ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, vs.

ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil-Service,

CASTRO, J.:

The petitioner's motions for reconsideration are directed specifically at the following portion of our
decision:

"In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred,
reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form
and substance . . . The provision of the substitute bill reads:

'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.'

"xxx xxx xxx

"At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase 'has served as officer in the Armed Forces' was
inserted so as to make the provision read:

'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer
of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.'

"It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has served
the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which
the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished
the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process
the phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped and only the Rodrigo
amendment was retained."

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of
Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase
"or has served as chief of police with exemplary record."

In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of
House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as
finally approved by both Houses of Congress (annex G), the following provision appears:
"SEC. 10. Minimum qualifications for appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. - No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution
of learning and has served either the Armed Forces of the Philippines or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record or the National Bureau of Investigation or the police department of any city and has
held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who
has served the police department of a city or has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years from the rank of captain and/or higher."

It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or,"
was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire
provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."

The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was
signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the bill,
explaining the change in Section 10, thus:

"Section 10. was recast for clarity. (with the consent of Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano)."

It would thus appear that the omission - whether deliberate or unintended - of the phrase, "who has
served the police department of a city or," was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but
only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the
change was made not by Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedty was a
rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that
the petitioner would have us look searchingly into the matter.

The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of government. As we
observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President
of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form
by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better
done in Congress. After all, House cleaning - the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitioner - can best be effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a
matter worthy of the attention not an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.

What the first Mr. Justice Harlan said in Harwood v. Wentworth 1 might aptly be said in answer to the
petitioner: "If there be danger, under the principles announced in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671, that
the governor and the presiding officers of the two houses of a territorial legislature may impose upon the
people an act that was never passed in the form in which it is preserved in the published statutes, how
much greater is the danger of permitting the validity of a legislative enactment to be questioned by
evidence furnished by the general indorsements made by clerks upon bills previous to their final passage
and enrollment, - indorsements usually so expressed as not to be intelligible to any one except those who
made them, and the scope and effect of which cannot in many cases be understood unless supplemented
by the recollection of clerks as to what occurred in the hurry and confusion often attendant upon
legislative proceedings." 2

Indeed the course suggested to us by the petitioner would be productive of nothing but mischief.

Both Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark and Harwood v. Wentworth involved claims similar to that made by the
petitioner in this case. In both the claims were rejected. Thus, in Marshall Field & Co. it was contended
that the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 was a nullity because "it is shown by the congressional records of
proceedings, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress,
and having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill as it finally passed, was not in the bill
authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress, and
approved by the President." 3 In rejecting the contention, the United States Supreme Court held that the
signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled
bill is an official attestation by the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. And when
the bill thus attested is signed by the President and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. 4

In Harwood the claim was that an act of the legislature of Arizona "contained, at the time of its final
passage, provisions that were omitted from it without authority of the council or the house, before it was
presented to the governor for his approval." 5 The Court reiterated its ruling in Marshall Field & Co.

It is contended, however, that in this jurisdiction the journals of the legislature have been declared
conclusive upon the courts, the petitioner citing United States v. Pons. 6 The case cited is inapposite as it
does not involve a discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the journal. Rather the issue tendered was
whether evidence could be received to show that, contrary to the entries of the journals, the legislature
did not adjourn at midnight of February 28, 1914 but after, and that "the hands of the clock were stayed
in order to enable the legislature to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session." In answering in the negative this Court
held that if the clock was in fact stopped, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of
the treachery of memory." 7 This Court "passed over the question" whether the enrolled bill was
conclusive as to its contents and mode of passage.

It was not until 1947 that the question was presented in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, 8 and we there held that
an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." This court held itself bound by an
authenticated resolution, despite the fact' that the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Congress
(as required by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually
obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate.

Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt there might have been as to the
status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in view of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, 9 was
finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. 10 Speaking for
the Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion said:

"Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill - which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of
'urea and formaldehyde' - is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez-
Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive - on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system - the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree."

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution 11
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which we do not now decide. 12 All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.