3.  The Rohingya Crisis: Myanmar policies nor taken operational decisions on how
and Bangladesh to manage more than a million Rohingya in its
Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis has entered a southeast, along the Myanmar border, in the
dangerous new phase, threatening Myanmar’s medium- to long-term. International funding
hard-won democratic transition, its stability, for an under-resourced emergency operation
and that of Bangladesh and the region as a will run out in February. All this – indeed, the
whole. very presence of a large population of state-
An August attack by the Arakan Rohingya less refugees – creates enormous dangers for
Salvation Army (ARSA), a militant group in Bangladesh. Conflict between refugees and a
Myanmar’s Rakhine state, prompted a brutal host community that is heavily outnumbered
and indiscriminate military response targeting in parts of the southeast and faces rising prices
the long-mistreated Muslim Rohingya com- and falling wages is an immediate risk. The
munity. That assault led to a massive refugee refugees’ presence also could be used to stoke
exodus, with at least 655,000 Rohingya fleeing communal conflict or aggravate political divi-
for Bangladesh. The UN called the operation sions ahead of elections expected in late 2018.
a “textbook example” of ethnic cleansing. The There are risks, too, for Myanmar. ARSA
government has heavily restricted humanitar- could regroup. It or even transnational groups
ian aid to the area, and international goodwill exploiting the Rohingya cause or recruiting
toward Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s Nobel among the displaced could launch cross-border
Peace Prize-winning state counsellor, has dis- attacks, escalating both Muslim-Buddhist
sipated. Her government retains its hard-line tension in Rakhine state and friction between
stance toward the Rohingya and resists conces- Myanmar and Bangladesh. Any attack outside
sions on even immediate humanitarian issues. Rakhine would provoke broader Buddhist-
In this, it has the support of the population, Muslim tension and violence across the coun-
which has embraced the Buddhist national- try. Acknowledging the crisis, implementing
ist and anti-Rohingya rhetoric disseminated recommendations of the Kofi Annan-led
through state and social media. Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, and
Pressure from the UN Security Council is disavowing divisive narratives would put the
critical, and Western governments are mov- Myanmar government – and its people – on a
ing toward targeted sanctions, which are a key better path.
signal that such actions cannot go unpunished.
Unfortunately, these sanctions are unlikely to 4. Yemen
have a significant positive impact on Myan- With 8 million people on the brink of famine,
mar’s policies. The focus is rightly on the right 1 million declared cholera cases, and over 3
of refugees to return in a voluntary, safe and, million internally displaced persons, the Yemen
dignified manner. In reality, however, and war could escalate further in 2018. After a
notwithstanding a late-November Bangladesh/ period of rising tensions, dueling rallies, and
Myanmar repatriation agreement, the refu- armed assaults, former President Ali Abdullah
gees will not return unless Myanmar restores Saleh announced in December that his General
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

People’s Congress was abandoning its partner- fiercer U.S. airstrikes, and more aggressive
ship with the Houthis in favor of the Saudi-led ground offensives by Afghan forces. The aim,
coalition. Saleh paid for it with his life; he was according to senior officials, is to halt the
killed immediately by his erstwhile partners. Taliban’s momentum and, eventually, force it
Saudi Arabia and its allies – believing that into a political settlement. For now, though, the
the Houthi/General People’s Congress split strategy is almost exclusively military.
opens new opportunities and still convinced a This strategy faces serious obstacles. While
military solution exists – will likely intensify hitting the Taliban harder might bring tactical
their campaign at a huge cost to civilians. Iran gains, it is unlikely to change the war’s course
will keep finding ample opportunity to keep the or the incentives of a locally rooted and potent
Saudis bogged down, and the more anarchic insurgency. The Taliban currently controls or
Yemen’s north becomes, the more likely that is contesting more territory than at any time
violence is to bleed across the border. The Hou- since 2001; it is better equipped and, even if
this will continue to take the fight to the Saudi pressured through conventional fighting, it
homefront, firing missiles toward Riyadh and would retain the ability to mount spectacular
threatening other Gulf states. urban attacks that erode confidence in the
Negotiations, already a distant prospect, government. Besides, between 2009 and 2012,
have become more complicated. The Hou- the Taliban withstood more than 100,000 U.S.
this, feeling simultaneously emboldened and troops.
embattled, could adopt a more uncompromis- Military leaders contend that this time will
ing stance. The General People’s Congress, be different because Trump, unlike Obama, has
a pragmatic centrist party, could fragment not set a withdrawal date. That argument holds
further. The south is divided, owing partly to little water. It also misreads the insurgency:
the widening rift between forces loyal to Yem- Battlefield losses in the past have not impacted
eni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Taliban leaders’ willingness to negotiate. Forth-
southern separatists backed by the United Arab coming Afghan elections (a parliamentary poll
Emirates. is slated for July 2018; a presidential vote is
There are signs of mounting U.S. discom- due in 2019) will suck oxygen from the military
fort with the indiscriminate Saudi bombard- campaign. Every vote since 2004 has ignited
ment and the blockade of Houthi-controlled some form of crisis, and political discord today
territories. But the Trump administration’s is particularly severe, with President Ashraf
belligerent rhetoric toward Iran encourages all Ghani accused by his critics of monopolizing
the wrong tendencies in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia power in the hands of a few advisors.
and its allies should instead lift the blockade of The strategy also underplays regional shifts.
Yemen and reopen civilian airports. Politically, Thus far, U.S. regional diplomacy has centered
there should be a new Security Council resolu- on pressuring Pakistan; yet the calculations
tion providing for a balanced settlement. The that motivate Islamabad’s support for the
Saudis are loath to concede anything to a group insurgency are unlikely to change. The Taliban
they consider an Iranian proxy, but were they also now enjoys ties to Iran and Russia, which
to embrace a realistic peace initiative, the onus claim to view it as a bulwark against an Islamic
would shift to the Houthis to accept it. State branch in Afghanistan that is small
but resilient – and also capable of mounting
5. Afghanistan high-profile attacks. Washington’s militarized
The War in Afghanistan looks set to intensify approach and diminished diplomacy risk
in 2018. The United States’ new Afghanistan signaling to those countries that it seeks not to
strategy raises the tempo of operations against stabilize and leave Afghanistan but to maintain
the Taliban insurgency, with more U.S. forces, a military presence. Given that they are likely
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

to perceive such a presence as a threat to their the two sides mostly have avoided confronta-
own interests, it could lead them to increase tion. With the Islamic State gone, the risks will
support for insurgents. Nor does U.S. diplo- increase.
macy on Afghanistan currently involve China, The east is also perilous due to wider U.S.-
whose increasing clout in parts of South Asia Iran rivalry and the close proximity of these
will make it critical to any settlement. rival forces. Iranian gains, particularly the
It is true that demonstrating sustained corridor linking regime-held parts of Syria to
U.S. support might reinforce the morale of the government-controlled Iraq, could provoke the
Afghan Army; a precipitous withdrawal, in U.S. to attempt to block what it views as a dan-
contrast, could trigger chaos. But as the battle- gerous land bridge from Iran to the Mediterra-
field tempo increases, the Trump administra- nean. Iran might target U.S. forces to retaliate
tion should keep lines of communication to the against U.S. actions elsewhere or to push the
insurgency open and explore the contours of a United States out altogether.
settlement with Afghanistan’s neighbors and In the southwest, Israel could view Iran-
other regional powers, however slim prospects backed militias operating on and near the
currently appear. U.S. allies in Afghanistan Golan Heights as a direct threat and take
should push for a greater diplomatic political military action to push them back. Whether
component to the U.S. strategy. As it stands, Moscow can prevent any Iranian or Hezbol-
that strategy sets the stage for more violence lah presence there, as it has pledged to do, is
while closing avenues for de-escalation. Afghan unclear. Israel may take matters into its own
civilians will pay the price. hands, striking Iran-allied forces. That pattern
– prodding by Iran, pushback by Israel – could
6. Syria last for some time. But a wider confrontation is
After nearly seven years of war, President only one miscalculation away and could quickly
Bashar al-Assad’s regime has the upper hand, spread beyond Syria, to Lebanon.
thanks largely to Iranian and Russian back- One of the gravest immediate dangers,
ing. But the fighting is not over. Large swaths however, is the possibility of an offensive by
of the country remain outside regime control, the Assad regime in Syria’s northwest, where
regional and international powers disagree on a rebel-held areas are home to some 2 million
settlement, and Syria is an arena for the rivalry Syrians and into which Turkey has deployed
between Iran and its enemies. As the Islamic military observers as part of a de-escalation
State is ousted from the east, prospects for deal with Iran and Russia. Regime and allied
escalation elsewhere will increase. forces appear to have shifted some attention
In eastern Syria, rival campaigns by pro- from the east to those areas, placing that deal
regime forces (supported by Iran-backed mili- under stress. A regime offensive in the north-
tias and Russian airpower) and the Kurdish-led west could provoke massive destruction and
Syrian Democratic Forces (the SDF, backed by displacement.
the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition), have
forced an Islamic State retreat. In Syria and 7.  The Sahel
Iraq, Islamic State remnants have retreated Weak states across the Sahel region are strug-
into the desert to await new opportunities. gling to manage an overlapping mix of inter-
For the regime and the SDF, the fight communal conflict, jihadi violence, and fighting
against the Islamic State was a means to an over smuggling routes. Their leaders’ predation
end. The two aimed to capture territory and and militarized responses often make things
resources, but also to build on those gains – the worse.
regime by consolidating control; the Kurds Mali’s 2012 crisis – which saw the Malian
by pressing for maximal autonomy. Thus far, army routed from the country’s north, a coup
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

that overthrew the government, and jihadis leaders should not be ruled out, if doing so can
holding northern towns for almost a year – help diminish violence.
illustrates how quickly things can unravel.
Since then, implementation of a peace deal 8.  Democratic Republic of Congo
that aimed to end that crisis has stalled, while President Joseph Kabila’s determination to
instability has spread from the north to Mali’s hold on to power threatens to escalate the
central region as well as parts of neighboring crisis in Congo and a humanitarian emergency
Niger and Burkina Faso. that is already among the world’s worst. At
Dynamics in each place are local, but gov- the end of 2016, the Saint Sylvester agreement
ernments’ lack of authority and their inability appeared to offer a way out, requiring elections
to stem – and, at times, their frequent contri- by the end of 2017, after which Kabila would
bution to – violence is a common theme. Weap- leave power (his second and, according to the
ons that flooded the region as Libya collapsed Congolese Constitution, final term in office
after Muammar al-Qaddafi’s overthrow have should have ended December 2016). Over the
made local quarrels deadlier. The instability past year, however, his regime has backtracked,
has opened a rich vein for jihadis, who piggy- exploiting the Congolese opposition’s disarray
back on intercommunal conflict or use Islam to and waning international attention and reneg-
frame struggles against traditional authorities. ing on a power-sharing deal. In November, the
As the situation has degenerated, the election commission announced a new calen-
regional and international response has focused dar – with a vote at the end of 2018, extending
excessively on military solutions. Europeans Kabila’s rule for at least another year.
in particular view the region as a threat to their The most likely course in 2018 is gradual
own safety and a source of migration and ter- deterioration. But there are worse scenarios. As
rorism. In late 2017, a new French-backed force the regime clamps down, fails to secure parts of
known as the G5 Sahel – comprising troops the country, and stokes instability in others, the
from Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and risk of a steeper descent into chaos remains –
Mauritania – prepared to deploy into a field with grave regional implications.
already crowded by France’s own counterter- There are already troubling signs. Popular
rorism operations, U.S. Special Forces, and UN discontent raises the risk of unrest in urban
peacekeepers. While military action must play a centers; in recent days, the violent dispersal of
part in reducing jihadis’ influence, the G5 force protesters in Kinshasa and other towns has left
raises more questions than it answers. It lacks a several people dead. Elsewhere, local militias
clear definition of the enemy, instead envisag- plague several provinces. Fighting over the past
ing operations against an array of jihadis, traf- year in the Kasai region has reportedly left more
fickers, and other criminals. Disrupting smug- than 3,000 dead, and the conflict in the coun-
gling in regions where that business represents try’s east claims dozens of lives each month.
the backbone of local economies could alienate International engagement has been lacklus-
communities. Regional leaders also appear ter. Disagreements between Africa and the West
likely to misuse military aid to shore up their do not help: Western powers are more critical
own power. and have sanctioned some of Kabila’s entou-
To avoid further deterioration, military rage, and African leaders and regional organi-
efforts must be accompanied by a political zations are reluctant to criticize the regime
strategy that rests on winning the support of openly, even as some recognize the dangers
local populations and defusing rather than behind closed doors. Only more active, force-
aggravating local disputes. Opening or restor- ful, and united diplomacy – and ideally a more
ing lines of communication with some militant engaged Congolese opposition – stand a chance
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

of nudging Kabila toward a peaceful transition. security to Organization for Security and Coop-
The Saint Sylvester principles (credible elec- eration in Europe monitors, would more likely
tions, no third term for Kabila, an opening of freeze the conflict than resolve it.
political space, and respect for human rights) Yet Moscow’s proposal opens a window
still offer the best route out of the crisis. for Kiev and its Western allies to explore how
peacekeepers might secure not only the line of
9. Ukraine separation but also the Ukraine-Russia border,
The conflict in eastern Ukraine has claimed and to create conditions for local elections and
over 10,000 lives and constitutes a grave ongo- the reintegration of separatist-held areas. They
ing humanitarian crisis. While it persists, rela- should, however, factor in growing animosity
tions between Russia and the West are unlikely toward the Minsk agreement. Europe’s involve-
to improve. Separatist-held areas are dysfunc- ment is essential for progress on peacekeeping
tional and dependent on Moscow. In other negotiations and to promote a more measured
areas of Ukraine, mounting anger at corruption debate in Ukraine that can halt the nationalist
and the 2015 Minsk II agreement, which Russia backlash against the Minsk agreement.
and Ukraine’s Western allies insist is the path
to resolve the conflict, creates new challenges.
Implementation of that agreement has 10. Venezuela
stalled: Moscow points to Kiev’s failure to carry Venezuela took yet another turn for the worse
out the Minsk agreement’s political provisions, in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s govern-
including devolving power to separatist-held ment ran the country further into the ground
areas once they are reintegrated into Ukraine; while strengthening its political grip. The oppo-
Kiev argues it cannot do so while Russian inter- sition has imploded. Prospects for a peaceful
ference and insecurity in those areas persist. restoration of democracy appear ever slimmer.
Both sides continue to exchange fire across the But with the economy in free fall, Maduro faces
line dividing Ukrainian troops from separatist enormous challenges. Expect the humanitarian
and Russian forces. crisis to deepen in 2018 as GDP continues to
Yet the east is not the whole story. The contract.
Ukrainian state remains fragile even outside In late November, Venezuela defaulted
areas where Moscow interferes directly. Presi- on part of its international debt. Sanctions
dent Petro Poroshenko’s government has not will make debt restructuring nearly impos-
addressed the systemic corruption at the root sible. Increasing Russian support is unlikely
of many of the country’s problems. Many to suffice, while China appears reluctant to
Ukrainians are losing faith in laws, institutions, bail Maduro out. A default could provoke the
and elites. Anger at the Minsk agreement, seizure of Venezuelan assets abroad, crippling
which Ukrainians see as a concession to separa- the oil trade that accounts for 95 percent of the
tists and Moscow, is growing, even among country’s export earnings.
reformists. Street demonstrations and clashes that
Given the diplomatic deadlock, Russia’s killed over 120 people between April and July
circulation of a draft UN Security Council subsided after the July election of a National
resolution proposing peacekeepers for Ukraine Constituent Assembly composed entirely of
in September 2017 came as a surprise. There government allies. Subsequent polls for state
are good reasons to suspect Russia’s intentions. governors and mayors led to major opposition
Despite the high costs of its entanglement, little losses amid disputes over whether to partici-
suggests it intends to loosen its grip on eastern pate. But food shortages, a collapsed health sys-
Ukraine. The lightly armed force it proposed, tem, and spiraling violent crime mean condi-
whose mandate would include only providing tions for unrest persist.
I N T ER NAT IONA L CR ISIS GROU P  ·  2 JA N UA RY 2018

While opposition politicians look to the weak Venezuelan state will continue to provide
presidential vote, due by late 2018, as an a haven for criminal networks and opportuni-
opportunity and entry point for foreign engage- ties for money laundering, drug trafficking, and
ment, the government is unlikely to permit a people smuggling, further disquieting Venezue-
credible vote. It might call early polls, catch la’s neighbors.
its opponents unprepared, and deploy the The prognosis for 2018 is further dete-
same voter suppression tactics it has used to rioration, humanitarian emergency, and an
win local and regional elections. If the opposi- increased exodus of Venezuelans. Sustained
tion begins to show signs of recovery, Maduro domestic and international pressure – as well
might seek to avoid elections altogether by as guarantees of future immunity – will be
claiming that external threats warrant a state required to push the government toward cred-
of emergency. A less probable scenario is that ible presidential elections.
the ruling party splits over who will succeed
Maduro; without a formal mechanism, the mili-
tary would be the likely arbiter. Meanwhile, the