Atok Big Wedge vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 63528

Facts: The decision of the CA, reversing the RTC which denied the application for land registration of Mr.
Saingan on the ground that the land was part of the mining claim of herein petitioner, wherein such
reversal was due to the lack of evidence that shows that they have rights vested on the land, is being
assailed in this petition.

Issue: Who has a better right?

Held: Mr. Saingan has a better right.

PH Bill of 1902

Under the Philippine bill of 1902, the holder of the mineral claim so located is entitled to all the minerals
which may lie within his claim, but he may not mine outside the boundary lines of his claim. The mine
claim locator must have his claim recorded in the mining recorder within thirty (30) days after the
location thereof; One of the continuing requirements for the subsistence of the mining claim is
performance of not less than one hundred dollars' worth of labor or undertaking of improvements of
the same value every year.

The 1935 Constitution

Not really all of the Philippines' natural resources were considered part of the public domain. Those
natural resources, and for that matter, those mineral lands and minerals with respect to which there
already was "any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under in Constitution," were then considered outside the application of the
jura regalia doctrine. This includes the mining claims under PH Bill 1902

CA 137

Since said 1935 Constitution necessarily prohibits the alienation of mining lands, the Mining Act granted
only lease rights to mining claimants who are proscribed from purchasing the mining claim itself. These
provisions of the Mining Act, however, were expressly inapplicable to mining claimants who had located
and recorded their claims under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

EO 141

E.O. No. 141 established the status of such unpatended mining claims which have not complied with
the annual work requirement, as having been abandoned and open for relocation, their declarations
of location being accordingly cancelled.

What is the nature of a claim of under PB 1902?

It can be said (1) that the rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 of a mining claim holder over his claim
has been made subject by the said Bill itself to the strict requirement that he actually performs work or
undertakes improvements on the mine every year and does not merely file his affidavit of annual
assessment, which requirement was correctly identified and declared in E.O. No. 141; and (2) that the
same rights have been terminated by P.D. No. 1214, a police power enactment, under which non-
application for mining lease amounts to waiver of all rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
application for mining lease amounts to waiver of the right under said Bill to apply for patent. In the light
of these substantial conditions upon the rights of a mining claim holder under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
there should remain no doubt now that such rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the
nature of ownership, and neither were they intended to be so.

Given that, nowhere on the subject land could be found tangible works or improvements of an extent
that would have existed has petitioner really complied with the annual work requirement from 1931
when it allegedly first located said mining claims. In fact, no mining infrastructure or equipment of any
sort can be found on the area, hence, petition is denied.

Didipio Earth Savers vs. Gozun

Facts: Being assailed herein is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine mining act
of 1995.

On 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares
covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu,
Nueva Vizcaya. AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes
under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders
of which are Australian nationals.

Petitioners then after multiple demands from the executive department to cancel the CAMC FTAA, filed
a petition for prohibition and mandamus on the ground that RA 7942 is unconstitutional.

Issues:

1) Is the government reduced to a sub-contractor upon the request of the private respondent, and
on account of the foregoing provision, the contractor can compel the government to exercise its
power of eminent domain thereby derogating the latters power to expropriate property?
2) Whether or not the respondents interpretation of the role of wholly foreign and foreign-owned
corporations in their involvement in mining enterprises, violates paragraph 4, section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
3) Whether or not the 1987 constitution prohibits service contracts

Held:

1) No. The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-
owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government
then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a
 voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA.
Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which
surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation.
2) No. The foregoing gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed
upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners contention.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government
agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and
change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure
commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining
enterprise.
3) No. The use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or
technical assistance. The word involving as used in this context has three connotations that can
be differentiated thus: one, the sense of concerning, having to do with, or affecting; two,
entailing, requiring, implying or necessitating; and three, including, containing or comprising.
a. We are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike
those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or owner of
the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital,
technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and
operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its
agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.
La bugal-blaan tribal association, inc vs. Ramos, DENR Secretary
G.R. No. 127882 December and January

Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of
(1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995,
executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed
between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited
by the 1987 Constitution.

Service Contracts: A service contract is a contractual arrangement for engaging in the exploitation and
development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other natural resources by which a government or
its agency, or a private person granted a right or privilege by the government authorizes the other party
(service contractor) to engage or participate in the exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the
privilege, in that the latter provides financial or technical resources, undertakes the exploitation or
production of a given resource, or directly manages the productive enterprise, operations of the
exploration and exploitation of the resources or the disposition of marketing or resources

Issue: Are service contracts unconstitutional? Is RA 7942 valid?

Held: In the January case, the Court rule that the FTAAs were unconstitutional , citing previous
interpretations of the Constitutional Commissions. Hence:

In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by
non-Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is very restrictive. Commissioner
Nolledo also remarked that entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of
natural resources for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be subject,
whenever possible, to stringent rules. Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provision rather than the exception.

With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act
authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical
agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service
contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
However, in the December MR, the Court reversed, citing the same provision in Art. XII:

“The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based
on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements,
the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.”

“The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.”

Interpreting the foregoing:

1. All natural resources are owned by the State. Except for agricultural lands, natural resources cannot
be alienated by the State.

2. The exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.

3. The State may undertake these EDU activities through either of the following:

(a) By itself directly and solely

(b) By (i) co-production; (ii) joint venture; or (iii) production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
corporations, at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by such citizens

4. Small-scale utilization of natural resources may be allowed by law in favor of Filipino citizens.

5. For large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law.

We do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could
inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters choice of words -- their
use of the phrase agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate
the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could
have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin
with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue.

In contrast, the use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical
assistance. The word involving as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated
thus: one, the sense of concerning, having to do with, or affecting; two, entailing, requiring, implying or
necessitating; and three, including, containing or comprising.
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word involving,
when understood in the sense of including, as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily
implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an
agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something
else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.

Technology Developers vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal
briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N.
Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring
with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's
permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other
document.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor
ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

Issue:Should a writ of preliminary injunction be granted?

Held: No. The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or
otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary
relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning
industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and
contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health,
nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
Henares vs. LTFRB
G.R. no. 158290

Facts: Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act
No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus

Held: Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1)
against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any
tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and
exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation
and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed
for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give
sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental
problems raised in this petition

MMDA vs. Jancom

Facts: On December 19, 1997, the BOT Contract for the waste-to-energy project was signed between
JANCOM and the Philippine Government. On March 5, 1998, the BOT contract was submitted to
President Ramos for approval but this was too close to the end of his term which expired without him
signing the contract. President Ramos, however, endorsed the contract to incoming President Joseph E.
Estrada.
With the change of administration, the composition of the EXECOM also changed. And due to the
clamor of residents of Rizal province, President Estrada had, in the interim, also ordered the closure of
the San Mateo landfill. Due to these circumstances, the Greater Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee adopted a resolution not to pursue the BOT contract with JANCOM. Subsequently, the
implementation of the BOT contract executed and signed between JANCOM and the Philippine
Government would no longer be pursued.

Due to availing the wrong remedy, wherein they filed a certiorari case instead of an appeal with the CA,
the RTC declared its judgement for execution, which led to the dismissal of the case in the CA. Also, the
CA declared that:

There is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM given that: a)
the contract does not bear the signature of the President of the Philippines; b) the conditions precedent
specified in the contract were not complied with; and c) there was no valid notice of award.

Issue: Was there a valid contract between the parties?

Held: The Court ruled that the failure to appeal was in fact sufficient enough to dismiss the petition.
However, ruling in the substantive issue. Citing the elements of a contract, the court ruled that:

In the case at bar, the signing and execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between
the parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the material details of the
contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the contract. The execution and signing of the contract
is not disputed by the parties. As the Court of Appeals aptly held:

Contrary to petitioners insistence that there was no perfected contract, the meeting of the offer and
acceptance upon the thing and the cause, which are to constitute the contract (Arts. 1315 and 1319,
New Civil Code), is borne out by the records.

Admittedly, when petitioners accepted private respondents bid proposal (offer), there was, in effect, a
meeting of the minds upon the object (waste management project) and the cause (BOT scheme). Hence,
the perfection of the contract. In City of Cebu vs. Heirs of Candido Rubi (306 SCRA 108), the Supreme
Court held that the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to
perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the bidder.

The fact that Chairman Oretas letter informed JANCOM EC that it was the sole complying (winning)
bidder for the San Mateo project leads to no other conclusion than that the project was being awarded
to it. But assuming that said notice of award did not comply with the legal requirements, private
respondents cannot be faulted therefore as it was the government representatives duty to issue the
proper notice.

As to the signature: The first argument conveniently overlooks the fact that then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Victor Ramos was likewise a signatory to the contract. While dela
Serna and Oreta may not have had any authority to sign, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources has such an authority. In fact, the authority of the signatories to the contract was not denied
by the Solicitor General. Moreover, as observed by the Court of Appeals, [i]t was not alleged, much less
shown, that those who signed in behalf of the Republic had acted beyond the scope of their authority.
The provision pertinent to the authority of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources would
actually be Section 1 of Executive Order No. 380, Series of 1989 which provides that The Secretaries of
all Departments and Governing Boards of government-owned or controlled corporations [except the
Secretaries of Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Communication, and Local Government
with respect to Rural Road Improvement projects] can enter into publicly bidded contracts regardless of
amount (See also Section 515, Government Accounting and Auditing Manual Volume I). Consequently,
MMDA may not claim that the BOT contract is not valid and binding due to the lack of presidential
approval.

Calanza vs. Paper Industries

Facts: On 22 December 1992, the governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Y. Lopez, approved the
applications and issued six small-scale mining permits in favor of the petitioners. Since the mining areas
applied for by petitioners were within the respondent Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines’
(PICOP) logging concession area under Timber License Agreements (TLAs), PICOP, through its officer
Roberto A. Dormendo, refused petitioners’ entry into the mining area on the grounds that it has the
exclusive right of occupation, possession and control over the area being a logging concessionaire
thereof; that petitioners’ mining permits are defective since they were issued by the governor of Davao
Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig, Surigao
del Sur; and that mining permits cannot be issued over areas covered by forest rights such as TLAs or
forest reservations unless their status as such is withdrawn by competent authority.

Issue: Whether PICOP has the right and authority to deny petitioners access to, possession of and the
authority to conduct mining activities within the disputed area

Held: Yes. Petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under Presidential Decree
No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect10 on 18 July 1991, approval of
the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining
Regulatory Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining
sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a representative from an environmental
group, this body is tasked to approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.

In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991,
making them bound by the procedures provided for under the applicable and prevailing statute,
Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte.
Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits
are null and void.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and
others similarly situated
G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

Facts: On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of
the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization
espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; that the DENR Secretary
unduly usurped and interfered with the jurisdiction of the RPA which had dismissed all adverse claims
against SEM in the Consolidated Mines cases; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the
unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are
enforced by the DENR.

Issue: Did the said memorandum order dictated the said recourse and, in effect, granted management
or operating agreements as well as provided for profit sharing arrangements to illegal small-scale
miners?

Held: No. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely
a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.

Also, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. It is not an absolute right. This is necessarily so since
the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters
impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the
grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and
due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may
alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare
Republic vs. Marcopper
G.R. No. 137174. July 10, 2000

Facts: Respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was issued a temporary permit to operate a
tailings sea disposal system. Before it expired, MMC filed an application for the renewal thereof with the
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC). On September 20, 1986, MMC received a telegraphic
order from the NPCC directing the former to (i)mmediately cease and desist from discharging mine
tailings into Calancan Bay. The directive was brought about through the efforts of certain religious
groups which had been protesting MMCs tailings sea disposal system. MMC requested the NPCC to
refrain from implementing the aforesaid directive until its adoption of an alternative tailings disposal
system.

Through a long line of the issuance of the cease and desist order, the Office of the President ordered
such to be enjoined, and that during the efficacy of this restraining order, MMC shall immediately
undertake, at a cost of not less than P30,000.00 a day, the building of artificial reefs and planting of sea
grass, mangroves and vegetation on the causeway of Calancan Bay under the supervision of the
Pollution Adjudication Board and subject to such guidelines as the Board may impose. However, on June
30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further
deposits to the ETF.

However, in the pendency of the case filed by the Mayor, Marcopper Mining Corporation was ordered
to pay the CBRP the amount of P30,000.00 per day, computed from the date Marcopper Mining
Corporation stopped paying on 01 July 1991, up to the formal lifting of the subject Order from the Office
of the President on 05 February 1993. The CA reversed this, hence this petition.

Issue: Should MMC pay? Has the PAB under RA 3931 as amended by PD 984 (National Pollution Control
Decree of 1976) been divested of its authority to try and hear pollution cases connected with mining
operations by virtue of the subsequent enactment of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)?

Held: No. the ETF there is admittedly an existing estimated balance of fourteen (14) million pesos in the
Fund. For its part, petitioner does not renege on its obligation to rehabilitate and in fact undertakes to
continue the rehabilitation process until its completion within two (2) years time and which would only
cost six (6) million pesos. Thus, as petitioner convincingly argued and which respondent unsatisfactorily
rebuked, the existing fourteen (14) million pesos in the ETF is more than enough to complete the
rehabilitation project. (TSN, Hearing dated 15 September 1997, at pp. 56 to 62, Rollo).

xxx. Without much ado, the Court concurs with the finding that to demand a daily deposit of thirty
thousand (P30, 000.00) pesos even if the root of the obligation, that is, the dumping of tailings waste,
had ceased to exist, is indubitably of a herculean and onerous burden on the part of petitioner
amounting to a deprivation of its property and a denial of its right to due process

Also, RA 7942 did not repeal RA 3931. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. Section
19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par.
(a) of PD 984 defines the term pollution as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical and
biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or any discharge thereto
of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create or to render such water, air and land
resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or which will adversely
affect their utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate
purposes.

From the foregoing, it readily appears that the power of the mines regional director does not foreclose
PABs authority to determine and act on complaints filed before it. The power granted to the mines
regional director to issue orders requiring the contractor to remedy any practice connected with mining
or quarrying operations or to summarily suspend the same in cases of violation of pollution laws is for
purposes of effectively regulating and monitoring activities within mining operations and installations
pursuant to the environmental protection and enhancement program undertaken by contractors and
permittees in procuring their mining permit. While the mines regional director has express
administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicative
powers over complaints for violation of pollution control statutes and regulations.

True, in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that adjudication of
pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) except where the special
law provides for another forum. However, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, RA 7942 does
not provide for another forum inasmuch as RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines
Regional Director. The authority is vested and remains with the PAB.

Narra Nickel vs Redmont Corp

Facts: Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a
domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring
certain areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and
mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications
of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3) separate
petitions for the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA designated as AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154
and MPSA IV-1-12.

In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra
are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont
reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind
petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since it knows that it can only
participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont
argued that given that petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise
disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino
citizens.
Issue: The ruling that Narra, Tesoro and McArthur are foreign corporations based on the "Grandfather
Rule" is contrary to law, particularly the express mandate of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, as
amended, and the FIA Rules.

Held: Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the
control test and the grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the
1967 SEC Rules which implemented the requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to
the controlling interests in enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural resources owned by
Filipino citizens, provides:

Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding
to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in
the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of
which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by Filipinos (Control Test).
But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or partnership,
respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as owned by Filipinos and
the other 50,000 shall be recorded as belonging to aliens (Grandfather Test).

In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the second part of
the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases
where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or
the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in
doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply. (emphasis supplied)

After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for the application
of the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in
the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino
equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their common investor, the 100%
Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded them. However, petitioners also claim that there is "doubt" only
when the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than 60%.
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 129546

Facts: Following a long line of history, the case involves a MOA entered into on 17 November 1988
wherein an area agreed to be a garbage dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation. The
DENR then strongly recommended that all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in
Pintong Bocaue be dismantled, and the garbage disposal operations be transferred to another area
outside the Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect the health and general welfare of the residents
of San Mateo in particular and the residents of Metro Manila in general.

Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies
aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and
issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August 1995, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation
Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal

Issue: Should the landfill be closed?

Held: Yes. The ESWM provides the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework,
which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the
eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps
and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any
landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40,
specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local
government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not
detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or
watershed areas

Cham vs. Pizzaro

Facts: Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario
Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to him a
parcel of land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No.
262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the property).

Upon agreement, he thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing the purchase
price of the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA063210[15] in the amount of
P168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers Check No. 004639GA[16] in the amount
of P3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.

He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front portion.
Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property could not be
fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park. Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to
return the purchase price of the rights over the property.
Issue: WON Respondent had a right to sell the land

Held: No. It is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of NIPAS
ACT[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights or possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan
Natural Park, the subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO Laurino D. Mapadanig of
Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to the Municipal Assessor therein and certified on
December 1, 1945 that subject property which is within this category was not subject for disposition; a
fact supposed to be known by the respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and was in the
practice of his profession also in said area.

PICOP Resources vs. Base Metals Minerals

Facts: A portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner PICOPs logging concession
in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement,
whereby, in mutual recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its
mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights
and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw
Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with
CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the
assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing
private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. When the MPSA was approved, PICOP
opposed the same contending that its consent is necessary for the MPSA

Issue: Are mining operations permitted in forest reserves?

Held: A 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA
has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve,
such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to
PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that
mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court
in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining
rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a
permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to
explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights and
reservations. It provides:

Sec. 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations.Subject to any existing rights or reservations and prior
agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands
as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance
agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by
the panel of arbitrators

PD 705 Sec 47. does not require that the consent of existing licensees be obtained but that they be
notified before mining activities may be commenced inside forest concessions.

Special People Foundation vs. Canda

Facts: The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in
Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of
water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six
other municipalities. They were seeking exemptions from the ECC requirement but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not, after petitioner’s due compliance with the requirements mandated by
respondents for the issuance of the certificate of non-coverage (cnc) applied for by petitioner, it is now
the ripened duty of respondents, through respondent emb regional director, to issue said document in
favor of petitioner

Held: No. Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application
when he made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements for
review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive aspect of the application, that is, whether the
project and the project area were considered critical to the environment. In fact, this was the reason
why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit certifications from the various government agencies
concerned. Surely, the required certifications were not mere formalities, because they would serve as
the bases for his decision on whether to grant or deny the application.

Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement
to submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the project
site was not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification showed that the project site had
experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of
"areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish
that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its application.
LLDA vs. CA
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

Coverage of the LLDA: The term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna;
the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto.
Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town
of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in
Metro Manila.

Facts: When the LGC was passed, municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue
fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of
July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation
drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to
construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the
Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. One month, thereafter, the Authority
sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt
thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.

Issue: Who has authority over the areas?

Held: LLDA. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no
intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of
laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special
law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions
and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law
are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue
purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering
local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160
under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local
Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de
Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. It does
partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Zamora vs. NPC

Facts: Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers
with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt
Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmariñas Village
proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’ homes are. Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel
towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could
cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles and studies linking the
incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from
cancer to leukemia. A TRO was issued which was reversed, hence this petition.

Issue: WON the preliminary injunction should be granted

Held: Yes. The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained
of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR
probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court
of a writ of preliminary injunction. With a member of Congress denouncing the subject project of
NAPOCOR because of the very same health and safety ills that petitioners now hew to in this petition,
and with documents on record to show that NAPOCOR made representations to petitioners that they
are looking into the possibility of relocating the project, added to the fact that there had been series of
negotiations and meetings between petitioners and NAPOCOR as well as related agencies, there is
ample indicia to suggest to the mind of the court that the health concerns of the petitioners are, at the
very least, far from imaginary.

Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected communities of a
government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement. In fact, there appears
a lack of exhaustive feasibility studies on NAPOCOR’s part before making a go with the project on
hand; otherwise, it should have anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in.
These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as sufficient basis to engender the cloud
of doubt that the NAPOCOR project could, indeed, endanger the lives of the petitioners. A preliminary
injunction is likewise justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not NAPOCOR
ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the court could, nay
should, grant the writ of preliminary injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a
wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial discretion.

Buendia vs. City of Iligan

Facts: On 05 October 1992, petitioner Buendia filed with the NWRB an application for the appropriation
of water from a spring located within his property in Ditucalan, Iligan City. In the absence of protests to
the applications being timely filed, the NWRB, after evaluating petitioners applications, issued on 25
June 1993, Water Permits No. 13842 and No. 13827in his favor.

On 17 November 1993, almost five (5) months after petitioners Water Permits were issued, respondent
City of Iligan filed with the NWRB an Opposition and/or Appeal contesting the issuance of said water
permits to petitioner. The Opposition and/or Appeal sought to serve as both a protest against
petitioners water permit applications, as well as an appeal to the NWRBs grant of the water permits to
petitioner. This was dismissed and was not appealed but instead was filed with a certiorari in RTC.

According to the lower court, the appropriation by the Iligan City Waterworks Sewerage System (ICWSS)
and its predecessors-in-interest of the water source at Ditucalan spring was from 1927 up to the
present, as shown by the following:

1. That the Iligan Waterworks Sewerage System has been existing as early as 1927 and the same was
taken over by the NAWASA on April 1, 1956;

2. That in 1971, R. A. No. 6234 was passed and by virtue of the same, the MWSS took over the NAWASA,
and on August 19, 1973, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was issued between the MWSS and the
City Mayor of Iligan, transferring the power of the MWSS to Iligan City

Issue: Can the Trial court issue such judgement?

Held: No. Art. 17. The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of filing of the
application for a water permit in case of approved permits, or as of the date of actual use in a case
where no permit is required. [Emphases ours]

From a reading of the above provisions, it is evident that after an application to obtain a water permit
has been made known to the public, any interested party must file his protest thereto, in order that the
application may be properly evaluated. Otherwise, after the application for a water permit has been
approved, the grantee of the permit now acquires an exclusive right to use the water source, reckoned
from the date of the filing of the applications. Thus, after petitioners right to the water permit has been
properly adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly question said grant. By virtue of respondents
failure to lodge a timely protest, petitioner has already acquired the right to appropriate the water from
the spring inside the latters property.

In conclusion, the failure of respondent City of Iligan to timely oppose the water permit applications,
and later on to file the Petition for Certiorari within a reasonable time has the effect of rendering the
grant of the water permits to petitioner Buendia final and executory.

The ICWSS cannot be said to have acquired a right to the use of the water source by acquisitive
prescription, since it only entered the premises two (2) years before the enactment of the Water Code
of the Philippines and only eighteen (18) years before petitioner applied with the NWRB for water
permits. Furthermore, respondents alleged exercise of its right to appropriate the water source since
1927 is negated by its belated application with the NWRB for water permits. If indeed the City of Iligan
has the right to appropriate water from the spring located inside petitioners property, then respondent
would not have filed said application after the water permits over said water source have already been
issued to petitioner.

Remman Enterprises vs. CA

Facts: Remman and Lat are adjoining owners of land. Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's
waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He
made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March 1985, after almost
one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result
of which the trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil
in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's
piggery farm.

Issue: Is petitioner liable?

Held: Yes.

Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention
of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.

A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.1067), which provides:

Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the intervention of
man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he
provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase this natural flow.

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower estate to
receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher states.
However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially collected in
man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate
to compensation

Lovina vs. Moreno

Facts: The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found
the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959,
ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the
Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent

Issue: Is Republic Act No. 2056 unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues
of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting
an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Held: No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person
was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership
thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination
of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but
these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and
authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected
is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
Tanjay Water District vs. Gaboton
G.R. No. L-63742 April 17, 1989

Facts: On March 3, 1983, petitioner Tanjay Water District, represented by its manager, Joel B. Borromeo,
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial Region, Civil Case No.
8144, an action for injunction with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, against respondent
Municipality of Pamplona and its officials to prevent them from interfering in the management of the
Tanjay Waterworks System.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case?

Held: Yes. In G.R. No. 63742, respondent Judge ruled that as the subject matter of Civil Case No. 8144
was water, the case should have been brought first to the National Water Resources Council in
accordance with Articles 88 and 89 of PD No. 1067, and, as the parties are government instrumentalities
(The Tanjay Water District and the Municipality of Pamplona), the dispute should be administratively
settled in accordance with PD No. 242.

Articles 88 and 89 of The Water Code (PD No. 1067, promulgated on January 25, 1977) provide as
follows:

ART. 88. The [Water Resources] Council shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to
appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters
within the meaning and context of the provisions of this Code.

The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies shall be immediately executory and the
enforcement thereof may be suspended only when a bond, in an amount fixed by the Council to answer
for damages occasioned by the suspension or stay of execution, shall have been filed by the appealing
party, unless the suspension is by virtue of an order of a competent court.

Our determination in the earlier cases (Baguio Water District vs. Trajano, 127 SCRA 730; Hagonoy Water
District vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 81490, August 31, 1988) that water districts are government instrumentalities
and that their employees belong to the civil service, disposes of Datuin's petition in G.R. No. 84300. The
National Labor Relations Commission has no jurisdiction over his complaint for illegal dismissal.
Ranulfo Feliciano vs. Gison
G.R. No. 165641 August 25, 2010

Facts: The present petition arose from the tax case initiated by LMWD after it filed with the Department
of Finance (DOF) a petition requesting that certain water supply equipment and a motor vehicle,
particularly a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck, be exempted from tax. These properties were given to LMWD
through a grant by the Japanese Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon-damaged water
supply system. On June 9, 2000, LMWD moved to reconsider the disallowance of the tax exemption on
the subject vehicle. The DOF, through then Undersecretary Cornelio C. Gison, denied LMWDs request
for reconsideration because the tax exemption privileges of government agencies and government
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 93.
This prompted LMWD, through its General Manager Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, to appeal to the CTA.

Issue: Whether water districts are, by law, GOCCs with original charter

Held: Yes. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations
through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned
or controlled.

Obviously, LWDs [referring to local water districts] are not private corporations because they are not
created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that [A]ll corporations organized under this code
shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x. LWDs have no
articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders
or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors
of LWDs for a fixed term of office.

URC vs. LLDA

Facts: Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution Control Division
Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratory analysis of
petitioners corn oil refinery plants wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government
standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.

LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no order should
be issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig
River and why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the LLDA.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDAs order justified such recourse as an
exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial action.

Issue: WON URC should be held liable

Held: Yes. In fine, the assailed LLDA orders of January 21, 2008 and July 11, 2008 correctly reckoned the
two periods within which petitioner was found to have continued discharging pollutive wastewater and
applied the penalty as provided for under Article VI, Section 32 of LLDA Resolution No. 33, Series of
1996.LLDAs explanation that behind its inclusion of certain days in its computation of the imposable
penalties that it had already deducted not just the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent
rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days) but had also excluded
from the computation the period during which no inspections or compliance monitorings were
conducted (a period covering two years and four months) is well-taken.

It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave petitioner the opportunity to submit
within fifteen (15) days.any valid documents to show proof of its non-operating dates that would be
necessary for the possible reduction of the accumulated daily penalties, but petitioner failed to comply
therewith.

It must be underscored that the protection of the environment, including bodies of water, is no less
urgent or vital than the pressing concerns of private enterprises, big or small. Everyone must do their
share to conserve the national patrimonys meager resources for the benefit of not only this generation,
but of those to follow. The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade its WTF (from 2003 to
2007), a move arrived at only under threat of continuing sanctions, militates against any genuine
concern for the well-being of the countrys waterways.